Professional Documents
Culture Documents
I. Preliminary Title
Section 3. Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University
of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule
adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which
are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be
the bases of any sanction against any party of persons.
Time and again, the Court has held that it is a very desirable and
necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of
law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle
and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the
same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and
disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of
certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that
follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may
be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any
powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided
alike.
C. Retroactivity of Laws
The rule in this jurisdiction is that one does not have a vested right in
procedural rules. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, the Court elucidated:
33
While the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as when the statute itself
expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are
excepted from its operation, or where to apply it would impair vested rights,
petitioners failed to show that application of A.O. No. 17 [amending the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman] to their case would cause
injustice to them. Indeed, in this case, the Office of the Ombudsman afforded
petitioners every opportunity to defend themselves by allowing them to submit
counter-affidavits, position papers, memoranda and other evidence in their
defense.
D. Waiver of Rights
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the
agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement,
it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a
change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was
wrangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of
settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to
annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person
making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was
doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the
transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.
E. Legal Periods
We find that the CA correctly ruled that the petition for review was filed out
of time based on our clarification in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC that the 15-day
extension period prayed for should be tacked to the original period and
commences immediately after the expiration of such period.1[14] Thus,
counting 15 days from the expiration of the period which was on May 19,
2007, the petition filed on June 5, 2007 was already two days late. However,
we find the circumstances obtaining in this case to merit the liberal
application of the rule in the interest of justice and fair play.
1
6
II. MARRIAGE
A. Requisites : Kinds of requisites, FC 2, 3, 5; cf. NCC 53
Kinds of non-compliance; Effect of non-compliance
C. Void Marriages
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
Psychological incapacity FC 36, cf FC 68- 73
Incestuous marriage FC 37 cf NCC 963 – 967
Marriages against public policy FC38; Compare FC38
(9) with NCC80(6)
Requisite for valid remarriage FC 40
Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr. Reyes
did not present the gravity and incurability of Catalina’s psychological
incapacity. There was, to start with, no evidence showing the root cause of
her alleged borderline personality disorder and that such disorder had existed
prior to her marriage. We have repeatedly pronounced that the root cause of
the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness,
with its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality
of the evidence presented during trial.
8
The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in her
Answer, was her abandonment of the conjugal home to live with another
man. Yet, abandonment was not one of the grounds for the nullity of
marriage under the Family Code. It did not also constitute psychological
incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation under Article
55(10) of the Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity was not
a valid ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, considering that there should be a showing that such marital infidelity
was a manifestation of a disordered personality that made her completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.33 Needless to state,
Eduardo did not adduce such evidence, rendering even his claim of her
infidelity bereft of factual and legal basis.
Petitioner contends that the Court’s Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10 rendered appeals by the
OSG no longer required, and that the appeal by the OSG was a mere superfluity that could be
deemed to have become functus officio if not totally disregarded. 25
The contention is grossly erroneous and unfounded. The Resolution nowhere stated that
appeals by the OSG were no longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly
required the OSG to actively participate in all stages of the proceedings, to wit:
9
a) The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the
date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same
period.26
b) The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with
the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda support of their
claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the
Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant
interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave
of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered
submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda. 27
c) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be
served with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent
summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the
decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation. 28
d) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the
parties.1âwphi1 Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or
new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the
Solicitor General.29
e) An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a
Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal
on the adverse parties.30
The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require the OSG to appear as counsel for the
State in the capacity of a defensor vinculi (i.e., defender of the marital bond) to oppose
petitions for, and to appeal judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby ensuring that only the meritorious cases for the
declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity-those sufficiently
evidenced by gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence-would succeed.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b)
the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has
all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of
the second marriage or subsequent marriage.23ςrνll It is essential in the prosecution for
bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be
valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.24ςrνll
In Mercado v. Tan,26Ï‚rll we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of
the first marriage was immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of
bigamy had already been consummated. And by contracting a second marriage while the
first was still subsisting, the accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code.
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration
that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because
Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went
on to explain, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of
procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws.
D. Voidable Marriages:
1. Grounds for annulment FC 45, 46
2. Who can seek annulment and when, FC 47
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit
his or her share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded
to the children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior
marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or
entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from
the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall
not apply.
Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community property
the property acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of
that property. Neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the
second marriage.
Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Although it
is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership,2[30] proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential
condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership.
Xxx this Court ruled, however, that the phrase “married to” is merely
descriptive of the civil status of the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean
that the husband is also a registered owner. Because it is likewise possible
that the property was acquired by the wife while she was still single and
registered only after her marriage, neither would registration thereof in said
manner constitute proof that the same was acquired during the marriage and,
for said reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature.
2
13
To repeat, the absence of the consent of one spouse to a sale renders the
entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property
pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited
constitutional prohibition"25 and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and
respondent registered the subject properties in the latter’s name. 26 Clearly, petitioner’s
actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of
such admission, the Court finds no reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling and
accordingly, deny petitioner’s claim for reimbursement.
As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. 49 However,
Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts
secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution." In this case, there
is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real
Estate Mortgage over the subject property which was even notarized by their original
counsel of record. And assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses
Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it
was sold at the public auction. As elucidated in Honrado v. Court of Appeals:50
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it
is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under
14
Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved
to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would
estop the party from later claiming the exemption.
We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate
paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,
support (as in this case) or inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on the
person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child." 31
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 32 We have held that such other
proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in
which [his] name has been entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission
by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court."33
Xxxx In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the
putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with
one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception. 38 Rodulfo corroborated her testimony
that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship. 39
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
15
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
xxxx
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the
father. However, said certificate has no probative value to establish Randy’s filiation to
Antonio since the latter had not signed the same. 60 It is settled that "a certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when
there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate."
Xxxxx Anent Randy’s baptismal certificate, we cannot agree with the CA that the same is a
good proof of Antonio’s paternity of Randy. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of
participation of the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this
document incompetent to prove paternity.65 And "while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s
paternity. Thus, x x x baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of
filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the
same."66
VII. ADOPTION
A. Who may adopt
B. Who may not adopt, FC 184
C. Who may be adopted FC 183, FC 185
D. Who may not be adopted, FC 187
E. Effects of adoption FC189
VIII.SUPPORT
Xx xxx Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent
is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. 45 Support consists of
16
Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta
Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese,
unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule
that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children
are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. 20 An illegitimate
child of Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges
attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. 21 But in
the case of respondent, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
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