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The Evolutionary Significance of Affect in


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Article in Group Processes & Intergroup Relations · September 2004


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Affect in Groups 1

Running head: AFFECT IN GROUPS

The Evolutionary Significance of Affect in Groups:

Communication and Group Bonding

Jennifer R. Spoor and Janice R. Kelly

Purdue University

In Press: Group Processes and Intergroup Relations

Corresponding Author:

Jennifer R. Spoor
Purdue University
Department of Psychological Sciences
703 Third Street
West Lafayette, IN 47907-2004
(765) 494-6892
E-mail: spoorj@psych.purdue.edu
Affect in Groups 2

Abstract

Recent theorizing and research has attempted to explicate the functions of moods and

emotions within small groups. In this paper, we examine these areas and suggest that affect in

groups, as well as specific mechanisms to regulate and maintain certain affective states in

groups, have had important roles in promoting group survival over evolutionary history.

Specifically, we suggest that affect in groups serves a coordination function, which can take one

of two forms. First, affect in groups quickly provides information about the environment and

group structure to other group members, thus coordinating group activity via a communication

function. Second, shared affect in groups coordinates group activity through fostering group

bonds and group loyalty. These two functions of affect in groups are closely related and

mutually reinforcing. Current research and directions for future research within an evolutionary

perspective are also discussed.

KEYWORDS: Groups, affect, evolutionary theory, emotional contagion


Affect in Groups 3

The Evolutionary Significance of Affect in Groups:

Communication and Group Bonding

Human beings are both social animals (Aronson, 1999; Caporael, 2001) and emotional

animals (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). Thus, interactions within small

groups and the experience of moods and emotions are both fundamental aspects of human life.

Researchers have recently become interested in the causes and consequences of moods and

emotions within small groups (Kelly, 2001; Kelly & Barsade, 2001). In this paper, we suggest

that an evolutionary perspective may provide a useful framework for understanding these effects.

Specifically, we suggest that the experience of shared affective states within groups, as well as

specific mechanisms to regulate and maintain certain affective states in groups, developed

because of their adaptive value within the context of group living.

First, we briefly discuss the importance of group living in human evolutionary

development. We then discuss the evolutionary significance of moods and emotions at the

individual level. We then apply this theorizing to the roles of moods and emotions in groups,

particularly the strategies that group members use to create and maintain certain affective states

within the group. Finally, we discuss the relevance of evolutionary theory to recent research on

groups and affect, as well as avenues for future research from an evolutionary perspective.

The Role of Small Groups in Evolutionary Development

We focus our discussion primarily on small face-to-face groups, similar in size and

function to Caporael's (1997) work/family group. Work/family groups refer to relatively small

groups whose members share similar task goals. Caporael argues that the primary function of

the work/family group is to distribute cognitive processes to facilitate the group members'

interactions with the physical environment. We also focus on face-to-face groups, although
Affect in Groups 4

much of our discussion is clearly applicable both to dyads and larger aggregates. We feel,

however, that our focus on face-to-face groups is appropriate for an initial discussion of the

evolutionary importance of moods and emotions in groups. In particular, there is reason to

believe that the environment of early human beings constrained the typical group size to smaller

work groups (Caporael, 1997; Caporael & Brewer, 1991). Additionally, early group size and

structure were likely limited by kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) and reciprocal altruism (Trivers,

1971). Kin selection (Hamilton, 1964; Rossano, 2003) refers to the principle that an individual's

reproductive fitness includes both direct offspring and the offspring of relatives (weighted by

their degree of relatedness). Kin selection helps to explain cooperation within kin groups and the

apparent altruism of a family member's sacrifice so that the family group survives. The principle

of reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971; Rossano, 2003) explains the development of cooperative

relationships between non-kin. One might be inclined to help a non-kin member if this person is

expected to reciprocate in the future, thus both individuals' survival chances and reproductive

fitness increase. These two principles would limit typical group size to small, interacting groups.

Thus, we believe that an examination of the moods and emotions in small, interacting groups

reflects a logical focus on the group that most pervaded the lives of early human beings.

Although there is some debate regarding whether social groups can actually serve as a

unit of evolutionary selection (Wilson & Sober, 1994), we do not argue in favor of an

individualist or gene’s eye view of evolution, nor do we argue that groups should be considered

the unit of selection. Rather, our position is that the early evolutionary environment was one in

which individuals relied on each other, and thus group interaction, in order to complete many of

the necessary survival and reproductive activities (Buss & Kenrick, 1998). Thus, living in

groups was one of the primary and most adaptive strategies for individuals. Individuals who
Affect in Groups 5

lived in groups were better able to obtain resources and defend themselves from predators than

those individuals who lived more solitary, and consequently, individuals living in groups were

more reproductively successful. Thus, individual group members’ interactions with the physical

environment were mediated by their interaction within the group environment, thus the group

acted as the immediate selection environment (Brewer, 1997; Caporael, 1997; Caporael &

Brewer, 1991; Keltner & Haidt, 2001). This level of analysis focuses on the problem of

coordination as the primary adaptive problem for humans (Brewer, 1997; Caporael, 1997;

Caporael & Brewer, 1991).

It has been argued that early groups, particularly those extending beyond immediate kin,

may not have occurred automatically, as individuals would have first needed to recognize the

long-term benefits of group living (e.g., Brewer, 1997; Brewer & Caporael, 1990). Thus, in

order to motivate individuals to join groups, and to remain in a group once it was formed, it has

been argued that group members must possess a certain level of predictability and coordination

(Brewer, 1997; Brewer & Caporael, 1990; Caporael & Brewer, 1991; Trivers, 1971). As

discussed above, early motivations to join and maintain groups were likely shaped by principles

of kinship selection (Hamilton, 1964) and reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), and current

mechanisms within a group may reflect these early motivations.

Over time, group living, both with kin and non-kin, exerted certain selection pressures on

individual group members. Individuals' survival was directly related to the group's survival

(Rossano, 2003), thus, group members would have benefited from retaining other individuals

who possessed traits that were conducive to group living. Consequently, these individuals were

more likely to remain in a group and to have more reproductive success. Thus, the questions of

which forces draw the group together and keep it bonded once it has formed become crucial. We
Affect in Groups 6

suggest that the development of moods and emotions in groups may have served as one such

force that functioned to coordinate group activity by communicating information among group

members and by facilitating the development of group member bonds.

Moods and Emotions in Evolutionary Development

The study of moods and emotions has become an increasingly important area of research

and theory within psychology and has been a focus of evolutionary theory since Darwin’s early

writings on expression (see Fridlund, 1994 for a discussion). Current evolutionary perspectives

on emotions tend to focus on the functions of emotions, with a recent emphasis on the functions

of emotions that result from the demands of group living (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Keltner &

Haidt, 2001; Nesse, 1991; but see Owren & Bachorowski, 2001 for a “selfish gene” approach).

At the same time, group researchers have recently become interested in the effects of group

members developing shared moods and emotions (Barsade & Gibson, 1998; Kelly, 2001; Kelly

& Barsade, 2001). At the individual level, affect is generally used as a broad umbrella term that

refers primarily to whether one’s reactions are primarily positive or negative. Thus, affect

encompasses both moods and emotions. Moods and emotions have several features in common,

including evaluative components (i.e., moods and emotions are generally experienced as either

affectively positive or negative), associated behavioral expressions, and a certain level of

physiological arousal (see Larsen, 2000 for a discussion). Moods and emotions differ primarily

in duration, intensity, and cause. Emotions generally refer to relatively short-lived, more intense

feeling states that usually have a clear and easily identifiable cause. Moods, on the other hand,

tend to refer to longer-lasting, more diffuse feeling states that are usually dissociated from their

original cause.
Affect in Groups 7

With regards to affect, emotions, and moods in small groups, there is hardly a clear

consensus regarding either definitions or the appropriate level of analysis (Barsade & Gibson,

1998; George, 1989; Kelly, 2001). For example, some researchers (e.g., Barsade, 2002; Barsade

& Gibson, 1998) have suggested that both groups in which members' affect is homogeneous and

heterogeneous can be thought of as having group level moods and emotions. That is, group

mood is conceived of as the composition of the individual moods of its group members. Other

researchers (e.g., George, 1990; Kelly, 2001) have stressed the importance of homogeneity of

individual members' affect. That is, group mood occurs at the group level and affects the

individual group members. We believe that additional research is necessary to clarify these

issues. Consequently, rather than suggest a group level affective construct, we focus on how

individual group members’ affect combines within the context of small interacting groups. Thus,

we discuss situations in which group members’ affect is homogenous or relatively similar, as

well as situations in which group members’ affect is relatively heterogeneous, or markedly

different. We believe that an evolutionary perspective on affect in groups highlights the

importance of both affective combinations. Finally, we will generally use the term affect, unless

we are specifically referring to moods or emotions or because technical terms specify a more

specific term (e.g., emotional contagion).1

As discussed above, evolutionary approaches to emotions tend to focus on the functions

of emotions (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Keltner & Haidt, 2001; Nesse, 1991). Emotions may

serve explicitly social functions through their ability to promote desirable social interactions, and

the demands of social living may also have implications for the development of specific

individual emotions (Keltner & Haidt, 2001). For example, guilt and gratitude promote group

member cooperation and prevent defection from the group. Positive and negative moods may
Affect in Groups 8

also function to maintain status hierarchies within a group (Nesse, 1991). For example, positive

moods are associated with dominance and negative moods are associated with submissiveness

(see Keltner & Haidt, 1999, 2001, for a more detailed discussion of specific individual emotions

that arose as adaptive responses to the pressures of group living). Finally, emotions are thought

to be informative, both to the person experiencing the emotion and to external observers (Clore,

1994; Ekman, 1993; Keltner & Haidt, 2001). For example, sincere emotional expression,

particularly facial expression, is assumed to communicate important information to others

(Ekman, 1993).

Emotions are also considered to be superoordinate programs that coordinate an

individual’s behavioral, psychological, and physiological responses (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000;

Keltner & Haidt, 2001; Levenson, 1994; Nesse, 1990; Rossano, 2003). Emotions help the

individual determine which aspects of the environment (e.g., the presence of a predator) and the

individual’s functioning (e.g., the need for sleep) are most immediately important. One function

of emotions is to motivate and allow individuals to respond appropriately to the environment

(Nesse, 1990). Thus, emotions “turn on” and prioritize certain responses (e.g., the need to

escape the predator takes priority over the immediate need for sleep), and thus are highly

adaptive for the individual’s overall survival.

Evolutionary Functions of Affect in Groups

Emotions and moods help to coordinate an individual's behavior and responses

(Cosmides & Tooby, 2000), and we suggest that they may play a similar role in a group, through

their ability to coordinate group member’s activities and actions. In particular, shared affect may

facilitate a group’s activity by helping group members to work together in the pursuit of shared

desired outcomes. Heterogeneous levels of affect within a group may also facilitate group
Affect in Groups 9

activities by communicating important information about the environment, such as the presence

of predators. Thus, assuming that coordination within groups is indeed a primary evolutionary

problem for human beings (Caporael, 1997), affect in groups may serve as one device that

coordinates group activity.2 Furthermore, shared affect may also serve to prevent group

dissolution by facilitating the development of bonds between group members. It should be noted

that our conceptualization of the role of affect in groups is more than a mere “scaling up” of

individual level theories of affect. We suggest that affect in groups serves a coordination

function, which can take one of two forms. First, group members’ various affective reactions

can quickly provide information about the environment, group structure, and group goals to other

group members, thus affect in groups may coordinate group members’ activity via a

communication function. Second, shared affect may help to coordinate group activity through

fostering group member bonds and loyalty to the group. These two functions of group emotions

are closely related and mutually reinforcing.

The Communication Function of Affect in Groups: Emotional Contagion, Interaction Synchrony,

and Affect Regulation

As discussed above, moods and emotions are generally believed to be adaptations that

motivate and allow individuals to respond quickly and appropriately to the environment (Nesse,

1990). Emotions, in particular, operate to quickly signal to the individual important information

about the environment, including general valenced information regarding whether the

environment is relatively safe or potentially dangerous. Specific emotions may also provide

more detailed information, such as the type of danger that is perceived (e.g., enemy vs. predator).

At the group level, this means that group members would have benefited from the development

of a mechanism for the rapid transmission of emotional states throughout the group, and
Affect in Groups 10

emotional contagion may have evolved to serve this communication function. Groups may also

have benefited from the use of mechanisms for controlling the moods and emotions of specific

group members, as well as the emotional tone of the group as a whole. Thus, group members

may also have benefited from the development of more explicit affect regulation and control

mechanisms. Each of these mechanisms is discussed in turn.

Emotional contagion refers to the processes whereby the moods and emotions of one

individual are transferred to nearby individuals. In humans, emotional contagion probably first

developed to facilitate mother-infant bonding (Bernieri, Reznik, & Rosenthal, 1988; Hatfield,

Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994; Preston & de Waal, 2002). Early emotional contagion may have

also facilitated bonding and communication among kin members (Rossano, 2003) and as a

consequence of reciprocal altruism, may have been used to communicate to non-kin group

members. Early forms of emotional contagion may have relied primarily on more direct

communication methods, such as by mimicking facial expression. Emotional contagion has been

observed in the spread of more intense emotional experiences (e.g., panic or “mob mind”), but is

now more commonly studied as a less extreme but more common phenomenon of “primitive

emotional contagion” (Hatfield et al., 1994). Primitive emotional contagion refers to the rapid,

fairly automatic, and unconscious tendency of individuals to mimic and synchronize with one

another in terms of facial expressions, vocalizations, posture, and movements and thereby

transfer affective states to others. Therefore, primitive emotional contagion leads to convergence

in mood and emotions across group members.

There is mounting evidence that we automatically mimic and synchronize with aspects of

emotional behavior in others (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Hatfield et al., 1994). In terms of motor

movements, there is evidence for both automatic and nonconscious synchrony (Bernieri et al.,
Affect in Groups 11

1988; Cappella, 1981) and for direct motor mimicry (Bavelas, Black, Lemery, & Mullett, 1987).

More importantly, however, is evidence that, as a result of physiological feedback from this

mimicry, our own emotional state is shaped in a manner consistent with the model’s affect. For

example, laboratory studies examining the facial feedback hypothesis demonstrate that having

subjects pose their faces in a manner that matches the normal expression of a particular emotion

(e.g., putting a pencil between teeth leads to a smiling position related to happiness) influences

the degree to which the subject experiences those same emotions. This occurs even though

subjects believe that they are engaging in a motor-coordination experiment and thus are unaware

of the relationship between their posed features and the emotional expression (Larsen, Kasimatis,

& Frey, 1992; Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). Similarly, research by Dimberg and colleagues

(as cited in Preston & de Waal, 2002) finds that exposure to an emotional facial expression

elicits physiological responses consistent with the valence of the emotion being observed.

Further, these physiological changes are found even when the emotional stimuli are presented

subliminally, and participants generally report actually experiencing emotions consistent with the

stimulus. Thus, part of the process of emotional contagion is one where we automatically mimic

the facial expressions and other movements of those around us, and in doing so communicate a

homogenous emotional state throughout the group.

Although the rapid communication of both positive and negative affective information

likely had adaptive benefits, the rapid communication of negative moods and emotions may have

been particularly important. Negative moods and emotions are thought to signal potential threat

or danger in the environment and are thought to motivate behaviors and cognitions that alleviate

the negative state (Larsen, 2000; Tice & Bratslavsky, 2000). In the prehistoric environment,

negative moods and emotions likely signaled the presence of enemies or predators, and thus, the
Affect in Groups 12

rapid spread of negative affective information within the group would have been vitally

important for group members’ survival. In fact, there is some empirical evidence that suggests

that negative affective states do indeed spread more easily than positive affective states. Joiner

(1994), for example, found evidence for contagion of depression among roommate pairs, but not

for positive affect. Tickle-Degnan and Puccinelli (1999) found that dyad members who were

both high in negativity and in nonverbal expressiveness communicated negative affect to their

partner easier than dyad members who were low in negativity but high in nonverbal

expressiveness. Finally, newborn humans respond to the emotional distress of another infants’

crying (Simner, 1971) and are capable of imitating fear, sadness, and surprise (Preston & de

Waal, 2002), which highlights the important role of being able to communicate negative

emotions in human survival. Thus, because negative emotions generally conveyed critical

survival information about the environment, group members may be particularly aware of the

presence of negative emotions within the group.

Several other primarily nonconscious processes also serve to support the contagion

process and the development of shared affect within the group (Kelly & Barsade, 2001).

Specifically, interaction synchrony, or behavioral entrainment, is thought to underlie emotional

contagion (Condon & Ogston, 1966; Hatfield et al., 1994; Kelly, 1987; McGrath & Kelly, 1986).

Interaction synchrony or behavioral entrainment refers to the in phase or out of phase

coordination of body movement between individuals. In terms of a social phenomenon,

interaction synchrony generally refers to the coordination of micro and macro body movements

or configurations, as well as, in a broader sense, the coordination of affect and attitudes (Siegman

& Reynolds, 1982) between interacting partners. Research on synchrony patterns between

mother-child pairs suggests that interactional synchrony may serve an evolutionary role. For
Affect in Groups 13

example, Bernieri et al. (1988) examined interactions between mothers and children and found

that interactions between mothers and their actual children were characterized by greater

interactional synchrony than the interactions between nonrelated pairs. Bernieri et al. suggested

that mother-child interactions might show relatively high levels of interaction synchrony in order

to prompt mothers to be more attentive and protective of children to whom they are biologically

related.

Although there is ample evidence for the pervasiveness of behavioral entrainment

(McGrath & Kelly, 1986), there are situations in which entrainment or synchrony between

individuals is unlikely or difficult to achieve. That is, there may be cases where interaction

rhythms are so disparate that no amount of accommodation can mesh the cycles. Kelly (1987),

for example, argues that different affective states are associated with differences in expressive

behaviors. Shared affect may promote entrainment by bringing each individual’s interaction

rhythms (i.e., expressive behavior) more closely together so that synchrony is more likely to

occur. Thus, similarity in affective states may encourage the ability of the interacting unit to

synchronize by facilitating the group’s ability to coordinate group members’ rhythms and to

engage in more efficient interaction.

Strong support for the contention that emotional contagion developed to meet

evolutionary challenges is found by examining comparative studies of other social animals. In

particular, emotional contagion has been observed in a variety of animal species and is believed

to serve a communication function (see Hatfield et al., 1994). In one intriguing study (Parr &

Hopkins, 2000), chimpanzees demonstrated emotional contagion in response to video clips of

other chimpanzees engaging in either negatively or positively toned emotional behavior. Both

the physiological and behavioral responses of the chimpanzees suggested that they were
Affect in Groups 14

experiencing emotions in line with those that they observed. Additionally, there is evidence that

animals "catch" and understand the meaning of negative emotions more quickly than neutral or

positively valenced emotions (Hatfield et al., 1994). Finally, the presence of a mirror system in

both primates and humans (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001) suggests that the physiological

systems of social animals are hardwired for emotional contagion, interaction synchrony, and

entrainment. In primates, the mirror system refers primarily to visuomotor neurons that are

activated both when the animal observes a behavior (e.g., grasping an object) and when the

animal actually engages in the behavior. In humans, several studies demonstrate that similar

changes in electrophysiological responses and brain activation occur when humans observe and

actually engage in behaviors. Other research suggests similar physiological responses may be

elicited when merely imagining engaging in an activity (Preston & de Waal, 2002). Rizzolatti et

al. (2001) suggest that the mirror system is responsible for the development of both imitation and

action understanding. Thus, the mirror system would appear to facilitate the process of

emotional contagion.

While emotional contagion may have been particularly important for rapid

communication in critical survival situations, groups may also have benefited from maintaining

particular levels of affect within the group. Nesse (1991) suggests that one function of moods is

to communicate status and rank within a group, with low moods (i.e., ordinary sadness) being

associated with low status and high moods (i.e., ordinary happiness) being associated with high

status. Similarly, Houser and Lovaglia (2002; Lovaglia & Houser, 1996) suggest a theory of

status-emotion compatibility, in which it is expected that high status group members tend to

experience positive emotions, while low status group members tend to experience negative

emotions. Thus, group members may have also benefited from developing affect regulation
Affect in Groups 15

strategies that maintain appropriate affect levels for certain group members, particularly the low

moods of low status group members. Thus, maintaining heterogeneous affect between group

members might be important in communicating status differences between group members.

One might expect that the low moods of low status group members might also leave these group

members dissatisfied, which might be expected to result in conflict and group dissolution.

However, there is evidence to suggest that once formed, status hierarchies are pervasive, in part

because high status members might work to create group member bonds, and the survival

benefits of remaining in a successful group, even if one's status is relatively low, may outweigh

selfish interests (cf. Houser & Lovaglia, 2002). It should also be noted that although status

differences within the group certainly exist, hunter-gatherer tribes tend to be relatively

egalitarian (Rossano, 2003), thus the affective experiences of different group members may have

served as a subtle cue to reinforce the relatively small but important status differences.

Research by Tiedens (2001; Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000) is somewhat

consistent with this proposed function of affective states in providing information about the

status hierarchy. Tiedens et al. (2000) found that participants expected that high status

individuals would experience pride in response to positive outcomes and anger in response to

negative outcomes. Low status individuals, on the other hand, were expected to experience

gratitude in response to positive outcomes and sadness in response to negative outcomes. This

research also found a similar pattern of expected emotional responses when competence rather

than status was manipulated. Highly competent individuals were expected to experience more

anger in response to negative outcomes, while less competent individuals were expected to

experience more sadness in response to negative outcomes. Tiedens (2001) also found that

targets who are described as angry were judged to have higher status and to be more worthy of a
Affect in Groups 16

job promotion, while targets who were described as sad or guilty were judged to be lower in

status. Emotional displays may constitute what Mazur (1985) refers to as controllable status

signs, and such signs are evident across various primate species.

Groups may also recognize the effects of certain moods and emotions on how group

related activities are completed. For example, positive affective states may help foster

cooperation between group members, while negative affective states may help foster hostility

and collective action toward enemies and predators. Thus, groups may also have benefited from

explicitly regulating affect levels within a group immediately before collective activities, as

certain affective states may communicate to group members that a specific group outcome is

desired. Again, support for the evolutionary development of this function is provided by

comparative research by de Waal (as cited in Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Specifically, chimpanzees

have been observed to engage in celebration just before the distribution of resources, and it is

believed that this positive collective affect facilitates cooperation and the achievement of higher-

order group goals.

In sum, affect in groups functions to alert the group to positive and negative aspects of

the environment. Affect levels spread quickly through the group via contagion processes, and in

fact, evidence suggests that negative affect spreads more quickly than does positive affect. A

number of other processes support emotional contagion, including interaction synchrony and

behavioral entrainment. In addition, the efficient and improved coordination that results from

successful entrainment is facilitated by similarity in affective states. Further, the communication

function of affect stresses the importance of both homogeneous and heterogeneous levels of

affect within a group. When group members experience homogeneous levels of affect, changes

in one group member, such as occurs when one group member senses danger, presents
Affect in Groups 17

particularly salient and easy to understand information about the environment. Thus,

heterogeneous levels of affect within a group potentially signal an important change in the

environment to which other group members should be attentive. Heterogeneous levels of affect

may also support status hierarchies within the group, while shared affect may support the pursuit

of specific group goals. Thus, the development of explicit affect regulation mechanisms should

also have been important for group members' survival.

The Bonding Function of Affect in Groups: Group Cohesiveness and Group Rapport

We propose that a second primary function of shared affect in groups is to facilitate the

development of group member bonds. In addition to coordination, Brewer (1997) has suggested

that groups must have certain features that create positive bonds among group members that

initially attract them to the group and also keep them loyal. In terms of group formation, there is

evidence that groups are likely to form when individuals develop shared feelings (Moreland,

1987). Additionally, there is extensive evidence that positively toned affective ties serve several

positive functions for the group, including to bind group members to one another, to operate in a

more group centered manner, to better coordinate efforts, and to better enforce group norms and

procedures (Forsyth, 1999). Similarly, Turner (2000) suggested that human emotions may have

evolved in order to facilitate the development of affective ties between individuals, and thus

increase group solidarity. The vast majority of research demonstrating these effects has focused

on the constructs of group cohesiveness (Mullen & Copper, 1994) and group rapport (Tickle-

Degnan & Rosenthal, 1987).

Cohesiveness is perhaps the most thoroughly investigated group level affective construct

(Kelly & Barsade, 2001). The literature on cohesiveness is too extensive to cover here and has

been well reviewed in other sources (e.g., Hogg, 1992; Mullen & Copper, 1994). However, it
Affect in Groups 18

should be noted that group cohesiveness is generally believed to be a multidimensional construct

that includes positive interpersonal attraction, task commitment, and group pride (Mullen &

Copper, 1994). Cohesiveness is viewed as both an influence on and an outcome of group

process (Levine & Moreland, 1990). Further, much of the literature examining cohesiveness has

focused on the relationship between cohesion and performance. Karau and Williams (1997), for

example, found that group members exerted a greater amount of effort in a group task in order to

compensate for a low ability partner when part of a cohesive group, but not when part of a non-

cohesive group. Zaccaro and McCoy (1988) also suggest that positive interpersonal

cohesiveness serves to facilitate the coordination of group member efforts and thus improves

group performance. Finally, many studies document the ability of cohesive groups to retain

members over time (Forsyth, 1999; Mobley, Griffeth, Hand, & Meglino, 1979). Thus, the

development of group cohesion serves to create bonds between group members, loyalty to the

groups, and positive feelings toward tasks that the group completes together.

Tickle-Degnan and Rosenthal (1987) describe a construct that is similar to group

cohesiveness, group rapport, as having three components: mutual attention and involvement,

coordination among participants in the interaction, and positive affect. Group rapport has several

potential benefits for group survival. First, when group members experience rapport, they are

more attentive and easily influenced by each other. Consequently, the development of group

rapport has important implications for group members' susceptibility to emotional contagion.

The coordination component of group rapport is similar to interaction synchrony. That is, group

rapport can be indexed by regulation of the interaction that coordinates the behavior of

participants and provides predictable patterns of behavior. The final component of group

rapport, positive affect, is closely tied to group cohesiveness and affects whether group members
Affect in Groups 19

want to remain with a particular group. Tickle-Degnan and Rosenthal suggest that all three

components can be observed through the nonverbal behavior of interacting group members. For

example, mutual attentiveness and involvement can be observed in the group’s spatial behavior

and in the use of eye contact and other postures that indicate attentiveness. Coordination can be

observed as synchrony in the interaction (Bernieri, Davis, Rosenthal, & Knee, 1994), and

positive affect can be observed in the use of affiliative nonverbal behaviors.

In sum, shared affect plays an important role in facilitating the creation and maintenance

of group bonds, which has clear implications for group stability and pursuit of group goals. In

particular, positive moods and emotions would appear to be crucial for a group’s day-to-day

functioning as these affective states facilitate group member cooperation and pursuit of group

goals. Negative moods and emotions appear to be crucial in critical survival situations, such as

responding to predators. Thus, within a group setting, positive affect would seem to be most

related to the bonding function, while negative affect would seem to be most related to the

communication function.

It is also clear that there is a dynamic and bi-directional relationship between the two

functions of affect in groups. Although there are a number of antecedents to group cohesiveness,

the experience of positive affect in the group is certainly one of the strongest contributors (Kelly

& Barsade, 2001). However, behavioral entrainment and interaction synchrony also have the

potential to contribute to group cohesiveness through the production of positive affect. For

example, research on entrainment and interaction synchrony suggests that synchrony functions to

coordinate interaction processes and to create a smoother and more efficient exchange of

information. In addition, the outcome of interaction synchrony is positive affect. This positive

affect can take the form of liking for the partner or group (Kelly, 1987), greater satisfaction with
Affect in Groups 20

the interaction (Bernieri et al., 1988), or greater group rapport (Tickle-Degnan & Rosenthal,

1987). Note, however, that the affect that occurs as a result of synchrony (or asynchrony) occurs

as an outcome of the entrainment process, rather than because of a contagion process. Thus, the

more efficient, entrained system elicits the reward of positive affect. Similarly, research on

nonconscious mimicry suggests that increased mimicry of interaction partners is bidirectionally

related to group rapport, interpersonal attraction, and positive affect (Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, &

Chartrand, 2003). Additionally, the establishment of hierarchies within the group may be

important for group coordination, which may be why status hierarchies are evident throughout

the animal kingdom (Mazur, 1973). Similarly, status differences may promote coordinated and

complementary nonverbal behaviors in others that serve to reinforce the hierarchy and are related

to more positive perceptions of the interaction (Tiedens & Fragale, 2003). Consequently,

dominance hierarchies may represent the most efficient group structure (Houser & Lovaglia,

2002; Sidanius, 1993).

Application of an Evolutionary Framework to Current Research on Affect in Groups

Research on moods and emotions in groups is relatively sparse, although many of the

available findings are consistent with the evolutionary framework proposed above. We discuss

the relevant research on affect in groups and discuss how this research is consistent with the

evolutionary framework that we have described.

Although much of the research on emotional contagion has focused on dyads, recent

research has found evidence for both positive and negative emotional contagion in larger work

groups. For example, Barsade (2002) examined the effects of emotional contagion on team

dynamics in a laboratory study using a trained confederate to induce emotional contagion.

Emotional contagion clearly affected team dynamics. In particular, contagion of positive affect
Affect in Groups 21

was associated with improved cooperation and decreased conflict. Further, self-reported ratings

of individual task performance (i.e., success at the negotiation task) were positively associated

with self-reported levels of emotional contagion. Contagion of negative affect also occurred and

generally led to opposite effects on team dynamics. These effects were apparent to the group

members themselves, as well as to outside observers. Thus, Barsade’s research provides fairly

direct evidence that positive emotional contagion has positive effects in terms of improving

coordination and positive perceptions of the group.

Other evidence for the effects of emotional contagion in groups is somewhat more

indirect. In a field study, Bartel and Saavedra (2000) found mood convergence in a highly

diverse sample of work groups, which they attributed to contagion processes and emotional

comparisons. While Bartel and Saavedra found mood convergence on eight different mood

categories, mood convergence tended to be most prevalent for unpleasant moods, which suggests

that the experience of negative group mood is a very salient experience for group members.

Additionally, mood convergence was positively related to characteristics of the groups’

environments, including membership stability and task and social interdependence, suggesting

that a group’s susceptibility to emotional contagion is a function of the external environment.

There is also evidence that supports the relationship between affect in groups and the

communication and maintenance of status hierarchies, as well as satisfaction with a relationship.

For example, Anderson, Keltner, and John (2003) examined emotional convergence in both

romantic couples and college roommates. The first study examined emotions in couples across

two time periods. Couples who remained together at time 2 tended to converge on emotion

measures but not on personality measures, with the lower power couple member tending to

converge more. Additionally, emotional similarity at time 1 was positively related to


Affect in Groups 22

relationship satisfaction and negatively related to breakup at time 2. In a second longitudinal

study using college roommates, Anderson et al. again found emotional convergence at time 2,

and roommates who reported more emotional convergence also reported being closer.

Consistent with their first study, the lower status roommate (as assessed by overall status within

the dorm) tended to converge more. In a final study, Anderson et al. found that the emotions that

roommates elicited while watching sad and happy film clips were more similar than the emotions

elicited by pairs of strangers. Thus, although this research was primarily concerned with dyadic

relationships, the results suggest that the development of shared affect is related to greater

bonding and commitment to the group. This research is also consistent with the contention that

low status group members may be more susceptible to affect regulation.

Recent research also points to the importance of homogenous levels of affect in

maintaining group stability and group bonds. In particular, George's (1989, 1990) research on

the effects of group affective tone in work teams clearly suggests that both positive and negative

affective tone, defined as "consistent or homogeneous affective reactions within a group" (1990,

p. 108) has important consequences for team dynamics. Specifically, positive affective tone was

negatively related to absenteeism, while negative affective tone was negatively related to

prosocial behavior. Thus, group affective tone appears to affect group stability and the extent to

which group members engage in behaviors that promote group related goals, which is consistent

with both of the proposed functions of affect in groups.

The bonding effect of affect in groups is also demonstrated in recent research on

attachment to social groups (Smith, Coats, & Murphy, 2001; Smith, Murphy, & Coats, 1999).

Smith et al. (1999) also adopted an evolutionary framework and suggested that attachment to

social groups had adaptive benefits in a manner that is conceptually similar to romantic
Affect in Groups 23

relationship attachments. Across several studies, Smith et al. (1999) found that positive

emotions regarding the group were negatively related to both attachment anxiety and avoidance.

Importantly, low levels of attachment anxiety and avoidance were also related to more

satisfaction with the social support provided by the group and intentions to remain with the

group. Rom and Mikulincer (2003, Study 4) expanded this work and found that some of the

negative effects of attachment anxiety were alleviated by membership in highly cohesive groups.

Thus, affect in groups, and positive emotions in particular, appear to play a role in bonding group

members together. Further, even when negative emotions are involved, such as is the case with

attachment anxiety, this research suggests that other positive emotions related to the group, such

as group cohesion, may ameliorate some of the negative effects.

Future Directions

An evolutionary perspective on affect in groups sheds new light on the role of moods and

emotions in group functioning and well-being. Specifically, an evolutionary perspective

suggests that affect in groups plays two crucial and related coordination functions:

communicating information among group members and creating social bonds that maintain the

group. Additionally, recent research examining affect in groups is consistent with this

perspective.

While a growing body of literature supports the bonding function of shared affect,

relatively little research has explicitly examined the communication function of affect in groups.

Thus, one avenue for future research is to examine the role of this important function of moods

and emotions. In particular, we have proposed that the rapid communication of negative affect

was particularly important in evolutionary history. While much of the current research has

suggested that there are potentially negative effects of negative emotional contagion (e.g.,
Affect in Groups 24

Barsade, 2002), an evolutionary perspective suggests that there may be situations in which

emotional contagion of negative affective states might be helpful for a group. For example, for

work teams, shared negative affect might signal negative aspects of the work environment.

Thus, negative emotional contagion may motivate the team to work together to achieve more

favorable outcomes. Certainly, the prevalence and success of unions and coalitions suggest that

there may be some positive consequences of the spread of negative affect within a group.

Additionally, research might fruitfully be directed at understanding the nature of the

relationship between the two coordination functions of affect in groups. In particular, we have

suggested that the two functions are related in a mutually dependent fashion. That is, emotional

contagion and interaction synchrony support the development of group rapport and group

cohesiveness, which in turn leads to greater contagion, etc. However, research could examine

when this relationship holds and when it falls apart. For example, are we always attracted to

groups in which we experience synchrony and emotional contagion, or does it only occur for

certain affective states? Positive emotional contagion may always be appealing, but do we ever

prefer negative emotional contagion? Further, is there a point at which group bonds are already

so close that further emotional contagion and synchrony is not possible and could potentially

harm the group? All of these questions pose interesting topics for future research.

Evolutionary psychology has emerged as a vibrant and exciting theoretical perspective in

modern psychology. Evolutionary psychology has the potential to provide a unifying theory for

understanding many of the disparate phenomena in psychology. We have suggested that

evolutionary psychology has the potential to help explain the role of group member moods and

emotions in facilitating group functioning and survival. Affect in groups coordinates group

activity by communicating important information among group members and fostering group
Affect in Groups 25

bonds, and specific mechanisms for spreading and controlling affect within a group may have

developed to facilitate these functions. Thus, we propose that our current affective experiences

within groups were likely shaped by an evolutionary history that favored a functional role for

affect and affect regulation mechanisms in groups.


Affect in Groups 26

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Affect in Groups 34

Footnotes
1
An emphasis on affect is also consistent with the idea that early emotional reactions

resulted from chemotaxis, the process by which organisms sense certain chemicals and then

approach or move away from them, or have a generally positive or negative reaction (Rossano,

2003).
2
Clearly, affect in groups is not the only solution to early group's coordination problems.

Groups may have also benefited from the development of shared knowledge structures or shared

mental models (e.g., Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993). We believe that these represent

potentially important and complementary solutions. However, we do not discuss these here and

instead focus on affect because we believe that affect may have played a unique and important

role in group living.


Affect in Groups 35

Acknowledgements

Preparation of this article was facilitated by a National Science Foundation Grant (#BCS-

0132258) awarded to the second author.

We are grateful to Howard Weiss, John Capaldi, Tatsuya Kameda, and two anonymous

reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.

Correspondence concerning this article may be addressed to Jennifer R. Spoor at the

Department of Psychological Sciences, Purdue University, 703 Third Street, West Lafayette, IN,

47907 (E-mail: spoorj@psych.purdue.edu; FAX: 765-496-1364).


Affect in Groups 36

Biographical Notes

Jennifer R. Spoor is a graduate student in social psychology at Purdue University. Her

research interests include affect in groups, regulatory processes in groups, and group information

processing.

Janice R. Kelly is a Professor of social psychology at Purdue University. Her primary

research interests include the effects of affective states and social factors (gender composition,

degree of acquaintance) on group and dyadic interaction.

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