SSS vs Aguas
FACTS:
- Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security
System (SSS) and a pensioner, died on December
8, 1996.
- Pablo’s surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas,
filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits on
December 13, 1996.
- Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo was
likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylnn, who
was born on October 29, 1991.
- Her claim for monthly pension was settled on
February 13,1997
- Sometime in April 1997, the SSS received a
sworn letter dated April 2, 1997 from Leticia
Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister, contesting
Rosanna’s claim for death benefits.
- She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family
abode approximately more than six years before,
and lived with another man on whom she has
been dependent for support
- She further averred that Pablo had no legal
children with Rosanna, but that the latter had
several children with acertain Romeo dela Peña.
- In support of her allegation, Leticia enclosed
anotarized copy of the original birth certificate
of one Jefren H. dela Peña, showing that the latter
was born on November 15, 1996 to Rosanna Y.
Hernandez and Romeo C.
dela Peña, and that the two were married on
November 1, 1990.
- As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of
Rosanna and Jeylnn’s monthly pension in
September 1997.
- SSS officer: She learned that the deceased had
no legal children with Rosanna; Jenelyn and
Jefren were Rosanna’s children with one Romeo
C. dela Peña; and Rosanna left the deceased six
years before his death and lived with Romeo
while she was still pregnant with
Jenelyn, who was born on October 29, 1991.
Mariquita also confirmed that Pablo was not
capable of having a child as he was under
treatment.
- On basis of discovery that Pablo is infertile, SSS
denied Rosanna’s request to resume pension and
asked for refund of payment.
- Filed a claim/petition of Restoration/Payment
of Pensions with the Social Security Commission
(SSC) w/ Janet Aguas, who claimed to be child of
deceased and Rosanna
- The claimants appended to their petition,
among others, photocopies of the following: (1)
Pablo and Rosanna’s marriage certificate; (2)
Janet’s certificate of live birth; (w/verified
signature) (3) Jeylnn’s certificate of live birth;
and (4) Pablo’s certificate of death.
- Neighbors:
Vivencia testified that she had known Pablo and
Rosanna for more than 30 years already; the
couple were married and lived in Macabacle,
Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga; she was a
former neighbor of the spouses, but four years
after their marriage, she (Vivencia) and her
family moved to Sto. Niño Triangulo, San
Fernando, Pampanga; she would often visit the
two, especially during Christmas or fiestas; the
spousesÊ real child was Jeylnn; Janet was only an
adopted child; the spouse later transferred
residence, not far from their old house, and Janet
- Carmelita testified that she had been a
neighbor of Pablo and Rosanna for 15 years and
that, up to the present, Rosanna and her children,
Janet, Jeylnn and Jefren, were still her neighbors;
Janet and Jeylnn were the children of Pablo and
Rosanna but she did not know whose child Jefren
is
- Leticia: Janet was not the real child of
Pablo and Rosanna; she was just taken in by the
spouses because for a long time they could not
have children; however, there were no legal
papers on Janet’s adoption. Later on, Rosanna
got pregnant with Jeylnn; after the latter’s
baptism, there was a commotion at the house
because Romeo dela Peña was claiming that he
was the father of the child and he got mad
because the child was named after Pablo; the
latter also got mad and even attempted to shoot
Rosanna; he drove them away from the
house; since then, Pablo and Rosanna separated;
she knew about this because at that time their
mother was sick, and she would often visit her at
their ancestral home, where Pablo and Rosanna
were also staying; Rosanna was
no longer living in their ancestral home but Janet
resided therein; she did not know where
Rosanna was staying now but she knew that the
latter and Romeo dela Peña were still living
together.
- During the hearing, Mariquita brought with her
photocopies of two baptismal certificates: that of
Jeylnn Aguas, child of Pablo Aguas
and Rosanna Hernandez born on October 29,
1991, and that of Jenelyn H. dela Peña,
child of Romeo dela Peña and Rosanna
Hernandez, born on January 29, 1992.
- SSC: DENIED, Rosanna no longer qualified
because she contracted marriage with Romeo
dela Pena. As for Jeylnn, the SSC ruled that, even
if her birth
certificate was signed by Pablo as her father,
there was more compelling evidence that Jeylnn
was not his legitimate child. The SSC deduced
from the records that Jeylnn and Jenelyn was one
and the same person and concluded, based on
the latter’s baptismal certificate, that she was the
daughter of Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña. As
for Janet, SSC declared her adopted.
- MR to SSC denied
- CA: entitled to benefits, birth certificates
sufficient, affair not properly proven
ISSUE: W/N Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are
entitled to SSS death benefits
HELD: The Court has reviewed the records of the
case and finds that only Jeylnn has sufficiently
established her right to a monthly pension.
Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her
birth certificate which bears the signature of
Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the
certification from the Civil Registry showing that
she was born on October 29, 1991. The records
also show that Rosanna and Pablo were
married on December 4, 1977 and the marriage
subsisted until the latter’s death on December 8,
1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was born
during Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage.
In this case, there is no showing that Pablo
challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his
lifetime. Hence, Jeylnn’s status as a legitimate
child of Pablo can no longer be contested. A
birth certificate signed by father is competent
evidence of paternity.
The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164,
however, can not extend to Janet because her
date of birth was not substantially proven. Unlike
Jeylnn, there was no confirmation
by the civil register of the fact of Janet’s birth on
the date stated in the certificate. Absent any
proof that the family has legally adopted Janet,
the Court cannot consider her a dependent child
of Pablo, hence, not a primary beneficiary.
While Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo,
she is likewise not qualified as a
primary beneficiary since she failed to present
any proof to show that at the time of his death,
she was still dependent on him for support even
if they were already living separately.
Suntay v Suntay (2010)
- On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina
Aguinaldo- Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr.
Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate.
- In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo
Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina
and Federico.
- At the time of her death, Cristina was survived
by her husband, Federico, and several
grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio
A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel
Cojuangco- Suntay.
- During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to
Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children,
namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita;
and Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay.
Emilio I’s marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was
subsequently annulled. (Emilio acquitted of
Parricide) Respondent and her siblings
Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother
on Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately from
their father and paternal grandparents.
- Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio
III and Nenita Suntay Tañedo (Nenita), by two
different women, Concepcion Mendoza and
Isabel Santos respectively
- Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he
was reared ever since he was a mere baby, nine
months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina
and was an acknowledged natural child of Emilio
I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of
Emilio I and was likewise brought up by the
spouses Federico and Cristina.
- After the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a
petition for visitation rights over his
grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita, and
Emilio II. Although the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court in Quezon City
granted the petition and allowed Federico one
hour of visitation monthly, initially reduced to
thirty minutes, it was altogether stopped because
of a manifestation filed by respondent Isabel,
articulating her sentiments on the
unwanted visits of her grandparents.
- After the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on
September 27, 1993, adopted their illegitimate
grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
- Isabel Congjuanco – Suntay (respondent) filed a
petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor
- Federico filed opposition
- After failed attempts to settle, Federico nomited
his adopted son Emilio III as admin of Cristina’s
estate on his behalf in the event he would be
decided as better rights to administration
- Federico died
- TC: Emilio III
- CA: Cristina
- Court: Both
Suntay v Suntay (2012)
- MR filed by Isabel from 2010 decision issuing
Letters of Administration to both Isabel and
Emilio III because Emilio was reared from
infancy and is legally adopted child of Federico
ISSUE: Who is administrator?
HELD: Sec 6, Rule 78 “next of kin v “nearest of
kin”
- Depends on facts and circumstances
- Isabel has more of an interest over estate of
Cristina, Emilio III unsuitable and caused damage
to estate
- He omitted partial inventories
- There is hostility between the two
- But the question of the heirs is not upon the
court to decide
Who are considered legitimate children? FC 168
1. valid marriage
Arbolario v CA
FACTS:
- The original owners of the controverted lot,
spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan
had five (5) children, namely: (1) Agueda
Colinco, (2) Catalina Baloyo, (3) Eduardo Baloyo,
(4) Gaudencia Baloyo, and (5) Julian Baloyo. All
of the above-named persons are now dead.
- The first child, Agueda Colinco, was survived by
her two children, namely, Antonio Colinco and
[respondent] Irene Colinco. Antonio Colinco
predeceased his three daughters, herein
[respondents], Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina, all
surnamed Colinco.
- The second child, Catalina Baloyo, was married
to Juan
Arbolario. Their union was blessed with the birth
of only one child, Purificacion Arbolario, who, in
1985, died a spinster and without issue.
- Purificacion’s father, Juan Arbolario, consorted
with another woman by the name of Francisca
Malvas. From this cohabitation was born the
[petitioners], viz, Voltaire Arbolario, Lucena
Arbolario Taala, Fe Arbolario, Exaltacion
Arbolario, and Carlos Arbolario (refered to
hereinafter as Arbolarios). All the foregoing
[petitioners] were born well before the year
1951.
- In 1946, it appears that the third child, Eduardo
Baloyo, sold his entire interest in Lot 323 to his
sister, Agueda Baloyo Colinco, by virtue of a
notarized document acknowledged before
Notary Public Deogracias Riego.
- In 1951, a notarized declaration of heirship was
executed by and between Agueda, Catalina,
Gaudencia, and their brothers Eduardo and
Julian, who extrajudicially declared themselves
to be the only heirs of the late spouses Anselmo
Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan. The fourth child,
Gaudencia Baloyo, conveyed her interest in the
said lot in favor of her two nieces, Irene Colinco
to one-half (1/2) and Purificacion Arbolario to
the other half.
- And as far as Julian Baloyo·the fifth and last
child·was
concerned, records could only show that he was
married to a certain Margarita Palma; and that
he died, presumably after 1951 without any
issue.
- Purificacion Arbolario was then allowed to take
possession of a portion of the disputed parcel
until her death sometime in 1984 or 1985.
- [respondents] Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco,
Orpha Colinco, and Goldelina Colinco, believing
themselves to be the only surviving heirs of
Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, executed a
ÂDeclaration of Heirship
and Partition AgreementÊ, dated May 8, 1987
where they adjudicated upon themselves their
proportionate or ideal shares in O.C.T. No.
16361, viz: Irene Colinco, to one-half (1/2);
while the
surviving daughters of her (IreneÊs) late brother
Antonio, namely Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina
Colinco, to share in equal, ideal proportions to
the remaining half (1/2). This forthwith brought
about the cancellation of O.C.T. No. 16361, and
the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-140018 in their
names and conformably with the aforesaid
distribution.
- the Colincos filed Civil Case No. 367 against
Spouses Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay and Carlito
Salhay,
seeking to recover possession of a portion of the
aforesaid lot occupied by [respondent] spouses
(Salhays hereinafter) since 1970.
- The Salhays alleged in their defense that they
have been the lawful lessees of the late
Purificacion Arbolario since 1971 up to 1) 2)
1978; and that said spouses allegedly purchased
the disputed portion of Lot No. 323 from the
deceased lessor sometime in [September] 1978.
- Arbolarios and Salhay sps filed cancellation of
title with damages: the Declaration of Heirship
and Partition Agreement executed by the
Colincos was defective and
thus voidable as they (Arbolarios) were excluded
therein. The Arbolarios claim that they
succeeded intestate to the inheritance of their
alleged half-sister, Purificacion Arbolario; and, as
forced heirs, they should be included in the
distribution of the aforesaid lot.
- TC: the Arbolarios were the brothers and the
sisters of the deceased Purificacion Arbolario,
while the Colincos were her cousins and nieces.
Pursuant to Article 1009 of the Civil Code, the
Colincos could not inherit from her, because she
had half-brothers and half-sisters. Their 1987
Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement
was made in bad faith, because they knew all
along the existence of, and their relationship
with, the Arbolarios. The Salhays, on the other
hand, had no document to prove their
acquisition and possession of a portion of the
disputed lot.
- CA: the CA rejected the contention of
petitioners that the cohabitation of their father
with their natural mother, Francisca Malvas, was
by virtue of a valid marriage The appellate court
observed that the Arbolarios had all been born
before the death of Catalina Baloyo, as shown by
the Deed of Declaration of Heirship, which she
had executed in 1951.
No evidence was ever presented showing that
her conjugal union with Juan Arbolario had been
judicially annulled or lawfully ended before that
year. Because it was also in 1951 when Juan
Arbolario cohabited with Francisca Malvas, their
union was presumably extramarital.
Consequently, their children are illegitimate half-
brothers and half-sisters of
Purificacion, the daughter of Juan and Catalina.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners are legitimate heirs of
Catalina?
- NO
HELD:
There is no solid basis for the argument of
petitioners that Juan Arbolario’s marriage to
Francisca Malvas was valid, supposedly because
Catalina Baloyo was already dead when they
were born It does not follow that just because his
first wife has died, a man is already conclusively
married to the woman who bore his children. A
marriage certificate or other generally accepted
proof is necessary to establish the marriage as an
undisputable fact.
Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a
relationship that must be judicially established.
It stands to reason that children born within
wedlock are legitimate. Petitioners,
however, failed to prove the fact (or even the
presumption) of marriage between their parents,
Juan Arbolario and Francisca Malvas; hence, they
cannot invoke a presumption of legitimacy in
their favor.
Continental Steel v Montano
- Hortillano, an employee of petitioner
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation
(Continental Steel) and a member of respondent
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel
Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms
(Union) filed a claim for Paternity Leave,
Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident
Insurance for dependent pursuant to the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
concluded between Continental and the Union
- The claim was based on the death of
Hortillano’s unborn child. HortillanoÊs wife,
Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on
5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week
of pregnancy.
- Continental Steel immediately granted
Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied
his claims for bereavement leave and other death
benefits, consisting of the death and accident
insurance.
- the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE)
- Continental Steel posited that the express
provision of the CBA did not contemplate the
death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal
personality. It claimed that there are two
elements for the entitlement to the benefits,
namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate
dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s
case.
- Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute
that the death of an employee’s legitimate
dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to
be supported by the parents from the very
moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to
rely on another for support; he/she could not
have existed or sustained himself/herself
without the power or aid of someone else,
specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus
was already a dependent, although he/she died
during the labor or delivery. There was also no
question that Hortillano and his wife were
lawfully married, making their dependent,
unborn child, legitimate.
CA: affirmed
ISSUE: W/N the child is dependent unborn child
HELD: As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements
for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2
of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be
of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child,
brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3)
legitimate relations of the dependent to the
employee.
The requisites for death and accident insurance
under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are:
(1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent,
who could be a parent,
spouse, or child of a married employee; or a
parent, brother, or sister of a single employee;
and (4) presentation of the proper legal
document to prove such death, e.g., death
certificate.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a
dependent under the CBA. The term legitimate
merely addresses the dependent child’s status in
relation to his/her parents.
It is apparent that according to the Family Code
and the aforecited jurisprudence, the legitimacy
or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her
conception. In the present case, it was not
disputed that Hortillano and his wife were
validly married and that their child was
conceived during said marriage, hence, making
said child legitimate upon her conception.
Given the existence of all the requisites for
bereavement leave and other death benefits
under the CBA, Hortillano’s claims for the same
should have been granted by Continental Steel.
4. voidable marriage
Suntay vs. Suntay (1998) GR No. 132524
FACTS:
Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to
respondent Isabel’s Petition for Letters of
Administration over the estate of Cristina A.
Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The
decedent is the wife of Federico and the
grandmother of Isabel. Isabel’s father Emilio, had
predeceased his mother Cristina.
The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously
been decalred by the CFI as “null and void.”
Federico anchors his oppostion on this fact,
alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel
has no right to succeed by right of representation
as she is an illegitimate child. The trial court had
denied Federico’s Motion to Dismiss, hence this
petition for certiorari. Federico contends that,
inter alia, that the dispositive portion of the the
decision declaring the marriage of Isabel’s
parents “null and void” be upheld.
ISSUE:
In case of conflict between the body of the
decision and the dispostive portion thereof,
which should prevail? Related thereto, was the
marriage of Isabel’s parents a case of a void or
voidable marriage?
Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child?
HELD:
Petition dismissed. Art. 10 of the Civil Code
states that in case of doubt in the interpretation
and application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail. This is also applicable and binding upon
courts in relation to its judgment. While the
dispositive portion of the CFI decision states that
the marriage be “declared null and void,” the
body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3
Art. 85 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at
the time. Art. 85 enumerates the causes for
which a marriage may be annulled. As such the
conflict between the body and the dispositive
portion of the decision may be reconcilable as
noted by the Supreme Court. The fundamental
distinction between void and voidable marriages
is that void marriage is deemed never to have
taken place at all. The effects of void marriages,
with respect to property relations of the spouses
are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil
Code. Children born of such marriages who are
called natural children by legal fiction have the
same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children under Article 89
irrespective of whether or not the parties to the
void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On
the other hand, a voidable marriage, is
considered valid and produces all its civil effects,
until it is set aside by final judgment of a
competent court in an action for annulment.
Juridically, the
annulment of a marriage dissolves the special
contract as if it had never been entered into but
the law makes express provisions to prevent the
effects of the marriage from being totally wiped
out.
The status of children born in voidable marriages
is governed by the second paragraph of Article
89 which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before
the decree of annulment shall be considered
legitimate; and children conceived thereafter
shall have the same status, rights and obligations
as acknowledged natural children, and are also
called natural children by legal fiction. In view
thereof, the status of Isabel would be covered by
the second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil
Code which provides that “ children conceived of
voidable marriages before the decree of
annulment shall be considered legitimate.
Rights of legitimate children
* in Scribd outline
Heirs of Basbas v. Basbas, G.R. No. 188773,
September 10, 2014
FACTS:
 This is a dispute over a parcel of land (Lot
39) located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna, which
was originally titled in the name of Severo
Basbas
 The property in question is now titled in
the names of Crispiniano and Ricardo,
respondents in this case
 Severo Basbas was married to Ana Rivera,
and they had one child named Valentin,
who had no brothers or sisters.
 Valentin was married to Irene Beato, and
they had four children: Pedro, Lucas,
Feliz, and Remigia.
 Petitioners in this case are direct
descendants of Valentin, as stipulated in
the Pre-trial Order in the MTC
proceedings
 Respondents Crispiniano and Ricardo
trace their claim to their father, Felomino,
whose father, Nicolas (respondents’
grandfather), was allegedly a son of
Severo
 MTC and RTC ruled in favor of the
petitioners, holding that respondents
failed to prove their filiation to Severo
 CA reversed RTC: holding that the MTC
and RTC did not have jurisdiction to rule
on matters of filiation and heirship
ISSUE: W/N respondents in this case are heirs of
Severo Basbas? – NO
HELD:
 Nicolas’ status as a purported heir of
Severo can no longer be established,
Nicolas’ right thereto expiring upon his
death, according to FC 173 and 175
 SC ruled that there was no need for a
separate proceeding for a declaration of
 the heirs of Severo in order to resolve the
action for Reconveyance of the property
 Valentin’s rights to the succession vested
upon Severo’s death, and petitioners’
rights vested upon Valentin’s death.
Hence, they own the subject property,
which forms part of Severo’s estate.