Republic of the Philippines married to Sally Go because of the existence of his prior marriage to Azucena; and (2) the

SUPREME COURT prosecution was unable to show that he and the "Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr.," who married
Manila Resally, were one and the same person.12
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 172777 October 19, 2011
In its December 3, 2003 Order,13 the RTC dismissed the criminal case against Benjamin, Jr. and
BENJAMIN B. BANGAYAN, JR., Petitioner,
Resally for insufficiency of evidence.14 It reasoned out that the prosecution failed to prove
vs.
beyond reasonable doubt that Benjamin, Jr. used the fictitious name, Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr.,
SALLY GO BANGAYAN, Respondent.
in contracting his marriage with Resally.15Corollarily, Resally cannot be convicted of bigamy
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
because the prosecution failed to establish that Resally married Benjamin, Jr.16
G.R. No. 172792
RESALLY DE ASIS DELFIN, Petitioner,
vs. Aggrieved, Sally Go elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. On March 14, 2006,
SALLY GO BANGAYAN, Respondent. the CA promulgated its Decision17 granting her petition and ordering the remand of the case to
DECISION the RTC for further proceedings. The CA held that the following pieces of evidence presented by
MENDOZA, J.: the prosecution were sufficient to deny the demurrer to evidence: (1) the existence of three
marriages of Benjamin, Jr. to Azucena, Sally Go and Resally; (2) the letters and love notes from
Resally to Benjamin, Jr.; (3) the admission of Benjamin, Jr. as regards his marriage to Sally Go
These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
and Azucena; and (4) Benjamin, Jr.’s admission that he and Resally were in some kind of a
Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the March 14, 2006 Decision1 and the May 22, 2006
relationship.18 The CA further stated that Benjamin, Jr. was mistaken in claiming that he could
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 83704 entitled "Sally Go-Bangayan
not be guilty of bigamy because his marriage to Sally Go was null and void in light of the fact
v. Hon. Luisito C. Sardillo, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Caloocan City, Branch 126,
that he was already married to Azucena. A judicial declaration of nullity was required in order
Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr. and Resally de Asis Delfin."
for him to be able to use the nullity of his marriage as a defense in a bigamy charge.19

The Facts
Petitioners’ motions for reconsideration were both denied by the CA in a Resolution dated May
22, 2006.20
This case stemmed from a complaint-affidavit filed by respondent Sally Go-Bangayan (Sally Go)
accusing petitioners Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin, Jr.) and Resally de Asis Delfin (Resally)
Hence, these petitions.
of having committed the crime of bigamy.3

On March 7, 1982, Benjamin, Jr. married Sally Go in Pasig City and they had two
children.4 Later, Sally Go learned that Benjamin, Jr. had taken Resally as his concubine whom
he subsequently married on January 5, 2001 under the false name, "Benjamin Z.
Sojayco."5 Benjamin, Jr. fathered two children with Resally. Furthermore, Sally Go discovered
that on September 10, 1973, Benjamin, Jr. also married a certain Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in
Caloocan City.
The City Prosecutor of Caloocan City conducted a preliminary investigation and thereafter issued
a Resolution dated June 5, 2002 recommending the filing of an information for bigamy against
Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for having contracted a marriage despite knowing fully well that he
was still legally married to Sally Go.6 The information was duly filed on November 15, 2002 and
was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 126 (RTC) where it was
docketed as Criminal Case No. C-66783.7
The Issues
Petitioner Benjamin, Jr. raises the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals in a certiorari proceedings may inquire into
the factual matters presented by the parties in the lower court, without violating the
constitutional right of herein petitioner (as accused in the lower court) against double jeopardy
as enshrined in Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not the order of the trial court that granted the Demurrer to Evidence filed by the
petitioners as accused therein was issued with grave abuse of discretion that is tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction as to warrant the grant of the relief as prayed for in
the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondent Sally [Go-Bangayan].

After the arraignment, during which petitioners both pleaded not guilty to the charge against
them, the prosecution presented and offered its evidence.8 On September 8, 2003, Benjamin,
Jr. and Resally separately filed their respective motions for leave to file a demurrer to
evidence.9 This was granted by the RTC in its Order dated September 29, 2003.10
3. Whether or not the prosecution was indeed denied due process when the trial court allegedly
ignored the existence [of the] pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution.21
On the other hand, petitioner Resally poses the following questions:

On October 20, 2003, Benjamin, Jr. filed his Demurrer to Evidence, praying that the criminal
1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in giving due
case for bigamy against him be dismissed for failure of the prosecution to present sufficient
course to the petition for certiorari notwithstanding the lack of legal standing of the herein
evidence of his guilt.11 His plea was anchored on two main arguments: (1) he was not legally
respondent (petitioner therein) as the said petition was filed without the prior conformity and/or
imprimatur of the Office of the Solicitor General, or even the City Prosecutor’s Office of Caloocan
City
2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ordering
the further proceedings of the case as it would violate the right of the accused against double
jeopardy.22
Essentially, the issues which must be resolved by this Court are:
1. Whether Sally Go had the legal standing to file a petition for certiorari before the CA despite
the lack of consent of either the Office of the Solicitor General or the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Caloocan.
2. Whether petitioners’ right against double jeopardy was violated by the CA when it reversed
the December 3, 2003 RTC Order dismissing the criminal case against them.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court finds merit in the petitions.
Only the OSG, and not the private offended party, has the authority to question the order
granting the demurrer to evidence in a criminal case.
Petitioner Resally argues that Sally Go had no personality to file the petition for certiorari before
the CA because the case against them (Resally and Benjamin, Jr.) is criminal in nature. It being
so, only the OSG or the OCP of Caloocan may question the RTC Order dismissing the case
against them.23 Respondent’s intervention as the offended party in the prosecution of the
criminal case is only limited to the enforcement of the civil liability.24
Sally Go counters that as the offended party, she has an interest in the maintenance of the
criminal prosecution against petitioners and quotes Merciales v. Court of Appeals25 to support
her position: "The right of offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives
them of due process has always been recognized, the only limitation being that they cannot
appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused in double jeopardy." Moreover,
the OSG and the OCP had impliedly consented to the filing of the petition before the CA because
they did not interpose any objection.26
This Court leans toward Resally’s contention that Sally Go had no personality to file the petition
for certiorari before the CA. It has been consistently held that in criminal cases, the acquittal of
the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor
General, acting on behalf of the State.27 The private complainant or the offended party may
question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is
concerned.28 As explained in the case of People v. Santiago:291awphil
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the
interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil
liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a
witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is
an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by
the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the
People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take
such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect
despite the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein
it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by
the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private
offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so
he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the
People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant.
[Emphases Supplied]
A perusal of the petition for certiorari filed by Sally Go before the CA discloses that she sought
reconsideration of the criminal aspect of the case. Specifically, she prayed for the reversal of the
trial court’s order granting petitioners’ demurrer to evidence and the conduct of a full blown trial
of the criminal case. Nowhere in her petition did she even briefly discuss the civil liability of
petitioners. It is apparent that her only desire was to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case
against the petitioners. Because bigamy is a criminal offense, only the OSG is authorized to
prosecute the case on appeal. Thus, Sally Go did not have the requisite legal standing to appeal
the acquittal of the petitioners.
Sally Go was mistaken in her reading of the ruling in Merciales. First, in the said case, the OSG
joined the cause of the petitioner, thereby meeting the requirement that criminal actions be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.30 Second, the acquittal of
the accused was done without due process and was declared null and void because of the
nonfeasance on the part of the public prosecutor and the trial court.31 There being no valid
acquittal, the accused therein could not invoke the protection of double jeopardy.
In this case, however, neither the Solicitor General nor the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City
joined the cause of Sally Go, much less consented to the filing of a petition for certiorari with
the appellate court. Furthermore, she cannot claim to have been denied due process because
the records show that the trial court heard all the evidence against the accused and that the
prosecution had formally offered the evidence before the court granted the demurrer to
evidence. Thus, the petitioners’ acquittal was valid, entitling them to invoke their right against
double jeopardy.
Double jeopardy had already set-in
Petitioners contend that the December 3, 2003 Order of dismissal issued by the RTC on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence is a judgment of acquittal. The prosecution is, thus, barred
from appealing the RTC Order because to allow such an appeal would violate petitioners’ right
against double jeopardy.32 They insist that the CA erred in ordering the remand of the case to
the lower court for further proceedings because it disregarded the constitutional proscription on
the prosecution of the accused for the same offense.33
On the other hand, Sally Go counters that the petitioners cannot invoke their right against
double jeopardy because the RTC decision acquitting them was issued with grave abuse of
discretion, rendering the same null and void.34
A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case and the trial court is
required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to
warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the court finds that the
evidence is not sufficient and grants the demurrer to evidence, such dismissal of the case is one
on the merits, which is equivalent to the acquittal of the accused.35 Well-established is the rule
that the Court cannot review an order granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the
accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence because to do so will place the accused in
double jeopardy.36
The right of the accused against double jeopardy is protected by no less than the Bill of Rights
(Article III) contained in the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or
information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge;
and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.37 However, jurisprudence allows for certain
exceptions when the dismissal is considered final even if it was made on motion of the accused,
to wit:
(1) Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the
prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an
acquittal.
(2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his
right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute.38
The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against double
jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the
opportunity to make its case against the accused or where the trial was a sham.39 For instance,
there is no double jeopardy (1) where the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of
the prosecution's evidence and forthwith dismissed the information for insufficiency of
evidence;40and (2) where the case was dismissed at a time when the case was not ready for
trial and adjudication.41
In this case, all four elements of double jeopardy are doubtless present. A valid information for
the crime of bigamy was filed against the petitioners, resulting in the institution of a criminal
case against them before the proper court. They pleaded not guilty to the charges against them
and subsequently, the case was dismissed after the prosecution had rested its case. Therefore,
the CA erred in reversing the trial court’s order dismissing the case against the petitioners
because it placed them in double jeopardy.
As previously discussed, an acquittal by virtue of a demurrer to evidence is not appealable
because it will place the accused in double jeopardy. However, it may be subject to review only
by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of
due process.42
Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as that capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. "The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility."43 The party questioning the acquittal of an
accused should be able to clearly establish that the trial court blatantly abused its discretion
such that it was deprived of its authority to dispense justice.44
The CA determined that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ignoring the
evidence presented by the prosecution and granting petitioners’ demurrer to evidence on the
ground that the prosecution failed to establish by sufficient evidence the existence of the
crime.45 An examination of the decision of the trial court, however, yields the conclusion that
there was no grave abuse of discretion on its part. Even if the trial court had incorrectly
overlooked the evidence against the petitioners, it only committed an error of judgment, and
not one of jurisdiction, which could not be rectified by a petition for certiorari because double
jeopardy had already set in.46
As regards Sally Go’s assertion that she had been denied due process, an evaluation of the
records of the case proves that nothing can be further from the truth. Jurisprudence dictates
that in order for a decision of the trial court to be declared null and void for lack of due process,
it must be shown that a party was deprived of his opportunity to be heard.47 Sally Go cannot
deny that she was given ample opportunity to present her witnesses and her evidence against
petitioners. Thus, her claim that she was denied due process is unavailing.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The March 14, 2006 Decision and the May 22, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 3, 2003 Order
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C-66783, granting
the Demurrer to Evidence of petitioners Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr. and Resally de Asis Delfin
and dismissing the case against them is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173089 August 25, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
Hon. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Biliran Province, Branch 16, and JAIME ABORDO, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), representing the State, seeking to reverse and set aside the June 7, 2006 Resolution 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 01289, which dismissed outright its petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 for being the wrong remedy.
From the records, it appears that on October 7, 2002, at 12:30 o’clock in the morning,
respondent Jaime Abordo (Abordo) was riding his motorcycle on his way home. He was met by
private complainants Kennard Majait (Majait),Joeniel Calvez (Calvez) and Jose
Montes (Montes). An altercation ensued between them. Abordo shot Majait in the leg while
Calvez was hit in the lower left side of his abdomen. Montes escaped unhurt.
Abordo was charged with two (2) counts of attempted murder in Criminal Case Nos. N-2212 and
N-2213 and one (1) count of frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. N-2211 before the Regional
Trial Court, Biliran Province, Branch 16 (RTC). The trial court found no treachery and evident
premeditation. Thus, in its August 29, 2005 Decision,2 the RTC held Abordo liable only for
Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less Serious Physical Injuries with regard to
Majait. It also appreciated four (4) generic mitigating circumstances in favor of Abordo. With
respect to the complaint of Montes, Abordo was acquitted.
All three complainants moved for a reconsideration regarding the civil aspect. They filed a
supplemental motion to include moral damages. Calvez without the conformity of the Provincial
Prosecutor, filed a notice of appeal for both the civil and the criminal aspects. For said reason,
Calvez later sought withdrawal of his motion for reconsideration and its supplement.
On October 24, 2005, the trial court dismissed Majait’s motion for reconsideration while Calvez’s
motion to withdraw was granted. On said date, the trial court also dismissed Calvez’ appeal for
not bearing the conformity of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Acting on Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuno’s Indorsement3 of the October 11, 2005
letter4 of Assistant City Prosecutor Nida C. Tabuldan-Gravino, a relative of Calvez, the OSG filed
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA based on the following grounds:
GROUNDS FOR THE ALLOWANCE
OF THE PETITION
(Petition for Certiorari before the CA)
I CRIM. CASE NOS. N-2211, N-2212 AND N-2213.7
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAD NO INTENT TO KILL,
IN HOLDING HIM GUILTY OF ONLY SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL
INJURIES INSTEAD OF FRUSTRATED MURDER AND ATTEMPTED MURDER IN CRIMINAL CASE
NOS. N-2211 AND N-2212, RESPECTIVELY, AND IN ACQUITTING HIM OF THE CRIME CHARGED
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. N-2213.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN APPRECIATING FOUR (4) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN
FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT. 5
The CA, in the assailed Resolution, dismissed the petition outright. According to the appellate
court, the filing of the petition for certiorari was the wrong remedy. As the State was
questioning the verdict of acquittal and findings of lesser offenses by the trial court, the remedy
should have been an appeal. Moreover, the petition for certiorariplaced the accused in double
jeopardy. Specifically, the CA wrote:
x x x. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case,
such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of
jurisdiction but an error of law or fact – a mistake of judgment – appeal is the remedy. In view
of the improper action taken by the herein petitioner, the instant petition should be dismissed.
Moreover, Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that any party
may appeal from a judgment or final order unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy.
In the instant petition, the Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines is
assailing the judgment of the public respondent in finding the accused guilty of lesser crimes
tha[n] the ones with which he was charged and of acquitting him in another. It appears to us
that the Solicitor General is also representing the interest of the private complainant Calvez
when it questioned the dismissal of the latter’s Notice of Appeal dated October 10, 2005 with
respect to the civil aspect of the case. Although the Solicitor General is allowed to file an appeal
under such rule; however, we must point out that in filing this petition for certiorari, the
accused is thereby placed in double jeopardy. Such recourse is tantamount to converting
the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the express injunction of the Constitution,
the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy.
We must emphasize that the prosecution cannot appeal a decision in a criminal case whether to
reverse an acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed in a conviction because it would place
him in double jeopardy. Hence, this petition is dismissible not only on the ground of
wrong remedy taken by the petitioner to question an error of judgment but also on
the ground that such action places the accused in double jeopardy.6 [emphases and
underscoring supplied]
Not in conformity, the OSG comes to this Court via this petition for review under Rule 45
presenting the following:
GROUNDS RELIED UPON FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING
OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI SEEKING TO ANNUL THE JOINT JUDGMENT DATED
AUGUST 29, 2005 OF HON. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
RTC OF BILIRAN, BRANCH 16 IN CRIM. CASE NOS. N-2211, N-2212 AND N-2213 WHICH WAS
CLEARLY SHOWN TO BE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND APPLICABLE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN THEREBY
AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE PLAINLY ERRONEOUS JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST 29, 2005 OF HON.
ENRIQUE C. ASIS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC OF BILIRAN PROVINCE, BRANCH 16, IN
On January 19, 2009, the petition was given due course and the parties were ordered to submit
their respective memoranda. The parties complied with the order.
We find that the appellate court erred in dismissing the petition outright.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of
acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the
finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. 8 The rule,
however, is not without exception. In several cases, 9 the Court has entertained petitions for
certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases. Thus,
in People v. Louel Uy,10 the Court has held:
Like any other rule, however, the above said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgmentbut also grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus
rendering the assailed judgment void. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
In People v. Laguio, Jr.,11 where the acquittal of the accused was via the grant of his demurrer
to evidence, We pointed out the propriety of resorting to a petition for certiorari. Thus:
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts
granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result
in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in
an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is
not violated. [Emphases supplied]
In this petition, the OSG claims that Abordo’s acquittal in Criminal Case No. N-2213 was
improper.1âwphi1 Since appeal could not be taken without violating Abordo’s constitutionally
guaranteed right against double jeopardy, the OSG was correct in pursuing its cause via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the appellate court. It was a serious error by the CA
to have deprived the petitioner of its right to avail of that remedy.
As the case was summarily dismissed on a technicality, the merits of the petition for certiorari
were not at all discussed. Thus, the proper recourse would be a remand to the CA.
A review of the records, however, shows that the case need not be remanded to the CA for
appropriate proceedings. The OSG’s petition for certiorari, which forms part of the records,
would not merit a favorable review even if it would be given due course simply because it is
bereft of merit. For said reason, We deem that a remand of the case would only prolong the
disposition of the case. It is not without precedent. "On many occasions, the Court, in the
interest of public service and for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions
on the merits, instead of remanding them for further proceedings, as where the ends of justice
would not be sub-served by the remand of the case."12
The rule is that "while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the
petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice."13 The case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan,14 presents an instructive exception to the rule
on double jeopardy, that is, when the prosecution has been denied due process of law. "The
rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse
of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently, there is
no double jeopardy."15
of the parties. It is apparent from the decision of public respondent that she considered all the
evidence adduced by the parties. Even assuming arguendo that public respondent may have
improperly assessed the evidence on hand, what is certain is that the decision was arrived at
only after all the evidence was considered, weighed and passed upon. In such a case, any error
committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied
by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of
certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the
evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of
law. Since no error of jurisdiction can be attributed to public respondent in her assessment of
the evidence, certiorari will not lie. [Emphasis supplied]
Summing them all up, the CA clearly erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it
by the OSG on the ground that it was the wrong remedy. There is, however, no need for the
remand of the case to the CA as the petition for certiorari, on its face, cannot be given due
course.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The June 7, 2006 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01289, dismissing the petition for certiorari for being the wrong
remedy is SET ASIDE. Acting on the petition for certiorari, the Court resolves to DENY the same
for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.

A reading of the OSG petition for certiorari filed before the CA, however, fails to show that the
prosecution was deprived of its right to due process. Primarily, the OSG petition does not
mention or even hint that there was a curtailment of its right. Unlike in Galman, the prosecution
in this case was never denied its day in court. Both the prosecution and the defense were able
to present their respective evidence, testimonial and documentary. Both parties had their
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and scrutinize every piece of evidence. Thereafter, the
trial court exercising its discretion evaluated the evidence before it and rendered its decision.
Certainly, there was no mistrial.

The arguments proffered in the said petition call for a review of the evidence and a recalibration
of the factual findings. At the outset, the OSG faulted the trial court for giving full faith and
credit to the testimonies of Abordo and his witnesses. It wrote:

In ruling that private respondent had no intent to kill private complainants, respondent judge
thus accorded full faith and credit to the testimonies of private respondent and his witnesses
Julito Bernadas and Melquiades Palconit. His findings, however, are contrary to law and the
evidence. Therefore, he acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.16

It further pointed out that the CA "failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion." 17 Subsequently, in its memorandum, it merely
reiterated the purported errors of the trial judge in appreciating and assessing the evidence of
both the prosecution and the defense. Apparently, it wants a review of the trial court’s judgment
which it claimed to be erroneous.

The OSG then proceeded to show how the evidence should have been appreciated by the trial
court in its favor and against Abordo to demonstrate that there was intent to kill on his part.

What the OSG is questioning, therefore, are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be
resolved without violating Abordo’s constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy.
An appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial court’s evaluation of the
evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ
of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave
abuse of discretion. In the case of People v. Hon. Tria-Tirona,18 it was written:

Petitioner, via a petition for review on certiorari, prays for the nullification and the setting aside
of the decision of public respondent acquitting private respondent claiming that the former
abused her discretion in disregarding the testimonies of the NBI agents on the discovery of the
illegal drugs. The petition smacks in the heart of the lower court's appreciation of the evidence