[G.R. No. 123872.
January 30, 1998] somewhere in Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias from Baguio City
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN
MONTILLA y GATDULA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-Appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula, alias "Joy," was
charged on August 22, 1994 for violating Section 4, Article II of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias, Cavite in an information which
alleges:
That on or about the 20th day of June 1994, at Barangay
Salitran, Municipality of Dasmarias, Province of Cavite,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, administer,
transport, and deliver twenty-eight (28) kilos of dried marijuana
leaves, which are considered prohibited drugs, in violation of
the provisions of R.A. 6425 thereby causing damage and
prejudice to the public interest.[1]
The consequent arraignment conducted on September 14,
1994 elicited a plea of not guilty from appellant who was
assisted therein by his counsel de parte.[2] Trial was held on
scheduled dates thereafter, which culminated in a verdict of
guilty in a decision of the trial court dated June 8, 1995 and
which imposed the extreme penalty of death on appellant. He
was further ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00
and to pay the costs of the proceedings.[3]
It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that appellant
was apprehended at around 4:00 A.M. of June 20, 1994 near a
waiting shed located at Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias, Cavite
by SPO1 Concordio Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin,
both members of the Cavite Philippine National Police
Command based in Dasmarias. Appellant, according to the two
officers, was caught transporting 28 marijuana bricks contained
in a traveling bag and a carton box, which marijuana bricks had
a total weight of 28 kilos.
These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided
by an informer in the arrest of appellant. That informer,
according to Talingting and Clarin, had informed them the day
before, or on June 19, 1994 at about 2:00 P.M., that a drug
courier, whom said informer could recognize, would be arriving
with an undetermined amount of marijuana. It was the same
informer who pinpointed to the arresting officers the appellant
when the latter alighted from a passenger jeepney on the
aforestated day, hour, and place.[4]
Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed ownership of the
prohibited drugs. He claimed during the trial that while he
indeed came all the way from Baguio City, he traveled to
Dasmarias, Cavite with only some pocket money and without
any luggage. His sole purpose in going there was to look up
his cousin who had earlier offered a prospective job at a
garment factory in said locality, after which he would return to
Baguio City. He never got around to doing so as he was
accosted by SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin at Barangay
Salitran.
He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in
Dasmarias, Cavite, he was never informed of his constitutional
rights and was in fact even robbed of the P500.00 which he
had with him. Melita Adaci, the cousin, corroborated appellant's
testimony about the job offer in the garment factory where she
reportedly worked as a supervisor,[5] although, as the trial
court observed, she never presented any document to prove
her alleged employment.
In the present appellate review, appellant disputes the trial
court's finding that he was legally caught in flagrante
transporting the prohibited drugs. This Court, after an objective
and exhaustive review of the evidence on record, discerns no
reversible error in the factual findings of the trial court. It finds
unassailable the reliance of the lower court on the positive
testimonies of the police officers to whom no ill motives can be
attributed, and its rejection of appellant's fragile defense of
denial which is evidently self-serving in nature.
1. Firstly, appellant asserts that the court a quo grossly erred in
convicting him on the basis of insufficient evidence as no proof
was proffered showing that he wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously administered, transported, and delivered 28 kilos of
dried marijuana leaves, since the police officers "testified only
on the alleged transporting of Marijuana from Baguio City to
Cavite."
Further, the failure of the prosecution to present in court the
civilian informant is supposedly corrosive of the People's cause
since, aside from impinging upon appellant's fundamental right
to confront the witnesses against him, that informant was a
vital personality in the operation who would have contradicted
the hearsay and conflicting testimonies of the arresting officers
on how appellant was collared by them.
 The Court also disagrees with the contention of appellant that
the civilian informer should have been produced in court
The pertinent provision of the penal law here involved, in considering that his testimony was "vital" and his presence in
Section 4 of Article II thereof, as amended, is as follows: court was essential in order to give effect to or recognition of
appellant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses
arrayed by the State against him. These assertions are,
however, much too strained. Far from compromising the
SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
primacy of appellant's right to confrontation, the non-
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion
presentation of the informer in this instance was justified and
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
cannot be faulted as error.
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker For one, the testimony of said informer would have been, at
in any of such transactions. best, merely corroborative of the declarations of SPO1
Talingting and SPO1 Clarin before the trial court, which
testimonies are not hearsay as both testified upon matters in
which they had personally taken part. As such, the testimony of
Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the
the informer could be dispensed with by the prosecution,[8]
contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a
more so where what he would have corroborated are the
prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be
narrations of law enforcers on whose performance of duties
the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the
regularity is the prevailing legal presumption. Besides,
maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
informants are generally not presented in court because of the
need to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable
services to the police.[9] Moreover, it is up to the prosecution
Now, the offense ascribed to appellant is a violation of the whom to present in court as its witnesses, and not for the
Dangerous Drugs Act, some of the various modes of defense to dictate that course.[10] Finally, appellant could very
commission[6] being the sale, administration, delivery, well have resorted to the coercive process of subpoena to
distribution, and transportation of prohibited drugs as set forth compel that eyewitness to appear before the court below,[11]
in the epigraph of Section 4, Article II of said law. The text of but which remedy was not availed of by him.
Section 4 expands and extends its punitive scope to other acts
besides those mentioned in its headnote by including these
who shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
2. Appellant contends that the marijuana bricks were
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug,
confiscated in the course of an unlawful warrantless search
or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions." Section 4
and seizure. He calls the attention of the Court to the fact that
could thus be violated by the commission of any of the acts
as early as 2:00 P.M. of the preceding day, June 19, 1994, the
specified therein, or a combination thereof, such as selling,
police authorities had already been apprised by their so-called
administering, delivering, giving away, distributing, dispatching
informer of appellant's impending arrival from Baguio City,
in transit or transporting, and the like.
hence those law enforcers had the opportunity to procure the
requisite warrant. Their misfeasance should therefore
invalidate the search for and seizure of the marijuana, as well
As already stated, appellant was charged with a violation of as the arrest of appellant on the following dawn. Once again,
Section 4, the transgressive acts alleged therein and attributed the Court is not persuaded.
to appellant being that he administered, delivered, and
transported marijuana. The governing rule with respect to an
offense which may be committed in any of the different modes
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general
provided by law is that an indictment would suffice if the
rule that a search and seizure must be carried out through or
offense is alleged to have been committed in one, two or more
on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search
modes specified therein. This is so as allegations in the
and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of
information of the various ways of committing the offense
said constitutional provision.[12] Evidence secured on the
should be considered as a description of only one offense and
occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is
the information cannot be dismissed on the ground of
tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of
multifariousness.[7] In appellant's case, the prosecution
a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it
adduced evidence clearly establishing that he transported
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite. By that act alone of
proceeding. This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute
transporting the illicit drugs, appellant had already run afoul of
and rigid proscription. Thus, (1) customs searches;[13] (2)
that particular section of the statute, hence, appellant's
searches of moving vehicles,[14] (3) seizure of evidence in
asseverations must fail.
plain view;[15] (4) consented searches;[16] (5) searches
incidental to a lawful arrest;[17] and (6) "stop and frisk"
measures[18] have been invariably recognized as the
traditional exceptions.
In appellant's case, it should be noted that the information
relayed by the civilian informant to the law enforcers was that
there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a
courier coming from Baguio City in the "early morning" of June
20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed
for time, this would be beside the point for, under these
circumstances, the information relayed was too sketchy and
not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding
arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the
informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he
knew him by name.
While it is not required that the authorities should know the
exact name of the subject of the warrant applied for, there is
the additional problem that the informant did not know to whom
the drugs would be delivered and at which particular part of the
barangay there would be such delivery. Neither did this asset
know the precise time of the suspect's arrival, or his means of
transportation, the container or contrivance wherein the drugs
were concealed and whether the same were arriving together
with, or were being brought by someone separately from, the
courier.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have
properly applied for a warrant, assuming that they could readily
have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the
time they could make preparations for applying therefor, and
on which there is no evidence presented by the defense. In
determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the
intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and
ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in
rural areas. In fact, the police had to form a surveillance team
and to lay down a dragnet at the possible entry points to
Barangay Salitran at midnight of that day notwithstanding the
tip regarding the "early morning" arrival of the courier. Their
leader, SPO2 Cali, had to reconnoiter inside and around the
barangay as backup, unsure as they were of the time when
and the place in Barangay Salitran, where their suspect would
show up, and how he would do so.
On the other hand, that they nonetheless believed the
informant is not surprising for, as both SPO1 Clarin and SPO1
Talingting recalled, he had proved to be a reliable source in
past operations. Moreover, experience shows that although
information gathered and passed on by these assets to law
enforcers are vague and piecemeal, and not as neatly and
completely packaged as one would expect from a professional
spymaster, such tip-offs are sometimes successful as it proved
to be in the apprehension of appellant. If the courts of justice
are to be of understanding assistance to our law enforcement
agencies, it is necessary to adopt a realistic appreciation of the
physical and tactical problems of the latter, instead of critically
viewing them from the placid and clinical environment of
judicial chambers.
3. On the defense argument that the warrantless search
conducted on appellant invalidates the evidence obtained from
him, still the search on his belongings and the consequent
confiscation of the illegal drugs as a result thereof was justified
as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Under that provision, a peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated,
necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to
validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous
weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense.[19] On the other hand, the
apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable
cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in
cadence with the instances of permissible arrests set out in
Section 5(a).[20] These instances have been applied to arrests
carried out on persons caught in flagrante delicto. The
conventional view is that probable cause, while largely a
relative term the determination of which must be resolved
according to the facts of each case, is understood as having
reference to such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe and conclude
as to the commission of an offense, and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched.[21]
Parenthetically, if we may digress, it is time to observe that the
evidentiary measure for the propriety of filing criminal charges
and, correlatively, for effecting a warrantless arrest, has been
reduced and liberalized. In the past, our statutory rules and
jurisprudence required prima facie evidence, which was of a
higher degree or quantum,[22] and was even used with dubiety
as equivalent to "probable cause." Yet, even in the American
jurisdiction from which we derived the term and its concept,
probable cause is understood to merely mean a reasonable
ground for belief in the existence of facts warranting the
proceedings complained of,[23] or an apparent state of facts
found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which would induce a
reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe that the
accused person had committed the crime.[24]
Felicitously, those problems and confusing concepts were
clarified and set aright, at least on the issue under discussion,
by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which provides
in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of evidence required in
preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to
"engender a well founded belief" as to the fact of the
commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt
thereof.[25] It has the same meaning as the related
phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule, that is, that
the investigating fiscal "finds cause to hold the respondent for
trial," or where "a probable cause exists."[26] It should,
therefore, be in that sense, wherein the right to effect a
warrantless arrest should be considered as legally authorized.
In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the
passenger jeepney the informer at once indicated to the
officers that their suspect was at hand by pointing to him from
the waiting shed. SPO1 Clarin recounted that the informer told
them that the marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling
bag and carton box which appellant was carrying at the time.
The officers thus realized that he was their man even if he was
simply carrying a seemingly innocent looking pair of luggage
for personal effects. Accordingly, they approached appellant,
introduced themselves as policemen, and requested him to
open and show them the contents of the traveling bag, which
appellant voluntarily and readily did. Upon cursory inspection
by SPO1 Clarin, the bag yielded the prohibited drugs, so,
without bothering to further search the box, they brought
appellant and his luggage to their headquarters for
questioning.
Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying
a traveling bag and a carton box should not elicit the slightest
suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal.
But, precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things that drugs
being illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers
and concealed from view. Thus, the officers could reasonably
assume, and not merely on a hollow suspicion since the
informant was by their side and had so informed them, that the
drugs were in appellant's luggage. It would obviously have
been irresponsible, if not downright absurd under the
circumstances, to require the constable to adopt a "wait and
see" attitude at the risk of eventually losing the quarry.
Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and
seizure that, at the point prior to the search, were already
constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could
properly create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded and
reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the
law. The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause
and the actuality that appellant was then actually committing a
crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. With these
attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in
flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of his
belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified.
Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is
borne out by the evidence. To repeat, when the officers
approached appellant and introduced themselves as
policemen, they asked him about the contents of his luggage,
and after he replied that they contained personal effects, the
officers asked him to open the traveling bag. Appellant readily
acceded, presumably or in all likelihood resigned to the fact
that the law had caught up with his criminal activities. When an
individual voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have
the same conducted upon his person or premises, he is
precluded from later complaining thereof.
After all, the right to be secure from unreasonable search may,
like other rights, be waived either expressly or impliedly.[27]
Thus, while it has been held that the silence of the accused
during a warrantless search should not be taken to mean
consent to the search but as a demonstration of that person's
regard for the supremacy of the law,[28] the case of herein
appellant is evidently different for, here, he spontaneously
performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the
bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts
should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right.[29]
4. Appellant likewise harps on the alleged failure of the
prosecution to "legally, properly and adequately establish that
the 28 bricks of marijuana allegedly confiscated from (him)
were the same marijuana examined by the forensic chemist
and presented in court." Indeed, the arresting officers did not
identify in court the marijuana bricks seized from appellant
since, in fact they did not have to do so. It should be noted that
the prosecution presented in the court below and formally
offered in evidence those 28 bricks of marijuana together with
the traveling bag and the carton box in which the same were
contained. The articles were properly marked as confiscated
evidence and proper safeguards were taken to ensure that the
marijuana turned over to the chemist for examination, and
which subsequently proved positive as such, were the same
drugs taken from appellant. The trial court, therefore, correctly
admitted them in evidence, satisfied that the articles were
indubitably no other than those taken from appellant.
Complementarily, the corpus delicti was firmly established by
SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting who categorically related
that when they had ascertained that the contents of the
traveling bag of appellant appeared to be marijuana, they
forthwith asked him where he had come from, and the latter
readily answered "Baguio City," thus confirming the veracity of
the report of the informer. No other conclusion can therefore be
derived than that appellant had transported the illicit drugs all
the way to Cavite from Baguio City. Coupled with the
presentation in court of the subject matter of the crime, the
marijuana bricks which had tested positive as being indian
hemp, the guilt of appellant for transporting the prohibited
drugs in violation of the law is beyond doubt.

Appellant questions the interrogation conducted by the police
authorities, claiming that he was not allowed to communicate
with anybody, and that he was not duly informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. Indeed, appellant has a point.
The police authorities here could possibly have violated the
provision of Republic Act No. 7438[30] which defines certain
rights of persons arrested, detained, or under custodial
investigation, as well as the duties of the arresting, detaining,
and investigating officers, and providing corresponding
penalties for violations thereof.
Assuming the existence of such irregularities, however, the
proceedings in the lower court will not necessarily be struck
down. Firstly, appellant never admitted or confessed anything
during his custodial investigation. Thus, no incriminatory
evidence in the nature of a compelled or involuntary confession
or admission was elicited from him which would otherwise
have been inadmissible in evidence. Secondly and more
importantly, the guilt of appellant was clearly established by
other evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the
testimonies of the arresting officers together with the
documentary and object evidence which were formally offered
and admitted in evidence in the court below.
5. The reversible error of the trial court lies in its imposition of
the penalty of death on appellant. As amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, Section 20, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act
now provides inter alia that the penalty in Section 4 of Article II
shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is, in the case
of indian hemp or marijuana, 750 grams or more. In said
Section 4, the transporting of prohibited drugs carries with it
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Thus,
the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. In the present case,
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code consequently provides
the rules to be observed in the application of said penalties.
As found by the trial court, there were neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances attending appellant's violation of
the law, hence the second paragraph of Article 63 must
necessarily apply, in which case the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua is the proper imposable penalty. Contrary to the
pronouncement of the court a quo, it was never intended by
the legislature that where the quantity of the dangerous drugs
involved exceeds those stated in Section 20, the maximum
penalty of death shall be imposed. Nowhere in the amendatory
law is there a provision from which such a conclusion may be
gleaned or deduced. On the contrary, this Court has already
concluded that Republic Act No. 7659 did not amend Article 63
of the Revised Penal Code,[31] the rules wherein were
observed although the cocaine subject of that case was also in
excess of the quantity provided in Section 20.
It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the law itself
provides a specific penalty where the violation thereof is in its
aggravated form as laid down in the second paragraph of
Section 4 whereby, regardless of Section 20 of Article IV, if the
victim is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any
offense in said section be the proximate cause of the death of
a victim thereof, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.[32]
While the minority or the death of the victim will increase the
liability of the offender, these two facts do not constitute
generic aggravating circumstances, as the law simply provides
for the imposition of the single indivisible penalty of death if the
offense is attended by either of such factual features. In that
situation, obviously the rules on the graduation of penalties in
Article 63 cannot apply. In herein appellant's case, there was
neither a minor victim nor a consequent death of any victim.
Hence, the basic rules in Article 63 of the Code govern.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 90, of Dasmarias, Cavite in Criminal Case No. 3401-94
is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that accused-appellant
Ruben Montilla y Gatdula shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
PP V. ARUTA
Search and Seizure – Informer’s Tip
In the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers
received information from an informant named “Benjie” that a
certain “Aling Rosa” would be leaving for Baguio City on 14
Dec 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day
carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; At 6:30 in the
evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta alighted from a Victory Liner
Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed her
out to the law enforcement officers; NARCOM officers
approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM
agents; When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her
travelling bag, she gave the same to him; When they opened
the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; Aruta was then
brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is
constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some 2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” the elements of which
drug traffickers are being freed due to technicalities. Aruta are:
cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest
about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Aruta
in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any
official duties;
manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was
who had the right to be where they are;
committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to
Aruta and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The
(d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without
NARCOM agents would not have apprehended Aruta were it
further search;
not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly
illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the

whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces

committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public

informant. The SC could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion

clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a

unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any criminal activity;

semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of 4. Consented warrantless search;
probable cause and warrantless arrests. Consequently, there
5. Customs search;
was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a
warrantless search of Aruta’s bag, there being no probable 6. Stop and Frisk; and

cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully 7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it
logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006

illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The

constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant.
As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence
against accused-appellant for these are “fruits of a poisoned
tree” and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III,
Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
Read full text here.
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO
B. OCON, Petitioners,
vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June
2003 Resolution denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed
decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D.

NOTES:
When is a warrantless search allowed?
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by
prevailing jurisprudence;
Anghad to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed Orders, the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus
and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE
COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001,
Order dated September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated
October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November
 14, 2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations for
Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523
and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and
REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001 and
Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then
acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are
hereby ordered REINSTATED in the docket of active
criminal cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial
Court of Santiago City, Isabela; and
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is
DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for
the apprehension of private respondents Jose
"Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3
Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in
said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as
follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in
Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as
the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of
private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness
protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo
Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin,
SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4
Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago
City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999,
the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced
them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2
Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at
large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic
review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused
therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested.
On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and
identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon,
and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and
Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of
Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder
against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and
submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June
2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued
warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to
complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to
recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge
Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint
Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion
cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime,
petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T.
Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D.
Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing
the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered
the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against
petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners
Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001.
State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved
for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for
the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for
reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October
2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order
dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with this Court, with
prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin
Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and
seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad
dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001,
and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution
resolving to grant the prayer for a temporary restraining order
against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the
criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge
Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001
dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners.
On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of respondent’s
cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15
November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order
while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for
adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public
Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad
"deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he
issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November
2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November
2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view
of the previous referral to it of respondent’s petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the
reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago
City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth
to this Court the following assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21,
2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in
criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in
upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6,
2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo
Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek
any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the
jurisdiction of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
erred in directing the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-
3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of
Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City,
Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue
the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed
a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal
Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active
criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of
Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public
respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein
petitioners, the order of dismissal issued therein having
become final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires
neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody
of law over the body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner
deals with the Court of Appeals’ ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not
submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction
over the person of the accused may be acquired either through
compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his
voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the
police or to the court. It is only when the court has already
acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may
invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V.
Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus,
an accused must first be placed in the custody of the law
before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial
reliefs.3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any
judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise
deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent
Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate;
to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest."4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by
arguing that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners
argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is
required before the court can act on their motion to quash the
warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was
already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent
Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in
the adjudication of applications for bail, petitioners quote
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court
to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to
dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of
the case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado
vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on
motion of the accused for lack of probable cause without the
accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of
Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the
issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by
the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs. Executive
Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court ordered the case
transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which
eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of
probable cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person
was already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion,
petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz
D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court
acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by
his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash
or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s
jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial)
or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is
intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a
rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused
has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest
or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between
custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of
the law is required before the court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of
other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.8 Custody of the
law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary
surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One can
be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person
arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before
arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can
be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and
yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused
escapes custody after his trial has commenced. 11Being in the
custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is
thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to
become obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody of the law is
literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is
not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the
Court of Appeals should not have been separated from the
issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail
of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire
paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody
of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who
has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no
right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge
should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the
applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of
the accused before considering the application for bail. 13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as
it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who
seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of
Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil
or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the
special requirement of the applicant being in the custody of the
law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of
bail is to secure one’s release and it would be incongruous to
grant bail to one who is free. Thus, ‘bail is the security required
and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of
law.’" The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it
discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious
practice wherein the accused could just send another in his
stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the
court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with
the requirements therefor. 17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings
seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and
the consequent submission of one’s person to the jurisdiction
of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is
precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court,
which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings
are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not
other grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in criminal
cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to
quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of
the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a
consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court
process forcing the submission of the person of the accused
that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal
cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed
waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special
jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his
person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special
appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the
court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person
nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the
special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first
submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the
general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking
affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement
for him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases
best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to
accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were
deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of
the court. Note that none of these cases involve the application
for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of
jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of
arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a
petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause,
we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from
enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge
therein from further proceeding with the case and, instead, to
elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accused’s
Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance
Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a
Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed
respondent judge therein to cease and desist from further
proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of
warrants of arrests against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the
accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the
Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional
Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of
the law in applications for bail are not present in motions to
quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to
persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that
many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and
could elude being held to answer for the commission of the
offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we
allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the
custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not
genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is
because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest
who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in
his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny
the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause after
personally examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official
functions, the warrant continues in force and effect until it is
quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at
any time of the day and night.22Furthermore, the continued
absence of the accused can be taken against him in the
determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of
guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is
free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his
freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher
preference in the hierarchy of rights than property
rights,23 demanding that due process in the deprivation of
liberty must come before its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed
petition for review with the Secretary of Justice and based on
doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed
actions of Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too
eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners.
First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his
predecessor because of a subsequently filed appeal to the
Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the
existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the
city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the
prosecutor’s resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the
basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different
accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order against further proceeding with the
case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of
petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant
prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge
Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of
arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad,
"x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a
deferment of the proceedings is but proper." 24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is
inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in
prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants
of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might,
in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutor’s resolution to the
Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was
filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact
remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the
prosecutor’s resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of
arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein
cannot assail as premature the filing of the information in court
against them on the ground that they still have the right to
appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the
Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of
arrest against petitioners herein should not have been quashed
as premature on the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of
the warrant of arrest is in order if true: violation of the
Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the
question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere
to the above-quoted constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2,
Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of
Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases?
To this query or issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments
raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds
merit in the contention of herein accused-movant, Jose
"Pempe" Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the
Constitution as having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case,
including the supporting evidence to the resolution of the
prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that
Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the
arrest of the petitioners is apparent from the face of the order
itself, which clearly stated that the determination of probable
cause was based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal
and not on a separate determination personally made by the
Judge. No presumption of regularity could be drawn from the
order since it expressly and clearly showed that it was based
only on the fiscal’s certification.28
Petitioners’ claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuan’s Joint Order
contains no such indication that he relied solely on the
prosecutor’s certification. The Joint Order even indicated the
contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the
prosecutor, the Court proceeded to determine the existence of
a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x
x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutor’s certification
was accompanied by supporting documents, following the
requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v.
Inting.31 The supporting documents are the following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor
Leo S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor
Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97-
160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel
Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer
Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no
violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III, Section
2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the
substantive part of said section, i.e., the existence of probable
cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled
that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the
following reasons: (1) it was given after almost two years in the
custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given
by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a
fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an
obvious reward of discharge from the information; and (4) it
was given during the election period amidst a "politically
charged scenario where "Santiago City voters were pitted
against each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one
side and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly
that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other."32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and
found no reason to disturb the findings of probable cause of
Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the
credibility of a witness is not within the province of the
determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb 33:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed
and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not
be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable
cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less
than evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of
probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It
is not a pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and
should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary
investigation is not a part of trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this
Court in another case with different accused constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the
ground, among other things, that there was a petition for
review of the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the
Secretary of Justice. However, after the Secretary of Justice
affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution, Judge Anghad summarily
dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the
basis of the following explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo
Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and based from his
sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda – the
mastermind and with him and the other police officers as the
direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of the
Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder, certainly
makes his sworn Statements a "narration of falsehood and
lies" and that because of the decision acquitting said officers
"who were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his
April 27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel
Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements
and therefore the same is without probable value." This Court
agrees with the defense’s views. Indeed, of what use is
Maderal’s statements when the Supreme Court rejected the
prosecution’s evidence presented and adduced in Criminal
Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state
witness in these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court
decision adverted to, the probative value of his statements is
practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused
Miranda dated October 18, 2001, praying for the summary
dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest
decision of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs.
Wilfredo Leaño, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused
therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented by
the prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2)
informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are
ordered dismissed.34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had
no right to twist our decision and interpret it to the discredit of
SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of the
prosecution in the Leaño case was presented. A decision,
even of this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime
cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against
different accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge
Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision
in Leaño was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in
Leaño that the crime did not happen; we just found that there
was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein,
since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial
evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the
criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is
here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leaño
furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliao’s son,
whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the
testimony of respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of
reasonable doubt in Leaño, "it is now beyond doubt that Rodel
Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements
and therefore the same is without probable value."35 On the
contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision in Leaño,
an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points
to the probability of the prosecution’s version of the facts
therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of
probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghad’s dismissal of the
informations two days after we resolved to issue, upon the
filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him
from further proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the
day after the informations were dismissed. While the dismissal
of the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the
temporary restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the
informations (days after this Court’s resolve to issue a TRO
against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the
motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the
reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified
proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the
Court of Appeals did not recall or reinstate the warrants of
arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge
Anghad to issue apparently new warrants of
arrest.36 According to the petitioners, it was an error for the
Court of Appeals to have done so, without a personal
determination of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the
issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the
reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge
Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the
slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect the
dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the
other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other
direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25
June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37 which issued the
warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise
declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void.
Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be
deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set
aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghad’s order
quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore
those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the
issuance of new warrants of arrest based on a determination of
probable cause, it would have been legally permissible for
them to do so. The records of the preliminary investigation had
been available to the Court of Appeals, and are also available
to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court
to personally examine the records of the case and not merely
rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in
Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the
determination of probable cause does not rest on a subjective
criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the
finding of probable cause of the judges therein on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also
overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable
cause, also on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal
case dismissed before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the
Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-
3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had
become final and executory. According to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order
of Judge Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of
those Orders which were assailed in the private respondent
Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed
by the private respondent before the Court of Appeals. As
carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision,
only the following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were
questioned by private respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge
Anghad, which ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-
3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed
Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not
have passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint Order of
November 14, 2001.38
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao’s
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not
with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of
Appeals decided the case because we referred the same to
them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such petition was
filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14
November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001
Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with
this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt,
alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully
committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November
2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the
informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred
said motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous
referral of respondent Tuliao’s petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public
Repondent in Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order
within the issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals.
In claiming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this
Court in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order, respondent
Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more
serious than grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14
November 2001 Order on 15 November 2001, antedating it so
as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In
said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from
further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent
Tuliao’s filing of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00.
Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in
contempt, seeing as disobedience to lawful orders of a court
and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt
which require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the
part of respondent,39 the prayer to cite public respondent in
contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises should be construed to include a prayer for the
nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed
before arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy.
Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not
been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the
case was dismissed.40
As to respondent Tuliao’s prayer (in both the original petition
for certiorari as well as in his motion to cite for contempt) to
disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case,
we hold that the number of instances of abuse of discretion in
this case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the
part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of
People v. SPO1 Leaño,41 by transferring the venue of Criminal
Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila,
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18
December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification
that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be
transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City
of Manila. In this connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago,
Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the
cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of
Santiago, Isabela, is likewise directed to report to this
Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from
transfer of these cases;
 3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall
proceed to raffle the criminal cases within ten (10)
days from the transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is
likewise directed to report to this Court compliance
with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said
compliance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are
raffled is directed to act on said cases with
reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to
issue forthwith warrants of arrest for the apprehension
of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio,
Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal,
conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 18 December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4
August 2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108494 September 20, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SAMUEL MARRA y ZARATE, ALLAN TAN, alias "Allan
Yao,"
PETER DOE, PAUL DOE and TOM DOE, accused.
SAMUEL MARRA y ZARATE, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
43, Dagupan City, Samuel Marra y Zarate, John Doe, Peter
Doe, Paul Doe and Tom Doe were charged with the crime of
murder for the fatal shooting of one Nelson Tandoc on March
7, 1992. 1 On June 4, 1992, an amended information was filed
wherein Allan Tan, alias "Allan Yao," was indicated as an
accused instead of John Doe. 2 A warrant of arrest was
thereafter issued against Allan Tan 3 but the same was
returned unserved, 4 hence trial proceeded with regard to
herein accused-appellant Samuel Marra alone.
Duly assisted by counsel, appellant pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment on May 15, 1992. 5 After trial on the merits,
judgment was rendered by the court below on October 8, 1992
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, attended by the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion
perpetua. He was further ordered to pay the heirs of Nelson
Tandoc the sums of P50,000.00 as death indemnity,
P50,000.00 as actual damages, P100,000.00 as moral
damages, and the costs. 6
The prosecution's eyewitness, Jimmy Din, positively identified
appellant as the triggerman in the killing of Nelson Tandoc. Din
recounted that at around 2:00 A.M. on March 7, 1992, he and
his friend, Nelson Tandoc, were conversing with each other in
front of Lucky Hotel located at M.H. del Pilar Street, Dagupan
City, which was owned by the witness' father and of which he
was the administrator. He noticed a man pass by on the
opposite side of the street. The man made a dirty sign with his
finger and Din informed Tandoc thereof. The man repeated his
offensive act and called them by waving his hands. Infuriated,
they followed the man until the latter stopped in front of the
Dunkin' Donuts store at the corner of Arellano and Fernandez
streets. They demanded an explanation from the man but they
were not given any. 7
At that instant, two men arrived and one of them inquired what
was going on. Tandoc informed him that they were just
demanding an explanation from the man. Din was surprised
when Tandoc unexpectedly slapped one of the two men. A
brawl ensued, with Tandoc clashing with the two men while Din
exchanged blows with the man who made the dirty finger sign.
After the fisticuffs, their three opponents ran away in a
westward direction. 8
Tandoc and Din then decided to walk back to the hotel. When
they were about to enter the place, they noticed that the men
with whom they just had a fight were running towards them.
Sensing danger, they ran inside the annex building of the hotel
and immediately secured the lock of the sliding outer door.
They entered a room and waited until they felt that the situation
had normalized. After ten to fifteen minutes, thinking that the
men were no longer in the vicinity, they left the room. Having
decided to go home, Tandoc opened the sliding door. All of a
sudden, Din saw Appellant, who at that time was wearing a
security guard's uniform, shoot Tandoc with a revolver. There
was a fluorescent bulb installed at the front of the hotel which
enabled Din to identify the assailant. Tandoc was shot in the
middle of the chest and he fell down. Then, Din saw four to five
men scamper away from the scene. 9
Aware of his injury, Tandoc told Din, "Tol, I was shot." The
latter tried to chase appellant and his companions but he failed
to catch up with them. Din and his wife then brought Tandoc to
the Villaflor Hospital. The victim was taken to the emergency
room but he expired an hour later. 10
At about 3:45 A.M. of March 7, 1992, SPO3 Reynaldo de Vera
of the Dagupan City Police Station received a report about a
shooting incident at the annex building of the Lucky Hotel. He
proceeded to the crime scene along with SPO4 Orlando
Garcia, SPO3 Mauricio Flores and SPO3 Noli de Castro. Upon
their arrival about five minutes later, they were informed by the
wife of Jimmy Din that the victim had been brought to the
Villaflor Hospital. They proceeded to the hospital where Din
informed them that he could recognize the man who killed
Tandoc and that the killer was, at that time, wearing the polo
shirt of a security guard's uniform. 11
They decided to proceed to an eatery called "Linda's Ihaw-
Ihaw." Seeing the security guard of a nearby bus company,
they inquired from him if he knew of any unusual incident that
happened in the vicinity. The guard said that he saw the guard
of "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw," together with some companions,
chasing two persons running towards M. H. del Pilar Street. He
further added that the man was wearing a polo shirt of a
security guard's uniform. Asked where that particular guard
might be, he pointed to a man eating inside the eatery nearby.
The man eating was not in a security guard's uniform. 12
They approached the man and inquired whether he was the
security guard of "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw," which the latter
answered in the affirmative. After a series of questions, they
learned that he was Samuel Marra, that his tour of duty was
from 7:00 P.M. of a preceding day to 6:00 A.M. the following
day, that he was still on duty at around 2:30 in the morning of
March 7, 1992, and that the firearm issued to him was in his
house. Upon their request to see the firearm, they proceeded
to Marra's residence at Interior Nueva Street. 13
When they arrived, Marra took a .38 caliber revolver from
inside an aparador and handed it to De Vera. De Vera also
found five live bullets and one spent shell. Smelling gunpowder
from the barrel of the gun, De Vera asked Marra when he last
fired the gun but the latter denied ever having done so.
Abruptly, De Vera asked him point-blank why he shot Tandoc.
Marra at first denied the accusation but when informed that
someone saw him do it, he said that he did so in self-defense,
firing at the victim only once. Tandoc allegedly had
a samurai sword with him at the time of the incident. However,
persistent efforts on the part of the policemen to thereafter
locate said bladed weapon proved futile. Marra also admitted
that prior to the incident, he chased the victim and Din. The
officers then took Marra to the police station where he was
detained. 14
Meanwhile, De Vera went to Villaflor Hospital from where he
fetched Din and brought him to the police station. There, Din
definitely identified Marra as the assailant. During the
investigation, De Vera also found out that Marra had not
firearm license. 15
Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer of Dagupan
City, testified that he conducted an autopsy on a certain
Nelson Tandoc. He found a gunshot wound on the victim with
the point of entry of the left side of the anterior chest wall and
the point of exit at the lower left portion of the right shoulder. 16
Prosecutor Gregorio Gaerlan, stepfather of the victim, testified
on the funeral, burial and other expenses incurred by the
family. He declared that they paid Funeraria Quiogue
P25,000.00 for its services; Villaflor Hospital, P2,875.00 for the
confinement of Tandoc; St. John Memorial Cathedral, P350.00;
Eternal Garden, P3,000.00 for the interment fee and P150.00
for the rent of the tent during the burial; and that they spent
P2,300.00 for the video tape expenses and P11,800.00 for
food and drinks during the wake. 17
Understandably, appellant gave a different version of the
incident. Marra declared in court that he used to work as a
security guard at "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw" from seven o'clock in the
evening to six o'clock in the morning of the following day. On
March 6, 1992, he reported for duty at seven o'clock that
evening as was his usual practice. At around four o'clock down
of the following day, he went home to change his clothes. He
proceeded to the Five Star Bus Terminal which was adjacent
to "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw." He saw Neneng, the cashier of said
eatery, and together they ordered arroz caldo. Later, at about
5:00 A.M., he was approached by four policemen who inquired
if he was a security guard. He answered in the affirmative. He
was also asked about his sidearm. When he answered that it
was at his residence, they all went to his house to look for it.
After he handed over the firearm to the policemen, he was
brought to the city hall where he was detained. 18
Under cross-examination, he insisted that when he handed the
gun to the policeman, there were five live bullets, and not four
live bullets and one empty shell as claimed by the prosecution.
Prior to the incident, he had never met Jimmy Din nor does he
know of any cause why Din would harbor any ill feelings
against him. 19
After a careful scrutiny of the records and an objective
evaluation of the evidence, the Court is not disposed to reverse
the judgment of the lower court, the decision of the latter being
amply supported by the established facts and fully sustained
by the applicable law.
In assailing the decision of the court below, the defense argues
that "Jimmy Din . . . was not able to identify the assailant in a
definite and believable manner." It goes on to state further that
" Jimmy Din was inside the hotel when Nelson Tandoc was
shot and his vision was o(b)structed by the door. Jimmy Din
was also not familiar with the accused. Under the
circumstances by which he allegedly witnessed the shooting,
how could be identify clearly an assailant at the distance of 45
meters?" 20
Appellant's counsel is only partly correct, having conveniently
failed to mention other vital parts of Din's testimony. An
impartial review of said testimony readily reveals that Din was
indeed in a position to know the identity of the assailant. Firstly,
Din knew for a fact that the persons he and Tandoc fought with
near the Dunkin' Donuts store were the same men who chased
them while they were on their way back to the hotel because
he was able to take a good look at them. During the chase, he
naturally turned around to look at the men who were running
after them and who were at that time in front of the Balingit
Trading store which was well-lighted. 21 It logically follows that
they were the same persons who were waiting for them when
they later came out of the hotel, and he was familiar with their
identities because of their previous encounter.
Secondly, we do not agree with appellant that the door blocked
the view of Din. Said door, partly made of plywood, had a
spring hinge which makes it possible for the door to close by
itself. However, at that time the spring hinge had been
weakened by long and constant use such that it would take
some time for it to close the door, thereby allowing Din
sufficient opportunity to have an unobstructed view of the
scene outside. 22
Thirdly, Din was quite near the victim and appellant, which
proximity, enabled him to clearly see what really happened. He
thus readily perceived the actual shooting at the time when
Tandoc pushed the door open. At that precise moment, Din
was at the left side of Tandoc and about four to five meters
away from the assailant. 23
Lastly, the place was brightly illuminated by a 20-watt
fluorescent bulb installed on the outside wall in front of the
hotel. Marra was only about three meters away therefrom.
Such physical conditions would undeniably afford a clear view
from inside the hotel of the immediate area outside and in front
of the same where the incident took place.
The prosecution presented another vital witness in the person
of Sgt. Reynaldo de Vera, whose testimony we shall repeat
here for easy reference. In capsulized form, De Vera narrated
the sequence of events that happened after he and his
companions went to the crime scene to conduct an
investigation. Having received information that a man in a
security guard's uniform was involved in the incident, they
sought information from a security guard of a nearby bus
terminal. Said security guard pointed them to Marra, who at
that time was eating in a carinderianearby. Informed by Marra
that his gun was at his residence, they all went to Marra's
residence to get the same. After receiving said firearm, De
Vera asked appellant why he killed Tandoc but Marra initially
denied any participation in the killing. Nevertheless, when
confronted with the fact that somebody saw him do it, Marra
admitted the act although he alleged it was done in self-
defense. This testimony of De Vera as to the confession of
Marra is of significant weight, but the admissibility thereof shall
also be passed upon.
Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that
"(a)ny person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. . . . ." The critical inquiry then is
whether or not Marra was under custodial investigation when
he admitted the killing but invoked self-defense. We believe
that he was not so situated.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on
a particular suspect,the suspect is taken into custody, and the
police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to
operate. 24
In the case at bar, appellant was not under custodial
investigation when he made the admission. There was no
coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such a statement.
Indeed, he could have refused to answer questions from the
very start when the policemen requested that they all go to his
residence. The police inquiry had not yet reached a level
wherein they considered him as a particular suspect. They
were just probing into a number of possibilities, having been
merely informed that the suspect was wearing what could be a
security guard's uniform. As we held in People vs. Dy: 25 "What
was told by the accused to Pat. Padilla was a spontaneous
statement not elicited through questioning, but given in an
ordinary manner. No written confession was sought to be
presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial
investigation. 26 The trial Court, therefore, cannot be held to
have erred in holding that compliance with the constitutional
procedure on custodial investigation is not applicable in the
instant case, . . . ."
Accordingly, the testimony of Sgt. de Vera assumes a
dominant dimension because it totally destroys the defense of
denial cum alibi subsequently raised by appellant. In his
answers to Sgt. De Vera, appellant expressly admitted that he
shot Tandoc, albeit with an exculpatory explanation. This
admission of Marra is in complete contrast to the statements
he later made in open court.
In addition, the law provides that the declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any
offense necessarily included therein may be given in evidence
against him and, in certain circumstances, this admission may
be considered as part of the res gestae. In a similar situation
involved in the aforecited case ofPeople vs. Dy, this Court
held:
. . . the oral confession made by the accused
to Pat. Padilla that "he had shot a tourist"
and that the gun he had used in shooting the
victim was in his bar which he wanted
surrendered to the Chief of Police (t.s.n.,
October 17, 1984, pp. 6-9) is competent
evidence against him. The declaration of an
accused acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged may be given in evidence
against him (Sec. 29 [now Sec. 33], Rule
130). It may in a sense be also regarded as
part of the res gestae. The rule is that, any
person, otherwise competent as a witness,
who heard the confession, is competent to
testify as to the substance of what he heard
if he heard and understood all of it. An oral
confession need not be repeated verbatim,
but in such a case it must be given in
substance. (23 C.J.S. 196, cited in People
vs. Tawat, G.R. No. 62871, May 25, 1985,
129 SCRA 431). (Italics supplied.)
In any event, even without his admission, the case against
appellant has been duly established by the other evidence of
the prosecution, as earlier discussed. However, persistently
arguing for an acquittal, the defense points out that when the
police officers saw Marra, he was not in a blue uniform
whereas Din testified that the person who shot Tandoc was
wearing the polo shirt of a security guard's uniform. This is a
puerile argument since appellant himself removed any
lingering doubts on this point. He said that on ending his tour of
duty at 4:00 A.M. of March 7, 1992, he decided to go home to
change clothes, after which he went to "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw" to
eat. This explains why, at the time the police officers saw him,
he was already in civilian clothes. The shooting had taken
place earlier at around 2:00 A.M. At that time, Marra was still in
his security guard's uniform, being then on duty.
However, while we agree that the crime committed by
appellant was murder qualified by treachery, we reject the
finding that the same was aggravated by nighttime. No
evidence was presented by the prosecution to show that
nocturnity was specially sought by appellant or taken
advantage of by him to facilitate the commission of the crime or
to ensure his immunity from capture. 27 At any rate, whether or
not such aggravating circumstance should be appreciated, the
penalty to be imposed on appellant would not be affected
considering the proscription against the imposition of the death
penalty at the time when the offense in the instant case was
committed.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding
accused-appellant Samuel Marra y Zarate guilty of the crime of
murder and imposing upon him the penalty and civil liabilities
therein stated is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.