COMELEC powers and duties

1. Pangandaman vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 134340. November 25, 1999

FACTS:
Complaints were filed before the COMELEC to declare failure of election
in the 12 municipalities of Lanao del Sur due to numerous irregularities
in the ballots and other election paraphernalia including intimidations
and violence between candidates and against election officers. The
complaints sought for the holding of special elections.

After investigations by the COMELEC, it was found that there was failure
of election in the said municipalities some owing to widespread terrorism.
Hence, COMELEC issued an Omnibus Order ordering the conduct of
special elections on July 18, 1998 in 5 municipalities and on July 15,
1998 in 3 municipalities.

Pangandaman asserted that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed Ominibus Order by insisting on holding special elections on July
18 and 25 more than 30 days after the failure to elect in certain
municipalities in contravention of the clear and explicit provisions of
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, among others.

In support of his cause, he insists on a strict compliance with the

holding of special elections not later than 30 days after failure to elect
pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code1 because the said
provision used the word “shall” thereby making it mandatory.

Pangandaman further asserted that the prescribed time frame actually

delimits COMELEC’S authority to call for a special election and that
instead, the power to call for a special election after the 30th day now
resides in Congress.

ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC has the power to call for special election after
the lapse of 30 days since the failure of elections

1 SEC. 6. Failure of elections. If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes the election

in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would
affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not
later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
HELD:
The purpose of the governing statutes on the conduct of elections is to
protect the integrity of elections to suppress all evils that may violate its
purity and defeat the will of the voters. The purity of the elections is one
of the most fundamental requisites of popular government. The
Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do everything
in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the
elections. In the performance of its duties, the Commission must be
given a considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will
insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created
to promote free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice of means
taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly
illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be
interfered with.

The legal compass from which the COMELEC should take its
bearings in acting upon election controversies is the principle that
clean elections control the appropriateness of the remedy.

In fixing the date for special elections the COMELEC should see to it
that: 1.] it should not be later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of
the cause of the postponement or suspension of the election or the
failure to elect; and, 2.] it should be reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in the failure to elect. The
first involves a question of fact. The second must be determined in the
light of the peculiar circumstances of a case. Thus, the holding of
elections within the next few months from the cessation of the cause of
the postponement, suspension or failure to elect may still be considered
reasonably close to the date of the election not held.

In this case, the COMELEC can hardly be faulted for tardiness. The dates
set for the special elections were actually the nearest dates from the time
total/partial failure of elections was determined, which date fell on July
14, 1998, the date of promulgation of the challenged Omnibus Order.
Needless to state, July 18 and 25, the dates chosen by the COMELEC for
the holding of special elections were only a few days away from the time a
total/partial failure of elections was declared and, thus, these were dates
reasonably close thereto, given the prevailing facts herein. Furthermore,
it bears stressing that in the exercise of the plenitude of its powers
to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC should not and
must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in the exercise of its
discretion to resolve election disputes.

In applying elections laws, it would be far better to err in favor of

popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little
understood legalisms.
2. Idulza vs. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 160130. April 14, 2004

FACTS:
An election protest was filed by 3 unsuccessful candidates (Paderanga,
Asuncion & Garcia) for seats in the Sangguniang Panglungsod in
Gingoog City directed at the 3 proclaimed candidates (Idulsa, Maquiso &
Cabana). The COMELEC found merit in the protest and ordered the
protestees to vacate their posts and at the same time determined that
Mortiz, who was not a party to the election protest, had garnered more
votes than the protestants. Apparently, per the Certificate of Canvass,
Mortiz had placed tenth (10th) in the city council election.

As a consequence of the final numeral results of the votes obtained by

the winning candidates vis-à-vis the number of those authorized to be
elected, Mortiz who garnered more votes than the protestants wins the
7th rank in the City Council while Paderanga in 8th rank, Asuncion 9th
and Garcia 10th.

The protestees appealed. Aside from contesting the Second Divisions’

appreciation of the contested ballots, they also specifically questioned the
proclamation of Mortiz, who was not a party to the election protest. The
protestees also noted therein that Asuncion and Garcia had filed
certificates of candidacy for Punong Barangay and Barangay Kagawad
respectively in the 2002 barangay elections, and Asuncion was elected.
As a result, it was argued, Asuncion and Garcia should be deemed to
have abandoned their election protest.

Before the COMELEC en banc had resolved the Motion for

Reconsideration, Bollozos intervened. She alleged that she too was a
losing candidate for the Gingoog City Sanggunian, yet her vote total
according to the records had surpassed the number of votes ascribed to
Asuncion and Garcia.[5] She therefore asserted that she should have
been proclaimed as the ninth (9th) winning candidate in lieu of
Asuncion, who should have placed tenth (10th) instead.

COMELEC en banc thereafter declared Mortiz as the 7th place councilor,

Bollozo (out-numbering Asuncion and Garcia, with Asuncion leading as
against Garcia) was proclaimed as placed as 9th councilor and at the
same time ruled that Asuncion has been deemed to have abandoned his
protest due to his successful candidacy for Punong Barangay.
Accordingly, the 10th place was declared vacant.

ISSUES:
Whether or not COMELEC has the power to proclaim Mortiz despite his
non-participation in the election protest
Whether or not COMELEC has the power to proclaim Bolloza despite the
filing of her motion for intervention beyond the period allowed by law

HELD:
Petitioners are unable to point out why the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the contested ballots.
Notwithstanding the dissenting opinion, the Second Divisions factual
findings, as affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc, are supported by
substantial evidence and thus beyond the ken of review by the Court.

Thus, the Court is bound by the findings of the COMELEC as to how

many votes the parties had obtained in the city council election. The
COMELEC had also noted that Mortiz, who had originally placed tenth
(10th), has become the seventh (7th) placer, considering that his original
vote total still surpassed that of the protestants. We are unable to see
how such declaration by the COMELEC could constitute grave abuse of
discretion, even if Mortiz had not been a party to the election protest. He
was not a losing candidate elevated into victory, as he apparently was
already proclaimed a duly elected city councilor in May of 2001.[11] The
petitioners were dislodged from their respective seats because the private
respondents garnered more votes than them. Mortizs vote total remained
unchanged despite the protest. His elevation to seventh (7th) place is but
a necessary consequence of the finding of the COMELEC that the
petitioners had actually obtained less number of votes than as reflected
in the first canvass results. It would be patently ridiculous for the Court
or the COMELEC to hold that he should still be deemed as the tenth
(10th) placer when the amended vote totals reveal that he had garnered
more votes than the new eighth (8th) placer. Presumptively, the vote
totals as amended after the revision more accurately reflect the true will
of the voters of Gingoog City, and the elevation of councilor Mortiz from
tenth (10th) to seventh (7th) place is in consonance with the electoral
mandate.

Election protests are guided by an extra-ordinary rule of interpretation

that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed
to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may
not be defeated by mere technical objections.[12] For that reason, the
Court sustains the allowance by the COMELEC of Bollozos Intervention.
It would have been explicitly anomalous had Bollozos not been seated in
the City Council, considering that her uncontested vote total had
exceeded that of Asuncion, the ninth (9th) placer according to the Second
Division. The people of Gingoog City had chosen Bollozos to serve as
their councilor, and it was but proper for the COMELEC to recognize that
electoral will and accordingly amend the Second Divisions Resolution.
Besides, in allowing the Bollozos Intervention, the COMELEC did not
stretch itself by applying an overarching equitable principle that would
have disturbed the judicially sedate. Statutory prescription on the right
to intervene in an election protest is provided only by the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, particularly Rule 8, Section 1. The aforementioned
rule does state that the motion for intervention be filed before or during
the trial of an action or proceeding.[13] At the same time, the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure are to be construed liberally in order to promote the
effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and to
achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition
of every action and proceeding before the COMELEC.[14] The allowance
of the motion for intervention was clearly geared towards fostering
honest, credible elections and a just outcome centered around the proper
proclamation of a candidate whom the voters have chosen to serve as
their councilor.

Admittedly, the Rules of Court provides that a motion to intervene be

filed at any time before rendition of judgment of the trial court.[15]
However, the suppletory role of the Rules of Court in this case must be
dispensed with if its application would frustrate the electoral will.
Further, as the Solicitor General points out in his Comment filed in
behalf of the COMELEC, the Court has, in exceptional cases, allowed
intervention notwithstanding the rendition of judgment by the trial
court[16], or even after the case had become final and executory.[17] The
Court is not ordinarily predisposed, on account of broad claims of equity,
to disregard infractions of procedural rules. Yet election cases are of such
an exceptional character that the supervening State interest is to ensure
that the true results of its elections are given efficacy. We find that the
COMELECs grant of the Bollozos Intervention is in accord with this
superior principle which is grounded on the imperative to seek and make
the sovereign will of the people prevail.

Finally, none of the parties question the COMELEC En Bancs declaration

of vacancy of the tenth (10th) seat in the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Gingoog City on the premise that the tenth (10th) placer Asuncions
subsequent active candidacy and election as Punong Barangay should be
deemed an abandonment of his protest. In so holding, the COMELEC En
Banc cited the Courts majority opinion in the case of Defensor-Santiago
v. Ramos.[18] The parties adduced no compelling reason for the Court to
disturb this conclusion of the COMELEC. At the same time, the eleventh
(11th) placer Garcia cannot be elevated to the tenth (10th) spot, for the
simple reason that the electorate of Gingoog City did not elect him as one
of the ten (10) city councilors.[19]
In 1996, Lynette Garvida filed her candidacy to the position of Chairman
of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of a barangay in Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
Her candidacy was opposed by her rival Florencio Sales, Jr. on the
ground that she is over 21 years old (21 years old, 9 months at the time
of the filing). Nevertheless, the trial court ordered that she be admitted as
a candidate and the SK elections went on. Sales, in the meantiume, filed
a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Garvida. When the
elections results came in, Garvida won with a vote of 78, while Sales got
76. Garvida was eventually proclaimed as winner but had to face the
petition filed by Sales.

WHO IS A CANDIDATE; ELIGIBILITIES OF A CANDIDATE

GARVIDA vs. SALES

FACTS
Garvida, in her defense, averred that Section 424 of the Local
Government Code (LGC) provides that candidates for the SK must be at
least 15 years of age and a maximum age of 21 years. Garvida states that
the LGC does not specify that the maximum age requirement is exactly
21 years hence said provision must be construed as 21 years and a
fraction of a year but still less than 22 years – so long as she does not
exceed 22 she is still eligible because she is still, technically, 21 years of
age (although she exceeds it by 9 months).

ISSUE:
Whether or not Garvida met the age requirement.

HELD:
No. Section 424 of the Local Government Code provides that candidates
for SK must be:

Filipino citizen;
an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months;
15 but not more than 21 years of age; and
duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official
barangay list.
The provision is clear. Must not be more than 21 years of age. The said
phrase is not equivalent to “less than 22 years old.” The law does not
state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day. If such
was the intention of Congress in framing the LGC, then they should have
expressly provided such.

Sales claims that he obtained the second highest number of vote, hence
he should be declared as the SK Chairman, is this a valid contention?
No. Applying the ruling in Labo vs COMELEC, a defeated candidate,
though obtaining the second highest number of vote, is not deemed to
have been elected by reason of the winner’s eventual
disqualification/ineligibility. He cannot be declared as successor simply
because he did not get the majority or the plurality of votes – the
electorate did not choose him. It would have been different if Sales was
able to prove that the voters still voted for Garvida despite knowing her
ineligibility, this would have rendered her votes “stray”.

Under Section 435 of the LGC, the SK Chairman should be succeeded by

the SK member who obtained the highest number of votes, should the SK
member obtaining such vote succeed Garvida?**

(**Not to be confused with Sales’ situation – Sales was a candidate for SK

chairmanship not SK membership.)

The above argument can’t be considered in this case because Section

435 only applies when the SK Chairman “refuses to assume office, fails
to qualify, is convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is
permanently incapacitated, is removed from office, or has been absent
without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months.” Garvida’s
case is not what Section 435 contemplates. Her removal from office by
reason of her age is a question of eligibility. Being “eligible” means being
“legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen.” Ineligibility, on the
other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the
Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. Ineligibility is not
one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK
Chairman.

CONCEPT AND EVOLUTION OF CITIZENSHIP

Tecson, et al, petitioner vs. COMELEC,

G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004

FACTS:
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC
to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation
in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino
citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners;
his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan
Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the
latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the
allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first,
Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after
the birth of respondent.

Petitioners also questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking

cognizance of and deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe
Jr. They asserted that under Section 4(7), Article VII of the 1987
Constituition, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen?
2) Whether or not the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the
qualifications of presidential candidates?

RULING:
1) It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ
is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the
father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino
citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his
putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at
84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870,
when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from
the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.
That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his
son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution,
during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
2) No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of
the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the
Supreme Court on April 1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction of
the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines,
and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In
such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election
scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have
received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an
election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario. It
is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include
cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a
candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are
held.

GAYO vs. VERCELES

Facts:
Verceles is running for mayor and was subsequently proclaimed as the
winner in that election. Her proclamation was however questioned for the
reason that she is a greencard holder and has not complied with the
residence requirement.

Ruling:
Supreme Court held that when Verceles abandoned her “greencard
holder” status when she surrendered her alien registration receipt card
before the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the American
Embassy in Manila prior to her filing for certificate of candidacy. Thus,
when Verceles filed her certificate of candidacy, she was no longer
disqualified to run as an elective official because of such waiver of
permanent resident status in a foreign country.
LONE CANDIDATE LAW (RA 8295)

SINACA vs. MULA

Facts:
In the May 1998 elections, petitioner Emmanuel Sinica was a substitute
candidate for the mayoral post of the Matugas Wing after their original
candidate, Teodoro Sinica, Jr., was disqualified for being convicted of
bigamy. He was proclaimed winner after the canvassing.

(Matugas Wing was a faction in the LAKAS-NUCD-UMPD party, as well

as the Barbers Wing. Each faction has separate candidates for the
mayoral post in the Municipality of Malimono , Surigao del Norte.)

Respondent Mula (who got Sinica, Jr. disqualified) filed a disqualification

case against Emmanuel Sinica before the COMELEC. He alleged that
said substitution was invalid because:

a) Sinica was not member of the LAKAS party when he was nominated as
a substitute; and
b) it lacks approval of Sen. Barbers as a joint signatory of the
substitution.

The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the disqualification case.

However, when respondent Mula filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
COMELEC en banc set aside the resolution of the Second Division and
disqualified EMMANUEL asserting that the substitution violated the
provisions of Sec. 77 of the Omnibus Election Code that the substitute
must belong to the same political party as the substituted candidate.
Emmanuel D. Sinaca was not valid because he was an independent
candidate for councilor prior to his nomination as substitute candidate
in place of the withdrawing candidate who was a Lakas party member.

Therefore, this case before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
WON the substitution of Emmanuel Sinica was against the provisions of
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Held:
NO. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that a
substitute candidate should be a person belonging to and certified by the
same political party as the candidate to be replaced.

Petitioner Emmanuel Sinaca, an independent candidate, had first

withdrawn his certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan Member
before he joined the LAKAS party and nominated by the LAKAS
MATUGAS Wing as the substitute candidate. He had filed his certificate
of candidacy and his certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty
candidate signed by Gov. Matugas with his written acceptance of the
party's nomination. Therefore, he is a bona fide LAKAS member.

There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute which requires as a

condition precedent that a substitute candidate must have been a
member of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he can
be nominated as such.

KAISER B. RECABO, JR. vs. COMELEC & FRANCISCO R. REYES, JR.

G.R. No. 134293; 308 SCRA 793
June 21, 1999

FACTS:
On March 27, 1998, Francisco R. Reyes, Jr., filed his certificate of
candidacy for vice-mayor of Mainit, Surigao Del Norte under the LAKAS
NUCD-UMDP. His nomination by said political party is evidence by the
certificate of nomination and acceptance dated March 27, 1998 signed by
Fidel V. Ramos and Jose de Venecia, National Chairman and Secretary
General, respectively, of said political party.

However, on April 2, 1998, Kaiser B. Recabo, Jr., claimed to be the

official candidate of LAKAS as vice-mayor of the same municipality and
also filed his certificate of candidacy. Recabo also submitted to the
Commission a copy of the certificate of his nomination and acceptance
signed only by one representative of LAKAS, Francisco T. Matugas. The
space of the other representative (Robert Z. Barbers) is blank. It was
further alleged that Recabo, Jr., is a SUBSTITUTE candidate of MRS.
CANDELARIA B. RECABO who filed her Certificate of Candidacy for
VICE-MAYOR of Mainit, Surigao del Norte on March 25, 1998.

Reyes submits the theory that since the certificate of nomination and
acceptance in favor of Candelaria B. Recabo is not signed by Robert
Barbers, there is no valid nomination by LAKAS NUCD-UMDP in favor of
Candelaria Recabo. Therefore, Candelaria B. Recabo not having been
validly nominated, should be deemed an independent candidate only.
And since Candelaria B. Recabo is an independent candidate, she cannot
be validly substituted because under Sec. 11 of Comelec Res. No. 2977
promulgated on January 15, 1998, “no substitution shall be allowed for
an independent candidate.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s certificate of nomination by LAKAS NUCD-
UMDP is valid?
HELD:
NO. COMELEC Resolution No. 2977 provides under Section 5 thereof:
The certificate of nomination by registered political parties of their official
candidates shall be filed with the certificates of candidacy not later than
the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy as specified in Section 4
hereof, duly signed and attested under oath by the party president,
chairman, secretary-general or any other party officer duly authorized in
writing to do so.

Be that as it may, the certificate of nomination of the petitioner as well as

his mother did not comply with the requirements of being official
candidates of LAKAS NUCD-UMDP Party. For the reason, that the
certificate of nomination was invalid because it was signed only by one
authorized party officer as compared to Reyes’ which was signed by the
National Chairman and Secretary General, respectively, of said political
party. Therefore, Candelaria Recabo is considered an independent
candidate.

Villanueva v. COMELEC
No. L – 54718 (December 4, 1986)

FACTS:
On January 25, 1980, Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice
Mayor of Dolores for the January 30 elections in substitution for his
companion Mendoza who withdrew candidacy without oath upon filing
on January 4. Petitioner won in the election but Respondent Board
disregarded all his votes and proclaimed Respondent Candidate as the
winner on the presumption that Petitioner’s candidacy was not duly
approved by Respondent. Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment
of the proclamation but was dismissed by Respondent Commission on
the grounds that Mendoza’s unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect,
and that assuming it was effective, Petitioner’s candidacy was not
valid since Mendoza did not withdraw after January 4.

ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of formal or
technical defects.

HELD:
No. The fact that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality,
which should not be used to frustrate the people’s will in favor of
Petitioner as the substitute candidate. Also, his withdrawal right on
the very same day that he filed his candidacy should be considered
as having been made substantially and in truth after the last day, even
going by the literal reading of the provision by Respondent Commission.
The spirit of the law rather than its literal reading should have guided
Respondent Commission in resolving the issue of last-minute
withdrawal and substitution of other persons as candidates.

THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM

G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts:
Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785,
which approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties,
including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections.
Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing
mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties,
the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by
which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to
the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list
elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

Ruling:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the
availability of other remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law,
where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The facts
attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.

2. Political parties – even the major ones -- may participate in the party-
list elections subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution
and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List
System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be

disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they
are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations” . It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine
proportional representation of the “marginalized and underrepresented”,
the criteria for participation, in relation to the cause of the party list
applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-
list system.

3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the

inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of
the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the
Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear
policy of the law and the Constitution, the Court decided to set some
guidelines culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the
Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in
the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.

NUISANCE CANDIDATE

Bautista vs. COMELEC

G.R. Nos. 154796-97 October 23, 2003

FACTS:
On June 10, 2002, Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong
Barangay in Lumbangan for the July 15, 2002 barangay elections.
Election Officer Jareño refused to accept Bautista's certificate of
candidacy because he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan. On June
11, 2002, Bautista filed an action for mandamus against Election Officer
Jareño with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas. The trial court ordered
Election Officer Jareño to accept Bautista's certificate of candidacy and
to include his name in the certified list of candidates for Punong
Barangay. In compliance with the trial court's order, Election Officer
Jareño included Bautista in the certified list of candidates for Punong
Barangay. At the same time, Election Officer Jareño referred the matter
of Bautista's inclusion in the certified list of candidates with the
COMELECLaw Department on 5 July 2002. Thereafter, the COMELEC
Law Department recommended the cancellation of Bautista's certificate
of candidacy since he was not registered as a voter in Lumbangan. The
COMELEC en banc failed to act on the COMELEC Law Department's
recommendation before the barangay elections on 15July 2002.During
the 15 July 2002 barangay elections, Bautista and private respondent
Alcoreza,ere candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in
Lumbangan. Bautista obtained the highest number of votes (719) while
Alcoreza came in second with 522 votes, or a margin of 197 votes. Thus,
the Lumbangan Board of Canvassers proclaimed Bautista as the elected
Punong Barangay. Meanwhile, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5404on
23 July 2002 and Resolution No. 5584 on 10 August 2002 ("COMELEC
Resolutions"). In Resolution No. 5404, the COMELEC en banc resolved to
cancel Bautista's certificate of candidacy. On the other hand, Resolution
No. 5584 expressed COMELEC's policy regarding proclaimed candidates
found to be ineligible for not being registered voters in the place of their
election.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it issued
Resolution Nos. 5404and 5584;2. Whether or not the COMELEC deprived
Bautista of due process when theCOMELEC en banc issued Resolution
Nos. 5404 and 55843. Whether Bautista was a registered voter of
Barangay Lumbangan when he filed his certificate of candidacy; and

4. Whether or not it was proper to proclaim Alcoreza as Punong

Barangay in view of the alleged disqualification of the winning candidate
Bautista.

HELD:
1. A division of the COMELEC should have first heard this case. The
COMELEC en banc can only act on the case if there is a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the COMELEC division. Hence, the
COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction when it ordered the
cancellation of Bautista's certificate of candidacy without first referring
the case to a division for summary hearing. The proceeding on the
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy does not merely pertain to the
administrative functions of the COMELEC. Cancellation proceedings
involve the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions.

2. The opportunity to be heard does not only refer to the right to present
verbal arguments in court during a formal hearing. There is due process
when a party is able to present evidence in the form of pleadings.

However, the COMELEC did not give Bautista such opportunity to

explain his side. The COMELEC en banc issued Resolution Nos. 5404
and 5584 without prior notice and hearing. A summary proceeding does
not mean that the COMELEC could do away with the requirements of
notice and hearing. The COMELEC should have at least given notice to
Bautista to give him the chance to adduce evidence to explain his side in
the cancellation proceeding. The COMELEC en banc deprived Bautista of
procedural due process of law when it approved the report and
recommendation of the Law Department without notice and hearing.

3. Bautista was aware when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the
office of Punong Barangay that he lacked one of the qualifications - that
of being a registered voter in the barangay where he ran for office. He
therefore made a misrepresentation of a material fact when he made a
false statement in his certificate of candidacy that he was a registered
voter in Barangay Lumbangan. An elective office is a public trust. He who
aspires for elective office should not make a mockery of the electoral
process by falsely representing himself. The importance of a valid
certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of the electoral process.
Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code,false representation of a
material fact in the certificate of candidacy is a ground for the denial or
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. The material
misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for
elective office. A candidate guilty of misrepresentation may be (1)
prevented from running, or (2) if elected, from serving, or (3) prosecuted
for violation of the election laws.

4. It is a well-settled doctrine that the COMELEC cannot proclaim as

winner the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes in
case the winning candidate is ineligible or disqualified. The exception to
this well-settled rule was mentioned in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections which held that the exception is predicated on the concurrence
of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest
number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in
fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their
votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Following Sec. 44 of the Local
Government Code provides for the rule regarding permanent vacancy in
the Office of the Punong Barangay, the highest ranking sangguniang
barangay member, or in the case of his permanent disability, the second
highest ranking sangguniang member, shall become the Punong
Barangay. Thus, thep roclamation of the second placer Divina Alcoreza
as winner in lieu of Bautista is void.

RECALL & INITIATIVE ELECTION

MIRIAM DEFENSOR – SANTIAGO versus FIDEL RAMOS

(253 SCRA 559)

Facts:
The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in
the May 1992 election. In her Motion on the 16th day of August in the
year 1995, reiterated in her comment of the 29th of August of the same
year, protestant Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision in the
remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision
process in the pilot areas be deemed computed.
The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the
protestant and protestee to submit their respective memoranda. Hence,
this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot
and academic by her election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and
her assumption of office as such on the 30th of June in the year 1995.

Held:
YES. The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been
abandoned or considered withdrawn as a consequence of her election
and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and
functions thereof.

The protestant abandoned her “determination to protest and pursue the

public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the
electorate.

Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it

would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992
presidential elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political
stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.

Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the
PET within 10 days if after the completion of the revision of the ballots
from her pilot areas, she still wishes to present evidence. Since DS has
not informed the Tribunal of any such intention, such is a manifest
indication that she no longer intends to do so.

Poe vs. Macapagal-Arroyo,

454 SCRA 242, March 29, 2005

Facts:
In the 2004 election, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) was proclaimed the
duly elected President of the Philippines. The second-placer in the
elections, Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed an election protest before the
Electoral Tribunal. When the Protestant died in the course of his medical
treatment, his widow, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe a.k.a. Susan Roces filed a
motion to intervene as a substitute for deceased protestant FPJ. She
claims that there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for
her late husband to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate
in the interest of the Filipino people. The Protestee, GMA asserts that the
widow of a deceased candidate is not the proper party to replace the
deceased protestant since a public office is personal and not a property
that passes on to the heirs. Protestee also contends that under the Rules
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the registered candidates who
obtained the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for the presidency may contest
the election of the president.

Issue:
May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during
the pendency of the latter’s protest case?

Held:
Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the
Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes
may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the
case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the
winner.

An election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant

or to the protestee, hence, substitution and intervention is allowed but
only by a real party in interest. Note that Mrs. FPJ herself denies any
claim to the office of President but rather stresses that it is with the
“paramount public interest” in mind that she desires “to pursue the
process” commenced by her late husband. However, nobility of intention
is not the point of reference in determining whether a person may
intervene in an election protest. In such intervention, the interest which
allows a person to intervene in a suit must be in the matter of litigation
and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will
either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this protest, Mrs. FPJ
will not immediately and directly benefit from the outcome should it be
determined that the declared president did not truly get the highest
number of votes.

QUO WARRANTO

Gaerlan vs Catubig
GR No. 23964, June 1, 1966

Facts:
In the 1963 elections, among the registered candidates for councilors in
the eight -seat City Council of Dagupan were Gregorio Gaerlan and Luis
Catubig. The latter obtained the third highest number of votes and was
proclaimed one of the elected councilors while the former lost his bid.
Gaerlan went to the Court to challenge Catubig’s eligibility for office on
the averment of non-age. Catubig was born in Dagupan City on May 19,
1939. At the time he presented his certificate of candidacy on September
10, 1963, he was 24 years, 3 months and 22 days; on election day,
November 12, 1963, he was 24 years, 5 months and 24 days; and at the
time he took his oath of office as councilor on January 1, 1964,3 he was
24 years, 7 months and 13 days. Whether his age be reckoned as of the
date of the filing of certificate of candidacy, or the election date, or the
date set by law for the assumption of office the - result is the same.
Whichever date is adopted, still, respondent was below 25 years of age.

The judgment held Catubig ineligible and declared his seat vacant.
Catubig appealed and alleged that the question of age eligibility should
be governed not by R.A. 170, and not by R.A. 2259. Republic Act No. 484
amending, inter alia, Section 12 of the Dagupan City Charter, took effect
on June 10, 1950; whereas, Republic Act No. 2259 became law on June
19, 1959 - nine years later.

R.A. 170, as amended Sec. 12 x xx the elective members of the

Municipality Board shall be qualified electors of the city, residents
therein for at least one year, and not less than twenty- three years of age.
xxx"

R.A. 2259

Sec. 6.No person shall be a City Mayor, Vice-Mayor, or Councilor unless

he is at least twenty-five years of age, resident of the city for one year
prior to his election and is a qualified voter.

Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 12 of R.A. 170 of the Dagupan City Charter, as
amended, has been repealed by Sec. 6 of R.A. 2259

Held:
Yes. The judgment appealed from was affirmed.

The question of whether or not a special law has been repealed or

amended by one or more subsequent general laws is dependent mainly
on the intent of the Congress in enacting the latter. The discussions on
the floor of Congress show beyond doubt that its members intended to
amend o r repeal all provisions of special laws inconsistent with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 2259, except those which are expressly
excluded from the operation thereof. In fact, Section 9 of R.A. 2259 states
that:

All Acts or parts of Acts, Executive Orders, rules and regulations in

consistent with theprovisions of this Ac t, are hereby repealed.

Section 1 of R.A. 2259 makes reference to "all chartered cities in the

Philippines”, whereas Section 8 excludes from the operation of the Act
"the cities of Manila, Cavite, Trece Martires and Tagaytay", and Section 4
contains a proviso exclusively for the City of Baguio, thus showing clearly
that all cities not particularly excepted from the provisions of said Act are
subject thereto. The only reference to Dagupan City in R.A. 2259 is found
in Section 2 stating that voters in said city, and in the City of Iloilo, are
expressly precluded to vote for provincial officials.

Since Dagupan City is removed from the exceptions of R.A. 2259, it

stands to reason itself that its charter provision on the age limit is
thereby repealed. Until Congress decrees otherwise, we are not to tamper
with the present statutory set-up. Rather, we should go by what the
legislative body has expressly ordained.

It is accordingly held that respondent is disqualified on the ground of

non -age because at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, at the
time of the election, and at the time he took his oath of office, he was
below the age of 25 years.