PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.

LOCSIN FABON @ "Loklok,"

FACTS:

Benjamin Milano, the nine (9) year old nephew and neighbor of the accused-appellant, as its first
witness. He testified that on 23 April 1995, at around five o'clock in the morning, he was awakened by
his mother to fetch water for their morning meal. Bringing along a container, he then proceeded to the
water pump of Bonifacia Lasquite, located at the back of the latter's house. After filling up his container,
he then went on his way home. However, while still near the house of Bonifacia Lasquite, he noticed
that someone was coming from the fence of Bonifacia Lasquite's house. Although it was still a little
dark, he recognized it to be his uncle, accused-appellant.[9] While standing only five (5) meters away,
accused-appellant asked him: "Toy, is there somebody fetching water?" He responded in the negative.
He noticed that the forehead, t-shirt and hair of accused-appellant were stained with blood. He also
noticed that accused-appellant was carrying a plastic bag and had a bolo tucked in his pants. Accused-
appellant then walked away in a hurried manner while repeatedly looking over his shoulders. Later on
in the day, he was informed by a certain Emma about the death of their neighbor, Bonifacia Lasquite.
Because of this, he informed Roberto Lasquite, the son of Bonifacia Lasquite, of his encounter with
accused-appellant in the early morning of the ill-fated day.

The second witness presented by the prosecution was Mario Vinculado. He testified that he has been
a resident of Brgy. Santa Cruz, Hilongos, Leyte, since his birth and, as such, he knows both accused-
appellant and the victim.[18] Sometime in the second week of August of 1995, he went to Ampayon,
Butuan City together with a police officer named Lumayno from the Hilongos Police Station.[19] He
went to the said town because he was requested by Roberto Lasquite to accompany police officer
Lumayno in ascertaining whether accused-appellant was indeed in Ampayon pursuant to an
information sent by the Butuan Police Station to the Hilongos Police Station.[20] When they arrived in
Ampayon, they went to the municipal jail where they found accused-appellant being investigated by
the police.[21] After the investigation, accused-appellant asked Mario Vinculado if they could have a
talk.[22] During their conversation, accused-appellant informed Mario Vinculado that he had a
companion when he assaulted Bonifacia Lasquite[23] and that he was only able to stab the victim
twice in the breast.[24] Upon Mario Vinculado's return to his hometown, he informed the Hilongos
police and Roberto Lasquite of the admission made to him by accused-appellant.

The prosecution then presented Dr. Conrado Abiera as its expert witness. He testified that on 23 April
1995, he conducted an autopsy on the victim and, correspondingly, accomplished a gross autopsy
report. During his testimony, Dr. Abiera clarified the statements he made in the gross autopsy report.
He stated that lacerated wound in the victim's forehead and the depressed skull fracture, reported as
the first item under the heading Pertinent Findings, signified that the victim was hit with a blunt
instrument which could have been a stone, a piece of wood or the back portion of a bolo. He added
that the same blunt instrument may have also been used in the depressed fracture in the parieto-
occipital area.[28] Dr. Abiera also explained that the punctured-like stab wounds, reported as the
second and third items under the heading Pertinent Findings, meant that the assailant used an
instrument similarly shaped as an ice pick or a sharpened welding rod. With regard to the hematoma
formation at the lower jaw and at the base of the neck, reported as the fifth item above, this signifies
that the victim was strangled. Dr. Abiera added that the strangulation of the victim caused her to
struggle for air and, in the process, she probably bit her tongue which, thus, accounts for the finding
in the ninth item above. He concluded that this strangulation could not have been caused by a wire or
a rope since these instruments would have left marks in the neck of the victim. In his expert opinion,
Dr. Abiera deduced that the victim was strangled through the use of a handkerchief or some other
piece of cloth. With regard to the hematoma formation in the vaginal canal and near the urethral
opening, the seventh item above, he explained that this could mean that the victim was raped.
However, he clarified that he cannot assert such conclusion with certainty because he did not examine
if there were sperm cells in the victim's vagina since the autopsy was conducted in a barrio where
there was no laboratory. Looking at the gross autopsy report in its entirety, Dr. Abiera concluded that
the assault on the victim could have been done by more than one assailant considering that three
devices were used in attacking the victim, i.e., a blunt object, an ice-pick like tool and a cloth-like
instrument. On the aspect of mutilation, Dr. Abiera stated that no vital part of the victim's body was
severed which, thus, negates mutilation.

ISSUE:
WON the prosecution sufficiently established the aggravating circumstances, i.e. rape and mutilation?
RULING:
Negative, although it is but proper to convict and sentence the appellant for robbery with homicide.
The courts agree with the Solicitor General's observation that the crime committed was erroneously
designated as robbery with homicide, rape and physical injuries. The proper designation is robbery
with homicide aggravated by rape. When rape and homicide co-exist in the commission of robbery, it
is the first paragraph of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code which applies, the rape to be considered
as an aggravating circumstance.

Moreover, the proven circumstances in the instant case, when viewed in their entirety, are as
convincing as direct evidence and, as such, negate the innocence of accused-appellant, to wit: (1)
accused-appellant was present at the scene of the crime; (2) he had blood stains on his body and
clothes, had a bolo tucked in his waist and was carrying a plastic bag when he was seen leaving the
scene of the crime; (3) he left Brgy. Sta. Cruz for Butuan City on the same day when the victim was
killed; (4) he admitted to Mario Vinculado that he kill the victim; (5) he did not even bother to inform
Roberto Lasquite of his alleged innocence despite having learned that he was being made accountable
for the death of Bonifacia Lasquite; (6) he could not think of any reason as to why Benjamin Milano,
his nephew, would lie in testifying against him; and (7) he escaped from incarceration during the
pendency of this case before the lower court.
In the appreciation of evidence in criminal cases, it is a basic tenet that the prosecution has the burden
of proof in establishing the guilt of the accused for all the offenses he is charged with - ei incumbit
probatio non qui negat. The conviction of accused-appellant must rest not on the weakness of his
defense but on the strength of the prosecution's evidence. In the present case, it is the opinion of the
Court that although the prosecution has sufficiently established accused-appellant's guilt for the crime
of robbery with homicide, it has, however, failed to substantiate the alleged aggravating circumstances
of rape and intentional mutilation. As testified upon by the prosecution's expert witness, Dr. Abiera, it
cannot be conclusively stated that the victim was raped. Due to the fact that the entirety of the evidence
presented in this case are all circumstantial, the fact that the victim was no longer wearing her
underwear when her cadaver was discovered and that the victim had hematoma formations on both
sides of vaginal canal and near the urethral opening cannot conclusively prove that she was raped.
Moreover, the aggravating circumstance of intentional mutilation cannot also be appreciated since, as
also testified upon by Dr. Abiera, no vital body part was severed. Likewise, the fact that the victim's
tongue was half-bitten does not prove intentional mutilation since it could have been caused by the
victim herself when she was fighting to breathe for air while she was being strangled by accused-
appellant.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Locsin Fabon, alias "Loklok," guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "robbery with homicide" under Article 294 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,[84] with the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the supreme
penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of Bonifacia Lasquite in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) and to pay Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as actual damages
for the stolen money.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let copies of the records of this case be forthwith
forwarded to the Office of the President of the Philippines for possible exercise of clemency or
pardoning power. Mesm

SO ORDERED.
 GLORIA PILAR S. AGUIRRE, G. R. No. 170723
Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
SECRETARY OF THE CORONA,*
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CHICO-NAZARIO, and
MICHELINA S. AGUIRRE- REYES, JJ.
OLONDRIZ, PEDRO B.
AGUIRRE, DR. JUVIDO
AGATEP and DR. MARISSA B. Promulgated:
PASCUAL,
Respondents. March 3, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, petitioner Gloria Pilar S. Aguirre (Gloria Aguirre) seeks the reversal of
the 21 July 2005 Decision[2] and 5 December 2005 Resolution,[3] both of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88370, entitled Gloria Pilar S. Aguirre v. Secretary
of the Department of Justice, Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz, Dr. Juvido Agatep,
Dra. Marissa B. Pascual, Pedro B. Aguirre and John and Jane Does.

The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) when the latter issued the twin
resolutions dated 11 February 2004[4] and 12 November 2004,[5] respectively, which
in turn affirmed the 8 January 2003 Resolution[6] of the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) of Quezon City.
 The Assistant City Prosecutor for the OCP of Quezon City recommended the
dismissal of the criminal complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 02-12466, for violation of
Articles 172 (Falsification by Private Individuals and Use of Falsified Documents)
and 262 (Mutilation), both of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act
No. 7610, otherwise known as Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,
for insufficiency of evidence.

The case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner Gloria Aguirre against
respondents Pedro B. Aguirre (Pedro Aguirre), Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz
(Olondriz), Dr. Juvido Agatep (Dr. Agatep), Dr. Marissa B. Pascual (Dr. Pascual)
and several John/Jane Does for falsification, mutilation and child abuse.

The antecedents of the present petition are:

Laureano Larry Aguirre[7] used to be a charge of the Heart of Mary Villa, a

child caring agency run by the Good Shepherd Sisters and licensed by the
Department of Social Work and Development (DSWD). Sometime in 1978,
respondent Pedro Aguirre; the latters spouse, Lourdes S. Aguirre (Lourdes Aguirre);
and their four daughters, who included petitioner Gloria Aguirre and respondent
Olondriz, came to know Larry, who was then just over a year old. The Aguirres
would have Larry spend a few days at their home and then return him to the
orphanage thereafter. In June 1980, Larry, then two years and nine months of age,
formally became the ward of respondent Pedro Aguirre and his spouse Lourdes
Aguirre by virtue of an Affidavit of Consent to Legal Guardianship executed in their
favor by Sister Mary Concepta Bellosillo, Superior of the Heart of Mary Villa. On 19
June 1986, the Aguirre spouses guardianship of Larry was legalized when the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan, duly appointed them as
joint co-guardians over the person and property of Larry.
As Larry was growing up, the Aguirre spouses and their children noticed that
his developmental milestones were remarkably delayed. His cognitive and physical
growth did not appear normal in that at age 3 to 4 years, Larry could only crawl on
his tummy like a frog x x x;[8] he did not utter his first word until he was three years
of age; did not speak in sentences until his sixth year; and only learned to stand up
and walk after he turned five years old. At age six, the Aguirre spouses first enrolled
Larry at the Colegio de San Agustin, Dasmarias Village, but the child experienced
significant learning difficulties there. In 1989, at age eleven, Larry was taken to
specialists for neurological and psychological evaluations. The psychological
evaluation[9] done on Larry revealed the latter to be suffering from a mild mental
deficiency.[10] Consequent thereto, the Aguirre spouses transferred Larry to St. John
Ma. Vianney, an educational institution for special children.

In November of 2001, respondent Dr. Agatep, a urologist/surgeon, was

approached concerning the intention to have Larry, then 24 years of age,
vasectomized. Prior to performing the procedure on the intended patient, respondent
Dr. Agatep required that Larry be evaluated by a psychiatrist in order to confirm and
validate whether or not the former could validly give his consent to the medical
procedure on account of his mental deficiency.

In view of the required psychiatric clearance, Larry was brought to respondent

Dr. Pascual, a psychiatrist, for evaluation. In a psychiatric report dated 21 January
2002, respondent Dr. Pascual made the following recommendation:

[T]he responsibility of decision making may be given to his parent or

guardian.[11]

the full text of which reads

PSYCHIATRY REPORT
21 January 2002

GENERAL DATA

LAUREANO AGUIRRE, 24 years old, male, high school graduate of St.

John [Marie Vianney], was referred for psychiatric evaluation to
determine competency to give consent for vasectomy.

CLINICAL SUMMARY

Larry was adopted at age 3 from an orphanage and prenatal history is not
known to the adoptive family except that abortion was
attempted. Developmental milestones were noted to be delayed. He
started to walk and speak in single word at around age 5. He was enrolled
in Colegio de San Agustin at age 6 where he showed significant learning
difficulties that he had to repeat 1st and 4th grades. A consult was done in
1989 when he was 11 years old. Neurological findings and EEG results
were not normal and he was given Tecretol and Encephabol by his
neurologist. Psychological evaluation revealed mild to moderate mental
retardation, special education training was advised and thus, he was
transferred to St. John Marie Vianney. He finished his elementary and
secondary education in the said school. He was later enrolled in a
vocational course at Don Bosco which he was unable to continue. There
has been no reported behavioral problems in school and he gets along
relatively well with his teachers and some of his classmates.

Larry grew up with a very supportive adoptive family. He is the youngest

in the family of four sisters. Currently, his adoptive parents are already
old and have medical problem and thus, they could no longer monitor and
take care of him like before. His adoptive mother has Bipolar Mood
Disorder and used to physically maltreat him. A year ago, he had an
episode of dizziness, vomiting and headaches after he was hit by his
adoptive mother. Consult was done in Makati Medical Center and several
tests were done, results of which were consistent with his developmental
problem. There was no evidence of acute insults. The family subsequently
decided that he should stay with one of his sisters to avoid similar incident
and the possibility that he would retaliate although he has never hurt
anybody. There has been no episode of violent outburst or aggressive
behavior. He would often keep to himself when sad, angry or frustrated.

He is currently employed in the company of his sister and given

assignment to do some photocopying, usually in the mornings. He enjoys
playing billiards and basketball with his nephews and, he spends most of
his leisure time watching TV and listening to music. He could perform
activities of daily living without assistance except that he still needs
supervision in taking a bath. He cannot prepare his own meal and never
allowed to go out and run errands alone. He does not have friends and it
is only his adoptive family whom he has significant relationships. He
claims that he once had a girlfriend when he was in high school who was
more like a best friend to him. He never had sexual relations. He has
learned to smoke and drink alcohol few years ago through his cousins and
the drivers. There is no history of abuse of alcohol or any prohibited
substances.

MEDICAL STATUS EXAMINATION

The applicant was appropriately dressed. He was cooperative and he had
intermittent eye contact. Speech was spontaneous, soft, and relevant. He
responded to questions in single words or simple sentences. He was
anxious specially at the start of the interview, with full affect appropriate
to mood and thought content. There was no apparent thought or perceptual
disturbance. No suicidal/homicidal thoughts elicited. He was oriented to
time, place and person. He has intact remote and recent memory. He could
do simple calculation. He could write his name and read simple words. His
human figure was comparable to a 7-8 year old. He demonstrated fair
judgment and poor insight. He had fair impulse control.

PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS

Psychological tests done on March 6, 1990 (Dr. Lourdes Ledesma) and

on August 4, 2000 (Dr. Ma. Teresa Gustilo-Villaosor) consistently
revealed mild to moderate mental deficiency.

SIGNIFICANT LABORATORY EXAMS RESULTS

CT scan done 09 January 2001 showed nonspecific right deep parietal

subcortical malacia. No localized mass lesion in the brain.

MRI done on 10 January 2001 showed bilateral parietal x x x volume loss,

encephalomalacia, gliosis and ulegyria consistent with sequela of
postnatal or neonatal infarcts.Ex-vacuo dilatation of the atria of lateral
ventricles associated thinned posterior half of the corpus callosum.

ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION

Axis I None
Axis II Mental Retardation, mild to moderate type
Axis III None
Axis IV None at present
Axis V Current GAF = 50-60

Larrys mental deficiency could be associated with possible

perinatal insults, which is consistent with the neuroimaging
findings. Mental retardation associated with neurological problems
usually has poorer prognosis. Larry is very much dependent on his family
for his needs, adaptive functioning, direction and in making major life
 decisions. At his capacity, he may never understand the nature, the
foreseeable risks and benefits, and consequences of the procedure
(vasectomy) that his family wants for his protection. Thus, the
responsibility of decision making may be given to his parent or guardian.

Marissa B. Pascual, M.D.

Psychiatrist[12]

Considering the above recommendation, respondent Pedro Aguirres written

consent was deemed sufficient in order to proceed with the conduct of the
vasectomy. Hence, on 31 January 2002, respondent Dr. Agatep performed a bilateral
vasectomy on Larry.

On 11 June 2002, petitioner Gloria Aguirre, respondent Pedro Aguirres eldest

child, instituted a criminal complaint for the violation of the Revised Penal Code,
particularly Articles 172 and 262, both in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 against
respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several John/Jane
Does before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.

The Complaint Affidavit,[13] docketed as I.S. No. 02-12466, contained the

following allegations:

2. x x x Dr. Agatep and Dra. Pascual were (sic) medical

practitioners specializing in urology and psychiatry respectively; while
respondent Pedro B. Aguirre is my father; Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz
is my sister, and the victim Laureano Larry Aguirre xxx is my common
law brother. JOHN and JANE DOES were the persons who, acting upon
the apparent instructions of respondents Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz
and/or Pedro B. Aguirre, actually scouted, prospected, facilitated,
solicited and/or procured the medical services of respondents Dra. Pascual
and Dr. Agatep vis--vis the intended mutilation via bilateral vasectomy of
my common law brother Larry Aguirre subject hereof.

xxxx

4. Sometime in March 2002, however, the Heart of Mary Villa of the Good
Shepherd Sisters was furnished a copy of respondent Dra. Pascuals
Psychiatry Report dated 21 January 2004 by the DSWD, in which my
 common law brother Larry was falsely and maliciously declared
incompetent and incapable of purportedly giving his own consent to the
MUTILATION VIA BILATERAL VASECTOMY intended to be
performed on him by all the respondents.

xxxx

6. Based on the foregoing charade and false pretenses invariably

committed by all of the respondents in conspiracy with each other, on 31
January 2002, my common law brother Larry Aguirre, although of legal
age but conspiratorially caused to be declared by respondents to be
mentally deficient and incompetent to give consent to his BILATERAL
VASECTOMY, was then intentionally, unlawfully, maliciously,
feloniously and/or criminally placed thereafter under surgery for
MUTILATION VIA BILATERAL VASECTOMY x x x, EVEN
WITHOUT ANY AUTHORIZATION ORDER from the
GUARDIANSHIP COURT, nor personal consent of Larry Aguirre
himself.

In addition to the above, the complaint included therein an allegation that

v. x x x without a PRIOR medical examination, professional

interview of nor verification and consultation with my
mother, Lourdes Sabino-Aguirre, respondent Dra.
Pascual baselessly, fraudulently and with obvious
intent to defame and malign her reputation and honor,
and worse, that of our Sabido family, falsely
concluded and diagnosed, via her falsified Psychiatry
Report, that my mother Lourdes Sabido-Aguirre
purportedly suffers from BIPOLAR MOOD
DISORDER x x x.

To answer petitioner Gloria Aguirres accusations against them, respondents

Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual submitted their respective
Counter-Affidavits.
 In her defense,[14] respondent Olondriz denied that she prospected, scouted,
facilitated, solicited and/or procured any false statement, mutilated or abused her
common-law brother, Larry Aguirre. Further, she countered that:

3. x x x While I am aware and admit that Larry went through a

vasectomy procedure, there is nothing in the Complaint
which explains how the vasectomy amounts to a mutilation.

xxxx

5. In any case, as I did not perform the vasectomy, I can state with
complete confidence that I did not participate in any way in
the alleged mutilation.

6. Neither did I procure or solicit the services of the physician who

performed the vasectomy, Dr. Juvido Agatep x x x. It was
my father, Pedro Aguirre, Larrys guardian, who obtained his
services. I merely acted upon his instructions and
accompanied my brother to the physician, respondents Dra.
Marissa B. Pascual x x x.

xxxx

10. Neither does the Complaint explain in what manner the

Complainant is authorized or has any standing to declare that
Larrys consent was not obtained. Complainant is not the
guardian or relative of Larry. While she argues that Larrys
consent should have been obtained the Complaint does not
dispute the psychiatrists findings about Larrys inability to
give consent.

xxxx

13. x x x the Complaint does not even state what alleged

participation was falsified or the portion of the psychiatric
report that allegedly states that someone participated when
in fact that person did not so participate.

xxxx
 15. Again, I had no participation in the preparation of the report of
Dr. Pascual x x x.

xxxx

17. x x x the Complaint does not dispute that he (Larry) is mentally

deficient or incompetent to give consent.

xxxx

19. x x x I verified that the effect of a vasectomy operation was

explained to him (Larry) by both respondent doctors.

20. x x x I accompanied Larry and obeyed my father on the belief

that my father continues to be the legal guardian of Larry. I
know of no one else who asserts to be his legal guardian x x
x.[15]

Alleging the same statement of facts and defenses, respondent Pedro Aguirre
argues against his complicity in the crime of mutilation as charged and asserts that:

5. In any case, as I did not perform the vasectomy, I can state with
complete confidence that I did not participate in any way in the
alleged mutilation.[16]

Nevertheless, he maintains that the vasectomy performed on Larry does not in any
way amount to mutilation, as the latters reproductive organ is still completely
intact.[17] In any case, respondent Pedro Aguirre explains that the procedure
performed is reversible through another procedure called Vasovasostomy, to wit:

8. I understand that vasectomy is reversible through a procedure called

Vasovasostomy. I can also state with confidence that the procedure
enables men who have undergone a vasectomy to sire a
child. Hence, no permanent damage was caused by the procedure.

Respondent Pedro Aguirre challenges the charge of falsification in the

complaint, to wit:
 14. x x x I did not make it appear that any person participated in any act
or proceeding when that person did not in fact participate x x x.

xxxx

16. x x x I had no participation in the preparation of the report of Dra.

Pascual. She arrived at her report independently, using her own
professional judgment x x x.

xxxx

31. What I cannot understand about Petitas Complaint is how Larry is

argued to be legally a child under the definition of one law but
nonetheless and simultaneously argued to be capacitated to give his
consent as fully as an adult.[18]

Respondent Pedro Aguirre further clarifies that co-guardianship over Larry

had been granted to himself and his wife, Lourdes Aguirre, way back on 19 June
1986 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan. Respondent Pedro
Aguirre contends that being one of the legal guardians, consequently, parental
authority over Larry is vested in him. But assuming for the sake of argument that
Larry does have the capacity to make the decision concerning his vasectomy,
respondent Pedro Aguirre argues that petitioner Gloria Aguirre has no legal
personality to institute the subject criminal complaint, for only Larry would have the
right to do so.

Just as the two preceding respondents did, respondent Dr. Agatep also
disputed the allegations of facts stated in the Complaint. Adopting the allegations of
his co-respondents insofar as they were material to the charges against him, he
vehemently denied failing to inform Larry of the intended procedure. In his counter-
statement of facts he averred that:

(b) x x x I scheduled Larry for consultative interview x x x wherein I

painstakingly explained what vasectomy is and the consequences thereof;
but finding signs of mental deficiency, x x x I advised his relatives and his
nurse who accompanied him to have Larry examined by a psychiatrist who
could properly determine whether or not Larry x x x can really give his
 consent, thus I required them to secure first a psychiatric evaluation and
clearance prior to the contemplated procedure.

(c) On January 21, 2002, I was furnished a copy of a psychiatric report

prepared by Dr. Marissa Pascual x x x. In her said report, Dr. Pascual
found Larry to suffer from mental retardation, mild to moderate type and
further stated that at his capacity, he may never understand the nature, the
foreseeable risks and benefits and consequences of the procedure
(vasectomy) x x x, thus the responsibility of decision making may be given
to his parent or guardian x x x.

(d) x x x I was likewise furnished a copy of an affidavit executed by Pedro

Aguirre stating that he was the legal guardian of Larry x x x Pedro Aguirre
gave his consent to vasectomize Larry x x x.

(e) Only then, specifically January 31, 2002, vasectomy was performed
with utmost care and diligence.[19]

In defense against the charge of falsification and mutilation, respondent Dr.

Agatep argued that subject complaint should be dismissed for the following reasons:

1. The complainant has no legal personality to file this case. As mentioned

above, she is only a common law sister of Larry who has a legal guardian
in the person of Pedro Aguirre, one of the herein respondents x x x.

2. x x x [t]he allegations in the complaint clearly centers on the condition

of complainants mother, Lourdes Aguirre, her reputation, and miserably
fails to implicate the degree of participation of herein respondent. x x x

xxxx

(b) Falsification. x x x I strongly aver that this felony does not apply to me
since it clearly gives reference to co-respondent, Dr. Marissa Pascuals
Psychiatry Report, dated January 21, 2002, in relation with her field of
profession, an expert opinion. I do not have any participation in the
preparation of said report, x x x neither did I utilized (sic) the same in any
proceedings to the damage to another. x x x I also deny using a falsified
document x x x.
 (c) Mutilation. x x x Vasectomy does not in anyway equate to castration
and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered an organ in the context
of law and medicine, it is quite remote from the penis x x x.

(d) Child Abuse. x x x the complaint-affidavit is very vague in specifying

the applicability of said law. It merely avers that Laureano Larry Aguirre
is a child, and alleges his father, Pedro Aguirre, has parental authority over
him x x x.[20]

Similarly, respondent Dr. Pascual denied the criminal charges of falsification

and mutilation imputed to her. She stands by the contents of the assailed Psychiatric
Report, justifying it thus:

x x x My opinion of Larry Aguirres mental status was based on my own

personal observations, his responses during my interview of him, the
results of the two (2) psychological tests conducted by clinical
psychologists, the results of laboratory tests, including a CT Scan and
MRI, and his personal and family history which I obtained from his sister,
Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz x x x.

5. x x x the reference in my report concerning Mrs. Lourdes Aguirre is not

a statement of my opinion of Mrs. Aguirres mental status, x x x. Rather, it
is part of the patients personal and family history as conveyed to me by
Mrs. Aguirre-Olondriz.

6. x x x An expression of my opinion, especially of an expert opinion,

cannot give rise to a charge for falsification. A contrary opinion by another
expert only means that the experts differ, and does not necessarily reflect
on the truth or falsity of either opinion x x x.

7. x x x I never stated that I examined Mrs. Aguirre, because I never did x

x x.

8. I had no participation in the surgery performed on Larry Aguirre except

to render an opinion on his capacity to give informed consent to the
vasectomy x x x.

9. Without admitting the merits of the complaint, I submit that

complainants are not the proper persons to subscribe to the same as they
 are not the offended party, peace officer or other public officer charged
with the enforcement of the law violated x x x.[21]

The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the circumstances attendant to the case
did not amount to the crime of falsification. He held that

[T]he claim of the complainant that the Psychiatric Report was falsified,
because consent was not given by Larry Aguirre to the vasectomy and/or
he was not consulted on said operation does not constitute falsification. It
would have been different if it was stated in the report that consent was
obtained from Larry Aguirre or that it was written therein that he was
consulted on the vasectomy, because that would mean that it was made to
appear in the report that Larry Aguirre participated in the act or proceeding
by giving his consent or was consulted on the matter when in truth and in
fact, he did not participate. Or if not, the entry would have been an
untruthful statement. But that is not the case. Precisely (sic) the report was
made to determine whether Larry Aguirre could give his consent to his
intended vasectomy. Be that as it may, the matter of Larrys consent having
obtained or not may nor be an issue after all, because complainants (sic)
herself alleged that Larrys mental condition is that of a child, who can not
give consent. Based on the foregoing consideration, no falsification can
be established under the circumstances.[22]

Even the statement in the Psychiatric Report of respondent Dr. Pascual that
Lourdes Aguirre had Bipolar Mood Disorder cannot be considered falsification since

The report did not state that Lourdes Aguirre was in fact personally
interviewed by respondent Dr. Pascual and that the latter concluded that
Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar Mood Disorder. The report merely quoted
other sources of information with respect to the condition of Lourdes
Aguirre, in the same manner that the fact that Lourdes Aguirre was
physically abusing Larry Aguirre was also not of Dra. Pascual personal
knowledge. But the fact that Dra. Pascual cited finding, which is not of
her own personal knowledge in her report does not mean that she
committed falsification in the process. Her sources may be wrong and may
affect the veracity of her report, but for as long as she has not alleged
therein that she personally diagnosed Lourdes Aguirre, which allegation
would not then be true, she cannot be charged of falsification. Therefore,
 it goes without saying that if the author of the report is not guilty, then
with more reason the other respondents are not liable.[23]

Respecting the charge of mutilation, the Assistant City Prosecutor also held
that the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and
penalized under Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., [t]he vasectomy
operation did not in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which
is still very much part of his physical self. He ratiocinated that:

While the operation renders him the inability (sic) to procreate, the
operation is reversible and therefore, cannot be the permanent damage
contemplated under Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code.[24]

The Assistant City Prosecutor,[25] in a Resolution[26] dated 8 January 2003,

found no probable cause to hold respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep
and Dr. Pascual liable for the complaint of falsification and mutilation, more
specifically, the violation of Articles 172 and 262 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Republic Act No. 7610. Accordingly, the Assistant City Prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of petitioner Gloria Aguirres complaint for insufficiency
of evidence. The dispositive portion of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, it is recommended that the above-entitled case be

dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.[27]

On 18 February 2003, petitioner Gloria Aguirre appealed the foregoing

resolution to the Secretary of the DOJ by means of a Petition for Review.[28]

In a Resolution dated 11 February 2004, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R.

Zuo, for the Secretary of the DOJ, dismissed the petition. In resolving said appeal,
the Chief State Prosecutor held that:

Under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of Department Circular

No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, the Secretary of Justice may, motu proprio,
dismiss outright the petition if there is no showing of any reversible error
in the questioned resolution or finds the same to be patently without merit.
 We carefully examined the petition and its attachments and found
no error that would justify a reversal of the assailed resolution which is in
accord with the law and evidenced (sic) on the matter.[29]

Petitioner Gloria Aguirres Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied

with finality by the DOJ in another Resolution dated 12 November 2004.

Resolute in her belief, petitioner Gloria Aguirre went to the Court of Appeals
by means of a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, as amended.

On 21 July 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision dismissing

petitioner Gloria Aguirres recourse for lack of merit.

The fallo of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby

DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Consequently, the assailed Resolutions dated February 11, 2004 and November 12,
2004 of the Secretary of Justice in I.S. No. 02-12466 are hereby AFFIRMED.[30]

Petitioner Gloria Aguirres motion for reconsideration proved futile as it was

denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 5 December 2005.

Hence, the present petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, premised on the following arguments:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS, GRAVE AND

REVERSIBLE ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT CONCLUDED, BASED
PURPORTEDLY ON THE INTERNET WHICH RUNS AMUCK WITH OUR
SYSTEM OF THE RULE OF LAW AND THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, THAT
BILATERAL VASECTOMY IS PURPORTEDLY 100% REVERSIBLE BY A
FUTURE MEDICAL PROCEDURE HENCE NOT AMOUNTING TO
MUTILATION, X X X; AND
 xxxx
II.

WORSE, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND

REVERSIBLE ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT REFUSED TO DIRECT THE
INDICTMENT OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR MUTILATION AND
FALSIFICATION DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT PROBABLE
CAUSE THEREFOR X X X.[31]

The foregoing issues notwithstanding, the more proper issue for this Courts
consideration is, given the facts of the case, whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when the latter affirmed the public prosecutors finding
of lack of probable cause for respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and
Dr. Pascual to stand trial for the criminal complaints of falsification and mutilation
in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.

In ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals explained that:

Evidently, the controversy lies in the permanency of sterilization as a result

of a vasectomy operation, and the chances of restoring fertility with a reversal
surgery x x x.

We sustain the DOJ in ruling that the bilateral vasectomy performed on

Larry does not constitute mutilation even if intentionally and purposely done to
prevent him from siring a child.

xxxx

Sterilization is to be distinguished from castration: in the latter act the reproductive

capacity is permanently removed or damaged.[32]

It then concluded that:

The matter of legal liability, other than criminal, which private respondents
may have incurred for the alleged absence of a valid consent to the vasectomy
performed on Larry, is certainly beyond the province of this certiorari petition. Out
task is confined to the issue of whether or not the Secretary of Justice and the Office
 of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City committed grave abuse of discretion in their
determining the existence or absence of probable cause for filing criminal cases
for falsification and mutilation under Articles 172 (2) and 262 of the Revised Penal
Code.[33]

Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, contends that the Court of Appeals and
the DOJ failed to appreciate several important facts: 1) that bilateral vasectomy
conducted on petitioners brother, Larry Aguirre, was admitted[34]; 2) that the
procedure caused the perpetual destruction of Larrys reproductive organs of
generation or conception;[35] 3) that the bilateral vasectomy was intentional and
deliberate to deprive Larry forever of his reproductive organ and his capacity to
procreate; and 4) that respondents, in conspiracy with one another, made not only
one but two (2) untruthful statements, and not mere inaccuracies when they made it
appear in the psychiatry report[36] that a) Larrys consent was obtained or at the very
least that the latter was informed of the intended vasectomy; and b) that Lourdes
Aguirre was likewise interviewed and evaluated. Paradoxically, however, petitioner
Gloria Aguirre does not in any way state that she, instead of respondent Pedro
Aguirre, has guardianship over the person of Larry. She only insists that respondents
should have obtained Larrys consent prior to the conduct of the bilateral vasectomy.

In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for public respondent
DOJ, argues that the conduct of preliminary investigation to determine the existence
of probable cause for the purpose of filing (an) information is the function of the
public prosecutor.[37] More importantly, the element[s] of castration or mutilation of
an organ necessary for generation is completely absent as he was not deprived of
any organ necessary for reproduction, much less the destruction of such organ.[38]

Likewise, in support of the decision of the Court of Appeals, respondents

Pedro Aguirre and Olondriz assert that, fundamentally, petitioner Gloria Aguirre has
no standing to file the complaint, as she has not shown any injury to her person or
asserted any relationship with Larry other than being his common law sister; further,
that she cannot prosecute the present case, as she has not been authorized by law to
file said complaint, not being the offended party, a peace officer or a public officer
charged with the enforcement of the law. Accordingly, respondents Pedro Aguirre
and Olondriz posit that they, together with the other respondents Dr. Agatep and Dr.
Pascual, may not be charged with, prosecuted for and ultimately convicted of: 1)
mutilation x x x since the bilateral vasectomy conducted on Larry does not involve
castration or amputation of an organ necessary for reproduction as the twin elements
of the crime of mutilation x x x are absent[39]; and 2) falsification x x x since the acts
allegedly constituting falsification involve matters of medical opinion and not
matters of fact,[40] and that petitioner Gloria Aguirre failed to prove damage to herself
or to any other person.

Respondent Dr. Agatep, in the same vein, stresses that vasectomy is not
mutilation. He elucidates that vasectomy is merely the excision of the vas deferens,
the duct in testis which transport semen[41]; that it is the penis and the testis that make
up the male reproductive organ and not the vas deferens; and additionally argues that
for the crime of mutilation to be accomplished, Article 262 of the Revised Penal
Code necessitates that there be intentional total or partial deprivation of some
essential organ for reproduction. Tubes, seminal ducts, vas deferens or prostatic
urethra not being organs, respondent Dr. Agatep concludes, therefore, that
vasectomy does not correspond to mutilation.

Anent the charge of falsification of a private document, respondent Dr. Agatep

asseverates that he never took part in disclosing any information, data or facts as
contained in the contentious Psychiatric Report.

For her part, respondent Dr. Pascual insists that the assailed Psychiatry Report
was the result of her independent exercise of professional judgment. Rightly or
wrongly, (she) diagnosed Larry Aguirre to be incapable of giving consent, based on
interviews made by the psychiatrist on Larry Aguirre and persons who interacted
with him.[42] And supposing that said report is flawed, it is, at most, an erroneous
medical diagnosis.

The petition has no merit.

Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within
the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for
which he was prosecuted.[43] The term does not mean actual and positive cause nor
does it import absolute certainty.[44] It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief;[45] that is, the belief that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand
trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.[46]

The executive department of the government is accountable for the

prosecution of crimes, its principal obligation being the faithful execution of the laws
of the land. A necessary component of the power to execute the laws is the right to
prosecute their violators,[47] the responsibility of which is thrust upon the
DOJ. Hence, the determination of whether or not probable cause exists to warrant
the prosecution in court of an accused is consigned and entrusted to the DOJ. And
by the nature of his office, a public prosecutor is under no compulsion to file a
particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to
prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different
conclusion.

Put simply, public prosecutors under the DOJ have a wide range of discretion,
the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends
on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by (public)
prosecutors.[48] And this Court has consistently adhered to the policy of non-
interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to leave to the
investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what
constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of an
information against the supposed offender.[49]

But this is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the
part of the prosecutor. It is entirely possible that the investigating prosecutor may
erroneously exercise the discretion lodged in him by law. This, however, does not
render his act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
of jurisdiction.[50]

Prescinding from the above, the courts duty in an appropriate case, therefore,
is confined to a determination of whether the assailed executive determination of
probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction resulting from a grave
abuse of discretion. For courts of law to grant the extraordinary writ of certiorari, so
as to justify the reversal of the finding of whether or not there exists probable cause
to file an information, the one seeking the writ must be able to establish that the
investigating prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be patent and gross as would
amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act
in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough.[51] Excess of
jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over the case but has transcended the
same or acted without authority.[52]

Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the reasons of the
Assistant City Prosecutor in dismissing the criminal complaints for falsification and
mutilation, as affirmed by the DOJ, is determinative of whether or not he committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In ruling the way he did that no probable cause for falsification and mutilation
exists - the Assistant City Prosecutor deliberated on the factual and legal milieu of
the case. He found that there was no sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case for the crimes complained of as defined and punished under Articles 172,
paragraph 2, and 262 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No.
7610, respectively. Concerning the crime of falsification of a private document, the
Assistant City Prosecutor reasoned that the circumstances attendant to the case did
not amount to the crime complained of, that is, the lack of consent by Larry Aguirre
before he was vasectomized; or the fact that the latter was not consulted. The lack
of the two preceding attendant facts do not in any way amount to falsification, absent
the contention that it was made to appear in the assailed report that said consent was
obtained. That would have been an untruthful statement. Neither does the fact that
the Psychiatric Report state that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar Mood Disorder by the
same token amount to falsification because said report does not put forward that such
finding arose after an examination of the concerned patient. Apropos the charge of
mutilation, he reasoned that though the vasectomy rendered Larry unable to
procreate, it was not the permanent damage contemplated under the pertinent
provision of the penal code.

We agree. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction on the part of the DOJ and the Assistant City Prosecutor was not shown
in the present case.
 In the present petition, respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and
Dr. Pascual are charged with violating Articles 172 and 262 of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. Article 172, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, defines the crime of falsification of a private document, viz

Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified

documents. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon:

xxxx

2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent
to cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the
acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

Petitioner Gloria Aguirre charges respondents with falsification of a private

document for conspiring with one another in keeping Larry in the dark about the
foregoing (vasectomy) as the same was concealed from him by the respondents x x
x,[53] as well as for falsely concluding and diagnosing Lourdes Aguirre to be
suffering from Bipolar Mood Disorder.

A scrutiny, however, of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code which defines
the acts constitutive of falsification, that is

Art. 171. x x x shall falsify a document by committing any of the following

acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or

proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding

statements other than those in fact made by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

5. Altering true dates;

 6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which
changes its meaning;

7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of

an original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a
statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or

8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance

thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.

vis--vis the much criticized Psychiatric Report, shows that the acts complained of do
not in any manner, by whatever stretch of the imagination, fall under any of the eight
(8) enumerated acts constituting the offense of falsification.

In order to properly address the issue presented by petitioner Gloria Aguirre,

it is necessary that we discuss the elements of the crime of falsification of private
document under the Revised Penal Code, a crime which all the respondents have
been accused of perpetrating. The elements of said crime under paragraph 2 of
Article 172 of our penal code are as follows: 1) that the offender committed any acts
of falsification, except those in par. 7, enumerated in Article 171; 2) that the
falsification was committed in any private document; and 3) that the falsification
caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent
to cause such damage. Under Article 171, paragraph 2, a person may commit
falsification of a private document by causing it to appear in a document that a person
or persons participated in an act or proceeding, when such person or persons did not
in fact so participate in the act or proceeding. On the other hand, falsification under
par. 3 of the same article is perpetrated by a person or persons who, participating in
an act or proceeding, made statements in that act or proceeding and the offender, in
making a document, attributed to such person or persons statements other than those
in fact made by such person or persons. And the crime defined under paragraph 4
thereof is committed when 1) the offender makes in a document statements in a
narration of facts; 2) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated by him; 3) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and 4) the
perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of
injuring a third person.
 Applying the above-stated elements of the crime to the case at bar, in order
that respondent Dr. Pascual, and the rest acting in conspiracy with her, to have
committed the crime of falsification under par. 3 and 4 of Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code, it is essential that that there be prima facie evidence to show that she
had caused it to appear that Larry gave his consent to be vasectomized or at the very
least, that the proposed medical procedure was explained to Larry. But in the assailed
report, no such thing was done. Lest it be forgotten, the reason for having Larry
psychiatrically evaluated was precisely to ascertain whether or not he can validly
consent with impunity to the proposed vasectomy, and not to obtain his consent to it
or to oblige respondent Dr. Pascual to explain to him what the import of the medical
procedure was. Further, that Larrys consent to be vasectomized was not obtained by
the psychiatrist was of no moment, because nowhere is it stated in said report that
such assent was obtained. At any rate, petitioner Gloria Aguirre contradicts her very
own allegations when she persists in the contention that Larry has the mental age of
a child; hence, he was legally incapable of validly consenting to the procedure.

In the matter of the supposed incorrect diagnosis of Lourdes Aguirre, with

regard to paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, we quote with
approval the succinct statements of the Assistant City Prosecutor:

[T]he fact that Dra. Pascual cited finding, which is not of her own personal
knowledge in her report does not mean that she committed falsification in
the process. Her sources may be wrong and may affect the veracity of her
report, but for as long as she has not alleged therein that she personally
diagnosed Lourdes Aguirre, which allegation would not then be true, she
cannot be charged of falsification. Therefore, it goes without saying that
if the author of the report is not guilty, then with more reason the other
respondents are not liable.[54]

As to the charge of mutilation, Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code defines the
crime as

Art. 262. Mutilation. The penalty of reclusion

temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who
shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or
partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.
 Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision
mayor in its medium and maximum periods.

A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the

elements[55] of mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal
Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for
generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is,
to deprive the offended party of some essential organ for reproduction. According
to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation
as defined and penalized above, i.e., [t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way
deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his
physical self. Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, would want this Court to make a
ruling that bilateral vasectomy constitutes the crime of mutilation.

This we cannot do, for such an interpretation would be contrary to the

intentions of the framers of our penal code.

A fitting riposte to the issue at hand lies in United States v. Esparcia,[56] in

which this Court had the occasion to shed light on the implication of the term
mutilation. Therein we said that:

The sole point which it is desirable to discuss is whether or not the

crime committed is that defined and penalized by article 414 of the Penal
Code. The English translation of this article reads: "Any person who shall
intentionally castrate another shall suffer a penalty ranging from reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua." The Spanish text, which should govern,
uses the word "castrare," inadequately translated into English as
"castrate." The word "capar," which is synonymous of "castrar," is defined
in the Royal Academic Dictionary as the destruction of the organs of
generation or conception. Clearly it is the intention of the law to punish
any person who shall intentionally deprived another of any organ
necessary for reproduction. An applicable construction is that of Viada in
the following language:
"At the head of these crimes, according to their order of gravity, is
the mutilation known by the name of 'castration' which consists of the
amputation of whatever organ is necessary for generation. The law could
not fail to punish with the utmost severity such a crime, which, although
 not destroying life, deprives a person of the means to transmit it. But bear
in mind that according to this article in order for 'castration' to exist, it is
indispensable that the 'castration' be made purposely. The law does not
look only to the result but also to the intention of the act. Consequently, if
by reason of an injury or attack, a person is deprived of the organs of
generation, the act, although voluntary, not being intentional to that end,
it would not come under the provisions of this article, but under No. 2 of
article 431." (Viada, Codigo Penal, vol. 3, p. 70. See to same effect, 4
Groizard, Codigo Penal, p. 525.)

Thus, the question is, does vasectomy deprive a man, totally or partially, of
some essential organ of reproduction? We answer in the negative.

In the male sterilization procedure of vasectomy, the tubular passage, called

the vas deferens, through which the sperm (cells) are transported from the testicle to
the urethra where they combine with the seminal fluid to form the ejaculant, is
divided and the cut ends merely tied.[57] That part, which is cut, that is, the vas
deferens, is merely a passageway that is part of the duct system of the male
reproductive organs. The vas deferens is not an organ, i.e., a highly organized unit
of structure, having a defined function in a multicellular organism and consisting of
a range of tissues.[58] Be that as it may, even assuming arguendo that the tubular
passage can be considered an organ, the cutting of the vas deferens does not divest
or deny a man of any essential organ of reproduction for the simple reason that it
does not entail the taking away of a part or portion of the male reproductive
system. The cut ends, after they have been tied, are then dropped back into the
incision.[59]

Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of reproduction, such

procedure does not deprive him, either totally or partially, of some essential organ
for reproduction. Notably, the ordinary usage of the term mutilation is the
deprivation of a limb or essential part (of the body),[60] with the operative expression
being deprivation. In the same manner, the word castration is defined as the removal
of the testies or ovaries.[61] Such being the case in this present petition, the bilateral
vasectomy done on Larry could not have amounted to the crime of mutilation as
defined and punished under Article 262, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal
Code. And no criminal culpability could be foisted on to respondent Dr. Agatep, the
urologist who performed the procedure, much less the other respondents. Thus, we
find sufficient evidence to explain why the Assistant City Prosecutor and the DOJ
ruled the way they did. Verily, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the writ
of certiorari is unavailing; hence, should not be issued.

It is once more apropos to pointedly apply the Courts general policy of non-
interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations. As it has been oft said, the
Supreme Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the
prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima
facie case.[62] The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but, as a rule, have
no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.[63] The possible exception to this rule
is where there is an unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction that will justify judicial intrusion into the precincts
of the executive. But that is not the case herein.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack

of merit. The assailed 21 July 2005 Decision and 5 December
2005Resolution, both of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88370 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Gloria Aguirre.
SO ORDERED.
NASSAS, Va., Jan. 21— In a verdict that highlighted the
plight and rights of abused women, a jury today found
Lorena L. Bobbitt not guilty of all criminal charges,
concluding that she was temporarily insane last June when
she cut off her husband's penis with a kitchen knife.
When the jury of seven women and five men announced
its decision, acquitting Mrs. Bobbitt of malicious
wounding -- an offense for which she could have been
imprisoned for 20 years -- a gasp went up among her
supporters in the courtroom.
Mrs. Bobbitt, who was born in Ecuador and raised in
Venezuela, apparently did not understand what the jury
foreman had said. Turning to one of her lawyers, Lisa
Kemler of Alexandria, she asked, "Is that good?" Ms.
Kemler replied, "You're free." Mrs. Bobbitt smiled briefly,
then resumed her customarily serious, slightly sorrowful
expression.
She still faces one more hurdle -- a psychiatric
examination that could last 45 days. To Undergo
Evaluation
Moments after the verdict, Mrs. Bobbitt left through the
rear of the courtroom and was taken for psychiatric
evaluation, as state law provides for people acquitted for
reasons of insanity. She was taken to Central State
Hospital in Petersburg, where a psychiatrist and a
psychologist will determine whether she poses any danger
to herself or the public.
The doctors are to decide on a course of treatment for Mrs.
Bobbitt, which will determine how long she is held. She
could be released after 45 days under an order to seek
private treatment.
The defense argued -- and the jury agreed, after slightly
more than six hours of deliberation -- that Mrs. Bobbitt,
flooded with nightmarish images of her husband's abuse
and suffering from a variety of mental illnesses, snapped
psychologically after her husband raped her and yielded to
an "irresistible impulse" to strike back.
In testimony, Mrs. Bobbitt said she had not realized what
she had done until later, when she fled their home and was
in her car. She said she then discovered the knife in one
hand and her husband's penis in the other. She threw what
she called his "body part" in the underbrush, from which it
was retrieved, and, after nine hours of surgery, reattached.
The verdict brought to an end the eight-day trial, during
which the Bobbitt marriage became one of the most highly
publicized and minutely scrutinized ever. Forty-eight
witnesses, including Mrs. Bobbitt and her husband, John
W. Bobbitt, graphically depicted a relationship gone sour.
The disintegration culminated early on the morning of
June 23, Mrs. Bobbitt said, when, moments after her
drunken husband raped her and while she was drinking a
glass of water in the kitchen, she spotted a 12-inch knife,
picked it up, approached the sleeping man and cut him.
'Seek Her American Dream'
In a statement read in English by Janna Bisutti, owner of
the nail salon where Mrs. Bobbitt has worked as a
manicurist, Mrs. Bobbitt thanked her supporters and
urged other battered women to seek the help of friends
and counselors. "She did once and will again seek her
American dream when she is able, and if the publicity of
her abuse can help one person find freedom, then all of
this is not in vain," said the statement, which was later
read in Spanish.
The prosecutor in the case, Paul B. Ebert, the Prince
William County Commonwealth Attorney, expressed fears
that the verdict could send the wrong message about
deterrence and punishment.
"I have a certain amount of sympathy for Mrs. Bobbitt, but
that doesn't justify what she did," Mr. Ebert said. "A lot of
people go to the penitentiary who in some ways tug at your
heart strings, but when you violate the law, you've got to
be punished, in my opinion, and this is no exception. I'm
happy she went out the back door rather than the front."
Kim Gandy, executive vice president of the National
Organization for Women, said today, "We're glad the jury
rejected the twisted argument that a battered woman
should be locked up in a prison cell." Ms. Gandy added,
however, that "this whole saga drives home the need for
swift passage of a comprehensive version of the Violence
Against Women Act, which is stalled in the never-
neverland of Congressional maneuvering." Marital Abuse
Corroborated
In remarks in the courtroom after the verdict, Mr. Ebert
said he had no regrets about calling Mr. Bobbitt to testify,
even though the prosecution's own experts concluded that
he had abused and raped his wife.
"I don't think we could begin to have a successful
prosecution without calling the victim in this case," Mr.
Ebert said. "John Bobbitt is what he is and he testified, I'm
sure, to the best of his ability." He also said he felt he had
done nothing wrong by handling the prosecutions of both
Mr. and Mrs. Bobbitt. Last November, a jury cleared Mr.
Bobbitt of charges of marital sexual abuse in a case that
examined evidence from only the five days immediately
preceding the mutilation.
A procession of witnesses corroborated Mrs. Bobbitt's
account of marital abuse, saying they often saw her with
bruises on her body. Two forensic psychologists and a
psychiatrist from the hospital in Petersburg, all appointed
by the court last fall to examine Mrs. Bobbitt, concluded
she was a battered woman. They also concluded that she
was seriously depressed when she cut her husband; two
held that she was suffering from post-traumatic stress
disorder.
But all rejected the diagnosis of a defense expert that Mrs.
Bobbitt had suffered a "brief reactive psychosis," one that
left her defenseless when the thought of mutilating her
husband came to her. Her actions, they concluded, were
too purposeful and "goal-oriented" to meet the definition
of "irresistible impulse," which impel random attacks on
friend or foe alike without regard for the consequences.
At the insistence of the defense, Judge Herman A.
Whisenant's charge to jurors on irresistible impulse was
considerably less stringent, requiring only that they find
that Mrs. Bobbitt's mind "was so impaired by disease that
she was unable to resist the impulse to commit the crime."
The jury wrestled with the language of the charge, asking
Judge Whisenant at one point whether they could use the
doctors' broader definition. He told them they could not;
moments later, they returned with their verdict. Memories
of Mutilation
The jury rejected the prosecution's assertion that Mrs.
Bobbitt acted intentionally and maliciously. It also
acquitted her of a lesser charge, unlawful wounding,
rejecting the assertion that she acted with intent and "in
the heat of passion."
The prosecution maintained that Mrs. Bobbitt's testimony
of remembering nothing about the episode -- an assertion,
they hinted, that neatly fit her insanity defense -- was
belied by more credible statements that she had made
earlier.
"He always have orgasm and he doesn't wait for me to
have orgasm," she told a police lieutenant hours after the
incident. "He's selfish. I don't think it's fair, so I pulled
back the sheets then and I did it."
While Mrs. Bobbitt's memories of the mutilation waned
over time, her memory of the prelude grew more
expansive as she detailed how her mind clouded over with
what she called "pictures" and what psychiatrists call
flashbacks, common to people who have suffered severe
trauma. But with witness after witness, along with Mrs.
Bobbitt herself, attesting to Mr. Bobbitt's psychological,
physical and sexual abusiveness, and with Mrs. Bobbitt's
having won sympathizers nationwide through broadcasts
of the trial, prosecutors appeared fearful of challenging
Mrs. Bobbitt's credibility too explicitly.
The verdict ended, at least in the courts, what began as a
depressingly ordinary private domestic dispute between
two mismatched people -- one a 26-year-old former
marine, bar bouncer, cab driver and construction worker,
the other his Ecuadorian-born wife, whom he married in
1989.
The matter would surely have remained that way had Mrs.
Bobbitt amputated any of her husband's other
appendages. Whether generated by concern for the
problem of domestic violence, voyeurism or the way in
which it has broken numerous social and journalistic
taboos, however, public appetite for the Bobbitts seems
insatiable.
Mr. Bobbitt was not in the courtroom for today's verdict.
Appearing on "Larry King Live," his parents, Marylyn and
Bill Biro, who were with him elsewhere in Manassas at the
time of the verdict, said their son was "dumbfounded" by
the results and asked, "You mean she got away with it?"
Throughout, the case juxtaposed images of normalcy and
perversity. Mr. Bobbitt, Ms. Kemler said in her opening
statement, was everything Mrs. Bobbitt wanted: "He was
handsome, he seemed nice, he was a U.S. marine, after
all."
Mrs. Bobbitt depicted herself as a devout, unworldly and
deeply religious Roman Catholic woman, but one who
admitted stealing dresses from Nordstrom's and money
and manicuring equipment from Ms. Bisutti.
Together, they made an unusual couple, whose bitter,
bruising fights were interspersed with trips to Luray
Caverns and the King's Dominion amusement park, who
engaged in consensual sex 72 hours before the
amputation, even as they planned to divorce.
"They are like children," Mr. Ebert said in his closing
argument. "Neither one plays with a whole deck. They
don't have all their spigots open."
 THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CIRIACO PUNSALAN, Defendant-Appellant.

Alfonso E. Mendoza for Appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. LESIONES; PRINCIPAL MEMBER OF THE BODY. — While the hand is a principal member as that term is
used in paragraph 2 of article 416, a finger is "a member other than a principal member" as that term is
used in paragraph 3 of article 416.

2. ID.; ID.; INFORMATION. — A complaint or information charging the crime of lesiones graves (serious
physical injuries), which alleges the injured party lost the use of three fingers as a result of the injuries
inflicted upon him, but does not allege that as a result of the loss of his fingers he lost the use of his hand, is
not sufficient to sustain a conviction under paragraph 2 of article 416, but does sustain a conviction under
paragraph 3 of article 416.

3. ID.; ID.; ID. — It might be an interesting question in a proper case whether proof of the loss of capacity
to bend three fingers of one hand would be sufficient to establish a finding of the loss of the use of the hand,
as hat term is used in paragraph 2 of article 416.

DECISION

CARSON, J. :

The defendant and appellant in this case was charged with the crime of lesiones graves (serious physical
injuries in the Court of First instance of the Province of Tarlac, upon the following information: jgc:chan robles .com.p h

"The undersigned charges Ciriaco Punsalan with the crime of lesiones graves, committed as follows: jgc:chan rob les.com. ph

"On or about August 11 of the present year (1910), the said accused did maliciously and criminally attack
Juan de Jesus with a penknife, inflicting upon him injuries in three fingers of his left hand, as a result of
which said fingers have become useless. The motive was that the accused suspected that the victim knew
about the abduction of the former’s sister.

"The affair occurred in the municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, P. I., in violation of the law." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

Accepting, as we do, the view of the trial judge as to the degree of credibility which should be accorded to
the respective witnesses of the prosecution and the defense, we are satisfied that the evidence of record
conclusively establishes the guilt of the defendant and appellant of the crime with which he was charged.

The trial court found the defendant and appellant guilty of the crime of lesiones graves (serious physical
injuries) as defined and penalized in paragraph 2 of article 416 of the Penal Code, and sentenced him to
three years six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional. We are of opinion, however, that the
crime with which the defendant and appellant was charged in the information is that defined in paragraph 3
of article 416 of the Penal Code, and that, even if the evidence of record were sufficient to establish the guilt
of the accused of the higher offense defined and penalized in paragraph 2 of that article, the trial court,
nevertheless, erred in convicting the defendant of a higher offense than that with which he was charged in
the information upon which he was tried.

Paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 416 of the Penal Code are as follows: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"ART. 416. Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault another shall be guilty of the crime of inflicting
serious physical injuries, and shall suffer:chan rob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

x x x
"2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum degree, if in consequence of the physical
injuries the person injured shall have lost an eye or any principal member, or shall have lost the use of such
member, or shall have become incapacitated for the work in which he shall have been habitually engaged
before receiving the injury.

"3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium degrees, if in consequence of the physical
injuries the person injured shall have become deformed, or shall have lost some member other than a
principal member, or shall have lost the use of such member, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the
performance of the work in which he was habitually engaged, for a period of more than ninety days." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

The trial judge found, and the evidence of record sustains his findings, that as a result of the injuries
received by the offended party, he lost the use of three of the fingers of his left hand, he having lost "the
power of flection of those fingers." The trial judge appears to have been of opinion that this finding was
equivalent to a finding that the offended party had lost the use of a principal member, as that term is used
in paragraph 2 of article 416, and, in accordance with this conclusion, he imposed the penalty prescribed in
that section.

Under a decision of the supreme court of Spain dated August 21, 1874, it might become an interesting
question in a proper case whether or not the loss of capacity to bend three fingers of one hand should be
taken to be equivalent to the loss of the use of that hand so as to sustain a conviction of the violation of the
provision of paragraph 2 of article 416. In that case the supreme court of Spain held, upon proof that three
fingers of one hand had been cut off, that the injured party had lost the use of the hand itself, and that
since the hand is a principal member under the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 416, the offender should
be convicted and sentenced under the provisions of that section (Viada, Penal Code, Vol. III, 4th ed., p.
73.)

In the case at bar, however, we are not called upon to go into this question, because the information does
not charge that the injuries caused by the accused resulted in the loss of the use of a principal member. The
allegation contained in the information is merely to the effect that the injured party lost the use of three of
the fingers of his left hand, and there is no allegation touching the loss of the use of the hand itself. The
fingers of the hand are not principal members, and it is evident, therefore, that without an allegation that as
a result of the loss of the use of several fingers the use of the hand itself had been lost, the information
charges the infliction of injuries of the class defined in paragraph 3 of article 416, and not of the class of
paragraph 2 of article 416.

We have frequently held that since an accused person is entitled to be advised at the outset of the
proceedings as to the nature and character of the offense with which he is charged, a conviction cannot be
sustained for a higher or different offense than that charged, even though the proof adduced at the trial be
sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused of a higher offense.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be and are hereby reversed,
but the evidence of record establishing the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense
with which he is charged, that is to say, of the offense defined and penalized in paragraph 3 of article 416,
we find him guilty as charged, and there being neither aggravating nor extenuating circumstances, we
sentence him to one year eight months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, that being the medium
penalty prescribed by law, together with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to pay the costs of the
proceedings in both instances, and to the indemnification of the offended party in the sum of P13, that being
the amount of the damages proven at the trial as found by the trial court.
G.R. No. 166414 October 22, 2014

GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. DANILO A. MANALASTAS (AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MALOLOS BULACAN, BR. VII), HON. ERANIO G. CEDILLO, SR., (AS PRESIDING JUDGE,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, BR.1) AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant accused to enter a plea, go to
trial, and should the decision be adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final judgment and assign as
error the denial of the motion to quash. The denial, being an interlocutory order, is not appealable,
and may not be the subject of a petition for certiorari because of the availability of other remedies in
the ordinary course of law.

Antecedents

Petitioners Godofredo Enrile and Dr. Frederick Enrile come to the Court on appeal, seeking to
reverse and undo the adverse resolutions promulgated on August 31, 20041 and December 21,
2004,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) respectively dismissed their petition for certiorari and
prohibition (assailing the dismissal of their petition for certiorariby the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 7, in Malolos, Bulacan, presided by RTC Judge Danilo A. Manalastas, to assail the denial of
their motions to quash the two informations charging themwith less serious physical injuries by the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Meycauayan, Bulacan), and denied their motion for reconsideration
anent such dismissal.

The mauling incident involving neighbors that transpired on January 18, 2003 outside the house of
the petitioners in St. Francis Subdivision, Barangay Pandayan, Meycauayan Bulacan gave rise to
the issue subject of this appeal. Claiming themselves to be the victims in that mauling, Josefina
Guinto Morano,3 Rommel Morano and Perla Beltran Morano charged the petitioners and one Alfredo
Enrile4 in the MTC with frustrated homicide (victim being Rommel) in Criminal Case No. 03-275; with
less serious physical injuries (victim being Josefina) in Criminal Case No. 03-276; and with less
serious physical injuries (victim being Perla) in Criminal Case No. 03-277, all of the MTC of
Meycauayan, Bulacan on August 8, 2003 after the parties submitted their respective affidavits, the
MTC issued its joint resolution,5 whereby it found probable cause against the petitioners for less
serious physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 03-276 and Criminal Case No. 03-277, and set their
arraignment on September 8, 2003. On August 19, 2003, the petitioners moved for the
reconsideration of the joint resolution, arguing that the complainants had not presented proof of their
having been given medical attention lasting 10 days or longer, thereby rendering their charges of
less serious physical injuries dismissible; and that the two cases for less serious physical injuries,
being necessarily related to the case of frustrated homicide still pending in the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, should not be governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure.6 On November
11, 2003, the MTC denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration because the grounds of the
motion had already been discussed and passed upon in the resolution sought to be reconsidered;
and because the cases were governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, which prohibited the
motion for reconsideration.7 Thereafter, the petitioners presented a manifestation with motion to
quash and a motion for the deferment of the arraignment.8
On February 11, 2004, the MTC denied the motion to quash, and ruled that the cases for less
serious physical injuries were covered by the rules on ordinary procedure; and reiterated the
arraignment previously scheduled on March 15, 2004.9 It explained its denial of the motion to quash
in the following terms, to wit:

xxxx

As to the Motion to Quash, this Court cannot give due course to said motion. A perusal of the
records shows that the grounds and/or issues raised therein are matters of defense that can be fully
ventilated in a full blown trial on the merits.

Accordingly, Criminal Cases Nos. 03-276 and 03-277 both for Less Serious Physical Injuries are
hereby ordered tried under the ordinary procedure.

The Motion to Quash is hereby DENIED for reasons aforestated.

Meanwhile, set these cases for arraignment on March 15, 2004 as previously scheduled.

SO ORDERED.10

Still, the petitioners sought reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash, but the MTC denied
their motion on March 25, 2004.11

Unsatisfied, the petitioners commenced a special civil action for certiorari assailing the order dated
February 11, 2004 denying their motion to quash, and the order dated March 25, 2004 denying their
motion for reconsideration. The special civil action for certiorari was assigned to Branch 7, presided
by RTC Judge Manalastas.

On May 25, 2004, the RTC Judge Manalastas dismissed the petition for certiorari because:

As could be gleaned from the order of the public respondent dated February 11, 2004, the
issuesraised in the motion toquash are matters of defense that could only be threshed outin a full
blown trial on the merits. Indeed, proof of the actual healing period of the alleged injuries of the
private complainants could only be established in the trial of the cases filed against herein petitioners
by means of competent evidence x x x. On the other hand, this court is likewise not in a position, not
being a trier of fact insofar as the instant petition is concerned, to rule on the issue as to whether or
not there was probable cause to prosecute the petitioners for the alleged less physical injuries with
which they stand charged. x x x.

All things considered, it would be premature to dismiss, the subject criminal cases filed against the
herein petitioners when the basis thereof could be determined only after trial on the merits. x x x.12

The petitioners moved for the reconsideration, but the RTC denied their motion on July 9, 2004.13

The petitioners next went to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the orders
issued by the RTC on May 25, 2004 and July 9, 2004, averring grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. They urged the dismissal of the criminal
cases on the same grounds they advanced in the RTC.

However, on August 31, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed resolution dismissing the petition for
certiorari and prohibition for being the wrong remedy, the proper remedy being an appeal; and ruling
that they should have filed their notice of appealon or before August 18, 2004 due to their receiving
the order of July 9, 2004 on August 3, 2004.14

On December 21, 2004, the CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.15

Issues

In this appeal, the petitioners submit that:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURTS’ RULING
DENYING THE PETITIONERS' MOTION TO QUASH THE COMPLAINTS DESPITE THE CLEAR
AND PATENT SHOWING THAT BOTH COMPLAINTS, ON THEIR FACE, LACKED ONE OF THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE ALLEGED CRIME OF LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE INJURIES
SUSTAINED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS WERE NOT PERPETRATED BY THE
PETITIONERS.16

Ruling of the Court

The CA did not commit any reversible errors.

Firstly, considering that the certiorari case in the RTC was an original action, the dismissal of the
petition for certiorarion May 25, 2004, and the denial of the motion for reconsideration onJuly 9,
2004, were in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. As such, the orders were final by reason of their
completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more to be done by the RTC.17 The proper
recourse for the petitioners should be an appeal by notice of appeal,18 taken within 15 days from
notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration.19

Yet, the petitioners chose to assail the dismissal by the RTC through petitions for certiorari and
prohibition in the CA, instead of appealing by notice of appeal. Such choice was patently erroneous
and impermissible, because certiorari and prohibition, being extra ordinary reliefs to address
jurisdictional errors of a lower court, were not available to them. Worthy to stress is that the RTC
dismissed the petition for certiorari upon its finding that the MTC did not gravely abuse its discretion
in denying the petitioners’ motion to quash. In its view, the RTC considered the denial of the motion
to quash correct, for it would be premature and unfounded for the MTC to dismiss the criminal cases
against the petitioners upon the supposed failure by the complainants to prove the period of their
incapacity or of the medical attendance for them. Indeed, the timeand the occasion to establish the
duration of the incapacity or medical attendance would only be at the trial on the merits.

Secondly, the motion to quash is the mode by which an accused, before entering his plea,
challenges the complaint or information for insufficiency on its facein point of law, or for defects
apparent on its face.20 Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the
quashal of the complaint or information, as follows: (a) the facts charged do not constitute an
offense; (b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the court trying
the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d) the officer who filed the information
had no authority to do so; (e) the complaint or information does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form; (f) more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various
offenses is prescribed by law; (g) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (h) the
complaint or information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and (i) the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged,
or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

According to Section 6,21 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the names of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the averments in a complaint or information is,
therefore, whether the facts alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the
offense.22

By alleging in their motion to quashthat both complaints should be dismissed for lack of one of the
essential elements of less serious physical injuries, the petitioners were averring that the facts
charged did not constitute offenses. To meet the test of sufficiency, therefore, it is necessary to refer
to the law definingthe offense charged, which,in this case, is Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code,
which pertinently states:

Article 265. Less serious physical injuries– Any person who shall inflict upon another physical
injuries x x x which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten days or more, or shall
require medical assistance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.

x x x x.

Based on the law, the elements of the crime of less serious physical injuries are, namely: (1) that the
offender inflicted physical injuries upon another; and (2) that the physical injuries inflicted either
incapacitated the victim for labor for 10 days or more, or the injuries required medical assistance for
more than 10 days.

Were the elements of the crime sufficiently averred in the complaints? To answer this query, the
Court refersto the averments of the complaints themselves, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 03-276

That on the 18th day of January 2003, at around 7:30 in the evening more or less, in Brgy.
Pandayan (St. Francis Subd.), Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused motivated
by anger by conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with another did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike the face of one JOSEFINA GUINTO MORAÑO,
thereby inflicting upon his (sic) physical injuries that will require a period of 10 to 12 days barring
healing and will incapacitate his customary labor for the same period of time attached Medical
Certificate (sic).

CONTRARY TO LAW.23

Criminal Case No. 03-277

That on the 18th day of January 2003, at around 7:30 in the evening more or less, in Brgy.
Pandayan (St. Francis Subd.), Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above named accused
MOTIVATED by anger did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and right
and give hitting her head against pavement of one PERLA BELTRAN MORAÑO inflicting the latter
physical injuries and will require Medical Attendance for a period of 12 to 15 days barring unforeseen
complication as per Medical Certificate hereto attached.

CONTRARY TO LAW.24

The aforequoted complaints bear out that the elements of less serious physical injuries were
specifically averred therein. The complaint in Criminal Case No. 03-276 stated that: (a) the
petitioners "wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike the face of one JOSEFINA
GUINTO MORAÑO;" and (b) the petitioners inflicted physical injuries upon the complainant "that will
require a period of 10 to 12 days barring healing and will incapacitate his customary labor for the
same period of time;" while that in CriminalCase No. 03-277 alleged that: (a) the petitioners "wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and right and give hitting her head against pavement of
one PERLA BELTRAN MORAÑO;" and (b) the petitioners inflicted upon the complainant "physical
injuries [that] will require Medical Attendance for a period of 12 to 15 days barring unforeseen
complication."

In the context of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,25 the complaints sufficiently charged the
petitioners with less serious physical injuries. Indeed, the complaints onlyneeded to aver the ultimate
facts constituting the offense, not the details of why and how the illegal acts allegedly amounted to
undue injury or damage, for such matters, being evidentiary, were appropriate for the trial. Hence,
the complaints were not quashable.

In challenging the sufficiency of the complaints, the petitioners insist that the "complaints do not
provide any evidence/s that would tend to establish and to show that the medical attendance
rendered on private complainants actually and in fact lasted for a period exceeding ten (10) days;"
and the medical certificates attached merely stated that "the probable disability period of healing is
10 to 12 days, for Josefina G. Morano, and, 12-15 days, for Perla B. Morano, hence, the findings of
the healing periods were merely speculations, surmises and conjectures ."They insist that the
"private complainants should have presented medical certificates that would show the number of
days rendered for medication considering that they filed their complaint on March 15, 2003 or about
two (2) months after the alleged incident."26

The petitioners’ insistence is utterly bereft of merit. 1âwphi 1

As the MTC and RTC rightly held, the presentation of the medical certificates to prove the duration of
the victims’ need for medical attendance or of their incapacity should take place only at the trial, not
before or during the preliminary investigation. According to Cinco v. Sandiganbayan,27 the preliminary
investigation, which is the occasion for the submission of the parties’ respective affidavits, counter-
affidavits and evidence to buttress their separate allegations, is merely inquisitorial, and is often the
only means of discovering whether a person may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the
prosecutor to prepare the information.28 It is not yet a trial on the merits, for its only purpose is to
determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty thereof.29 The scope of the investigation does not approximate that of a trial
before the court; hence, what is required is only that the evidence be sufficient to establish probable
causethat the accused committed the crime charged, not that all reasonable doubtof the guilt of the
accused be removed.30
We further agree with the RTC’s observation that "the issues raised in the motion to quash are
matters of defense that could only be threshed out in a full blown trial on the merits. Indeed, proof of
actual healing period of the alleged injuries of the private complainant could only be established in
the trial of the cases filed against herein petitioners by means of competent evidence, and to grant
the main prayer of the instant petition for the dismissal of the criminal cases against them for less
serious physical injuries is to prevent the trial court to hear and receive evidence in connection with
said cases and to render judgments thereon. x x x All things considered, it would be premature to
dismiss the subject criminal cases filed against the herein petitioners when the basis thereof could
be determined only after trial of the merits."31

And, lastly, in opting to still assail the denial of the motion to quash by the MTC by bringing the
special civil action for certiorariin the RTC, the petitioners deliberately disregarded the fundamental
conditions for initiating the special civil action for certiorari. These conditions were, firstly, the
petitioners must show thatthe respondent trial court lacked jurisdiction or exceeded it, or gravely
abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and,secondly, because the denial
was interlocutory, they must show that there was no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.32

The petitioners’ disregard of the fundamental conditions precluded the success of their recourse. To
start with, the petitioners did not show that the MTC had no jurisdiction, or exceeded its jurisdiction in
denying the motion to quash, or gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in its denial. That showing was the door that would have opened the way to their success
with the recourse. Yet, the door remained unopened to them because the denial by the MTC of the
motion to quash was procedurally and substantively correct because the duration of the physical
incapacity or medical attendance should be dealt with only during the trial on the merits, not at the
early stage of dealing with and resolving the motion to quash. As to the second condition, the fact
that the denial was interlocutory, not a final order, signified that the MTC did not yet completely
terminate its proceedings in the criminal cases. The proper recourse of the petitioners was to enter
their pleas as the accused, go to trial in the MTC, and should the decision of the MTC be adverse to
them in the end, reiterate the issue on their appeal from the judgment and assign as error the
unwarranted denial of their motion to quash.33 Certiorari was not available to them in the RTC
because they had an appeal, or another plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the resolutions
promulgated on August 31, 2004 and December 21, 2004; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the
costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013

GEORGE BONGALON, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.1 Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is
punished under the Revised Penal Code.

The Case

On June 22, 2005,2 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of the petitioner for the crime
of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.

Antecedents

On June 26, 2000, the Prosecutor’s Office of Legazpi City charged the petitioner in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Legazpi City with child abuse, an act in violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act
No. 7610, alleging as follows:

That on or about the 11th day of May 2000, in the City of Legazpi Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit on the person of JAYSON DELA CRUZ, a twelve year-old,

Grade VI pupil of MABA Institute, Legazpi City, acts of physical abuse and/or maltreatment by
striking said JAYSON DELA CRUZ with his palm hitting the latter at his back and by slapping said
minor hitting his left cheek and uttering derogatory remarks to the latter’s family to wit: "Mga hayop
kamo, para dayo kamo digdi, Iharap mo dito ama mo" (You all animals, you are all strangers here.
Bring your father here), which acts of the accused are prejudicial to the child’s development and
which demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said child as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older
brother, both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in Legazpi City;
that when the procession passed in front of the petitioner’s house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann
Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that the petitioner confronted
Jayson and Roldan and called them names like "strangers" and "animals"; that the petitioner struck
Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on the face;4 that the petitioner then went to
the brothers’ house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not
come out of the house to take on the petitioner; that Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi
City Police Station and reported the incident; that Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the
Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital;5 that the doctors who examined Jayson issued two
medical certificates attesting that Jayson suffered the following contusions, to wit: (1) contusion .5 x
2.5 scapular area, left; and (2) +1x1 cm. contusion left zygomatic area and contusion .5 x 2.33 cm.
scapular area, left.6

On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that
he only talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor daughters,
had told him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at them and about Jayson’s burning
Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight, insisting that
he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from harming his daughters.7

To corroborate the petitioner’s testimony, Mary Ann Rose testified that her father did not hit or slap
but only confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her daughters "Kimi" and why he had
burned Cherrlyn’s hair. Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson and calling him a "sissy."
She insisted that it was instead Jayson who had pelted her with stones during the procession. She
described the petitioner as a loving and protective father.8

Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the RTC found and declared the petitioner guilty of child abuse as charged, to wit:9

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused GEORGE BONGALON @ "GI" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Republic
Act No. 7610, and is hereby ordered to undergo imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to
eight (8) years of prision mayor in its minimum period.

SO ORDERED.

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the petitioner assailed the credibility of the Prosecution witnesses by citing their
inconsistencies. He contended that the RTC overlooked or disregarded material facts and
circumstances in the records that would have led to a favorable judgment for him. He attacked the
lack of credibility of the witnesses presented against him, citing the failure of the complaining
brothers to react to the incident, which was unnatural and contrary to human experience.

The CA affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty,10 viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 20, 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 9 of Legazpi City is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-
appellant George Bongalon is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum term, to six (6) years, eight (8) months
and 1 day of prision mayor as the maximum term.

Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Jayson de la Cruz the additional amount
of P5,000 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

Issues

The petitioner has come to the Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.11
The petitioner asserts that he was not guilty of the crime charged; and that even assuming that he
was guilty, his liability should be mitigated because he had merely acted to protect her two minor
daughters.

Ruling of the Court

At the outset, we should observe that the petitioner has adopted the wrong remedy in assailing the
CA’s affirmance of his conviction. His proper recourse from the affirmance of his conviction was an
appeal taken in due course. Hence, he should have filed a petition for review on certiorari. Instead,
he wrongly brought a petition for certiorari. We explained why in People v. Court of Appeals:12

The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to
keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As observed in Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. "the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison d’etre for the rule is
when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprived it of
the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a
court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In
such a scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question
involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision–not the jurisdiction of the court to
render said decision–the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. The
proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

It is of no consequence that the petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in
his petition. The allegation of grave abuse of discretion no more warrants the granting of due course
to the petition as one for certiorari if appeal was available as a proper and adequate remedy. At any
rate, a reading of his presentation of the issues in his petition indicates that he thereby imputes to
the CA errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction. He mentions instances attendant during the
commission of the crime that he claims were really constitutive of justifying and mitigating
circumstances; and specifies reasons why he believes Republic Act No. 7610 favors his innocence
rather than his guilt for the crime charged.13 The errors he thereby underscores in the petition
concerned only the CA’s appreciation and assessment of the evidence on record, which really are
errors of judgment, not of jurisdiction.

Even if we were to treat the petition as one brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, it would still
be defective due to its being filed beyond the period provided by law. Section 2 of Rule 45 requires
the filing of the petition within 15 days from the notice of judgment to be appealed. However, the
petitioner received a copy of the CA’s decision on July 15, 2005,14 but filed the petition only on
September 12, 2005,15 or well beyond the period prescribed by the Rules of Court.

The procedural transgressions of the petitioner notwithstanding, we opt to forego quickly dismissing
the petition, and instead set ourselves upon the task of resolving the issues posed by the petition on
their merits. We cannot fairly and justly ignore his plea about the sentence imposed on him not being
commensurate to the wrong he committed. His plea is worthy of another long and hard look. If, on
the other hand, we were to outrightly dismiss his plea because of the procedural lapses he has
committed, the Court may be seen as an unfeeling tribunal of last resort willing to sacrifice justice in
order to give premium to the rigidity of its rules of procedure. But the Rules of Court has not been
intended to be rigidly enforced at all times. Rather, it has been instituted first and foremost to ensure
justice to every litigant. Indeed, its announced objective has been to secure a "just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."16 This objective will be beyond realization
here unless the Rules of Court be given liberal construction and application as the noble ends of
justice demand. Thereby, we give primacy to substance over form, which, to a temple of justice and
equity like the Court, now becomes the ideal ingredient in the dispensation of justice in the case now
awaiting our consideration.

The petitioner’s right to liberty is in jeopardy. He may be entirely deprived of such birthright without
due process of law unless we shunt aside the rigidity of the rules of procedure and review his case.
Hence, we treat this recourse as an appeal timely brought to the Court. Consonant with the basic
rule in criminal procedure that an appeal opens the whole case for review, we should deem it our
duty to correct errors in the appealed judgment, whether assigned or not.17

The law under which the petitioner was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is Section 10 (a),
Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610, which relevantly states:

Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions Prejudicial to
the Child’s Development. –

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

xxxx

Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:

Section 3. Definition of terms. –

xxxx

(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any
of the following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

xxxx

Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner
struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their
holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the above-quoted provisions. The
records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been
intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had
thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on
Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then
overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had
just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked
that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.

It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is resolved in
favor of the petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible circumstances in
his favor.18

What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?

Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention,19 the
petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:

Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. — The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the
offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the same
period.

xxxx

The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day to 30 days of
imprisonment.20In imposing the correct penalty, however, we have to consider the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of the Revised Penal Code,21 because
the petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will
power.22 Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing only in the honest belief of
the accused.23 It is relevant to mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a
diminution of intelligence and intent. With his having acted under the belief that Jayson and Roldan
had thrown stones at his two minor daughters, and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyn’s hair, the
petitioner was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion. Arresto menor is prescribed in its
minimum period (i.e., one day to 10 days) in the absence of any aggravating circumstance that offset
the mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being
inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not exceeding one year,24 the petitioner shall suffer a
straight penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.

The award of moral damages to Jayson is appropriate. Such damages are granted in criminal cases
resulting in physical injuries.25 The amount of P5,000.00 fixed by the lower courts as moral damages
is consistent with the current jurisprudence.26

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ENTER a new judgment:
(a) finding petitioner George Bongalon GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 1, Article 266, of the Revised Penal Code; (b) sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of 10 days of arresto menor; and (c) ordering him to pay Jayson Dela Cruz
the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice