If the Loyalists Had Won the Spanish Civil War.....

The Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 was one of the great dramas of the 1930s. I use the word
"drama" advisedly, since the debate and propaganda campaigns about the war became the
substance of much of the political and intellectual life of the West during the years the war was
fought. In the progressive literature of the period, the war was a morality tale of good defending
itself against evil, of fascism against democracy, of the Enlightenment against Catholic
obscurantism. The war became a counter in the political struggle between the international
communist movement and the more loosely organized cause of fascism. In the publishing
industry and the better magazines, the Loyalists won the propaganda argument, but on the
ground the Nationalists won. In this note, I would like to suggest some ways that history, and
particularly the course of the Second World War, might have been different if the Loyalists had
won.

A full description of the origins and course of the war is unnecessary here. The questions
involved are also still controversial. Suffice it to say that, after a decade of seesaw election
results, a Popular Front government finally came to power in Spain, but with a very narrow
majority. The Front sought to be inclusive of the Left, from Anarchists to Social Democrats. The
Front, however, was more and more controlled by the Communists. In any event, having
achieved a narrow victory, the government undertook a radical land redistribution. Elements of
the Front, particularly the Anarchists, began some spontaneous redistribution of their own, and
the government did not attempt to protect life and property. Clerics and Church property were
particularly subject to assault. These events caused the Spanish African Army under General
Francisco Franco to stage a revolt. The rebels became the Nationalists. The legitimate
government refused to yield, however, and the conflict became an elaborate civil war. The
Nationalists received aid from the Italian Fascists and the Nazis, including some troops and
airmen. The Loyalists received material aid from Soviet Russia, but on ruinous financial terms.
They were also assisted by volunteer legions from many countries. The resources of the two
sides were not terribly unequal. However, the Nationalists had most of the experienced officers.
Also, the Communists in the Popular Front carried on a small-scale version of the purges then
occurring in the Soviet Union, directed against the other Leftist parties. This degraded the
fighting capacities of the Loyalist armies, which were organized along political lines. The Loyalists
were overwhelmed a few months before the Second World War started. Generalissimo Franco
surprised everybody by remaining neutral in that conflict.

A Loyalist victory is not hard to imagine. Franco was a competent rather than a brilliant general.
The accident of a military genius on the other side might have altered the outcome of the war.
So might have more generous support from the Soviet Union. The Communists might have
deferred their own political agenda until after the war was over. Neither side had any difficulty
obtaining arms they could pay for; France, which had a Popular Front government too in the
1930s, might have offered arms on credit. Alternatively, an effective League of Nations embargo
would have redounded to the Loyalists' benefit, since they controlled most of the country's
manufacturing capacity. So, let us assume that by the end of spring, 1939, the Nationalists are
forced to finally surrender, and Franco goes into exile in Argentina.

One thing that I think would have been inevitable is that the Soviet Union would, in effect, have
a colony in the Western Mediterranean. The front-and-purge policy the Communists used
against their rivals in the Loyalist camp was not very different from the one they used in
Czechoslovakia just after the Second World War (except, perhaps, that it was much bloodier).
Stalin was at all times of two minds about what he wanted to happen in Spain. While he wanted
to humiliate the Italians and the Germans, he also had doubts about whether another
Communist state so far from his borders was a good idea. He knew that such a state would be
difficult for him to control, and that it would offer an alternative focus of loyalty for Communist
parties around the world. The Soviet Union's subsequent problems with Yugoslavia and China
show that these fears were well founded. However, it would have taken years for a rift to
develop. The Spanish Communist Party was devotedly pro-Soviet. The new state would have
needed Soviet material support. With the growing threat of a Fascist war, a near-term split with
Moscow would not have been in the cards. Spain would become for the USSR something like
what Cuba became in the 1960s and Nicaragua in the 1980s.

The French would not have been pleased by this turn of events. French governments have
traditionally alined themselves with whatever regime ruled Russia in order to counterbalance
the powers of Middle Europe. They would have found this harder to do, however, if the Russians
acquired a base adjoining French territory. The advantage to a Russian alliance, after all, is that
Russians are too far away to be a menace themselves. There was no way the French could have
thrown their support to Germany. It would have been politically impossible, and it would have
been strategic suicide. However, the proximity of Soviet Spain would have made France much
more reluctant to engage in any major war, anywhere. It is not just that Spain could eventually
become a military threat. The Communist Party in France would have been so emboldened by
their southern colleagues' success that would have started looking for revolutionary
opportunities. A lost war, or even a stalemated war, would do just nicely. Knowing this, the
French government would have been much less likely to declare war on Germany in 1939 after
the invasion of Poland. Indeed, it might not have been possible to do so, since the Hitler-Stalin
Pact was in effect, and the French Left would have made quite a fuss about entering the war,
even if they hoped to benefit from the outcome.

Thus, one result of a Loyalist victory could have been that Hitler would not, at the outset, have
had to fight a war on two fronts. If the French did not declare war, the British could not have,
either. Where would they have put their army? In his pre-war alliance negotiations with
Mussolini, Hitler seemed to be contemplating a general war for 1942 or 1943. He would have
been able to pick a fight in the West at his leisure, probably much better prepared than he was in
1939. In this war, the desperate French might have accepted an alliance with Soviet Spain,
provided Stalin relented. Certainly Spain would have been a reasonable base for the French to
retreat to, after losing Paris. Even if Soviet Spain had chosen Franco's policy and attempted
neutrality, it is unlikely that Hitler would have accepted it. He could not have. His goal in World
War II was the conquest of Russia, something he could not have accomplished with a Soviet ally
in his rear. The conquest of Spain could have been part of his initial western campaign, or it
might have waited a year or two, but it would have been inevitable.

A Nazi campaign would have had several things working against it. For one thing, the supply lines
were long enough to create formidable logistical problems, never the strong suit of the Nazi
military. Assuming the English were still in the war, Hitler, like Napoleon, would have found just
how accessible Spain is from the sea. On the other hand, the Spanish Soviet government would
have been unlikely to be very popular by this time, assuming it had continued with the process
of Stalinization. If the Germans concluded their campaign by taking Gibraltar, whose British base
was (and is) a long-standing affront to Spanish pride, the Germans could have been accepted as
liberators. The loss of Gibraltar could have cost the British effective control of the
Mediterranean. The resupplying, not just of Egypt, but of India and Australia, would have
become immensely more difficult.

In sum, then, a Loyalist victory in the Spanish Civil War could have lost the Allies the Second
World War. I, for one, find this conclusion paradoxical.

Any other ideas?

[If you liked this piece, you might also be interested in taking a look at a revew of The Last
Crusade, a history of the Spanish Civil War from a Carlist perspective.]