C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a |1
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2399 November 19, 2014
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 13-4013-RTJ]
GASPAR BANDOY, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 45,
and ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 46, both at
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE, OCCIDENT AL MINDORO,
Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For review before the Court is this administrative case against
respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. (Judge Jacinto, Jr.) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branches 451 and 46,2 San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, filed by Gaspar Bandoy (Bandoy) for Grave
Abuse of Authority in relation to Criminal Case No. 2-1928,3
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Caspar Bandoy, Peter Alfaro
and Randolph Ignacio" and Criminal Case No. Z-1910, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Romulo De Jesus, Jr."
Complainant Bandoy alleged, inhis verified complaint,4 that he
was one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 2-1928, for Serious
Illegal Detention filed by Romulo De Jesus, Jr. (De Jesus, Jr.),which
was raffled to Branch 44 of the RTC, Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro (RTC-Br. 44), with Judge Jacinto, Jr. as the Assisting
Presiding Judge. Bandoy claimed that the case was initiated by De
Jesus, Jr. to get back at him for being instrumental in the filing of
an earlier criminal complaint against him for Violation of Article
XXII, Section 261, paragraph 7, number 14 of the Omnibus
Election Code (Ballot Switching). The said case was likewise
raffled to RTC-Br. 44.
Bandoy also averred that he was an election watcher of former
Mayor Joel Panaligan during the 2007 local elections, while De
Jesus, Jr., a teacher of their municipality’s public elementary
school, was one of the chairpersons of the Board of Election
Inspectors; thatthey were both assigned in Precinct 3-A of
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro; that De Jesus, Jr. was rumored to
be closely associated with the rival mayoralty candidate, Voltaire
Anthony C. Villarosa (Voltaire), son of House representative
Amelita C. Villarosa (Cong. Villarosa)and Mayor Jose Tapales
Villarosa (Mayor Villarosa) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; that
in the said local elections, De Jesus, Jr. was caught in the act of
ballot switching, which was captured on video by a member of
the media, a certain Randy Bool; that by virtue of a search
warrant from the Commission of Elections (COMELEC), De Jesus,
Jr. was caught in possession of some ballots insidehis backpack;
and that as a result of this incident, De Jesus, Jr. was criminally
charged with the offense of ballot switching. Accordingly, on
August 17, 2007, a warrant of arrest was issued against De Jesus,
Jr.5
According to Bandoy, on August 20, 2007, De Jesus, Jr. personally
appeared before Provincial Prosecutor Levitico Salcedo to file a
criminal case for Serious Illegal Detention against him, Peter
Alfaro, Randolph Ignacio, and then Election Supervisor, Atty. Judy
Lorenzo (Atty. Lorenzo). Apparently, De Jesus, Jr. did this while
there was a standing warrant of arrest against him. Worse, De
Jesus, Jr. remained at-large until he was able to post bail on
March 7, 2008 before then Las Pinas RTC Judge Raul B.
Villanueva.6 Because complainant Bandoy was charged with
Serious Illegal Detention, the provincial prosecutor
recommended "no bail" leaving them incarcerated for morethan
two years.7
Bandoy further claims that Judge Jacinto, Jr. committed grave
abuse of his authority by displaying manifest bias and partiality
in favor of De Jesus, Jr. when he granted several postponements
of De Jesus, Jr.’s arraignment, originally scheduled on April 23,
2008,8 but was reset for seven times until De Jesus, Jr. entered a
plea of not guilty supposedly inside Judge Jacinto, Jr.’s chambers
on July 6, 2011.9
Bandoy emphasized that many of the said resettings were mostly
due to De Jesus, Jr.’s non-appearance for failure to locate him at
his given address. Despite these supposed obvious court defiance,
Judge Jacinto, Jr. remained lenient and seemingly tolerated his
continuous non-appearance in the court’s subsequent scheduled
hearings. Another example of Judge Jacinto, Jr.’s supposed
unreasonable bias towards Bandoy was his lack of interest to
dispose of the case of serious illegal detention despite De Jesus,
Jr.’s obvious dilatory tactics and unjustified absences when his
appearance was necessary.
Bandoy, along with his co-accused, moved for reconsideration
and filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice
(DOJ)to have the serious illegal detention case against them
dismissed. Meanwhile, coaccused Atty. Lorenzo filed a separate
petition with the Court of Appeals (CA)and won the case. The
Court later affirmed the dismissal of the case against her. At first,
the DOJ denied their petition. Upon reconsideration, however, the
DOJ, under the helm of Justice Secretary Leila De Lima, directed
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Occidental Mindoro, to
cause the withdrawal of the case against Bandoy and his co-
accused.10 Accordingly, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
filed its Motion to Withdraw Information.
Judge Jacinto, Jr., in an order,11 dated July 5, 2011, denied the
motion to withdraw information. In the end, Bandoy was only
able to regain temporary freedom when Judge Jacinto, Jr. finally
resolved12 to allow him to post a bail bond of ₱100,000.00 each
or a total of ₱300,000.00.13 Bandoy added that Voltaire was a
principal sponsor in the wedding of Judge Jacinto, Jr.’s child.
Thereafter, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was assigned to another sala, while
Judge Wilfredo De Joya Mayor (Judge Mayor) became the
assisting presiding judge of Branch 44. It was during this time
that the case for serious illegal detention was temporarily
dismissed, but upon reconsideration, Judge Mayor decided to
reinstate and continue the case against Bandoy. Meanwhile, the
case of ballot switching against De Jesus, Jr. was dismissed on

October 25, 2012,14 while their bail for the serious illegal
detention case was cancelled.15
According to complainant Bandoy, the compelling force that
made him initiate this present administrative case was because
Judge Jacinto, Jr. would take over Judge Mayor’s assignments on
account of the latter’s compulsory retirement from service on
December 1, 2012, which would include their pending serious
illegal detention case. He claimed that Judge Jacinto, Jr. ordered
the police and the CIDG to re-arrest him and his coaccused even
though there was no warrant of arrest against them.16 He begged
the Court not to let Judge Jacinto, Jr. handle their case of serious
illegal detention for fear that they would have to endure another
bout of extreme bias and partiality from him.
In his Comment,17 Judge Jacinto, Jr. denied being an ally of the
Villarosa clan.18 He also denied having a hand in the order to
arrest Bandoy and his co-accused as the Chief of PNP and the
CIDG Chief, both of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, merely
consulted him on how to go about the order of cancellation of bail
that Judge Mayor issued. He explained "wala po akong alam sa
Kautusan kaya binasa po sa akin ang nilalaman nito sa cellphone
at pagkatapos ay nagwika po akong parang may kulang sa
Kautusan at kapag nakansela ang piyansa ay babalik sila sa selda
dahil wala na po silang piyansa (as a consequence thereof)."19
Judge Jacinto, Jr. even refused to issue a warrant of arrest when
he was asked because he was not handling the case anymore.20
Bandoy, in his Reply,21 brought to the attention of the Court that
Judge Jacinto, Jr., in order to thwartthe enemies of his supposed
master, Mayor Villarosa, issued warrants of arrest against ten
individuals.22 He also divulged that the audit team from the
Court was personally assisted by Judge Jacinto, Jr. and given
accommodations in "Aroma Center," one of the properties of
Mayor Villarosa.23 Bandoy was thankful that Judge Jacinto, Jr. did
not deny the fact that the police officials wanted to arrest them
even without a warrant of arrest.24 Bandoy showed a timeline of
events supposedly depicting how De Jesus, Jr., through the
tolerance and partiality of Judge Jacinto, Jr., evaded arraignment
on numerous occasions effectively delaying the progress of the
case for ballot switching and even actually conducting the
arraignment in his chambers.25 He further reiterated his plea not
to let Judge Jacinto, Jr. preside over the affairs of Branch 44.
In his Rejoinder,26 Judge Jacinto, Jr. stated that he was again
assigned as Assisting Presiding Judge of Branch 44.27 He clarified
that he indeed issued warrants of arrest against ten individuals in
connection with a serious illegal detention case against them, but
only after a finding of probable cause by the public prosecutor
handling it. Judge Jacinto, Jr. reiterated that he merely affirmed
the finding of probable cause, which justified the issuance of the
warrants of arrest as the charge was a non-bailable offense.28 He
likewise denied seeking any favor from Mayor Villarosa to
accommodate the audit team in their property, the Aroma Family
Hotel. He explained that the audit team paid him a "courtesy call"
where he assured the team of his cooperation.29 He again
restated that the police officials merely coordinated with him as
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was customary because he was the Executive Judge of the
municipality.30 Judge Jacinto, Jr. believes that Bandoy’s
accusations against him were designed to oust him as Presiding
Judge of Branches 45 and 46 of San Jose and even as Assisting
Presiding Judge of Branch 44, Mamburao, both in the province of
Occidental Mindoro.31
In its Report,32 dated June 03, 2014, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) did not give credence to Bandoy’s allegation
that Judge Jacinto, Jr. issued an order for his arrest without a
warrant and to the insinuation that the Court’s audit team was
conveniently housed in Aroma Family Hotel of the Villarosas for
failure to present proof.33 The OCA observed, however, that
Judge Jacinto, Jr. never refuted the allegations of leniency over
the several resettings of the arraignment of De Jesus, Jr. and that
the arraignment was held in his chambers. As such, the OCA
equated his silence to admission.34
Thus, the OCA recommended that:
1. The administrative complaint against Presiding Judge Jose S.
Jacinto, Jr., Branch 45, Regional Trial Court, San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, be RE-DOCKETED as regular administrative matter; and
2. Respondent Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr. be found GUILTY of Bias and
Partiality and Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure and,
accordingly, be FINEDin the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos
(₱40,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.35
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA.
Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code ofJudicial Conduct mandates that a
judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence. Indeed, competence and diligence are prerequisites
to the due performance of judicial office.36
Everyone, especially a judge, is presumed to know the law. One
who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and
the Court the duty to maintain professional competence at all
times.37
In this case, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was directly confronted with an
allegation that he arraigned De Jesus, Jr. inside his
chambers.1âwphi1 He was given the opportunity to answer, but
he chose not to delve into it. Ultimately, Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not
squarely face the issues being imputed against him, which was
quite irregular since it was his name and his capacity as a
member of the bench, that was being challenged. As aptly
observed by the OCA, "the natural instinct of man impels him to
resist an unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself. It
isagainst human nature to just remain reticent and say nothing in
the face of false accusations."38 His silence introduces doubt in
the minds of the public, which is not acceptable.

Given the exacting standards required of magistrates in the
application of the law and procedure, the Court finds Judge
Jacinto, Jr. administratively guilty of gross ignorance of Rule 116
of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically Section 1(a) thereof
requiring arraignment of an accused to be made in open court, to
wit:
Section 1. Arraignment and plea, how made. – (a) The accused
must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or
information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall
be made in open courtby the judge or clerk by furnishing the
accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the
same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him
whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call
at the trial witnesses other then those named in the complaint or
information.
(Emphasis supplied)
The procedural steps laid down in Section 1(a) of Rule 116 are
not empty rituals that a judge can take nonchalantly. Each step
constitutes an integral part of that crucial stage in criminal
litigation "where the issues are joined x x x and without which
the proceedings cannot advance further."39
Thus, anything less than is required by Section 1(a) of Rule 116
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.40 There is gross
ignorance of the law when the error committed by the judge was
"gross or patent, deliberate or malicious."41 It may also be
committed when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to apply
settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption.42 Gross ignorance of the law or
incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith.43
The Court has impressed upon judges that they owe it to the
public and the legal profession to know the very law that they are
supposed to apply in a given controversy.44 They are called upon
to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes
and procedural rules, to be conversant with the basic law, and to
maintain the desired professional competence.45 When a judge
displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the
confidence of the public in the courts. A judge owes the public
and the Court the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected
to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance
of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.46
Canon 2,47 Rule 2.0148 and Canon 349 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct likewise emphasize that judges, as officers of the court,
have the duty to see to it that justice is dispensed with evenly and
fairly. Not only must they be honest and impartial, but they must
also appear to be honest and impartial in the dispensation of
justice. Judges should make sure that their acts are circumspect
and do not arouse suspicion in the minds of the public. When
they fail to do so, such acts may cast doubt upon their integrity
and ultimately the judiciary in general.50 As held in Joselito
Rallos, et al., vs. Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr., Branch 5 RTC, Cebu
City:51
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Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be
impartial but should also appear impartial." Jurisprudence
repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of
due process, like notice and hearing, would become meaningless
if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge.
Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions,
but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their
fairness, impartiality and integrity.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal,
metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein
respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have
direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the
intermediaries between conflicting interests and the
embodiments of the people’s sense of justice. Thus, their official
conduct should be beyond reproach.
Here, the Court cannot fathom why the arraignment of De Jesus,
Jr. was postponed from 2007 to 2011 without appropriate action
coming from the court. Judge Jacinto, Jr. should have availed of
known legal remedies to compel De Jesus, Jr. to personally appear
for his arraignment, but he did not. The appearance of leniency
seemingly exhibited in favor of De Jesus, Jr. gives an impression
of bias and partiality that should be addressed and
corrected.1âwphi1
Consequently, under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or
procedure is classified as a serious charge. Section 11 (A) of the
same Rule provides that the penalty to be imposed if a
respondent Judge is found guilty of a serious charge is either a
fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not more than ₱40,000.00,
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three but not exceeding six months, or dismissal from
the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned
or controlled corporations.
The Court is aware of the other pending administrative cases
against Judge Jacinto, Jr., but they cannot be fully considered in
the imposition of the penalty in this case as they are still under
review and evaluation. Thus, a fine of ₱40,000.0052 is deemed
appropriate under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr.
GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure and of Bias
and Partiality. Accordingly, he is FINED in the amount of Forty
Thousand (₱40,000.00) Pesos with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 163972-77
JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN,
- versus -
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
March 28, 2008
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Joselito Raniero J. Daan (petitioner), one of the accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 24167-24170, 24195-24196,[1] questions
the denial by the Sandiganbayan of his plea bargaining proposal.
The antecedents facts are laid down by Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution dated March 25, 2004, as follows:
Said accused,[2] together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were
charged before this Court for three counts of malversation of
public funds involving the sums of P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and
P13,528.00, respectively, which they purportedly tried to conceal
by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period making
it appear that some laborers worked on the construction of the
new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte and collected their
respective salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact, they did
not. Thus, in addition to the charge for malversation, the accused
were also indicted before this Court for three counts of
falsification of public document by a public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their
plea of not guilty and substitute the same with a plea of guilty,
provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of
guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor.
In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused
proposed instead to substitute their plea of not guilty to the
crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or
employee with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of
falsification of a public document by a private individual. On the
other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to
substitute their plea of not guilty thereto with a plea of guilty, but
to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render
accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution
found as acceptable the proposal of the accused to plead guilty to
the lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private
individual. The prosecution explained:
With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it
appears that the act of the accused in pleading guilty for a lesser
offense of falsification by a private individual defined and
penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal code will
strengthen our cases against the principal accused, Municipal
Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of
these criminal acts.
Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution
was likewise amenable to the offer of said accused to plead guilty
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a |4
to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render
accounts because:
x x x JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total
amount of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the
provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In
short, the damage caused to the government has already been
restituted x x x.[3]
The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution,[4] dated
March 25, 2004, denied petitioners Motion to Plea Bargain,
despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the
main ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify its
approval.[5]
The Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration in a Resolution dated May 31, 2004.
This compelled petitioner to file the present case for certiorari
and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/ or writ of preliminary injunction under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse
of discretion in denying his plea bargaining offer on the following
grounds: first, petitioner is not an accountable officer and he
merely affixed his signature on the payrolls on a routinary basis,
negating any criminal intent; and that the amount involved is
only P18,860.00, which he already restituted.[6]
The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the
accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually
involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to
only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in
return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.[7]
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. At arraignment, the
accused, with the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still
be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of
the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court,
require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the
pre-trial conference,[8] viz:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. In all criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court,

Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court
shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date
the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused,
unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars
of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the
following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the
charge but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the
criminal and civil aspects of the case.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. All agreements or admissions made
or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in
writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they
cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the
matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by
the court. (Emphasis supplied)
But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the
prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested its
case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea
bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was
made only after the prosecution already presented several
witnesses.[9]
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic
requisites upon which plea bargaining may be made, i.e., that it
should be with the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor,[10] and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The
rules however use word may in the second sentence of Section 2,
denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on
whether to allow the accused to make such plea.[11] Trial courts
are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter
offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed
as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of
the accused.[12]
In People of the Philippines v. Villarama,[13] the Court ruled that
the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not
demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter
that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial
court,[14] viz:
x x x In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court
and the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a |5
their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v.
Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held
that the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does
not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime
charged. In his concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R.
No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice
Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely the rationale or
the law:
x x x (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on
which the fiscal and the court could rightfully act in allowing the
appellant to change his former plea of not guilty to murder to
guilty to the lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more
nothing less than the evidence already in the record. The reason
for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule
116) under which a plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not
and could not have been intended as a procedure for
compromise, much less bargaining.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the
prosecution had already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the
present case, the trial court's exercise of its discretion should
neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and
whimsical exercise of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law.[16]
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea
offer on the ground that petitioner and the prosecution failed to
demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of
the public. The Sandiganbayan believes that approving the
proposal would only serve to trivialize the seriousness of the
charges against them and send the wrong signal to potential
grafters in public office that the penalties they are likely to face
would be lighter than what their criminal acts would have
merited or that the economic benefits they are likely to derive
from their criminal activities far outweigh the risks they face in
committing them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent value of
the laws intended to curb graft and corruption in
government.[17]
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in
rejecting petitioner's plea offer. However, subsequent events and
higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's
plea offer should be accepted. The present case calls for the
judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction -
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and
do complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility

of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the
special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity
regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the
form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is
variously expressed by different courts.[18]
and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings
of lower courts,[19] in order to afford equal justice to petitioner.
In People of the Philippines v. Estrada,[20] the Sandiganbayan, in
its Resolution dated March 14, 2007, approved the Plea
Bargaining Agreement entered into by the prosecution and one of
the accused, Charlie Atong Ang. The agreement provided that the
accused undertakes to assist in the prosecution of the case and
promises to return the amount of P25,000,000.00. In approving
the Plea Bargaining Agreement, the Sandiganbayan took into
consideration the timeliness of the plea bargaining and whether
the agreement complied with the requirements of Section 2, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court. The Sandigabayan noted that the
accused had already withdrawn his earlier plea of not guilty; and
that the prosecution consented to the plea of guilt to a lesser
offense; and the lesser offense, which is Corruption of Public
Officials in relation to Indirect Bribery, is necessarily included in
the offense charged, which is Plunder.[21]
The Court sees no reason why the standards applied by the
Sandiganbayan to Estrada should not be applied to the present
case. Records show that there was a favorable recommendation
by the Office of the Special Prosecutor to approve petitioner's
motion to plea bargain. Thus, in its Memorandum dated August
16, 2002, the Office of the Special Prosecutor rationalized:
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J.
DAAN has already restituted the total amount of P18,860.00 as
per official receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte
dated February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to the
government has already been restituted by the accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily
surrendered in the instant cases. Moreover, the accused is also
willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which to our mind,
merits consideration.
With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it
appears that the act of the accused in pleading guilty for a lesser
offense of falsification by private individual defined and
penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code will
strengthen our cases against the principal accused, the Municipal
Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of
these criminal acts. After all, the movants herein JOSELITO
RANIERO J. DAAN was merely designated as draftsman detailed
as foreman/timekeeper of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte.[22]
Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private
Individuals and Failure to Render Account by an Accountable
Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of
Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, respectively,
with which petitioner was originally charged.
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a |6
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for the
crime of Falsification of Public Documents through an untruthful
narration of facts to be established, the following elements must
concur: (a) the offender makes in a document untruthful
statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts
narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (d) the
perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the
wrongful intent of injuring a third person.[23]
On the other hand, Falsification by Private Individuals penalized
under Article 172, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code has the
following elements: (a) the offender is a private individual or a
public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position; (b) the offender committed any of the acts of
falsification enumerated under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code; and (c) the falsification was committed in a public or
official or commercial document.[24]
As regards the crime of Malversation of Public Funds defined and
penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, with
which petitioner was also charged, the elements are as follows:
(a) the offender is a public officer; (b) he has custody or control
of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) the
funds or property involved are public funds or property for
which he is accountable; and (d) he has appropriated, taken or
misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment
or negligence permitted, the taking by another person of such
funds or property.[25] Article 217 also provides that the failure
of the public officer to have duly forthcoming such public funds
or property, upon demand by a duly authorized officer, shall be
prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use. In this regard, it has been ruled that
once such presumption is rebutted, then it is completely
destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never deemed to have
existed at all.[26]
Meanwhile, under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, Failure
to Render Account by an Accountable Officer, the lesser offense
which petitioner seeks to plead guilty of, the following elements
must concur: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) the offender
must be an accountable officer for public funds or property; (c)
the offender is required by law or regulation to render accounts
to the COA or to a provincial auditor; and (d) the offender fails to
render an account for a period of two months after such accounts
should be rendered.[27]
Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states when an offense
includes or is included in the other, to wit:
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An
offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And
an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved,
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form
part of those constituting the latter.
 C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a |7

An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some

of the essential elements or ingredients of the former as alleged
in the complaint or information constitute the latter. And vice
versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in
another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute
or form part of those constituting the latter.[28]

In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against

petitioner are sufficient to hold petitioner liable for the lesser
offenses. Thus, in the charge for Falsification of Public
Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense of
Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not
appear that petitioner took advantage of his official position in
allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of the Municipality
of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, with regard to the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds, while the Informations contain
allegations which make out a case for Malversation against
petitioner, nevertheless, absent the element of conversion,
theoretically, petitioner may still be held liable for Failure to
Render Account by an Accountable Officer if it is shown that the
failure to render account was in violation of a law or regulation
that requires him to render such an accounting within the
prescribed period.

Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses

charged in this case likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then
petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses.

Finally, as propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is not an

accountable officer in that the nature of his duty as
foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession or
custody of local government funds,[29] not to mention that
petitioner has already restituted the amount of P18,860.00
involved in this case. Unlike Estrada which involves a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death,[30] and a whopping
P25,000,000.00 taken from the public coffers, this case
tremendously pales in comparison.

Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where

gross inequity will result in a discriminatory dispensation of
justice, the Court will not hesitate to intervene in order to
equalize the imbalance.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated

March 25, 2004 and May 31, 2004 are SET ASIDE. The
Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to grant petitioner's Motion
to Plea Bargain. Let records of this case be REMANDED to the
Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 164953
February 13, 2006
JOHN JOSEPH LUMANLAW y BULINAO,
Petitioner,
- versus -
Hon. EDUARDO B. PERALTA JR., in His Capacity as
Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court
(Branch 13), Manila,
Respondent.
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
Vexatious, oppressive, unjustified and capricious delays in the
arraignment violates the constitutional right to speedy trial and
speedy case disposition, particularly when the accused is
detained. Under the circumstances of the present case,
mandamus is a proper remedy for relief from prolonged
detention. This Court safeguards liberty and will therefore always
uphold the basic constitutional rights of the people, especially the
weak and the marginalized.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Mandamus[1] under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, seeking (1) the dismissal of the Information filed
against Petitioner John Joseph Lumanlaw y Bulinao; and (2) his
release from the Manila City Jail.
The Facts
Culled from the parties pleadings are the following undisputed
facts.
Petitioner Lumanlaw was apprehended by the Western Police
District near San Diego Street, Sampaloc, Manila, on the evening
of November 26, 2002, for illegal possession of a dangerous drug.
He was charged in an Information[2] filed with Branch 13 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, as follows:
That on or about November 24, 2002, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, custody and
control one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
zero point zero one one (0.011) grams of white crystalline
substance known as SHABU containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[3]
A Commitment Order[4] was consequently issued by Presiding
Judge Luis J. Arranz directing the detention of petitioner in the
Manila City Jail and setting the latters arraignment on January 8,
2003. On even date, petitioners counsel manifested[5] his
intention to file a motion for preliminary investigation. Because
of the Manifestation, the arraignment was deferred to February
21, 2003. The aforesaid Motion[6] was filed together with a
Petition to Reduce Bail[7] on January 17, 2003.
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a |8
The resolution of these matters was overtaken by Judge Arranzs
retirement from public service. Thus, the arraignment scheduled
for February 21, 2003, had to be postponed. This Court
designated herein respondent, Judge Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., as
acting presiding judge of Branch 13, Regional Trial Court, Manila,
in Administrative Order No. 27-2003 issued on February 18,
2003.[8]
On March 26, 2003, the newly designated acting presiding judge
issued an Order[9] setting the arraignment of petitioner on April
23, 2003. On the latter date, the arraignment was reset to June
25, 2003, due to the public prosecutors absence.[10]
On June 25, 2003, petitioners counsel received the lower courts
Order granting Lumanlaws Petition to Reduce Bail and denying
his Motion for Preliminary Investigation for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period.[11] In the same Order, the trial
court set petitioners arraignment on August 6, 2003.
The arraignment was postponed again, this time due to the
absence of petitioners counsel. According to him, he requested
the court to proceed with the arraignment, with the public
defender assisting the accused, but that respondent judge denied
the request on the ground that petitioner was already
represented by a counsel de parte.[12] The trial court then re-
scheduled the arraignment on September 24, 2003.[13]
In what was beginning to be a pattern of laxity, the September 24
arraignment was likewise postponed in view of the scheduled
meeting of presiding judges with accredited newspaper
publishers and was thus reset to October 1, 2003.[14]
On the latter date, respondent judge issued the following
Order:[15]
In view of the draft Order dated August 6, 2003 which impeded
the Produce Order for the arraignment and pre-trial conference
this afternoon of defendant John Joseph Lumanlaw in relation to
Criminal Case No. 02-208426, the arraignment and pre-trial
conference are hereby reset on December 10, 2003 at 2:00 oclock
in the afternoon, on the date amenable to Atty. Ernesto Delfin, as
well as the defendant.
Again, the arraignment did not occur on December 10, 2003,
because petitioner had not been brought to the court by the
wardens of the Manila City Jail. According to the trial courts
Order,[16] there was no proof of service on the Manila City Jail.
The arraignment was thus reset to March 1, 2004.
Notably, a year had passed since the filing of the Information, yet
Lumanlaw remained uninformed of the charges against him,
while continuing to be in detention and despair all throughout
that period of limbo. Owing to this insufferable state of affairs,
petitioners counsel manifested his intention to file a motion to
dismiss on account of the violation of his clients right to a speedy
trial.[17] Accordingly, an Urgent Motion to Dismiss[18] was filed
on December 19, 2003. The Motion was heard on February 20,

2004, but was promptly denied by the trial court. The
arraignment was reset yet again to March 17, 2004.[19]
The arraignment did not take place, however, because the
accused was not produced in court by the jail wardens
concerned. It turned out that the trial court had not issued a
produce order to the Manila City Jail. Another resetting was
ordered for April 16, 2004.[20]
Now frustrated with the repeated postponements, petitioner filed
a Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss[21] on March 22, 2004.
Relying on the provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, mandating that arraignment should be held within
thirty (30) days from the date the court acquired jurisdiction
over the accused, petitioner argued that the protracted delay of
his arraignment violated his constitutional right to speedy
trial.[22]
On April 16, 2004, the RTC could not proceed with the
arraignment. What transpired on that date is evident from its
Order:[23]
Inasmuch as the Trial Prosecutor has just furnished a copy of her
Comment dated April 12, 2004 to the defense counsel, as prayed
for by Atty. Ernesto Delfin, counsel for accused John Joseph
Lumanlaw in Criminal Case No. 02-208426, he is GRANTED five
(5) days from today to submit his Reply. After which, the pending
Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss dated March 21, 2004 filed on
March 22, 2004 (page 33, Record in Criminal Case No. 02-
208426) will be deemed submitted for resolution.
Meanwhile, without prejudice to the resolution of the pending
motion, the arraignment and pre-trial conference of John Joseph
Lumanlaw are hereby tentatively scheduled on May 26, 2004 at
2:00 oclock in the afternoon.
On May 26, 2004, the arraignment could not be conducted, again
because of the Manila City Jails failure to bring petitioner to the
court despite notice.[24] On the same day, his counsel
received[25] the trial courts Order[26] dated May 3, 2004,
denying his Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss. The arraignment
was reset to June 16, 2004.[27]
On this date, it was respondent judges absence that caused the
postponement of the arraignment, which was reset to July 21,
2004.[28] But on that date, no hearing was conducted in Branch
13 because of the ongoing semestral inventory of cases in
respondent judges regular sala, Branch 17.[29]
Hence, the present Petition.[30]
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
Whether or not the failure of public respondent to conduct the
arraignment of the petitioner despite the delay of one (1) year,
nine (9) months and four (4) days constitute undue and
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a |9
unjustifiable delay in violation of his constitutional right to
speedy trial.
Whether or not such undue and unjustifiable delay would
warrant the dismissal of the Information filed against the
petitioner.
That should the decision by the Honorable Supreme Court be one
finding merit in this Petition, whether or not the said decision is
binding upon the newly appointed presiding judge of Regional
Trial Court, Branch 13, Manila, as successor of public
respondent.[31]
On the other hand, respondent asks whether the Petition for
Mandamus should be given due course. [32]
On the whole, the issues may be reduced to the following: 1)
whether there was a violation of the right to speedy trial,
warranting a quashal of the Information against petitioner; and
2) whether mandamus is the proper remedy.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Right to Speedy Trial
Arraignment is a vital stage in criminal proceedings in which the
accused are formally informed of the charges against them.[33]
The proper conduct of the arraignment is provided in Rule 116 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. A perusal of the
provision shows that arraignment is not a mere formality, but an
integral part of due process.[34] Particularly, it implements the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against them and their right to
speedy trial.
On this point, petitioner argues that, by respondents failure to act
expeditiously on his arraignment, his right to speedy trial was
violated. He points out the fourteen postponements that resulted
in his intolerable detention for almost two years. Moreover, he
cites Section 2 of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98
(implementing Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as The
Speedy Trial Act of 1998), which provides that arraignment shall
be held within thirty days from the date the court acquired
jurisdiction over the accused.
On the other hand, respondent counters that there were no
capricious and oppressive delays that would justify a dismissal of
the Information. The Office of the Solicitor General points to the
participation of petitioner himself in the protracted proceedings,
such as his filing of a Motion for Preliminary Investigation and his
counsels absence from one of the scheduled hearings.[35]

Speedy Trial Construed
The thirty-day period invoked by petitioner was construed in
Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How.[36] It was held in that
case that the period was not absolute. Certain delays were
allowed by law and excluded from the computation of the time
within which trial must commence. The Court ruled that those
exclusions should reflect the fundamentally recognized principle
that the concept of speedy trial is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept.[37] It held further that courts
must strive to maintain a delicate balance between the demands
of due process and the strictures of speedy trial, on the one hand;
and, on the other, the right of the State to prosecute crimes and
rid society of criminals.
Indeed, judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum. They must
contend with the realities of everyday life. Thus, a sensible
assessment of their conduct must consider several factors, rather
than a mere mathematical calculation of periods that have
elapsed between stages. Jurisprudence has set forth the following
guidelines:
x x x. [T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to
determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a
speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in
which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are
weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the
delay, the defendants assertion or non-assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are
considered.[38]
Reasonable Postponements
It should be stressed that petitioner never acquiesced to the
seemingly endless postponements of the arraignment. He
asserted his right to speedy trial twice, but was denied by
respondent in both instances. Considering that petitioner has
been under detention since December 2002, we need not belabor
the prejudice, distress, and anxiety he suffered as a result of the
delayed arraignment.
We concede that the bases for some of the delays were
completely sound, such as the retirement of Judge Arranz[39]
and the manifestation of petitioner that the latter would be filing
a Motion for Preliminary Investigation.[40] Those matters were
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 10
manifestly not intended to delay the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 02-208426.
The delay caused by Judge Arranzs retirement may be deemed a
normal part of the ordinary conduct of court business and was
not necessarily unreasonable. The second ground was the right of
the accused accorded by Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure.[41] Verily, petitioners request for a
preliminary investigation before arraignment was well-advised,
in view of the rule that failure to do so would constitute a waiver
of the right.[42] Thus, it has been held that though the conduct of
a preliminary investigation may hold back the progress of a case,
such investigation is necessary so that the defendants right will
not be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of expediency.[43]
Unjustified Delay
This Court reviewed the other reasons for the postponements in
this case, but finds them far from being reasonable. There were
fourteen postponements in all. Going over the causes for the
delays, we see the lack of earnest effort on the part of respondent
to conduct the arraignment as soon as the court calendar would
allow. Most of the postponements could have easily been avoided
if he had been more keen on respecting and upholding
petitioners constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy
disposition.
Given the length and the unreasonableness of the majority of the
delays, a violation of the right of petitioner to speedy trial
becomes manifest. Almost two years[44] elapsed from the filing
of the Information against him until the filing of this Petition;
incredibly, he has not been arraigned. An arraignment takes, at
most, ten minutes of the courts business and does not normally
entail legal gymnastics. It consists simply of reading to the
accused the charges leveled against them, ensuring their
understanding of those charges, and obtaining their plea to the
charges. A prudent and resolute judge can conduct an
arraignment as soon as the accused are presented before the
court.
In fact, by fixing a period of only thirty days from the filing of the
information to the conduct of an arraignment, RA 8493
recognizes that this fundamental right should and can be done
with minimal delay. For this reason alone, we are astonished that
the court a quo could not complete such a simple but
fundamental stage in the proceedings. The protracted delay
became all the more oppressive and vexatious when viewed from
the perspective that the liberty of the accused was being curtailed
for the entire duration.
Postponement Due to
Absence of Counsel

It will be recalled that the arraignment set for August 6, 2003,
was postponed by the trial court due to the absence of the
counsel of petitioner. [45] The latter sought to proceed with the
arraignment by requesting the assistance of the public defender
as counsel de oficio, but the request was denied on the flimsy
ground that the accused already had a counsel de parte. We find
no legal basis for the trial courts action.
The appointment of a counsel de oficio in the absence of the
defendants counsel de parte is not prohibited,[46] not even by
the Constitution,[47] especially when the accused themselves
request that appointment. In fact, the court has a mandatory duty
to appoint a counsel de oficio when the accused have no counsel
of choice at the time of their arraignment.[48] People v. Serzo[49]
held thus:
x x x [A]n accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to
be represented either by a court-appointed lawyer or by one of
his own choice. While his right to be represented by counsel is
immutable, his option to secure the services of counsel de parte,
however, is not absolute. The court is obliged to balance the
privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the state's and the
offended party's equally important right to speedy and adequate
justice. Thus, the court may restrict the accused's option to retain
a counsel de parte if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot
afford, or the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or the
attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid reason, e.g.
conflict of interest and the like.[50]
Like other personal rights, the right to a counsel de parte is
waivable, so long as 1) the waiver is not contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals or good customs; or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law; and 2) the waiver is
unequivocally, knowingly and intelligently made.[51]
Applying these principles, it would have been more prudent for
respondent judge to have appointed a counsel de oficio for
purposes of arraignment only. This course of action became more
compelling in the instant case when petitioner himself requested
the appointment.[52] To be sure, he would not have been
prejudiced by that action, provided there was a proper
observance of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Under Section 8 of this rule, before proceeding with
the arraignment, the court is mandated to give the appointed
counsel de oficio reasonable time to consult with the accused as
to the latters plea.[53]
Clearly, respondent judges postponement of the arraignment on
August 6, 2003, had no substantial basis. Thus, the
postponement, initially caused by the absence of petitioners
counsel, became unreasonable and ultimately attributable to
respondents inflexibility as regards contingencies.
Responsibility of Judges
in Minimizing Delay
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 11
The foremost cause for the lengthy delay in this case was the
repeated failure of the jail wardens to bring the accused to court.
No less than four court settings,[54] spanning seven months,
were postponed on this ground alone. To be sure, this recurring
circumstance was caused, in different instances, by the failure of
the court personnel to issue the produce order on time and by
the dereliction of the jail wardens. Remarkably, although
respondent judge was justified in deferring the arraignment until
the accused was presented,[55] the problem could have been
easily averted by efficient court management.
In his role as administrator, respondent should have supervised
his clerk of court to ensure a timely service of the produce order
on the wardens of the Manila City Jail. Judges must keep a
watchful eye on the level of performance and conduct of the court
personnel under their immediate supervision, who are primarily
employed to aid in the administration of justice. Judges who set
the pace for greater efficiency, diligence and dedication, could
prompt their personnel to be more diligent and efficient in the
performance of official duties. For certain, leniency in the
administrative supervision of court personnel must be
avoided.[56]
We stress the need to remind judges to exhibit more diligence
and efficiency in the performance of their judicial duties to avoid
loss of faith and confidence in the administration of justice. Rule
3.09 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires them to
organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt
and efficient dispatch of business x x x. Additionally, Section 5(d)
of Rule 135 confers upon every court the power to control the
conduct of its ministerial officers and of all other persons who in
any manner are connected with a case before it.
Respondent did not exercise his prerogatives in administering
speedy justice. Instead, he was content with issuing
reminders[57] that miserably failed to resolve the problem
expeditiously. We can only conclude from the distinct
circumstances of the case that he failed to assert actively his
authority to expedite the proceedings.
Instead of being proactive and steering the course of the
proceedings with deliberate dispatch, respondent tended to be
passive and reactive by allowing the pace of the proceedings to
be dictated by the listlessness of the parties, his staff, and the jail
wardens. Judges should be more deliberate in their actions and,
within the bounds of law, make full use of their authority to
expedite proceedings while continuing to respect the rights of
parties to ventilate their respective causes fully.
Indeed, judges are required to dispose of the courts business
expeditiously, in accordance with Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, which we quote:
A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide
cases within the required period.

This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to act
promptly on their cases. Delay in the disposition of cases erodes
the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards, and brings it into disrepute.[58]
In the light of the numerous and unreasonable delays in the
arraignment of petitioner, the sought for dismissal of the
Information filed against him is in order.
Second Issue:
Propriety of a Petition for Mandamus
Respondent maintains that mandamus is not the proper remedy,
because he did not neglect his duties. Considering the above
findings of inordinate delay, respondents contention evidently
has no leg to stand on.
It is established that a writ of mandamus may be issued to control
the exercise of discretion[59] when, in the performance of duty,
there is undue delay that can be characterized as a grave abuse of
discretion resulting in manifest injustice.[60] In view of our
finding of unwarranted delays in the conduct of the arraignment
of petitioner, he has indeed the right to demand -- through a writ
of mandamus -- expeditious action from all officials tasked with
the administration of justice. Thus, he may not only demand that
his arraignment be held but, ultimately, that the information
against him be dismissed on the ground of the violation of his
right to speedy trial.
Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a
public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most
especially when the public right involved is mandated by the
Constitution.[61] Besides, it has long been established in this
jurisdiction that the writ of mandamus is available to the accused
to compel a dismissal of the case.[62]
Respondent argues for the dismissal of the instant Petition on the
ground that petitioner did not move for a reconsideration of the
trial courts Order dated May 3, 2004. Respondent insists that a
motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to a mandamus
petition, because the former remedy is plain, speedy, and
adequate in the ordinary course of law.[63] Indeed, his
contention expresses the general rule, but is not impervious to
exceptions.
In the face of extraordinary and compelling reasons, it has been
held that the availability of another remedy does not preclude a
resort to a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
These reasons arise when, among others, the assailed order
issued with grave abuse of discretion is null,[64] when the
available remedy will not afford expeditious relief,[65] and when
a motion for reconsideration will be useless.[66]
The instant case falls under these exceptional cases. To begin
with, the numerous and unreasonable postponements displayed
an abusive exercise of discretion. The delays were ordered in
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 12
total disregard of the constitutional right of petitioner. In fact, the
Orders denying his motions to dismiss did not even bother to
explain the reasonableness of the bases for the postponements.
The Order dated February 20, 2004, contains only this general
statement:
Pending resolution of certain incidents as chronicled by the Court
in open court, and given the Trial Prosecutors objections thereto
lifted from the record as to why the arraignment and pre-trial
conference of the [petitioner] John Joseph Lumanlaw y Bolinao
were not scheduled forwith (sic) as expected by counsel for the
defense, the Court opted to DENY the Urgent Motion to Dismiss
dated December 17, 2003 in Criminal Case No. 02-208426.[67]
After enumerating all the causes for the postponements, the
Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss was denied by respondent in
the Order dated May 3, 2004, in words that were just as vague, as
shown below:
Based on the foregoing chronological backdrop, there were
causes that justified the suspension of the arraignment that shall
be excluded in computing the period for arraignment per Section
1 (g), Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
thusly:
Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme
Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30)
days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to
quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes justifying
suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in computing
the period.
Accordingly, the Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss dated March
21, 2004 from defense counsel in Criminal Case No. 02-208426
must be and is hereby DENIED. x x x.[68]
The Orders did not even discuss why the postponements were
justified, or which of them could be excluded from the
computation of the prescribed period. Absent any discussion of
these matters, baseless was the court a quos conclusion that
there was no violation of petitioners right to speedy trial. A
veritable display of capriciousness cannot be countenanced when
weighed against an immutable right protected by the
Constitution.
As further aggravation, respondent did not exert any effort to
expedite the arraignment even after petitioner had filed two
urgent motions to dismiss. Indeed, there was basis for the latters
belief that filing a motion for reconsideration would have been
only an exercise in futility.[69]
Respondent also contends that the instant Petition should be
dismissed for disregarding the hierarchy of courts. This Court has
full discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed
directly with it.[70] In the interest of speedy justice, the Court
deemed it best to take cognizance of the present Petition,
notwithstanding the hierarchy of courts. Remanding the legal
 C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 13

issues to the Court of Appeals would have only exacerbated the

violation of petitioners rights.

It is the policy of this Court not to deny a writ of mandamus on

purely technical matters, if a party would be deprived of
substantive rights. Procedural rules should not be strictly
enforced when their enforcement would result in a miscarriage
of justice. This principle holds, especially when a petition is
meritorious and the trial judge clearly violated petitioners
constitutional right. The protection of our peoples civil liberties
overwhelms all rules of procedure. These rules are mere tools for
facilitating the attainment of justice. As explicitly provided in the
Rules of Court itself, they shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy, and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.[71]

Let it be known that this Court will not shirk from the
responsibility -- nay, the duty -- to set aside all obstacles to the
fortification of every citizens constitutionally enshrined rights.
We will not condone or give our imprimatur to the sluggish pace
of the proceedings below. The Court has the duty to safeguard
liberty; hence, it will always uphold the basic constitutional
rights of our people, especially the weak and the marginalized.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 02-

208425-26 pending before Branch 13 of the Manila Regional
Trial Court is DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby ordered
RELEASED from the Manila City Jail, where he is currently
detained, unless he is being held for any other lawful cause.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 188314
Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus
KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay,
ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, GAPPAL BANNAH ASALI
a.k.a. Maidan or Negro, JAINAL SALI a.k.a. Abu Solaiman,
ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Jackie or Zaky, and other JOHN
and JANE DOES, Accused, GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay,
ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and ROHMAT
ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky,
Promulgated:
January 10, 2011
Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated 30 June 2008, which affirmed the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 05-
476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The latter Decision
convicted the three accused-appellants namely, Gamal B. Baharan
a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat
Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky of the complex crime of
multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, and sentenced
them to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. The CA
modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua as required by
Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death
Penalty).
Statement of Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as
follows:
On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual
southbound route, from its Navotas bus terminal towards its
Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA).
Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were about to
move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the bus
conductor noticed two men running after the bus. The two
insisted on getting on the bus, so the conductor obliged and let
them in.
According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately
became wary of the two men, because, even if they got on the bus
together, the two sat away from each other one sat two seats
behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of the bus. At
the time, there were only 15 passengers inside the bus. He also
noticed that the eyes of one of the men were reddish. When he
approached the person near the driver and asked him whether he
was paying for two passengers, the latter looked dumb struck by
the question. He then stuttered and said he was paying for two
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 14
and gave PhP20. Andales grew more concerned when the other
man seated at the back also paid for both passengers. At this
point, Andales said he became more certain that the two were up
to no good, and that there might be a holdup.
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because
both men kept on asking him if the bus was going to stop at Ayala
Avenue. The witness also noticed that the man at the back
appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched out in front of
him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view as if he was
tinkering with something. When Andales would get near the man,
the latter would glare at him. Andales admitted, however, that he
did not report the suspicious characters to the police.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala
Avenue and EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the bus.
According to Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let
them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance prohibited
unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops. Eventually,
the bus driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight.
The two immediately got off the bus and ran towards Ayala
Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He then saw
fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a
nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where the bus was. He
saw their bus passengers either lying on the ground or looking
traumatized. A few hours after, he made a statement before the
Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the
Department of Justice, confirming that shortly before the
explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group Abu
Solaiman announced over radio station DZBB that the group had
a Valentines Day gift for former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo. After the bombing, he again went on radio and warned of
more bomb attacks.
As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN
News Network an exclusive interview some time after the
incident, confessing his participation in the Valentines Day
bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the network,
accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing
incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview,
confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14
February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the
accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the
two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14
February.
Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group namely Khaddafy Janjalani,
Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal
Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other
John and Jane Does were then charged with multiple murder and
multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and
Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain at-large.
On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case
No. 05-476), Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of

guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment for the multiple
frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-477), accused Asali
pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty.
Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges. During the pretrial
hearing, the parties stipulated the following:
1.) The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses
charged.
2.) That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad,
and Asali admitted knowing one another before February 14,
2005.
3.) All the same three accused likewise admitted that a
bomb exploded in the RRCG bus while the bus was plying the
EDSA route fronting the MRT terminal which is in front of the
Makati Commercial Center.
4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused
alias Rohmat whom he claims taught him how to make explosive
devices.
5.) The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat
before the February 14 bombing incident.
6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted
to causing the bomb explosion inside the RRCG bus which left
four people dead and more or less forty persons injured.
7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that
within the period March 20-24 each gave separate interviews to
the ABS-CBN news network admitting their participation in the
commission of the said crimes, subject of these cases.
8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to
pleading guilty to these crimes, because they were guilt-stricken
after seeing a man carrying a child in the first bus that they had
entered.
9.) Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of
March 2005 he gave a television news interview in which he
admitted that he supplied the explosive devices which resulted in
this explosion inside the RRCG bus and which resulted in the
filing of these charges.
10.) Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted
that they are members of the Abu Sayyaf.[1]
In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked
whether accused Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to
changing their not guilty pleas to the charge of multiple
frustrated murder, considering that they pled guilty to the
heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent
inconsistency in their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with
accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained to them the
consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the
inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-
arraignment. After the Information was read to them, Baharan
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 15
and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated
murder.[2]
After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified
that while under training with the Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat,
a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two other persons taught him how
to make bombs and explosives. The trainees were told that they
were to wage battles against the government in the city, and that
their first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway
Transit (LRT), and other parts of Metro Manila.
As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required
by the Abu Sayyaf leadership, specifically Abu Solaiman and
Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of TNT, a soldering gun, aluminum
powder, a tester, and Christmas lights, all of which he knew
would be used to make a bomb. He then recalled that sometime
in November to December 2004, Trinidad asked him for a total of
4 kilos of TNT that is, 2 kilos on two separate occasions. Rohmat
allegedly called Asali to confirm that Trinidad would get TNT
from Asali and use it for their first mission. The TNT was
allegedly placed in two buses sometime in December 2004, but
neither one of them exploded.
Asali then testified that the night before the Valentines Day
bombing, Trinidad and Baharan got another two kilos of TNT
from him. Late in the evening of 14 February, he received a call
from Abu Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to leave home or go
to crowded areas, since the TNT taken by Baharan and Trinidad
had already been exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later,
Trinidad called Asali, repeating the warning of Abu Solaiman. The
next day, Asali allegedly received a call from accused Rohmat,
congratulating the former on the success of the mission.[3]
According to Asali, Abu Zaky specifically said, Sa wakas nag
success din yung tinuro ko sayo.
Assignment of Errors
Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-
appellants plea of guilt despite insufficiency of searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the said plea.
II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of
accused-appellants for the crimes charged had been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.[4]
First Assignment of Error
Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial
court did not conduct a searching inquiry after they had changed
their plea from not guilty to guilty. The transcript of stenographic
notes during the 18 April 2005 re-arraignment before the Makati
Regional Trial Court is reproduced below:

COURT : Anyway, I think what we should have to do, considering
the stipulations that were agreed upon during the last hearing, is
to address this matter of pleas of not guilty entered for the
frustrated murder charges by the two accused, Mr. Trinidad and
Mr. Baharan, because if you will recall they entered pleas of guilty
to the multiple murder charges, but then earlier pleas of not
guilty for the frustrated multiple murder charges remain [I]s that
not inconsistent considering the stipulations that were entered
into during the initial pretrial of this case? [If] you will recall, they
admitted to have caused the bomb explosion that led to the death
of at least four people and injury of about forty other persons and
so under the circumstances, Atty Pea, have you discussed this
matter with your clients?
ATTY. PEA : Then we should be given enough time to talk with
them. I havent conferred with them about this with regard to the
multiple murder case.
COURT : Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Pea, can you assist the
two accused because if they are interested in withdrawing their
[pleas], I want to hear it from your lips.
ATTY. PEA : Yes, your Honor.
(At this juncture, Atty. Pea confers with the two accused, namely
Trinidad and Baharan)
I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have explained to them
the consequence of their pleas, your Honor, and that the plea of
guilt to the murder case and plea of not guilty to the frustrated
multiple murder actually are inconsistent with their pleas.
COURT : With matters that they stipulated upon?
ATTY. PEA : Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they already
plead guilt to the murder case, then they are now changing their
pleas, your Honor, from not guilty to the one of guilt. They are
now ready, your Honor, for re-arraignment.
INTERPRETER: (Read again that portion [of the information] and
translated it in Filipino in a clearer way and asked both accused
what their pleas are).
Your Honor, both accused are entering separate pleas of guilt to
the crime charged.
COURT : All right. So after the information was re-read to the
accused, they have withdrawn their pleas of not guilty and
changed it to the pleas of guilty to the charge of frustrated
murder. Thank you. Are there any matters you need to address at
pretrial now? If there are none, then I will terminate pretrial and
accommodate[5]
As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled
that all trial judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an
accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy
administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 16
seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands
fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable
conviction.[6] Thus, trial court judges are required to observe the
following procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require
the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
(Emphasis supplied)
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so
in cases of re-arraignment. In People v. Galvez, the Court noted
that since accused-appellant's original plea was not guilty, the
trial court should have exerted careful effort in inquiring into
why he changed his plea to guilty.[7] According to the Court:
The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of
guilt, especially in a case involving the death penalty, is imposed
upon the trial judge in order to leave no room for doubt on the
possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature
of the charge and the consequences of the plea.[8]
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should
not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the defense
counsel who explained the consequences of a guilty plea to the
accused, as it appears in this case. In People v. Alborida, this
Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty,
even if the accused had already signified in open court that his
counsel had explained the consequences of the guilty plea; that
he understood the explanation of his counsel; that the accused
understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to
him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or
threatened.[9]
We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a
searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are
mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had
not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a
misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences
of their guilty plea.[10] This requirement is stringent and
mandatory.[11]
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which
the re-arraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu
surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused. The Court
observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled
guilty to another charge multiple murder based on the same act
relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court
further notes that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt,
accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of
guilt one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television
interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and
the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering
the foregoing circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on
 C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 17

the sufficiency of the searching inquiry in this instance.

Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the A : Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the three of them,
accuseds plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory that Angelo Trinidad and myself be the one to be trained to make
judgment under consideration.[12] an explosive, sir.

Second Assignment of Error Q : Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long did it take
that training?
In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement
of conducting a searching inquiry was not complied with, [t]he A : If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make bomb about
manner by which the plea of guilt is made loses much of great one month and two weeks.
significance where the conviction can be based on independent
evidence proving the commission by the person accused of the
offense charged.[13] Thus, in People v. Nadera, the Court stated: Q : Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, while you were
still in training at Mr. Cararao, is there any mission that you
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside undertook, if any, with respect to that mission?
only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court
relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused,
the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated A : Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls, LRT, and
not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence other parts of Metro Manila, sir.[16]
proving his commission of the offense charged.[14] (Emphasis
supplied.) The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for
accused Baharan and Trinidad.
In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert
that guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. They pointed Q : Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did you know what
out that the testimony of the conductor was merely happened to the 2 kilos of bomb that Trinidad and Tapay took
circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was from you sometime in November 2004?
insufficient.
A : That was the explosive that he planted in the G-liner, which
Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are did not explode.
concerned, the evidence for the prosecution, in addition to that
which can be drawn from the stipulation of facts, primarily Q : How did you know, Mr. witness?
consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer Andales,
and of the accused-turned-state-witness, Asali. Andales positively A : He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo Trinidad, sir.
identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two men who had
acted suspiciously while inside the bus; who had insisted on
getting off the bus in violation of a Makati ordinance; and who Q : What happened next, Mr. witness, when the bomb did not
had scampered away from the bus moments before the bomb explode, as told to you by Trinidad?
exploded. On the other hand, Asali testified that he had given
accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing A : On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of TNT
incident in Makati City. The guilt of the accused Baharan and bombs.
Trinidad was sufficiently established by these corroborating
testimonies, coupled with their respective judicial admissions
(pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive Q : Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another amount of
television interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial) that explosive on that date, December 29, 2004? Will you kindly tell
they were indeed the perpetrators of the Valentines Day us the reason why?
bombing.[15] Accordingly, the Court upholds the findings of guilt
made by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
A : He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to get the TNT so
Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution that he could detonate a bomb
consisted of the testimony of accused-turned-state-witness Asali.
Below is a reproduction of the transcript of stenographic notes
on the state prosecutors direct examination of state-witness Asali Q : Were there any other person, besides Abu Solaiman, who
during the 26 May 2005 trial: called you up, with respect to the taking of the explosives from
you?
Q : You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. Under what
circumstances did he train you, Mr. Witness, to assemble those A : There is, sir Abu Zaky, sir, called up also.
explosives, you and Trinidad?

Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called you up?
A : He told me that this is your first mission.
Q : Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is that mission
you are referring to?
A : That is the first mission where we can show our anger
towards the Christians.
Q : The second time that he got a bomb from you, Mr. witness, do
you know if the bomb explode?
A : I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos taken by
Angelo Trinidad from me until after I was caught, because I was
told by the policeman that interviewed me after I was arrested
that the 2 kilos were planted in a bus, which also did not explode.
Q : So besides these two incidents, were there any other incidents
that Angelo Trinidad and Tapay get an explosive for you, Mr.
witness?
A : If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at 6:30 p.m.
Q : Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?
A : Its Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.
Q : How many explosives did they get from you, Mr. witness, at
that time?
A : They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.
Q : Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they going to use that
explosive?
A : No, sir.
Q : Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the third batch
of explosives, which were taken from you by Trinidad and Tapay?
A : That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.
Q : Why did you know, Mr. witness?
A : Because I was called in the evening of February 14 by Abu
Solaiman. He told me not to leave the house because the
explosive that were taken by Tapay and Angelo Trinidad
exploded.
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 18
Q : Was there any other call during that time, Mr. Witness?
A : I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the house because
the explosive that he took exploded already, sir.
Q : How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time, that indeed, the
bomb exploded at Makati, beside the call of Abu Solaiman and
Trinidad?
A : It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in Makati
should coincide with the bombing in General Santos.
A : He told it to me, sir I cannot remember the date anymore, but I
know it was sometime in February 2005.
Q : Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu Solaiman and Trinidad
after the bombing exploded in Makati, any other call?
A : There is, sir The call came from Abu Zaky.
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness?
A : He just greeted us congratulations, because we have a
successful mission.
A : He told me that sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo.
Q : By the way, Mr. witness, I would just like to clarify this. You
stated that Abu Zaky called you up the following day, that was
February 15, and congratulating you for the success of the
mission. My question to you, Mr. witness, if you know what is the
relation of that mission, wherein you were congratulated by Abu
Zaky, to the mission, which have been indoctrinated to you, while
you were in Mt. Cararao, Mr. witness?
A : They are connected, sir.
Q : Connected in what sense, Mr. witness?
A : Because when we were undergoing training, we were told that
the Abu Sayyaf should not wage war to the forest, but also wage
our battles in the city.
Q : Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness?
A : The government, sir.[17]
What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu
Sayyaf Group was determined to sow terror in Metro Manila, so
that they could show their anger towards the Christians.[18] It
can also be seen that Rohmat, together with Janjalani and Abu
Solaiman, had carefully planned the Valentines Day bombing

incident, months before it happened. Rohmat had trained Asali
and Trinidad to make bombs and explosives. While in training,
Asali and others were told that their mission was to plant bombs
in malls, the LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila. According to
Asali, Rohmat called him on 29 December 2004 to confirm that
Trinidad would get two kilos of TNT from Asali, as they were
about to commence their first mission.[19] They made two
separate attempts to bomb a bus in Metro Manila, but to no avail.
The day before the Valentines Day bombing, Trinidad got another
two kilos of TNT from Asali. On Valentines Day, the Abu Sayyaf
Group announced that they had a gift for the former President,
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On their third try, their plan finally
succeeded. Right after the bomb exploded, the Abu Sayyaf Group
declared that there would be more bombings in the future. Asali
then received a call from Rohmat, praising the former: Sa wakas
nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo.[20]
In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the
finding of guilt against Rohmat. Article 17 of the Revised Penal
Code reads:
Art. 17. Principals. The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by
another act without which it would not have been accomplished
Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second
paragraph, or the provision on principal by inducement. The
instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make
bombs coupled with their careful planning and persistent
attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmats
confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as
part of their mission prove the finding that Rohmats co-
inducement was the determining cause of the commission of the
crime.[21] Such command or advice [was] of such nature that,
without it, the crime would not have materialized.[22]
Further, the inducement was so influential in producing the
criminal act that without it, the act would not have been
performed.[23] In People v. Sanchez, et al., the Court ruled that,
notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the crime
scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the
criminal act or the principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor
Sanchez was a co-principal and co-conspirator, and because the
act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor was rendered
liable for all the resulting crimes.[24] The same finding must be
applied to the case at bar.
The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of conspiracy
involving accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Rohmat. Conspiracy
was clearly established from the collective acts of the accused-
appellants before, during and after the commission of the crime.
As correctly declared by the trial court in its Omnibus Decision:
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 19
Asalis clear and categorical testimony, which remains unrebutted
on its major points, coupled with the judicial admissions freely
and voluntarily given by the two other accused, are sufficient to
prove the existence of a conspiracy hatched between and among
the four accused, all members of the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf,
to wreak chaos and mayhem in the metropolis by
indiscriminately killing and injuring civilian victims by utilizing
bombs and other similar destructive explosive devices.
While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not
been expressly admitted by accused Baharan, Angelo Trinidad,
and Rohmat, more specifically with respect to the latters
participation in the commission of the crimes, nonetheless it has
been established by virtue of the aforementioned evidence, which
established the existence of the conspiracy itself and the
indispensable participation of accused Rohmat in seeing to it that
the conspirators criminal design would be realized.
It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred from the
acts of the accused, which clearly manifests a concurrence of
wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime (People v.
Lenantud, 352 SCRA 544). Hence, where acts of the accused
collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a
common design towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident and all the perpetrators
will be held liable as principals (People v. Ellado, 353 SCRA
643).[25]
In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it would be
justified in concluding that the defendants therein were engaged
in a conspiracy when the defendants by their acts aimed at the
same object, one performing one part and the other performing
another part so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of
the same object; and their acts, though apparently independent,
were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of
personal association, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments.[26]
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible
pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that
under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-
conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence
of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People v.
Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his
extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the
testimony admissible as to both conspirators.[27] Thus, in People
v. Palijon, the Court held the following:
[W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial
confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence
against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial
confession is admissible against the declarants co-accused since
the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former.
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to
extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial
where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-
 C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 20

examine the declarant. Mercenes admission implicating his co-

accused was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in
evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several
accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of
a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence
against the latter.[28]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Makati, as affirmed with modification by
the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-TANG, HON.
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, AND HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE
THIRD DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the “petition for certiorari with prayers (a) for the
Court En Banc to act on the petition; (b) to expedite the
proceedings and to set the case for oral arguments; and (c) to
issue a temporary restraining order to the respondents from
holding a pre-trial and further proceedings in Criminal Case No.
SB-14-CRM-0238”1 filed by petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile)
challenging the July 11, 2014 resolutions2 of the Sandiganbayan.
I.
THE ANTECEDENTS
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an
Information3 for plunder against Enrile, Jessica Lucila Reyes,
Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis
before the Sandiganbayan.
The Information reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this
Honorable Court’s jurisdiction, above-named accused JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G.
REYES, then Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s Office, both public
officers, committing the offense in relation to their respective
offices, conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM
NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass,
accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at
least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(Php172,834,500.00) through a combination or series of overt
criminal acts, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a)
by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her
representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following circumstances: before, during
and/or after the project identification, NAPOLES gave, and
ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost of a
project to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S
endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the appropriate
government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-government
organizations which became the recipients and/or target
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 21
implementors of ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly-funded
projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling
NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal
gain;
(b)
by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official
positions, authority, relationships, connections, and influence to
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Enrile responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan (1) an
urgent omnibus motion (motion to dismiss for lack of evidence
on record to establish probable cause and ad cautelam motion for
bail),4 and (2) a supplemental opposition to issuance of warrant
of arrest and for dismissal of Information,5 on June 10, 2014, and
June 16, 2014, respectively. The Sandiganbayan heard both
motions on June 20, 2014.
On June 24, 2014, the prosecution filed a consolidated opposition
to both motions.
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motions and
ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest on the plunder case
against the accused.6redarclaw
On July 8, 2014, Enrile received a notice of hearing7 informing
him that his arraignment would be held before the
Sandiganbayan’s Third Division on July 11, 2014.
On July 10, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars8
before the Sandiganbayan. On the same date, he filed a motion for
deferment of arraignment9 since he was to undergo medical
examination at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH).
On July 11, 2014, Enrile was brought to the Sandiganbayan
pursuant to the Sandiganbayan’s order and his motion for bill of
particulars was called for hearing. Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty.
Mendoza), Enrile’s counsel, argued the motion orally. Thereafter,
Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice (PJ) Amparo Cabotaje-Tang
(Cabotaje-Tang), declared a “10-minute recess” to deliberate on
the motion.
When the court session resumed, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced
the Court’s denial of Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars
essentially on the following grounds:
(1)
the details that Enrile desires are “substantial reiterations” of the
arguments he raised in his supplemental opposition to the
issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information;
and
(2)
the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best
ventilated during trial.

Atty. Mendoza asked for time to file a motion for reconsideration,
stating that he would orally move to reconsider the
Sandiganbayan’s denial if he would not be given time to seek a
reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan then directed Atty. Mendoza
to immediately proceed with his motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Mendoza thus orally presented his arguments for the
reconsideration of the denial of Enrile’s motion for bill of
particulars. The Sandiganbayan again declared a recess to
deliberate on the motion. After five (5) minutes, PJ Cabotaje-Tang
announced the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the motion for
reconsideration.10redarclaw
The Sandiganbayan reduced its rulings into writing on Enrile’s
written and oral motions. The pertinent portion of this ruling
reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
In today’s consideration of accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion
for Bill of Particulars, the Court heard the parties on oral
arguments in relation thereto. Thereafter, it declared a ten-
minute recess to deliberate thereon. After deliberating on the
said motion as well as the arguments of the parties, the Court
resolves to DENY as it hereby DENIES the same motion for bill of
particulars for the following reasons: (1) the details desired in
paragraphs 2 to 5 of the said motion are substantially
reiterations of the arguments raised by accused Enrile in his
Supplemental Opposition to Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and
for Dismissal of Information dated June 16, 2014 x x x.
The Court already upheld the sufficiency of the allegations in the
Information charging accused Enrile, among other persons, with
the crime of plunder in its Resolution dated July 3, 2014. It finds
no cogent reasons to reconsider the said ruling.
Moreover, the “desired details” that accused Enrile would like the
prosecution to provide are evidentiary in nature, which need not
be alleged in the Information. They are best ventilated during the
trial of the case.
Counsel for accused Juan Ponce Enrile orally sought a
reconsideration of the denial of his motion for bill of particulars
which was opposed by the prosecution. The Court then declared
another ten-minute recess to deliberate on the said motion for
reconsideration. After deliberation thereon, the Court likewise
resolved to DENY as it hereby DENIES accused Juan Ponce
Enrile’s motion for reconsideration there being no new or
substantial grounds raised to warrant the grant thereof.
ACCORDINGLY, the scheduled arraignment of accused Juan Ponce
Enrile shall now proceed as previously scheduled.
SO ORDERED.11
Atty. Mendoza subsequently moved for the deferment of Enrile’s
arraignment. The Sandiganbayan responded by directing the
doctors present to determine whether he was physically fit to be
arraigned. After he was declared fit, the Sandiganbayan
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 22
proceeded with Enrile’s arraignment. Enrile entered a “no plea,”
prompting the Sandiganbayan to enter a “not guilty” plea on his
behalf.
II.
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied his motion for bill of particulars
despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of the Information filed
against him. Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious
violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
Enrile further alleges that he was left to speculate on what his
specific participation in the crime of plunder had been. He posits
that the Information should have stated the details of the
particular acts that allegedly constituted the imputed series or
combination of overt acts that led to the charge of plunder. Enrile
essentially reiterates the “details desired” that he sought in his
motion for bill of particulars, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Allegations of Information
Details Desired
“x x x accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator,
JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s
Office, both public officers, committing the offense in relation to
their respective offices, conspiring with one another and with
JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND
DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally
amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting
to at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(Php172,834,500.00) through a combination or series of overt
acts, x x x.”
a. Who among the accused acquired the alleged “ ill-gotten
wealth amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (Php172,834,500.00)”? One of them, two of
them or all of them? Kindly specify.
b. The allegation “through a combination or series of overt
criminal acts” is a conclusion of fact or of law. What are the
particular overt acts which constitute the “combination”? What
are the particular overt acts which constitute the “series”? Who
committed those acts?
x x x by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her
representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following circumstances: before, during
and/or after the project identification, NAPOLES gave, and
ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost of a
project to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S
endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the appropriate
government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-government

organizations which became the recipients and/or target
implementers of ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly-funded
projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling
NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal
gain;
a. What was “repeatedly” received? If sums of money, the
particular amount. If on several occasions and in different
amounts, specify the amount on each occasion and the
corresponding date of receipt.
b. Name the specific person(s) who delivered the amount of
Php172,834,500.00 and the specific person(s) who received the
amount; or if not in lump sum, the various amounts totaling
Php172,834,500.00. x x x Specify particularly the person who
delivered the amount, Napoles or Lim or De Asis, and who
particularly are “the others.”
c. To whom was the money given? To Enrile or Reyes? State the
amount given on each occasion, the date when and the place
where the amount was given.
d. x x x Describe each project allegedly identified, how, and by
whom was the project identified, the nature of each project,
where it is located and the cost of each project.
e. For each of the years 2004-2010, under what law or official
document is a portion of the “Priority Development Assistance
Fund” identified as that of a member of Congress, in this instance,
as ENRILE’s, to be found? In what amount for each year is
ENRILE’s Priority Development Assistance Fund? When, and to
whom, did Enrile endorse the projects in favor of “Napoles non-
government organizations which became the recipients and/or
target implementers of ENRILE’s PDAF projects?” Name Napoles
non-government organizations which became the recipients
and/or target implementers of ENRILE’s PDAF projects. Who
paid Napoles, from whom did Napoles collect the fund for the
projects which turned out to be ghosts or fictitious? Who
authorized the payments for each project?
f. x x x what COA audits or field investigations were conducted
which validated the findings that each of Enrile’s PDAF projects
in the years 2004-2010 were ghosts or spurious projects?
x x x by taking undue advantage, on several occasions of their
official positions, authority, relationships, connections, and
influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines.
a. Provide the details of how Enrile took undue advantage, on
several occasions, of his official positions, authority,
relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich
himself at the expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. Was this
because he received any money from the government? From
whom and for what reason did he receive any money or property
from the government through which he “unjustly enriched
himself”? State the details from whom each amount was received,
the place and the time.
Enrile posits that his ‘desired details’ are not evidentiary in
nature; they are material facts that should be clearly alleged in
the Information so that he may be fully informed of the charges
against him and be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 23
Enrile adds that the grounds raised in his motion for bill of
particulars are cited in a context different from his opposition to
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. He maintains that the
resolution of the probable cause issue was interlocutory and did
“not bar the submission of the same issue in subsequent
proceedings especially in the context of a different proceeding.”
Enrile thus prays that: “(a) the Court en banc act on the present
petition; (b) by way of an interim measure, the Court issue a TRO
or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Sandiganbayan
from holding the pre-trial and subsequent proceedings against
him in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 during the pendency
of the present petition; (c) the Court expedite the proceedings
and set the case for oral arguments; and (d) at the conclusion of
the proceedings, the Court annul and set aside the
Sandiganbayan’s July 11, 2014 resolution and his arraignment.”
A. The People’s Comment
In its Comment,12 the People of the Philippines13 counters that
the Sandiganbayan did not exercise its discretionary power in an
arbitrary or despotic manner. Even assuming that the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars
was erroneous, the error did not amount to lack or excess or
jurisdiction. It further maintains that the assailed Sandiganbayan
rulings were arrived at based on the procedures prescribed
under Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan.
The People also argues that the Information already contained
the ultimate facts; matters of evidence do not need to be averred.
B. Enrile’s Reply
In his Reply, Enrile essentially claims that the right to move for a
bill of particulars is “ancillary to and in implementation” of an
accused’s rights to due process, to be heard, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He
maintains that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of his motion for bill of
particulars is not “a mere denial of a procedural right under the
Rules of Court, but of rights vested in an accused under the
Constitution to ensure fairness in the trial of the offense
charged.” Enrile also adds that there could only be a fair trial if he
could properly plead to the Information and prepare for trial.
Enrile further argues that the People’s Comment did not dispute
the relevance of the details sought in the motion for bill of
particulars. He likewise claims that the “desired details” could not
be found in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution
during the preliminary conference. Finally, Enrile maintains that
his motion for bill of particulars was not dilatory.
III.
THE COURT’S RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to partially GRANT the
petition under the terms outlined below.
A. The constitutional right of the accused to be informed
Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a
criminal offense has the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.14 This right has long been
established in English law, and is the same right expressly
guaranteed in our 1987 Constitution. This right requires that the
offense charged be stated with clarity and with certainty to
inform the accused of the crime he is facing in sufficient detail to
enable him to prepare his defense.15redarclaw
In the 1904 case of United States v. Karelsen,16 the Court
explained the purpose of informing an accused in writing of the
charges against him from the perspective of his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The object of this written accusation was – First. To furnish the
accused with such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of
his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of
the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient
in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. (United
States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.) In order that this requirement
may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law.
Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be
set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time,
place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In
short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every
fact and circumstances necessary to constitute the crime charged.
x x x.17 [Emphasis supplied.]
The objective, in short, is to describe the act with sufficient
certainty to fully appraise the accused of the nature of the charge
against him and to avoid possible surprises that may lead to
injustice. Otherwise, the accused would be left speculating on
why he has been charged at all.18redarclaw
In People v. Hon. Mencias, et al.,19 the Court further explained
that a person’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him signifies that an accused
should be given the necessary data on why he is the subject of a
criminal proceeding. The Court added that the act or conduct
imputed to a person must be described with sufficient
particularity to enable the accused to defend himself properly.
The general grant and recognition of a protected right emanates
from Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which states
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. The purpose of the guaranty is to
prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty, and
property of individuals; to secure the individual from the
arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained
by the established principles of private rights and distributive
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 24
justice x x x; and to secure to all persons equal and impartial
justice and the benefit of the general law.20redarclaw
Separately from Section 1, Article III is the specific and direct
underlying root of the right to information in criminal
proceedings – Section 14(1), Article III – which provides that “No
person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.” Thus, no doubt exists that the right to be
informed of the cause of the accusation in a criminal case has
deep constitutional roots that, rather than being cavalierly
disregarded, should be carefully protected.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division),21
the Court, in sustaining the Sandiganbayan’s grant of the motion
for bill of particulars of Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., held that “the facile
verbosity with which the legal counsel for the government
flaunted the accusation of excesses against the Marcoses in
general terms must be soonest refurbished by a bill of
particulars, so that respondent can properly prepare an
intelligent responsive pleading and so that trial in this case will
proceed as expeditiously as possible.”22 The Court additionally
stated that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This Court has been liberal in giving the lower courts the widest
latitude of discretion in setting aside default orders justified
under the right to due process principle. Plain justice demands
and the law requires no less that defendants must know what the
complaint against them is all about.
x x x In the interest of justice, we need to dispel the impression in
the individual respondents' minds that they are being railroaded
out of their rights and properties without due process of law.23
B. Procedural Sufficiency of the Information
An Information is an accusation in writing charging a person with
an offense, signed by the prosecutor and filed with the court.24
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in implementing the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, specifically require
certain matters to be stated in the Information for its sufficiency.
The requirement aims to enable the accused to properly prepare
for his defense since he is presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts constituting the offense
charged.25redarclaw
To be considered as sufficient and valid, an information must
state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of
the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense
was committed.26redarclaw
If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made
to the section or subsection of the statute penalizing it. The acts
or omissions constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances alleged must be stated in ordinary and
concise language; they do not necessarily need to be in the
language of the statute, and should be in terms sufficient to

enable a person of common understanding to know what offense
is charged and what qualifying and aggravating circumstances
are alleged, so that the court can pronounce judgment.27 The
Rules do not require the Information to exactly allege the date
and place of the commission of the offense, unless the date and
the place are material ingredients or essential elements of the
offense, or are necessary for its identification.
B.1. Ultimate facts versus Evidentiary facts
An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting
the offense; the evidentiary and other details (i.e., the facts
supporting the ultimate facts) can be provided during the
trial.28redarclaw
Ultimate facts is defined as “those facts which the expected
evidence will support. The term does not refer to the details of
probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these
material elements are to be established.” It refers to the facts that
the evidence will prove at the trial.29redarclaw
Ultimate facts has also been defined as the principal,
determinative, and constitutive facts on whose existence the
cause of action rests;30 they are also the essential and
determining facts on which the court's conclusion rests and
without which the judgment would lack support in essential
particulars.31redarclaw
Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to
establish the ultimate facts; they are the premises that lead to the
ultimate facts as conclusion.32They are facts supporting the
existence of some other alleged and unproven fact.33redarclaw
In Bautista v. Court of Appeals,34 the Court explained these two
concepts in relation to a particular criminal case, as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The distinction between the elements of the offense and the
evidence of these elements is analogous or akin to the difference
between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil cases.
Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which either
form the basis of the primary right and duty or which directly
make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant, while
evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove or establish said
ultimate facts. x x x.35 [Emphasis supplied.]
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be
alleged in the Information, matters of evidence – as distinguished
from the facts essential to the nature of the offense – do not need
to be alleged. Whatever facts and circumstances must necessarily
be alleged are to be determined based on the definition and the
essential elements of the specific crimes.36redarclaw
C. Arraignment
The procedural due process mandate of the Constitution requires
that the accused be arraigned so that he may be fully informed as
to why he was charged and what penal offense he has to face, to
be convicted only on showing that his guilt is shown beyond
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 25
reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence
against him.37 During arraignment, the accused is granted the
opportunity to fully know the precise charge that confronts him
and made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to
him.38redarclaw
An arraignment thus ensures that an accused be fully acquainted
with the nature of the crime imputed to him in the Information
and the circumstances under which it is allegedly committed.39
It is likewise at this stage of the proceedings when the accused
enters his plea,40 or enters a plea of not guilty to a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the offense charged.41redarclaw
A concomitant component of this stage of the proceedings is that
the Information should provide the accused with fair notice of the
accusations made against him, so that he will be able to make an
intelligent plea and prepare a defense.42Moreover, the
Information must provide some means of ensuring that the crime
for which the accused is brought to trial is in fact one for which
he was charged, rather than some alternative crime seized upon
by the prosecution in light of subsequently discovered
evidence.43Likewise, it must indicate just what crime or crimes
an accused is being tried for, in order to avoid subsequent
attempts to retry him for the same crime or crimes.44 In other
words, the Information must permit the accused to prepare his
defense, ensure that he is prosecuted only on the basis of facts
presented, enable him to plead jeopardy against a later
prosecution, and inform the court of the facts alleged so that it
can determine the sufficiency of the charge.
Oftentimes, this is achieved when the Information alleges the
material elements of the crime charged. If the Information fails to
comply with this basic standard, it would be quashed on the
ground that it fails to charge an offense.45Of course, an
Information may be sufficient to withstand a motion to quash,
and yet insufficiently inform the accused of the specific details of
the alleged offenses. In such instances, the Rules of Court allow
the accused to move for a bill of particulars to enable him
properly to plead and to prepare for trial.46redarclaw
C.1. Bill of Particulars
In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification of the
charges or claims in an action, which an accused may avail of by
motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and
prepare for trial. In civil proceedings, a bill of particulars has
been defined as a complementary procedural document
consisting of an amplification or more particularized outline of a
pleading, and is in the nature of a more specific allegation of the
facts recited in the pleading.47 The purpose of a motion for bill of
particulars in civil cases is to enable a party to prepare his
responsive pleading properly.
In criminal cases, a bill of particulars details items or specific
conduct not recited in the Information but nonetheless pertain to
or are included in the crime charged. Its purpose is to enable an

accused: to know the theory of the government’s case;48 to
prepare his defense and to avoid surprise at the trial; to plead his
acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for the same
offense; and to compel the prosecution to observe certain
limitations in offering evidence.49redarclaw
In criminal proceedings, the motion for a bill of particulars is
governed by Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 9. Bill of particulars. - The accused may, before
arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly
to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the
alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details
desired.
The rule requires the information to describe the offense with
sufficient particularity to apprise the accused of the crime
charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The
particularity must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence
may immediately know what the Information
means.50redarclaw
The general function of a bill of particulars, whether in civil or
criminal proceedings, is to guard against surprises during trial. It
is not the function of the bill to furnish the accused with the
evidence of the prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor shall not be
required to include in the bill of particulars matters of evidence
relating to how the people intend to prove the elements of the
offense charged or how the people intend to prove any item of
factual information included in the bill of particulars.51redarclaw
C.2. Origin of bill of particulars in criminal cases52redarclaw
Even before the promulgation of the 1964 Rules of Court, when
the applicable rules for criminal procedure was still General
Order No. 58,53 the Court had already recognized the need for a
bill of particulars in criminal cases. This recognition came despite
the lack of any specific provision in General Order No. 58 setting
out the rules for a bill of particulars in criminal cases.
In U.S. v. Schneer,54 the issue presented was whether a bill of
particulars was available in a criminal case for estafa after the
accused had already been arraigned. The Court essentially ruled
that there was no specific provision of law expressly authorizing
the filing of specifications or bills of particulars in criminal cases,
and held that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
We know of no provision either in General Orders, No. 58, or in
the laws existing prior thereto which requires the Government to
furnish such a bill of particulars, and we accordingly hold that it
was not error on the part of the court below to refuse to do so.
In U.S. v. Cernias,55 however, the Court formally recognized the
existence and applicability of a bill of particulars in criminal
cases. In this case, the prosecution filed an information charging
Basilio Cernias with several counts of brigandage before the
Court of First Instance of Leyte. In overruling the accused’s
objection, the Court declared that the prosecution’s act of
specifying certain acts done by the conspirators in the
Information “did no more than to furnish the defendant with a
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 26
bill of particulars of the facts which it intended to prove at the
trial x x x.”56redarclaw
In sum, the Court essentially held that a detailed complaint or
information is not objectionable, and that the details it contains
may be properly considered as specifications or bill of
particulars.57redarclaw
In People v. Abad Santos,58 the court first recognized a bill of
particulars, as a right that the accused may ask for from the court.
In this case, the prosecution charged respondent Joseph Arcache
with the crime of treason before the People’s Court. The
Information filed against the accused contained, in counts 2 and
3, the phrase “and other similar equipment.”
The counsel for the accused verbally petitioned the People’s
court to order the prosecution to “make more specific [the]
phrase ‘and other similar equipment,’” which request the
People’s Court granted. The People of the Philippines filed a
petition for certiorari, but the Court dismissed this petition.
In upholding the order of the People’s Court, the Court ruled that
“in the absence of specific provisions of law prohibiting the filing
of specifications or bills of particulars in criminal cases, their
submission may be permitted, as they cannot prejudice any
substantial rights of the accused. On the contrary, they will serve
to apprise the accused clearly of the charges filed against them,
and thus enable them to prepare intelligently whatever defense
or defenses they might have.59redarclaw
Notably, Abad Santos emphasized the importance of a bill of
particulars in criminal cases, stating that “x x x inasmuch as in
criminal cases not only the liberty but even the life of the accused
may be at stake, it is always wise and proper that the accused
should be fully apprised of the true charges against them, and
thus avoid all and any possible surprise, which might be
detrimental to their rights and interests; and ambiguous phrases
should not, therefore, be permitted in criminal complaints or
informations; and if any such phrase has been included therein,
on motion of the defense, before the commencement of the trial,
the court should order either its elimination as surplusage or the
filing of the necessary specification, which is but an amendment
in mere matters of form.”60redarclaw
In these cited cases, the Courts did not rely on the Rules of Court
to provide for a bill of particulars in criminal cases. A specific
provision granting the accused the right “to move for or demand
a more definite statement or a bill of particulars” was not
incorporated as a formal rule until the 1964 Rules of
Court,61under its Section 6, Rule 116. This initial provision later
became Section 10 of Rule 116 under the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure62and Section 9 of Rule 116 under the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended.63redarclaw
C.3. The Distinctive Role of a Bill of Particulars

When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the
remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for
a bill of particulars.
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or
allegations in the complaint or information to enable the accused
to properly plead and prepare for trial. It presupposes a valid
Information, one that presents all the elements of the crime
charged, albeit under vague terms. Notably, the specifications
that a bill of particulars may supply are only formal amendments
to the complaint or Information.
In Virata v. Sandiganbayan,64 the Court expounded on the
purpose of a bill of particulars as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
It is the office or function, as well as the object or purpose, of a
bill of particulars to amplify or limit a pleading, specify more
minutely and particularly a claim or defense set up and pleaded
in general terms, give information, not contained in the pleading,
to the opposite party and the court as to the precise nature,
character, scope, and extent of the cause of action or defense
relied on by the pleader, and apprise the opposite party of the
case which he has to meet, to the end that the proof at the trial
may be limited to the matters specified, and in order that
surprise at, and needless preparation for, the trial may be
avoided, and that the opposite party may be aided in framing his
answering pleading and preparing for trial. It has also been
stated that it is the function or purpose of a bill of particulars to
define, clarify, particularize, and limit or circumscribe the issues
in the case, to expedite the trial, and assist the court. A general
function or purpose of a bill of particulars is to prevent injustice
or do justice in the case when that cannot be accomplished
without the aid of such a bill.65redarclaw
x x x x [Emphasis ours.]
Notably, the failure of the accused to move for the specification of
the details desired deprives him of the right to object to evidence
that could be introduced and admitted under an Information of
more or less general terms but which sufficiently charges the
accused with a definite crime.66redarclaw
Although the application for the bill of particulars is one
addressed to the sound discretion of the court67 it should
nonetheless exercise its discretion within the context of the facts
and the nature of the crime charged in each case and the right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him. As articulated in the case of People v. Iannone:68
It is beyond cavil that a defendant has a basic and fundamental
right to be informed of the charges against him so that he will be
able to prepare a defense. Hence the courts must exercise careful
surveillance to ensure that a defendant is not deprived of this
right by an overzealous prosecutor attempting to protect his case
or his witnesses. Any effort to leave a defendant in ignorance of
the substance of the accusation until the time of trial must be
firmly rebuffed. This is especially so where the indictment itself
provides a paucity of information. In such cases, the court must
be vigilant in safeguarding the defendant's rights to a bill of
particulars and to effective discovery. Should the prosecutor
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 27
decide to use an indictment which, although technically sufficient,
does not adequately allow a defendant to properly prepare for
trial, he may well run afoul of the defendant's right to be
informed of the accusations against him.
Thus, if the Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal
attitude towards its granting69 and order the government to file
a bill of particulars elaborating on the charges. Doubts should be
resolved in favor of granting the bill70 to give full meaning to the
accused’s Constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position
of disclosing certain overt acts through the Information and
withholding others subsequently discovered, all of which it
intends to prove at the trial. This is the type of surprise a bill of
particulars is designed to avoid.71The accused is entitled to the
observance of all the rules designated to bring about a fair
verdict.
This becomes more relevant in the present case where the crime
charged carries with it the severe penalty of capital punishment
and entails the commission of several predicate criminal acts
involving a great number of transactions spread over a
considerable period of time.
C.4. Motion to Quash vs. Motion for Bill of Particulars
A bill of particulars presupposes a valid Information while a
motion to quash is a jurisdictional defect on account that the facts
charged in the Information does not constitute an
offense.72redarclaw
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his dissent, avers that the allegations
in the information are not vague because the Information needs
only allege the ultimate facts constituting the offense for which
the accused stands charged, not the finer details of why and how
the illegal acts alleged were committed. In support of his position,
Justice Carpio cited the cases of Miguel v. Sandiganbayan,73Go v.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,74 and People v. Romualdez,75
among others, to support the superfluity of the details requested
by Enrile.
Justice Carpio’s reliance on these cases is misplaced for they
involve the issue of quashal of an information on the ground that
the facts charge do not constitute an offense, rather than a
request for bill of particulars. That is, these cited cases involve
the critical issue of the validity of an information, and not a
request for specificity with request to an offense charged in an
information.
On the other hand, the cases of People v. Sanico,76People v.
Banzuela,77Pielago v. People,78People v. Rayon, Sr.,79People v.
Subesa,80People v. Anguac,81 and Los Baños v. Pedro,82 which
were likewise cited by Justice Carpio, involve the issue that an
Information only need to allege the ultimate facts, and not the
specificity of the allegations contained in the information as to
allow the accused to prepare for trial and make an intelligent
plea.83redarclaw

Notably, in Miguel,84 to which Justice Carpio concurred, this
Court mentioned that the proper remedy, if at all, to a supposed
ambiguity in an otherwise valid Information, is merely to move
for a bill of particulars and not for the quashal of an information
which sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense
charged.85redarclaw
Clearly then, a bill of particulars does not presuppose an invalid
information for it merely fills in the details on an otherwise valid
information to enable an accused to make an intelligent plea and
prepare for his defense.
I stress, however, that the issue in the present case involves
abuse of discretion for denying Enrile’s request for a bill of
particulars, and not a motion to quash.
If the information does not charge an offense, then a motion to
quash is in order.86redarclaw
But if the information charges an offense and the averments are
so vague that the accused cannot prepare to plead or prepare for
trial, then a motion for a bill of particulars is the proper
remedy.87redarclaw
Thus viewed, a motion to quash and a motion for a bill of
particulars are distinct and separate remedies, the latter
presupposing an information sufficient in law to charge an
offense.88redarclaw
D. The Grave Abuse of Discretion Issue
The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is
discretionary on the court where the Information is filed. As
usual in matters of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not
be reversed unless grave abuse of discretion or a manifestly
erroneous order amounting to grave abuse of discretion is
shown.89redarclaw
Grave abuse of discretion refers to the capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment that amounts or is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law such as when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.90 For the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there
must be capricious, arbitrary, or whimsical exercise of power.
It will be recalled that the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motion
for bill of particulars on two grounds,
namely:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) the details sought were evidentiary in nature and are
best ventilated during trial; and
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 28
(2) his desired details were reiterations of the details he
sought in his supplemental opposition to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.
We shall separately examine these grounds in determining
whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied Enrile’s motion for a bill of particulars and his
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Sandiganbayan Ground #1:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The details sought were evidentiary in nature
D.1. The Law of Plunder
A determination of whether the details that Enrile sought were
evidentiary requires an examination of the elements of the
offense he is charged with, i.e., plunder under Republic Act No.
7080.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended,
reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. — Any
public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates
or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of
overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal
Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare
any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other
incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks
derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor
of the State. [Emphasis supplied.]
Based on this definition, the elements of plunder
are:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1)
That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates, or other
persons;
(2)
That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal
acts:
(a)
through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation
of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(b)
by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits
from any person and/or entity in connection with any

government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer concerned;
(c)
by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities of government-owned or -
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries;
(d)
by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
(e)
by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies
or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and
orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests;
or
(f)
by taking undue advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
(3)
That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth
amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
[Emphasis supplied.]
D.1.a. The Conspiracy Element and its Requested Details
Taking these elements into account, we hold that Enrile’s
requested details on Who among the accused acquired the
alleged “ill-gotten wealth” are not proper subjects for a bill of
particulars.
The allegation of the Information that the accused and Jessica
Lucila G. Reyes, “conspiring with one another and with Janet Lim
Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis x x x”
expressly charges conspiracy.
The law on plunder provides that it is committed by “a public
officer who acts by himself or in connivance with x x x.” The term
“connivance” suggests an agreement or consent to commit an
unlawful act or deed with another; to connive is to cooperate or
take part secretly with another.91 It implies both knowledge and
assent that may either be active or passive.92redarclaw
Since the crime of plunder may be done in connivance or in
conspiracy with other persons, and the Information filed clearly
alleged that Enrile and Jessica Lucila Reyes conspired with one
another and with Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim and John
Raymund De Asis, then it is unnecessary to specify, as an
essential element of the offense, whether the ill-gotten wealth
amounting to at least P172,834,500.00 had been acquired by one,
by two or by all of the accused. In the crime of plunder, the
amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by each accused in a
conspiracy is immaterial for as long as the total amount amassed,
acquired or accumulated is at least P50 million.
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 29
We point out that conspiracy in the present case is not charged as
a crime by itself but only as the mode of committing the crime.
Thus, there is no absolute necessity of reciting its particulars in
the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the
offense charged.
It is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of
an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the
word “conspire,” or its derivatives or synonyms, such as
confederate, connive, collude; or (2) by allegations of basic facts
constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common
understanding would know what is intended, and with such
precision as the nature of the crime charged will admit, to enable
the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent
indictment based on the same facts.93redarclaw
Our ruling on this point in People v. Quitlong94 is particularly
instructive:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the
components of conspiracy or allege all the details thereof, like the
part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence
proving the common design or the facts connecting all the
accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is
it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of
particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is
enough that the indictment contains a statement of the facts
relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and
concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case
will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision
that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a
subsequent indictment based on the same facts. x x x95
D.1.b. The Requested Details of Enrile’s PDAF
We similarly rule that the petitioner is not entitled to a bill of
particulars for specifics sought under the questions –
For each of the years 2004-2010, under what law or official
document is a portion of the “Priority Development Assistance
Fund” identified as that of a member of Congress, in this instance,
as ENRILE’s, to be found? In what amount for each year is
ENRILE’s Priority Development Assistance Fund?
and
x x x what COA audits or field investigations were conducted
which validated the findings that each of Enrile’s PDAF projects
in the years 2004-2010 were ghosts or spurious projects?
These matters will simply establish and support the ultimate fact
that Enrile’s PDAF was used to fund fictitious or nonexistent
projects. Whether a discretionary fund (in the form of PDAF) had
indeed been made available to Enrile as a member of the
Philippine Congress and in what amounts are evidentiary matters
that do not need to be reflected with particularity in the
Information, and may be passed upon at the full-blown trial on
the merits of the case.
D.1.b(i) The yearly PDAF Allocations

Specifically, we believe that the exact amounts of Enrile’s yearly
PDAF allocations, if any, from 2004 to 2010 need not be pleaded
with specific particularity to enable him to properly plead and
prepare for his defense. In fact, Enrile may be in a better position
to know these details than the prosecution and thus cannot claim
that he would be taken by surprise during trial by the omission in
the Information of his annual PDAF allocations.
Thus, whether the amounts of Enrile’s PDAF allocations have
been specified or not, Enrile has been sufficiently informed that
he stands charged of endorsing Napoles’ non-government
organizations to implement spurious or fictitious projects, in
exchange for a percentage of his PDAF.
D.1.b(ii) The details of the COA Audits
The details of the “COA audits or field investigations” only
support the ultimate fact that the projects implemented by
Napoles’ NGOs, and funded by Enrile’s PDAF, were nonexisting or
fictitious. Thus, they are evidentiary in nature and do not need to
be spelled out with particularity in the Information.
To require more details on these matters from the prosecution
would amount to asking for evidentiary information that the
latter intends to present at the trial; it would be a compulsion on
the prosecution to disclose in advance of the trial the evidence it
will use in proving the charges alleged in the indictment.
D.1.c. Other Sources of Kickbacks and Commissions
We also deny Enrile’s plea for details on who “the others” were
(aside from Napoles, Lim and De Asis) from whom he allegedly
received kickbacks and commissions. These other persons do not
stand charged of conspiring with Enrile and need not therefore
be stated with particularly, either as specific individuals or as
John Does. The Court cannot second-guess the prosecution’s
reason for not divulging the identity of these “others” who may
potentially be witnesses for the prosecution.
What the Constitution guarantees the accused is simply the right
to meet and examine the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution
has the prerogative to call witnesses other than those named in
the complaint or information, subject to the defense’s right to
cross-examine them.96 Making these “others” known would in
fact be equivalent to the prosecution’s premature disclosure of its
evidence. We stress, to the point of repetition, that a bill of
particulars is not meant to compel the prosecution to
prematurely disclose evidentiary matters supporting its case.
D.2. The Overt Acts constituting the “Combination” or “Series”
under the Plunder Law
We hold that Enrile is entitled to a bill of particulars for specifics
sought under the following questions –
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the
“combination”? What are the particular overt acts which
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 30
constitute the “series”? Who committed those acts? [Emphasis
ours.]
D.2.a. Reason for Requirement for Particulars of Overt Acts
Plunder is the crime committed by public officers when they
amass wealth involving at least P50 million by means of a
combination or series of overt acts.97 Under these terms, it is not
sufficient to simply allege that the amount of ill-gotten wealth
amassed amounted to at least P50 million; the manner of
amassing the ill-gotten wealth – whether through a combination
or series of overt acts under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080 – is an
important element that must be alleged.
When the Plunder Law speaks of “combination,” it refers to at
least two (2) acts falling under different categories listed in
Section 1, paragraph (d) of R.A. No. 7080 [for example, raids on
the public treasury under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph
(1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the
National Government under Section 1, paragraph (d),
subparagraph (3)].
On the other hand, to constitute a “series” there must be two (2)
or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
enumeration found in Section 1, paragraph (d) [for example,
misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury,
all of which fall under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph
(1)].98redarclaw
With respect to paragraph (a) of the Information –
[(i.e., by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her
representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following circumstances: before, during
and/or after the project identification, NAPOLES gave, and
ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost of a
project to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S
endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the appropriate
government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-government
organizations which became the recipients and/or target
implementers of ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly funded
projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling
NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal
gain x x x)] –
we hold that the prosecution employed a generalized or shotgun
approach in alleging the criminal overt acts allegedly committed
by Enrile. This approach rendered the allegations of the
paragraph uncertain to the point of ambiguity for purposes of
enabling Enrile to respond and prepare for his defense. These
points are explained in greater detail below.
The heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase “combination or
series of overt or criminal acts.” Hence, even if the accumulated
ill-gotten wealth amounts to at least P50 million, a person cannot
be prosecuted for the crime of plunder if this resulted from a
single criminal act. This interpretation of the Plunder Law is very
clear from the congressional deliberations.99redarclaw

Considering that without a number of overt or criminal acts,
there can be no crime of plunder, the various overt acts that
constitute the “combination” and “series” the Information
alleged, are material facts that should not only be alleged, but
must be stated with sufficient definiteness so that the accused
would know what he is specifically charged of and why he stands
charged, so that he could properly defend himself against the
charge.
Thus, the several (i.e., at least 2) acts which are indicative of the
overall scheme or conspiracy must not be generally stated; they
should be stated with enough particularity for Enrile (and his co-
accused) to be able to prepare the corresponding refuting
evidence to meet these alleged overt acts.
It is insufficient, too, to merely allege that a set of acts had been
repeatedly done (although this may constitute a series if averred
with sufficient definiteness), and aver that these acts resulted in
the accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth amounting to
at least P172,834,500.00, as in this case. The Information should
reflect with particularity the predicate acts that underlie the
crime of plunder, based on the enumeration in Section 1(d) of
R.A. No. 7080.
A reading of the Information filed against Enrile in the present
case shows that the prosecution made little or no effort to
particularize the transactions that would constitute the required
series or combination of overt acts.
In fact, it clustered under paragraph (a) of the Information its
recital of the manner Enrile and his co-accused allegedly
operated, thus describing its general view of the series or
combination of overt criminal acts that constituted the crime of
plunder.
Without any specification of the basic transactions where
kickbacks or commissions amounting to at least P172,834,500.00
had been allegedly received, Enrile’s preparation for trial is
obviously hampered. This defect is not cured by mere reference
to the prosecution’s attachment, as Enrile already stated in his
Reply that the “desired details” could not be found in the bundle
of documents marked by the prosecution, which documents are
not integral parts of the Information. Hence, the prosecution does
not discharge its burden of informing Enrile what these overt
acts were by simply pointing to these documents.
In providing the particulars of the overt acts that constitute the
“combination” or “series” of transactions constituting plunder, it
stands to reason that the amounts involved, or at their ball park
figures, should be stated; these transactions are not necessarily
uniform in amount, and cannot simply collectively be described
as amounting to P172,834,500.00 without hampering Enrile’s
right to respond after receiving the right information.
To stress, this final sum is not a general ball park figure but a very
specific sum based on a number of different acts and hence must
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 31
have a breakdown. Providing this breakdown reinforces the
required specificity in describing the different overt acts.
Negatively stated, unless Enrile is given the particulars and is
later given the chance to object to unalleged details, he stands to
be surprised at the trial at the same time that the prosecution is
given the opportunity to play fast and loose with its evidence to
satisfy the more than P50 Million requirement of law.
D.2.b. Approximate Dates of Commissions or Kickbacks
Enrile should likewise know the approximate dates, at least, of
the receipt of the kickbacks and commissions, so that he could
prepare the necessary pieces of evidence, documentary or
otherwise, to disprove the allegations against him. We point out
that the period covered by the indictment extends from “2004 to
2010 or thereabout,” of which, we again stress that different
overt acts constituting of the elements of Plunder took place
during this period.
Undoubtedly, the length of time involved – six years – will pose
difficulties to Enrile in the preparation of his defense and will
render him susceptible to surprises. Enrile should not be left
guessing and speculating which one/s from among the numerous
transactions involving his discretionary PDAF funds from 2004 to
2010, are covered by the indictment.
D.2.c. The Projects Funded and NGOs Involved
Enrile is also entitled to particulars specifying the project that
Enrile allegedly funded coupled with the name of Napoles’ NGO
(e.g., Pangkabuhayan Foundation, Inc.), to sufficiently inform
Enrile of the particular transactions referred to.100redarclaw
Be it remembered that the core of the indictment
is:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) the funding of nonexisting projects using Enrile’s PDAF;
(2) Enrile’s endorsement of Napoles’ NGOs to the government
agencies to implement these projects; and
(3) Enrile’s receipt of kickbacks or commissions in exchange for
his endorsement.
Under the elaborate scheme alleged to have been committed by
Enrile and his co-accused, the project identification was what
started the totality of acts constituting plunder: only after a
project has been identified could Enrile have endorsed Napoles’
NGO to the appropriate government agency that, in turn, would
implement the supposed project using Enrile’s PDAF. Note that
without the project identification, no justification existed to
release Enrile’s PDAF to Napoles’ allegedly bogus NGO.
In these lights, the “identified project” and “Napoles’ NGO” are
material facts that should be clearly and definitely stated in the
Information to allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense

evidence on the specific transaction pointed to. The omission of
these details will necessarily leave Enrile guessing on what
transaction/s he will have to defend against, since he may have
funded other projects with his PDAF. Specification will also allow
him to object to evidence not referred to or covered by the
Information’s ultimate facts.
D.2.d. The Government Agencies Serving as Conduits
The government agencies to whom Enrile endorsed Napoles’
NGOs are also material facts that must be specified, since they
served a necessary role in the crime charged – the alleged
conduits between Enrile and Napoles’ NGOs. They were
indispensable participants in the elaborate scheme alleged to
have been committed.
The particular person/s in each government agency who
facilitated the transactions, need not anymore be named in the
Information, as these are already evidentiary matters. The
identification of the particular agency vis-à-vis Napoles’ NGO and
the identified project, will already inform Enrile of the
transaction referred to.
In Tantuico v. Republic,101 the Republic filed a case for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages
before the Sandiganbayan against former President Ferdinand
Marcos, Imelda Marcos, Benjamin Romualdez, and Francisco
Tantuico, Jr. Tantuico filed a motion for bill of particulars
essentially alleging that the complaint was couched in general
terms and did not have the parti-culars that would inform him of
the alleged factual and legal bases. The Sandiganbayan denied his
motion on the ground that the particulars sought are evidentiary
in nature. Tantuico moved to reconsider this decision, but the
Sandiganbayan again denied his motion.
The Court overturned the Sandiganbayan’s ruling and directed
the prosecution to prepare and file a bill of particulars.
Significantly, the Court held that the particulars prayed for, such
as: names of persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts
involved, a specification of property for identification purposes,
the particular transactions involving withdrawals and
disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as would
support the conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not
evidentiary in nature. The Court explained that those particulars
are material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in
the complaint so that the defendant may be fairly informed of the
claims made against him and be prepared to meet the issues at
the trial.
To be sure, the differences between ultimate and evidentiary
matters are not easy to distinguish. While Tantuico was a civil
case and did not involve the crime of plunder, the Court’s ruling
nonetheless serves as a useful guide in the determination of what
matters are indispensable and what matters may be omitted in
the Information, in relation with the constitutional right of an
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 32
In the present case, the particulars on the:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) projects involved;
(2) Napoles’ participating NGOs; and
(3) the government agency involved in each transaction
will undoubtedly provide Enrile with sufficient data to know the
specific transactions involved, and thus enable him to prepare
adequately and intelligently whatever defense or defenses he
may have.
We reiterate that the purpose of a bill of particular is to clarify
allegations in the Information that are indefinite, vague, or are
conclusions of law to enable the accused to properly plead and
prepare for trial, not simply to inform him of the crime of which
he stands accused. Verily, an accused cannot intelligently respond
to the charge laid if the allegations are incomplete or are unclear
to him.
We are aware that in a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to
be established is the commission of the criminal acts in
furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language
of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080, for purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder, it is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable
doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire
ill-gotten wealth.102redarclaw
The term “overall unlawful scheme” indicates a general plan of
action or method that the principal accused and public officer
and others conniving with him follow to achieve their common
criminal goal. In the alternative, if no overall scheme can be found
or where the schemes or methods used by the multiple accused
vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to
attain a common criminal goal.103redarclaw
Lest Section 4 be misunderstood as allowing the prosecution to
allege that a set of acts has been repeatedly done (thereby
showing a ‘pattern’ of overt criminal acts), as has been done in
the present case, we point out that this section does not dispense
with the requirement of stating the essential or material facts of
each component or predicate act of plunder; it merely prescribes
a rule of procedure for the prosecution of plunder.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,104 we construed this procedural
rule to mean that [w]hat the prosecution needed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt was only the number of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series that would constitute a pattern involving
an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There was no need to
prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have
been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire
ill-gotten wealth.105redarclaw
If, for example, the accused is charged in the Information of
malversing public funds on twenty different (20) occasions, the

prosecution does not need to prove all 20 transactions; it suffices
if a number of these acts of malversation can be proven with
moral certainty, provided only that the series or combination of
transaction would amount to at least P50,000,000.00.
Nonetheless, each of the twenty transactions should be averred
with particularity, more so if the circumstances surrounding each
transaction are not the same. This is the only way that the
accused can properly prepare for his defense during trial.
D.3. Paragraph (b) of the Information
As his last requested point, Enrile wants the prosecution to
provide the details of the allegation under paragraph (b) of the
Information (i.e., x x x by taking undue advantage, on several
occasions, of their official position, authority, relationships,
connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines) in the following
manner:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Provide the details of how Enrile took undue advantage, on
several occasions, of his official positions, authority,
relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich
himself at the expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. Was this
because he received any money from the government? From
whom and for what reason did he receive any money or property
from the government through which he “unjustly enriched
himself”? State the details from whom each amount was received,
the place and the time.
Our ruling on Enrile’s desired details – specifically, the particular
overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination” and “series”
charged in the Information; a breakdown of the amounts of the
kickbacks and commissions allegedly received, stating how the
amount of P172,834,500.00 was arrived at; a brief description of
the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks and commissions were
received; the approximate dates of receipt of the alleged
kickbacks and commissions from the identified projects; the
name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs) which
were the alleged “recipients and/or target implementors of
Enrile’s PDAF projects;” and the government agencies to whom
Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles’ NGOs – renders it
unnecessary to require the prosecution to submit further
particulars on the allegations contained under paragraph (b) of
the Information.
Simply put, the particular overt acts alleged to constitute the
combination or series required by the crime of plunder, coupled
with a specification of the other non-evidentiary details stated
above, already answer the question of how Enrile took undue
advantage of his position, authority, relationships, connections
and influence as Senator to unjustly enrich himself.
We also point out that the PDAF is a discretionary fund intended
solely for public purposes. Since the Information stated that
Enrile, as “Philippine Senator,” committed the offense “in relation
to his office,” by “repeatedly receiving kickbacks or commissions”
from Napoles and/or her representatives through projects
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 33
funded by his (Enrile’s) PDAF, then it already alleged how undue
advantage had been taken and how the Filipino people and the
Republic had been prejudiced. These points are fairly deducible
from the allegations in the Information as supplemented by the
required particulars.
E. The Grave Abuse of Discretion
In the light of all these considerations, we hold that the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s motion for a bill of
particulars, on the ground that the details sought to be itemized
or specified are all evidentiary – without any explanation
supporting this conclusion – constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
As discussed above, some of the desired details are material facts
that must be alleged to enable the petitioner to properly plead
and prepare his defense. The Sandiganbayan should have
diligently sifted through each detail sought to be specified, and
made the necessary determination of whether each detail was an
ultimate or evidentiary fact, particularly after Enrile stated in his
Reply that the “desired details” could not be found in the bundle
of documents marked by the prosecution. We cannot insist or
speculate that he is feigning ignorance of the presence of these
desired details; neither can we put on him the burden of
unearthing from these voluminous documents what the desired
details are. The remedy of a bill of particulars is precisely made
available by the Rules to enable an accused to positively respond
and make an intelligent defense.
Justice Carpio’s reference to the voluminous 144-page
Ombudsman’s resolution (which found probable cause to indict
the petitioner and his co-accused not only of the crime of
plunder, but also for violations of several counts of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practice Act) to justify his argument that Enrile was
already aware of the details he seeks in his motion for a bill of
particulars, all the more strengthens our conclusive position that
the Information for plunder filed against Enrile was ambiguous
and glaringly insufficient to enable him to make a proper plea
and to prepare for trial. We reiterate, to the point of being
repetitive, that the purpose of the bill of particulars in criminal
cases is to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint or
information to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare
for trial.
Moreover, a resolution arising from a preliminary investigation
does not amount to nor does it serve the purpose of a bill of
particulars.
A bill of particulars guards against the taking of an accused by
surprise by restricting the scope of the proof;106it limits the
evidence to be presented by the parties to the matters alleged in
the Information as supplemented by the bill. It is for this reason
that the failure of an accused to move for a bill of particulars
deprives him of the right to object to evidence which could be
lawfully introduced and admitted under an information of more

or less general terms which sufficiently charges the defendants
with a definite crime.
The record on preliminary investigation, in comparison, serves as
the written account of the inquisitorial process when the fiscal
determined the existence of prima facie evidence to indict a
person for a particular crime. The record of the preliminary
investigation, as a general rule, does not even form part of the
records of the case.107 These features of the record of
investigation are significantly different from the bill of particulars
that serves as basis, together with the Information, in specifying
the overt acts constituting the offense that the accused pleaded to
during arraignment.
Notably, plunder is a crime composed of several predicate
criminal acts. To prove plunder, the prosecution must weave a
web out of the six ways of illegally amassing wealth and show
how the various acts reveal a combination or series of means or
schemes that reveal a pattern of criminality. The
interrelationship of the separate acts must be shown and be
established as a scheme to accumulate ill-gotten wealth
amounting to at least P50 million.
Plunder thus involves intricate predicate criminal acts and
numerous transactions and schemes that span a period of time.
Naturally, in its prosecution, the State possesses an “effective
flexibility” of proving a predicate criminal act or transaction, not
originally contemplated in the Information, but is otherwise
included in the broad statutory definition, in light of
subsequently discovered evidence. The unwarranted use of the
flexibility is what the bill of particulars guards against.
Justice Carpio further argues that the ponencia transformed the
nature of an action from an accusation in writing charging a
person with an offense to an initiatory pleading alleging a cause
of action.
We see nothing wrong with such treatment, for a motion for a bill
of particulars in criminal cases is designed to achieve the same
purpose as the motion for a bill of particulars in civil cases. In
fact, certainty, to a reasonable extent, is an essential attribute of
all pleadings, both civil and criminal, and is more especially
needed in the latter where conviction is followed by penal
consequences.108redarclaw
Thus, even if the Information employs the statutory words does
not mean that it is unnecessary to allege such facts in connection
with the commission of the offense as will certainly put the
accused on full notice of what he is called upon to defend, and
establish such a record as will effectually bar a subsequent
prosecution for that identical offense.109redarclaw
Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of
capital punishment; for this reason, more process is due, not less.
When a person’s life interest – protected by the life, liberty, and
property language recognized in the due process clause – is at
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 34
stake in the proceeding, all measures must be taken to ensure the
protection of those fundamental rights.
As we emphasized in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,110 “the
administration of justice is not a matter of guesswork. The name
of the game is fair play, not foul play. We cannot allow a legal
skirmish where, from the start, one of the protagonists enters the
arena with one arm tied to his back.”
Finally, we find no significance in Justice Carpio’s argument that
Atty. Estelito Mendoza did not previously find vague the
Information for plunder filed against President Joseph Estrada in
2001.
Under the amended Information111 against Estrada, et al., each
overt act that constituted the series or combination and
corresponding to the predicate acts under Section 1(d) had been
averred with sufficient particularity so that there was no doubt
what particular transaction was referred to.
We point out that unlike in the Information against Enrile, the
following matters had been averred with sufficient definiteness,
viz: the predicate acts that constitute the crime of plunder; the
breakdown of how the alleged amount of P4,097,804,173.17,
more or less, had been arrived at; the participants involved in
each transaction; and the specific sources of the illegal wealth
amassed.
At any rate, that Atty. Mendoza did not previously question the
indictment of President Estrada via a motion for bill of
particulars does not ipso facto mean that the present Information
for plunder filed against Enrile is not vague and ambiguous.
Sandiganbayan Ground #2:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
That Enrile’s cited grounds are reiterations of the grounds
previously raised
Enrile does not deny that the arguments he raised in his
supplemental opposition to issuance of a warrant of arrest and
for dismissal of information and in his motion for bill of
particulars were identical. He argues, however, that the mere
reiteration of these grounds should not be a ground for the denial
of his motion for bill of particulars, since “the context in which
those questions were raised was entirely different.”
While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the motion
for bill of particulars involved the right of an accused to due
process, the enumeration of the details desired in Enrile’s
supplemental opposition to issuance of a warrant of arrest and
for dismissal of information and in his motion for bill of
particulars are different viewed particularly from the prism of
their respective objectives.
In the former, Enrile took the position that the Information did
not state a crime for which he can be convicted; thus, the
Information is void; he alleged a defect of substance. In the latter,

he already impliedly admits that the Information sufficiently
alleged a crime but is unclear and lacking in details that would
allow him to properly plead and prepare his defense; he
essentially alleged here a defect of form.
Note that in the former, the purpose is to dismiss the Information
for its failure to state the nature and cause of the accusation
against Enrile; while the details desired in the latter (the motion
for bill of particulars) are required to be specified in sufficient
detail because the allegations in the Information are vague,
indefinite, or in the form of conclusions and will not allow Enrile
to adequately prepare his defense unless specifications are made.
That every element constituting the offense had been alleged in
the Information does not preclude the accused from requesting
for more specific details of the various acts or omissions he is
alleged to have committed. The request for details is precisely the
function of a bill of particulars.
Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of
stating the cause and the crime an accused is charged, the
allegations may still be inadequate for purposes of enabling him
to properly plead and prepare for trial.
We likewise find no complete congruence between the grounds
invoked and the details sought by Enrile in his motion for bill of
particulars, and the grounds invoked in opposing the warrant for
his arrest issued, so that the Sandiganbayan’s action in one would
bar Enrile from essentially invoking the same grounds.
The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the
judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on
the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused
under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.112
Simply put, the judge determines whether the necessity exists to
place the accused under immediate custody to avoid frustrating
the ends of justice.
On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
grants the accused the remedy of a bill of particulars to better
inform himself of the specifics or particulars concerning facts or
matters that had not been averred in the Information with the
necessary clarity for purposes of his defense.
Its purpose is to better acquaint the accused of the specific acts
and/or omissions in relation with the crime charged, to limit the
matters and the evidence that the prosecution may otherwise be
allowed to use against him under a more or less general
averment, and to meet the charges head on and timely object to
evidence whose inadmissibility may otherwise be deemed
waived.
Based on these considerations, the question of whether there is
probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest against an accused, is
separate and distinct from the issue of whether the allegations in
the Information have been worded with sufficient definiteness to
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 35
enable the accused to properly plead and prepare his defense.
While the grounds cited for each may seemingly be the same,
they are submitted for different purposes and should be
appreciated from different perspectives, so that the insufficiency
of these grounds for one does not necessarily translate to
insufficiency for the other. Thus, the resolution of the issue of
probable cause should not bar Enrile from seeking a more
detailed averment of the allegations in the Information.
The Sandiganbayan grossly missed these legal points and thus
gravely abused its discretion: it used wrong and completely
inapplicable considerations to support its conclusion.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
a. We PARTIALLY GRANT the present petition for certiorari, and
SET ASIDE the Sandiganbayan’s resolutions dated July 11, 2014,
which denied Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars and his
motion for reconsideration of this denial.
b. We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within a
non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from finality of this
Decision, with copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of particulars
containing the facts sought that we herein rule to be material and
necessary. The bill of particulars shall specifically contain the
following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the
“combination or series of overt criminal acts” charged in the
Information.
2. A breakdown of the amounts of the “kickbacks or
commissions” allegedly received, stating how the amount of
P172,834,500.00 was arrived at.
3. A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks
or commissions were received.
4. The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or
thereabout,” of the alleged kickbacks and commissions from the
identified projects. At the very least, the prosecution should state
the year when the kickbacks and transactions from the identified
projects were received.
5. The name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs)
which were the alleged “recipients and/or target implementors
of Enrile’s PDAF projects.”
6. The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed
Napoles’ NGOs. The particular person/s in each government
agency who facilitated the transactions need not be named as a
particular.
All particulars prayed for that are not included in the above are
hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 140208 March 12, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELPIDIO PASTOR, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
For automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
the City of Tagbilaran, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 10283,
dated August 30, 1999, finding accused-appellant Elpidio Pastor
guilty of incestuous rape and sentencing him to suffer the
supreme penalty of death with its accessory penalties, to
indemnify the complainant Maria Niña R. Pastor the sum of
P75,000.00, and to pay the costs.1
In an Information2 dated March 12, 1999, accused-appellant was
charged with the crime of Incestuous Rape, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 7th day of May, 1998, in the Municipality of
Loon, Province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused with lewd
designs, entered the room of his own daughter, Maria Niña R.
Pastor (accused being the biological father of the victim), a 13-
year-old girl, and once inside did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation,
lie on top of her, insert his penis in the vagina of the said offended
victim, Maria Niña R. Pastor, and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her against her will and without her consent
resulting in the pregnancy of the victim, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter.1âwphi1.nêt
Acts committed in violation of Sec. 2, Art. 266-B, par. 1, of RA
8353, amending [Article] 335 of the Revised Penal Code."
On April 8, 1999, accused-appellant was arraigned and, with the
assistance of PAO lawyer Atty. Perpetuo Magallano, entered a
plea of not guilty.
During the hearing on June 23, 1999, Atty. Adriano Damalerio of
PAO manifested that after a conference with accused-appellant,
the latter had decided to change his plea from Not Guilty to
Guilty. The trial court ordered that the previous plea of not guilty
be set aside and that accused-appellant be arraigned anew. Upon
re-arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of guilty to the
Information which was read and translated to him in the Visayan
dialect. Thereafter, the trial court propounded clarificatory
questions to accused-appellant to ascertain whether he
understood the consequences of his plea.
Accused-appellant then testified on the mitigating circumstances
of plea of guilty, voluntary surrender and drunkenness which is
not habitual. The prosecution admitted the plea of guilty and
voluntary surrender. Accused-appellant offered evidence to
prove drunkenness. He testified that on May 7, 1998, he drank
tuba and in his drunkenness, he was led to think bad about his
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 36
daughter, herein complainant, because his wife left him. He
claims that it was never his intention to rape his daughter.3
Subsequently, the prosecution was ordered to prove the
culpability of accused-appellant. Complainant Maria Niña
testified that on May 7, 1998, at about 3 o'clock in the morning,
she was raped by her father, herein accused-appellant, in their
house at Catagbacan Sur, Loon, Bohol. Her parents were already
separated at that time and her mother was living in Manila.
Complainant was impregnated4 and gave birth on December 12,
1998.5 On cross examination, complainant testified that she was
13 years old at the time of the incident;6 that she had a
premature delivery and her baby died five days after birth; that
nobody forced her to file the complaint against accused-
appellant; and that she pursued the prosecution of the case
against accused-appellant knowing that he may be sentenced to
death.7
On August 30, 1999, the court a quo rendered judgment finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
incestuous rape. It nevertheless recommended the commutation
of the sentence from death to reclusion perpetua by reason of the
remorseful attitude exhibited by accused-appellant. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 10283, the Court finds
accused ELPIDIO PASTOR, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Incestuous Rape, defined under Par 1 (a) of Article 266-
A and penalized under Par 5, No. (1) of Article 266-B, of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, and
hereby sentences said accused ELPIDIO PASTOR to suffer the
supreme and indivisible penalty of DEATH, in the manner
provided for by law, with the accessory penalties of the law, to
indemnify the offended party, Maria Niña R. Pastor the sum of
P75,000.00, and to pay the costs.
The Court herein was saved of its precious time in conducting (a)
full-dress trial because the accused pleaded guilty. The
prosecution even conformed to accused' (sic) claim of the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
spontaneous plea of guilt.
When the accused took the witness stand to prove the
circumstance of drunkenness, which is not habitual, which was
not conceded by the prosecution, we found him to be meditative
and remorseful, a behaviour which is quite different from other
death-row convicts, who despite the onus of the evidence against
them, with insistence, persist in needlessly taxing the court on
their claim of innocence, all throughout the trial and even after
the affirmance of their conviction by our Highest Court. We
believe that accused herein should not be equated to the likes of
these calloused and non-repentant offenders.
It is therefore on the basis of the foregoing circumstances, and in
the highest interest of humane and compassionate justice, that
we are minded of the provisions of Article 5, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, and hereby, without suspending the

execution of the sentence herein, recommends unto the President
of the Republic of the Philippines, thru the Secretary of Justice,
the commutation of accused' (sic) sentence from death to
reclusion perpetua.
Accordingly, let copy of this decision be furnished the Secretary
of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila, for whatever recommendation he
may deem proper to His Excellency, the President of the Republic
of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED."
In his appellant's brief, accused-appellant avers that the trial
court gravely erred in not applying the guidelines for a plea of
guilty to a capital offense provided in Section 3, Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Specifically, it is contended
that the trial court failed to conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the
accused-appellant's plea, pursuant to the ruling laid down in the
cases of People vs. Bello8 and People vs. Dayot.9 Allegedly, the
questions propounded to the accused-appellant were limited to
his family background and personal circumstances. Accused-
appellant thus prays that the case be remanded to the court a quo
for a full-blown trial.
Section 3, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides, viz:
"SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. -
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require
the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of his
culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf."
When a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered, the trial court
is duty bound to: (1) conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness of the plea and the accused's full comprehension of
the consequences thereof; (2) require the prosecution to present
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree
of his culpability; and (3) inquire from the accused if he desires to
present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires.10 The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must
proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its
severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of
such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that
innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty.11 Moreover, the
requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on
appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of
the plea.12
I.
Anent the first requirement, the searching inquiry must
determine whether the plea of guilt was based on a free and
informed judgment. Hence, it must focus on (1) the voluntariness
of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 37
the plea.13 Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to
how a trial judge must conduct a "searching inquiry," we have
held that the following guidelines should be observed:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought
into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a
competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained
and interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to
rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or
placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical
harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the
judge's intimidating robes.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he
had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the
meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused,
such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational
background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his
capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature
of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve
such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in
the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of
promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should
he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to
ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken
impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the
admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the
aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase
punishment.14
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is
charged and fully explain to him the elements of the crime which
is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would
constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of
the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of
his right to due process.15
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language
known and understood by the latter.16
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in
pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to
narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing
details.17
In the case at bar, the records will show that the trial court
miserably failed to discharge its duty to conduct a "searching
inquiry," to wit:
"ATTY. ADRIANO DAMALERIO:
 C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 38

Yes, your Honor, and the accused is now ready to enter a plea of A Yes, Your Honor.
Guilty, and I would like to manifest, Your Honor, that the accused
was already arraigned and he entered the plea of Not Guilty and Q What is the name of your wife?
he would like to change his plea of Not Guilty to Guilty, Your A Josefina Requello.
Honor, and we move that the earlier plea of Not Guilty be vacated
and the accused be re-arraigned. Q You and your wife were married in church?
A Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q Do you have children?
Let the previous plea of Not Guilty by the accused Elpidio Pastor A Yes, Your Honor, five (5) children.
be set aside and re-arraign the accused now.
Q Tell the Court the names of your children?
COURT: A Goldelyn the eldest.

Call the accused, Elpidio Pastor, and arraign the accused. Q How old is Goldelyn now?
A 16 years old.
RECORD:
Q Where is Goldelyn now?
COURT INTERPRETER: reads the Information of Incestuous Rape A She is in Mindanao, Don Carlos, Mindanao.
and translated the same to the accused in Visayan vernacular.
Q Your second child, what is the name?
COURT TO ACCUSED ELPIDIO PASTOR: A Maria Niña, Your Honor.

Let's ask the accused Elpidio Pastor, whether he understood the Q Maria Niña is the private complainant in this case?
Information read and translated to him in the Visayan vernacular. A Yes, Your Honor.

COURT INTERPRETER TO THE ACCUSED: Q How old is Maria Niña?

A 14 years old, Your Honor.
Q Do you understand the Information read to you?
Q Maria Niña was living with you during the incident?
ACCUSED ELPIDIO PASTOR: A Yes, Your Honor.

A Yes, Your Honor. Q The third child, what is the name?

A Joel.
COURT:
Q How old is Joel?
Q Now, having understood the Information, Mr. Elpidio Pastor, A 12 years old, Your Honor.
what is your plea, guilty or not guilty?
Q How about the 4th child?
ACCUSED ELPIDIO PASTOR: A Rodel.

A I admit, Your Honor, that I have committed a sin. Q How old is Rodel?
A 10 years old, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q And the 5th child?
Enter a plea of Guilty as expressed by accused Elpidio Pastor A Jenelyn.
through his very own mouth, upon his re-arraignment today.
Q How old is Jenelyn?
COURT TO ELPIDIO PASTOR: A 8 years old.

Q You are Elpidio Pastor? Q Your wife Josefina is living with you?
A Yes, Your Honor. A We got separated, Your Honor, she left for Manila and she
did not return because she had a boyfriend.
Q How old are you?
A 35 years old, Your Honor. Q Of the five (5) children, how many children were living with
you at that time of the incident?
Q You are married? A Four (4), Your Honor.
 C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 39

Call the accused to the witness stand.

Q Who supported your four (4) children, Maria Niña, Joel,
Rodel and Jenelyn? xxx xxx xxx
A Me and my mother.
ATTY. ADRIANO DAMALERIO:
Q Why, what is your work?
A Fisherman, Your Honor. The purpose of the testimony of Elpidio Pastor, Your Honor, is to
prove the three (3) mitigating circumstances: 1. Plea of guilt; 2.
Q You have changed your plea from Not Guilty to Guilty, is this Voluntary surrender; and 3. Drunkenness which is not habitual,
correct? Your Honor.
A Yes, Your Honor, that is true that I have committed a sin.
FISCAL HELEN T. CABATOS:
Q Nobody has forced you to plead guilty to this Information?
A None, Your Honor. We admit the plea of guilt, Your Honor, and the voluntary
surrender, Your Honor.
Q In other words, your pleading guilty is your free and
voluntary act? xxx xxx xxx
A Yes, Your Honor.
DIRECT EXAMINATION ON ELPIDIO PASTOR
Q Do you know that by pleading guilty you may be sentenced BY: ATTY. ADRIANO DAMALERIO
to a death penalty?
A I do not know what will be the outcome of my pleading Q You have just admitted and in fact pleaded guilty to the
guilty, Your Honor. crime which accordingly committed (sic) on May 7, 1998, now
please tell the Court why did you do this kind of crime and what
Q The Court is now telling you, that by pleading guilty you led you to do this crime?
may be sentenced to a death penalty. A I have drunk tuba.
A Yes, Your Honor, I understand.
Q And what did you feel after you drunk tuba?
Q Despite of your knowledge, you still insist on your plea of A A little bit tipsy.
guilt?
A Yes, Your Honor. Q You mean you are drunk?
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q And because of that drunkenness, what did you do?
No further questions. A I was led to think bad about my daughter because my wife
left me.
ATTY. ADRIANO DAMALERIO:
xxx xxx xxx
Your Honor, we would like to present the accused himself to the
witness stand to prove three (3) mitigating circumstances: First, CROSS EXAMINATION:
the plea of guilt; Second, voluntary surrender; and Third,
drunkenness which is not habitual and at that time of the xxx xxx xxx
incident, Your Honor, he was drunk.
Q I said, this is not the first time that you were drunk?
COURT TO COUNSELS: A There are times that I got drunk but that was the only time
that I committed that kind of incident.
I have to inform counsels that in cases of Incestuous Rape,
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances cannot (sic) be xxx xxx xxx
availed of.
COURT:
ATTY. ADRIANO DAMALERIO:
xxx xxx xxx
Only to save him, Your Honor, for (sic) the penalty of death.
Q Now, did you purposely take tuba in order to commit crime
COURT: (sic) against your child?
A When I drunk (sic), Your Honor, that was not my intention
Okay, let's hear the accused. to do it."18
 C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 40

and the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable

The questions propounded by the trial court failed to show the doubt. It must be stressed that under the 1985 Rules of Criminal
voluntariness of the plea of guilt of accused-appellant nor did the Procedure, a conviction in capital offenses cannot rest alone on a
questions demonstrate that he fully understood the plea of guilt. The prosecution evidence must be sufficient to
consequences of his plea. sustain a judgment of conviction independently of the plea of
guilty.24
First, all the questions propounded by the court were couched in
English but there is nothing in the records to show that accused- In the case at bar, complainant Maria Niña testified as follows:
appellant had a good comprehension, or at least, a nodding
acquaintance with the English language. The records also do not "Q Ma. Niña, the accused in this case is Elpidio Pastor, how are
show whether the judge translated and explained his questions you related to him?
to accused-appellant in a language or dialect known and A My father.
understood by the latter.19 Accused-appellant is a simple
fisherman and his educational background is unknown. Q If your father is inside this court room today please point
(sic) him?
Second, the trial court failed to explain to accused-appellant the A That one, ma'am.
elements of the crime of rape. Moreover, when the trial court
asked accused-appellant if he knew that by pleading guilty he xxx xxx xxx
may be sentenced to a death penalty, the latter answered "I do
not know what will be the outcome of my pleading guilty, Your Q Were you present during the arraignment of your father, the
Honor." Given the vagueness of accused-appellant's answer, the accused in this case?
trial court went no further to find out whether or not he fully A Yes, maam.
comprehended the consequences of his plea. In addition,
accused-appellant was not categorically advised that his plea of Q And you heard him pleaded (sic) guilty to the crime charge
guilt would not under any circumstance affect or reduce his (sic)?
sentence. The records reveal that it was the defense counsel, not A Yes maam, I heard.
accused-appellant, who was informed and warned by the court
that in cases of incestuous rape, mitigating and aggravating Q Having heard your father admitted (sic) the crime charged
circumstances do not matter.20 When accused-appellant against him, do you still insist to pursue in prosecuting this case?
attempted to prove the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty, A Yes, Your Honor.
voluntary surrender and drunkenness, he was under the
mistaken assumption that his liability would be reduced.21 He COURT:
was not warned that the penalty of death is indivisible and is not
affected by either aggravating or mitigating circumstances.22 The Record that the witness is crying.
trial court's statement that by pleading guilty he "may" be
sentenced to a death penalty is inadequate. It should have xxx xxx xxx
warned him, in a language that cannot be misinterpreted, that
should the court find that the qualifying circumstances alleged in Q Now, if you can recall, when was that that your father raped
the information were proved during the trial, along with the you?
elements of the crime of rape, he would be meted the death A May 7, 1998.
penalty.23
Q Where did it happen?
Third, when accused-appellant was questioned by the court as to A In our house.
the act he committed, he answered that he "was led to think bad
about my daughter because my wife left me." Again, the answer is Q Where is your house located?
hardly comprehensible yet, the court failed to probe deeper into A Catagbacan Sur, Loon, Bohol.
the material details of the crime.
Q Can you recall what time was that, that your father sexually
We hold that in the absence of a "searching inquiry" into the abused you?
voluntariness of the plea of guilt of accused-appellant and his full A That was 3:00 o'clock dawn.
comprehension of the consequences thereof, the re-arraignment
of accused-appellant is fatally flawed. Q By the way, where was your mother at that time when your
father sexually abused you?
II. A My mother is not there.

The second requirement prescribes that the trial court must xxx xxx xxx
order the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused-appellant
 C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 41

Q What was the result of that sexual abused (sic) committed As heretofore discussed, the plea of guilty of accused-appellant
by your father on May 7, 1998? was made improvidently. Convictions based on an improvident
A I got ill and always vomit. plea of guilt are set aside if such plea is the sole basis of the
judgment. If, however, the trial court relied on sufficient and
Q What was the caused (sic) of vomiting? credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be
A I was pregnant. sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty
plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of
Q Were you examined by a doctor, to prove that you were the offense charged.29
pregnant of that rape incident?
A Yes, maam. A perusal of the decision of the trial court will reveal that the
judge failed to state the factual and legal reasons on which he
xxx xxx xxx based accused-appellant's conviction. The judge merely stated
that the complainant "positively declared that on May 7, 1998,
Q Now, you said that you were pregnant, eventually did you her father (the accused in this case), without her consent, forcibly
give birth of (sic) a child? obtained carnal knowledge with her, which resulted in her being
A Yes, maam. pregnant." He then concluded that the lone testimony of the
victim, if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction, and made a
Q When did you give birth? bare recital of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
A December 12, 1998. amended by R.A. 8353. There is no discussion of the facts of the
case and the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information,
Q And where is your baby now? in utter disregard of the constitutional injunction that "no
A She died. decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
xxx xxx xxx based."30

Q What did you feel about the sexual assault committed by Also, there is no evaluation of the evidence and no reason given
your father against you? why the court found that the testimony of the complainant is
A I'm mad. credible. We note that the first question asked of the complainant
in her direct examination was if she could recall when she was
Q What else did you feel? raped by the accused-appellant. It did not elicit the specific
A Angry. details as to how the rape was committed against complainant.
The prosecution simply presumed that the complainant was
Q Is that all your feelings because of this incident? indeed raped on the basis of the plea of guilty of accused-
A I'm also sad. appellant.

xxx xxx xxx Moreover, there was practically no evidence presented to prove
force and intimidation as well as the relationship of accused-
FISCAL HELEN T. CABATOS: appellant with complainant. It is true that our jurisprudence is
replete with cases where the moral ascendancy of a parent over
No further questions, Your Honor. his child has been allowed to justify a finding that there was
intimidation sufficient to convict the accused of incestuous rape.
COURT: However, in the case of People vs. Alberto Chua,31 we held that
the mere fact that accused-appellant is her father and therefore
Cross. exercises moral ascendancy over his daughter cannot ipso facto
justify this Court to conclude that the victim was intimidated.
ATTY. ADRIANO DAMALERIO: Thus, we held:

No cross, Your Honor, accused had already pleaded guilty."25
The prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence
which consist of the birth certificate of complainant to prove that
she was 13 years old at the time of the incident and that accused-
appellant is her father,26 and two medical certificates, one
showing that complainant has been pregnant for 23-3/7
weeks,27 and the other that she gave birth to a baby girl who
died five days thereafter.28
"There must be some evidence of intimidation employed on the
victim as to indubitably show how vitiated the victim's consent
was to the violation of her womanhood. After all, rape is
committed against or without the consent of the victim. x x x The
court cannot rely on presumptions of moral ascendancy x x x
[which] cannot and should not prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence. Force or intimidation is an element of
the crime of rape. There must, therefore, be proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the victim did not resist her defloration
due to the moral ascendancy of the accused."

We have ruled that it is the concurrence of the minority of the
victim and her relationship with the offender that would qualify
the rape as heinous and thus justify the imposition of the
supreme penalty.32 Both qualifying circumstances of age and
relationship must be alleged in the information and proved
during the trial. In the case at bar, the qualifying circumstance of
relationship was not established beyond moral certainty. The
rule is that relationship, as a qualifying circumstance of rape,
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, just as the crime itself.
It has been held that the bare testimony of the complainant and
the admission of accused-appellant as to their relationship is not
sufficient.33 The birth certificate of herein complainant which
was not duly certified cannot be given probative value insofar as
the relationship of complainant with accused-appellant is
concerned.34 Since the relationship of complainant to accused-
appellant has not been sufficiently established, it was error for
the trial court to impose the penalty of death.
In addition, the trial court, in convicting accused-appellant,
considered pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution that
are inadmissible for being hearsay. The prosecution merely asked
complainant to identify the two medical certificates relating to
her pregnancy without presenting the doctors who issued the
certifications to testify thereon. The defense counsel failed to
object to the documentary evidence of the prosecution and
worse, even expressed his conformity to its admission. Such
lapses should not have been allowed by the trial court
considering that it was trying a case where a life was at stake. Life
cannot be lost due to the ignorance of counsel.
III.
Under the third requirement, the court must ask the accused if he
desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if
he desires. In the present case, there is nothing in the records to
show that accused-appellant was informed, either by his counsel
or by the court, of his right to present evidence, if he so desires.
Very glaring is the manifest lack of enthusiasm of the defense
counsel, Atty. Damalerio, for his client's cause when he refused to
cross examine the complainant, on the pretext that accused-
appellant has pleaded guilty. We reiterate that it is the bounden
duty of lawyers to protect the constitutional right of an accused
even when he has pleaded guilty to the crime charged, viz.:
"It may be so that defense counsel personally found Oleby's
testimony to be believable. Nonetheless, he had the bounden duty
to scrutinize private complainant's testimony to ensure that the
accused's constitutional right to confront and examine the
witnesses against him was not rendered for naught.
It bears pointing out that in rape cases, it is often the word of the
complainant against that of the accused, the two being the only
persons present during the commission of the offense. While the
lone testimony of the victim is sufficient to convict the accused,
such testimony must be clear, positive, convincing and consistent
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 42
with human nature and the normal course of things.
Complainant's testimony cannot be accepted with precipitate
credulity without denying the accused's constitutional right to be
presumed innocent. This is where cross examination becomes
essential to test the credibility of the witnesses, expose
falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed
direct examination testimonies may successfully suppress, and
demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters which create
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus to give
substance to the constitutional right of the accused to confront
the witnesses against him. For unless proven otherwise to be
guilty beyond all reasonable doubt, the accused is presumed to be
innocent. 1âwphi1.nêt
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Brotonel, as counsel de oficio, had the duty to defend his
client and protect his rights, no matter how guilty or evil he
perceives accused-appellant to be. The performance of this duty
was all the more imperative because the life of accused-appellant
hangs in the balance. His duty was no less because he was
counsel de oficio."35
This utter lack of concern is further aggravated by Atty.
Damalerio's lackadaisical and perfunctory discharge of his
obligation to present evidence in behalf of accused-appellant.
After the prosecution rested its case, Atty. Damalerio manifested
that since the accused-appellant had already pleaded guilty, he is
not presenting any defense, and merely prayed that his client be
credited with the mitigating circumstances earlier claimed by
him.36 To say the least, Atty. Damalerio's attitude falls short of
the noble duty of a lawyer to defend an accused however guilty
he may appear to be if only to assure that his prosecution is in
accord with the procedure laid down by our law. In cannot be
over emphasized that even the guilty cannot be prosecuted by
means revolting to the civilized demands of due process.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the judgment appealed from is SET ASIDE.
The case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings
in accord with the guidelines set forth in this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 128289 April 23, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO LIMA y SILPA, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Among the heinous crimes, none stirs up so much public outrage,
repulsion and hatred than incestuous rape. It is so odious and
disgusting that the perpetrator rightfully must feel the anger and
spurn of society. Indeed, a father who stains the purity and
dignity of his own flesh and blood has reduced himself to the
lowliest of lowly beasts.
Gregorio S. Lima was charged by her own daughter, Sherilyn
Lima, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Davao
City, with two counts of rape under the following informations:
Criminal Case No. 36,517-961
"The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime
of rape under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the
instance of the complainant, Sherilyn B. Lima, who is a minor, and
her mother, Erlinda B. Lima, and witness SPO2 Ricardo M. Arcilla,
whose affidavits are hereto attached to form part of this
information. The crime is committed as follows:
"That sometime in 1992, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
mentioned accused, by means of force and intimidation and
abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with her
daughter, Sherilyn B. Lima, a minor who is below fourteen (14)
years of age, against her will.
"Contrary to law."
Criminal case No. 36,380-962
"The undersigned, SHERILYN LIMA Y BARLIZO, after having been
duly sworn according to law, accuses her father, GREGORIO LIMA
Y SILPA of the crime of rape, under Art. 335, par. 1 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, committed as
follows:
"That on or about January 20, 1996, in the City of Davao,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-mentioned accused by means of force and
intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with the undersigned
complainant, who is 14 years of age against her will.
"Contrary to law."
The two cases were originally raffled to the two branches of the
said RTC. When arraigned separately on the two Informations,
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 43
accused pleaded "Not guilty." Thereafter, the two cases were
consolidated in Branch 17.
On November 20, 1996, counsel for the accused manifested that
the latter would change his plea of not guilty to both charges.3
Upon rearraignment, he entered a plea of "Guilty." Thereafter,
upon order of the trial court, the prosecution presented its
evidence and rested its case.
The prosecution’s evidence consisted of the testimonies of the
victim, Sherilyn Lima, her mother, Erlinda Lima, SP02 Ricardo
Arcilla, and Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma.
Sherilyn was 15 years old when she testified in court on
November 20, 1996 about her harrowing experience in the hands
of her very own father. She identified her Certificate of Live
Birth4 which indicates that she was born on August 14, 1981 in
Davao City, and that her father is Gregorio Silpa Lima, the
accused. She narrated that sometime in 1992, when she was only
10 years old, her father, whom she identified in court, raped her
in their house located in Sitio Concepcion, Indangan, Buhangin,
Davao City. He warned her not to inform anyone about that
incident lest he would kill all of their family members. Because of
fear that he would harm them, she did not tell her mother what
he did to her. Since that incident in 1992, she had been
repeatedly ravished by the accused on occasions when her
mother was out of the house. In all those instances, she
repeatedly pleaded to him to stop abusing her, but her pleas only
fell on deaf ears.5
Sherilyn further testified that in the evening of January 20, 1996,
when she was 14 years old, she was sleeping in the sala of their
house together with her brothers. At that time, her mother was
attending a birthday party in her sister’s place about 16
kilometers away. Sherilyn was roused from her sleep by the
accused, telling her to transfer to the master’s bedroom. When
she asked why, he replied that he would do something to her.
Inside the room, he instructed her to undress and lie down. He
then placed himself on top of her, kissed her private parts, and
inserted his organ into her vagina. Sherilyn felt extreme pain in
her vagina while he was raping her. But she could not resist for
fear he would kill her.6
According to Erlinda Lima, Sherilyn’s mother, at around 10:00 in
the evening of the same date, she arrived home and noticed that
the gate of the house was locked from inside. She then entered
the gate of her brother-in-law, which was beside their house, and
proceeded to her house. When she entered the master’s
bedroom, she was surprised to find Sherilyn sleeping on the bed.
She approached her daughter, removed the blanket and saw her
totally naked. Erlinda told her to dress up because they were
attending her nephew’s birthday party. At that moment, the
accused went out to open the gate. When he returned, Erlinda did
not let him notice her suspicion. On their way to the house of
Erlinda’s sister, Sherilyn cried as she confided to her mother that
the accused raped her. She also told her mother that when she
was ten, or four years earlier, she was already ravished by her

father. Thereupon, Erlinda brought Sherilyn to the police station
and reported the rape incidents.
In the course of her testimony, Erlinda also identified and
confirmed the Certificate of Live Birth (Exhibit "B") of her
daughter and further testified that she is legally married to
accused Gregorio Lima.7
Meanwhile, at midnight of that same day, January 20, 1996, SPO2
Ricardo Arcilla and several policemen, together with Sherilyn and
her mother, proceeded to the house of accused. SP02 Arcilla
invited him to go with them to the police station, but the latter
resisted. Forthwith, Arcilla asked a fellow policeman to handcuff
the accused and brought him to the police station.8
Thereafter, Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma, Medico-legal Officer of the
Davao City Health Office, physically examined Sherilyn and found
"old healed deep lacerations at 3 and 8 o’clock positions" in her
hymen. He also observed that her "hymenal orifice...admits a tube
3.0 in diameter." He estimated that the lacerations could be more
than four (4) months old, or possibly more than three (3) years
old. He also found spermatozoa in her vaginal canal. These
findings are reflected in the Medical Certificate he issued on
January 22, 1996.9
The accused pleaded guilty to the charges. He testified that on
January 21, 1996, the police went to his house and invited him to
the police station for investigation regarding the rape incident.
He then extended his two arms to be handcuffed showing that he
voluntarily surrendered.10 He already knew that his wife Erlinda
and daughter Sherilyn would go to the police station to have him
arrested. He declared that her daughter "agreed" to what he had
done to her "because she used to get money from my wallet, (so)
she cannot refuse anymore." When asked why he raped his
daughter, he answered, "Because at times that I am drunk, I lost
my composure and Sherilyn used to lay down inside my room."
He also admitted having raped her when she was 10 years old.11
The defense rested its case with the prayer that the "voluntary
plea of guilty and voluntary surrender" be appreciated as
mitigating circumstances so as to reduce the penalty to be
imposed upon the accused.12
On November 29, 1996, the trial court rendered a Joint
Judgment,13 the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Accordingly, finding the evidence of the prosecution more than
sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused Gregorio Lima Y Silpa
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged for rape under
Criminal Case No. 36, 517-96, said accused is sentenced to suffer
an indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Art. 335,
par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, together with all the accessory
penalty attached therewith in accordance with law.
"In Criminal Case No. 36,380-96, finding the evidence of the
prosecution, notwithstanding the plea of guilty of the accused
voluntarily entered, more than sufficient to prove beyond
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 44
reasonable doubt the guilt of accused, pursuant to Republic Act
7659, Sec. 11 thereof, sub-paragraph 7, accused Gregorio Lima y
Silpa is sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death by
electrocution pursuant to sec. 24 of R.A. 7659 in the manner
therein provided, subject to such other method of carrying out
his sentence as may be provided for by law, under existing
procedure or maybe regulated through other means such as
lethal injection to be executed in the manner and procedure
therein provided.
"Moreover, pursuant to Art. 100, in relation to Art. 104 of the
Revised Penal Code, governing civil indemnity, accused is
furthermore ordered to indemnify complainant Sherilyn Lima...
the amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral damages of all the
ignominy and sufferings she incurred out of accused demonic act
of sexually abusing his own daughter.1âwphi1.nêt
"x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
In this appeal, appellant asserts, as his lone assignment of error,
that "the trial court gravely erred in convicting (him) on an
improvident plea of guilty and sentencing him to suffer reclusion
perpetua (in Criminal Case No. 36,517-96) and the supreme
penalty of death (in Criminal Case No. 36,380-96)."14
Appellant argues, in essence, that his plea in both cases was
"improvident, fatally defective and void" because the trial court
failed to observe the mandatory provisions of Sec. 3, Rule 116 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides –
"Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence -
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf."
Appellant claims that nothing on record shows that: a) he
understood the two (2) separate charges against him; and b) he
was made to understand and was specifically warned that in
Crim. Case No. 36,380-96, he shall be sentenced to death and that
his plea of guilty shall not in any way affect or reduce the penalty.
The records of the proceedings during the rearraignment of
appellant show how he entered his plea of guilty, thus:
"ATTY ARIQUEZ: For the accused. We would like to inform the
Honorable Court that the accused intend to withdraw his plea of
not guilty to both charges and instead enters a plea of guilty to
both charges.
COURT: Does he understand the consequences of this?
ATTY. ARIQUEZ: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: Alright, re-arraign the accused.

COURT INTERPRETER:
Reading both informations to accused:
ACCUSED: GUILTY.
COURT: In these two informations against you, you understand
the extent and implication of your plea of guilty?
ACCUSED: I know, your Honor because I committed a mistake.
COURT: Were these matters explained and fully understood by
you upon assistance by your counsel?
ACCUSED: Yes, I was advised by my lawyer and I understand
what he explained to me, very clearly.
COURT: I would like to explain to you and understand, that upon
your plea of guilty on the two offenses, very serious offenses, in
fact, capital offenses, you may be sentenced to life or death
penalty, you understand that?
ACCUSED: Whatever will be the judgment I will gladly accept it
Your Honor.
COURT: The court is explaining to you the consequences now, did
you understand the explanation given to you by the court?
ACCUSED: I understand your Honor.
COURT: Do you still insist that you plead guilty in these two
offenses just read to you?
ACCUSED: Yes, I will accept it.
COURT: Were you forced or intimidated or unduly influenced by
anybody in your plea of guilty in these two offenses?
ACCUSED: No one has forced me to admit the two charges, it is
voluntary on my part.
COURT: In other words, despite the explanation of the court and
your lawyer, it is voluntary on your part that you will plead guilty
to the two offenses?
ACCUSED: It is my voluntary plea of guilty in these two cases.
COURT: The court is convinced on the voluntariness of plea of
guilty of accused in both cases, but considering the matter of
these charges against the accused, capital offenses, and pursuant
to the ruling of the Supreme Court, despite his plea of guilty, the
prosecution will still present its evidence against the accused,
and the accused, if the defense decides to present, the court will
receive his evidence, despite his plea of guilty."15
Appellant’s theory does not convince us.
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 45
There is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge may
go about the matter of a proper "searching inquiry" as required
by the aforecited rule.16 It is incumbent upon a trial judge to
ascertain and be totally convinced that the plea of guilty was
voluntarily made and its consequences fully comprehended by
the accused.
In the present case, to fully determine whether such
voluntariness and comprehension attended appellant’s plea of
guilty, his whole testimony must be taken into account and be
read together with his statements made during the
rearraignment proceedings. As narrated earlier, after the
prosecution rested its case, appellant admitted that he sexually
abused her daughter Sherilyn because of the influence of wine
which made him lost his composure; and that at the time he slept
with Sherilyn in 1992, she was 10 years old.17 This admission is
significant since appellant furnished and explained to the trial
court the missing details of why he committed the offenses
charged. Certainly, his explanation is an earmark of voluntariness
of his plea of guilty and a clear comprehension of the
consequences thereof.
Moreover, as noted earlier, the defense, after presenting the
testimony of the accused, earnestly prayed before the trial court
that his "voluntary plea of guilty" be taken into account as a
mitigating circumstance in reducing his penalty. By invoking such
plea of guilty, the appellant has completely demolished his
argument that his plea was improvidently made.
In any case, contrary to appellant’s assertion, he was convicted by
the trial court, not on the basis of his plea of guilty, but on the
strength of the evidence adduced by the prosecution. As held by
this Court in People vs. Lakindanum,18 People vs. Nismal,19
People vs. Petalcorin,20 and People vs. Tahop,21 convictions
based on pleas of guilty to capital offenses have been set aside
because of improvidence of the plea, but only when such plea is
the sole basis of the judgment. Where, as here, the trial court
relied solely on the prosecution’s sufficient and convincing
evidence to convict the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, not
on his guilty plea, the same must be sustained.22 As the trial
court aptly stated in its appealed decision of November 29, 1996:
"Notwithstanding, the plea of guilty of accused and his open
confession of his understanding as to its legal import and
consequences, the court, aware of his rights and prevailing
jurisprudence decided by the Supreme Court en banc in the case
of People of the Philippines vs. Alberto Diaz (G.R. No. 119073,
March 13, 1996) and the case of People vs. Rolly Albert y Oliver
(G.R. No. 114001, promulgated on December 11, 1995), required
the prosecution to present its evidence against the accused . . . ."
It bears stressing that four credible witnesses were presented by
the prosecution who were extensively cross-examined by
appellant’s counsel. The victim, Sherilyn, herself gave a clear,
positive and straightforward account of how she was sexually
assaulted by appellant. The three other witnesses strongly
corroborated her testimony which established beyond
 C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 46

reasonable doubt appellant’s guilt. But to be sure, the victim’s

testimony is sufficient to establish the crimes charged,23 thus: A: My brother.

"Q: How old are you now Sherilyn Lima? Q: How about your father, where was he slept that night?

A: 15 years old. A: In his room.

Q: Do you have a birth certificate to prove your age? Q: Is that the room of your father and mother?

A: Yes, I have. A: Yes.

Q: I am showing to you a birth certificate, marked Exh. "A", is Q: While you were sleeping in the sala on Jan. 20, 1996, tell
this the same birth certificate? the court Sherilyn what did your father do, if any?

A: Yes. A: He woke me up.

Q: And you were born on October 4, 1981, you can confirm Q: Why did your father wake you up?
that?
A: He wanted me to go to his room.
A: Yes.
Q: What was your reaction to that, when your father asked
Q: Your father is Gregorio Lima? you to go to his room?

A: Yes. A: I was surprised why he wanted me to go inside his room.

Q: Is this the Gregorio lima accused in this case? Q: What did you tell your father when he told you to go to his
room?
A: Yes.
A: I asked him why he was going to bring me to his room.
Q: Now, on January 20, 1996, where were you Sherilyn?
Q: What was the answer of your father?
A: In our house.
A: According to him, he wanted me to sleep in his room. He
Q: Who were your companion in your house? wanted to do something to me.

A: My brother. Q: Did you go with your father to the room?

Q: And aside from your brother, who else? A: Yes.

A: My father. Q: And while in the room, what did your father tell you, if any?

Q: And where was your mother at that time? A: He told me to undress.

A: She was in the house of my auntie attending a party. Q: What was your reaction when you were told by your father
to undress?
Q: At that time on January 20, 1996, at that night while your
mother was not in your house attending party, where did you A: I was surprised.
sleep?
Q: Precisely. Aside from being surprised, what did your father
A: In the sala. tell you?

Q: Of your house? A: Just to undress myself.

A: Yes. Q: When you were told to undress, what happened next?

Q: Who were your supposed companion in sleeping in your A: He had me lie down.
sala?
 C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 47

Q: Did you comply with his instruction?

Q: Prior to January 20, 1996, do you recall what your father
A: Yes. has been doing to you long before January 20, 1996?

Q: When you lied down, what happened? A: He molested me.

A: He molested me. Q: That was sometime in 1992?

Q: Sherilyn, how did your father molest you? A: Yes.

A: He raped me. Q: Why did you not report the matter to your mother?

Q: Please describe to the Hon. Court, how did your father rape A: Because if I reveal the matter, he will kill all of us.
you?
Q: How often did your father do this to you in 1992?
A: He placed himself on top of me.
A: Many times.
Q: What happened when he was on top of you?
Q: Where?
A: He kissed my private parts.
A: In the house.
Q: Aside from kissing your private parts, what happened
next? Q: At that time, how old are you in 1992, when he started
molesting you?
A: He did something to my private parts.
A: 10 years old.
Q: Please specify that something he did on your private part?
Q: Why is it that it was only in 1996 that you have the courage
A: He inserted his organ to my private part. to tell your mother about it?

FISCAL EVANGELIO: A: I was afraid because my mother might be harmed.

Please make it on record, that the witness is crying. Q: In that evening of January 20, 1996, do you recall if your
mother woke you up when she returned from your Auntie from
Q: How did you know that the private part of your father was Lanang?
inserted in your vagina?
A: Yes.
A: Because I was awake when he did that to me.
Q: What was your physical appearance at that time when your
Q: Aside from awake, what did you feel when his organ was mother woke you up?
inserted in your vagina?
A: I was sleeping.
A: I feel great pain.
Q: Aside from sleeping, were you dressed?
Q: More or less, how long this so-called sexual molestation
made by your father on the evening of January 20, 1996? A: I was naked.

A: I cannot estimate, how long was that. Q: Where did your mother bring you?

Q: Sherilyn, while your father was doing the act on January A: To the birthday party of my cousin.
20, 1996, why did you not resist?
Q: What transportation did you take in going there?
A: Because he will kill me.
A: The car of my auntie.
Q: Why, did he hold you?
Q: On the same evening, you reported the incident to the
A: He held my hands. Buhangin Police Station?
 C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 48

A: Yes. A: She was sleeping, so I have to wake her up because we

were invited by my sister for the birthday.
Q: On January 22, 1996, do you recall if you submitted
yourself for examination? Q: While at that moment, where was your husband?

A: Yes. A: In the house.

Q: I have here a medical certificate. Is this the same medical Q: When you instructed your daughter to dress up, where was
certificate issued to you by Dr. Ledesma? your husband?

A: Yes."24 A: He was still opening the gate.

It is worthy to note that Sherilyn cried while testifying. Such Q: Were you able to leave the house?
actuation, undoubtedly, demonstrates her sincerity, spontaneity
and truthfulness of what she was narrating.25 A: Yes, sir.

In a plethora of cases, we have held that the crime of rape is Q: What was the reaction of your husband, if any?
difficult to prove because it is generally unwitnessed and very
often, only the victim is left to testify for herself. Fortunately for A: Nothing. There was no reaction because I told him that we
the victim here, her testimony is reinforced by the testimonies of were attending the party of my nephew. We did not let him notice
two other witnesses who were extensively cross-examined. that we have suspicion.

Sherilyn’s mother, Erlinda Lima, testified as follows:26 Q: In going to the place of your sister, what transportation did
you take?
"Q: You said you went home at 10:00 p.m. Please tell us why
you went home at 10:00 p.m.? A: The vehicle of my sister.

A: Because it was the birthday of my nephew and this nephew Q: And while in the vehicle of your sister going to your sister’s
of mine wanted that my children will also attend the birthday, so house in Lanang, do you have a conversation with your daughter?
that I went home to get my children.
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And what did your daughter tell the court, that your
Q: Where did you proceed when you entered the house? daughter confided also that prior to January 20, 1996, she was
also abused?
A: When I reached the house, I knock and the one who opened
the door was my son? A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where did you proceed? Q: Upon learning of the incident on that evening, where did
you bring your daughter?
A: When I entered the house, I cannot find my daughter. So I
proceeded to the room of my husband to look for my daughter. A: We proceeded to the Buhangin Police Station.

Q: What did you notice, if any? Q: What did you do in the Buhangin Police Station?

A: I was surprised because I saw my daughter already A: We reported what her father had done to her.
sleeping beside the bed where my husband sleep, because at that
time, my husband went out to open the gate. I was surprised, I Q: Was your report recorded in the log book?
approached her and took off the blanket and she was already
naked. A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Totally naked? Q: And do you know what action was taken by the police
based on your report?
A: Yes, sir.
A: They immediately arrested my husband.
Q: To that situation, what did you tell your daughter?
 C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 49

Q: Do you know if your daughter was subjected to medical Q: Finally, in your opinion, this old healed laceration, you
examination by the City Health Office? found on the private parts of patient, how long more or less were
these lacerations exist, old healed lacerations?
A: Yes, sir.
A: More than 4 months, when I saw patient, it could be more
Q: Why do you know that? than one year, more than 3 years."

A: Because I was the one who brought her to Dr. Ledesma." The foregoing testimonies effectively corroborated Sherilyn’s
account.
Also, Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma of the Davao City Health Office
testified, thus:27 Furthermore, the trial court found that the prosecution’s
witnesses were telling the truth. We have consistently held that
"Q: As medico-legal officer of the Davao City Health Office, do the findings of fact of the trial judge who tried the case and heard
you recall having attended to the patient named Sherilyn Lima? the witnesses should not be disturbed on appeal and should be
given considerable weight and respect, especially on the
A: Yes, sir. credibility of the witnesses, since he was in a better position to
decide the question, having heard and observed the demeanor,
Q: Sometime in 1996? attitude, conduct and deportment of witnesses.28

A: Yes, sir. Based on the prosecution’s evidence, and as correctly found by

xxx xxx xxx
Q; Now, it appears in your findings, that I call your attention to
the genital examination you conducted wherein you said among
others that there was healed, deep laceration on the private parts
of patient, what was your basis in that finding of yours?
A: When I examined the genital of the patient, particularly the
hymen, I saw old healed deep laceration at 3:00 and 8:00 o’clock
position, if it is compared to a clock, wherein the lacerations were
found at 3:00 and 8:00 o’clock positions.
Q: And what does that imply or indicate, Doctor?
A: Meaning to say that these lacerations when I saw and
examined the victim more than four months.
the trial court, the crimes charged have been sufficiently
established beyond reasonable doubt. Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659,
provides:
"Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. -Rape is committed
by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
"The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Q: And in your examination of the patient, have you found out xxx xxx xxx
what would have caused such lacerations?
"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
A: Yes, sir. committed with any of the following circumstances:

Q: And finally you said, the patient was positive for "1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
spermatozoa, what do you mean by that, Doctor? offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
A: With vaginal discharges were taken smear, there was the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphasis
presence of sperm cells. supplied)

Q: And when you said sperm cells, from male organ? xxx xxx xxx"

A: Yes, sir. The prosecution has sufficiently established that in Criminal Case
No. 36,517-96, the victim was only ten years old when she was
xxx xxx xxx raped by her father. However, the death penalty cannot be
imposed upon the appellant because the crime was committed in
1992 when R.A. 7659 was not yet in effect.29 As regards Criminal
Case No. 36,380-96, it was proven that the victim was only 14
 C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 50

years old when she was raped by her father in 1996. Thus, the
penalty of death was correctly meted out by the trial court.

The mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty cannot be

appreciated in his favor because reclusion perpetua and death
are indivisible penalties imposed in their entirety regardless of
any mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the
crime.30

Finally, we rectify the error committed by the trial court with

respect to the award of damages to the victim. The award of
₱30,000.00 as moral damages is not in line with the prevailing
jurisprudence,31 fixing the amount at ₱50,000.00 for each count
of rape. In addition, the amount of ₱50,000.00 should be awarded
to her as indemnity ex delicto in Criminal Case No. 36,517-96
since the penalty is only reclusion perpetua; while in Criminal
Case No. 36,380-96 where the penalty imposed is death, the
indemnity ex delicto for the victim should be in the amount of
₱75,000.00.32 Since the fact of relationship between the offender
and the victim is an aggravating circumstance, she is entitled to
the award of exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00 for each count of
rape.33 In People vs. Catubig,34 this Court clarified that an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should
entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages
within the meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the appealed Joint Decision in Criminal Case Nos.

36,517-96 and 36,380-96 is AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION in
the sense that appellant Gregorio S. Lima is ordered to PAY the
victim, Sherilyn Lima, ₱50,000.00 as indemnity ex delicto in
Criminal Case No. 36,517-96, and ₱75,000.00 in Criminal Case
No. 36,380-96; and, in each case, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against the
appellant.

Relative to Criminal Case No. 36,380-96 wherein we affirm the

imposition of death penalty upon the appellant, three (3)
members of the Court, although maintaining their adherence to
the separate opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray that R.A.
7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death, is
unconstitutional, nevertheless submit to the ruling of the
majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty
should be accordingly imposed.

In consonance with Sec. 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of the

Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this Decision, let the record
of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President
for the possible exercise of his pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

[ G.R. No. 164258, August 22, 2012 ]
ESTRELLA TAGLAY, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE MARIVIC
TRABAJO DARAY AND LOVERIE PALACAY, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Orders[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Digos City, Branch
18, dated March 9, 2004 and June 7, 2004, in Criminal Case No.
FC-71-02. The March 9, 2004 Order denied herein petitioner's
Motion to Dismiss, while the June 7, 2004 Order denied her
Motion for Reconsideration.
The instant petition arose from a Criminal Complaint[2] for
Qualified Trespass to Dwelling filed by private respondent
against herein petitioner with the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Sta. Maria-Malita-Don Marcelino, Davao del Sur
on June 19, 2001.
Finding probable cause to indict petitioner, the Public Prosecutor
assigned to handle the case filed an Information[3] against her on
November 19, 2001. The Information reads as follows:
The undersigned Prosecutor accuses ESTRELLA TAGLAY of the
crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling as defined and penalized
under Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
committed as follows:
That on June 2, 2001 at about 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon at
Tibangao, Malita, Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforesaid accused, a
private person and without any justifiable reason and by means
of violence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously enter into the dwelling of Loverie Palacay without her
consent and against her will and once inside maltreated, boxed
and choked her, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Upon arraignment on June 7, 2002, petitioner pleaded not
guilty.[5] Pre-trial conference was set on August 13, 2002.
However, on August 15, 2002, the MCTC issued an Order,[6] to
wit:
It appearing that private complainant Loverie Palacay was a
minor on June 2, 2001, the date of the incident, since she was
born on August 7, 1983, per Certification dated August 15, 2002
issued by Municipal Registrar Josephine A. Marquez, this case,
upon manifestation of Prosecutor Perfecto P. Ordaneza and
pursuant to Republic Act. No. 8369 and Circular 11-99, is hereby
transferred to Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Digos City, for
proper disposition.
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 51
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, the case was transferred to the RTC of Digos City
where petitioner was brought to trial.
Witnesses were then presented by the prosecution. Prior to the
presentation of the final witness for the prosecution, petitioner
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner contended that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case, because the MCTC erroneously transferred the case
to the RTC instead of dismissing it. Petitioner also argued that the
RTC's lack of jurisdiction was further aggravated when she was
not arraigned before the RTC.
On March 9, 2004, the RTC issued its assailed Order[7] ruling that
it acquired jurisdiction over the case when it received the records
of the case as a consequence of the transfer effected by the MCTC;
that the transfer of the case from the MCTC is authorized under
Administrative Matter No. 99-1-13-SC and Circular No. 11-99;
that there is no doubt that the offended party is a minor and,
thus, the case falls within the original jurisdiction of Family
Courts pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369. The RTC also
held that even granting that there was defect or irregularity in
the procedure because petitioner was not arraigned before the
RTC, such defect was fully cured when petitioner's counsel
entered into trial without objecting that his client had not yet
been arraigned. Furthermore, the RTC noted that petitioner's
counsel has cross-examined the witnesses for the prosecution.
Consequently, the RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was
denied by the RTC via its Order[8] dated June 7, 2004.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
Petitioner raises two main grounds.
First, petitioner contends that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case because Circular No. 11-99, which
authorizes the transfer of Family Courts cases filed with first-
level courts to the RTCs, is applicable only to cases which were
filed prior to the effectivity of the said Circular on March 1, 1999.
Petitioner argues that all Family Courts cases filed with first-level
courts after the effectivity of the said Circular can no longer be
transferred to the RTC; instead they should be dismissed.
Considering that the Information in the instant case was filed
with the MCTC on November 19, 2001, petitioner avers that the
MCTC should have dismissed the case instead of ordering its
transfer to the RTC.
Second, petitioner insists that she should have been arraigned
anew before the RTC and that her arraignment before the MCTC
does not count because the proceedings conducted therein were
void.
The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that, generally, a direct
recourse to this Court in a petition for certiorari is highly
improper for it violates the established policy of strict
observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.[9] While this Court
has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the CA to issue
writs of certiorari, this concurrence is not to be taken as an
unrestrained freedom of choice as to which court the application
for the writ will be directed.[10] There is after all a hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals
and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate
forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs.[11] This Court is
a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily
perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and
immemorial tradition.[12] A direct invocation of the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction to issue these extraordinary writs is
allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.[13]
However, it is also settled that this Court has full discretionary
power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly with it if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues
raised, so warrant.[14] Under the present circumstances, the
Court will take cognizance of this case as an exception to the
principle of hierarchy of courts, considering that the Information
against petitioner was filed way back in November 2001.[15] Any
further delay in the resolution of the instant petition will be
prejudicial to petitioner. Moreover, the principle may be relaxed
when pure questions of law are raised as in this case.[16]
Now, on the merits of the petition.
It is significant to point out, at this juncture, the well-entrenched
doctrine that the jurisdiction of a tribunal over the subject matter
of an action is conferred by law.[17] Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.[18] The Family Courts Act of 1997,
which took effect on November 23, 1997.[19] Section 5 (a) of R.A.
8369 clearly provides that Family Courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction over criminal cases where one or more of the accused
is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9)
years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the
time of the commission of the offense. In the present case, there
is no dispute that at the time of the commission of the alleged
offense on June 2, 2001, private respondent, who is also the
private complainant, was a minor. Hence, the case falls under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of Family Courts.
Anent the first issue raised, the Court agrees that the Resolution
of this Court in Administrative Matter No. 99-1-13-SC and
Circular No. 11-99, issued pursuant thereto, is applicable only to
Family Courts cases which were filed with first-level courts prior
to the effectivity of the said Resolution on March 1, 1999.[20]
This is evident in the language used by the Court in the third
"Whereas" clause of the subject Resolution wherein it was stated
that "pending the constitution and organization of the Family
Courts and the designation of branches of the Regional Trial
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 52
Courts as Family Courts in accordance with Section 17
(Transitory Provisions) of R.A. 8369, there is a need to provide
guidelines in the hearing and determination of criminal cases
falling within the jurisdiction of Family Courts which have
heretofore been filed with first-level courts." The operative word,
as correctly cited by petitioner, is "heretofore" which means
"before this" or "up to this time."[21] Moreover, Section 1 of the
same Resolution directs all first-level courts, within ten (10) days
from receipt of a copy of the subject Resolution, to take an
inventory of all criminal cases falling within the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts which were filed with them (first-level courts),
to prepare an appropriate inventory and to submit the same to
the Court Management Office of the Office of the Court
Administrator. Logic dictates that only those cases which were
filed prior to the issuance of the Resolution shall be included in
the inventory and, therefore, shall be subject to transfer by first-
level courts to the appropriate RTCs. The necessary implication
then is that all cases filed with first-level courts after the
effectivity of the Resolution on March 1, 1999 should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In the present case, the
Information was filed against petitioner on November 19, 2001.
Thus, the MCTC is already bereft of any authority to transfer the
case to the RTC as the same no longer falls under the coverage of
Circular No. 11-99. What the MCTC should have done was to
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
More importantly, what justifies the dismissal of the case is that
the Information filed with the MCTC cannot be used as a basis for
the valid indictment of petitioner before the RTC acting as a
Family Court, because there was no allegation therein of private
complainant's minority. To proceed to trial before the RTC on the
basis of the Information filed with the MCTC would be an exercise
in futility as there is an infirmity in the Information constituting a
jurisdictional defect which cannot be cured. There is no point in
proceeding under a defective Information that could never be the
basis of a valid conviction.[22] The Information filed with the
MCTC must thus first be amended and thereafter filed with the
RTC. Pending the filing of such Information, the RTC has not yet
acquired jurisdiction because while a court may have jurisdiction
over the subject matter, it does not acquire jurisdiction over the
case itself until its jurisdiction is invoked with the filing of a valid
Information.[23]
The Court also agrees with petitioner in her contention in the
second issue raised that she should have been arraigned by the
RTC.
It is true that petitioner was arraigned by the MCTC. However,
the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
present case. It is settled that the proceedings before a court or
tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and
void.[24] Considering that the MCTC has no jurisdiction, all the
proceedings conducted therein, including petitioner's
arraignment, are null and void. Thus, the need for petitioner's
arraignment on the basis of a valid Information filed with the
RTC.
 C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 53

It is also true that petitioner's counsel participated in the

proceedings held before the RTC without objecting that his client
had not yet been arraigned. However, it is wrong for the RTC to
rely on the case of People v. Cabale,[25] because the accused
therein was in fact arraigned, although the same was made only
after the case was submitted for decision. In the similar cases of
People v. Atienza and Closa[26] and People v. Pangilinan,[27] the
accused in the said cases were also belatedly arraigned. The
Court, in these three cases, held that the active participation of
the counsels of the accused, as well as their opportunity to cross-
examine the prosecution witnesses during trial without objecting
on the ground that their clients had not yet been arraigned, had
the effect of curing the defect in the belated arraignment.
Moreover, the accused in these cases did not object when they
were belatedly arraigned. The same, however, cannot be said in
the instant case. There is no arraignment at all before the RTC. On
the other hand, the arraignment conducted by the MCTC is null
and void. Thus, there is nothing to be cured. Petitioner's counsel
also timely raised before the RTC the fact that her client, herein
petitioner, was not arraigned.

Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the

constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.[28] The purpose of
arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of
freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the
prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him.[29] As an
indispensable requirement of due process, an arraignment
cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily.[30]
Otherwise, absence of arraignment results in the nullity of the
proceedings before the trial court.[31]

As a final note, it may not be amiss to stress that at all stages of

the proceedings leading to his trial and conviction, the accused
must be charged and tried according to the procedure prescribed
by law and marked by observance of the rights given to him by
the Constitution.[32] In the same way that the reading of the
Information to the accused during arraignment is not a useless
formality, so is the validity of the information being read not an
idle ceremony.[33]

Criminal due process requires that the accused must be

proceeded against under the orderly processes of law.[34] In all
criminal cases, the judge should follow the step-by-step
procedure required by the Rules.[35] The reason for this is to
assure that the State makes no mistake in taking the life or liberty
except that of the guilty.[36]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of

the Regional Trial Court of Digos City, Branch 18, dated March 9,
2004 and June 7, 2004, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one rendered dismissing the Information in Criminal Case No. FC-
71-02, without prejudice to refiling the same in the proper court.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 172707 October 1, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
vs.
HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO, EDWIN
DUKILMAN Y SUBOH, TONY ABAO Y SULA, RAUL UDAL Y
KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN
MACALINBOL Y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS Y AMPIL, NORA
EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN Y RAFON A.K.A LARINA
PERPENIAN AND JOHN DOES, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court for Automatic Review is the Decision1 dated 28
June 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00863, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109 dated 16
October 1998, finding accused-appellants Halil Gambao y Esmail,
Eddie Karim y Uso, Edwin Dukilman y Suboh, Tony Abao y Sula,
Raul Udal y Kagui, Teng Mandao y Haron, Theng Dilangalen y
Nanding, Jaman Macalinbol y Katol, Monette Ronas y Ampil, Nora
Evad y Mulok and Thian Perpenian y Rafon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom as defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659.
The accused-appellants, along with an unidentified person, were
charged under the criminal information3 which reads:
Criminal Case No. 98-0928
For Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA 7659
That on August 12, 1998 at around 7:30 o’clock in the evening at
No. 118 FB Harrison Pasay City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named-accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping
themselves together, did then and there by force and
intimidation, and the use of high powered firearms, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and deprive Lucia
Chan y Lee of her liberty against her will for the purpose of
extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a
condition for her release amounting to FOUR HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (₱400,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of
Lucia L. Chan in the said amount and such other amounts as may
be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code.
The antecedent facts were culled from the records of the case:4
Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. She usually
expected fish deliveries, which were shipped by her suppliers
from the provinces. Sometime in the afternoon of 11 August
1998, two persons, one of whom was identified as Theng
Dilangalen (Dilangalen), went to Chan’s residence at FB Harrison
St., Pasay City to inquire about a certain passport alleged to have
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 54
been mistakenly placed inside a box of fish to be delivered to her.
Unable to locate said passport, the two left. The next morning,
Dilangalen, together with another companion identified as Tony
Abao (Abao), returned looking for Chan but were told that she
was out. When the two returned in the afternoon, Chan informed
them that the fish delivery had yet to arrive. Chan offered instead
to accompany them to the airport to retrieve the box of fish
allegedly containing the passport. Dilangalen and Abao declined
and told Chan that they would be back later that evening.5
Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains
at large, returned to Chan’s residence that evening. Chan’s
houseboy ushered them in and Chan met them by the stairs.6
Thereat, the unidentified companion of Dilangalen pointed his
gun at Chan’s son, Levy Chan (Levy), and the house companions.7
As the unidentified man forcibly dragged Chan, her son Levy tried
to stop the man by grabbing his mother’s feet. Seeing this,
Dilangalen pointed his gun at Levy’s head forcing the latter to
release his grip on Chan’s feet.8 Levy thereafter proceeded to the
Pasay Police Headquarters to report the incident.9
Chan was forced to board a "Tamaraw FX" van.10 After travelling
for about two hours, the group stopped at a certain house.
Accused-appellant Edwin Dukilman (Dukilman) warned Chan not
to shout as he had his gun pointed at her mouth. Chan was
ordered to go with two women,11 later identified in court by
Chan as appellants Monette Ronas (Ronas) and Nora Evad
(Evad).12 Chan was brought inside a house and was made to lie
down on a bed, guarded by Ronas, Evad, Dukilman and Jaman
Macalinbol (Macalinbol).13 Ronas and Evad threatened Chan that
she would be killed unless she paid 20 Million Pesos.14
On 13 August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and was asked
to board the "Tamaraw FX" van. After travelling for about ten
minutes, the van stopped and the group alighted. Chan was
brought to a room on the second floor of the house. Inside the
room were three persons whom Chan identified in court as
Macalinbol, Raul Udal (Udal) and Halil Gambao (Gambao).15
Another woman, later identified as Thian Perpenian (Perpenian),
arrived.16 At about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, a man who was
later identified as Teng Mandao (Mandao), entered the room with
a handgun and asked Chan "Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa pulis?"17
Another man, whom Chan identified in court as Eddie Karim
(Karim), ordered Mandao out of the room. Karim informed Chan
that he was sent by their boss to ask her how much money she
has.18 Chan was instructed to talk to her son through a cell
phone and she gave instructions to her son to get the ₱75, 000.00
she kept in her cabinet.19 The group then talked to Chan’s son
and negotiated the ransom amount in exchange for his mother’s
release. It was agreed upon that Levy was to deliver ₱400,000.00
at the "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia Avenue.20
Inspectors Narciso Ouano, Jr. (Inspector Ouano) and Cesar
Mancao (Inspector Mancao), who were assigned at the Pasay City
area to conduct the investigation regarding the kidnapping, were
informed that the abductors called and demanded for ransom in
exchange for Chan’s release.21 During their surveillance the

following day, Inspectors Ouano and Mancao observed a Red
Transport taxicab entering the route which led to the victim’s
residence. The inspectors observed that the occupants of the
taxicab kept on looking at the second floor of the house. The
inspectors and their team tailed the taxicab until Pansol,
Calamba, Laguna, where it entered the Elizabeth Resort and
stopped in front of Cottage 1. Convinced that the woman the team
saw in the cottage was the victim, they sought clearance from
Philippine Anti Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to conduct
a rescue operation.22
On 14 August 1998, P/Insp. Vicente Arnado (Inspector Arnado)
received information that the abductors acceded to a
₱400,000.00 ransom money to be delivered at "Chowking"
Restaurant at Buendia Avenue at around 2:00 am. Upon learning
of the information, the team immediately and strategically
positioned themselves around the vicinity of the restaurant. At
about 2:00 am, a light blue "Tamaraw FX" van with 4 people on
board arrived. The four took the ransom money and headed
towards the South Luzon Expressway. The surveillance team
successfully intercepted the van and arrested the 4 men, later
identified in court as Karim, Abao, Gambao and Dukilman. The
team was also able to recover the ₱400,000.00 ransom.23
At about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of the same day, the police
team assaulted Cottage No. 1, resulting in the safe rescue of Chan
and the apprehension of seven of her abductors, later identified
in court as Dilangalen, Udal, Macalinbol, Mandao, Perpenian, Evad
and Ronas.24
During the 7 October 1998 hearing, after the victim and her son
testified, Karim manifested his desire to change his earlier plea of
"not guilty" to "guilty." The presiding judge then explained the
consequences of a change of plea, stating: "It would mean the
moment you withdraw your previous pleas of not guilty and
enter a plea of guilty, the court of course, after receiving
evidence, as in fact it has received the testimonies of [the] two
witnesses, will [outrightly] sentence you to the penalty provided
by law after the prosecution shall have finished the presentation
of its evidence. Now that I have explained to you the
consequences of your entering a plea of guilty, are you still
desirous of entering a plea of ‘guilty’?" Eddie Karim answered,
"Yes."25 On hearing this clarification, the other appellants
likewise manifested, through their counsel who had earlier
conferred with them and explained to each of them the
consequences of a change of plea, their desire to change the pleas
they entered. The trial court separately asked each of the
appellants namely: Gambao, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen,
Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad if they understood the consequence
of changing their pleas. All of them answered in the
affirmative.26 Similarly, Dukilman manifested his desire to
change his plea and assured the trial court that he understood the
consequences of such change of plea.27 Thereupon, the trial
court ordered their re-arraignment. After they pleaded guilty,28
the trial court directed the prosecution to present evidence,
which it did.
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 55
On 16 October 1998, the RTC rendered a decision convicting
Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen,
Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and Perpenian of Kidnapping for
Ransom. Hence, they appealed to the CA.
In a Decision dated 28 June 2005, the appellate court affirmed
with modifications the decision of the trial court. The dispositive
portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-
appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO,
EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y
KAGUI, TENG MANDAO y HARON, THENG DILANGALEN y
NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y
AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659
and imposing upon each of them the supreme penalty of death is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that each of them is ordered to
pay jointly and severally the victim in the amount of ₱50,000.00
by way of moral damages.
It appearing that accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON
was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime,
she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.29
Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative
Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to
this Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.
In a Resolution30 dated 20 June 2006, we required the parties to
file their respective supplemental briefs. The issues raised by the
accused-appellants in their respective briefs, supplemental briefs
and manifestations will be discussed collectively.
Insufficiency of Evidence
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas, Evad would have this Court
believe that the witness, Chan, was not able to positively identify
them because of her failing eyesight due to old age.
This argument is bereft of merit. We note that both the trial court
and the CA found Chan’s testimony credible and straightforward.
During her testimony, she positively identified the accused-
appellants. If she had not met them before, she could not have
positively identified them in open court. In fact, the participation
of these accused-appellants was further established through the
testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses.
Time and again, this Court has maintained that the question of
credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to
determine. For this reason, its observations and conclusions are
accorded great respect on appeal. They are conclusive and
binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless,
through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence has not been considered.31 In People v. Tañedo,32 this

Court had occasion to reiterate the ruling that findings of fact of
the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses command
great respect since it had the opportunity to observe their
demeanor while they testified in court.33 It can be observed that
the briefs submitted by the accused-appellants are replete with
generalities and wanting in relevant particulars. It is for this
reason that we are giving full credence to the findings of the trial
court regarding the credibility of witness Chan.
Perpenian likewise argued that the evidence for her conviction is
insufficient. We also find her argument bereft of merit.
The testimony of Inspector Ouano, establishing Perpenian as one
of the seven people apprehended when they conducted the
rescue operation at around 5:00 o’clock in the morning of 14
August 1998,34 and the positive identification of Perpenian by
Chan constituted adequate evidence working against her defense
of denial.
Further, it should be noted that the only defense the accused-
appellants proffered was denial. It is established jurisprudence
that denial cannot prevail over the witnesses’ positive
identification of the accused-appellants, more so where the
defense did not present convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for them to have been present at the crime
scene at the time of the commission of the crime.35
The foregoing considered, the positive identification by Chan, the
relevant testimonies of witnesses and the absence of evidence
other than mere denial proffered by the defense lead this Court to
give due weight to the findings of the lower courts.
Improvident Plea
As provided for by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA 7659, the penalty for kidnapping for ransom is
death. A review of the records36 shows that on 7 October 1998,
the accused-appellants withdrew their plea of "not guilty" and
were re-arraigned. They subsequently entered pleas of "guilty" to
the crime of kidnapping for ransom, a capital offense. This Court,
in People v. Oden,37 laid down the duties of the trial court when
the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. The trial court is
mandated:
(1)
to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt,
(2)
to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused
and the precise degree of his culpability, and
(3)
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 56
to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence
in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.38
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed
with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest
form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a
sentence is irreversible. The primordial purpose is to avoid
improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused where grave
crimes are involved since he might be admitting his guilt before
the court and thus forfeiting his life and liberty without having
fully understood the meaning, significance and consequence of
his plea.39 Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence
would aid this Court on appellate review in determining the
propriety or impropriety of the plea.40
Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines
whether the plea of guilt was based on a free and informed
judgement. The inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the
plea and the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea.
This Court finds no cogent reason for deviating from the
guidelines provided by jurisprudence41 and thus, adopts the
same:
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial
judge must conduct a "searching inquiry," we have held that the
following guidelines should be observed:
Ascertain from the accused himself
(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during
the custodial and preliminary investigations; and
(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated
during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the
possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a
state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming
from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge’s
intimidating robes.
Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he
had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the
meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused,
such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational
background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his
capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of
the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve
such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in
the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of
promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should
he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to
ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken

impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the
admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the
aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase
punishment.
Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged
and fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the
basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would
constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of
the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of
his right to due process.
All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known
and understood by the latter.
The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading
guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the
tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.
It is evident from the records42 that the aforesaid rules have not
been fully complied with. The questions propounded by the trial
court judge failed to ensure that accused-appellants fully
understood the consequences of their plea. In fact, it is readily
apparent from the records43 that Karim had the mistaken
assumption that his plea of guilt would mitigate the imposable
penalty and that both the judge and his counsel failed to explain
to him that such plea of guilt will not mitigate the penalty
pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Karim was not
warned by the trial court judge that in cases where the penalty is
single and indivisible, like death, the penalty is not affected by
either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The trial court
judge’s seemingly annoyed statement that a conditional plea is
not allowed, as provided below, is inadequate:
Atty. Ferrer:
Your Honor please, may we be allowed to say something before
the trial. For accused Eddie Karim we manifest and petition this
court that he be allowed to be re-arraigned Your Honor please,
considering that he will plead guilty as charged but the imposable
penalty is lowered, Your Honor.
Court:
You cannot make a conditional plea of guilty, that is what the law
says. You plead guilty, no condition attached. Conditional plea is
not allowed.
Atty. Ferrer:
Considering, Your Honor, accused Eddie Karim is already
repenting
Court:
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 57
Nevertheless. Read the law. If you entered a plea of guilty there
should be no condition attached. We cannot make that condition
and dictate to the court the penalty. 44
Although the pleas rendered, save for Perpenian’s, were
improvidently made, this Court will still not set aside the
condemnatory judgment. Despite the trial court judge’s
shortcomings, we still agree with his ruling on accused-
appellants’ culpability.
As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of
guilt are set aside and the cases are remanded for further
proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of judgement. If the trial
court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to
convict the accused, as it did in this case, the conviction must be
sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty
plea but on evidence proving the commission of the offense
charged.45 The manner by which the plea of guilty is made,
whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance where the
conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the
commission of the crime by the accused.46
Contrary to accused-appellants’ assertions, they were convicted
by the trial court, not on the basis of their plea of guilty, but on
the strength of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, which
was properly appreciated by the trial court.47 The prosecution
was able to prove the guilt of the accused-appellants and their
degrees of culpability beyond reasonable doubt.
Degree of Culpability
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas and Evad argue in their
respective briefs that conspiracy, insofar as they were concerned,
was not convincingly established. Dukilman hinges his argument
on the fact that he was not one of those arrested during the
rescue operation based on the testimony of Inspector Ouano.48
On the other hand, Ronas and Evad base their argument on the
fact that they had no participation whatsoever in the negotiation
for the ransom money.
We hold otherwise. Although Dukilman was not one of those
apprehended at the cottage during the rescue operation, the
testimony of Police Inspector Arnado sufficiently established that
he was one of the four people apprehended when the police
intercepted the "Tamaraw FX" at the Nichols Tollgate.49
Likewise, the testimony of Police Inspector Ouano sufficiently
established that Ronas and Evad were two of those who were
arrested during the rescue operation.50 This Court has held
before that to be a conspirator, one need not participate in every
detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or
need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others
in the execution of the conspiracy.51 Once conspiracy is shown,
the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent
or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary,
since all the conspirators are principals.52 Moreover, Chan
positively identified the accused-appellants and placed all of
them at the crime scenes.

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a
felony and decide to commit it. It has been a long standing
opinion of this Court that proof of the conspiracy need not rest on
direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective
conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of
the crime indicating a common understanding among them with
respect to the commission of the offense.53 The testimonies,
when taken together, reveal the common purpose of the accused-
appellants and how they were all united in its execution from
beginning to end. There were testimonies proving that (1) before
the incident, two of the accused-appellants kept coming back to
the victim’s house; (2) during the kidnapping, accused-appellants
changed shifts in guarding the victim; and (3) the accused
appellants were those present when the ransom money was
recovered and when the rescue operation was conducted.
Seeing that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao,
Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad was
established beyond reasonable doubt based on the proffered
evidence of the prosecution, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators.
In Perpenian’s Supplemental Brief,54 she directs this Court’s
attention to the manifestation made by the prosecution regarding
their disinterest in prosecuting, insofar as she was concerned.55
However, pursuant to the ruling of this Court in Crespo v. Judge
Mogul,56 once the information is filed, any disposition of the case
or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within
the exclusive jurisdiction, competence and discretion of the
courts; more so in this case, where no Motion to Dismiss was filed
by the prosecution.
The trial court took note of the fact that Perpenian gave
inconsistent answers and lied several times under oath during
the trial.57 Perpenian lied about substantial details such as her
real name, age, address and the fact that she saw Chan at the
Elizabeth Resort. When asked why she lied several times,
Perpenian claimed she was scared to be included or identified
with the other accused-appellants. The lying and the fear of being
identified with people whom she knew had done wrong are
indicative of discernment. She knew, therefore, that there was an
ongoing crime being committed at the resort while she was there.
It is apparent that she was fully aware of the consequences of the
unlawful act.
As reflected in the records,58 the prosecution was not able to
proffer sufficient evidence to hold her responsible as a principal.
Seeing that the only evidence the prosecution had was the
testimony59 of Chan to the effect that on 13 August 1998
Perpenian entered the room where the victim was detained and
conversed with Evad and Ronas regarding stories unrelated to
the kidnapping, this Court opines that Perpenian should not be
held liable as a co-principal, but rather only as an accomplice to
the crime.
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 58
Jurisprudence60 is instructive of the elements required, in
accordance with Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, in order
that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that
there be community of design; that is knowing the criminal
design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with
the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution
by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying
material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an
efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts
done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged
as accomplice.
The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to exonerate
her criminal liability.1âwphi1 Assuming arguendo that she just
came to the resort thinking it was a swimming party, it was
inevitable that she acquired knowledge of the criminal design of
the principals when she saw Chan being guarded in the room. A
rational person would have suspected something was wrong and
would have reported such incident to the police. Perpenian,
however, chose to keep quiet; and to add to that, she even spent
the night at the cottage. It has been held before that being present
and giving moral support when a crime is being committed will
make a person responsible as an accomplice in the crime
committed.61 It should be noted that the accused-appellant’s
presence and company were not indispensable and essential to
the perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom; hence, she is only
liable as an accomplice.62 Moreover, this Court is guided by the
ruling in People v. Clemente, et al.,63 where it was stressed that
in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be
considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a
principal.
Having admitted their involvement in the crime of kidnapping for
ransom and considering the evidence presented by the
prosecution, linking accused-appellants’ participation in the
crime, no doubt can be entertained as to their guilt. The CA
convicted the accused-appellants of kidnapping for ransom and
imposed upon them the supreme penalty of death, applying the
provisions of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, this
Court finds accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals to the crime of kidnapping for ransom. However,
pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,64 we modify the penalty imposed by
the trial court and reduce the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua,
without eligibility for parole.
Modification should also be made as to the criminal liability of
Perpenian. Pursuant to the passing of R.A. No. 9344,65 a
determination of whether she acted with or without discernment
is necessary. Considering that Perpenian acted with discernment
when she was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the
offense, her minority should be appreciated not as an exempting
circumstance, but as a privileged mitigating circumstance
pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344,66 the suspension of sentence
of a child in conflict with the law shall still be applied even if

he/she is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time
of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer
benefit from the aforesaid provision, because under Article 40 of
R.A. No. 9344,67 the suspension of sentence can be availed of
only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum
age of twenty-one (21) years. This leaves the Court with no
choice but to pronounce judgement. Perpenian is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom. Since this Court has ruled that death as
utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code shall no longer
form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties pursuant
to R.A. No. 9346,68 the penalty imposed by law on accomplices in
the commission of consummated kidnapping for ransom is
Reclusion Temporal, the penalty one degree lower than what the
principals would bear (Reclusion Perpetua).69 Applying Article
68 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should then
be adjusted to the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law
for accomplices. This Court, therefore, holds that as to Perpenian,
the penalty of Prision Mayor, the penalty lower than that
prescribed by law (Reclusion Temporal), should be imposed.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty,
which is one degree lower than the maximum imposable penalty,
shall be within the range of Prision Correccional; and the
maximum penalty shall be within the minimum period of Prision
Mayor, absent any aggravating circumstance and there being one
mitigating circumstance. Hence, the Court imposes the
indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of
Prision Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1)
day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.
As regards Perpenian’s possible confinement in an agricultural
camp or other training facility in accordance with Section 51 of
R.A. 9344, this Court held in People v. Jacinto70 that the age of
the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation
of the judgment is not material. What matters is that the offender
committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. This
Court, however, finds such arrangement no longer necessary in
view of the fact that Perpenian’s actual served term has already
exceeded the imposable penalty for her offense. For such reason,
she may be immediately released from detention.
We note that in the Order71 dated 9 October 1998, the trial court
admitted the documentary evidence offered by the counsel for
the defense proving that the real name of Thian Perpenian is
Larina Perpenian.
In view of the death of Mandao during the pendency of this case,
he is relieved of all personal and pecuniary penalties attendant to
the crime, his death72 having occurred before rendition of final
judgement.73
There is prevailing jurisprudence,74 on civil liabilities arising
from the commission of kidnapping for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code. The persons convicted were held liable
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 59
for ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages;
and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
We take this opportunity to increase the amounts of indemnity
and damages, where, as in this case, the penalty for the crime
committed is death which, however, cannot be imposed because
of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346:75
1. ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. ₱100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to
have suffered and thus needs no proof; and
3. ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the
public good.
These amounts shall be the minimum indemnity and damages
where death is the penalty warranted by the facts but is not
imposable under present law.
The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros76 is instructive
on the apportionment of civil liabilities among all the accused-
appellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be
apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission
of the crime according to the degrees of their liability, respective
responsibilities and actual participation. Hence, each principal
accused-appellant should shoulder a greater share in the total
amount of indemnity and damages than Perpenian who was
adjudged as only an accomplice.
Taking into account the difference in the degrees of their
participation, all of them shall be liable for the total amount of
₱300,000.00 divided among the principals who shall be liable for
₱288,000.00 (or ₱32,000.00 each) and Perpenian who shall be
liable for ₱12,000.00. This is broken down into ₱10,666.67 civil
indemnity, ₱10,666.67 moral damages and ₱10,666.67
exemplary damages for each principal; and ₱4,000.00 civil
indemnity, ₱4,000.00 moral damages and ₱4,000.00 exemplary
damages for the lone accomplice.
WHEREFORE, the 28 June 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR–H.C. No. 00863 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL,
EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y
SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING,
JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and
NORA EVAD y MULOK are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principals in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without
eligibility of parole. Accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y
RAFON A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for
ransom and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
(6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as minimum,
to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.
Accused-appellants are ordered to indemnify the victim in the
amounts of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral
 C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 60

damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages apportioned in

the following manner: the principals to the crime shall jointly and
severally pay the victim the total amount of ₱288,000.00 while
the accomplice shall pay the victim ₱12,000.00, subject to Article
110 of the Revised Penal Code on several and subsidiary liability.

The Court orders the Correctional Institute for Women to

immediately release THIAN PERPENIAN A.K.A. LARINA
PERPENIAN due to her having fully served the penalty imposed
on her, unless her further detention is warranted for any other
lawful causes.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate

implementation to the Director of the Correctional Institute for
Women by personal service. The Director of the Correctional
Institute for Women shall submit to this Court, within five (5)
days from receipt of a copy of the decision, the action he has
taken thereon.

SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174056
Appellee, [Formerly G.R. No. 138257]
- versus -
ROGELIO GUMIMBA y CORONA,
MORADANTE alias ROWING and CARPIO-MORALES,*
RONTE ABABO (acquitted), CALLEJO, SR.,*
Appellants,
Promulgated:
February 27, 2007
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
For review before the Court is the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated 26 April 2006, affirming with modification
the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Ozamiz City,
Branch 15,[3] dated 10 March 1999, finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide.
In an Information[4] dated 17 April 1997, appellant Rogelio
Gumimba y Morandante alias Rowing and co-accused Ronie
Abapo (Abapo) were charged before the RTC, with the crime of
rape with homicide of an eight (8)-year old child, thus:
That on or about April 8, 1997, in Barangay Pantaon, Ozamiz City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with
each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and by means of force, violence and intimidation, to
wit: by then and there pinning down one [AAA],[5] a minor, 8
years of age, and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her
and as a result thereof she suffered 6-12 oclock lacerated wounds
of [sic] the vagina as well as fatal stab wounds on the different
parts of her body and which were the direct cause of her death
thereafter.
CONTRARY to Article 335 in relation with Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code.
On 16 May 1997, appellant and Abapo both entered a plea of not
guilty on arraignment.[6] Thereafter, the case proceeded to trial
with the prosecution first presenting two witnesses: (1) Emelio
Magallano, President of Purok I, Barangay Pantaon, Ozamiz City;
and (2) Sofronio Araas, a Civilian Volunteer Officer (CVO) of the
same barangay.
Magallano and Araas testified that at around 9 oclock in the
evening of 10 April 1997, appellant went to Magallanos home and
confessed to him that he alone and by himself raped and killed
his (appellants) niece, AAA, in Purok Pantaon, Ozamiz City.
Subsequently, Magallano accompanied appellant to the residence
of Araas where he reiterated his confession. That same night,
Magallano, Araas, appellant and family members of the witnesses
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 61
proceeded to the home of Barangay Captain Santiago Acapulco,
Jr. who conducted an investigation. Appellant repeated his
narration and confessed to the barangay captain that he had
raped and killed the victim, and that he was alone when he
committed the crime. As a result thereof, Acapulco, Jr., in the
company of the others, brought appellant to the Ozamiz City Hall
and turned him over to the police authorities.[7]
However, appellant manifested though counsel (before the court)
at the following hearing on 22 May 1997 that he would like to
change his earlier plea of not guilty to a plea of guilty.[8] The RTC
ordered appellants re-arraignment and the latter accordingly
entered a plea of guilty.[9] The court conducted an inquiry to
ascertain the voluntariness of appellants plea and his full
comprehension of the consequences thereof. Prosecution was
likewise charged to establish the guilt and degree of culpability of
appellant.[10]
In accordance with the courts directive, the prosecution
continued with the presentation of its evidence in chief. It
presented Dr. Pedrita Rosauro, the physician who conducted the
autopsy on the body of the victim, and who testified that the
victim was raped before she was killed. The examination by Dr.
Rosauro revealed that AAA sustained four (4) stab wounds in
front, two (2) stab wounds in her back and one (1) lacerated
wound each on her neck and on her middle upper extremity.
Furthermore, she found 6 and 12 oclock laceration wounds on
the external genital organ of the victim.[11]
Before resting its case, the prosecution presented appellant as
witness against his co-accused Abapo. Appellant testified that he
and Abapo raped and killed the victim. He likewise explained that
he had previously confessed to Magallano, Araas and Acapulco
that he alone committed the crime in the hope that the parents of
the victim, who were relatives of his, might take pity on him.[12]
In his defense, Abapo testified that at the time the crime was
allegedly committed, he was with his mother and three (3)
siblings at the Labo River, about two (2) kilometers away from
Barangay Pantaon, washing their clothes.[13] In support thereof,
Abapo presented his mother Virgencita Abapo, Elisa Carreon and
Raymundo Orot, all of whom corroborated his alibi.[14] The
defense also presented witness Araas who reiterated his earlier
testimony that appellant confessed to him that he alone was
responsible for the raping and killing of the victim.[15] Finally,
Eugenio Bucog, a teacher at Capucao Elementary School, was
presented to demonstrate Abapos good character when he was
his student.[16]
On 10 March 1999, the RTC promulgated its Decision. On the
basis of appellants plea of guilty, the RTC found him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged. Appellant was
sentenced to suffer the death penalty and ordered to indemnify
the heirs of the victim in the amounts of P50,000.00 as indemnity
for the life of the victim, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and

costs.[17] On the other hand, the trial court acquitted Abapo on
the ground that his guilt was not established beyond reasonable
doubt. Except for the lone testimony of appellant, the RTC held
that no other evidence was adduced to prove the participation of
Abapo. Moreover, the court a quo found that appellants
testimony implicating Abapo was not worthy of credence coming
as it did from a polluted source.[18]
With the death penalty imposed on appellant, the case was
elevated to this Court on automatic review. Pursuant to this
Courts decision in People v. Mateo,[19] the case was transferred
to the Court of Appeals.
On 26 April 2006, the appellate court rendered its Decision[20]
affirming the appellants conviction, but with modification as to
damages awarded to the heirs of the victim. The dispositive
portion of the said Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated March 10, 1999
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Ozami[s] City, is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount of civil
indemnity ex delicto is hereby increased from P50,000.00 to
P100,000.00, including the award of moral damages from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00. Conformably with the ruling of the
Supreme Court in People of the Philippines v. Efren Mateo, We
refrain from entering judgment, and the Division Clerk of Court is
hereby directed to elevate the entire records of the case to the
Honorable Supreme Court for its final disposition.
SO ORDERED.[21]
On 3 October 2006, the Court issued an order requiring the
parties to simultaneously submit supplemental briefs within
thirty (30) days from notice should they so desire.[22] On 21
November and 24 November 2006, appellant and appellee filed
similar manifestations that they are adopting the briefs they filed
before the Court of Appeals.[23]
Thus, appellant raises the following errors in this petition for
review:
I xxxx
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF HIS IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF
GUILTY AND HIS ALLEGED SEPARATE CONFESSIONS TO ONE
EM[I]LIO MAGALLANO, AND ONE SOFRONIO ARAAS, THE
LATTER BEING HEARSAY AND WITHOUT PROBATIVE VALUE
WHATSOEVER.
II
THE COURT A QUO LIKEWISE ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 62
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE LATTERS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OWNING UP ONLY TO THE CRIME OF SIMPLE
RAPE.[24]
The ultimate issue is whether appellants guilt was established by
evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
It must be conceded at the outset that the trial court failed in its
duty to conduct the prescribed searching inquiry into the
voluntariness of appellants plea of guilty and full comprehension
thereof. Consequently, appellants plea of guilty was made
improvidently and it is rendered inefficacious.[25] Nevertheless,
the Court must rule against appellant as the evidence on record is
ample to sustain the judgment of conviction independent from
his plea of guilty.
The crime of rape with homicide is punishable with death under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7659, which provides:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed
by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented.
The crime of rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.
The Information, to which appellant pleaded guilty, alleged that
homicide was committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape
of AAA. This, if proven, would warrant the penalty of death at that
time.[26] Accordingly, a plea of guilty to such charges calls into
play the provisions of Section 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require

the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.
Based on this rule, when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is
entered, there are three (3) conditions that the trial court must
observe to obviate an improvident plea of guilty by the accused:
(1) it must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension by the accused of the consequences of his
plea; (2) it must require the prosecution to present evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and (3) it must ask the accused whether he desires to
present evidence on his behalf, and allow him to do so if he so
desires. [27]
There is no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a
searching inquiry, or as to the number and character of questions
he may ask the accused, or as to the earnestness with which he
may conduct it, since each case must be measured according to
its individual merit.[28] However, the logic behind the rule is that
courts must proceed with caution where the imposable penalty is
death for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is
irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons
have at times pleaded guilty.[29] An improvident plea of guilty on
the part of the accused when capital crimes are involved should
be avoided since he might be admitting his guilt before the court
and thus forfeit his life and liberty without having fully
comprehended the meaning and import and consequences of his
plea.[30] Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence
would aid this Court on appellate review in determining the
propriety or impropriety of the plea.[31]
In the instant case, when the accused entered a plea of guilty at
his re-arraignment, it is evident that the RTC did not strictly
observe the requirements under Section 3, Rule 116 above. A
mere warning
that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is
insufficient.[32] Such procedure falls short of the exacting
guidelines in the conduct of a searching inquiry, as follows:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought
into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a
competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained
and interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to
rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or
placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical
harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the
judges intimidating robes.
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he
had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the
meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused,
such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational
background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his
capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 63
(4) Inform the accused of the exact length of imprisonment or
nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will
serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads
guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or
because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter
penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of
the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these
mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not
only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of
the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase
punishment.
(5) Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is
charged and to fully explain to him the elements of the crime
which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so
would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be
informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him and
a denial of his right to due process.
(6) All questions posed to the accused should be in a language
known and understood by the latter.
(7) The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in
pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to
narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing
details.[33]
An examination of the records of the proceedings will illustrate
the courts treatment of appellants change of plea, viz:
Atty. Cagaanan:
Considering the voluntary plea of guilty of the accused[,] we pray
that the mitigating circumstance to prove his plea of guilty be
appreciated in favor of the accused. We likewise pray that
another mitigating [circumstance] of voluntary surrender be
appreciated in his favor.
Pros. Edmilao:
Considering the gravity of the crime, may we ask your Honor that
we will present evidence inorder [sic] that it will give also justice
to the victim.
Court:
Present evidence to prove gravity of the crime.
Pros. Edmilao:
Our first witness is the ABC president.
Court:
 C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 64

What matter will Santiago Acapulco testify? Q Was it committed inside or outside the house?
A Outside.
Court:
Q In what particular place of the house[:] in front, at the side or at
Was there cruelty done by the accused in picking [sic] the life of the back?
the minor girl? A At the back of the house of the victim.

xxxx Q Will you please tell the court, how did you do it, will you please
narrate.
Pros. Edmilao: A I raped her by tying her hand, then I killed her.

May we ask that we will present her [sic] in the next hearing. Q Before you raped and killed [AAA], where did you get her?
A I saw her roaming around.
Court:
Q In committing the crime, were you alone?
The court will call the accused to the witness stand.
Atty. Anonat:
xxxx Objection

(The witness after having administered an oath, took the witness Court:
stand and declared that he is: Sustained.
Pros. Edmilao:

ROGELIO GUMIMBA You stated that you pushed her and even tied her hand and raped
20 years old her and stabbed her, were you the one alone [sic]?
Single
Occupation- duck raising Atty. Anonat:
Resident of Capucao, Ozamiz City) Objection

xxxx Court:
Sustained.
Court:
The court will allow the prosecutor or the defense to profound Court:
[sic] question [sic] on the matter and the accused understand
[sic] and fully comprehend [sic] the consequence of his plea of Q When you said you raped her, you mean you inserted your
guilty. penis inside the vagina of [AAA]?
A No, Your Honor.
xxxx
Q When you said you raped her, what do you mean?
Pros. Edmilao: A I was drank [sic] at that time.

Q Mr. Rogelio Gumimba[,] are you the same accused in this case Q And you said you tied [AAA], what did you use in tying her?
in Crim. Case No. RTC 2074? A Banana skin.
A Yes, sir.
Q How did you tie [AAA]?
Q Now the victim in this case is [AAA], a minor, 8 years of age[.] A I tied both her hands.
Since you have admitted this in what particular place wherein
[sic] you raped and slew [AAA]? Q The hands of [AAA], you placed at the back?
A Purok Pantaon, Ozamiz City. A In front of her.

Q How far is that place wherein you slew and raped [AAA] from Q After tying her [,] what did you do to her?
her house? A After that I went home.
A Very near, sir.
Q You did not stab [AAA]?
Q Can you estimate how many meters? A I stabbed her, Your Honor.
A One meter, sir.

Q What weapon did you use in stabbing her?
A A long bolo.
Q You mean you were bringing [a] long bolo at that time?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q After stabbing her, what did you do to her?
A No more, Your Honor.
Q How many times did you stab [AAA]?
A I could not count how many stab wounds I inflicted to [sic] her.
Q But you will agree that you have stabbed her many times?
A I could no longer count how many stab wounds, Your Honor.
Q When you were arraigned, you pleaded guilty, do you
understand the consequence of your pleading guilty?
A I do not know Your Honor [,] the consequence.
Q You pleaded guilty to the offense of rape with homicide, did you
understand?
A Yes, Your Honor, I understand.
Q That by your pleading guilty to the offense you will be
sentenced to die?
A Yes, I am aware.
Q Your act of pleading guilty to the offense charged is your
voluntary will?
A Yes, I admitted that crime, but we were two.
Q You mean to say there were two of you who raped [AAA]?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Before raping her, was [AAA] wearing clothes?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Was [AAA] wearing [a] panty before you raped her?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did you remove her panty before raping her?
A No, You Honor, I did not.
Q How did you rape [AAA]?
A I have sexed [sic] with her.
Q What do you mean by I remedio her, you mean you have
inserted your penis into the vagina of [AAA]?
A No, Your Honor, my penis did not penetrate into the vagina of
[AAA].
Q Why your penis did [sic] not able to penetrate into the vagina
of [AAA]?
A The vagina of [AAA] is very small.
Q Can you tell this Court how tall was [AAA]?
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 65
A (The witness demonstrated that from the floor about 3 feet
high was the height of [AAA])
Q If you are standing and [AAA] is also standing side by side with
you, up to what part of your body is the height of [AAA]?
A Up to my waist line.
Atty. Cagaanan:
Q When you pleaded guilty [,] was it in your own free will?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were you not forced or coerced by anybody with this crime?
A No, sir.[34]
The inefficacious plea of guilty notwithstanding, the totality of
the evidence for the prosecution undeniably establishes
appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
with homicide. Apart from his testimony upon changing his plea
to a plea of guilty, appellant gave a subsequent testimony when
he was presented by the prosecution as a witness against his co-
accused. This second testimony which constitutes another
judicial confession, replete with details and made consciously as
it was, cured the deficiencies which made his earlier plea of guilty
improvident. The latter testimony left no room for doubt as to the
voluntariness and comprehension on appellants part of his
change of plea, as well as completed his narration of how he
raped and killed the victim. The pertinent portions of the second
testimony follow, thus:
Pros. Jose A. Edmilao:
Q While you were gathering firewoods [sic] and Ronie Abapo was
pasturing carabao, do you recall of any untoward incident that
happened?
A We raped and killed.
Q Whom did you rape and kill?
A [AAA].
Q And when you said [AAA], who was then your companion,
because you said we?
A Ronie Abapo.
xxxx
Q While she [AAA] was there gathering oranges, you mean to say
you were close to the place [AAA] was?
A I, together with Ronie Abapo go [sic] near to the place [AAA]
was.
Q When you were already near at [sic] the place where [AAA] was
climbing, was she still up there at the orange tree?
A She already came down.
Q When she came down, what followed next then?
 C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 66

A We held her hands. Q What [sic] you said that it was Ronie Abapo, what did you do
then when he was on [sic] the act of raping her?
Q Who held her hands? A I was just near to [sic] them.
A The two of us.
Q The after Ronie Abapo, what did you do then?
Q You mean one hand was held by you and the other hand was A He told me that you will be the next [sic].
held by Ronie Abapo?
Q So when he told you that you will be the next [sic], what did
Atty. Anonat: you do next?
Objection, leading. A I also raped her.

Pros. Edmilao: Q Again, when you said you raped her, you inserted your penis
into the vagina of [AAA]?
Q You said that you were holding the hands of [AAA], how did A It did not enter [sic].
you do it?
A We held her hands and tied it [sic] with banana skin. Q Why?
A It did not penetrate, because I was afraid.
Q Who tied the hands of [AAA]?
A Both of us. Q But your penis erected [sic]?
A No, Your Honor.
Q After tying the hands of [AAA][,] with banana stalk where did
you place her? Q You said that Ronie was the first to have sexual intercourse,
A We brought her to the [sic] grassy place. was he able to insert his penis into the vagina of [AAA]?
A No, sir, because he was watching, if there was person [sic]
Q What happened then after [AAA] was brought to the [sic] around.
grassy place?
A We killed her. Q Were you able to see the penis of Ronie inserted into the vagina
of [AAA]?
Q Before you killed her, what did you do to her? A I have [sic] not seen.
A We raped her.
xxxx
Q Who raped her first?
A It was Ronie Abapo, then followed by me. Q You said that you and Ronie Abapo raped [AAA], what do you
mean or what do you understand by the word rape?
Q How did you rape her? A We undressed her.
A We undress[sed] her.
Q Why did you undress her?
Q What was she wearing at that time? A We undressed her, because we want [sic] to do something to
A She wore a dress. her.

Q What about Ronie Abapo? Q What is that something that you want [sic] top do to [AAA]?
A He did not undress. A We raped her.

Q How did you let your penis out? Q When you said we raped her, you mean, you inserted your
A I removed my t-shirt. penis inside the vagina of [AAA]?
A No, sir.

Q How about your pants? Q But you tried to insert your penis inside the vagina?
A I also removed my pants. A Yes, sir.

Q What was then the reaction of [AAA], when you first tied her Q And your penis touched the vagina of [AAA]?
hand? A Yes, sir.
A She did not cry, because we covered her mouth.
Q Only your penis was not able to enter the vagina because [AAA]
Q Who covered her mouth? You or Ronie? is [sic] still a small girl?
A Ronie. A Yes, sir.
 C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 67

Q After trying to insert your penis after Ronie Abapo, what did A I cannot remember anymore.
you do to [AAA]?
A I walked away, but he called me. Q Aside from the stomach, where were the other pants [sic] of
[AAA] also hit?
Q Who called you? A At the left side.
A Ronie Abapo.
Q How about you, did you made [sic] the following stab to [AAA]?
Q Why did he call you? A I was hesitant to stab, but eventually I stabbed her.
A He asked me, what to do with [AAA]. It might be that she will
tell us to somebody [sic], we will kill her. Q How many times?
A Only one.
Q What did you do?
A I did not answer. Q What part of her body was she hit?
A At the stomach.
Q And what was your answer?
A Because he keep [sic] on persuading me. Q Do you mean to say that you also got the bolo from the hands of
Ronie Abapo and also stabbed [AAA]?
Q How did he persuade you? A Yes, sir.
A He persuaded me because we might be caught.
Q Why was [AAA] not killed, when Ronie Abapo made stabbed
Q And what did he tell you to do? [sic] on her?
A That we will kill [AAA]. A He [sic] was already dead.

Q How did he tell you that?

A Rowing[,] we will kill her.
Q Why did you stab her, when she was already dead?
Q And what was your reply? A I just stabbed her, because I thought that she was still alive.
A I refused.
xxxx
Q When you refused, what did he do then?
A He keep [sic] on persuading me. Q Do you know where is [sic] the bolo used in stabbing [AAA]?
A No, sir.
Q And what did eventually came [sic] to your mind?
A Evil came to my mind, so we killed her. Q After killing [AAA], where did you place the bolo?
A In our place.
Q How did you kill her?
A We stabbed her. Q It [sic] it there in your home?
A Already taken.
Q What weapon you used [sic] when you killed her?
A A long bolo. Q Who got?
A The barangay captain.
Q Whose [sic] the owner of that long bolo?
A Mine, but Ronie Abapo used it. Q Now, did you tell to [sic] anybody regarding the raping and
killing of [AAA] aside from here in Court?
Q Who was the first one to use it? A I have already told.
A Ronie Abapo.
Q Who was the person whom you talked about [sic]?
Q But the bolo was in your hands, how did [sic] he be able to use A My neighbor.
it?
A I put it on the ground and he got it. Q Whose [sic] the name of that neighbor?
A Emilio Magallano.
Q You said that he made the first struck [sic]. Where was [AAA]
first hit? Q After Emilio Magallano[,] to whom did you report?
A In the stomach. A Sofronio Aranas.

Q How many times did Ronie Abapo strike her with the use of Q Who else?
that bolo? A Rico Magallano.

Q Who else?
A The wife of Panyong.
Q In the reporting [sic] this matter[,] were you together with
Ronie Abapo telling these persons that you raped [AAA]?
A I was alone.
Q And did you tell her that you were two in killing and raping
with Ronie Abapo?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A According to Emilio that the mother of the victim might be [sic]
pity enough to me, because I am related to them.
Q When you reported to these persons you have mentioned, did
you also tell them that you were together with Ronie Abapo in
killing and raping?
A No, sir.[35]
While the trial court found appellants second testimony insofar
as it implicated his co-accused to be unworthy of credence, there
is absolutely nothing on record which militates against its use as
basis for establishing appellants guilt. In fact, in his Brief,
appellant submits that he must be convicted of simple rape alone
and not rape with homicide. Thus, he admits in writing, albeit
implicitly, that he raped the victim.
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside
only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court
relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused,
the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated
not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence
proving his commission of the offense charged.[36] Thus, as we
have ruled in People v. Derilo:[37]
While it may be argued that appellant entered an improvident
plea of guilty when re-arraigned, we find no need, however, to
remand the case to the lower court for further reception of
evidence. As a rule, this Court has set aside convictions based on
pleas of guilty in capital offenses because of improvidence
thereof and when such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory
judgment. However, where the trial court receives evidence to
determine precisely whether or not the accused has erred in
admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is made
(improvidently or not) loses legal significance, for the simple
reason that the conviction is based on evidence proving the
commission by the accused of the offense charged.
Thus, even without considering the plea of guilty of appellant, he
may still be convicted if there is adequate evidence on record on
which to predicate his conviction. x x x x
C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 68
Here, the prosecution was able to establish, through the separate
testimonies of appellant, that at around 1:00 oclock in the
afternoon of 8 April 1997, appellant was gathering firewood not
far from the house of the victim AAA in Barangay Pantaon,
Ozamiz City. He met co-accused Ronie Abapo who was then
pasturing his carabao also within the vicinity of the victims home.
They spotted the victim picking oranges with her three (3)-year
old brother at the back of their house and together approached
her from behind, tied her hands with banana skin and dragged
her to a grassy place.[38] Abapo raped the victim first.[39]
Thereafter, appellant followed suit.[40] Once they had finished
with their dastardly acts, they stabbed and killed the victim with
a long bolo which belonged to appellant.[41]
Through the testimony of the physician who conducted the
autopsy on AAAs body, it was established that the victim had 6
and 12 oclock lacerations on her external genital organ. Thus, it is
clear that the rape was consummated.
Appellant challenges the testimonies of the witnesses Magallano
and Araas on what appellant had confessed to or told them for
being hearsay. The challenge fails. The testimonies, it should be
conceded, cannot serve as a proof of extrajudicial confession for
an extrajudicial confession has to be in writing, among others, to
be admissible in evidence.[42] That is why the testimonies are of
use in the case as corroborative evidence only. Such utility,
however, cannot be defeated by the hearsay rule. The testimonies
covered are independently relevant statements which are not
barred by the hearsay rule.
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only
the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth
or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply.
The statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the
making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.[43]
Moreover, where, as in the case at bar, there is no evidence to
show any dubious reason or improper motive for a prosecution
witness to bear false testimony against the accused or falsely
implicate him in a crime, his or her testimony should be given full
faith and credit.[44]
Next, we address appellants contention that he can only be
convicted of simple rape, as this is the only crime to which he has
owned up. Arguing that the victim may have already been dead
after his co-accused had allegedly hacked her first, appellant
theorizes that he, at most, would be guilty of an impossible crime.
Appellant is clutching at straws. It is extremely doubtful that
appellant could have known positively that the victim was
already dead when he struck her. The proposition not only
completely contradicts his judicial confession, it is also
speculative as to cause of death. In light of the particular
 C a s e s o n A r r a i g n m e n t / P l e a | 69

circumstances of the event, appellants mere conjecture that AAA
had already expired by the time he hacked her cannot be
sufficient to support his assertion of an impossible crime. An
examination of the testimony is again called for, thus:
Pros. Edmilao:
Q You said that he (Abapo) made the first strike, where was
[AAA] first hit?
A In the stomach.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR-
HC No. 00193 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole and to pay the heirs of the victim, AAA, in the
amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, plus costs.

Q How many times did Ronie Abapo strike her with the use of
that bolo?
A I cannot remember anymore.

Q Aside from the stomach, where were the other pants [sic] of
[AAA] also hit?
A At the left side.

Q How about you, did you made [sic] the following stab to [AAA]?
A I was hesitant to stab, but eventually I stabbed her.

Q How many times?

A Only one.

Q What part of her body was she hit?

A At the stomach.

Q Do you mean to say that you also got the bolo from the hands of
Ronie Abapo and also stabbed AAA?
A Yes, sir.

Q Why was [AAA] not killed, when Ronie Abapo made stabbed
[sic] on her?
A He [sic] was already dead.

Q Why did you stab her, when she was already dead?
A I just stabbed her, because I thought that she was still alive.[45]

Thus, the finding of guilt as pronounced by the RTC and the Court
of Appeals should be sustained. However, with the passage of R.A.
No. 9346, entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines, the penalty of death can no longer be
imposed. Accordingly, the penalty imposed upon appellant is
reduced from death to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole.[46]

With respect to the civil liability of appellant, we modify the

award in light of prevailing jurisprudence. Accordingly, appellant
is ordered to indemnify the heirs of AAA in the amount of
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
P25,000.00 as temperate damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages.[47]