Supreme Court of the Philippines

263 Phil. 1016

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 90204, May 11, 1990
MANUEL BELARMINO, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES
COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

GRINO-AQUINO, J.:

This seven-year-old case involves a claim for benefits for the death of a lady
school teacher which the public respondents disallowed on the ground that the
cause of death was not work-connected.

Before her death on February 19, 1982, petitioner’s wife, Oania Belarmino, was
a classroom teacher of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
assigned at the Buracan Elementary School in Dimasalang, Masbate (p. 13,
Rollo). She had been a classroom teacher since October 18, 1971, or for eleven
(11) years. Her husband, the petitioner, is also a public school teacher.

On January 14, 1982, at nine o’clock in the morning, while performing her
duties as a classroom teacher, Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th month of
pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on the classroom floor. Moments later,
she complained of abdominal pain and stomach cramps. For several days, she
continued to suffer from recurrent abdominal pain and a feeling of heaviness in
her stomach, but, heedless of the advice of her female co-teachers to take a
leave of absence, she continued to report to the school because there was much
work to do. On January 25, 1982, eleven (11) days after her accident, she went
into labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl at home (p. 8, Rollo).

Her abdominal pains persisted even after the delivery, accompanied by high
fever and headache. She was brought to the Alino Hospital in Dimasalang,
Masbate on February 11, 1982. Dr. Alfonso Alino found that she was suffering
from septicemia post partum due to infected lacerations of the vagina. She was
discharged from the hospital after five (5) days on February 16, 1982, apparently
recovered, but she died three (3) days later. The cause of death was septicemia
post partum. She was 33 years old, survived by her husband and four (4)
children, the oldest of whom was 11 years old and the youngest, her new-born
infant (p. 9, Rollo).

On April 21, 1983, a claim for death benefits was filed by her husband. On
February 14, 1984, it was denied by the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) which held that “septicemia post partum, the cause of death, is not an
occupational disease, and neither was there any showing that aforesaid ailment
was contracted by reason of her employment. x x x. The alleged accident
mentioned could not have precipitated the death of the wife but rather the result
of the infection of her lacerated wounds as a result of her delivery at home” (p.
14, Rollo).

On appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission, the latter issued

Resolution No. 3913 dated July 8, 1988 holding:

“We agree with the decision of the system, hence we dismiss this appeal. Post-
partum septicemia is an acute infectious disease of the puerperium resulting
from the entrance into the blood of bacteria usually streptococci and their
toxins which cause dissolution of the blood, degenerative changes in the organs
and the symptoms of intoxication. The cause of this condition in the instant
case was the infected vaginal lacerations resulting from the decedent’s delivery
of her child which took place at home. The alleged accident in school could not
have been the cause of septicemia, which in this case is clearly caused by factors
not inherent in employment or in the working conditions of the deceased.” (pp.
14-15, Rollo.)

Hence, this petition for review.

After a careful consideration of the petition and the annexes thereof, as well as
the comments of the public respondents, we are persuaded that the public
respondents’ peremptory denial of the petitioner’s claim constitutes a grave
abuse of discretion.
Rule III, Section 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation
enumerates the grounds for compensability of injury resulting in disability or
death of an employee, as follows:

“SECTION 1. Grounds - (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death
to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident
satisfying all of the following conditions:

“(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work
requires him to be;

“(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and

“(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been
executing an order for the employer.

“(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable,
the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex ‘A’
of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be
shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions.

“(c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the
resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules.”

The illness, septicemia post partum, which resulted in the death of Oania
Belarmino, is admittedly not listed as an occupational disease in her particular
line of work as a classroom teacher. However, as pointed out in the petition,
her death from that ailment is compensable because an employment accident
and the conditions of her employment contributed to its development. The
condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and
suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal
pains which culminated in the premature termination of her pregnancy with
tragic consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom floor brought about her
premature delivery which caused the development of post partum septicemia
which resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the proximate or responsible
cause that set in motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise.
“x x x what is termed in American cases the proximate cause, not implying
however, as might be inferred from the word itself, the nearest in point of time
or relation, but rather, [is] the efficient cause, which may be the most remote of
an operative chain. It must be that which sets the others in motion and is to be
distinguished from a mere preexisting condition upon which the effective cause
operates, and must have been adequate to produce the resultant damage without
the intervention of an independent cause.” (Atlantic Gulf vs. Insular
Government, 10 Phil. 166, 171.)

“The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom.” (Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181.)

Thus in Enriquez v. WCC, 93 SCRA 366, 372, this Court ruled:

“x x x. Verily, the right to compensation extends to disability due to disease

supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable
injury (82 Am. Jur. 132). Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in
the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury
likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent
intervening cause attributable to claimant’s own negligence or misconduct (I
Larson Workmen’s Compensation Law 3-279 [1972]). Simply stated, all the
medical consequences and sequels that flow from the primary injury are
compensable. (Ibid.)”

Mrs. Belarmino’s fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her
employment as a classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences
flowing from it: her recurrent abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her
baby, her septicemia post partum, and death, are compensable.

There is no merit in the public respondents’ argument that the cause of the
decedent’s post partum septicemia “was the infected vaginal lacerations resulting
from the decedent’s delivery of her child at home” for the incident in school
could not have caused septicemia post partum, x x x if the necessary precautions
to avoid infection during or after labor were (not) taken” (p. 29, Rollo).

The argument is unconvincing. It overlooks the fact that septicemia post

partum is a disease of childbirth, and premature childbirth would not have
occurred if she did not accidentally fall in the classroom.

It is true that if she had delivered her baby under sterile conditions in a hospital
operating room instead of in the unsterile environment of her humble home,
and if she had been attended by specially trained doctors and nurses, she
probably would not have suffered lacerations of the vagina and she probably
would not have contracted the fatal infection. Furthermore, if she had remained
longer than five (5) days in the hospital to complete the treatment of the
infection, she probably would not have died. But who is to blame for her
inability to afford a hospital delivery and the service of trained doctors and
nurses? The court may take judicial notice of the meager salaries that the
Government pays its public school teachers. Forced to live on the margin of
poverty, they are unable to afford expensive hospital care, nor the services of
trained doctors and nurses when they or members of their families are ill.
Penury compelled the deceased to scrimp by delivering her baby at home
instead of in a hospital.

The Government is not entirely blameless for her death for it is not entirely
blameless for her poverty. Government has yet to perform its declared policy
“to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to
them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all (Sec. 7,
Art. II, 1973 Constitution and Sec. 9, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). Social justice
for the lowly and underpaid public school teachers will only be an empty
shibboleth until Government adopts measures to ameliorate their economic
condition and provides them with adequate medical care or the means to afford
it. “Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society” (PLDT
v. Bucay and NLRC, 164 SCRA 671, 673). By their denial of the petitioner’s
claim for benefits arising from the death of his wife, the public respondents
ignored this imperative of Government, and thereby committed a grave abuse
of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The respondents

Employees Compensation Commission and the Government Service Insurance
System are ordered to pay death benefits to the petitioner and/or the
dependents of the late Oania Belarmino, with legal rate of interest from the
filing of the claim until it is fully paid, plus attorney’s fees equivalent to ten
(10%) percent of the award, and costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., on leave.

Copyright 2016 - Batas.org

 Supreme Court of the Philippines

242 Phil. 448

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-48594, March 16, 1988
GENEROSO ALANO, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The only issue in this case is whether or not the injury sustained by the deceased
Dedicacion de Vera resulting in her death is compensable under the law as an
employment accident.

The facts as found by the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission

are as follows:
"Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as
principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour
of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at - 7:00 A.M.,
while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to
the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which
resulted in her instantaneous death. She is survived by her four sons and a
daughter.

"On June 27, 1977, Generoso C. Alano, brother of the deceased, filed the
instant claim for income benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the
decedent's children. The claim was, however, denied on the same date on the
ground that ‘the injury upon which compensation is being claimed is not an
employment accident satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law.’ On July 19,
1977 appellant requested for a reconsideration of the system's decision, but the
same was denied and the records of the case were elevated to this Commission
for review." (Rollo, p. 12)
The respondent Commission affirmed the decision of the Government Service
Insurance System. It stated that Section I(a), Rule III of the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation specifically provides that: "For the injury and the
resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of
an employment accident satisfying all the following conditions: (1) The
employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours; (2) The
employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to
be; and (3) The employee must have been performing his official functions."
(Rollo, p. 13)

According to the respondent Commission, the deceased's accident did not meet
any of the aforementioned conditions. First, the accident occurred at about 7:00
a.m. or thirty minutes before the deceased's working hours. Second, it happened
not at her workplace but at the plaza where she usually waits for a ride to her
work. Third, she was not then performing her official functions as school
principal nor was she on a special errand for the school. The case, therefore, was
dismissed.

The petitioner then went to this Court on petition for review on certiorari. He
alleges that the deceased's accident has "arisen out of or in the course of her
employment."

The respondent Commission reiterates its views and contends that the present
provision of law on employment injury is different from that provided in the old
Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428) and is "categorical in that the injury
must have been sustained at work while at the workplace, or elsewhere while
executing an order from the employer." (Rollo, p. 44)

The Government Service Insurance System which received a copy of the

Court's resolution requiring the parties to submit their memoranda, however
manifests that it does not appear to be a party to the case because it had not
been impleaded as a party thereto.

We rule in favor of the petitioner.

This case does not come to us with a novel issue. In the earlier case of Vda. de
Torbela v. Employees' Compensation Commission (96 SCRA 260, 263-264)
which has a similar factual background, this Court held:
"It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock
in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he
was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was located
and that at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he
allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of his death.

"The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point

reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his
work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his
employment."
In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of
work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily
required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was
nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of the
accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there.

As to the Government Service Insurance System's manifestation, we hold that it

is not fatal to this case that it was not impleaded as a party respondent. As early
as the case of La O v. Employees' Compensation Commission, (97 SCRA 782)
up to Cabanero v. Employees’ Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 413) and
recently, Clemente v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. L-
47521, August 31, 1987), this Court has ruled that the Government Service
Insurance System is a proper party in employees' compensation cases as the
ultimate implementing agency of the Employees' Compensation Commission.
We held in the aforecited cases that "the law and the rules refer to the said
System in all aspects of employee compensation including enforcement of
decisions (Article 182 of Implementing Rules)."

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission

appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the Government Service Insurance
System is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of Twelve Thousand
Pesos (P12,000.00) as death benefit and the sum of One Thousand Two
Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) as attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

 Supreme Court of the Philippines

264 Phil. 953

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 78617, June 18, 1990
SALVADOR LAZO, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES), RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the respondent Employees Compensation

Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 2883 which affirmed the dismissal of
petitioner’s claim for compensation against the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS).

The petitioner, Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central Bank of the
Philippines assigned to its main office in Malate, Manila. His regular tour of
duty is from 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o’clock in the evening. On
18 June 1986, the petitioner rendered duty from 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon to
10:00 o’clock in the evening. But, as the security guard who was to relieve him
failed to arrive, the petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5:00 o’clock in the
morning of 19 June 1986, when he asked permission from his superior to leave
early in order to take home to Binangonan, Rizal, his sack of rice.

On his way home, at about 6:00 o’clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, the
passenger jeepney the petitioner was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road.
As a result, he sustained injuries and was taken to the Angono Emergency
Hospital for treatment. He was later transferred to the National Orthopedic
Hospital where he was confined until 25 July 1986.
For the injuries he sustained, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under
PD 626, as amended. His claim, however, was denied by the GSIS for the
reason that -

“It appears that after performing your regular duties as Security Guard from
2:00 P.M. to 10:00 P.M. on June 18, 1986, you rendered overtime duty from
10:00 P.M. to 5:06 A.M. of the following day; that at about 5:06 A.M. after
asking permission from your superior you were allowed to leave the Office to
do certain personal matter - that of bringing home a sack of rice and that, while
on your way home, you met a vehicular accident that resulted to (sic) your
injuries. From the foregoing informations, it is evident that you were not at
your work place performing your duties when the incident occurred.” [1]

It was held that the condition for compensability had not been satisfied.

Upon review of the case, the respondent Employees Compensation

Commission affirmed the decision since the accident which involved the
petitioner occurred far from his work place and while he was attending to a
personal matter.

Hence, the present recourse.

The petitioner contends that the injuries he sustained due to the vehicular
accident on his way home from work should be construed as “arising out of or
in the course of employment” and thus, compensable. In support of his prayer
for the reversal of the decision, the petitioner cites the case of Pedro Baldebrin
vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commision, where the Court awarded
[2]

compensation to the petitioner therein who figured in an accident on his way

home from his official station at Pagadian City to his place of residence at
Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. In the accident, petitioner’s left eye was hit by a
pebble while he was riding on a bus.
Respondents claim that the Baldebrin ruling is a deviation from cases earlier
decided and hence, not applicable to the present case.

The Court has carefully considered the petition and the arguments of the parties
and finds that the petitioner’s submission is meritorious.

Liberally interpreting the employees compensation law to give effect to its

compassionate spirit as a social legislation, in Vda. de Torbela v. ECC, the
[3] [4]

Court held:

“It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o’clock
in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he
was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was located
and that at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he
allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of his death. The claim is
compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably
proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such
injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.”

Again in Alano v. ECC, it was reiterated:

[5]

“Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as

principal of Salinap School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty
was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A.M., while
she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the
school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which
resulted in her instantaneous death. x x x”
“In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of
work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily
required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was
nothing private or personal about the school principal’s being at the place of the
accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there.”

More recently, in Vano vs. GSIS & ECC, this Court, applying the above quoted
[6]

decisions, enunciated:

“Filomeno Vano was a letter carrier of the Bureau of Posts in Tagbilaran City.
On July 31, 1983, a Sunday, at around 3:30 p.m. Vano was driving his
motorcycle with his son as backrider allegedly on his way to his station in
Tagbilaran for his work the following day, Monday. As they were approaching
Hinawanan Bridge in Loay, Bohol, the motorcycle skidded, causing its
passengers to be thrown overboard. Vano’s head hit the bridge’s railing which
rendered him unconscious. He was taken to the Engelwood Hospital where he
was declared dead on arrival due to severe hemorrhage.
“We see no reason to deviate from the foregoing rulings. Like the deceased in
these two (2) aforementioned cases, it was established that petitioner’s husband
in the case at bar was on his way to his place of work when he met the accident.
His death, therefore, is compensable under the law as an employment accident.”

In the above cases, the employees were on their way to work. In the case at bar,
petitioner had come from work and was on his way home, just like in the
Baldebrin case, where the employee “x x x figured in an accident when he was
going home from his official station at Pagadian City to his place of residence at
Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur x x x.” [7]

In Baldebrin, the Court said:

“The principal issue is whether petitioner’s injury comes within the meaning of
and intendment of the phrase ‘arising out of and in the course of employment.’
(Section 2, Workmen’s Compensation Act). In Philippine Engineer’s Syndicate,
Inc. vs. Flora S. Martin and Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 4 SCRA
356. We held that ‘where an employee, after working hours, attempted to ride
on the platform of a service truck of the company near his place of work, and,
while thus attempting, slipped and fell to the ground and was run over by the
truck, resulting in his death, the accident may be said to have arisen out of or in
the course of employment, for which reason his death is compensable. The fact
standing alone, that the truck was in motion when the employee boarded, is
insufficient to justify the conclusion that he had been notoriously negligent,
where it does not appear that the truck was running at a great speed.’ And, in a
later case, Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, 26 SCRA 102, 103, We ruled that ‘[e]mployment includes not only
the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space
necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be
done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied
consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer’s
premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in
practical effect a part of the employer’s premises, the injury is one arising out of
and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while
the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance.”
(Underscoring supplied)

In the case at bar, it can be seen that petitioner left his station at the Central
Bank several hours after his regular time off, because the reliever did not arrive,
and so petitioner was asked to go on overtime. After permission to leave was
given, he went home. There is no evidence on record that petitioner deviated
from his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the
journey.

While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the

Workmen’s Compensation Act (under which the Baldebrin case was decided)
may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code, it is significant that the
[8]

liberality of the law in general in favor of the workingman still subsists. As

agent charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by
the Constitution, the Employees Compensation Commission should adopt a
liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability,
especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection
to the accident.

This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate

spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states
that “all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of
the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be
resolved in favor of labor.”

The policy then is to extend the applicability of the decree (PD 626) to as many
employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder. This is in consonance with
the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor. [9]

There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be protected for a

reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable
distance before reaching or after leaving the employer’s premises.[10]

If the Vano ruling awarded compensation to an employee who was on his way
from home to his work station one day before an official working day, there is
no reason to deny compensation for accidental injury occuring while he is on his
way home one hour after he had left his work station.

We are constrained not to consider the defense of the street peril doctrine and
instead interpret the law liberally in favor of the employee because the
Employees Compensation Act, like the Workmen’s Compensation Act, is
basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working men and
women in our society.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let the case be remanded to the ECC and the GSIS for disposition in
accordance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

[1] Annex “B”, Rollo at p. 7

1[2] G.R. No. L-43792, October 12, 1984, 132 SCRA 510
[3] Clemente v. WCC, G.R. No. L-42087, 8 April 1988, 159 SCRA 492
[4] G.R. No. L-42627, February 21, 1980, 96 SCRA 260
[5] G.R. No. L-48594, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 670
[6] G.R. No. 81327, December 4, 1989
[7] see Baldebrin, supra.

PD 626 - promulgated on 1 January 1975, further amended by PD 1368 on 1

[8]

May 1978.

Carbajal v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. L-46654, August

[9]

9, 1988, 164 SCRA 204

Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 [1923] and Papineau v.
[10]

Industrial Accident Commission, 187 Pac. 108.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-46046 April 5, 1985

EMELITA ENAO, petitioner,

vs.
THE EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.

Vivencio M. Carpio, Jr. for petitioner.

Jose G. De Vera for respondent ECC.

ALAMPAY, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (E.C.C.),
dated October 26, 1976, affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System,
denying petitioner's claim for Compensation of income benefits due to the injuries sustained by her
when on August 1, 1975, while on her way to Dipolog City for the purpose of purchasing supplies
and other training and school aids for her office, she, together with others, were ambushed by
unidentified men believed to be communist insurgents.

The antecedent facts of this case are not disputed and are well stated in the appealed decision
rendered by the Employees' Compensation Commission, subject of the petition in this case.

... On August 1, 1975, appellant (Emelita Enao), a Public School Teacher, together
with others, was on her way from her official station at Sergio Osmena, Sr.,
Zamboanga del Norte to Dipolog City. According to the Acting Administrative Officer
of her employer, 'Having held classes on July 26, in lieu of August 1, 1975, as per
District Memorandum hereto attached, Miss Enao was on her way home from station
when their group was ambushed and fired upon by armed men hitting her on her
forearm and abdomen necessitating operation' (Part II, Income Benefits Claim for
Payment), and according to appellant's witnesses, who were members of the
ambushed party, she was on her way to Dipolog City for the purpose of 'securing
supplies and other training and school aids necessary for furthering (our) services as
a school teacher' (Affidavits of Francisco L. Podol and Juanita Adanza, respectively).
When the appellant and her group were at barrio de Venta Perla, Polanco,
Zamboanga del Norte, they were fired upon by a band of armed men believed to be
communist insurgents. As a result of the ambush, the appellant sustained gunshot
wounds on her left forearm and abdomen which compelled her confinement at the
Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Hospital from August 1 to 6, 1975, for surgical
removal of foreign bodies (shrapnel) from her left arm and later at the Dipolog
Medical Center from September 10 to 12, 1975 for definitive treatment. She also
developed interstitial pneumonia as a result. (Decision of the Employees'
Compensation Commission, Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 8-9).
On August 5, 1975, petitioner sent a notice of claim of injury to the Secretary of Education and
Culture, through the Division Superintendent of Schools, Zamboanga City. It is said that this claim
was not controverted.

On the same date, a claim for income benefits for disability was filed by the herein petitioner with the
Government Service Insurance System but this claim was denied by the System in its letter-
decision, dated February 27, 1976, on its reasoning that:

It appears that on your way to Dipolog City for the purpose of purchasing your needs,
you were ambushed by unidentified men believed to be NPAS. Though this
happened on August 1, 1975, a regular working day, this was considered your off
day, having held classes in its stead on July 26, 1975, a Saturday, per District
Memorandum No. 1, s. 1975, dated June 2, 1975. Under such situation, for purposes
of the Employees' Compensation, said accident happened outside your time and
place of work, not to mention the fact that you were not in the performance of your
official functions when it happened.

In view of the foregoing, your claim is hereby denied. (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 7)

Not satisfied with the above ruling of the GSIS and upon denial of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof, the latter appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission. On
October 26, 1976, the ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS appealed from and dismissed the
Petitioner's claim, on the grounds that:

... First. the day when the accident occurred, more particularly August 1, 1975, was
an off-day. Perusal of the District Memorandum No. 1, series of 1975 and dated June
2, 1975, win show that August 1, 1975, is not just an isolated off-day, but one of
those dates fixed and set in lieu of Saturday. Hence, the injury was incurred not
during office hours. Second, appellant incurred injury while en route to Dipolog City;
more aptly put, while outside t-he school premises where she normally discharges
her official functions. The sworn statement of the Acting Administrative Officer and
the appellant's witness all point to the same circumstance. Third, while appellant's
witnesses testified in an affidavit that appellant left her official station for Dipolog City
on the day in question for the purpose of procurring school supplies and training aids
to enhance her teaching efficiency, we find the version of the Acting Administrative
Officer more credible-that is, the appellant was on her way home from station-for
there is nothing which indicates that it is false, misleading or fabricated. On the other
hand, the preponderance of legal opinion holds that affidavits, as those of appellant's
witnesses, are only prima facie evidence of weak probative force and are in
themselves self-serving declarations where the same have been made in anticipation
of a future litigation. It has been said that 'perhaps the most subtle and prolific of au
the fallacies of testimony arises out of unconscious partisanship.' In the case at bar,
upon the happening of the accident, the companions of the appellant perhaps still
sympathetic to her for what befall her, and testifying in an affidavit, are apt to side
with her. (Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 9-10)

In the petition for review presented to this Court, Petitioner contends that the Respondent ECC has
decided the claim in a way not in accordance with law and applicable decision of the Supreme Court.

At the time of the incident in question, the pertinent and governing provisions of law are to be found
in Section 1, Rule 11, of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, which provides:
 SECTION 1. Grounds.—(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all
of the following conditions:

(1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours;

(2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him
to be; and

(3) The employee must have been performing his official function.

The Petitioner, in proceeding to Dipolog City on August 1, 1975, which is a Friday, from her station
at the Municipality of Sergio Osmena, Sr., Zamboanga del Norte, intended to procure supplies and
other training aids which are needed facilities in connection with her services as a school teacher at
the Wilbon Primary School, cannot be at all disputed. The companions of the Petitioner at the time of
the ambush and who appear to be co-teachers of the Petitioner, namely: Francisco L. Podol and
Juanita Adanza, have attested in their respective affidavits that they and the Petitioner were at that
time on their way to Dipolog City "for the purpose of securing supplies and other training and school
aids necessary for the furtherance of their services as school teachers." There is no mention at an in
the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission that this particular assertion has been at
all contradicted or controverted by any evidence whatsoever submitted to the Commission by the
GSIS.

We find no basis at an for the findings made by the Employees' Compensation Commission in its
decision that the statements of Petitioner and her witnesses are merely self-serving declarations
because We can discern no circumstance that would indicate or support such a conclusion. As a
matter of fact, the decision appealed from accepts the fact that the statements given by Petitioner-
Appellant's witnesses constitute prima facie evidence of the matter sought to be established.
Uncontroverted and unrefuted by any evidence, then such statements of appellant's witnesses would
suffice to establish that the multiple gunshot wounds and injuries sustained by appellant and which
caused her confinement at the Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Hospital from August 1 to 6, 1975
for removal of shrapnels from her left arm and later at the Dipolog Medical Center from September 1
to 12, 1975, are definitely work-connected.

The conjecture expressed in the decision of the ECC that appellant obtained the referred self-
serving declaration of her witnesses "in anticipation of a future litigation" is unfair and untenable.
Petitioner could not have even expected that respondent GSIS would resist her claim. Notice of the
same claim for the injuries she sustained is said to have been presented to the Secretary of
Education and Culture, through the Division Superintendent of Schools, Division of Zamboanga del
Norte at Dipolog City, promptly on August 5, 1975, or four (4) days after the ambush incident and
such claim was not controverted by said public school officials. These submissions of Petitioner-
Appellant have not at all been contradicted by Respondent. No cause has, therefore, been shown
why petitioner would have been to obtain false affidavits from her co-teachers whose sense and
probity and righteousness must be presumed until otherwise disproved.

Furthermore, the fact that Dipolog City is also the residence of the Petitioner does not at all, by this
singular circumstance, render untrue or false the clear evidence submitted in this case that Petitioner
and her co-teachers were proceeding to Dipolog City at the time to purchase needed supplies and
other training and school aids. That Dipolog City happened to be also the Petitioner's place of
residence, in this instance, becomes simply incidental and/or purely coincidental.
As it can be rightfully ruled that the Claimant-Petitioner was actually then performing her official
functions, it hardly matters then whether such task which Petitioner was then engaged in or
discharging, happened outside the regular working hours and not in the Petitioner's place of work. It
is rather obvious that in proceeding to purchase school materials in Dipolog City, Petitioner would
necessarily have to leave the school premises and her travel need not be during her usual working
hours. What is significant and controlling is that the injuries she sustained are work-connected,
which the Court finds to be so.

The environmental facts in this case are even more compelling than the earlier case of Vda. de
Torbela vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, L-42627, February 21, 1980, 96 SCRA 260,
where, by a significant majority vote of this Court, it was held that a claim arising from a vehicular
accident sustained by a school principal on his way from Bacolod City where he lived to his school at
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where he was the school principal of, is compensable. It was therein
ruled that "where an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place of
work, while she is going to and from her work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the
course of her employment.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed from is hereby
SET ASIDE, and the Government Service Insurance System is hereby ordered to grant the
Petitioner's claim for loss of income benefits and to process and ascertain the total amount due
herein Petitioner and thereafter to pay the same.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ.,
concur.
 Supreme Court of the Philippines

186 Phil. 43

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-48488, April 25, 1980
GLORIA D. MEÑEZ, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION & CULTURE), RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

MAKASIAR, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari from the decision en banc dated March 1, 1978 of
the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0462, affirming
the denial by the Government Service Insurance System of the claim of
petitioner for benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 (now Title II of the
New Labor Code) and dismissing said claim.

The records disclose that petitioner Gloria D. Meñez was employed by the
Department (now Ministry) of Education & Culture as a school teacher. She
retired on August 31, 1975 under the disability retirement plan at the age of 54
years after 32 years of teaching, due to rheumatoid arthritis and
pneumonitis. Before her retirement, she was assigned at Raja Soliman High
School in Tondo-Binondo, Manila -- near a dirty creek.

On October 21, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with respondent Government Service
Insurance System (p. 1, ECC rec.).

On October 25, 1976, respondent GSIS denied said claim on the ground that
petitioner's ailments, rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis, are not occupational
diseases taking into consideration the nature of her particular work. In denying
aforesaid claim, respondent GSIS thus resolved:
"Upon evaluation based on generally accepted medical authorities, your ailments
are found to be in the least causally related to your duties and conditions of
work. We believe that your ailments are principally traceable to factors which
are definitely not work-connected. Moreover, the evidences you have submitted
have not shown that the said ailments directly resulted from your occupation as
Teacher IV of Raja Soliman High School, Manila" (Letter-Resolution, p. 4, ECC
Case No. 0462).
On November 24, 1976, petitioner filed a letter-request for reconsideration of
the aforesaid denial of her claim, which request was denied by the GSIS in its
letter-resolution of November 28, 1976 therein reiterating that on the basis of
the evidence on record, it appears that petitioner has not established that her
employment had any causal relationship with the contraction of the ailments (p.
6, ECC rec.).

On March 7, 1977, petitioner again requested for reconsideration of the second

denial of said claim, still alleging that her ailments arose out of and in the course
of employment (p. 11, ECC rec.).

On March 11, 1977, respondent GSIS reaffirmed its stand on the case and
elevated the entire records thereof to the Employees' Compensation
Commission for review (p. 12, ECC rec.).

On March 1, 1978, respondent Commission issued a decision en banc thus

stating:
"x x x Despite assertions to the contrary by herein appellant, this Commission
fully agrees with the respondent system that appellant's employment has nothing
to do with the development of her disabling illnesses, Appellant's ailments are
not listed as occupational diseases for the employment she was engaged in as to
merit compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended" (p. 13,
rec.).
On July 7, 1978, petitioner filed this petition seeking a review of aforesaid
decision of respondent Commission (p. 2, rec.).

Petitioner claims she contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with

hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on January 27, 1975 after wetting and
chilling during the course of employment which are permanent and recurring in
nature and work-connected (p. 2, rec.).
She specifically alleged that --
"x x x said sickness and/or disabilities arose out of or in the course of
employment and is aggravated by the condition and nature of the work in
school, that appellant belonged to the afternoon and night shifts as shown by
her time record, Annex D, subjecting her to varying climatic (sic) temperature at
noon and night time; and that the place of work, Raja Soliman High School, is
surrounded by the Divisoria market at the north, Sta. Helena Bridge and Creek
which is heavily polluted; in the Northeast, is the presence of many squatter
houses too, and in the south -- gasoline stations, bakery, Textile market as stated
before and a fact. That as a teacher of social studies handling 250 students more
or less a day, she is subjected to infections from students who have flu, colds
and other respiratory infections which aggravated her ailments" (p. 3, rec.).
Petitioner now maintains that her ailments arose in the course of employment
and were aggravated by the condition and nature of her work. Specifically, she
asserts that "pneumonitis or baby pneumonia which has become chronic that
led to bronchiectasis which is irreversible and permanent in nature is
compensable under No. 21 of compensable diseases (Resolution No. 432 dated
July 20, 1977) as conditions were present as attested to by doctors' affidavits and
certifications."

Respondents Commission and System contend that petitioner's ailments of

rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are not among the occupational diseases
listed as compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, or under
Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation; and, that respondent
Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the form of
accepted medical findings thus making said decision final and conclusive on the
matter (p. 33 & 68, rec.).

Article 167(1) of the new Labor Code provides that --

"(1) 'Sickness' means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease
listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof
by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions. x x"
Rule III, Section 1(b) of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation thus
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
"(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of
these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be
shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by working
conditions."
Rule III, Section 1(c) of said Rules states:
"(c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the
resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules."

The aforequoted provisions clearly establish that for an illness to be

compensable, it must either be:

1. An illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease; or

2. An illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that

the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions.

An occupational disease is one "which results from the nature of the

employment, and by nature is meant conditions to which all employees of a class are
subject and which produce the disease as a natural incident of a particular occupation,
and attach to that occupation a hazard which distinguishes it from the usual run of
occupations and is in excess of the hazard attending the employment in general" (Goldberg vs.
954 Mancy Corp., 12 N.E. 2d 311; underlining supplied).

To be occupational, the disease must be one "due wholly to causes and

conditions which are normal and constantly present and characteristic of the particular
occupation; that is, those things which science and industry have not yet learned
how to eliminate. Every worker in every plant of the same industry is alike
constantly exposed to the danger of contracting a particular occupational
disease" (Seattle Can Co. vs. Dept. of Labor, 265, p. 741; underscoring supplied).

An occupational disease is one which develops as a result of hazards peculiar to certain

occupations, due to toxic substances (as in the organic solvents industry), radiation
(as in television repairmen), repeated mechanical injury, emotional strain,
etc. (Schmidt's Attorneys' Dictionary of Medicine, p. 561).

From the foregoing definitions of occupational diseases or ailments, rheumatoid

arthritis and pneumonitis can be considered as such occupational diseases. All
public high school teachers, like herein petitioner, admittedly the most
underpaid but overworked employees of the government, are subject to
emotional strains and stresses, dealing as they do with intractable teenagers,
especially young boys, and harassed as they are by various extra-curricular or
non-academic assignments, aside from preparing lesson plans until late at night,
if they are not badgered by very demanding superiors. In the case of the
petitioner, her emotional tension is heightened by the fact that the high school
in which she teaches is situated in a tough area -- Binondo district, which is
inhabited by thugs and other criminal elements and further aggravated by the
heavy pollution and congestion therein as well as the stinking smell of the dirty
Estero de la Reina nearby. Women, like herein petitioner, are most vulnerable
to such unhealthy conditions. The pitiful situation of all public school teachers
is further accentuated by poor diet, for they can ill-afford nutritious food.

In her work, petitioner also has to contend with the natural elements, like the
inclement weather -- heavy rains, typhoons -- as well as dust -- and disease-
ridden surroundings peculiar to an insanitary slum area.

These unwholesome conditions are "normal and consistently present in" or are
the "hazards peculiar to" the occupation of a public high school teacher. It is
therefore evident that rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are the "natural
incidents" of petitioner's occupation as such public high school teacher.

But even if rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are not occupational diseases,
there is ample proof that petitioner contracted such ailments by reason of her
occupation as a public high school teacher due to her exposure to the adverse
working conditions above-mentioned.

Indisputably, petitioner contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with

hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on January 27, 1975 after being drenched
and the consequent "chilling during the course of employment which are
permanent and recurring in nature and work-connected." Undoubtedly,
petitioner's ailments thus become compensable under the New Labor Code
since under Rule III, Section 1(c) of its Implementing Rules, "only sickness or
injury which occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or
death shall be compensable under these Rules."
It must be borne in mind that petitioner was a teacher of the Raja Soliman High
School which is located in the heart of Binondo District. She was constantly
exposed to the heavily polluted air and congestion (squatters' area) characteristic
of the area. She was not only exposed to the elements -- varying degrees of
temperature throughout the day and night -- but also had to withstand long
hours of standing while performing her teaching job. Likewise, she had to
regularly negotiate long trips from her home in Project 2, Quirino District,
Quezon City (her residence) to said high school in Binondo, scampering from
one ride to another, rain or shine, and sweating in the process.

Furthermore, judicial notice should be taken of the fact that our country is in a
typhoon belt and that yearly we experience torrential rains and storms. Needless
to say, in her daily rides from Quezon City to Binondo and back, she had to go
through the ordeal of perspiring and getting wet from downpours or heavy
rains, thus making her susceptible to contracting her ailments. Moreover,
petitioner was always in contact with 250 students who might have been carriers
of contagious respiratory diseases like flu and colds and who were themselves
inadequately nourished, residing as they do in a depressed and congested
area. And adding to the unhygienic working atmosphere was her malnutrition
or undernourishment. More often than not, a teacher who has no other source
of income takes to -- aside from the poor man's staple diet of tuyo, daing, and rice
-- legumes like mongo, vegetables and fruits with edible seeds which contain
much uric acid.

Acute arthritis is inflammation of a joint marked by pain, swelling, heat and

redness; the result of rheumatism or gout (p. 56, The Simplified Medical
Dictionary for Lawyers). Gout is a disease characterized by painful inflammation
of the joints, an excessive amount of uric acid in the blood. Poor man's gout is caused by
hard work, poor food and exposure (p. 268, supra). It may thus be seen that uric acid
eventually causes arthritis, aside from excessive mental and physical stresses to
which teachers are subject by reason of their duties.

Consequently, this Court finds petitioner to have substantially shown that the
risk of contracting her ailments had been increased by unfavorable working
conditions.

In Dimaano vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission (78 SCRA 510 [1977]), WE

ruled that illnesses of rheumatic arthritis with sub-acute exacerbation and
hypertension of therein petitioner, who was herself a teacher, as service-
connected, after WE considered her working conditions and nature of
employment which are substantially the same as those of herein petitioner.

Significantly also, the Employees' Compensation Commission, in its Resolutions

Nos. 233 and 432, respectively dated March 16, 1977 and July 20, 1977, adopted
a more realistic construction of the provisions of the New Labor Code by
including in the list of compensable ailments and diseases, cardiovascular disease
which comprehends myocardial infarction, pneumonia and bronchial asthma
(Sepulveda vs. WCC, et al., L-46290, Aug. 25, 1978).

Furthermore, it must be stressed that "the approval of petitioner's application

for retirement is a clear indication that she was physically incapacitated to render
efficient service (Sudario vs. Republic, L-44088, Oct. 6, 1977; Dimaano vs. WCC, et
al., supra). Petitioner was allowed to retire under the disability retirement plan
on August 31, 1975 at the age of 54 which is way below the compulsory
retirement age of 65. Under Memorandum Circular No. 133 optional
retirement shall be recommended for approval only when "the employee
applicant is below 65 years of age and is physically incapacitated to render
further efficient service." Obviously, petitioner thus retired by reason of her
ailments.

Finally, Republic Act 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Charta for Public
School Teachers, recognized the enervating effects of these factors (duties and
activities of a school teacher certainly involve physical, mental and emotional
stresses) on the health of school teachers when it directed in one of its
provisions that "Teachers shall be protected against the consequences of
employment injury in accordance with existing laws. The effects of the physical
and nervous strain on the teacher's health shall be recognized as compensable
occupational diseases in accordance with laws" (Pantoja vs. Republic, et al., L-
43317, December 29, 1978).

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE EMPLOYEES'

COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE IS HEREBY ORDERED

1) TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF SIX THOUSAND [P6,000.00]

PESOS AS DISABILITY INCOME BENEFITS; AND
2) TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER'S MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL
EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY RECEIPTS.

SO ORDERED.

Fernandez, Guerrero, and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, (Chairman), J., concurs in the result.
Melencio-Herrera, J., see dissent.

DISSENTING OPINION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

I am constrained to dissent.

The Workmen's Compensation Act has been expressly repealed. It is the new
Labor Code and its provisions on employees' compensation that govern
compensability. Section 1(b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation explicitly provides:
"SECTION 1.

xxx

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of
these rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown
that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions" (Rule III,
Amended Rules of Employees' Compensation) (underscoring supplied)
Petitioner retired due to rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis. Those ailments
are not listed as occupational diseases. Nor is there adequate proof that the risk
of contracting them was increased by conditions under which petitioner
worked. In fact, in so far as rheumatoid arthritis is concerned, it has been
described as a "chronic systemic inflammatory disease of unknown cause" (Current
Medical Diagnosis and Treatment, Krupp & Chatton, 16th Annual Revision, p.
474). It is also a disease that is worlds apart from acute arthritis, mentioned in
page 7 of the Decision.

And, as I stated in my dissent in Biscarra vs. Republic and WCC (G.R. No. L-
43425), Mitra vs. ECC (G.R. No. L-45846), and Torbela vs. ECC (G.R. No. L-
42627), the rulings and opinions of administrative agencies in areas within their
competence command great respect and weight, except in case of palpable error
or grave abuse of discretion. With these factors absent in this particular case, I
vote for the affirmance of the ruling of the Employees' Compensation
Commission.

Copyright 2016 - Batas.org

 Supreme Court of the Philippines

261 Phil. 99

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80157, February 06, 1990
AMALIA NARAZO, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR'S OFFICE, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL),
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Employees' Compensation

Commission (ECC) dated 19 May 1987,[1] denying petitioner's claim for
compensation benefits under PD 626, as amended, for the death of her
husband, Geronimo Narazo.

Geronimo Narazo was employed for thirty eight (38) years as Budget Examiner
in the Office of the Governor, Province of Negros Occidental. His duties
included preparation of the budget of the Province, financial reports and review
or examination of the budget of some provincial and municipal offices.

On 14 May 1984, Narazo died at the age of fifty seven (57). His medical records
show that he was confined three (3) times at the Dona Corazon L. Montelibano
Hospital in Bacolod City, for urinary retention, abdominal pain and anemia. He
was thereafter diagnosed to be suffering from "obstructive nepropathy due to
benign prostatic hypertrophy", commonly known as "Uremia".

Petitioner, as the widow of the deceased, filed a claim with the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) for death benefits for the death of her
husband, under the Employees' Compensation Law (PD 626, as amended).
However, said claim was denied on the ground that the cause of death of
Narazo is not listed as an occupational disease, and that there is no showing that
the position and duties of the deceased as Budget Examiner had increased the
risk of contracting "Uremia".[2] Petitioner moved for reconsideration of said
decision, claiming that although the cause of her husband's death is not
considered as an occupational disease, nevertheless, his job as Budget Examiner
which required long hours of sedentary work, coupled with stress and pressure,
caused him many times to delay urination, which eventually led to the
development of his ailments. The GSIS denied said motion for reconsideration.

On appeal, the Employees' Compensation Commission affirmed the decision of

the GSIS on the ground that the ailments of the deceased could not be
attributed to employment factors and as impressed by medical experts, benign
prostatic hypertrophy is quite common among men over fifty (50) years of age,
regardless of occupation, while uremia is a complication of obstructive
nephtropathy due to benign prostatic hypertrophy;[3] hence, this petition.

Petitioner avers that the nature, length of time, and circumstances of the
occupation of the deceased were not considered in determining whether the
work of the said deceased had increased the risks of contracting the ailments
which caused his death. The work of the deceased, which required long
sedentary work under pressure, aggravated the risk of contracting the disease
leading to his hospital confinement and death.[4]

In controversion, the ECC argues that petitioner failed to show proof that the
disease which caused the death of her husband is work-connected; and that no
credence could be given to petitioner's claim that her husband's delayed urina-
tion gave rise to the development of his ailments, for lack of medical bases. All
that petitioner has shown, according to the ECC, are mere aggravation, and not
work-connection causes.[5]

Rule III, section 1, paragraph 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended,
defines a "compensable sickness" as any illness definitely accepted as an
occupational disease listed by the ECC or any illness caused by employment
subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by working conditions.[6] The ECC is empowered to determine and
approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered
compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment.[7]

Thus, a sickness or death caused by said sickness compensable if the same is

listed as an occupational disease. If it is not so listed, compensation may still be
recovered if the illness was aggravated by employment. However, it is
incumbent upon the claimant to show proof that the risk of contracting the
illness was increased by his working conditions.

The death of petitioner's husband was caused by "Uremia due to obstructive

nephropathy and benign prostatic hypertrophy," which is admittedly not among
those listed as occupational diseases.[8] As per finding of the ECC, "Uremia is a
toxic clinical condition characterized by restlessness, muscular twitchings,
mental disturbance, nausea, and vomiting associated with renal insufficiency
brought about by the retention in blood of nitrogeneous urinary waste
products." One of its causes is the obstruction in the flow of urinary waste
products.[9]

Under the circumstances, the burden of proof was upon petitioner to show that
the conditions under which her deceased husband was then working had
increased the risk of contracting the illness which caused his death.

To establish compensability under the increased risk theory, the claimant must
show proof of reasonable work-connection, not necessarily direct causal
relation. The degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which
means such relevant evidence as will support a decision, or clear and convincing
evidence. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable. To require proof of actual
causes or factors which lead to an ailment would not be consistent with the
liberal interpretation of the Labor Code and the social justice guarantee in favor
of the workers.[10] Although strict rules of evidence are not applicable, yet the
basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence cannot be disregarded.[11]

The nature of the work of the deceased as Budget Examiner in the Office of the
Governor dealt with the detailed preparation of the budget, financial reports and
review and/or examination of the budget of other provincial and municipal
offices. Full concentration and thorough study of the entries of accounts in the
budget and/or financial reports were necessary, such that the deceased had to sit
for hours and more often that not, delay and even forego urination in order not
to interrupt the flow of concentration. In addition, tension and pressure must
have aggravated the situation. In the case of Ceniza v. ECC,[12] the Court held
that:

"x x x. It may be added that teachers have a tendency to sit for hours on end,
and to put off or postpone emptying their bladders when it interferes with their
teaching hours or preparation of lesson plans. From human experience,
prolonged sitting down and putting off urination result in stagnation of the
urine. This encourages the growth of bacteria in the urine, and affects the
delicate balance between bacterial multiplication rates and the host defense
mechanisms. Delayed excretion may permit the retention and survival of micro-
organisms which multiply rapidly, and infect the urinary tract. These are
predisposing factors to pyelonephritis and uremia. Thus, while We may concede
that these illnesses are not directly caused by the nature of the duties of a
teacher, the risk of contracting the same is certainly aggravated by their working
habits necessitated by demands of job efficiency."

Under the foregoing circumstances, we are persuaded to hold that the cause of
death of petitioner's husband is work-connected, i.e. the risk of contracting the
illness was aggravated by the nature of the work, so much so that petitioner is
entitled to receive compensation benefits for the death of her husband.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Employees'

Compensation Commission denying petitioner's claim for benefits under PD
626, as amended, arising from the death of her husband, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 8-11.

[2] Ibid., p. 9.
[3] Ibid., p. 10.
[4] Petition, Rollo, pp. 2-6.
[5] Comment by ECC, Rollo, pp. 81-83.

Sierra v. GSIS, G.R. No. 50954, 8 February 1989; Carbajal v. GSIS, G.R. No. L-
[6]

46654, August 9, 1988, 164 SCRA 204.

[7] Bonifacio v. GSIS, G.R. No. 62207, December 15, 1986, 146 SCRA 276.
[8] Annex "A" to the Employees' Compensation La.

Rollo, p. 10, citing Christopher's Textbook of Surgery, Davis, 7th Ed., 911-
[9]

915, 862-865.
[10] Limjoco v. Republic, G.R. No. L-46575, 31 August 1988, 165 SCRA 202.
[11] Garol v. ECC, G.R. No. 55233, 29 November 1988.
[12] G.R. No. 55645, 2 November 1982, 118 SCRA 138.

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 Supreme Court of the Philippines

233 Phil. 118

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-47294, April 08, 1987
HILARIA DABATIAN, PETITIONER, VS. GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (GENERAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, CAGAYAN
DE ORO CITY), RESPONDENT.

DECISION

GANCAYCO, J.:

A petition to review the decision of the Employees’ Compensation Commission

dated June 27, 1977 in ECC Case No. 0217 which affirmed the decision of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denying the claim for death
benefits of Hilaria Dabatian, widow of the late Sigfredo A. Dabatian, was filed
on September 26, 1977. However, for failure to file the necessary docket fees,
this Court denied the petition in a Resolution dated September 30, 1977.

A Motion for Reconsideration together with a motion to litigate as pauper was

filed by the petitioner and this Court, in a Resolution dated November 11, 1977,
gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file simultaneous
memoranda. The Employees' Compensation Commission, which was not
formally impleaded as respondent in the petition, filed its memorandum and so
did respondent GSIS. Petitioner failed to file her memorandum. The case was
submitted for decision on August 30, 1978.

The undisputed factual background as found by the ECC which should have
been made the proper respondent in this case, is as follows:
"At the time of his death, Sigfredo A. Dabatian was employed as Garbage Truck
Driver in the General Services Department of the City Government of Cagayan
de Oro City. As Garbage Truck Driver, he was assigned mostly in the night
shift. In fact, at the time of his death, his time of duty started from 10:00
o’clock at night to 6:00 o'clock in the morning the next day. It was gathered
from the evidence on record that the deceased was a heavy coffee drinker which
was his way of warding off sleepiness.

"Prior to his death, he was observed by his co-employees to have been getting
paler and weaker while at work until the time he collapsed and became
unconscious while on his tour duty and was brought to his residence by his
companions. Despite hospitalization, he died two weeks later on July 3, 1976.

"A claim for income benefits under the Employee's Compensation Program was
filed by the widow, the herein appellant. The Government Service Insurance
System decided against the compensability of the claim on the ground that
decedent's ailment, Peptic Ulcer, is not definitely accepted as an occupational
disease, as listed under the present law on compensation. Neither was there a
showing that the same was directly caused by his employment and that the risk
of contracting the same was increased by the working conditions attendant to
the deceased’s employment."[1]
The case was then elevated to the ECC which ruled that:
"x x x Peptic ulcer, the deceased’s main ailment, is a sharply circumscribed loss
of tissue resulting from the digestive action of acid gastric juice. Aggravating
factors are ingestion of alcohol, coffee, tea and cola drinks. Cigarette smoking
& has also been documented to be a definite cause of delayed healing of
ulcer. Some drugs also contribute to its occurrence. Another factor in the
production of peptic ulcer is the hereditary predisposition which seems to play a
major role in the occurrence of peptic ulcer. Intractable bleeding is a
complication of peptic ulcer. Death will ensue due to irreversible shock as a
result of a bleeding peptic ulcer. (Principles of Internal Medicine by Harrison).
Upon evaluation based on generally accepted medical authorities, the deceased's
ailment was found not to be in the least causally related to his duties and
conditions of work. His ailment was principally traceable to factors which were
definitely not work-connected, specifically, his inherent predisposition to
drinking coffee heavily which could have aggravated his contraction of the
disease resulting to his death. However, aggravation of an illness is not a
ground for compensation under the present compensation law."[2]

On these considerations, the ECC found no sufficient basis to reverse the ruling
of the GSIS denying petitioner's claim. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
The sole issue which the Court must determine is whether or not under the
premises the death of Sigfredo A. Dabatian is compensable.

The petition obviously addresses itself to the presumption of compensability

and the principle of aggravation which were sufficient grounds for entitlement
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. In fact, all the cases cited by the
petitioner were decided under the old compensation law.

The records show that petitioner died on July 3, 1976 when the old
compensation law had already been abrogated. No competent evidence
whatsoever was submitted to prove that Dabatian's ailment was contracted prior
to January 1, 1975 in order to bring it under the protective mantle of the old
compensation law.[3] There are no medical findings, affidavits, reports or any
other evidence that the deceased suffered from pain or any discomfort prior to
the effectivity of the New Labor Code. No allegation was even made to this
effect. True it is, that strict rules on evidence do not apply in cases such as this
and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of labor. However, We cannot
over-extend the limits of such rules. Justice and fair play dictate otherwise. The
new law on compensation should be applied to this case.

The present labor Code, P.D. 442 as amended, abolished the presumption of
compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness caused by the nature of
employment, the reason being - "to restore a sensible equilibrium between the
employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right
to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability x x x.”[4] It was
found, and rightly so, that the old law, the Workmen's Compensation Act,
destroyed the parity or balance between the competing interests of employer
and employee with respect to workmen's compensation. The balance was tilted
unduly in favor of the workmen since it was possible to stretch the work-related
nature of an ailment beyond seemingly rational limits.[5]

Thus, under the present law,[6] in order for the employee to be entitled to
sickness or death benefits, the sickness or death resulting therefrom must be, or
must have resulted from either a) any illness definitely accepted as an
occupational disease listed by the Commission, or b) any illness caused by
employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased
by working conditions.
Since peptic ulcer is not included in the list of occupational diseases as drawn up
by the Commission, then petitioner has the burden of proving that the nature of
her husband's work increased the risk of contracting the disease.

Aside from the undisputed fact that the deceased is a heavy coffee drinker,
which was his way of warding off sleepiness, no evidence was ever adduced by
petitioner to bolster the theory that her husband's work increased the risk of
contracting the ailment.

Being a heavy coffee drinker may have aggravated his peptic ulcer, but,
aggravation of an illness is no longer a ground for compensation under the
present law.

This Court takes notice of the fact that the conditions in this case are not
peculiar to the work mentioned herein. Many, if not most, employees are
equally exposed to similar conditions but have not been victims of peptic ulcer.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied for lack of

merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, and Sarmiento, JJ.,

concur.

[1] Pages 9-10, Record.

[2] Supra, pp. 10-11.

[3] Article 208, PD 442 as amended.

[4] Armeña vs. ECC, 122 SCRA 851; Sulit vs. ECC, 98 SCRA 483, among others.

[5] De Jesus vs. ECC, 142 SCRA 92, 99.

[6] Article 167 (L) of the New Labor Code, PD 442 as amended, and Section
1(b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation; De Jesus vs. ECC,
142 SCRA 92; Vda. de Silencio vs. ECC, 131 SCRA 128; Armeña vs. ECC, 122
SCRA 851.

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 Supreme Court of the Philippines

258 Phil. 647

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No.L-46454, September 28, 1989
NICETAS C. RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (BUREAU OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION),
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner's late husband, Hector P. Rodriguez, was a public school teacher

assigned at Salaan Elementary School in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. On
November 19, 1975 he went on sick leave and was confined at the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital after complaining of severe stomach pains accompanied by
nausea and vomiting, later diagnosed as "Intestinal Lipomatosis of the Large
Colon with Obstruction of the Ascending Colon." His ailment called for a
surgical operation which was performed on November 27, 1975 but this proved
unavailing. A few days thereafter, on December 2, 1975, he expired.

On January 28, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for death compensation under the
Labor Code with respondent Government Service Insurance System
(hereinafter referred to as GSIS). In a letter-decision dated February 23, 1976,
the GSIS denied the claim finding that the cause of the death of petitioner's
husband is not an occupational disease since the nature of his duties as a
teacher, as well as the working conditions of his employment, could not have
directly caused his ailment which eventuated in his subsequent death.
[1]

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, dated August 11, 1976, was denied upon
the finding that the evidence failed to establish that the decedent's employment
had any causal relationship with the contraction of the ailment and there was no
showing that the same directly arose therefrom or resulted from the nature
thereof. A second motion for reconsideration filed on October 18, 1976 having
[2]

been denied by the GSIS, petitioner's claim was elevated for review to the
respondent commission where it was docketed as ECC Case No. 0266.

On March 16, 1977, respondent commission affirmed the ruling of the GSIS
and denied the claim of petitioner. The case is now before us on a petition for
review.

The applicable rule established in law and jurisprudence concerning claims

based on the provisions of the Labor Code on employees' compensation,
particularly on death benefits under Article 194, is that they must result from an
occupational disease. A compensable disease means any illness accepted and
listed by the Employees' Compensation Commission or any illness caused by
the employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting
the same was increased by the working conditions. [3]

If the disease is listed in the Table of Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex

A of the Rules on Employees’ Compensation, no proof of causation is required.
However, if it is not so listed, it has been held that the employee, this time
assisted by his employer, is required to prove a positive proposition, that is, that
the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. The
fact that the cause of the disease was not positively identified does not dispense
with this burden of proof. [4]

The observations heretofore made do not mean that proof of direct causal
relation is indispensably required. It is enough that the claimant adduces proof
of reasonable work connection, whereby the development of the disease was
brought about largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. Strict
rules of evidence are not demanded, the degree of proof required being merely
substantial evidence, which has been held to be such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. [5]

After the surgical operation performed by Dr. Arturo de Vera, he gave the
clinical impression that the deceased was suffering from "Intestinal Obstruction
Partial, due to Lipomatosis of the Colon and Adhesion," explained by
respondent commission as follows:

"x x x As established in medical science, intestinal obstruction is a condition in

which the passage of intestinal contents is arrested or seriously impaired. This is
due to causes which are either mechanical, vascular or neurogenic. Mechanical
causes are intrinsic factors as adhesions and tumors, such as what happened in
the instant case, and hernia, and such factors as impacted foreign body or feces,
parasites and gallstones. Vascular causes include embolism or trombosis of a
large blood vessel. The neurogenic causes consist of those seen in pneumonia
and peritonitis and following abdominal surgery or injuries to the spinal cord.
(The Merck Manual-8th edition: Principles of Internal Medicine by Harrison).
xxx" [6]

Public respondent GSIS in its letter-decision also gave this explanation to

petitioner:

"Intestinal Obstruction is failure of progression of intestinal contents due to

mechanical causes or to inadequacy of intestinal muscular activity. In your
husband's case, it was due to Lipomatosis and Adhesions. Lipomata are
benigned (sic) tumors characteristically found in middle adult life, although they
may have been growing slowly for many years before making clinical mischief.
They arise from adipose or fatty tissue anywhere in the body. The mesentery of
the colon contains a large amount of such tissue and this may produce
obstruction by compression of the intestinal wall. Worthy of note is the fact
that the abdomen of your late husband was markedly obese." [7]

Petitioner does not dispute the fact that the principal duties of her husband as a
classroom teacher alone would not have any connection with his disease.
However, she posits that the deceased's auxiliary activities as a classroom
teacher directly affected his physical constitution and indubitably caused him to
have sustained some trauma in his abdominal cavity and other parts of the body.
According to petitioner, the deceased was a member of the basketball team of
the public school teachers in their school for the last five years prior to his death
and had served as a coach in basketball for three years. He was also said to have
been an active member of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines serving as
committee chairman of Unit 671 of the Pangasinan council. [8]

It is our considered view that the circumstances alleged by the petitioner and the
evidence she presented are not enough to discharge the required quantum of
proof, liberal as it is. There is no clear evidence as to when the disease
commenced and supervened; the tumors which developed in the deceased's
colon may have been growing for many years even before he was employed as a
teacher. Neither was there any indication as to what really caused the disease:
in fact, the nature of the disease as described militate against a finding of a
causal nexus. The "trauma" that was supposed to have caused or at least
contributed to the disease was neither satisfactorily clarified nor adequately
proved. Surely, the activities relied upon by the petitioner being outside the
regular or primary functions of a teacher could not have been done every
working day. It is safe to assume that they were done only for certain limited
periods of time and on isolated occasions as for instance, during competitions.
Thus, it cannot be said that decedent's work as a teacher exposed him to hazards
different or greater from those involved in ordinary or normal life-styles. There
is no showing that he did not engage in other extraneous activities, aside from
playing basketball or being a member of the Boy Scouts. Of further note is the
observation that the abdomen of the deceased was markedly obese, which
circumstance may also have been a causative or contributive factor considering
the etiological and pathological particulars of said ailment.

Additionally, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that said co-curricular activities

can be considered as "hazards," as theorized by petitioner, exposure to the same
was on the voluntary choice of the deceased. As pointed out by respondent
commission, the decision to engage therein was at decedent's option since, not
forming part of his work as teacher, there was no compulsion on him to
participate said activities.

UNDER THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the instant petition is

DENIED and the decision of respondent Employees' Compensation
Commission is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman) and Padilla, J., concur.

Paras, J., I dissent conformably with my dissent in the RARO case.
Sarmiento, J., I dissent. (See dissenting opinion.)

[1] Rollo, 20.

[2] Ibid., 12-13.

Art. 167 (1), Labor Code; Dabatian vs. GSIS, 149 SCRA 123 (1987); Tanedo vs.
[3]

Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., 154 SCRA 289 (1987); Mora, Jr.
vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., 156 SCRA 16 (1987); Garol vs.
Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., G.R. No. 55233, November 29,
1988.

Raro vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., G.R. No. 58445, April
[4]

27, 1989.

Bagsican vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 141 SCRA 226 (1986); Tolentino, et al. vs.
[5]

Court of Appeals, et al., 150 SCRA 26 (1987).

[6] Ibid., 22.
[7] Ibid., 11-12.
[8] Ibid., 15.

DISSENTING OPINION
SARMIENTO, J.:

The view I expressed in the dissent I filed in Raro vs. Employees’ Compensation
Commission, et al.,[1] consonant with my opinion in Iscala vs. Republic of the
Philippines (Dept. of Education & Culture, Bureau of Public Schools). Government
Service Insurance, et al., has not changed one whit.
I wrote in Raro:
I do not think that the Labor Code intended to do away with the “presumption
of compensability” prevailing under the old Workmen's Compensation Act. It
must be noted that as a social legislation, the Code is fundamentally a measure
intended to afford protection unto the working class. If any protection should
be given to labor, it is in workmen's compensation cases that protection is a felt
need.
The primacy that the majority would give to the integrity or the trust fund “to
which the tens of millions of workers and their families look for compensation
whenever covered accidents, diseases, and deaths occur” is correct but, in my
view, hardly the point. In granting the petitioner compensation, I do not believe
we would have dissipated substantially the State Insurance Fund, and
considering the fact that the petitioner is a victim herself.
It must likewise be noted that the petitioner is suffering from cancer (brain
tumor), whose cause medical science is yet to unravel. It would then be asking
too much to make her prove that her illness was caused by work or aggravated
by it, when experts themselves are ignorant as to what brings it about.
I do not believe, finally, that the question is a matter for legislation.
Compassion, in my view, is reason enough.[2]
Compassion and liberality in favor of employees and workers in the constrution of
social legislation are constant.
[1] G.R. No. 58445. April 27, 1989, En Banc.

[2] L-47414, December 11, 1987, Second Division: 166 SCRA 270.

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 Supreme Court of the Philippines

146 Phil. 646

G.R. No. L-21723, November 26, 1970

HILARION BERONILLA, PETITIONER, VS. GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, ITS BOARD OF TRUSTEES, ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BARREDO, J.:

A special civil action for prohibition seeking to declare Resolution No. 1497 of
the Board of Trustees of the respondent Government Service Insurance System
of August 9, 1963 to the effect that petitioner "Mr. (Hilarion) Beronilla be
considered compulsorily retired from the service (as Auditor of the Philippine
National Bank) effective January 14, 1963" as null and void for having been
issued, in the words of the petition, "in excess of the powers granted to it by
law, a want on abuse of discretion, violation of contracts, removal or forced
retirement without due process of law and to declare all acts heretofore taken in
implementation thereof also void, and to prohibit said respondent and its
representatives from carrying out or implementing the aforesaid resolution."
Acting on petitioner's prayer for preliminary injunction, on August 26, 1963, this
Court issued the writ prayed for upon petitioner's filing an injunction bond in
the amount of P1,000.00.

At the time of the filing of the present petition on August 23, 1963, petitioner
was acting as and performing the duties of Auditor of the Philippine National
Bank. Before that, he had occupied many other positions in the government
and had been a member of the GSIS during all times required by law.

In his application for employment, his applications for life and retirement
insurance as well as his application to be allowed to take civil service
examinations, ten times from 1917 to 1925, petitioner uniformly indicated that
his date of birth is January 14, 1898. He also indicated the same date of birth in
his Member's Service Record which he submitted to the GSIS on October 29,
1954 pursuant to the provisions of Section 13-A, Republic Act No. 660.

On September 29, 1959, he requested the Commissioner of Civil Service, thru

the Auditor General, that his date of birth indicated in the records be changed
to January 14, 1900. According to the petition, it was only in 1955, before the
demise of his mother that petitioner discovered that his true date of birth is
January 14, 1900; that his mother told him that in 1916, his uncle, Alvaro
Beronilla, purchased a cedula for him showing in the same that he was already
18 years old for the reason that his uncle wanted to take advantage of his being
able to vote for him in La Paz, Abra in 1919, when he would be already twenty-
one years of age and the uncle a candidate for vice-president of the municipality;
that since then he had been looking for people who could attest to his true date
of birth and it was only in September, 1959 that he came upon two old persons
of their town, Felix Alberne and Ricardo Lalin who could do so; that the former
had been a member of the provincial board and the latter is a retired justice of
the peace; and that his letter to the Civil Service Commissioner was supported
by the affidavits of these two persons. This letter was endorsed by the
Commission to the GSIS for action "without the intervention of the Civil
Service Commission."

In the GSIS, petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Legal Counsel who,
on October 22, 1959, denied the same since "all official records point to January
14, 1898 as the birthday of Mr. Hilarion Beronilla." Upon learning of this denial,
petitioner submitted additional evidence to support his request. This evidence
consisted of photostat copies of the yearbooks of the Philippine Institute of
Accountants in 1954 and 1958 wherein his date of birth is shown as January 14,
1900. This additional evidence notwithstanding, on March 21, 1960 the Legal
Counsel reiterated his former denial. Whereupon, on May 21, 1960 petitioner
appealed to the General Manager of the System who at that time was Mr.
Rodolfo Andal. Upon favorable recommendation of the 2nd Assistant General
Manager, Mr. F. G. Araña, in a memorandum dated May 30, 1960, on June 2,
1960, Mr. Andal placed "OK." at the foot thereof over his initials, thus
indicating approval of the requested change.

Based on this action of the General Manager, notes of the adjustment of the
date of birth of petitioner to January 14, 1900 were sent to the Auditor General
and the Commissioner of Civil Service and the proceeds of petitioner's policy
was re-computed. The Legal Counsel whose title and rank had been meanwhile
changed to Assistant General Manager for Legal Affairs later communicated the
aforesaid decision of the General Manager to the Philippine National Bank on
November 2, 1962 and the Deputy Auditor General on November 12, 1962, by
letter and indorsement, respectively. As emphasized by petitioner, in the letter
to the Philippine National Bank, it is stated that "his date of birth has been
adjusted by this office, after careful study and deliberation." On the other hand,
in the 2nd indorsement to the Deputy Auditor General, it was made clear that
relative to petitioner's life insurance policy No. N-2065 which had matured on
November 30, 1957, corresponding adjustment or recomputation of the
maturity value had been effected on the basis of his changed date of birth. In
the meantime, upon application of petitioner, on October 1, 1960, he was issued
a new life policy No. 335778 indicating his date of birth as January 14,
1900. Regarding his above-mentioned policy No. N-2065, on July 7, 1960,
demand was made upon petitioner to pay the System additionally the sum of
P131.09, due to the adjustment of his date of birth, which demand, petitioner
promptly complied with.

Almost three years after Mr. Andal approved the change of petitioner's date of
birth, more specifically, on May 6, 1963, Mr. Ismael Mathay, then Auditor of the
Central Bank detailed to the Philippine National Bank, wrote the Board of
Trustees of the GSIS about the service of petitioner and stated that "in the
course of the audit of the transactions of the Philippine National Bank, it was
found that Mr. Hilarion Beronilla has been continuously paid since January 15,
1963, his salary allowances and other fringe benefits as Auditor of said Bank
notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Beronilla has attained his sixty-fifth (65th)
birthday last January 14, 1963, the date of his automatic and compulsory
retirement from the government service as fixed under Republic Act No. 3096
approved June 16, 1961." Acting on this letter, the Board referred the same to
Assistant General Manager and Actuary, Dr. Manuel Hizon, then in charge of
the Claims Department. The latter submitted a memorandum on August 6,
1963 stating the facts and evidence in the GSIS records concerning the
determination of the date of birth of petitioner, including the actions
aforementioned taken thereon by Mr. Andal and the Legal Counsel. On August
9, 1963, the Board adopted the disputed resolution without even notifying
petitioner of Mr. Mathay's letter and without giving him any opportunity to be
heard regarding the same.
Upon these facts, it is the theory of petitioner that the approval by General
manager Andal of his request for the change of the date of his birth in the
official records of the GSIS from January 14, 1898 to January 14, 1900, after the
same had been previously denied by the Legal Counsel, could not be legally
altered or modified by the Board of Trustees, not only because the power to
decide such matter finally is legally lodged in the General Manager and not in
the Legal Counsel, nor in the Board, but also because even if the Board were
assumed to have authority to review the acts of the General Manager, it was
either guilty of laches or estopped from revising the same; and, furthermore, in
approving the resolution in dispute, the Board of Trustees had denied due
process to petitioner and impaired the obligations of the contract between
petitioner and the GSIS regarding his retirement. In other words, the main issue
before Us in this case is one of power and does not call for Our determination
of whether petitioner's real date of birth is January 14, 1898 or January 14,
1900. Accordingly, all We have to decide is whether or not the GSIS Board of
Trustees acted within its power when it reversed the approval by General
Manager Andal of petitioner's request for the change of his date of birth, taking
all circumstances into account including petitioner's allegations of res adjudicata,
laches, estoppel, denial of due process and unconstitutional impairment of
contractual obligations. After carefully going over the facts on record and
considering all pertinent legal principles and statutory provisions, particularly
Commonwealth Act 186, the Charter of the GSIS, as amended, together with
the relevant resolutions of the Board of Trustees, We have decided to uphold
the superior authority of the Board over the General Manager and to dismiss
this petition.

We do not deem it necessary to pass upon petitioner's initial proposition,

pressed vigorously, to be sure, to the effect that as between the previous denial
by the Legal Counsel and the subsequent approval by General Manager Andal
of his request for the change of his date of birth in the records, the latter, which
was precisely the action on his appeal from the Legal Counsel's denial, should
prevail. Even granting it to be true that, pursuant to what is generally the
practice and the rule, applications for retirement annuities in the GSIS are sub-
ject to final approval by the General Manager after its being approved by one of
the Assistant General Manager’s and/or one or two Department Managers, it is [1]

clear to Us that under the GSIS charter, the General Manager's approval is not
beyond review and reprobation by the Board of Trustees. It must be borne in
mind that under Section 16 of said charter, the System "shall be managed by the
Board of Trustees ……” and Section 17 adds that the Board "shall have the
following powers and authority: (a) to adopt by-laws, rules and regulations for
the administration of the System and the transaction of its business." On the
other hand, the extent of the functions and powers of the General Manager are
defined in Section 18 as follows:

"SEC. 18. Personnel. - The Board shall have the power to appoint a general
manager, who shall be a person of recognized experience and capacity in the
subject of life and social insurance, and who shall be the chief executive officer
of the System, one or more assistant general managers, one or more managers, a
medical director, and an actuary, and fix their compensation. The general
manager shall, subject to the approval of the Board, appoint additional
personnel whenever and wherever they may be necessary to the effective
execution of the provisions of this Act, fix their compensation, remove,
suspend, or otherwise discipline them, for cause. He shall have the power to
prescribe their duties, grant leave, prescribe certain qualifications to the end that
only competent persons may be employed, and appoint committees: Provided,
however, That said additional personnel shall be subject to existing Civil Service
laws, rules and regulations.
x x x x"

It is thus obvious that by express statutory authority, the Board of Trustees

directly manages the System and the General Manager is only the chief executive
officer of the Board. In the exercise of its power to adopt rules and regulations
for the administration of the System and the transaction of its business, the
Board may lodge in the General Manager the authority to act on any matter the
Board may deem proper, but in no wise can such conferment of authority be
considered as a full and complete delegation resulting in the diminution, much
less exhaustion, of the Board's own statutorily-based prerogative and
responsibility to manage the affairs of the System and, accordingly, to decide
with finality any matter affecting its transactions or business. In other words,
even if the Board may entrust to the General Manager the power to give final
approval to applications for retirement annuities, the finality of such approval
cannot be understood to divest the Board, in appropriate cases and upon its
attention being called to a flaw, mistake or irregularity in the General Manager's
action, of the authority to exercise its power of supervision and control which
flows naturally from the ultimate and final responsibility for the proper
management of the System imposed upon it by the charter. Incidentally, it may
be added that the force of this principle is even more true insofar as the GSIS is
concerned, for the fiduciary character of the management of the System is
rendered more strict by the fact that the funds under its administration are partly
contributed by the thousands upon thousands of employees and workers in all
the branches and instrumentalities of the government. It is indeed well to
remember at all times that the System and, particularly, its funds do not belong
to the government, much less to any administration which may happen to be
temporarily on the saddle, and that the interests of the mass of its members can
only be duly safeguarded if the administrators of the System act with utmost
fidelity and care. Not for nothing is its controlling and managing board called
the Board of Trustees. It results, therefore, that the first contention of
petitioner cannot be sustained and We hold that any authority conferred upon
the General Manager by the Board of Trustees notwithstanding, the said Board
may in appropriate cases and in the exercise of its own sound discretion review
the actions and decisions of the General Manager. The mere fact that the re-
solution granting the authority expressly gives the character of finality to the
General Manager's acts does not constitute such a representation to third
persons dealing with the System that such finality is definite even vis-a-vis the
Board as to create any estoppel, for the simple reason that it is not legally
possible for the Board to divest itself of an authority which the charter of the
System places under its direct responsibility. From another point of view, since
the law clearly vests the management in the Board and makes the General
Manager only its chief executive officer, all parties dealing with the System must
be deemed to be on guard regarding the ultimate authority of the Board to
modify or reverse any action of the General Manager and they cannot complain
should the Board exercise its powers in the premises.

Petitioner posits, however, that even assuming that the Board may have the
power to reverse or modify any action of the General Manager in the exercise of
his authority, because of the failure of the Board to act from June 2, 1960, when
General Manager Andal acted favorably on his request to August 9, 1963, when
the Board approved the herein impugned Resolution No. 1497, or for more
than three years, during which time corresponding adjustments were made in his
GSIS records, payment and life insurance policies and due notices were served
by the GSIS itself on all parties concerned on the basis of his changed date of
birth, respondent should be considered as guilty of laches or held in estoppel to
change or alter the action of Mr. Andal. While petitioner's posture is not
entirely without logic, it falls short of the requirements for the successful
invocation of the pleas of laches and estoppel. We have carefully considered the
lengthy and rather impressive discussion by petitioner of these points in his
petition, memorandum and reply to respondent's memorandum as well as the
equally detailed and authority-supported contrary arguments in the answer and
memorandum of the respondent, and We have arrived at the conclusion that
petitioner's position cannot be sustained.

It may be stated at the outset that petitioner's twin points of laches and estoppel
actually boil down in this particular case to nothing more than estoppel by
silence. With this clarification, it is meet to recall that "mere innocent silence
will not work estoppel. There must also be some element of turpitude or
negligence connected with the silence by which another is misled to his injury"
(Civil Code of the Philippines by Tolentino, Vol. IV, p. 600) and that "the
doctrine of estoppel having its origin in equity and therefore being based on
moral and natural justice, its applicability to any particular case depends, to a
very large extent, upon the special circumstances of the case." (Mirasol v.
Municipality of Tabaco, 43 Phil. 610, 614) Important also it is not to overlook
that as regards the actuations of government officials, the general rule is that
their mistakes and omissions do not create estoppel. (Republic vs. Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Co., L-18841, January 27, 1969, citing Pineda vs.
Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; and Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724. See also: Republic vs. Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., L-26862, March 30, 1970, and the cases therein cited.)

Moreover, in computing the period of alleged silence or inaction of the Board,

what is relevant is not the actual or, what petitioner calls, imputable knowledge
of said Board of the favorable action of Mr. Andal. Even if such knowledge had
come earlier than May 6, 1963, the date of Mr. Mathay's letter, what is decisive is
that it was only thru Mr. Mathay's letter that the Board got notice of the error in
Mr. Andal's action. Precisely because it was not incumbent upon the Board, as
petitioner himself alleges, to spontaneously or in the ordinary course review the
action of the General Manager, any knowledge thereof by the Board, whether
actual or imputable, could not, in logic and conscience, have placed the Board
on notice of any error or irregularity therein. Consequently, the immediate steps
taken by the Board to have the facts alleged in Mr. Mathay's letter verified are
inconsistent with the charge of unreasonable delay, much more of laches.
The compulsory retirement of government officials and employees upon their
reaching the age of 65 years is founded on public policy which aims by it to
maintain efficiency in the government service and at the same time give to the
retiring public servants the opportunity to enjoy during the remainder of their
lives the recompense, inadequate perhaps for their long service and devotion to
the government, in the form of a comparatively easier life, freed from the rigors
of civil service discipline and the exacting demands that the nature of their work
and their relations with their superiors as well as the public would impose upon
them. Needless to say, therefore, the officials charged with the duty of
implementing this policy cannot be too careful in insuring and safeguarding the
correctness and integrity of the records they prepare and keep. In this case, all
that the Board has done is to set aside what it found to be an erroneous decision
of the General Manager in approving the change of date of petitioner's birth,
because from the evidence before it, the Board was convinced that the originally
recorded date of birth should not be disturbed. We cannot see where the
charged inequity of such action of the Board could lie.

Above all, it is a must consideration whenever principles of equity are invoked

that for such invocation to succeed, it must appear that if the plea is not heeded,
the party making the plea will suffer, in truth and in fact, inequity and injury,
whether pecuniary or moral or, at least, in a juridical sense. Such is not the case
with petitioner. Examining the circumstances of this case, We see nothing
inequitous to petitioner in the questioned resolution of the Board of
Trustees. For decades back, repeatedly and uniformly, petitioner made it appear
in all material government and public records and in all his representations to
respondent System that his date of birth is January 14, 1898. His rather belated
request for a change of said date to January 14, 1900 which would
unquestionably favor his interests, pecuniarily or otherwise, and correspondingly
adversely affect those of the System and, of course, its members, was duly
investigated and found not to be sufficiently grounded to merit favorable action
by the Legal Counsel in whom is lodged the authority to evaluate such
request. True this negative action was reversed by the General Manager, albeit
by virtue of a procedure not strictly in accordance with the established one as
outlined in footnote 1 of this opinion, but on the other hand, the favorable
action of the General Manager was in turn reversed by the Board of Trustees,
the final legal authority in the System, upon its being informed of the error
thereof. It is to be noted that, after all, it was always the petitioner who made
representations to the respondent System as to his date of birth, and not the
other way around. All that the System did was to take his representations for
what they were worth. He was not believed by the Legal Counsel, but the
General Manager did; on the other hand, the authority higher than the General
Manager found the action of the General Manager erroneous. Under these
circumstances, how could the System be in estoppel, where the conflicting
representations are of the petitioner rather than of the System?

Anent petitioner's contention that he was denied due process when the Board of
Trustees acted on the letter of Mr. Mathay without notifying him thereof or
hearing him thereon, suffice it to say that since there is no showing that under
the procedure established in the GSIS, such notice and hearing are required,
considering that the System operates as a business corporation and generally
notice and hearing are not indispensable for due process in corporations, and in
any event, inasmuch as what was considered by the Board was nothing more
than petitioner's own conflicting representations, and if petitioner really believed
he should have been heard, he could have filed a motion for reconsideration or
reopening, it cannot be said that indeed he had not had due opportunity to pre-
sent his side.

Finally, as regards petitioner's argument that the Board's resolution in question

constitutes an impairment of the obligations of his contract of insurance, it is
obvious that the constitutional injunction that is evidently the basis of such
argument refers to the legislature and not to resolutions even of government
corporations. Besides, petitioner's life insurance policy, apart from not having
any real relevance in this case, what is involved being his retirement, contains
specific provisions contemplating the correction of any error or mistake in the
date of birth of the insured. On the other hand, the retirement of government
employees is imposed by law and is not the result of any contractual stipulation.

WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is dismissed, with costs against

petitioner, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued herein is hereby
dissolved.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Fernando, J., concur in the result.
Ruiz Castro, J., reserves his vote.
Villamor, J., inhibits himself.
Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., on official leave of absence.
 With respect to the procedure for approval of applications for retirement, the
[1]

Board of Trustees has from time to time approved the following resolutions:

1. On January 15, 1952, Resolution No. 15 providing:

"In order to expedite action on applications for retirement

annuities, the Board resolved to authorize the Manager of the
Administrative Department of the System to process and approve such
applications, subject to final approval of the General Manager and
Actuary." (Emphasis supplied)

2. On March 24, 1954, Resolution No. 145 as follows:

"2. Retirement Applications

"Retirement applications shall be approved by the General

Manager, Administrative Department, the Assistant General Manager,
and the Associate Actuary and Acting Manager, Production
Department.

"In the following cases, approval of the following officials shall also
be required in addition to those named hereinabove:

a. No beneficiary or where there is legal problem involved - By the Legal

Officer.

b. No premium payments - By the Manager, Accounting Department."

3. On November 3, 1954, Resolution No. 627 reading:

"Retirement applications shall be approved by the 3 officials as

follows: Manager, Claims Department, either one of the Assistant
General Managers, and either the Actuary or Associate Actuary.

"In the following cases, approval of the following officials shall also
be required in addition to those named hereinabove:
 a. No beneficiary or where there is legal problem involved - By the Legal
Officer.

b. No premium payments - By the Manager, Accounting Department."

4. On July 3, 1957, Resolution No. 1591 thus:

"Where the records show conflicting dates of birth of an applicant

for retirement and no birth or baptismal certificate can be submitted
due to its loss or destruction, the matter is referred to the Corporate
Counsel of the System, together with all secondary evidence in relation
to the date of birth of the applicant. The Corporate Counsel in turn
determines the correct date of birth, for purposes of retirement and life
insurance, after evaluating the relative evidentiary value of the
documents submitted, in accordance with the Rules of Court."
(Underscoring Supplied)

It is the theory of petitioner that Resolutions Nos. 627 and 1591

must be understood as subject to the condition in Resolution No. 15
that the approval of the other subordinate managers or officials
referred to therein must be approved by the General Manager whose
action shall be final. Respondents deny this, specially as regards
Resolution No. 1591 which they claim makes the Corporate Counsel
of the System the final authority on the matters therein mentioned,
which include controversies or discrepancies as to the date of birth of
any applicant for retirement. The Court sees no necessity, as stated in
the above opinion, of passing on this secondary issue, the same being
subordinate, after all, to the main proposition that the General
Manager's decision is subject to the review and final action of the
Board of Trustees.

Copyright 2016 - Batas.org

Supreme Court of the Philippines

G.R. No. 121545

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 121545, November 14, 1996

EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION (ECC) AND

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS),
PETITIONERS VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND LILIA S. AREOLA,
RESPONDENTS,

DECISION

DAVIDE JR., J.:

Sometime in September, 1990, petitioner Rey O. Garcia was hired by private

respondent Mahal Kong Pilipinas, Inc. (MKPI) to review and edit articles, news
items, literary contributions, essays, manuscripts, and other features to be
published in the Say Magazine and other publications owned by private
respondent.

On March 16, 1992, petitioner’s employment was terminated. At that time, he

was allegedly receiving a monthly salary of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00).
Consequently, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against private
respondent with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The same
was docketed as NLRC NCR-00-04-02249-92.

Summons were thereafter duly served on private respondent to appear for a

mandatory conference to be held on April 29, 1992.
On the appointed date, private respondent, represented by Necy Avecilla,
sought a postponement of the conference. The motion was granted and the date
for the conference was reset to May 8, 1992.

On May 8, 1992, private respondent failed to appear prompting the Labor

Arbiter to again reset the date of the conference to May 27, 1992 with a warning
that failure to appear and to submit its position paper on the said date will be
deemed a waiver of its right to be heard and to present its evidence.

On May 27, 1992, both parties appeared. Petitioner filed an amended

complaint, a copy of which was served on private respondent in open court. By
mutual agreement of the parties, the filing of their respective position papers as
well as the next hearing was scheduled on June 9, 1992.

On said date, private respondent again failed to attend. It, however, filed a letter
requesting for the postponement of the hearing. Petitioner vigorously objected
and instead moved that private respondent be declared in default and that he be
allowed to present his evidence ex parte. Said motion was granted and
petitioner was given one (1) week to submit his position paper and documentary
evidence after which the case was to be considered submitted for decision.

On June 11, 1992, petitioner filed his position paper.

On June 15, 1992, private respondent, through a letter from Marilou L. Bocobo,
requested Labor Arbiter Nieves V. de Castro for time to answer petitioner’s
allegations. The letter-request, found to be merely dilatory, was denied.

On August 13, 1992, Labor Arbiter Nieves V. de Castro rendered a decision, the
decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby directed to reinstate complainant to his

former position effective August 16, 1992 with full backwages of P24,000.00
(from March 16, 1992 to August 15, 1992) and all other benefits complainant
was receiving prior to his termination with notice to respondent that
reinstatement order is immediately executory even pending appeal.

SO ORDERED.[1]
On September 10, 1992, private respondent received a copy of the said decision.
However, instead of filing an appeal therefrom, private respondent, through its
company president Michael G. Say, wrote yet another letter to the labor arbiter
expressing surprise and disappointment over an allegedly erroneous decision.
The letter reads in full:

DATE : 10 September 1992

TO : HON. NIEVES DE CASTRO
FROM : MAHAL KONG PILIPINAS, INC.
RE : MANIFESTATION

______________________________________________________________
___________

This is in response to the notice of judgement we have received this day, from
your good office, with decision dated August 13, 1992.

Your decision regarding the reinstating of Mr. Rey Garcia in the company is
surprising and appaling (sic). We would like to call your attention to a gross
error of judgment.

1. It is not true that the complainant’s contract with MAHAL KONG

PILIPINAS, INC. took (in) effect in September, 1990. But he used to be the
contractor for editing of MAHAL KONG PILIPINAS FOUNDATION, INC.,
a separate entity from MAHAL KONG PILIPINAS, INC.

His editing contract with Mahal Kong Pilipinas, Inc. only started last October of
1991.

2. Mahal Kong Pilipinas, Inc. had already closed its office at 2nd Floor Silvertree
Bldg., San Miguel Ave., Cor. Shaw Blvd., Pasig, M.M.

3. It is not our intention to delay the position paper. It is just that we have been
very busy (in) during the past months closing the office.

4. True, the complainant acted as the editor-in-chief of Say Magazine. The

magazine is under contract with him as editor-in-chief wherein we pay him per
issue. Regarding the books, he only acted as its honorary editor-in-chief,
meaning only in name.

5. You stated ‘... dismissal from employment ...’ How can he be dismissed from
employment when he was not even employed by the company. Again, I would
like to remind you that Mr. Rey Garcia is only a contractor, whom we
contracted to do the magazine editing for us. He was not directly under us.

6. How can we reinstate the complainant when there is no more SAY

MAGAZINE. The magazine has been shut down last March, 1992.

We believe that Mr. Garcia is only doing this to extort money from us. I hope
you will not allow yourself to be his instrument in this wrongdoing.

Thank you very much.

Sincerely yours,

(SGD.)
MICHAEL G. SAY
Chief Executive Officer[2]
As aforestated, no appeal was filed from the said decision, hence, the same
became final and executory. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on
November 13, 1992.

Subsequently, private respondent filed a motion to quash the writ of execution

but the same was not acted upon.

On November 25, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for preliminary

injunction with respondent NLRC.

On January 14, 1993, respondent NLRC issued a resolution disposing thusly:

NLRC NCR IC No. 00319-92 (NLRC NCR CASE No. 00-04-02249-92)

entitled Mahal Kong Pilipinas Inc. and Michael Say vs. Hon. de Castro, Rene
Masilungan and Rey Garcia--- CONSIDERING the petition filed by petitioner
on November 25, 1992, the oral report of the Labor Arbiter assigned in this
case, and the records of the main case (NLRC NCR Case No. 00-04-02249-92),
the Commission (Second Division) RESOLVED to treat the letter of Michael
Say, Chief Executive Officer of Mahal Kong Pilipinas, Inc., received by the
Docket Section, National Capital Region, NLRC, on September 10, 1992, (as an
appeal) which shall be resolved, in relation to the subject petition, by the said
Division.[3]
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the said resolution contending that
the subject decision had long become final and executory.

On March 10, 1993, respondent NLRC issued a resolution ruling thusly:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated August 13, 1992 is

vacated and set aside and the writ of execution is hereby declared quashed.
Thus, a new decision is hereby rendered remanding the case for reception of
evidence with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.[4]
Obviously aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition predicated on the
following assignment of errors, viz:

PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN TREATING
UNVERIFIED LETTER OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, MICHAEL G. SAY, AS AN APPEAL BY SAID
RESPONDENT FROM THE DECISION, DATED AUGUST 13, 1992
RENDERED BY LABOR ARBITER NIEVES V. DE CASTRO;

PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO A VIRTUAL REFUSAL TO PERFORM
THE DUTY ENJOINED OR TO ACT AT ALL IN CONTEMPLATION
OF LAW, WHEN IT EXERCISED ITS POWER OF REVIEW IN AN
ARBITRARY OR DESPOTIC MANNER TO THE PREJUDICE OF
PETITIONER IN FAVORABLY ACTING ON PRIVATE
RESPONDENT’S APPEAL DESPITE NON-POSTING OF THE
REQUISITE CASH OR SURETY BONDS; and

PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ACTED IN AN ARBITRARY AND DESPOTIC

EXERCISE OF POWER IN REMANDING THE CASE TO THE LABOR
ARBITER.[5]The assignment of errors boils down to the lone issue of whether
or not respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of
jurisdiction in treating the letter of Michael G. Say as an appeal from the labor
arbiter’s decision of August 13, 1992.

We rule that it did. In blatant disregard for the rule mandating strict and
rigorous compliance with the reglementary period for appeals, respondent
NLRC took cognizance of a mere letter from private respondent’s president
expressing disappointment over what was perceived to be an appalling judgment
of Labor Arbiter de Castro and treated said letter as private respondent’s appeal
from the said decision.

The first paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715,
provides:

ART. 223. Appeal.-- Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are
final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties
within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders.
Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:

(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the
Labor Arbiter;

(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion,
including graft and corruption;

(c) If made purely on questions of law; and

(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave
or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.
Similarly, Section 3(a), Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC
provides:

Section 3. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal.- (a) The appeal shall be filed
within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be
under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of
a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 5 of this Rule; shall be
accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied
upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a
statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, order
or award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal.

A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated
shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
Clearly therefore, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional.[6]Failure
to conform with the rules regarding appeal will certainly render the judgment
final and executory, hence, unappealable.

In the case at bar, records bear out that private respondent did not comply with
the foregoing mandatory rules on appeals. After receiving a copy of the
decision, private respondent through its president, wrote the labor arbiter who
rendered the decision and expressed dismay over the judgment. No appeal was
taken therefrom within ten (10) days from September 10, 1992, the date private
respondent received a copy of such judgment. Neither was a cash or surety
bond posted by the private respondent. For even assuming for the sake of
argument that the letter is a valid notice of appeal, the lack of a cash or surety
bond is fatal to the appeal. The judgment in question involves a monetary
award, and in cases where the judgment involves a monetary award, the second
paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, provides
that the appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by
the NLRC in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from.
Clearly, respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion and lack of
jurisdiction in treating the letter of private respondent’s president as an appeal
from the judgment of the labor arbiter. In the words of the Solicitor General in
his comment, the foregoing observations were summed up as follows:

The plain letter sent by private respondent to Labor Arbiter Nieves de Castro is
certainly not a notice of appeal. The letter was not under oath, let alone
accompanied by a memorandum of appeal. It was nothing more than an
expression of disappointment over what was perceived as an appalling judgment
of Labor Arbiter de Castro. It did not even seek any affirmative relief. Worse,
there is no indication that petitioner was furnished with a copy of said letter.
Likewise, there was no proof that the required appeal fee and cash or surety
bond was paid and/or posted at the time the letter was received by the Labor
Arbiter. The statutory provision regarding an appeal instituted before NLRC
uses the word ‘shall’ which indicates that the requirements therein recited are
mandatory, and non-observance thereof is fatal to one’s cause. These
requirements, being mandatory in character, cannot be waived. Thus, NLRC’s
ruling that private respondent’s letter be treated as a notice of appeal is invalid.
It is contrary to law. Indeed, for private respondent’s failure to comply with the
mandatory requirements of a valid appeal, the Labor Arbiter’s Decision has
attained finality. Nothing more can be done to revive or reopen the
proceedings a quo. The Labor Arbiter, therefore correctly acted in granting a
writ of execution.[7]
One final note. Private respondent’s asseveration that it has been denied due
process is likewise untenable. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard,[8]or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.[9]What the law prohibits is absolute absence
of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process
where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side. In the case at
bar, private respondent was given ample opportunity to do just that on April 29,
1992, May 8, 1992, May 27, 1992 and June 9, 1992.

Prescinding from the foregoing, respondent NLRC evidently acted with grave
abuse of discretion and lack of jurisdiction in treating the September 10, 1992
letter of Michael G. Say, president of private respondent, as an appeal and in
consequently remanding the case to the labor arbiter for reception of evidence.
WHEREFORE,the petition for certiorariis GRANTED. The NLRC
Resolutions dated January 14, 1993 and March 10, 1993 are hereby SET
ASIDEand the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated August 13, 1992 is
DECLAREDto have become final and executory. Costs against private
respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ.,concur.

[1]Rollo, p. 23.

[2]Id., at 72.

[3]Id., at 24.

[4]Id., at 37.

[5]Id., at 5-6.

[6]United Placement International v. NLRC, G.R. No. 103370, June 17, 1996;
Italian Village Restaurant v. NLRC, 207 SCRA 204 [1992] cited in Globe
General Services and Security Agency v. NLRC, 249 SCRA 408 [1995].

[7]See Note 1, supra, pp. 66-67.

[8]Eden v. Ministry of Labor and Employment, 182 SCRA 840 [1990].

[9]Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. v. Torres, 231 SCRA 335 [1994].

Copyright 2016 - Batas.org

 Supreme Court of the Philippines

421 Phil. 95

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 132916, November 16, 2001
RUFINA TANCINCO, PETITIONER, VS. GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM AND EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari, praying for the reversal of the
Resolutions[1] dated May 30, 1997 and March 5, 1998 issued by the former
Sixteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44148. The first
resolution dismissed petitioner's appeal from the decision of the Employees'
Compensation Commission, whereas the second resolution denied her motion
for reconsideration.

The facts are:

At around noon of July 17, 1995, while he was repairing a service vehicle in
front of his house along the National Road in Barangay Palanas, Lemery,
Batangas, SPO1 Eddie G. Tancinco was shot dead by five (5) unidentified
armed men. SPO1 Tancinco was a member of the NCR Security Protection
Group of the Philippine National Police, and at the time of his death, was
assigned as part of the close-in security detail of then Vice-President Joseph E.
Estrada. SPO1 Tancinco was off-duty at the time inasmuch as the former Vice-
President was in the United States for medical treatment.

His widow, petitioner Rufina Tancinco, filed a claim for benefits before the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). On February 19, 1996, the GSIS
denied petitioner's claim on the ground that there was no proof that petitioner's
husband's death was work-related. Petitioner appealed the denial to the
Employees' Compensation Commission (Commission) which, on December 19,
1996, issued a Resolution[2] dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. As ruled by
the Commission:
It is evident that the death of SPO1 Tancinco on July 17, 1995, when he was on
off duty status did not arise out of and in the course of his employment as a
member of the PNP Security Command.

Apparently, the conditions aforementioned were not satisfied in the present

case. Notably, SPO1 Tancinco was repairing his service vehicle at the time of his
death. He was neither executing an order for VP Estrada nor performing an
official function on that fateful day inasmuch as Police Superintendent Atilano
Miranda duly certified that SPO1 Tancinco was on "off-duty status" on July 17,
1995.

We would like to stress once more that not all contingencies such as injury,
disability, or death which befall an employee are compensable. The same must
be the result of accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Since the cause of SPO1 Tancinco's death is no longer part of his official
functions, the claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No.
626, as amended, cannot be given due course.
Petitioner filed a petition for review from the aforesaid decision of the
Commission before the Court of Appeals. On May 30, 1997, the appellate court
issued the first assailed resolution[3] dismissing the petition for review on the
following grounds: (a) that the certification of non-forum shopping was
defective; (b) that certified true copies of material portions of the record were
not attached to the petition; and (c) that the petition failed to state all the
material dates which would establish the timeliness thereof. As admitted by
petitioner herself, she received a copy of the resolution on June 9, 1997, and yet
it was only on January 27, 1998, or seven-and-a-half (7 ½) months later, that she
filed a motion for reconsideration. As can be expected, the appellate court
denied her motion in the second assailed resolution[4] of March 5, 1998.

Petitioner seeks recourse before us via this petition for review on certiorari,
arguing that:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION OR A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
ENTERTAINING THE PETITION FILED BY PETITIONER WHICH
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE RULES AND WAS ON ITS
FACE MERITORIOUS.
In lieu of a comment, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation[5]
signifying its solidarity with petitioner. The Solicitor General adopts the view
that SPO1 Tancinco's death is work-related given the circumstances under
which he was killed, given that (a) the deceased was a policeman and (b) the
killing was done in a professional manner. He speculates that the motive behind
the killing "is likely to have arisen during the duration of the almost eighteen
(18) years that he served as constable in the PC and as a policeman."

With regret, we deny the petition.

The conclusion is inevitable because the instant petition was not timely filed.[6]
Under section 1 of Rule 45 of the former Revised Rules of Court, which was
then still in effect, an appeal from a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals
to this Court must be made within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment
or the denial of a motion for reconsideration filed in due time. In the case at bar,
petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration from receipt of the resolution of
dismissal two hundred thirty one (231) days late, thereby rendering the said
resolution final and executory. The gap of more than seven (7) months is too
large for us to ignore. Petitioner did not even offer any explanation to account
for the tardiness. It behooves the party invoking liberality in the application of
procedural rules to at least explain his non-compliance therewith.[7] We have
held that the period of appeal is not only mandatory, but more importantly, it is
jurisdictional.[8] Even we cannot ignore the immutable character of a final
judgment.[9]

Prescinding from the finality of the appealed resolutions, the appeal will still fail
on the merits. Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation
provides:
SECTION 1. Grounds--(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to
be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident
satisfying all of the following conditions:

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires
him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing
an order for the employer.

xxx xxx xxx

The aforesaid requirements have not been met. Anent the first, as part of the
former Vice-President's security detail, the decedent was required to guard the
person of the former; hence, his presence was officially required wherever the
Vice-President would go. At the time of his death, SPO1 Tancinco was off-duty
since Vice-President Estrada was out of the country. In fact, he was at home; it
is not even known if he was temporarily re-assigned to another detail while the
Vice-President was away. Clearly, he was not at the place where his work
required him to be.

As to the second requirement, it was not sufficiently established that SPO1

Tancinco died while performing his official functions. In this regard, we held
that policemen are regarded as being on twenty-four (24) hour alert. As we
explained in Employees' Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals,[10]
xxx But for clarity's sake and as a guide for future cases, we hereby hold that
members of the national police, like P/Sgt. Alvaran, are by the nature of their
functions technically on duty 24 hours a day. Except when they are on vacation
leave, policemen are subject to call at any time and may be asked by their
superiors or by any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and
security of the community.

xxx xxx xxx

We hold that by analogy and for purposes of granting compensation under P.D.
No. 626, as amended, policemen should be treated in the same manner as
soldiers.
The twenty-four hour duty rule was originally applied to members of the armed
forces,[11] until it was applied by extension to policemen, as aforesaid, and
eventually to firemen.[12]

However, in the more recent case of Government Service Insurance System v. Court of
Appeals,[13] we clarified that not all deaths of policemen are compensable. Thus,
Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with
respect to claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the
place where his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been
performing his official functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere,
the employee must have been executing an order for the employer, it is not
difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegre's widow should be denied the
claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to
at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was
intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no
particular directive or permission of his superior officer. In the absence of such
prior authority as in the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature
of the act attended to by the policeman at the time he died even without the
explicit permission or directive of a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt.
Alvaran, there is no justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites
set forth in the ECC guidelines. That he may be called upon at any time to
render police work as he is considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was
not on an approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion arrived at
considering that he was not placed in a situation where he was required to
exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was refusing to render
one pointing out that he already complied with the duty detail. At any rate, the 24-
hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact
validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket
license to benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the
24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing
the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are
nonetheless basically police service in character. [italics supplied]
In the present case, the decedent was repairing a service vehicle when he was
killed. We have tried to view it from all possible angles, but the inescapable
conclusion is that he was not performing acts that are "basically police service in
character." As a policeman, SPO1 Tancinco is part of "an organized civil force
for maintaining order, preventing and detecting crimes, and enforcing the laws xxx".[14]
Based on these parameters, it cannot be said that the deceased was discharging
official functions; if anything, repairing a service vehicle is only incidental to his
job.

Neither was the last requirement satisfied. As the fatal incident occurred when
SPO1 Tancinco was at home, it was incumbent on petitioner to show that her
husband was discharging a task pursuant to an order issued by his superiors.
This also was not done.

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary to support a

claim is substantial evidence,[15] which is that "amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."[16]
Unfortunately, the burden was not successfully met.

In closing, we express our heartfelt commiseration with petitioner for the

misfortune which has befallen her and her family. Even this Court, the
embodiment of justice dispensed impartially, can feel very human emotions, as it
does so now. However, for reasons both procedural and substantive, we cannot
grant her petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions

dated May 30, 1997 and March 5, 1998 are AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Quisumbing, J., in the result.

Penned by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales and concurred in by

[1]

Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and Demetrio G. Demetria.

Rollo, pp. 16-22.

[2] Rollo, pp. 24-28.

[3] Rollo, pp. 18-19.

[4] Rollo, pp. 21-22.

[5] Rollo, pp. 61-73.

[6]Astoundingly, despite this glaring infirmity, the processor indicated on the

first page of the Rollo that the petition was filed on time.

[7] Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA
305, 318 (2000).

[8]Eg., Demata v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 690, 696 (1999) and the cases
cited therein.

[9] Cf. Bank of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi, 230 SCRA 9, 16 (1994).

[10] 257 SCRA 717, 725 (1996).

Hinoguin v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 172 SCRA 350 (1989);

[11]

also Nitura v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 201 SCRA 278 (1991).

See Valeriano v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 333 SCRA 441

[12]

(2000).

[13] 306 SCRA 41, 49 (1999).

[14] Mission, et al. v. Rosario, et al., 94 Phil. 483, 486 (1954).

[15] Lorena v. Encomienda, 302 SCRA 632, 641 (1999).

Iriga Telephone Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 286

[16]

SCRA 600, 608 (1998).

Copyright 2016 - Batas.org

 Supreme Court of the Philippines

213 Phil. 334

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-58176, March 23, 1984
RUTH JIMENEZ, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

MAKASIAR, Acting C.J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of respondent Employees

Compensation Commission (ECC) dated August 20, 1981 (Annex "A",
Decision, pp. 10-12, rec.) in ECC Case No. 1587, which affirmed the decision of
respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), denying petitioner's
claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Petitioner is the widow of the late Alfredo Jimenez, who joined the government
service in June, 1969 as a constable in the Philippine Constabulary (p. 2, rec.).

After rendering service for one year, he was promoted to the rank of constable
second class. On December 16, 1974, he was again promoted to the rank of
sergeant (p. 26, rec.).

Sometime in April, 1976, he and his wife boarded a bus from Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, to Anulung, Cagayan. While on their way, Sgt. Jimenez, who was
seated on the left side of the bus, fell down from the bus because of the sudden
stop of the vehicle. As a result, he was confined at the Cagayan Provincial
Hospital for about one (1) week, and thereafter, released (comment of
respondent ECC, pp. 25-36, rec.). He was again confined for further treatment
from November 7, 1978 to May 16, 1979 at the AFP Medical Center in Quezon
City.

While on duty with the 111th PC Company, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, he was

assigned as security to one Dr. Emilio Cordero of Anulung, Cagayan (ECC rec.,
Proceedings of the PC Regional Board, June 6, 1980). In compliance with his
duty, he always accompanied the doctor wherever the latter went (p. 26, rec.).

On November 7, 1978, the deceased was again confined at the Cagayan

Provincial Hospital and then transferred to the AFP V. Luna Medical Center at
Quezon City for further treatment. He complained of off-and-on back pains,
associated with occasional cough and also the swelling of the right forearm. The
doctors found a mass growth on his right forearm, which grew to the size of 3
by 2 inches, hard and associated with pain, which the doctors diagnosed as
"aortic aneurysm, medrastinal tumor" (p. 27, rec.).

His condition improved somewhat after treatment and he was released on May
16, 1979. He was advised to have complete rest and to continue medication. He
was then given light duty inside the barracks of their company. Unfortunately,
his ailment continued and became more serious.

On May 12, 1980, he died in his house at Anulung, Cagayan, at about 9:00
o'clock in the evening. He was barely 35 years old at the time of his death.

The cause of death, as found by the doctors, is "bronchogenic carcinoma"

which is a malignant tumor of the lungs.

On June 6, 1980, an administrative hearing was conducted before the PC

Regional Board. It was their official findings that the subject enlisted man "died
in line of duty"; that the deceased was a PC member of the 111th PC Company
at Tuguegarao, Cagayan; that he died due to "bronchogenic CA"; and that he
"died not as a result of his misconduct and did not violate any provisions of the
Articles of War" (ECC rec., Proceedings of the PC Regional Board, June 6,
1980).

The Board recommended "that all benefits due to or become due subject EP be
paid and settled to his legal heirs" (ECC rec., Proceedings of the PC Regional
Board, June 6, 1980). Thus, as per records of the GSIS, petitioner was paid
benefits due to her deceased husband under Republic Act. No. 610 (Comment
of respondent ECC, p. 27, rec.).

Nevertheless, petitioner filed a claim for death benefits under PD No. 626, as
amended with the respondent GSIS. Said claim was denied by the GSIS on the
ground that her husband's death is not compensable "for the reason that the
injury/sickness that caused his death is not due to the circumstances of the
employment or in the performance of the duties and responsibilities of said
employment" (Letter of denial by the GSIS dated July 14, 1980, ECC rec.).

The said decision was affirmed by respondent Employees Compensation

Commission in its decision dated August 21, 1981, stating among others:

"xx xx xx.

"After an exhausted (sic) study of the evidences (sic) on record and the
applicable law on the case, we conclude that the law has been properly applied
by the respondent System. x x x.

"Bronchogenic carcinoma, medical authorities disclose, is the most common

form of malignancy in males reaching a peak between the fifth and seventh
decades and accounting for one in four male cancer deaths. The sex incidence is
at least 5 to 1, male to female. Extensive statistical analysis by medical
authorities have confirmed the relationship between lung cancer and cigarette
smoking. Other factors that may have potential roles are exposure to ionizing
radiation, exposure to chromates, metallic iron and iron oxides, arsenic, nickel,
beryllium and asbestos (Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine by Wintrobe, et al.,
7th Edition, p. 1322).

"Although Presidential Decree. No. 626, as amended was envisioned to give

relief to workingmen, who sustain an injury or contract an ailment in the course
of employment and that to best attain its lofty objective, a liberal interpretation
of the law should pervade in its implementation, this precept, however, may not
be invoked as not even a slight causal link between the development of the
ailment and the decedent's (sic) duties and working conditions as a PC sergeant
could be deduced from the records of this case. The respondent System's ruling
that appellant's claim does not fall within the beneficiant provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, and therefore the same should be
denied, is in full harmony with the law and the facts obtaining herein.
"xx xx xx" (Decision, pp. 10-12, rec.).

On September 28, 1981, petitioner, assisted by counsel, filed the instant petition,
the only pertinent issue being whether or not her husband's death from
bronchogenic carcinoma is compensable under the law.

The petitioner contends that her husband's death is compensable and that
respondent Commission erred in not taking into consideration the
uncontroverted circumstance that when the deceased entered into the Philippine
Constabulary, he was found to be physically and mentally healthy. She further
contends that as a soldier, her husband's work has always been in the field where
exposure to the elements, dust and dirt, fatigue and lack of sleep and rest was
the rule rather than the exception. The nature of work of a soldier being to
protect life and property of citizens, he was subject to call at any time of day or
night. Furthermore, he was even assigned as security to one Emilio Cordero and
always accompanied the latter wherever he went. Exposed to these
circumstances for several years, the deceased's physical constitution began to
deteriorate, which eventually resulted to his death from bronchogenic carcinoma
(Petition, pp. 2-9, rec.).

On the other hand, respondent Commission maintains that while the deceased
soldier may have been exposed to elements of dust and dirt and condition of
lack of rest and continued fatigue by virtue of his duties to protect the life and
property of the citizens, such conditions have no causal relation to his
contraction of bronchogenic carcinoma. It is also the opinion of the respondent
that since there is evidence of the deceased to be a smoker, "the late Sgt.
Jimenez may have indulged heavily in smoking and drinking, not merely
'occasionally'. And it has been demonstrated medically that the more cigarettes a
person smokes, the greater the risk of developing lung cancer" (Memorandum,
p. 62, rec.). In short, the respondent alleges that the deceased was responsible to
a large degree for his having contracted bronchogenic carcinoma that led to his
demise.

WE find the petitioner's claim meritorious.

Primary carcinoma of the lung is the most common fatal cancer and its
frequency is increasing (The Merck Manual, 13th Edition, p. 647). Admittedly,
cancer of the lungs (bronchogenic carcinoma) is one of those borderline cases
where a study of the circumstances of the case is mandated to fully appreciate
whether the nature of the work of the deceased increased the possibility of
contracting such an ailment. In the case of Laron vs. Workmen's Compensation
Commission (73 SCRA 90), WE held, citing Schmidt's Attorney's Dictionary of
Medicine, 165 Sup. 143; Beerman vs. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 191
A 297, 299; Words and Phrases, 6 Permanent Edition 61, "The English word
'cancer' means 'crab'; in the medical sense, it refers to a malignant, usually fatal,
tumor or growth." Findings of fact by the respondent points out that
bronchogenic carcinoma is a malignant tumor of the lungs. WE have ruled in
the case of Dator vs. Employees Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 634,
L-57416, January 30, 1982) that "(U)ntil now, the cause of cancer is not known."
Indeed, the respondent has provided an opening through which petitioner can
pursue and did pursue the possibility that the deceased's ailment could have
been caused by the working conditions while employed with the Philippine
Constabulary.

Respondents maintain that the deceased was a smoker and the logical
conclusion is that the cause of the fatal lung cancer could only be smoking
which cannot in any way be justified as work-connected. However, medical
authorities support the conclusion that up to now, the etiology or cause of
cancer of the lungs is still largely unknown as provided for in the following:

"Although the etiology of cancer in humans cannot yet be explained at the

molecular level, it is clear that genetic composition of the host is important in
cancer induction. Related immunologic factors may predispose the host to a
putative carcinogen. There is some evidence that viruses may play a role in the
neoplastic process. In addition, both environmental and therapeutic agents have been
identified as carcinogens" (Harrison, Principles of Internal Medicine, 9th Edition, 1980,
p. 1584).

"Considerable attention has been directed to the potential role of air pollution,
exposure to ionizing radiation and numerous occupational hazards, including exposure to
chromates, metallic iron and iron oxides, arsenic, nickel, beryllium and asbestos" (Harrison,
Ibid., p. 1259).

"The lungs are the site of origin of primary benign and malignant tumors and
receive metastases from many other organs and tissues. Specific causes have not been
established but a strong dose-related statistical association exists between cigarette
smoking and squamous cell and undifferentiated small (oat) cell bronchogenic
carcinomas. There is suggestive evidence that prolonged exposure to air
pollution promotes lung neoplasms" (The Merck Manual, 13th Edition, p. 647).

"What emerges from such concepts is the belief that cancers in man do not
appear suddenly 'out of the blue'. x x Moreover, there need not be a single etiology or
pathogenesis. Many influences may be at work during the evolution of the lesion
and many pathways may be involved. Indeed, the term cancer embrace a multiplicity of
diseases of diverse origins" (Robbins, Pathologic Basis of Disease, 2nd Edition, 1979, p.
185, italics supplied).

WE cannot deny the fact that the causes of the illness of the deceased are still
unknown and may embrace such diverse origins which even the medical
sciences cannot tell with reasonable certainty. Indeed, scientists attending the
World Genetic Congress in New Delhi, India, have warned that about 25,000
chemicals used around the world could potentially cause cancer, and Lawrence
Fishbein of the U.S. National Center for Toxilogical Research pointed out that
humans were daily exposed to literally hundreds of chemical agents via air, food,
medication, both in their industrial home and environments (Evening Post,
December 16, 1983, p. 3, cols. 2-3).

The theory of increased risk is applicable in the instant case. WE had the
occasion to interpret the theory of increased risk in the case of Cristobal vs.
Employees Compensation Commission (103 SCRA, 336-337, L-49280, February 26,
1981):

"To establish compensability under the said theory, the claimant must show
proof of work-connection. Impliedly, the degree of proof required is merely
substantial evidence, which means 'such relevant evidence to support a decision'
(Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union,
Inc., 69 Phil. 635) or clear and convincing evidence. In this connection, it must
be pointed out that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for
compensation. Respondents however insist on evidence which would establish
direct causal relation between the disease rectal cancer and the employment of
the deceased. Such a strict requirement which even medical experts cannot
support considering the uncertainty of the nature of the disease would negate
the principle of the liberality in the matter of evidence. Apparently, what the law
merely requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation. This kind of
interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate
spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the new Labor Code which states
that 'all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of this Code, including
its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.'

"x x x As the agents charged by the law to implement the social justice guarantee
secured by both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more
liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensation especially when there is
some basis in the facts inferring a work-connection. This should not be confused with
the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act. While these doctrines may have been abandoned under the New Labor
Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is
significant that the liberality of the law, in general, still subsists. x x x" (italics supplied).

The sweeping conclusion of the respondent Employees Compensation

Commission to the effect that the cause of the bronchogenic carcinoma of the
deceased was due to his being a smoker and not in any manner connected with
his work as a soldier, is not in accordance with medical authorities nor with the
facts on record. No certitude can arise from a position of uncertainty.

WE are dealing with possibilities and medical authorities have given credence to
the stand of the petitioner that her husband developed bronchogenic carcinoma
while working as a soldier with the Philippine Constabulary. The records show
that when the deceased enlisted with the Philippine Constabulary in 1969, he
was found to be physically and mentally healthy. A soldier's life is a hard one. As
a soldier assigned to field duty, exposure to the elements, dust and dirt, fatigue
and lack of sleep and rest is a common occurrence. Exposure to chemicals while
handling ammunition and firearms cannot be discounted. WE take also fact that
he became the security of one Dr. Emilio Cordero of Anulung, Cagayan, and he
always accompanied the doctor wherever the latter went (p. 26, rec.). Such
assignment invariably involved irregular working hours, exposure to different
working conditions, and body fatigue, not to mention psychological stress and
other similar factors which influenced the evolution of his ailment.

WE held in the case of San Valentin vs. Employees Compensation Commission (118
SCRA 160) that:

"xx xx xx.
"In compensation cases, strict rules of evidence are not applicable. A reasonable
work-connection is all that is required or that the risk of contracting the disease
is increased by the working conditions."

In the case of Dator vs. Employees Compensation Commission (L-57416, January 30,
1982), WE held the death of Wenifreda Dator, a librarian for 15 years, caused by
bronchogenic carcinoma compensable. Being a librarian, "she was exposed to
dusty books and other deleterious substances in the library under unsanitary
conditions" (Ibid., 632). WE do not see any reason to depart from the ruling in
the said case, considering that a soldier's duties and environment are more
hazardous.

This is in line with the avowed policy of the State as mandated by the
Constitution (Article II, Section 9) and restated in the new Labor Code (Article
4), to give maximum aid and protection to labor.

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY SET

ASIDE AND THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM IS
HEREBY ORDERED

1. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND

(P12,000.00) PESOS AS DEATH BENEFITS;

2. TO REIMBURSE THE PETITIONER'S MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL

EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS; AND

3. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF ONE THOUSAND TWO

HUNDRED (P1,200.00) PESOS FOR BURIAL EXPENSES.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., he dissents. Bronchogenic carcinoma was not work-connected. The

ECC did not err in denying death benefits.

Copyright 2016 - Batas.org

 Supreme Court of the Philippines

213 Phil. 426

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-64802, March 29, 1984
VENUSTO PANOTES, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE), RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

MAKASIAR, Acting C.J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari, seeking the review of the decision of respondent

Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case. No. 1963, dated June 16,
1983, affirming the decision of respondent Government Service Insurance
System denying the claim of petitioner Venusto Panotes for compensation
benefits under P.D. 626, as amended, for the death of his wife, Agustina Garfin
Panotes, on the ground that the cause of death, colonic malignancy or cancer of
the colon, is not compensable.76

The GSIS, however, paid the petitioner gratuity benefits under C.A. No. 186, as
amended, in the amount of P28,405.22, in lieu of compensation benefits. The
GSIS, also, will refund to the petitioner the total retirement premiums paid by
his deceased wife (with interest) and the corresponding government share
(without interest) [Comment, p. 20, rec.].

For more than 30 years, from 1949 to 1980, the deceased worked as an
elementary school teacher of the Ministry of Education and Culture, her last
assignment being With the Francisco Balagtas Elementary School in Sta. Cruz,
Manila (p. 6, rec.).

On October 25, 1979, she was admitted in the UST Hospital, complaining of
vomiting and severe abdominal pains. The attending physician, Dr. Rafael
Ferrer, diagnosed her ailment as colonic malignancy or cancer of the colon. She
underwent two operations. On May 23, 1980, she died of the same ailment at
the age of fifty.

Upon her death, the petitioner filed with respondent GSIS a claim for
compensation benefits under P.D. 626, as amended. The System denied his
claim on the ground that colonic malignancy was not work-connected.
Petitioner asked for reconsideration but the same was denied, with respondent
GSIS reiterating that "there is no proof that the deceased's ailment was the
direct result of the nature of employment" (p. 6, rec.). On February 12, 1982,
petitioner then wrote to President Marcos, which letter was considered as an
appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission. The respondent ECC
affirmed the GSIS' denial of the claim, on the basis, to wit:

"Carcinoma of the colon, medical experts say, is one of the most common types
of cancer. The disease is slightly more common in females than in males. It is
particularly common in colon involved by multiple polyposis or by ulcerative
colitis. If cancer is encountered before the fourth decade, it usually is associated
with one of these diseases. Symptoms are quite variable, depending upon the
primary location of the tumor. In the right colon, the symptoms consist of
flatulence distention to cramp-like pains, secondary anemia and change in bowel
habit. In the left colon the symptoms are constipation and bleeding with bowel
movement is common (Christopher's Textbook of Surgery, Davis, 7th edition,
pp. 708-709).

"From the foregoing medical discussion, it is evident that carcinoma of the colon is
traceable to factors but rather to multiple polyposis or ulcerative colitis. It is likewise shown
that gastric influence is an important predisposing factor. Therefore, we cannot give
weight to appellant's arguments that his wife's irregular meals in the course of her employment
gave rise to her ailment. This supposition lacks medical basis.

"Moreover, we note that the deceased in her entire career as a teacher was never
exposed to toxic chemicals and radioactive substances, exposure to which has
been found by cancer experts to be contributory factors in the development of
cancer.

"Much as we desire to help herein appellant, we cannot do so because the facts

and the evidence on record negate compensability under P.D. 626" (pp. 21-22,
rec.).
The only issue is whether or not colonic malignancy or cancer of the colon is
compensable under P.D. No. 626, as amended.

Petitioner contends that the ailment which took the life of his wife is not an
occupational disease, nevertheless, he asserts that the risk of contracting the
same was increased by the nature and the working conditions of his wife's
employment. He further contends that the deceased was in perfect health when
the started teaching in 1949. Because of the meetings and other school activities,
she missed her meals occasionally which weakened her and made her susceptible
to diseases. He also contends that by the nature of her job and precisely because
of her employment her disease worsened resulting in her early demise.

Respondent ECC, on the other hand, contends that cancer of the colon is not
listed as an occupational disease and no proof was shown that the risk of con-
tracting the same was increased by the working conditions. Furthermore, ECC
contends that the doctrine of compensability and the principle of aggravation
have been abandoned under the New Labor Code. Respondent Commission
also submits that "the New Labor Code is an entirely new social insurance
scheme, vastly different in philosophy and approach from the old law where the
employer shoulders by himself alone, the responsibility of paying liability
compensation. It was and still is envisioned to compensate only purely work-
connected sickness, disability or death, to restore a sensible equilibrium between
the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employees'
right to receive reparation for work-connected disability or death" (p. 40, rec.).

WE find for the petitioner.

The disease cancer of the colon, has been described as follows:

"A malignant new growth of the colon. This type of cancer is made up of cells
which tend to infiltrate the surrounding tissues and give rise to metastasis. It
usually grows to a large size and produces constipation and ulceration with
bleeding. This type of cancer is believed to have a close relationship between
lesions of the large intestines such as polyps chronic inflammatory disease of the
colon as seen in ulcerative colitis. Familial tendency of the diseases is also well
documented" (p. 21, rec.).

"Cancer of the Colon Etiology. The cause of colon cancer is unknown. The
greater incidence in Western Society suggests that dietary factors may be
involved x x x. As mentioned above, while there is a possibility that
adenomatous polyps may become malignant, villous adenomas are definitely
associated with cancer. It appears that a colon bearing a polyp may develop a
cancer elsewhere. Congenital multiple polyposis of the colon has an
astonishingly high malignant potential; ulcerative colitis also seems to potentiate
or stimulate the development of carcinoma in the diseased bowel. Other lesions
of the large intestine seem to bear no causal relations to cancer (pp; 1563-1564,
Harrison, Principles of Internal Medicine, 8th Edition; Italics supplied).

"Carcinoma of the large bowel is fairly common at any age, but 75% of the
cases are discovered in the sixth, seventh and eighth decades of life. Males and
females are affected about equally. All colonic cancers tend to be more
aggressive in younger patients, resulting in a sharp reduction in the five year
survival rate. The question of a familial tendency with respect to these lesions
has long been a controversial issue. While a few reports have cited a higher attack
rate in blood relatives of a proband, other reports have disagreed. In any event,
if any familial tendency exists, it is indeed equivocal.

"It is well to remember that certain conditions predispose to the development of

carcinoma of the colon. These include chronic ulcerative colitis, multiple familial
polyposis, villous adenomas and previous colonic carcinoma. In about 4% of
the cases two carcinomas occur either concomitantly or successively. Stated in
another way, the patient with a primary colonic carcinoma has a severalfold
increased likelihood of developing a completely independent second tumor. x x
x It is now appreciated that carcinoma of the colon pre-exists for a considerable time
before it produces clinical symtoms. It begins in all probability as an 'in situ' lesion and
then later becomes a small mucosal area of asymptomatic cancerous
transformation. In all likelihood it requires years to become an overt tumor. x x x" (pp.
881-883, Pathology by Robbins, 3rd edition; Italics supplied).

"Carcinoma of the colon, medical experts say, is one of the most common types
of cancer. The disease is slightly more common in females than in males. It is particularly
common in colon involved by multiple polyposis or by ulcerative colitis. If
cancer is encountered before the fourth decade, it usually is associated with one
of these diseases. Symptoms consist of flatulence distention to cramplike pains,
secondary anemia and change in bowel habit. In the left colon the symptoms are
constipation and bleeding with bowel movement is common" (Christopher's Textbook of
Surgery, Davis, 7th edition, pp. 708-709, as cited by respondent in its decision, p.
13, rec.; Italics supplied).

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the cause of colonic malignancy is still
unknown. Predisposing factors which may cause the fatal disease have been
mentioned but all these have been qualified as probabilities. As in other cancer
diseases, medical experts are still in the process of finding out the exact nature
of the disease, what causes it and what may cure it.

In its decision, however, respondent ECC was definite in its conclusion that the
fatal disease is traceable to factors which are not attributable to employment but
rather to multiple polyposis or ulcerative colitis. This indeed, is a sweeping
conclusion which is devoid of any merit. Respondent cannot state definite
conclusions from an unknown or uncertain premise. It must be pointed out that
medical authorities have always qualified their discussion of the subject with a
statement that "the cause of the disease (cancer of the colon) is still unknown."

Cancer is still an unanswered question in medical science. Its nature and cause
are vague even to the most respected experts in the medical field and its
characteristic fatality and uncertainty are unfortunately the only feature which
are certain and definite. Thus, in the case of Acosta vs. ECC (109 SCRA 210),
this Court recognized such fact and commented: "x x it is generally accepted
that the exact origin of practically all types of cancer is not yet determined.
Scientists and medical experts are still in the process of discovering the most
effective cure for that malady. With this backdrop, one should not expect
ordinary persons like petitioner to prove the real cause of the ailment of the
deceased when the experts themselves are still in the dark." This
pronouncement by the high Court indeed justifies petitioner's allegation that the
nature and the working conditions of his wife's employment increased the risk
of contracting the fatal disease.

The deceased worked as an elementary school teacher from 1949 until she
contracted the fatal disease in 1979. She entered the service in perfect health. As
a teacher, she was not simply confined to the four corners of her classroom but
instead was made to attend meetings and other school activities. She must have
been assigned in other places in the course of her service, a natural occurrence
in the life of an elementary public school teacher. This exposed her to far and
dirty places where she could have contracted viruses and parasites. Her constant
exposure to chalk and dust, to the vagaries of nature when attending school
activities, would naturally take its toll on her health.

She was constantly under physical, mental and emotional pressure. She does not
only teach children but had to take care of them too, thus, entailing a very big
responsibility on her shoulders. She must stay in the classroom throughout the
class hours and must wait until recess time or until the class is over before she
could relieve herself whenever the need for it arises, which was of course very
detrimental to the health, adding to the sad fact that most comfort rooms in
public schools are quite unhygienic.

She had loads of work to do which surely made her miss her meals, as alleged.
The tension and the pressure which every teacher must go through in order to
finish the papers and the grades of at least forty pupils on time, aside from the
fact that they have to attend to other school activities, cannot be discounted.
These factors would likely weaken her bodily condition and make her
susceptible to diseases.

In the case of Abadiano vs. GSIS (111 SCRA 509) citing the case of Meñez vs.
ECC (97 SCRA 87), this Court expressed concern for public school teachers,
thus:

"xx xx xx.

"Finally, Republic Act 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Charta for Public
School Teachers, recognized the enervating effects of these factors (duties and
activities of a school teacher certainly involve physical, mental and emotional
stresses) on the health of school teachers when it directed in one of its
provisions that 'Teachers shall be protected against the consequences of
employment injury in accordance with existing laws. The effects of physical and
nervous strain on the teacher's health shall be recognized as compensable
occupational diseases in accordance with laws'" (Pantoja vs. Republic, et al., L-
43317, December 29, 1978).

As correctly alleged by petitioner, the theory of increased risk is applicable in

this case. Section 1(b), Rule III of P.D. 626, as amended, states:

"For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of
these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be
shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions."

Construing the above provision in the case of Cristobal vs. ECC (103 SCRA
329), this Court stated the following:

"To establish compensability under the said theory, the claimant must show
proof of work-connection. Impliedly, the degree of proof required is merely
substantial evidence, which means 'such relevant evidence to support a decision'
(Ang Tibay vs. The Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union,
Inc., 69 Phil. 635) or clear and convincing evidence. In this connection, it must
be pointed out that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for
compensation. Respondents however insist on evidence which would establish
direct causal relation between the disease rectal cancer and the employment of
the deceased. Such a strict requirement which even medical experts cannot
support considering the uncertainty of the nature of the disease would negate
the principle of the liberality in the matter of evidence. Apparently, what the law
merely requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation.
This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and
compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor
Code which states that 'all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of
this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in
favor of labor.'

"x x x As the agents charged by the law to implement the social justice guarantee
secured by both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more
liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensation especially when there is
some basis in the facts inferring a work-connection. This should not be confused with
the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act. While these doctrines may have been abandoned under the new Labor
Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the
liberality of the law, in general, still subsists. x x x" (Italics supplied).

Considering the uncertainty of the cause of cancer diseases, the Court has ruled
that:

"x x x (I)t is possible that the disease must have supervened before the
Amended Labor Code took effect. Even if the illness occurred after the
Amended Labor Code had taken effect, the illness of the deceased should be
considered as compensable" (Dator vs. ECC, 111 SCRA 632; Cristobal vs. ECC,
103 SCRA 329).

Finally, it must be reiterated that the deceased died of a disease (colonic

malignancy) the etiology or cause of which is still unknown. Taking this fact into
consideration, this Court has enunciated the following ruling in the case of
Dator vs. ECC, et al. (111 SCRA supra) as cited in the case of De Leon vs. ECC
(118 SCRA 544):

"We have ruled that until now the cause of cancer is still unknown. Despite this
fact, however, the ECC has listed some kinds of cancer as compensable. There is no reason
why cancer of the lungs should not be considered as a compensable disease" Italics supplied.

Thus, where the cause of employees' death is unknown, the right to

compensation subsists, the reason being that the Workmen's Compensation Act
is a social legislation, designed to give relief to the workingman, and therefore,
to effectuate its purposes, it must be liberally construed (Najera vs. ECC, 122
SCRA 697). In compensation cases, strict rules of evidence are not applicable.
Proof of actual cause of the ailment is not necessary. The test of evidence or the
relation of the disease with the employment is probability and not certainty (San
Valentin vs. ECC, 118 SCRA 160). To be compensable, it is enough that the
hypothesis on which workmen's claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to
the contrary can be disregarded (Delegente vs. ECC, 118 SCRA 67).

In the case of Cristobal vs. ECC (10 SCRA 329), as cited in the case of
Abadiano vs. GSIS (111 SCRA 509), this Court had the occasion to qualify the
compensability of borderline cases in the New Labor Code and the social justice
guarantee under this new set-up, thus:

"xx xx xx.

"In the instant case, it is evident that rectal cancer is one of those borderline
cases. Like, it is clear that the purpose of the resolution is extend the
applicability of the provisions of P.D. 626, thereby affording a greater number
of employees the opportunity to avail of the benefits under the law. This is in
consonance with the avowed policy of the State, as mandated by the Consti-
tution and embodied in the New Labor Code, to give maximum aid and
protection to labor. The Employees' Compensation Commission, like the
defunct Court of Industrial Relations and the Workmen's Compensation
Commission, is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to
the constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man, more specially, the
social justice guarantee; for otherwise, these guarantees would be merely 'a lot of
meaningless patter' (Santos vs. WCC, 75 SCRA 37], 1977).

"As pointed out by no less than the respondent ECC itself in its Comment
dated January 5, 1978 --

'It may not be amiss to mention that the ECC has time and again expanded the list of
occupational diseases. This comes about after continuing studies made by the ECC.
Indeed, cancer has been included a qualified occupational disease in certain cases - x x x.'

"Worth noting is the fact that the above types of cancer have no known
etiology. Yet they are regarded as occupational. The clear implication is that the
law merely requires a reasonable work connection (pp. 59-60, rec.).

"From the foregoing statements, it is palpable that the respondent ECC

recognizes, as it is duty bound to, the policy of the State to afford maximum aid
and protection to labor. Therefore, to require the petitioner to show the actual
causes or factors which led to the decedent's rectal malignancy would not be
consistent with this liberal interpretation. It is of universal acceptance that
practically all kinds of cancer belong to the class of clinical diseases whose exact
etiology, cause or origin, is unknown. x x x (Id., pp. 479-480)" [Italics supplied].

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY SET

ASIDE AND THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM IS
HEREBY ORDERED

1. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND

(P12,000.00) PESOS AS DEATH BENEFITS;

2. TO REIMBURSE THE PETITIONER'S MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL

EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS;

3. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF ONE THOUSAND TWO

HUNDRED (P1,200.00) PESOS FOR FUNERAL EXPENSES; AND
4. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF ONE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED (P1,200.00) PESOS AS ATTORNEY'S FEES.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., dissents. The disease was not work-related. He votes for the
affirmance of the ECC decision.

Copyright 2016 - Batas.org

 Supreme Court of the Philippines

267 Phil. 99

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 83491, August 27, 1990
MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO., INC. AND GUILLERMO ARANETA,
PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND HERMINIA
FAMOSO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

To say the least, the Court views with regret the adamant refusal of petitioner
Ma-ao Sugar Central to recompense the private respondent for the death of
Julio Famoso, their main source of support, who was killed in line of duty while
in its employ. It is not only a matter of law but also of compassion on which we
are called upon to rule today. We shall state at the outset that on both counts
the petition must fail.

On March 22, 1980, Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the caboose or
"carbonera" of Plymouth No. 12, a cargo train of the petitioner, when the
locomotive was suddenly derailed. He and his companion jumped off to escape
injury, but the train fell on its side, caught his legs by its wheels and pinned him
down. He was declared dead on the spot. 1

The claims for death and other benefits having been denied by the petitioner,
the herein private respondent filed suit in the Regional Trial Court of Bago
City. Judge Marietta Hobilla-Alinio ruled in her favor but deducted from the
total damages awarded 25% thereof for the decedent's contributory negligence
and the total pension of P41,367.60 private respondent and her children would
be receiving from the SSS for the next five years. The dispositive portion of the
decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances present in this
case, the Court orders as it does hereby order the defendant Ma-ao Sugar
Central thru its Manager Mr. Guillermo Y. Araneta to pay plaintiff the following
amount:
P30,000.00 - for the death of plaintiff's husband, the late Julio
Famoso
P30,000.00 - for actual, exemplary and moral damages
P10,000.00 - loss of earnings for twenty (20) years
P 3,000.00 - funeral expenses
P73,000.00 - Total Damages
Less: P18,250.00 - 25% for the deceased's contributory negligence
Less: P41,367.60 - pension plaintiff and her minor children would
be receiving for five (5) years from the SSS
___________
P13,382.40
Plus: P 3,000.00 - Attorney's fees and cost of this suit
___________
P16,382.40 - Total amount payable to the plaintiff
SO ORDERED.

The widow appealed, claiming that the deductions were illegal. So did the
petitioner, but on the ground that it was not negligent and therefore not liable at
all.

In its own decision, the Court of Appeals2 sustained the rulings of the trial court
except as to the contributory negligence of the deceased and disallowed the
deductions protested by the private respondent. Thus, the respondent court
declared:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED by ordering the

defendant-appellant to pay the plaintiff-appellee the following amounts:
P30,000.00, for the death of Julio Famoso
P30,000.00, for actual, exemplary and moral damages
P10,000.00, for loss of earnings for twenty (20) years
P 3,000.00, for funeral expenses
P 3,000.00, for attorney's fees
P76,000.00 Total Amount
In this petition, the respondent court is faulted for finding the petitioner guilty
of negligence notwithstanding its defense of due diligence under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code and for disallowing the deductions made by the trial court.

Investigation of the accident revealed that the derailment of the locomotive was
caused by protruding rails which had come loose because they were not
connected and fixed in place by fish plates. Fish plates are described as strips of
iron 8" to 12" long and 3 1/2" thick which are attached to the rails by 4 bolts,
two on each side, to keep the rails aligned. Although they could be removed
only with special equipment, the fish plates that should have kept the rails
aligned could not be found at the scene of the accident.

There is no question that the maintenance of the rails, for the purpose inter alia
of preventing derailments, was the responsibility of the petitioner, and that this
responsibility was not discharged. According to Jose Treyes, its own witness,
who was in charge of the control and supervision of its train operations, cases of
derailment in the milling district were frequent and there were even times when
such derailments were reported every hour.3 The petitioner should therefore
have taken more prudent steps to prevent such accidents instead of waiting until
a life was finally lost because of its negligence.

The argument that no one had been hurt before because of such derailments is
of course not acceptable. And neither are we impressed by the claim that the
brakemen and the conductors were required to report any defect in the
condition of the railways and to fill out prescribed forms for the purpose. For
what is important is that the petitioner should act on these reports and not
merely receive and file them. The fact that it is not easy to detect if the fish
plates are missing is no excuse either. Indeed, it should stress all the more the
need for the responsible employees of the petitioner to make periodic checks
and actually go down to the railroad tracks and see if the fish plates were in
place.

It is argued that the locomotive that was derailed was on its way back and that it
had passed the same rails earlier without accident. The suggestion is that the
rails were properly aligned then, but that does not necessarily mean they were
still aligned afterwards. It is possible that the fish plates were loosened and
detached during its first trip and the rails were as a result already mis-aligned
during the return trip. But the Court feels that even this was unlikely, for, as
earlier noted, the fish plates were supposed to have been bolted to the rails and
could be removed only with special tools. The fact that the fish plates were not
found later at the scene of the mishap may show they were never there at all to
begin with or had been been removed long before.

At any rate, the absence of the fish plates - whatever the cause or reason - is by
itself alone proof of the negligence of the petitioner. Res ipsa loquitur. The
doctrine was described recently in Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court,4
thus:

Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of
the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care.

The petitioner also disclaims liability on the ground of Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, contending it has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision
of its employees. The Court cannot agree. The record shows it was in fact lax
in requiring them to exercise the necessary vigilance in maintaining the rails in
good condition to prevent the derailments that sometimes happened "every
hour." Obviously, merely ordering the brakemen and conductors to fill out
prescribed forms reporting derailments - which reports have not been acted
upon as shown by the hourly derailments - is not the kind of supervision
envisioned by the Civil Code.

We also do not see how the decedent can be held guilty of contributory
negligence from the mere fact that he was not at his assigned station when the
train was derailed. That might have been a violation of company rules but could
not have directly contributed to his injury, as the petitioner suggests. It is pure
speculation to suppose that he would not have been injured if he had stayed in
the front car rather than at the back and that he had been killed because he
chose to ride in the caboose.

Contributory negligence has been defined as "the act or omission amounting to

want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with
the defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause of the the injury."5 It has been
held that "to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be
shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of
warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body."6 There is no
showing that the caboose where Famoso was riding was a dangerous place and
that he recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of impending
danger.

The last point raised by the petitioner is easily resolved. Citing the case of
Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation,7 it argues that the respondent court erred
in disauthorizing the deduction from the total damages awarded the private
respondent of the amount of P41,367.60, representing the pension to be
received by the private respondent from the Social Security System for a period
of five years. The argument is that such deduction was quite proper because of
Art. 173 of the Labor Code, as amended. This article provides that any amount
received by the heirs of a deceased employee from the Employees
Compensation Commission, whose funds are administered by the SSS, shall be
exclusive of all other amounts that may otherwise be claimed under the Civil
Code and other pertinent laws.

The amount to be paid by the SSS represents the usual pension received by the
heirs of a deceased employee who was a member of the SSS at the time of his
death and had regularly contributed his premiums as required by the
System. The pension is the benefit derivable from such contributions. It does
not represent the death benefits payable under the Workmen's Compensation
Act to an employee who dies as a result of a work-connected injury. Indeed, the
certification from the SSS8 submitted by the petitioner is simply to the effect
that:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that Mrs. Herminia Vda. de Famoso is a recipient of a monthly
pension from the Social Security System arising from the death of her late
husband, Julio Famoso, an SSS member with SSS No. 07-018173-1.
This certification is issued to Ma-ao Sugar Central for whatever legal purpose it
may serve best.
Issued this 8th day of April 1983 in Bacolod City, Philippines.
GODOFREDO S. SISON
Regional Manager
By: (SGD.) COSME Q. BERMEO, JR.
Chief, Benefits Branch
It does not indicate that the pension is to be taken from the funds of the
ECC. The certification would have said so if the pension represented the death
benefits accruing to the heirs under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

This conclusion is supported by the express provision of Art. 173 as amended,

which categorically states that:

Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability. - Unless otherwise provided, the liability of

the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all
other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone
otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his
dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the
recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as
amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred eighty-six, as amended,
Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered
Forty-eight hundred sixty-four, as amended and other laws whose benefits are
administered by the System or by other agencies of the government. (Emphasis
supplied).

Rep. Act No. 1161, as amended, is the Social Security Law.

As observed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Valencia v. Manila Yacht

Club,9 which is still controlling:

. . . By their nature and purpose, the sickness or disability benefits to which a

member of the System may be entitled under the Social Security law (Rep. Act
No. 1161, as amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 1792 and 2658) are not the same as
the compensation that may be claimed against the employer under the
Workmen's Compensation Act or the Civil Code, so that payment to the
member employee of social security benefits would not wipe out or extinguish
the employer's liability for the injury or illness contracted by his employee in the
course of or during the employment. It must be realized that, under the
Workmen's Compensation Act (or the Civil Code, in a proper case), the
employer is required to compensate the employee for the sickness or injury
arising in the course of the employment because the industry is supposed to be
responsible therefore; whereas, under the Social Security Act, payment is being
made because the hazard specifically covered by the membership, and for which
the employee had put up his own money, had taken place. As this Court had
said:

. . . To deny payment of social security benefits because the death or injury or

confinement is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act would be
to deprive the employees members of the System of the statutory benefits
bought and paid for by them, since they contributed their money to the general
common fund out of which benefits are paid. In other words, the benefits
provided for in the Workmen's Compensation Act accrues to the employees
concerned due to the hazards involved in their employment and is made a
burden on the employment itself. However, social security benefits are paid to
the System's members, by reason of their membership therein for which they
contribute their money to a general common fund. . . .

It may be added that whereas social security benefits are intended to provide
insurance or protection against the hazards or risks for which they are
established, e.g., disability, sickness, old age or death, irrespective of whether
they arose from or in the course of the employment or not, the compensation
receivable under the Workmen's Compensation law is in the nature of indemnity
for the injury or damage suffered by the employee or his dependents on account
of the employment. (Rural Transit Employees Asso. vs. Bachrach Trans. Co.,
21 SCRA 1263 [1967])

And according to Justice Jesus G. Barrera in Benguet Consolidated, Inc. v.

Social Security System:10

The philosophy underlying the Workmen's Compensation Act is to make the

payment of the benefits provided for therein as a responsibility of the industry,
on the ground that it is industry which should bear the resulting death or injury
to employees engaged in the said industry. On the other hand, social security
sickness benefits are not paid as a burden on the industry, but are paid to the
members of the System as a matter of right, whenever the hazards provided for
in the law occurs. To deny payment of social security benefits because the death
or injury or confinement is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation
Act would be to deprive the employees-members of the System of the statutory
benefits bought and paid for by them, since they contribute their money to the
general common fund out of which benefits are paid. In other words, the
benefits provided for in the Workmen's Compensation Act accrues to the
employees concerned, due to the hazards involved in their employment and is
made a burden on the employment itself. However, social security benefits are
paid to the System's members, by reason of their membership therein for which
they contributed their money to a general common fund.

Famoso's widow and nine minor children have since his death sought to recover
the just recompense they need for their support. Instead of lending a
sympathetic hand, the petitioner has sought to frustrate their efforts and has
even come to this Court to seek our assistance in defeating their claim. That
relief - and we are happy to say this - must be withheld.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto. The petition is

DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Original Record, p. 122.

2Penned by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, and concurred in by Justices Gloria C.

Paras and Conrado T. Limcaoco.

3 TSN, October 31, 1984, p. 27.

4 167 SCRA 376.

5 Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed., p. 210.

6 Ocampo v. Capistrano, CA-G.R. No. 47067-R, January 24, 1980.

7 136 SCRA 141.

8 Exhibit “4,” Original Record, p. 92.

9 28 SCRA 724.

10 10 SCRA 616.