IX.
RIGHT TO INFORMATION way of informing themselves of the specific contents
1. TANADA VS TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985, Escolin, J.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a
public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law.
FACTS:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters
of public concern, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders.
The respondents argued that petitioners have no legal
standing to bring the petition in the absence of any
showing that petitioners are prejudiced by the alleged
non-publication of the presidential issuances. Upon
the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the
subject of the petition concerns a public right and its
object is to compel the performance of a public duty,
they need not show any specific interest for their
petition to be given due course.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner may file a petition for
mandamus as against the the respondents to compel
them to publish the unpublished laws on the basis of
their right to be informed on matters of public
concern.
RULING:
YES. The clear object of Article 2 of the Civil Code
is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of
a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even
a constructive one. Without publication, the people
have no means of knowing what presidential decrees
have actually been promulgated, much less a definite
and texts of such decrees.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a
public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees
that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which apply
only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. It is needless to add that
the publication of presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement
of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person
may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents.
2. BENGZON VS. DRILON
FACTS:
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving
pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797.
President Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-
A of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of the
pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted
members of the AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued
by Marcos which provided for the automatic
readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted
men was restored, while that of the retired justices
was not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in
1990. When her advisers gave the wrong information
that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an
attempt to overcome her earlier veto in 1990,
President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in
this petition.
It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797
never became a valid law absent its publication, thus
there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in
effect and HB 16297 was superfluous because it tried
to restore benefits which were never taken away
validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce
any effect.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President of certain
provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the
payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is
constitutional or valid.
RULING:
The act of the President of vetoing the provision in
the Appropriation Bill which set aside certain sum of
money for the payment of the adjusted retirement
pension of retired justices of the SC and CA was
invalid because in fact, the President was vetoing RA
No. 1797 and the ruling of the Supreme Court in the
Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA. The
president has no power to set aside and override the
decision of the Supreme Court neither does the
president have the power to enact or amend statutes
promulgated by her predecessors much less to the
repeal of existing laws.
It was held in the case of Tanada V. Tuvera that all
laws must be published in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation before it can take
effect. In this case, PD No. 644, as already ruled by
the SC in the pertinent Administrative Case, did not
become a valid law because it was not duly published.
Absence such publication, the law shall be invalid.
PD No. 644 never became a law, therefore RA No.
1797 remains in force and so does the automatic
readjustment feature of the pension of the retired SC
and CAS justices. Therefore the President cannot veto
the appropriation made by Congress.
3. NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO
MASIGASIG, INC VS. MILITARY SHRINE
SERVICES-PHILIPPINE VETERANS
AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE
FACTS:
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423,
President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels ofland in
the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque,
Province of Rizal and Pasay City for amilitary
reservation. The military reservation, then known
as Fort William McKinley, was later onrenamed Fort
Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).On 28 May 1967,
President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos)
issued Proclamation No. 208,amending Proclamation
No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort
Bonifacio and reserved it fora national shrine. The
excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga
Bayani, which is under theadministration of herein
respondent Military Shrine Services
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-
PVAO). Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending
Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangays
Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village
from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and
declared it open for disposition under the provisions
of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730. At the
bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos
made a handwritten addendum, which reads:"P.S.
This includes Western Bicutan (SGD.) Ferdinand E.
Marcos
The crux of the controversy started when
Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official
Gazette on 3 February 1986, without the above-
quoted addendum. Years later, President Corazon C.
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172 which
substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as
published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of
Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation
No. 423 and declared the said lots open for disposition
under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.Through the
years, informal settlers increased and occupied some
areas of Fort Bonifacio including portions of the
Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General
Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No. 1323
creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to
prevent further unauthorizedoccupation and to cause
the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner
Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc.
(NMSMI)filed a Petition with the Commission on
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP). Thus, on
1September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution
granting the Petition and declaring the portions of
land in question alienable and disposable, with
Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General
dissenting. The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten
addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of
Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore,
controlling. The intention of the President could not
be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of
others. Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, which was denied by the
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COSLAP.MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court
of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP
Resolutions. The Court of Appeals First Division
rendered the assailed Decision granting MSS-
PVAO’s Petition.
Both NMSMI and WBLOAI appealed the said
Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the handwritten addendum was
considered published also at the time the
Proclamationwas published.
RULING:
No. Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots
3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots), their claims
were anchored on the handwritten addendum of
President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476.They
allege that the former President intended to include all
Western Bicutan in the reclassification of portions of
Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he
made a notation just below the printed version of
Proclamation No. 2476.However, it is undisputed that
the handwritten addendum was not included when
Proclamation No.2476 was published in the Official
Gazette. The resolution of whether the subject lots
were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the
determination of whether the handwritten addendum
of President Marcos has the force and effect of law.
In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code
expressly provides: ART. 2. Laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it
is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one
year after such publication. Under the above
provision, the requirement of publication is
indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law
itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless
otherwise provided" refers to a different effectivity
date other than after fifteen days following the
completion of the law’s publication
in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the
requirement of publication may be dispensed with.
The issue of the requirement of publication was
already settled in the landmark case Tañada v.
Hon.Tuvera.Court cannot rely on a handwritten note
that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as
published. Without publication, the note never had
any legal force and effect. Furthermore, under Section
24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code,
"the publication of any law, resolution or other
official documents in the Official Gazette shall be
prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether
or not President Marcos intended to include Western
Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply
put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable
intent of the legislature apart from the words
appearing in the law.
This Court cannot rule that a word appears inthe law
when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers,
Inc. v. Hon. Trajano, we ruled that “under Article 8 of
the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines.' This does
not mean, however, that courts can create law. The
courts exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting
it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the
principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the
sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the
laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or
where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not
arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The
remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial
interpretation, but another legislation that would
amend the law ‘to include petitioners' lots in the
reclassification.
4. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
ERMITA
FACTS:
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the
Senate as a whole issued invitations to various
officials of the Executive Department for them to
appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the
railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery and
Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project).On
September 28, 2005, the President then issued
Executive Order 464, “Ensuring Observance of the
Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the
Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the
Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and For Other Purposes,” which,
pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect
immediately.
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ISSUES:
1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of
inquiry vested in Congress;
2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern; and
3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse
of discretion when they implemented E.O.464 prior
to its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
HELD:
1. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly
recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. This power of inquiry is broad enough
to cover officials of the executive branch; itis co-
extensive with the power to legislate. The matters
which may be a proper subject of legislation and
those which may be a proper subject of investigation
are one. It follows that the operation of government,
being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper
subject for investigation.
2. Yes. Although there are clear distinctions
between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern,
any executive issuance tending to unduly limit
disclosures of information in investigations in
Congress necessarily deprives the people of
information which, being presumed to be in aid of
legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public
concern.
3. Yes. While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the
executive branch, it does not follow that the same is
exempt from the need for publication. It has a direct
effect on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. Due process requires
that the people should have been apprised of its
issuance before it was implemented.
5. AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY
(AKBAYAN) VS. AQUINO
FACTS:
The Petitioners (non-government organizations,
Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers) demanded
the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement (JPEPA)including the
Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the
negotiation process. The JPEPA, which will be the
first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into
by the Philippines with another country in the event
the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad
range of topics as follows: trade in goods, rules of
origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in
services, investment, intellectual property rights,
government procurement, movement of natural
persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual
recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement,
improvement of the business environment, and
general and final provisions.
Respondents do not dispute that, at the time the
petition was filed up to the filing of petitioners’ Reply
–when the JPEPA was still being negotiated – the
initial drafts thereof were kept from public view. With
the Senate deliberations on the JPEPA still pending,
the agreement as it now stands cannot yet be
considered as final and binding between the two
States. Article 164 of the JPEPA itself provides that
the agreement does not take effect immediately upon
the signing thereof. For it must still go through the
procedures required by the laws of each country for
its entry into force) – BASIN MAG-ASK SI SIR…
the petitioners file this case in the 3rd year of
negotiation.
The respondent alleged that the request of the
Petitioners must be denied on the ground that the
issue is under the executive privileged and is due
confidential. The petitioners argue that the contents of
the JPEPA are matter of public interest, and thus it
covers by their right to information. Whether a claim
of executive privilege is valid depends on the ground
invoked to justify it and the context in which it is
made.In the present case, the ground for respondents’
claim of privilege is set forth in their
x x The categories of information that may be
considered privileged includes matters of diplomatic
character and under negotiation and review. In this
case, the privileged character of the diplomatic
negotiations has been categorically invoked and
clearly explained by respondents particularly
respondent DTI Senior Undersecretary.
The documents on the proposed JPEPA as well as the
text which is subject to negotiations and legal review
by the parties fall under the exceptions to the right of
4
access to information on matters of public concern
and policy of public disclosure. They come within the
coverage of executive privilege. At the time when the
Committee was requesting for copies of such
documents, the negotiations were ongoing as they are
still now and the text of the proposed JPEPA is still
uncertain and subject to change. This is in reference
to PMPF v.Manglapus
The petitioner argue that PMPF v. Manglapus does
not apply in the present case. They stress that PMPF
v. Manglapus involved the Military Bases Agreement
which necessarily pertained to matters affecting
national security; whereas the present case involves
an economic treaty that seeks to regulate trade and
commerce between the Philippines and Japan
LEGAL
ISSUE
WON the full text/content/negotiation of the JPEPA
is under the executive privileged and thus must be
confidential?
RULING:
Respondents’ claim of executive privilege being
valid.In PMPF v. Manglapus -
"the [public’s] right to information . . . does not
extend to matters recognized as privileged
information under the separation of powers." What
counts as privileged information in an executive-
legislative conflict is thus also recognized as such in
cases involving the public’s right to information. The
court held that when the Executive has already shown
that an information is covered by executive privilege,
the party demanding the information must present a
"strong showing of need," whether that party is
Congress or a private citizen.
However, when the Executive has – as in this case –
invoked the privilege, and it has been established that
the subject information is indeed covered by the
privilege being claimed, can a party overcome the
same by merely asserting that the information being
demanded is a matter of public concern, without any
further showing required? Certainly not, for that
would render the doctrine of executive privilege of no
force and effect whatsoever as a limitation on the
right to information, because then the sole test in such
controversies would be whether an information is a
matter of public concern. By disclosing the
documents of the JPEPA negotiations, the Philippine
government runs the grave risk of betraying the trust
reposed in it by the Japanese representatives, indeed,
by the Japanese government itself. How would the
Philippine government then explain itself when that
happens? Surely, it cannot bear to say that it just had
to release the information because certain persons
simply wanted to know it "because it interests them.
"Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether
an information is covered by the right toi nformation,
a specific "showing of need" for such information is
not a relevant consideration, but only whether the
same is a matter of public concern. When, however,
the government has claimed executive privilege, and
it has established that the information is indeed
covered by the same, then the party demanding it, if
it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that the
information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of
its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and
reasonably participate in social, political, and
economic decision-making.
Diplomatic negotiations have, since the Court
promulgated its Resolution in PMPF v. Manglapus on
September 13, 1988, been recognized as privileged in
this jurisdiction and the reasons proffered by
petitioners against the application of the ruling therein
to the present case have not persuaded the Court.
Moreover, petitioners – both private citizens and
members of the House of Representatives – have
failed to present a "sufficient showing of need" to
overcome the claim of privilege in this case. That the
privilege was asserted for the first time in
respondents’ Comment to the present petition, and
not during the hearings of the House Special
Committee on Globalization, is of no moment, since
it cannot be interpreted as a waiver of the privilege on
the part of the Executive branch. For reasons already
explained, this Decision shall not be interpreted as
departing from the ruling in Senate v.Ermita that
executive privilege should be invoked by the
President or through the Executive Secretary "by
order of the President.
6. SERENO VS. COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
RELATED MATTERS (CTRM) OF THE
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NEDA)
7. IN RE: PRODUCTION OF COURT
RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS AND THE
ATTENDANCE OF COURT OFFICIALS AND
5
EMPLOYEES AS WITNESSES UNDER THE
SUBPOENAS OF FEBRUARY 10, 2012 AND
THE VARIOUS LETTERS FOR THE
IMPEACHMENT PROSECUTION PANEL
DATED JANUARY 19 AND 25, 2012
 February
14, 2012, Per Curiam
 Chief Justice or other Members of the Court about
As far as the Court is concerned, its Members and
officials involved in all proceedings are duty-bound
to observe the privileged communication and
confidentiality rules if the integrity of the
administration of justice were to be preserved.
FACTS:
During the impeachment proceedings against Chief
Justice Corona, the Prosecution Panel manifested in a
COMPLIANCE that it would present about 100
witnesses and almost a thousand documents, to be
secured from both private and public offices. The list
of proposed witnesses included Justices of the
Supreme Court, and Court officials and employees
who will testify on matters, many of which are,
internal to the Court.
Atty. Vidal, Clerk of the Supreme Court, brought to
SC’s attention the Subpoena Ad Testificandum et
Duces Tecum and Subpoena Ad Testificandum she
received, commanding her to appear at 10:00 in the
morning of the 13th of February 2012 with the
original and certified true copies of the documents
listed above, and to likewise appear in the afternoon
at 2:00 of the same day and everyday thereafter, to
produce the listed documents and to testify. In light of
the subpoenas served, the urgent need for a court
ruling and based on the Constitution, the pertinent
laws and of the Court's rules and policies, there
should be a determination of how the Court will
comply with the subpoenas and the letters of the
Prosecution Impeachment Panel.
ISSUE:
What is the policy of the Court with regard to the
access to its records?
RULING:
In line with the public's constitutional right to
information, the Court has adopted a policy of
transparency with respect to documents in its
possession or custody, necessary to maintain the
integrity of its sworn duty to adjudicate justiciable
disputes.
The Members of the Court may not be compelled to
testify in the impeachment proceedings against the
information they acquired in the performance of their
official function of adjudication, such as information
on how deliberations were conducted or the material
inputs that the justices used in decision-making,
because the end-result would be the disclosure of
confidential information that could subject them to
criminal prosecution. Such act violates judicial
privilege (or the equivalent of executive privilege) as
it pertains to the exercise of the constitutional
mandate of adjudication.
Jurisprudence implies that justices and judges may
not be subject to any compulsory process in relation
to the performance of their adjudicatory functions.
With respect to Court officials and employees, the
same rules on confidentiality that apply to justices and
judges apply to them. They are barred from disclosing
(1) the result of the raffle of cases, (2) the actions
taken by the Court on each case included in the
agenda of the Court's session, and (3) the
deliberations of the Members in court sessions on
cases and matters pending before it. They are subject
as well to the disqualification by reason of privileged
communication and the sub judice rule. As stated
above, these rules extend to documents and other
communications which cannot be disclosed.
These privileges, incidentally, belong to the Judiciary
and are for the Supreme Court (as the representative
and entity speaking for the Judiciary), and not for the
individual justice, judge, or court official or
employees to waive. Thus, every proposed waiver
must be referred to the Supreme Court for its
consideration and approval.
To state the rule differently, Justices of the Court
cannot be compelled to testify on matters relating to
the internal deliberations and actions of the Court, in
the exercise of their adjudicatory functions and
duties. This is to be differentiated from a situation
where the testimony is on a matter which is external
to their adjudicatory functions and duties.
6
8. RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008
STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND
NET WORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA
SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE
JUDICIARY
A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012, Mendoza, J.
The information disclosed in the Statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) is a matter of
public concern and interest. The right to information
goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of
full public disclosure and honesty in the public
service.
FACTS:
The Research Director and researcher-writer of
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ)
sought copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities
and Net Worth (SALN) of the SC Justices for the year
2008 for the purpose of updating their database of
information on government officials. Meanwhile,
several requests for copies of SALN and other
personal documents of SC, CA and Sandiganbayan
Justices were also filed. The requests were made for
different purposes. Although no direct opposition to
the disclosure of SALN and other personal documents
is being expressed, it is the uniform position of the
said magistrates and the various judges’ associations
that the disclosure must be made in accord with the
guidelines set by the Court and under such
circumstances that would not undermine the
independence of the Judiciary.
ISSUE:
Whether the SALNs of the Justices have to be
disclosed for being matters of public concern and
interest.
RULING:
YES. Section 17, Article XI, has classified the
information disclosed in the SALN as a matter of
public concern and interest. The right to information
goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of
full public disclosure and honesty in the public
service. The public has the right to know the assets,
liabilities, net worth and financial and business
interests of public officials and employees including
those of their spouses and of unmarried children 18
years of age living in their households.
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right
to information, with its companion right of access to
official records, is not absolute. While providing
guaranty for that right, the Constitution also provides
that the people’s right. Jurisprudence has provided the
following limitations to that right: (1) national
security matters and intelligence information; (2)
trade secrets and banking transactions; (3) criminal
matters; and (4) other confidential information such
as confidential or classified information officially
known to public officers and employees by reason of
their office and not made available to the public as
well as diplomatic correspondence, closed door
Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either
house of Congress, and the internal deliberations of
the Supreme Court.
This could only mean that while no prohibition could
stand against access to official records, such as the
SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation.
9. PEOPLE VS. CABALQUINTO
FACTS
This is a case of child who allegedly raped by her own
father. The mother of the child abuse victim sent a
letter addressed to the Chief Justice expressing
anxiety over the posting of full text decisions of the
Supreme Court on its Internet Web Page. The mother
submitted that confidentiality and the best interest of
the child must prevail over public access to
information and pleaded that her daughter’s case, as
well as those of a similar nature, be excluded from the
Web Page. The Court required the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), National Press Club (NPC),
Philippine Press Institute (PPI), Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) and the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to
comment on the issue:
The position of the OSG in its Comment is
noteworthy. The OSG submits that the posting of the
full text of decisions in cases involving child abuse on
the Supreme Court Web Page violates the right to
privacy of the aggrieved parties. In order to
7
determine whether the subject matter upon which the
right to privacy being invoked falls within the
constitutionally-protected zone of privacy, it must be
shown that the person’s expectation of privacy is
reasonable. The reasonableness of such expectancy
depends on a two–part test: (1) whether by his
conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation
of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one
that society recognizes as reasonable.
According to the OSG, the fact that the aggrieved
child may have consented, through a parent or
guardian, to a public hearing of the case does not
negate the expectation of privacy which the child may
later invoke because child victims cannot be
presumed to have intended their initial agreement to
extend beyond the termination of their case to the
posting of the decision reached by the Court on the
Web Page. Moreover, such an expectation of privacy
is reasonable considering the various statutes and
rules which reveal the intention of the State to
maintain the confidentiality of information pertaining
to child abuse cases.
The DSWD imparted the same sentiment. It submits
that the court records of child abuse cases should be
treated with strict confidentiality not only throughout
the court proceedings, but even after the
promulgation of the decision in order to protect the
right to privacy of the child and her family and to
preclude instances where undue disclosure of
information may impair the treatment and
rehabilitation of the child-victim.
The Court likewise appreciates the separate
comments of the KBP and NPC. The KBP informs the
Court that its members have agreed not to identify in
their broadcasts the names of children who are
victims of abuse or are in conflict with the law. The
NPC, on the other hand, tells us that the prevailing
media practice is to inquire whether these individuals
wish to have their names appear in the report. If they
do not, media would normally take off the names and
merely provide a very general description of the
individual in recognition of the need to carefully
balance the right to information with the welfare of
the parties involved.
ISSUE
Whether or not it is proper to post the full text of
decisions of similar cases on the Supreme Court Web
Page in cases involving child sexual abuse.
HELD
This case presents an opportunity for the Court not
only to once again dispense due requital for the
sufferings of a child who has been defiled by her own
father, but also to effectuate the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610), otherwise known
as the Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, and its
implementing rules, RA 9262, otherwise known as
the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004, and its implementing rules, and
our own Rule on Violence Against Women and their
Children.
The provisions on confidentiality of these enactments
uniformly seek to respect the dignity and protect the
privacy of women and their children. Sec. 29 of RA
7610 provides:
Sec. 29. Confidentiality. — at the instance of the
offended party, his name may be withheld from the
public until the court acquires jurisdiction over the
case.
It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and
reporter or columnist in case of printed materials,
announcer or producer in the case of television and
radio broadcasting, producer and director in the case
of the movie industry, to cause undue and
sensationalized publicity of any case of a violation of
this Act which results in the moral degradation and
suffering of the offended party.
Sec. 44 of RA 9262 similarly provides:
Sec. 44. Confidentiality.—All records pertaining to
cases of violence against women and their children
including those in the barangay shall be confidential
and all public officers and employees and public or
private clinics or hospitals shall respect the right to
privacy of the victim. Whoever publishes or causes to
be published, in any format, the name, address,
telephone number, school, business address,
employer, or other identifying information of a victim
or an immediate family member, without the latter’s
consent, shall be liable to the contempt power of the
court.
8
Any person who violates this provision shall suffer the
penalty of one (1) year imprisonment and a fine of not
more than Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00).
Likewise, the Rule on Violence Against Women and
their Children states:
Sec. 40. Privacy and confidentiality of proceedings.—
All hearings of cases of violence against women and
their children shall be conducted in a manner
consistent with the dignity of women and their
children and respect for their privacy.
Records of the cases shall be treated with utmost
confidentiality. Whoever publishes or causes to be
published, in any format, the name, address,
telephone number, school, business address,
employer or other identifying information of the
parties or an immediate family or household member,
without their consent or without authority of the
court, shall be liable for contempt of court and shall
suffer the penalty of one year imprisonment and a fine
of not more than Five Hundred Thousand
(P500,000.00) Pesos.
Taking all these opinions into account and in view of
recent enactments which unequivocally express the
intention to maintain the confidentiality of
information in cases involving violence against
women and their children, in this case and henceforth,
the Court shall withhold the real name of the victim-
survivor and shall use fictitious initials instead to
represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances
of the victims-survivors or any other information
tending to establish or compromise their identities, as
well those of their immediate family or household
members, shall not be disclosed.
10. FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, Presiding
Judge, MCTC, Compostela-New Bataan,
Compostela Valley Province v. JUDICIAL AND
BAR COUNCIL
G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015, Reyes, J.
The qualification standard by which the JBC shall
 qualification standard by which the JBC shall
determine proven competence of an applicant is not
an internal regulation; hence, its publication is
indispensable. It is but a
 natural consequence
thereof that potential applicants be informed of the
 their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a
requirements to the judicial positions, so that they
would be able to prepare
 for and comply with them.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ferdinand Villanueva was appointed as the
Judge of Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Compostela
– New Bataan. After more than one year of service,
he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge
in three branches of RTC (in Tagum City, Davao
City, and Agusan Del Sur). Consequently he was not
included by the JBC in the list of considered
applicants since he failed to meet the 5-year service
requirement, as he has been a judge only for more
than a year. The petitioner averred that the assailed
policy violates procedural due
 process for lack of
publication and non-submission to the University of
the
 Philippines Law Center Office of the National
Administrative Register
 (ONAR). The petitioner
said that the assailed policy will affect all applying

judges, thus, the said policy should have been
published.
ISSUE:
Whether the 5-year service qualification should have
been published.
RULING:
YES. The assailed JBC policy requiring five years of
service as judges of first-level courts before they can
qualify as applicants to second-level courts should
have been published. As a general rule, publication is
indispensable in order that all statutes, including
administrative rules that are intended to enforce or
implement existing laws, attain binding force and
effect. However, this publication requirement admits
of some exceptions. Nevertheless, the assailed JBC
policy does not fall within the administrative
 rules
and regulations exempted from the publication
requirement. The
 assailed policy involves a


determine proven competence of an applicant. It is
not an internal regulation, because if it were, it would
regulate and affect only the members
 of the JBC and
call to
 lawyers who meet the qualifications in the
9
Constitution and are willing to
 serve in the Judiciary
to apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a
 limitation on petitioner’s right to information and
natural consequence thereof that potential applicants
be informed of the
 requirements to the judicial
positions, so that they would be able to prepare
 for
and comply with them.
Nonetheless, the JBC’s failure to publish the assailed
policy has not
 prejudiced the petitioner’s private
interest. The petitioner has no legal right to be
included in the list of nominees for
 judicial
vacancies since the possession of the constitutional
and statutory
 qualifications for appointment to the
Judiciary may not be used to legally
 demand that
one’s name be included in the list of candidates for a
judicial
 vacancy. One’s inclusion in the shortlist is
strictly within the discretion of the JBC.
11. HAZEL MA. C. ANTOLIN v. ABELARDO T.
DOMONDON, JOSE A. GANGAN, and
VIOLETA J. JOSEF
G.R. Nos. 165036 and 175705, July 5, 2010, Del
Castillo, J.
Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to
information is not absolute. The people’s right to
information is limited to matters of public concern,
and is further subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
FACTS:
Petitioner Hazel Ma. C. Antolin took the 1997 CPA
Board Examinations but did not make it. Convinced
that she deserved to pass the examinations, she wrote
to respondent Domondon Acting Chairman of the
Board of Accountancy for her to be furnished a copy
of her answer sheets and the questionnaires of the
seven subjects she took together with their answer
keys. She was given only the copy of her answer sheet
and nothing else. The respondent contended that
Section 36 of Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) Resolution No. 332 and Section 20, Article IV
of PRC Resolution No. 338 preclude the Board from
releasing the Examination Papers (other than the
answer sheet) and that the same constituted a valid
access to government documents.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner Antolin has the right to demand
access to the Examination Papers in view of her right
to information as enshrined in the Constitution.
RULING:
YES. Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right
to information is not absolute. The people’s right to
information is limited to matters of public concern,
and is further subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law. Similarly, the State’s policy of full
disclosure is limited to transactions involving public
interest, and is subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law. The Court has always grappled
with the meanings of the terms public interest and
public concern. The SC has also recognized the need
to preserve a measure of confidentiality on some
matters, such as national security, trade secrets and
banking transactions, criminal matters, and other
confidential matters.
SC conceded that national board examinations such
as the CPA Board Exams are matters of public
concern. The populace in general, and the examinees
in particular, would understandably be interested in
the fair and competent administration of these exams
in order to ensure that only those qualified are
admitted into the accounting profession. And as with
all matters pedagogical, these examinations could be
not merely quantitative means of assessment, but also
means to further improve the teaching and learning of
the art and science of accounting. On the other hand,
there may be valid reasons to limit access to the
Examination Papers in order to properly administer
the exam. More than the mere convenience of the
examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent
difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding,
administration, and checking of these multiple choice
exams that require that the questions and answers
remain confidential for a limited duration. However,
the PRC is not a party to these proceedings. They
have not been given an opportunity to explain the
reasons behind their regulations or articulate the
justification for keeping the Examination Documents
confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications
10
of this case, which may impact on every board
examination administered by the PRC, and in order
that all relevant issues may be ventilated, the SC
deemed it best to remand the cases to the RTC for
further proceedings.
X. RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
1. GRISWOLD VS. CONNECTICUT
Brief Fact Summary. Appellants were charged with
violating a statute preventing the distribution of
advice to married couples regarding the prevention of
conception. Appellants claimed that the statute
violated the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The right of a married
couple to privacy is protected by the Constitution.
Facts. Appellant Griswold, Executive Director of the
Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and
Appellant Buxton, a licensed physician who served as
Medical Director for the League at its Center in New
Haven, were arrested and charged with giving
information, instruction, and medical advice to
married persons on means of preventing conception.
Appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined
$100 each. Appellants appealed on the theory that the
accessory statute as applied violated the 14th
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Appellants claimed standing based on their
professional relationship with the married people they
advised.
Issue. Does the Constitution provide for a privacy
right for married couples?
Held. The First Amendment has a penumbra where
privacy is protected from governmental intrusion,
which although not expressly included in the
Amendment, is necessary to make the express
guarantees meaningful. The association of marriage
is a privacy right older than the Bill of Rights, and the
State’s effort to control marital activities in this case
is unnecessarily broad and therefore impinges on
protected Constitutional freedoms.
Dissent. Justice Stewart and Justice Black. Although
the law is silly, it is not unconstitutional. The citizens
of Connecticut should use their rights under the 9th
and 10th Amendment to convince their elected
representatives to repeal it if the law does not conform
to their community standards.
Concurrence. Justice Goldberg, the Chief Justice,
and Justice Brennan. The right to privacy in marriage
is so basic and fundamental that to allow it to be
infringed because it is not specifically addressed in
the first eight amendments is to give the 9th
Amendment no effect.
Justice Harlan. The relevant statute violates the Due
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment because if
violates the basic values implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.
Discussion. The right to privacy in marriage is not
specifically protected in either the Bill of Rights or
the Constitution. Nonetheless, it is a right so firmly
rooted in tradition that its protection is mandated by
various Constitutional Amendments, including the
1st, 9th and 14th Amendments.
2. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISIO T.
BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO
MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE
ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO
AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO v. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO,
RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY
G.R. Nos. 85279, July 28, 1989, Cortes, J.
In recognizing the right of government employees to
organize, the commissioners intended to limit the
right to the formation of unions or associations only,
without including the right to strike.
FACTS:
The Social Security System Employees Association
(SSSEA) went on strike after the SSS failed to act on
the union’s demands. The strike was reported to the
Public Sector Labor-Management Council, which
ordered the strikers to return to work. However, the
strikers refused to return to work prompting the SSS
to file before RTC a complaint for damages with a
11
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners. SSS contended that its employees are
covered by civil service laws and rules and
regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not
have the right to strike.
ISSUE:
Whether SSS employees have the right to strike.
RULING:
NO. The Bill of Rights provides that the right of the
people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
abridged (Art. III, Sec. 8). While there is no question
that the Constitution recognizes the right of
government employees to organize, it is silent as to
whether such recognition also includes the right to
strike.
A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would
show that in recognizing the right of government
employees to organize, the commissioners intended
to limit the right to the formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right to
strike. At present, in the absence of any legislation
allowing government employees to strike,
recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the
exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking,
by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6
and as implied in E.O. No. 180. Employees of the SSS
are part of the civil service and are covered by the
Civil Service Commission’s Memorandum
prohibiting strikes.
3. IN THE MATTER OF THE IBP
MEMBERSHIP DUES DELINQUENCY OF
ATTY. MARCIAL A. EDILLON (IBP
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. MDD-1)
AC-1928, August 3, 1978, Castro, C.J.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated
Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate.
FACTS:
Respondent Martial A. Edillon is a duly licensed
practicing attorney in the Philippines. A resolution
was adopted by Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Board of Governors recommending to the
Court the removal of the name of the respondent from
its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues to the IBP since the latter’s
constitution notwithstanding due notice. Respondent
contended that the Court is without power to compel
him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and alleged that Section 1 of the Court
Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his
constitutional right of freedom to associate.
ISSUE:
Whether Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for violating one’s freedom to
associate.
RULING:
NO. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of
any group of which he is already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. All that integration actually does is to
provide an official national organization for the well-
defined but unorganized and incohesive group of
which every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses.
The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order
to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating
the quality of professional legal services, may require
that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of
the regulatory program – the lawyers. Assuming that
the questioned provision does in a sense compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police
power of the State.
4. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. BPI
EMPLOYEES UNION-DAVAO CHAPTER-
FEDERATION OF UNIONS IN BPI UNIBANK
G.R. No. 164301, August 10, 2010, Leonardo-De
Castro, J.
12
When certain employees are obliged to join a
particular union as a requisite for continued
employment, as in the case of Union Security
Clauses, this condition is a valid restriction of the
freedom or right not to join any labor organization
because it is in favor of unionism.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Article and Plan of Merger between
BPI and FEBTC, all the assets and liabilities of
FEBTC were transferred to and absorbed by BPI as
the surviving corporation. FEBTC employees,
including those in its different branches across the
country, were hired by petitioner as its own
employees, with their status and tenure recognized
and salaries and benefits maintained.
The union and BPI entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with a close shop agreement.
Despite notice to this kind of agreement, the
employees still refused to join the union. After two
months of management inaction, on request,
respondent informed petitioner of its decision to refer
the issue of the implementation of the Union Shop
Clause of the CBA to the Grievance Committee.
However, the issue remained unresolved at this level
and so it was subsequently submitted for voluntary
arbitration by the parties. Voluntary Arbitrator ruled
against the Union and concluded that the former
FEBTC employees could not be compelled to join the
Union, as it was their constitutional right to join or not
to join any organization. Respondent Union filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the voluntary
arbitrator denied the same. It appealed to the CA. The
CA reversed and set aside the decision of the
voluntary arbitrator. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether the union shop clauses in a CBA violate
one’s freedom or right not to join any labor
organization and hence, invalid.
RULING:
NO. When certain employees are obliged to join a
particular union as a requisite for continued
employment, as in the case of Union Security
Clauses, this condition is a valid restriction of the
freedom or right not to join any labor organization
because it is in favor of unionism. The Supreme
Court, on occasion, has even held that a union
security clause in a CBA is not a restriction of the
right of freedom of association guaranteed by the
Constitution. Moreover, a closed shop agreement is
an agreement whereby an employer binds himself to
hire only members of the contracting union who must
continue to remain members in good standing to keep
their jobs. It is “the most prized achievement of
unionism.” It adds membership and compulsory dues.
By holding out to loyal members a promise of
employment in the closed shop, it wields group
solidarity.
The rationale for upholding the validity of union shop
clauses in a CBA, even if they impinge upon the
individual employee’s right or freedom of
association, is not to protect the union for the union’s
sake. Laws and jurisprudence promote unionism and
afford certain protections to the certified bargaining
agent in a unionized company because a strong and
effective union presumably benefits all employees in
the bargaining unit since such a union would be in a
better position to demand improved benefits and
conditions of work from the employer. This is the
rationale behind the State policy to promote unionism
declared in the Constitution.
5. BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA VS. DALE
FACTS
The Boy Scouts of America revoked former Eagle
Scout and assistant scoutmaster James Dale's adult
membership when the organization discovered that
Dale was a homosexual and a gay rights activist. In
1992, Dale filed suit against the Boy Scouts, alleging
that the Boy Scouts had violated the New Jersey
statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in places of public accommodation.
The Boy Scouts, a private, not-for-profit
organization, asserted that homosexual conduct was
inconsistent with the values it was attempting to
instill in young people. The New Jersey Superior
Court held that New Jersey's public accommodations
law was inapplicable because the Boy Scouts was not
a place of public accommodation. The court also
concluded that the Boy Scouts' First Amendment
freedom of expressive association prevented the
government from forcing the Boy Scouts to accept
Dale as an adult leader. The court's Appellate
Division held that New Jersey's public
accommodations law applied to the Boy Scouts
13
because of its broad-based membership solicitation
and its connections with various public entities, and
that the Boy Scouts violated it by revoking Dale's
membership based on his homosexuality.
The court rejected the Boy Scouts' federal
constitutional claims. The New Jersey Supreme Court
affirmed. The court held that application of New
Jersey's public accommodations law did not violate
the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive
association because Dale's inclusion would not
significantly affect members' abilities to carry out
their purpose. Furthermore, the court concluded that
reinstating Dale did not compel the Boy Scouts to
express any message.
ISSUE
Does the application of New Jersey's public
accommodations law violate the Boy Scouts' First
Amendment right of expressive association to bar
homosexuals from serving as troop leaders?
RULING
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "applying
New Jersey's public accommodations law to require
the Boy Scouts to admit Dale violates the Boy Scouts'
First Amendment right of expressive association." In
effect, the ruling gives the Boy Scouts of America a
constitutional right to bar homosexuals from serving
as troop leaders. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the
Court that, "[t]he Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual
conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to
instill," and that a gay troop leader's presence "would,
at the very least, force the organization to send a
message, both to the young members and the world,
that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a
legitimate form of behavior."

14