Fuhrmann, M. (2009) - Spreading Temptation Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements

Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements
Author(s): Matthew Fuhrmann

Source: International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Summer, 2009), pp. 7-41
Published by: The MIT Press
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SpreadingTemptationMatthewFuhrmann
and PeacefulNuclear
Proliferation
CooperationAgreements
E eaceful nuclearcoop-
-
eration thetransfer ofnucleartechnology,materials, or knowledgefromone
-
stateto anotherforpeacefulpurposes has figuredprominently in interna-
tionalpoliticssincethedawnoftheatomicage.1Duringan addressbeforethe
UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyin December1953,U.S. PresidentDwight
Eisenhowerencouragedthenuclearsuppliersto promoteinternational peace
and prosperity bysharing theirtechnologyand know-how.2 Since this "atoms
forpeace" speech,countries havesignedmorethan2,000bilateralciviliannu-
clearcooperationagreements (NCAs) pledgingto exchangenucleartechnol-
ogy,materials,or knowledgeforpeacefulpurposes.3Recently, NCAs have
been signed at an increasingly rapid rate, as countries look for solutions
to global climatechangeand forassistancein combatingenergyshortages
and highoil prices.Forexample,sincecomingto officein May 2007,French
PresidentNicolasSarkozyhas signedNCAs witha plethoraofstatesseeking
tobeginor reviveciviliannuclearprograms, includingAlgeria,Jordan, Libya,
Qatar,the United ArabEmirates, and Vietnam.
Thisarticleexaminestherelationship betweenpeacefulnuclearcooperation
and nuclearweaponsproliferation. it exploreswhethercountries
Specifically,
receivingciviliannuclearaid overtimearemore likelytoinitiateweaponspro-
gramsand build thebomb. The conventional wisdom is thatciviliannuclear
cooperationdoes not lead to proliferation. Most scholarsargue thatnu-
clearweaponsspreadwhenstateshave a demandforthebomb- notwhen
theyhave thetechnicalcapacityto proliferate.4 Thosewho recognizetheim-
ofSouthCarolina.
ofPoliticalScienceat theUniversity
MatthewFuhrmannis AssistantProfessor
The authorthanksHassan Abbas,Katherine Barbieri, GaryBertsch,

Kyle Beardsley, Matthew
Bunn,Jonathan Caverley,EricaChenoweth, AlexanderDownes,ErikGartzke,JohnHoldren,
MatthewKroenig, Quan Li, MartinMalin,VipinNarang,NegeenPegahi,EtelSolingen,Harvey
DominicTierney,
Starr, Jaroslav in research
Tir,and participants seminarsat HarvardUniversity
and theUniversityofSouthCarolinaforusefulcomments. and theonline
All dataforreplication
appendixare availableat http://people.cas.sc.edu/fuhrmann.
"civiliannuclearcooperation/7
1. I use theterms"peacefulnuclearcooperation/' and "nuclearas-
sistance"interchangeablythroughout thisarticle.
2. DwightD. Eisenhower, "AddressbyMr.DwightD. Eisenhower, President
oftheUnitedStates
ofAmerica, tothe470thPlenaryMeetingoftheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly/' December8,
1953,http:// www.iaea.org/
About/history_speech.html.
3. See Matthew Fuhrmann, "Takinga Walkon theSupplySide:TheDeterminants ofCivilianNu-
clearCooperation/' Journal
ofConflict Vol.53,No. 2 (April2009),pp. 181-208.
Resolution,
4. See,forexample,GeorgeH. Quester,ThePolitics ofNuclearProliferation
(Baltimore,Md.:Johns
International Vol.34,No. 1 (Summer2009),pp. 7-41

Security,
© 2009bythePresident Institute
and FellowsofHarvardCollegeand theMassachusetts ofTechnology.
-7
Security34:1 | 8
International
portanceofthesupplyside ofproliferation arguethatcertaintypesofnuclear

assistanceenablecountries tobuildnuclearweaponsbutthatothersareinnoc-
uous or evenpositivefroma nonproliferation standpoint.Nuclearsuppliers,
forinstance,generally restrict
the sale of uranium enrichmentorplutonium re-
processing facilities
because these can be used to
directly produce fissile
mate-
rial fora bomb,but suppliersroutinely build researchor powerreactorsin
othercountries and trainforeign scientists.5 A recentstudyfindsthatcountries
receiving enrichment and reprocessing bombdesigns,or significant
facilities,
of
quantities weapons-grade fissilematerial are morelikelyto acquirethe
bomb.6Theimplication ofthisresearch is thatotherformsofatomicassistance
do notlead to thespreadofnuclearweapons.
Thisarticlearguesthattheconventional wisdomis wrong - and dangerous.
All typesofciviliannuclearassistanceraisetherisksofproliferation. Peaceful
nuclearcooperationand proliferation are causallyconnectedbecause of the
dual-usenatureof nucleartechnology and know-how.7 Civiliancooperation
providestechnology and materials necessary for a nuclearweaponsprogram
and helpsto establishexpertise in matters relevanttobuildingthebomb.I de-
velop fourhypotheses based on thisgeneralinsight.First,receivingcivilian
nuclearassistanceovertimeincreasesthelikelihoodthatstateswillbeginnu-
clearweaponsprograms becauseitreducestheexpectedcostsofsucha cam-
paignand inspiresgreaterconfidence amongleadersthatthebombcouldbe
successfullydeveloped.Second,militarized disputeswithothercountries con-
ditiontheeffect ofciviliannuclearassistanceon programinitiation. Thelikeli-
hood thatnuclearassistancecauses countriesto begin weapons programs
increasesas theirsecurity environments worsen.Third,peacefulaid increases
HopkinsUniversityPress,1973);EtelSolingen, 'The PoliticalEconomyofNuclearRestraint/'In-

ternational Vol.19,No. 2 (Fall 1994),pp. 126-169;MitchellReiss,Bridled
Security, Ambition:Why
Countries
ConstrainTheirNuclearCapabilities
(Washington, D.C.: WoodrowWilsonCenterPress,
1995);ScottD. Sagan,"WhyDo StatesBuildNuclearWeapons?ThreeModelsin Searchof a
Bomb/'International Vol.21,No. 3 (Winter
Security, 1996/97),pp. 54-86;T.V.Paul,Powerversus
Prudence:WhyNationsForgoNuclearWeapons (Montreal:McGill-Queens UniversityPress,2000);
Jacques E.C. Hymans, The Psychology
ofNuclearProliferation: Emotions,and ForeignPolicy
Identity,
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,2006);and EtelSolingen,NuclearLogics:Contrasting
Pathsin EastAsiaandtheMiddleEast(Princeton, N.J.:Princeton Press,2007).
University
5. See,forexample,Office ofthePressSecretary, "StatementbyBushon Nonproliferation ofNu-
clearWeaponsTreaty"(Washington, D.C.: WhiteHouse,July1,2008),http://www.america.gov/
The guidelinesof theNu-
st/texttrans-english/2008/July/20080701141025eaifas0.9588587.html.
clearSuppliersGroup,an informal organization ofcountries designedto harmonize nuclearex-
discouragethesupplyofenrichment
portpolicies,explicitly or reprocessingfacilities.
6. MatthewKroenig,"Importing theBomb:SensitiveNuclearAssistanceand NuclearProlifera-
tion,"Journal
ofConflictResolution,Vol.53,No. 2 (April2009),pp. 161-180.
7. On thedual-usedilemma, see MatthewFuhrmann, "Exporting MassDestruction:TheDetermi-
nantsofDual-UseTrade,"Journal ofPeaceResearch,Vol.45,No. 5 (September2008),pp. 633-652.
|9
SpreadingTemptation
theprobability thatcountries willsuccessfully

buildnuclearweapons.Fourth,
thisis especiallytruewhena country's securityenvironment deteriorates.
To testthesehypotheses, I produceda dataseton civiliannuclearassistance
based on thecodingofall NCAs signedfrom1945to 2000.8A combination of
and
qualitative quantitative for
analysisyieldssupport myarguments, even
whencontrolling fortheothervariablesthought toinfluenceproliferation.The
resultsfrommystatistical analysis indicatethatother such
factors, as indus-
trialcapacityand membership in thenuclearNonproliferation Treaty(NPT),
also have significant on
effects proliferation. But peacefulcooperationis
amongthefewvariablesthatis consistently salientin explainingbothnuclear
weaponsprogram onsetand weaponsacquisition.
The conclusionsreachedin thisarticleshouldraiseconcernamongpolicy-
makersin theUnitedStatesand abroad.Formorethanfifty years,theinterna-
tionalcommunity has behavedas thoughpeacefulatomicassistancecould
serveas an effective armscontrolpolicy.The UnitedNationsestablishedthe
InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA) in 1957to helpbringnuclearen-
ergyto countriesaroundtheworldand establisha systemof safeguardsto
ensurethatcountries did notuse peacefulassistanceformilitary purposes.9 A
decade later,Eisenhower'snotionof "atomsforpeace" was codifiedin the
NPT,whichobligatessignatories toforgonuclearweaponsin exchangeforac-
cesstonucleartechnology forpeacefulpurposes.Thefindings inthisarticlere-
veal thateffortsto promotethespreadofnucleartechnology forpeacefuluse
have largelybackfired. Giventhata nuclearenergyrenaissanceloomson the
horizon,theUnitedStatesand othersuppliercountries shouldreevaluatetheir
exportpractices.
Previousresearchhas notedthatillicitproliferation networksoperatedby
"rogue" statescan contribute to nuclear Mostinfamously,
proliferation.10 the
Pakistan-based AbdulQadeer(A.Q.) Khannetwork servedas a "Wal-Mart for
8. I endtheanalysisin2000becauseofdatarestrictions. Morethan2,000agreements weresigned

duringthisperiod.Theseefforts buildonJamesF.Keeley'sworkand aredescribedinmoredetail
below.See Keeley,"A ListofBilateralCivilianNuclearCooperation Agreements/'University of
Calgary, 2003.
9. See LeonardWeiss,"AtomsforPeace, Bulletin oftheAtomic Vol.59,No. 6 (Novem-
Scientists,
ber-December 2003),p. 40.
10. bee,forexample,Chaimbraunand Christopher r. Cñyba, rrohreration Kings:New L.nai-
lengesto theNuclearNonproliferation Regime/'International
Security,Vol.29,No. 2 (Fall 2004),
pp. 5-49;AlexanderH. Montgomery, "Ringingin Proliferation:How to Dismantlean Atomic
BombNetwork," International Vol.30,No. 2 (Fall2005),pp. 153-187;SheenaChestnut,
Security, "Il-
NorthKoreanSmuggling
and Proliferation:
licitActivity Networks/' International Vol.32,
Security,
No. 1 (Summer2007),pp. 80-111;and GordonCorera,Shopping forBombs: NuclearProliferation,
and theRise and Fall oftheA.Q. KhanNetwork(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,
GlobalInsecurity,
2006).
Security34:1 10
International
proliferators,"sellingweapons-relevant technology to Iran,NorthKorea,and

and
Pakistan, possibly other countries.11 This articledoes notdisputethatil-
licitcommercial activitiesconductedbysecond-tier the
supplierscan facilitate
spread of nuclear weapons. Rather, it demonstrates that legal nuclear com-
merceconductedundertheauspicesoftheNPT can also have damagingef-
fectsfornationaland international security.
Thenextsectionoffers an overviewoftheexisting researchon thecausesof
nuclearproliferation. In subsequentsections,I lay outmyhypotheses linking
peacefulnuclearcooperation and proliferation. I thendrawfromseveralcases
to illustrate
theplausibility ofmyargument and describehow civiliannuclear
cooperation can contribute to thespreadofnuclearweapons.NextI describe
thestatisticaltestsused to evaluatethehypotheses and discusstheresults.I
concludeby summarizing the article'sfindings, underscoring the contribu-
tionsofthisstudy,and offering directionsforfutureresearch.
WhyDo StatesPursueNuclearWeapons?
Thereis a richliteratureon why statespursuenuclearweapons.In recent
yearsthisscholarshiphas turnedits attention towardfactorsinfluencing a
country's demand fornuclearweapons and has treatedtechnologicalconsid-
erationsas a secondaryconcern.Forexample,ScottSaganarguesthatscholars
and practitionersshouldfocuson "addressingthesourcesofthepoliticalde-
mandfornuclearweapons,ratherthanfocusingprimarily on efforts
to safe-
guard existingstockpilesof nuclear materials and to restrict
the supplyof
specificweaponstechnology from the'haves' to the'have-nots.'"12
The extant
literatureidentifies
a numberofdemand-side considerations thataresalientin
explaining nuclearproliferation,
including:a state'ssecurityenvironment, in-
ternational norms,domestic and or
politics, intangible symbolic motivations.13
Thesestudiesare oftendismissiveofsupply-sideapproachesbecauseseveral
countries- most notablyGermanyand Japan - have the technicalcapacity
to build nuclearbombsbut have chosennot to do so. This critiquefailsto
11. IAEA Director-GeneralMohamed ElBaradei compared the Khan networkto Walmart.See es-
pecially Corera, ShoppingforBombs.
12. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?" p. 56 (emphasis in original).
13. Quester, The PoliticsofNuclearProliferation;Richard K. Betts,"Paranoids, Pygmies,Pariahs,
and Nonproliferation," ForeignPolicy,No. 26 (Spring 1977), pp. 157-183; Sagan, "Why Do States
Build Nuclear Weapons?"; Hymans, ThePsychology ofNuclearProliferation;WilliamEpstein,"Why
States Go- and Don't Go- Nuclear," AnnalsoftheAmericanAcademyofPoliticaland Social Science,
Vol. 430 (March 1977),pp. 16-28; Lewis A. Dunn and Herman Kahn, Trendsin NuclearProliferation,
1975-1995: Projections,Problems,and Policy Options(Washington,D.C: Hudson Institute,1976);
Ashok Kapur, International NuclearProliferation:
MultilateralDiplomacyand RegionalAspects(New
York:Praeger,1979); and Solingen,NuclearLogics.
| 11
SpreadingTemptation
consider,however,thattechnology-based argumentsare probabilistic, not

deterministic.14
Recentresearchfocuseson the supplyside of nuclearproliferation. This
authorhas examinedwhystatestransfer dual-usetechnology thatcould be
employedtobuildweaponsofmassdestruction and whycountries exportnu-
cleartechnology, materials,and know-howforpeacefulpurposes.15 Matthew
has reasons states "sensitive"nuclearassis-
Kroenig analyzed why provide
tanceto help othercountriesto build nuclearweapons.16 Otherquantitative
studiesexaminethelinksbetweentechnical capacity and the spreadofnuclear
weapons.17These studieshave foundthatindicatorsof economiccapacity,
such as a state's gross domesticproduct(GDP) and the nuclear-related
resourcesit possesses,are correlatedwithweaponsproliferation. Despiteits
manycontributions, thisworkhas notadequatelyaddressedthelinksbetween
civiliannuclearcooperation and weaponsproliferation. In particular, itfailsto
sufficientlytesttheargument thatthediffusion of and
knowledge technology
makesproliferation morelikely.Dong-Joon Joand ErikGartzkeincludea vari-
able in theirmodelmeasuring thenaturallog ofthenumberofyearsbetween
1938and timet,whichallowstheauthorsto testthesystemic effects ofdiffu-
sion, butdiffusiondoes not occur equallyacross all states.18Kroenig examines
therelationship betweennuclearassistanceand proliferation moredirectly, al-
thoughhe does notexplorehow peacefulaid can encouragecountries to pur-
sue nuclearweapons.19 He also does notexaminehowstrategic factors suchas
militarizedinterstatedisputescould interactwithnuclearassistance.Kroenig
arguesthatonlycertain sensitivenuclearassistance helpscountries acquirethe
bomb.20 Thistypeof aid makesup a merefraction of all nuclearassistance,
14. Formoreon thispoint,see SonaliSinghand Christopher R. Way,'The CorrelatesofNuclear

Proliferation:A Quantitative
Test,"Journal ofConflict Vol.48,No. 6 (December2004),
Resolution,
pp. 859-885.
15. Fuhrmann, "ExportingMass Destruction"; and Fuhrmann, 'Takinga Walkon theSupply
Side."
16. MatthewKroenig,"Exporting theBomb:WhyStatesProvideSensitiveNuclearAssistance,"
American Political
Science
Review,Vol.103,No. 1 (February 2009),pp. 113-133.
17. See Singhand Way,"TheCorrelates ofNuclearProliferation"; Dong-JoonJoand ErikGartzke,
"Determinants ofNuclearWeaponsProliferation," JournalofConflict Vol.51,No. 1 (Feb-
Resolution,
ruary2007),pp. 167-194;andKroenig, "Importing theBomb."Foran earlierstudy, see StephenM.
Meyer,TheDynamics ofNuclearProliferation
(Chicago:University ofChicagoPress,1984).
18. Joand Gartzke,"TheDeterminants ofNuclearWeaponsProliferation." Forexample,a state
amountofciviliannuclearassistance(e.g.,India)willexperience
thatreceivesa significant a great
dealofdiffusion, whereasa statethatreceivesno assistance(e.g.,Lebanon)willnotexperience the
sameeffects.
19. Kroenig, "Importing theBomb.
20. He defines"sensitive nuclearassistance"as assistancein thedesignand construction ofnu-
clearweapons,thesupplyofweapons-grade orassistance
fissilematerial, inbuildinguraniumen-
richment or plutonium reprocessingfacilities.
International
Security34:1 | 12
however.Of themorethan2,000bilateralciviliannuclearcooperationagree-
mentssignedfrom1945to2000,only14 (lessthan0.7 percent)meetKroenig's
ofsensitiveassistance.I arguethattherelationship
definition betweennuclear
aid and atomicweapons is muchbroader.All formsof atomicassistance -
whetherit involvestrainingscientists, supplyingreactors,or buildingfuel
-
facilitiesraisethelikelihoodthatnuclearweaponswill spread.
fabrication
and theBomb
CivilianNuclearCooperation
Decades ago scholarsoffered a "technological momentum" hypothesis,sug-

gesting that countries are more to
likely pursue nuclearweapons once they
obtainciviliannucleartechnology and expertise.21 The logicdrivingthishy-
pothesisis thattheaccumulation ofnucleartechnology and knowledgeleads
to incremental advancesin the fieldof nuclearengineering thatultimately
makesprogresstowarddevelopinga nuclearweaponscapability beforea for-
mal decisionto buildthebombis made.22JohnHoldrenillustrates thisargu-
mentwellwhenhe statesthattheproliferation ofnuclearpowerrepresents the
spread of an "attractive nuisance."23This logichighlightsthe be-
relationship
tweenthepeacefuland military uses oftheatom,butitunderplaysthepoliti-
cal dimensionsofproliferation.24
Peacefulnuclearcooperation and nuclearweaponsarerelatedintwokeyre-
spects.First, all technology materialslinkedto a nuclearweapons pro-
and
gram have legitimate civilianapplications. Forexample,uraniumenrichment
and plutonium reprocessing facilities
have dual usesbecausetheycanproduce
fuelforpowerreactors orfissilematerialfornuclearweapons.Second,civilian
nuclearcooperationincreasesknowledgein nuclear-related matters.This
knowledge can thenbe to
applied weapons-related endeavors.Civiliannu-
21. LawrenceScheinman, Atomic Energy PolicyinTrance undertheFourthRepublic(Princeton,

N.J.:
PrincetonUniversity Press,1965);Dunn and Kahn,Trends RichardN.
in NuclearProliferation;
Rosecrance,TheDispersion ofNuclearWeapons: StrategyandPolitics(New York:ColumbiaUniver-
Nuclear
sityPress,1964);and WilliamC. Potter, PowerandNonproliferation: Per-
AnInterdisciplinary
(Cambridge,
spective Mass.:Oelgeschlager,Gunn,and Hain,1982).
22. Potter,NuclearPowerand Nonproliferation; Johnrioldren, Nuclear rower and Nuclear
Weapons:TheConnection Is Dangerous/'BulletinoftheAtomic Vol.39,No. 1 (January
Scientists,
1983),pp. 40-45; RobertaWohlstetter, "U.S. PeacefulAid and the Indian Bomb/'in Albert
VictorGilinsky,
Wohlstetter, RobertGillette,and RobertaWohlstetter,Nuclear Fuelwithout
Policies:
theBomb(Cambridge, 1978),pp. 57-72;and PeterLavoy,"NuclearMythsand the
Mass.:Ballinger,
CausesofNuclearProliferation/' inZacharyS. Davis and Benjamin Frankel,eds.,TheProliferation
Puzzle:WhyNuclearWeapons Spread(andWhatResults) (Portland,Ore.:FrankCass,1993),pp. 192-
212.
23. Holdren,"NuclearPowerand NuclearWeapons,"p. 42.
24. Meyer,TheDynamics ofNuclear MatthewBunn,"Realist,Idealist,and Integrative
Proliferation;
Approaches Policy/'HarvardUniversity,
to Proliferation 2003.
j 13
SpreadingTemptation
clearprograms necessitate withthehandlingofradioactive

familiarity materi-
als, processesforfuelfabrication and materialshavingchemicalor nuclear
properties,and the operation function
and of reactorsand electronic control
systems.They also provideexperience in othercrucialfields,such as metal-
lurgyand neutronics.25 These experiences offer"a technologybase upon
whicha nuclearweaponprogramcould draw."26
These linkagessuggestthatpeacefulnuclearassistancereducesthe ex-
pectedcostsofa weaponsprogram, makingit morelikelythata decisionto
begin such a programwill be made. Considerablepoliticaland economic
costs- suchas international diplomaticisolation,and strainedrela-
sanctions,
tionshipswith -
allies can accompanynuclearweaponsprograms.27 Leaders
maybe reluctant to take on these burdens unlesstheybelieve that a weapons
campaigncouldsucceedrelatively As StephenMeyerargues,"When
quickly.28
thefinancialand resourcedemandsof [beginning a weapons program]be-
comeless burdensome, statesmightoptto proceed. . . undera balanceofin-
centivesand disincentives thattraditionallymighthave been perceivedas
insufficientfora proliferation decision."29
Sometimes, nuclearassistancecan cause leadersto initiatenuclearweapons
programs in theabsenceofa compelling securitythreat.Thisusuallyhappens
whenscientists and othermembersof atomicenergycommissions convince
the politicalleadershipthatproducinga nuclearweapon is technologically
possibleand can be done withrelatively limitedcosts.30Scientistsdo notal-
ways push leaders down the nuclear path,but in many cases theydo.31
Leadersarepersuadedbythislobbying becausetheyarekeenlyawarethatthe
quicker thebomb can be developed, lesslikelyothernationalpriorities
the will
suffer.
Althoughnuclearassistanceoccasionallyproducesbombprogramsin the
25. Donald MacKenzieand GrahamSpinardi,'Tacit Knowledge,WeaponsDesign,and the

Uninvention ofNuclearWeapons/'American JournalofSociology, 1995),pp. 44-
Vol.101,No. 1 (July
99.
26. U.S. Congress,United States Officeof TechnologyAssessment,Technologies Underlying
Weapons ofMassDestruction
(Washington,D.C.: U.S.Government PrintingOffice,December1993),
No. OTA-BP-ISC-115,p. 153.
NuclearLogics.
27. See,forexample,Solingen,
28. TedGreenwood, andTheodoreB. Taylor,
HaroldA. Feiveson, Nuclear Motivations,
Proliferation:
forControl(New York:McGraw-Hill,1977), p. 150.
and Strategies
Capabilities,
p. 143.
29. Meyer,The DynamicsofNuclearProliferation,
30. PeterLiberman, "TheRiseand FalloftheSouthAfricanBomb, International Vol.26,
Security,
No. 2 (Fall2001),pp. 45-86;Lavoy,"NuclearMythsandtheCausesofNuclearProliferation";
Mat-
thewBunn,"CivilianNuclearEnergyand NuclearWeaponsPrograms: The Record,"working
draft,BelferCenterforScienceand International HarvardUniversity,
Affairs, June29,2001.
31. In Germanyand Brazil,forexample,scientists lobbiedleadersnotto developthebomb.I
thankEtelSolingenforthisinsight.
Security34:1 | 14
International
absenceofa security threat,therelationshipbetweensuchassistanceand pro-

liferationis usuallymorenuanced.Countriesthathave receivedconsiderable
assistanceare especiallylikelyto initiatebombprogramswhenthreatsarise
because theyhave greaterdemandforthestrategic advantagesthatnuclear
weapons In
offer.32 otherwords, peacefulnuclear assistance typicallycondi-
tionstheeffect thata security environment has on a state'spoliticaldecisionto
begina weaponsprogram.A statethatsuffers a defeatin war or feelsthreat-
enedforanotherreasonis unlikelytoinitiatea programifitlacksa developed
civiliannuclearprogram. Without thetechnical base in place,itis toocostlyto
venturedowntheweaponspath.Thisexplains,in part,whySaudi Arabiahas
yettobegina nuclearweaponsprogrameventhoughitfacesconsiderable se-
curity threats.33Likewise, countries are unlikely to nuclearize- even if they
haveaccumulatedsignificant amountsofassistance - iftheydo notfacesecu-
ritythreats. On theotherhand,initiation ofa weaponsprogramis morelikely
instatesthatoperateindangeroussecurity environments and possesspeaceful
nuclearfacilitiesand a cadreoftrainedscientists and technicians.
Thereare also strongtheoretical reasonsto suggesttheexistenceofa rela-
tionshipbetweenciviliannuclearcooperationand theacquisitionof nuclear
weapons.Giventhelinksdescribedabove,civiliannuclearenergycooperation
can aid nuclearweaponsproduction by providingthetechnology and items
to
necessary produce fissile
material.34
This is noteworthy because fissilemate-
rialproduction is themostdifficult stepin buildingthebomb.35 Cooperation
also establishesa technicalknowledgebase thatpermitsadvancesin nuclear
explosivesand relatedfields,ultimately facilitatingbombproduction. Occa-
sionally,technical capacityalone causesstates to produce thebomb. But justas
all statesreceiving nuclearaid do notbeginweaponsprograms, everycountry
thatacquiresassistancedoes notassemblebombs.Security threats, whichpro-
32. On thestrategic
benefits
ofthebomb,see ThomasC. Schelling,
TheStrategy (Cam-
ofConflict
bridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1960);BruceBuenode Mesquitaand WilliamH. Riker,
"AnAssessment oftheMeritsofSelective
NuclearProliferation/7
Journal
ofConflict Vol.
Resolution,
26, No. 2 (June1982),pp. 283-306; RobertPowell, NuclearDeterrence
Theory:TheSearchforCredibil-
ity(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,1990);ErikGartzkeand Dong-Joon Jo,"Bargaining,
NuclearProliferation,and InternationalDisputes/'Journal
ofConflictResolution,Vol.53, No. 2
(April2009),pp. 209-233;MichaelHorowitz, "TheSpreadofNuclearWeaponsand International
Conflict:Does ExperienceMatter?"Journal Vol. 53, No. 2 (April2009),
Resolution,
of Conflict
pp. 234-257;RobertRauchhaus,"EvaluatingtheNuclearPeace Hypothesis: A QuantitativeAp-
proach/'JournalofConflict Vol.53,No. 2 (April2009),pp. 258-277;and KyleBeardsley
Resolution,
andVictor Asal,"Winning withtheBomb,"Journal Vol.53,No. 2 (April2009),
Resolution,
ofConflict
pp. 278-301.
33. Singhand WayincludeSaudi Arabiaon a listof"Dogs ThatDid NotBark."Singhand Way,
"TheCorrelates ofNuclearProliferation."
34. Bunn,"CivilianNuclearEnergyand NuclearWeaponsPrograms."
35. JosephCirmcione,JonB. Wolfsthal,and MiriamRajkumar, DeadlyArsenals:Nuclear,Biological,
andChemical Threats(Washington,D.C.: CarnegieEndowment forInternationalPeace,2005).
| 15
SpreadingTemptation
videthepoliticalmotivation tobuildthebomb,coupledwithatomicaid area

recipefortheacquisitionofnuclearweapons.
Fourhypotheses flowfromthislogic:
Hypothesis1: Countriesreceiving
peacefulnuclearassistancearemorelikelyto
begin nuclear weaponsprograms.
Hypothesis2: Countriesreceivingpeacefulnuclearassistanceare morelikely
to beginnuclearweaponsprogramswhena security threatarises.
Hypothesis3: Countries
receivingpeacefulnuclearassistancearemorelikelyto
acquirenuclearweapons.
Hypothesis4: Countriesfacingsecurity
threatsand receivingpeacefulnuclear
assistanceare morelikelyto acquireweapons.
BelowI applythesehypotheses to severalcases to showhow peacefulnu-
can lead to proliferation.
clearcooperation
Case Studies
In thissectionI brieflydiscusswhy my argumentis salientin explaining

nucleardecisionmaking in threeproliferationcases.ThenI examinetwocases
in moredetail:(1) India's decisionto begina weaponsprogramin 1964,and
(2) Pakistan'sacquisitionofthebombin 1987.The qualitativeevidenceshows
thatnuclearassistancecan lead to proliferation - especiallywhencombined
withsecuritythreats.Afterdiscussingthesecases, I turnto the statistical
analysis.
TheSouthAfrican experienceillustrateshowpeacefulnuclearassistancecan
contribute to the onsetof a weapons programin the absenceof a security
threat.U.S. assistanceto SouthAfrica'speacefulnuclearprogram, whichbe-
gan in July1957,had a salienteffect on thatcountry's decisionto begina nu-
clear weapons program.U.S. aid includedthe construction of a nuclear
researchreactorin Pelindaba,thesupplyofhighlyenricheduranium,and the
training Thiscooperation
ofnuclearscientists. led to significant
technological
advancements and providedkeyscientists in theSouthAfrican atomicenergy
complexwithtremendous politicalinfluence.36
Particularly was the
significant
president ofthe Atomic EnergyCorporation, A.J."Ampie"Roux, who report-
edlyquipped,"I can ask [theSouthAfrican] government foranything I want
and I'll getit."37Indeed,RouxconvincedPrimeMinister JohnVorster to fund
construction ofa piloturaniumenrichment plant in 1968, the
despite latter' s
Bomb/'Bulletin
"SouthAfricaand theAffordable
36. See David Albright, oftheAtomic
Scientists,
Vol.50,No. 4 (July/August
1994),pp. 37-47.
37. Quotedin Liberman,"TheRiseand Fall oftheSouthAfrican
Bomb/'p. 64.
Security34:1 | 16
International
concernsaboutthecostsofsucha program.38 In the1970sRouxthenlobbied

theprimeminister todevelopnuclearbombson thegroundsthatdoingso was
technologically Vorster
feasible.39 decidedtoauthorizea nuclearweaponspro-
in
gram part because he recognizedthatSouthAfrica'scivilnuclearinfrastruc-
turewouldpermitthequickand successful development oftheseweapons.As
MitchellReissnotes,"Withthe [civiliannuclear]capabilityalreadyin place,
thesubsequentdecisionto buildnuclearweaponswas made thatmucheas-
ier."40Thislogicis especiallycompelling in lightofrevelations fromrecently
declassifieddocuments that securitymotivations - particularly need fora
the
deterrent againsta Soviet-supported attackfromAngola or Mozambique -
had littlerolein influencing theonsetofSouthAfrica'sweaponsprogram.41
Becausethenuclearprogramcouldnothavedevelopedas itdid withoutU.S.
assistancebeginningin the late 1950s,thisshortnarrativeexemplifies how
peaceful nuclear cooperation can enable proliferation decisions.
Evidencefromtwo othercases also revealsthatpeacefulnuclearcoopera-
tioncan enableacquisitionofthebomb.Frenchreprocessing aid to Israelbe-
tween1958and 1965enhancedIsrael'sabilityto assemblea nuclearweapon
much quickerthanit would have been able to throughsolelyindigenous
means.42 Butthisassistancealone was insufficient forIsraelto crossthenu-
clearthreshold. Heavy water suppliedby Norway,theUnitedKingdom,and
the UnitedStatesalso facilitated Israel's acquisitionof nuclearweapons.43
Gary Milhollin the
highlights importance offoreign-supplied heavywaterfor
Israel'sweaponsprogram whenhe notesthat"thereactor at Dimonais Israel's
onlymeansofmakingplutonium, and plutoniumis Israel'sprimary nuclear
weapon material.WhenDimona opened in 1963 . . . Israelwas producing
heavywateronlyin laboratory quantities.Therefore, itwas physically impos-
sibleto startDimonawithoutU.S. or Norwegianheavywater."44
I arguedabovethattheknowledgeacquiredfrompeacefulnuclearcoopera-
38. VerneHarris,Sello Hatang,and PeterLiberman, "UnveilingSouthAfrica'sNuclearPast/'

ofSouthern
Journal AfricanStudies, 2004),pp. 457-476;and Reiss,Bridled
Vol.30,No. 3 (September
p. 29.
Ambition,
39. WaldoStumpf, "SouthAfrica'sNuclearWeaponsProgram:FromDeterrence to Dismantle-
ment,"ArmsControl Vol.25,No. 10 (December/January
Today, 1995/96),p. 4; and Liberman,
"The
Riseand Fall oftheSouthAfrican Bomb."
p. 29.
40. Reiss, BridledAmbition,
41. Harris,Hatang,and Liberman, "UnveilingSouthAfrica'sNuclearPast."
42. Kroenig,"Importing theBomb";and AvnerCohen,IsraelandtheBomb(New York:Columbia
UniversityPress,1998).
43. GaryMilhollin,"HeavyWaterCheaters," Vol.69 (Winter
Policy,
Foreign 1987/88),pp. 100-119;
AstridForlan,"Norway'sNuclearOdyssey:FromOptimistic Proponentto Nonproliferator,"
Review,
Nonproliferation Vol.4, No. 2 (Winter1997),pp. 1-16;and "UK HelpedIsraelGetNuclear
Bomb,"BBCNews,August4, 2005,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4743987.stm.
"HeavyWaterCheaters,"
44. Milhollin, p. 105.
| 17
SpreadingTemptation
tion also plays a majorrole in enablingcountriesto manufacture nuclear

bombs.45The NorthKoreancase illuminatesthispoint.The SovietUnion
trainedNorthKoreannuclearscientists beginning in thelate 1950sand com-
pleted constructionof a research reactor
at Yongbyonin 1965.Thistechnical
aid provideda base of knowledgein nuclearmatterssufficient to help the
NorthKoreansbuild an "experimental nuclearinstallation" in the 1980s.46
Pyongyang this to
employed facility produceplutonium, which itthenused to
explode a nuclearbomb in October 2006.47
As thecase studies
presented below
this
makeclear, experience is notatypical.
THE ORIGINS OF INDIA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM, 1964

In 1955Indiabuiltitsfirst
research reactorusingBritish-supplieddesigns.This
knownas theApsararesearchreactor,
facility, becameoperational in 1956us-
ingenriched uraniumfuelalso suppliedbytheUnitedKingdom.In April1956
Canada agreedto supplyIndiawitha 40-megawatt researchreactorknownas
theCanada-India-United Statesresearchreactor(CIRUS).The CIRUS reactor
was builtas partoftheColomboPlan,a developmental aid programforcoun-
triesofSouthAsia modeledaftertheMarshallPlan.48It was intendedto help
the Indiansdevelop theirknowledgein nuclearengineering.49 The United
Statesprovidedheavywaterto moderatetheCIRUS reactor, enablingittobe-
gin operatingin 1960.In addition,beginningin 1955,it invited1,104Indian
totrainat theArgonneLaboratory
nuclearscientists SchoolofNuclearScience
and Engineering, among other facilities.50
U.S. and Canadianassistancecontinuedin the1960s.In April1961Indiabe-
gan constructionofa reprocessing plantdesignedto extractplutoniumfrom
spent nuclear fuel.
This named
facility, Phoenix,was designedin partby an
American firm,Vitro and
International, based on declassified
U.S. plansforre-
processing usingthe PUREX method.51 In 1964 Canada agreedto assistIndia
in developingitsfirstpowerreactor, knownas RajasthanAtomicPowerPlant
(RAPP-1),and supplyone-halfof theinitialuraniumfuelcharge.Thisassis-
tanceenabledIndiatoobtain"detaileddesigndata,includingplansand work-
45. Bunn,"CivilianEnergyPrograms and NuclearWeaponsPrograms/'

46. AlexanderZhebin,"A PoliticalHistoryof Soviet-North
KoreanNuclearCooperation/'
in
JamesClayMoltzand AlexanderY. Mansourov, eds.,TheNorth
Korean
NuclearProgram:
Security,
and New Perspectives
Strategy, fromRussia (New York:Routledge,2000), pp. 27-40.
47. Faye Flam, "AmericanScientistsExplain NorthKorean Nuclear Test/'Philadelphia Oc-
Inquirer,
tober10, 2006.
48. Shyam Bhatia,India's NuclearBomb(Ghaziabad, India: Vikas, 1979).
49. Duane Bratt,ThePoliticsofCANDU Exports(Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress,2006),p. 89.
50. George Perkovich,India'sNuclearBomb:TheImpacton GlobalProliferation
(Berkeley:University
ofCalifornia Press,1999),p. 30.
51. Ibid.,p. 64.
Security34:1 18
International
ingdrawingsregarding thedesignand construction ofnuclearpowerstations

oftheheavywatertype/'52 Canada additionally agreedto provideone-half of
theinitialuraniumfuelchargefortheRajasthanreactor. In December1966it
agreed to offerassistancein the design and construction ofa secondnuclear
power reactorat Rajasthan (RAPP-2). At the same time, the UnitedStates
to
agreed supplyplutonium to India forresearch purposes.53
Thesetransfers werehighlyconsequential forIndia's civiliannuclearpro-
gram.In the 1950s and 1960s,India could not have developeda nuclear
programin theabsenceofforeign Peacefulnuclearassistancealso
assistance.54
spurred India's decisionto begin a nuclear weapons program.To begin,it
decreasedtheexpectedcostsof obtainingthebomband increasedthelikeli-
hood thatone couldbe producedrelatively quickly.The training and technol-
ogy that India received had applications for both peaceful and military
programs. Key Indiandecisionmakers werewell awareofthis.In September
1956Homi Bhabha,thechairmanof theIndianAtomicEnergyCommission,
argued thatcountriescan easily use know-howand experiencesobtained
through peacefulprogramsto developa separatemilitary program.55 Bhabha
expresseda similaropinionin January1964 when he indicated that "any
knowledgeofoperating a reactorforpeacefulpurposescanbe employedlater
foroperatinga reactorformilitarypurposes."56 PrimeMinisterJawaharlal
Nehruwas equallyaware thatnuclearassistancecould servebothpeaceful
and military programs, and he expressedthisbeliefpubliclyon severalocca-
By1964U.S. and Canadianpeacefulnuclearassistancehad yieldedre-
sions.57
sultsthatwould have important implicationsforIndia'scivilianand military
nuclearprograms. In Juneofthatyear,thefirst spentfuelfromtheCanadian-
suppliedCIRUS reactorwas deliveredto thereprocessing plantat Trombay.
ThismeantthatIndiawouldsoonseparateplutonium forthefirst time.Pluto-
niumcan be used to powercertaintypesofnuclearreactors, butit is also an
important component ofnuclearweapons.Usingthisplutoniumin a nuclear
weapon,however, wouldhavebrokenNew Delhi'spriorcommitments thatit
woulduse technology and trainingprovidedby Canada and theUnited States
52. "IndiaProfile:
NuclearChronology, 1960-1964"(Monterey,
Calif.:CenterforNonproliferation
Studies,MontereyInstitutefor International Studies,August 2003), http://www.nti.org/e_
research/profiles/India/Nuclear/2296_2346.html.
53. Bratt,ThePolitics
ofCANDU Exports.
54. Wohlstetter,
"U.S. PeacefulAid and theIndianBomb."
55. Perkovich,India'sNuclearBomb, p. 29.
56. HomiJ.Bhabha,"TheImplications ofa WiderDispersalofMilitaryPowerforWorldSecurity
and theProblemofSafeguards," proceedings oftheTwelfthPugwashConference on Scienceand
WorldAffairs, January 27-February 1, 1964,Udaipur,India,pp. 78-79.
57. See, forexample,AshokKapur,India'sNuclearOption:Atomic DiplomacyandDecisionmaking
(New York:Praeger, 1976),p. 193.
SpreadingTemptation19
onlyforpeacefulpurposes.Nevertheless, developments in theciviliansector

had a salienteffecton PrimeMinisterLai BahadurShastri'sdecisionmaking.
Shastriwas highlysensitiveto theexpectedcostsofa nuclearweaponspro-
grambecauseIndiafacedeconomichardshipand massivefoodshortages dur-
ing his tenure.He was initiallyreluctantto initiatea weapons program
becausethiswould forceNew Delhi to abandonplansforeconomicdevelop-
mentand divertsubstantial resourcesaway fromotherdomesticprograms.58
Thesesentiments werecapturedin an editorialpublishedin theStatesman in
August1964:"Bothbombproduction and effective deliverycouldbe secured
ifthepriceis paid foritin termsofeconomicdeprivation. Butno responsible
has
person suggested that theobject is worth that price."59
Fearsthatthebombwouldbe technically toodifficult toproduceand would
commandsubstantial resourcesinitiallyled Shastrito opposebeginning a nu-
clearweaponsprogram. ButBhabharelentlessly lobbiedtheprimeminister in
assertingthat thebomb could be produced with relativeease due to develop-
mentsin India'sciviliannuclearprogram. In October1964Bhabhaproclaimed
thatIndiacouldacquirea nuclearbombwithineighteenmonthsofa political
decisionto developit and thata 10-kiloton blastwould costonly$350,000.60
These estimateswere overlyoptimisticbecause India would not acquire
weapons-usable plutonium until1965(eventhoughthespentfuelwas loaded
intothereprocessing in June1964),and it lackeda reliablebombde-
facility
sign.61But thesechallenges were overlooked, in partbecauseBhabhahad an
extraordinary amount ofpower, and information relevantto thenuclearpro-
gramwas so tightly guardedthatothersdid nothavea chanceto questionhis
assertions. BhabhaconvincedShastrithata bombcould be built
Eventually,
relativelyquicklywithout diverting substantial resourcesawayfromdevelop-
mentprograms. was
Thisargument especiallycompelling becausethecoun-
try'srivalrywithChinaprovidedstrategic incentives to buildthebomb.62
On November27, 1964,aftermeetingwithBhabha,Shastriofficially en-
dorseda nuclearweaponsprogram.Thisdecision,whichmarkedtheofficial
beginning oftheIndianprogram, resultedfromthecombination offoreign nu-
clearassistanceand securitythreats emanating from China. But theformer fac-
torplayedan especiallycrucialand underappreciated role.
"LeadersRejectDemandforAtomBomb/'Hindu,November9, 1964.
58. K. Rangaswami,
Indias NuclearBomb,
59. Quotedin Perkovich, p. 65.
60. Ibid.,p. 65.
61. Ibid.,p. 71.
"India/'in MitchellReissand RobertS. Litwak,eds.,NuclearProliferation
62. BrahmaChellaney,
after D.C.: WoodrowWilsonCenterPress,1994),pp. 165-190;Kapur,In-
theColdWar(Washington,
dia's NuclearOption;and Ashok Kapur,Pokhranand Beyond:India'sNuclearBehaviour(Oxford:Ox-
fordUniversity
Press,2001).
International
Security34:1 20
Pakistan's bombacquisition, 1987

Pakistan'sciviliannuclearprogram beganin the1950swiththehelpofforeign
assistance.In August1955 the UnitedStatessigneda nuclearcooperation
agreement withPakistanthatled totheconstruction ofa smallresearch reactor
at thePakistanInstitute ofNuclearScienceand Technology (PINSTECH)and
the supplyof highlyenricheduraniumto fuelit. The PINSTECH reactor,
whichbeganoperationin 1963,was used toprovidetraining toPakistanitech-
nicians,produceisotopes, and conduct neutron physicsexperiments.63 In the
1960sCanada signeda nuclearcooperation agreement withPakistanallowing
theCanadiansto build theKarachiNuclearPowerPlantand supplyheavy
waterand uraniumto fuelthereactor. Thisreactorbeganoperationin 1972.
Canada also helped Pakistandevelop a fuelfabrication facilityat Chasma
in thelate 1970s.64Western Europeansuppliersoffered considerable amounts
ofassistanceto Pakistanas well.TheUnitedKingdom,forexample,provided
hot cells capable of separatingplutoniumon a laboratory scale.65Similarly,
Belgiumand FranceassistedPakistanin developingthe"New Laboratories"
at PINSTECH to reprocessspent nuclear fuel.66Brusselsalso provided
Islamabadwitha heavywaterproduction facilitythatcameonlineat Multan
in 1980.67 Parisagreedin 1976to supplya large-scalereprocessing centerat
Chasma,butit suspendedthisdeal in 1978.68
In additionto transferringthesematerialsand technology, manysuppliers
provided substantial know-how Forinstance,theUnitedStates
to Pakistan.69
trainedpromisingyoungscientists fromPakistanat ArgonneNationalLab-
70 were
oratory justoutsideofChicagobetween1955and 1961. Thesescientists
trainedin the designand construction of nuclearreactors,the handlingof
radioactivematerials, chemistryand metallurgy, and otherpeacefulapplica-
tionsofatomicenergy.71 TheUnitedKingdom,Belgium, and othercountries in
Western Europeprovidedsimilartraining to Pakistanipersonnel.72
63. CentralIntelligenceAgency,"Pakistan'sNuclearProgram/' NationalIntelligence Estimate,

April26,1978.
64. AshokKapur,Pakistan's NuclearDevelopment (London:CroomHelm,1987),p. 75.
65. Givenitssize,thisfacility
was notwellsuitedtoproducingplutonium forbombs.Ibid.,p. 156.
66. U.S. Department ofState,"ThePakistaniNuclearProgram/' briefingpaper,June23,1983.
67. AndrewKoch and Jennifer Topping,"Pakistan'sNuclear-Related Facilities,"factsheet
(Monterey, Calif.:CenterforNonproliferation Institute
Studies,Monterey ofInternational Studies,
1997),http://cns.miis.edu/reports/pdfs/9707paki.pdf.
68. U.S. Department ofState,"Apprehensions RegardingPakistan'sNuclearIntentions," memo-
randumofconversation, September 3, 1975.
69. CentralIntelligenceAgency, "Pakistan'sNuclearProgram."
70. International
InstituteofNuclearScienceand Engineering
Classbook(Argonne,111.:ArgonneNa-
tionalLaboratory,
1961).
71. ArgonneNationalLaboratory,"International
SchoolFocusedon PeacefulUsesofNuclearEn-
ergy"(Washington,D.C.: U.S. Departmentof Energy,October12, 1996),http://www.anl.gov/
Media_Center/News/History/news961012.html.
72. Shahid-Ur
Rehman,LongRoadtoChagai(Islamabad:PrintWise,1999),pp. 36-37.
| 21
SpreadingTemptation
AfterPakistansuffered a humiliating defeatat the hands of India in the

1971Indo-Pakistani it
War, initiated a nuclear weaponsprogram.Islamabad
redoubledits efforts to acquirenuclearweaponsafterIndia testeda nuclear
explosivedevicein May 1974.73 PrimeMinisterZulfikarAli Bhuttofamously
proclaimed that all Pakistani citizenswould "eatgrassorleaves,evengo hun-
gry"to developthebombforPakistanto countertheIndiannuclearthreat.74
WhenBhuttoinitiated theprogram, he plannedtodevelopreactors and repro-
cessing centersto produceplutonium for nuclear weapons. The primeminister
tapped Munir Ahmad Khan, the chairman of the PakistanAtomic Energy
Commission(PAEC),to implement thisplan.Khanwas one ofthePakistanis
trainedatArgonneNationalLaboratory morethana decadeearlier.75 Notonly
did Khanpersonally benefit fromthattraining, butas chairmanofthePAEC,
he was able to sharehis expertisewithothersonce he returned to Pakistan.
Otherswho receivedtraining abroadwerealso able to sharetheirexperiences
withPakistaniscientists. This accumulationof nuclearknow-howenabled
Pakistanto develop a technicalbase thatwas "equally adept" to India's
abilitiesin theearly1970s.76
scientific It also increasedthePAEC's confidence
thatit could deliverthebombforPakistan.77
Bhuttoand KhanbelievedthatPakistancoulduse facilities builtforpeaceful
to
purposes develop nuclear -
weapons just as India would do in 1974.78
But ultimately, Islamabadchose a slightlydifferent path,focusinginstead
on theuraniumrouteto thebomb.The history ofPakistan'senrichment pro-
gram is well known.79In September1974 a young metallurgist named
A.Q. Khanwrotea letterto PrimeMinisterBhuttooffering to help Pakistan
buildthebomb.80 Khanhad beenworkingintheNetherlands fora subcontrac-
torof the Europeanenrichment consortium URENCO. Whileemployedby
URENCO,he stolesensitiveinformation dealingwithcentrifuge technology
thatcouldbe used to enrich uranium. At the end of1975,he suddenlyleftthe
73. See, for example, Kapur, Pakistan'sNuclear Development;Corera, Shoppingfor Bombs;and

HassanAbbas,"CausesThatLed toNuclearProliferationfromPakistantoIran,Libya,andNorth
SchoolofLaw and Diplomacy,
Korea/'Fletcher TuftsUniversity,2008.
74. Bhuttomadethisstatement in the1960s.MitchellB. Reiss,"TheNuclear
as defenseminister
TippingPoint:Prospectsfora Worldof ManyNuclearWeaponsStates,"in KurtM. Campbell,
RobertJ.Einhorn,and Reiss, eds., The NuclearTippingPoint: WhyStatesReconsiderTheirNuclear
Choices
(Washington,D.C.: Brookings Press,2004),p. 6.
Institution
75. WalterKato,interviewby author,Cambridge,Massachusetts, November20, 2008.Dr. Kato
involvedin thetraining
was personally thattookplaceat ArgonneNationalLaboratory.
p. 169.
76. Kapur, Pakistans NuclearDevelopment,
77. See ibid.,p. 136.
78. See ibid.,p. 169;and CentralIntelligence "Pakistan'sNuclearProgram/'
Agency,
79. See especiallyCorera,Shopping forBombs.
80. MichaelLaufer, A.Q. Khan NuclearChronology, issuebrief,Vol.o, No. b
Nonprolijeranon
(Washington, D.C.: CarnegieEndowmentforInternational Peace, September7, 2005),http://
www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/Kha^Chronologypdf.
Security34:1 22
International
Netherlands and returnedto Pakistanwithstolenblueprints forcentrifuges

and a Rolodexcontaining information on 100companiesthatsuppliedenrich-
menttechnology.81
Pakistanused thisinformation topurchasesubcomponents fromabroadand
to construct covertenrichment facilitiesdedicatedto a nuclearbomb pro-
gram.82 As a resultof Khan's activities,Pakistanhad virtually everything it
needed to build a centrifugeenrichment plantas earlyas 1979.83Withthis
equipment in hand,Pakistanbegan to construct enrichment at Sihala
facilities
and Kahutausing stolenblueprints.84 In the end, highlyenricheduranium
producedat theseplantsenabledIslamabadto assembleat leastone bombby
1987and conductnucleartestselevenyearslater.85
Pakistanwas able to mastersophisticated enrichment technology and pro-
ducehighlyenriched uranium for nuclear weapons because ofthepeacefulas-
sistanceitreceivedbeginninginthemid-1950s. Islamabadwas abletodrawon
trainingprovidedby theUnited States,Canada, and WestEuropeancountries
to constructand operate the enrichment centersat Sihala and Kahuta.
Pakistaniscientists
receivedtraining inuraniummetallurgy - thephysicaland
chemicalbehaviorofuraniumand itsalloys.Expertise in metallurgy is vitalto
enriching uranium the
using gas centrifuge method. Without thisknow-how,
Islamabadwouldnothaveknownwhattodo withthetechnology and materi-
als itprocuredfromabroad.As a developingcountry, Pakistancouldnothave
obtainedtherequisiteexpertise solelythrough indigenousmeans.MunirKahn
underscored thesignificance
offoreign assistance:
I have no place fromwhichto drawtalentedscientists

and engineersto work
in ournuclearestablishment. systemforthekindof
We don'thave a training
cadreswe need.But,ifwe can getFranceorsomebodyelsetocomeand create
a broadnuclearinfrastructure, I
and buildtheseplantsand theselaboratories,
willtrainhundredsofmypeoplein waysthatotherwise theywould never be
able to be trained.And withthattraining,
and withtheblueprints and the
81. Ibid.
82. JamesM. Markham, "BonnChecksReportofSmuggling ofAtomicTechnologyto Pakistan/7
NewYorkTimes, May5, 1987;Corera,Shopping
forBombs, "Chronol-
p. 23;and ShelbyMcNichols,
ogy of PakistaniNuclearDevelopment" (Monterey,Calif.:CenterforNonproliferation
Studies,
Monterey ofInternational
Institute Studies,July2000).
83. Corera, ShoppingforBombs,p. 27.
84. Ibid.,p. 22.
85. David Albright
and KevinO'Neill,"ISIS TechnicalAssessment: Pakistan'sStockofWeapon-
GradeUranium"(Washington, D.C.: Institute
forScienceand International
Security,June1998),
httpV/www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/ta-pakOóO^S.html;
Christopher Clary,"Dr.
Khan'sNuclearWalMart," Disarmament Diplomacy,No. 76 (March/April 2004);David Albright
and MarkHibbs,"Pakistan'sBomb:Out of theCloset,"Bulletin oftheAtomic Vol.48
Scientists,
(July/August1992),p. 39;Corera,ShoppingforBombs,p. 49;and Kapur,Pakistan's
NuclearDevelop-
ment, p. 208.
otherthingsthatwe'd getalongtheway,thenwe couldsetup separateplants

thatwould notbe undersafeguards, thatwould notbe builtwithdirectfor-
but
eignassistance, I would nothave thepeoplewho coulddo that.IfI don't
getthecooperation,I can'ttrainthepeopleto runa weaponsprogram.86
SamarMubarakmand, who headed the teamof scientists thatorchestrated
Pakistan's1998 nucleartests,expressedsimilarsentiments.87 He suggested
can
thatanycountry procure dual-useequipment relevantto a weaponspro-
gram,but statescannotbuild thebomb "unlessthereis a humanresource
available. . . whichunderstands workto suchan extentthat
[nuclear-related]
itis able to developand raisethisprogramfromzeroto 100%all by itself."88
He added thatcountries suchas Libyawereunableto developthebombbe-
cause theylackedwhatPakistanhad: therequisiteknowledgebase. Between
1970and 2003,Libyaattempted to procurenuclearweapons-relevant technol-
ogyon the black marketbut was neverable to developthe bomb.
StatisticalTests
Giventhateveryempiricalapproachhas drawbacks,a multimethod assess-

mentofmytheorycan inspiregreaterconfidence in thefindingspresentedin
The case studyanalysisabove providesrichdescriptions
thisarticle.89 ofmy
argument and that
illustrates the causal processesoperate expectedin
as
actualinstancesof proliferation.90 analysisallows me to minimize
Statistical
the risksof selectionbias and determinethe averageeffectof independent
variableson proliferationaims and outcomes.91 it permitsme
Additionally,
to controlfor confoundingvariablesand to show that peacefulnuclear
cooperation- and notsomeotherfactor - explainsnuclearproliferation.This
is especiallyimportant because proliferation is a complicatedprocess,and
thereis rarelyonlyone factorthatexplainswhynuclearweaponsspread.92
For thestatisticalanalysis,I use a data set compiledby Sonali Singhand
86. Quotedin GeorgePerkovich, "NuclearPowerand NuclearWeaponsin India,Pakistan, and

Iran/'in Paul Leventhal,SharonTänzer,and StevenDolley,eds.,NuclearPowerandtheSpreadof
NuclearWeapons: CanWeHaveOnewithout theOther? D.C.: Brassey's,
(Washington, 2002),p. 194.
87. SamarMubarakmand, CapitalTalkSpecial,Geo-TV,May 3, 2004,http://www.pakdef.info/
forum/showthread.php?t+9214.
88. Ibid.
see Alexander
89. Fora similardiscussion, B. Downes,Targeting
Civiliansin War(Ithaca,N.Y.:Cor-
nellUniversity Press,2008),pp. 40-41.
90. See,forexample,AlexanderL. Georgeand AndrewBennett, CaseStudiesandTheory Develop-
mentin theSocialSciences(Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press,2005).
91. WillH. Moore,"Synthesis v. Purityand Large-NStudies:How MightWeAssesstheGap be-
tweenPromiseand Performance?" HumanRights andHumanWelfare, Vol.6 (2006),pp. 89-97.
92. Sagan,"WhyDo StatesBuildNuclearWeapons?"
International
Security34:1 | 24
Christopher Way to identifythe determinants I

of nuclearproliferation.93
adopt a standard time-series
cross-sectional
data for
structure the period1945
to 2000,and theunitofanalysisis thecountry(monad)year.Formyanalysis
ofnuclearweaponsprogramonset,a country exitsthedatasetonceitinitiates
a weaponsacquisitioncampaign.Similarly, formyanalysisofnuclearweap-
ons acquisition,
a countryexitsthedatasetonceitobtainsat leastone nuclear
bomb.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
To analyzenuclearproliferation, I coded two dependentvariables,bothof
whichare dichotomous. The firstis coded 1 ifthecountry initiateda nuclear
in
weaponsprogram year t and 0 otherwise. The secondis coded 1 ifthecoun-
tryacquirednuclear in
weapons year t and 0 otherwise.To create thesevari-
I
ables, consulteda listofnuclearproliferation datescompiledby Singhand
Way94
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
I hypothesizedabove thatthe accumulationof civiliannuclearassistance
makesstatesmorelikelybothto beginnuclearweaponsprogramsand to ac-
quire such weapons- especiallywhen securitythreatsare also present.To
operationalizeciviliannuclearassistance,I collectedand coded new data on
NCAs signedfrom1945to 2000.NCAs are an appropriate independent vari-
able forthisanalysisbecausetheymustbe in placein virtually all casesbefore
theexchangeof nucleartechnology, materials, or knowledgecan takeplace.
Theseagreements typicallylead to theconstruction ofa nuclearpoweror re-
searchreactor,thesupplyoffissilematerials(e.g.,plutonium or enrichedura-
nium),the exportof fissilematerialproductionfacilities, or the trainingof
scientists
and technicians.Relatedagreements thatare notclassifiedas NCAs
include:(1) agreements thatare explicitly
defenserelated;(2) financialagree-
ments;(3) agriculturalor industrialagreements unrelatedto nuclearpower;
(4) agreements dealingwiththeleasingof nuclearmaterial;and (5) liability
agreements.
To producethesedata,I consulteda listcompiledbyJamesKeeleyofmore
than2,000NCAs.95Figure1 plotsthenumberofNCAs signedfrom1950to
93. Singhand Way,'The Correlates ofNuclearProliferation/'

94. Ibid.
95. See Keeley,"A ListofBilateralCivilianNuclearCooperation Agreements/7 I conductedfur-
therresearchon all oftheagreementsinKeeley's listtoensurethatI includedonlydealsthatactu-
ally providethe basis for the exchangeof nucleartechnology, materials,or knowledge.
KeeleyincludedsomeNCAs thataresimplyamendments
Additionally, toearlieragreements,and
| 25
SpreadingTemptation
Figure 1. Total Number of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements Signed, 1950-2000
160
140 ♦ *
120 j' A
100 - -
fulK W
-
60 ♦- ^-|i- /yw»- i m
20 f
0 H- ♦ v 1 1 1 1 1
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
SOURCES:Matthew Fuhrmann,"Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinantsof Civil-

ian Nuclear Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53, No. 2 (April 2009),
pp. 181-208; and James F. Keeley, "A List of BilateralCivilianNuclear Cooperation Agree-
ments," Universityof Calgary, 2003.
2000.The figureshowsa generalincreasein thenumberofNCAs overtime,

whichis explainedby theemergence ofa greaternumberofcapablenuclear
suppliers.Thenumber has fluctuated withpeaksin thelate1980sand
slightly,
the mid-1990s.The firstNCA was signedin 1952,afterwhichthe average
numberofagreements signedeach yearwas 58.
I createdan independent variablethatmeasurestheaggregatenumberof
NCAs thata statesignedin a givenyearentitling ittonucleartechnology,
ma-
or
terials, knowledge from anothercountry.96Ifa statesignedan NCA butonly
supplied- and did notreceive - nuclearassistanceas partofthetermsofthe
deal,thenthiswould notbe capturedby thenuclearcooperation agreements
variable.Table1 liststhethirtycountries thatreceivedthemostnuclearassis-
tancevia theseagreements from1945to 2000.97
do notauthorizethesupplyofadditionalnucleartechnology, orknow-how.
materials, I excluded
theseagreements fromthecodingoftheindependent variable.
96. Sometimes thereis a delaybetweenthetimean NCA is signedand thetimethatnucleartech-
nology, orknow-how
materials, I lag thein-
Toaccountforthispossibility,
areactuallytransferred.
dependent in 1975,itwouldnot"count"
variablesfiveyears,so thatifa statesignedan agreement
until1980.1estimateall modelsusingthisalternate codingofthevariable,and theresultsarethe
same.
97. Someofthesecountries areincludedinmysampletoronlya limitednumberotyearsbecause
Security34:1 | 26
International
Table 1. Top Recipients of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements, 1945-2000
Country Total Number of Agreements

United States 396
France 221
Germany 171
Russia 136
United Kingdom 133
Japan 122
Italy 1 12
Belgium 93
Argentina 92
Netherlands 80
Canada 77
Brazil 70
Spain 70
Switzerland 68
Luxembourg 63
Sweden 56
Denmark 55
China 53
South Korea 49
India 39
Ireland 36
Romania 35
Portugal 33
Czechoslovakia (1945-91) 30
Greece 30
Egypt 29
Finland 29
Poland 28
Australia 25
Indonesia 22
NOTE: summary statistics: N = 186; mean = 15.34; minimum= 0; maximum = 396
To operationalize I createda variablemeasuringthefive-

securitythreats,
yearmovingaverageofthenumberofmilitarized interstate
disputes(MIDs)
peryearin which a countrywas involved.This is
variable based on version3.0
oftheCorrelatesofWar'sMID dataset.98 1codeda thirdvariablethatinteracts
thesetwomeasuresto testfortheconditional effectofnuclearcooperation on
proliferation.
statesareremovedoncetheypursueor acquirenuclearweapons.ThefirstNCA was notsigned

until1952.
98. FatenGhosn,GlennPalmer,and StuartA. Bremer,'The MÏD3 Data Set,1993-2001:Proce-
dures,CodingRules,and Description,"
Conflict
ManagementandPeaceScience,
Vol.21,No. 2 (2004),
pp. 133-154.
| 27
SpreadingTemptation
CONTROL VARIABLES
I controlledforotherfactorsthoughtto affectproliferation." To controlfor
technological capacity, I included a variable a
measuring country's GDP per
capitaand a squared term of this measure to for
allow thepossiblecurvilinear
relationshipbetweeneconomicdevelopment and thepursuitofnuclearweap-
ons.100To measurea state'sindustrial capacity, I includeda dichotomous vari-
able thatis coded 1 ifit producedsteeldomestically and had an electricity-
generating capacitygreater than5,000megawatts and 0 otherwise. I includeda
dichotomous variablethatis coded 1 ifthestatewas involvedin at leastone
enduring rivalry as an additionalproxyfora state'ssecurity environment.101A
dichotomous variablethatis coded 1 ifa stateshareda defensepactwithone
ofthenuclear-capable greatpowersand 0 otherwise is also includedbecause
securityguarantees of thismagnitude could reduce states'incentivesto de-
velop theirown nuclear weapons.102
Therearea numberof"internal determinants" thatcouldaffect incentivesto
I includedtwovariablesrelatedto democracy.
proliferate. The firstmeasures
thecountry's scoreon thePolityIV scale.103 The secondvariable,whichmea-
sureswhethera stateis democratizing, calculatesmovementtowarddemoc-
racyovera five-year spanby subtracting a state'sPolityscorein yeart-5from
itsPolityscorein yeart. To controlfora state'sexposureto theglobalecon-
omy,I includeda variablemeasuringtheratioof exportsplus importsas a
shareofGDP.104 I also includeda measureoftradeliberalization thatmirrors
thedemocratization measuredescribedabove.
Forthesake ofrobustness, I includedone variablethatSinghand Wayex-
cludedfromtheirmodel.105 I createda dichotomous variableand codedit 1 if
thestatesignedtheNPT in yeart and 0 otherwise. NPT membership couldbe
99. Theseare generally thesamevariablesused by Singhand Way,"TheCorrelates ofNuclear

Proliferation/'
100. See ibid.,p. 868.
101. Singhand Waycode thisvariablebased on D. ScottBennett's1998listof rivalries.See
Bennett,"Integrating andTesting ModelsofRivalry American
Duration/' JournalofPolitical
Science,
Vol.42,No. 4 (October1998),pp. 1200-1232.
102. Singhand Wayrelyon version3.0oftheCorrelates ofWaralliancedatasettocodethisvari-
able.DouglasM. Gibierand Meredith ReidSarkees,"Measuring Alliances:TheCorrelatesofWar
FormalInterstate ofPeaceResearch,
AllianceDataset,"Journal Vol.41,No. 2 (March2004),pp. 211-
222.
103. ThePolityIV dataarebasedon a 21-pointscalethatmeasurestherelative opennessotpoliti-
See MontyG. Marshalland KeithJaggers,
cal institutions. "PolityIV Project:PoliticalRegime
Characteristicsand Transitions,1800-2002/' http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
104. Singhand WaytaketheirGDP data fromversion6.1 ofthePennWorldTables.A. Heston,
R. Summers, and B. Aten,PennWorld Table(Philadelphia:
CenterforInternational Comparisons,
University ofPennsylvania, 2002),ver.6.1.
105. See Singhand Way,"TheCorrelates ofNuclearProliferation."
International
Security34:1 28
salientin explaining
decisionstoproliferate
becausestatesmakelegalpledges
notto pursuenuclearweaponswhentheysignthistreaty.
METHODS OF ANALYSIS
I used probitregression
analysistoestimate
theeffect ofindependent variables
on nuclearweaponsprogramonsetand bombacquisition. Given that thepro-
liferationoutcomesanalyzedhereoccurredrelatively infrequently,I also used
rareeventslogitto estimatethe effectof independentvariableson nuclear
weaponsprogramonsetand nuclearweaponsacquisition.106 Thisestimator is
appropriatewhen the dependentvariablehas thousandsof timesfewerl's
thanO's.I used clustering
overstatesto controlforheteroskedastic errorvari-
ance.To controlforpossibletemporaldependence in the data,I also included a
variableto countthenumberofyearsthatpassedwithouta country pursuing
nuclearweaponsor acquiringthebomb.107 Finally,I laggedall independent
variablesoneyearbehindthedependentvariabletocontrol forpossiblesimul-
taneity bias.
ResultsoftheStatisticalTests
Beforemovingto themultivariate analysis,I consideredcrosstabulations of

nuclear cooperationagreementsagainst nuclearweapons programonset
and nuclearweaponsacquisition.The resultsare presentedin tables2 and 3.
Thesesimplecrosstabulations underscorethatproliferationis a relativelyrare
event.Decisionsto beginweaponsprogramoccurin fifteen of theobserva-
tionsin thesample(0.22percent), and bombacquisitionoccursin nineobser-
vations in the sample (0.13 percent).Even thoughproliferation occurs
these
infrequently, crosstabulations show that nuclearcooperationstrongly
influenceswhether countrieswillgo downthenuclearpath.Participation inat
leastone nuclearcooperation agreement increasesthe likelihoodofbeginning
a bombprogrambyabout500percent. Thecombination ofmilitarized conflict
and nuclearassistancehas an evenlargersubstantive effecton programonset.
Experiencing bothofthesephenomenon increasestheprobability ofinitiating
106. GaryKingand LangcheZeng,"LogisticRegression in RareEventsData/'Political

Analysis,
Vol.9,No 2 (February2001),pp. 137-163.1also use a Cox proportional
hazardmodeltoestimate
all models,and theresultsare virtually
identical.I do notlisttheCox resultsbecauseof space
constraints.
107. NathanielBeck,Jonathan N. Katz,and RichardTucker, 'TakingTimeSeriously:Time-Series-
Cross-SectionAnalysiswitha BinaryDependentVariable/' American ofPolitical
Journal Science,
Vol.42,No. 4 (October1998),pp. 1260-1288.
Cubicsplinesarenotincludedbecauseproliferation
outcomescannotrecur;oncea country beginsa program oracquiresthebomb,itis removedfrom
thesample.
| 29
SpreadingTemptation
Table 2. Nuclear Cooperation, MilitarizedDisputes, and Nuclear Weapons Program Onset,

1945-2000
Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and

Civilian Nuclear Cooperation MilitarizedDisputes
No Yes Total No Yes Total
Nuclear No 4,066 2,865 6,931 5,080 1,851 6,931

weapons (99.93%) (99.58%) (99.78%) (99.92%) (99.41%) (99.78%)
program yes 3 12 15 4 11 15
onset (0.07%) (0.42%) (0.22%) (0.08%) (0.59%) (0.22%)
Total 4,069 2,877 6,946 5,084 1,862 6,946
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Pearson Chi2(1) = 9.22, Pearson Chi2(1) = 16.59,
Pr = 0.002 Pr < 0.0001
Table 3. Nuclear Cooperation, MilitarizedDisputes, and Nuclear Weapons Acquisition,

1945-2000
Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and

Civilian Nuclear Cooperation MilitarizedDisputes
No Yes Total No Yes Total
Nuclear No 4,077 3,050 7,127 5,099 2,028 7,127

weapons (99.95%) (99.77%) (99.87%) (99.96%) (99.66%) (99.78%)
program Yes 2 7 9 2 7 9
onset (0.05%) (0.23%) (0.13%) (0.04%) (0.34%) (0.13%)
Total 4,079 3,057 7,136 5,101 2,035 7,136
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Pearson Chi2(1) = 4.49, Pearson Chi2(1) = 10.73,
Pr = 0.034 Pr = 0.0001
a weaponsprogramby about 638 percent.This simpleanalysisemphasizes

thattheserelationshipsare notdeterministic.Althoughcountries thatreceive
peacefulassistancewere more to the
likely beginweaponsprograms, majority
ofcountries fromsuchaid do notproliferate.
thatbenefit It is also noteworthy
that80 percentofthecountries thatbeganprogramsdid so afterreceiving ci-
vilianaid. Thefourcountriesthatinitiatednuclearweaponprograms without
receivingsuchassistance- France,theSovietUnion,theUnitedKingdom,and
-
theUnitedStates did so in the1940sand early1950swhenpeacefulnuclear
cooperation was notan option.From1955to2000,no country begana nuclear
weaponsprogram withoutfirst
receivingcivilian
assistance.This suggeststhat
aftertheearlydaysoftheatomicage, nuclearaid becamea necessarycondi-
tionforlaunchinga nuclearweaponsprogram.
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Security34:1 32
International
Similarpatterns emergedbetweennuclearassistanceand weaponsacquisi-

tion.Nuclearaid increasesthe likelihoodof acquiringthe bomb by about
360 percent;the combination of atomicassistanceand militarizeddisputes
increasesthe probability of buildingnuclearweapons by 750 percent.The
relationshipbetweennuclearassistanceand weapons acquisitionis also
- not deterministic
probabilistic - because not all countriesthatreceiveaid
crossthenuclearthreshold. Table3 indicatesthatatomicassistancewas notal-
a
ways necessary condition for bombacquisition, althoughthevastmajority of
did receivehelp.Seventy-eight
all proliferators percent of the countriesthat
producedthebombreceivedsomeassistance, and no country acquiredweap-
ons withoutreceivingaid from1953to 2000.
To explorethe role of possibleconfounding variables,I turnnow to the
multivariate Table
analysis. 4 presents the resultsfromthemultivariate
initial
statistical
analysis.The odd-numbered modelswereestimatedusingprobit,
and the even-numbered modelswere estimatedusing rareeventslogit.In
models1-4,thedependentvariableis weaponsprogramonset.Models1 and 2
excludetheinteraction termand allow me to evaluatewhetherpeacefulnu-
clearassistanceaffects decisionsto beginbombprogramsindependent ofthe
securityenvironment. Models 3 and 4 include the term
interaction and enable
me to evaluatetheconditional effectofatomicassistanceon theinitiation of
nuclearweaponscampaigns.In models5-8 thedependentvariableis acquisi-
tion.Models 5-6 excludethe interaction term,allowingme to evaluatethe
unconditional effectofnuclearaid on bombdevelopment. Models7 and 8 in-
cludetheinteraction term, so I can assess the conditionaleffectofatomicassis-
tanceon a country successfully building nuclear weapons.
The resultsshowthatpeacefulnuclearassistancecontinuesto contribute to
bothnuclearweaponsprogramonsetand bombacquisition, even whenac-
countingforconfounding variables.In models1-2 thecoefficient on thevari-
able measuringthe cumulativeamountof atomicassistancea countryhas
receivedis positiveand highlystatistically Thisindicatesthat,
significant.108
on average,countriesreceivingnuclearaid are morelikelyto initiatebomb
programs.The substantive effectof thisvariableis also strong.Raisingthe
value of the NCA variablefromits mean (6.69) to one standarddeviation
above themean(22.72)increasesthelikelihoodofbeginning a weaponspro-
gramby 185 The
percent.109 findings in table4 reveala similarrelationshipbe-
108. One could arguethatthereis a threshold effect

involvingNCAs wherebymakinga few
agreements increasestheriskof proliferation
but manyagreementsmakestatesmorelikelyto
foreswearthebomb.To testforthis,I add a squaredtermoftheNCA variabletothemodelsdis-
playedin table4. Thisdoes notaffecttheresults.
109. Thesecalculationsarebased on theresultsfrommodel2.
| 33
SpreadingTemptation
tweenatomicassistanceand bombacquisition.As shownin models5-6, the

coefficient on the variablemeasuringthe numberof NCAs a countryhas
signedis positiveand highlysignificant, indicatingthatcountriesreceiving
peaceful nuclear aid are more likely to build thebomb.IncreasingtheNCA
variablefromitsmeanto one standarddeviationabove themeanraisesthe
probability thata country willbuildnuclearweaponsby 243 percent.110
Does peacefulnuclearassistancehavean especiallystrongeffect on prolifer-
ationwhencountriesalso facesecurity threats? BecauseI use an interaction
termto testthispartofmyargument, it is notpossibleto evaluatethiseffect
based solelyon theinformation presentedin table4. The appropriate way to
interpretinteraction terms is to the
graph marginal effect of atomic assistance
and thecorresponding standarderrorsacrossthefullrangeofthemilitarized
interstate disputevariable.111 If zero is includedin the confidence interval,
thenatomicassistancedoes nothavea statistically significant effect on prolif-
erationat thatparticular levelofconflict. Figures2 and 3 allowme to evaluate
howthecombination ofatomicaid and militarized conflictaffect proliferation.
Figure2 plotsthemarginaleffect ofnuclearaid on weaponsprogramonset
as thenumberofmilitarized disputesrises.112 It is difficultto see in thefigure,
butatomicassistancehas a statistically significant effect on weaponsprograms
acrossall levelsofconflict becausezerois neverincludedin theconfidence in-
terval.At low levelsofconflict, increasesin peacefulnuclearassistancehave
relativelysmall substantive effectson thelikelihoodofbombprogramonset.
Butas thesecurity environment worsens,thesubstantive effectofatomicassis-
on
tance initiating a bomb is
program magnified.
The probability thatan averagecountryexperiencing six militarizeddis-
putes will develop the bomb risesfrom 0.000936 to 0.0902 whenthecountry
receivesincreasesin atomicaid.113 Thisindicatesthatcountries arehighlyun-
in the absence of such assistance - evenif
likelyto beginweaponsprograms
theyfacesecuritythreats.But if threatsare presentand statesreceiveaddi-
tionalatomicassistance,thelikelihoodofbeginninga bombprogramspikes
dramatically. If thatsame countrywereto be involvedin twelvemilitarized
disputesin one year,increasesin nuclearassistancewould raisetheprobabil-
ityofprogram initiation from0.0625to0.737,an increaseof1,078percent. Ifan
110.Thesecalculations arebased on theresultsfrommodel6.

111.ThomasBrambor, WilliamRobertsClark,and MattGolder,"Understanding Interaction
Models:Improving EmpiricalAnalyses," Political
Analysis,Vol.14,No. 1 (Winter
2006),pp. 63-82.
112.Figure2 is based on theresultsin model3. To calculatethemarginaleffects,I increasethe
valueofthepeacefulnuclearcooperation variablefromitsmeanto one-half standarddeviation
abovethemean.
I setall othervariablesat theirmean.
113.To calculatethesefigures,
Security34:1 | 34
International
Figure 2. Marginal Effectof Nuclear Assistance on Weapons Program Onset as Number

of Disputes Increases
11 '
-- -
0.9 7^
/
0.8
jt
•• °-7 r - ^ ^-
i
|
0.5 j
/ -/-
/ ^v ^
| 0.4 / -X-
.£ 03 f /_
i / -
0.1 /.- -/. /
^ ^^
-1- -
I ......"
I I I I I I
0 3 6 9 12 15 18
MilitarizedInterstateDisputes
*NCAs = nuclear cooperation agreements
averagecountrythatexperienceseighteenmilitarized disputesin a yearre-

ceivesadditionalatomicassistance, thelikelihoodthatitwillbegina weapons
programrisesfrom0.426to 0.933,an increaseof119percent. Notethatat high
levelsofconflict,
theprobability ofweaponsprogramonsetapproaches1 with
increasesin peacefulaid,butcountries thatfacenumeroussecurity threats are
also likelytoproliferate
intheabsenceofassistance.Consequently, increasesin
nuclearassistanceyieldsmallerrisesin theprobability ofproliferationat high
levelsofconflict.
Thisis whythemarginaleffect displayedin figure2 declines
slightlyafterabout thirteendisputes.
Figure3 illustrates
theconditional effectofnuclearaid on weaponsacquisi-
tionas thenumberofdisputesrises.114 Nuclearassistancedoes nothavea sta-
tistically effect
significant on acquisitionwhencountries experiencean average
ofzeromilitarized disputes, because zero is includedin theconfidence inter-
114.Figure3 is based on theresultsin model7.
Figure 3. Marginal Effectof Nuclear Assistance on Weapons Acquisition as Number of

Disputes Increases
1
0.9
0.8 *'"
. 0.7 Z
0 0.6 /
° 0.5 L ^^^
1 0.4 I /_
.<= 0.3 / y_
i 0.2 jl y_
0.1
''''^
-0.1
0 3 6 9 12 15 18
MilitarizedInterstateDisputes
*NCAs = nuclear cooperation agreements
val. For all otherlevels of conflict, atomicassistancehas a statisticallysig-

nificanteffect. If countriesexperiencean averageof one militarized dispute,
thesubstantive effectofatomicaid is modest.Increasesin peacefulassistance
raisetheprobability ofbombacquisitionfrom0.0000165to 0.0000122, an in-
creaseof43 percent.Foran averagestateexperiencing six disputes,receiving
nuclearaid raisestheprobability it will acquirenuclearweaponsmoresub-
stantially,from0.000504to 0.00202.If thatsame statewere to experience
twelvedisputesina year,theprobability ofacquisitionwouldrisefrom0.0144
to0.306,an increaseof2,031percent. Likewise,receivingatomicassistanceand
experiencing eighteen increases
conflicts the probability bombdevelopment
of
by 511 percent,from0.110to 0.671.These resultsindicatethat,on average,
countriesthat receiveatomic assistanceare more likelyto proliferate -
especiallywhensecurity threatsarise.
Turningto thecontrolvariables,thecoefficient on thevariablemeasuring
whether a statesharesa military alliancewitha nuclear-armed poweris statis-
in all
ticallyinsignificant eight models, suggestingthatnuclear protectionhas
Security34:1 | 36
International
no effect on whether a country pursuesthebomborsuccessfully buildsit.The

coefficients on thevariablesmeasuring whether a country is democratic or is
democratizing are also statistically insignificant,indicatingthatregimetype
has littleeffect on proliferation aims and outcomes.Manypolicymakers as-
sumethatproliferation is a problemcausedby"rogue"orundemocratic states.
Althoughsomeautocratic statessuchas NorthKoreahave proliferated in re-
centyears,on averagedemocracy is lesssalientinexplaining thespreadofnu-
clearweaponsthantheconventional wisdomsuggests.Theresultsalso failto
supporttheargument thattradedependenceinfluences nuclearproliferation.
The coefficients on thevariablesmeasuringtradedependenceand liberaliza-
tionare notstatistically significant in models1-4,meaningthatthesefactors
have no effecton states'decisionsto build the bomb.Economicopenness
also has an insignificant effect on bombacquisition.Butinterestingly, liberal-
izationhas a positiveand statistically significanteffectinmodels6 and 8,indi-
cating that liberalizing states are more likelyto cross thenuclearthreshold.
Futureresearchshouldexplorewhether theseresultsmaybe due to imperfect
measurement oftheseconcepts.
Someofthecontrolvariablesdo behaveas expected.The coefficient on the
variablemeasuring whether a country has signedtheNPT is negativeand sta-
tisticallysignificant in models1-4,indicating thatcountries makingnonprolif-
erationcommitments are less likelyto initiatebombprograms. Substantively,
NPT membership reducesthelikelihoodthata countrywill begina nuclear
weaponsprogrambymorethan90 percent. Forstatisticalreasons,itwas nec-
essary to exclude the NPT variable from models 5-8.U5 The on the
coefficient
variablemeasuringwhethera country is involvedin a rivalryis positiveand
statistically significant acrossmodels1-4,but it is insignificant in models6
and 8. Likewise,theGDP variableshavestatistically significant inmod-
effects
els 1 and 3,buttheseresultsaresensitivetomodelspecification. Industrial ca-
pacity has a positive and statistically significant in
effect all eightmodels,
indicatingthatcountrieswithhighindustrialcapabilitiesare morelikelyto
beginweaponsprogramsand successfully build thebomb.This is theonly
variableotherthanthefactors operationalizing myargument thathas a statis-
ticallysignificant effect acrossmodelspecifications. Havingadequateindus-
trialcapacityincreasestheprobability ofprograminitiation from0.00000226 to
0.000105and theprobability ofacquisitionfrom0.000487to 0.000804.
To further assess therobustness of my findings, I conducteda sensitivity
analysis. I used a newestimator toaccountforpossibleendogeneity and an al-
ternatecodingforthedependentvariable.In addition,I excluded"sensitive"
115.TheNPT variableis notincludedin theacquisition

analysisbecauseitpredictsfailureper-
Thisposesproblemsforstandardstatistical
fectly. techniques.
nuclearcooperation agreementsfromthecodingofmykeyindependent vari-

able.Forspaceconsiderations,I discussonlybrieflytheresultsoftheserobust-
ness checks.Detaileddiscussionsof the resultsand procedures,as well as
all of the tablesdisplayingthe statistical
results,are availablein an online
appendix.116
ENDOGENEITY
My argument is thattheaccumulation ofnuclearcooperation agreements en-
courages statesto begin nuclear weaponsprograms and thatreceiving atomic
aid ultimatelyenablesstatestoacquirenuclearweapons.Butitis also possible
thatstatesseeknuclearassistancewhentheyarepursuingnuclearweapons.117
Thus,nuclearcooperation maybe endogenousto nuclearweaponspursuit.
One standardapproachto addresstheendogeneity issueis to lag theinde-
pendentvariablesone yearbehindthedependentvariable.118 I adoptedthis
approach in the analysispresented above. As an additional way to address
thisissue,I estimatedtwo endogenousequationssimultaneously. The first
equationrepresents the totalnumber of nuclearcooperationagreementsa
statehas made in a particular year,and thesecondestimatesthelikelihood
thatit is pursuingnuclearweapons.As was the case above, the prolifera-
tionequationparallelstheworkofSinghand Way.119 Thenuclearcooperation
equationthatI employedis based on a recentstudyofthecausesofatomicas-
To estimatetheseequationssimultaneously,
sistance.120 I used a technique
originallydevelopedby G.S. Maddala and practically
implemented by Omar
Keshk.121 Thismethodis designedforsimultaneous equation models where
one oftheendogenousvariablesis continuousand theotheris dichotomous,
whichis precisely thenatureofthevariablesin thisanalysis.Thetwo-stage es-
timation techniquegenerates instruments for eachofthe endogenous variables
and thensubstitutes themin the respectivestructural equations.The first
equation(withthe continuousvariable)is estimatedusing ordinaryleast
squares,and thesecond(withthedichotomous variable)is estimatedusing
probit.122
116.See data section,http://people.cas.sc.edu/fuhrmann.

117.See Fuhrmann, 'Takinga Walkon theSupplySide/'
118.See,forexample,ErikGartzkeand Quan Li,"MeasureforMeasure:ConceptOperationahza-
tionand theTradeInterdependence-ConflictDebate/'Journal Vol.40,No. 5 (Sep-
ofPeaceResearch,
tember 2003),pp. 553-571.
119.Singhand Way,"TheCorrelates ofNuclearProliferation."
120. Fuhrmann, "Takinga Walkon theSupplySide."
and QualitativeVariablesin Econometrics
121. G.S. Maddala, Limited-Dependent (Cambridge: Cam-
bridgeUniversityPress,1986);andOmarKeshk,"CDSIMEQ:A Program toImplement
Two-Stage
Vol.3, No. 2 (June2003),pp. 157-167.
ProbitLeastSquares,"StataJournal,
122. rorotherworkm politicalsciencethatuses thisapproach,see UmarM.U. Keshk,BrianM.
Pollins,and RafaelReuveny,"TradeStillFollowstheFlag:The PrimacyofPoliticsin a Simulta-
International
Security34:1 | 38
Theresultsofthetwo-stage probitleastsquaresmodelthataddressesthesi-
multaneityissueare consistent
generally withthefindings presentedabove.123
Mostimportant, nuclearcooperationhas a positiveand statistically
significant
effecton nuclearweapons pursuit.This resultis robustto alternatemodel
specifications.124
DEPENDENT VARIABLE CODING

Itis oftendifficult
todetermine theyearthata country beginsa nuclearweap-
onsprogram oracquiresthebomb,giventhesecrecythatsurrounds suchmili-
tary endeavors.As a there
result, is some disagreementamong scholarson the
datesthatcertaincountries begantoproliferate.To explorewhether myresults
are sensitiveto proliferationcodings,I used an alternateset of proliferators
and dates compiledby Joand Gartzke.125 Estimating the same modelsdis-
playedabovebutwiththealternate datesalso does notaffect
proliferation the
resultsrelatingto myargument.
REMOVAL OF SENSITIVE AGREEMENTS

Recentresearchfindsthatcountries
receiving nuclearassis-
certain"sensitive"
tanceare morelikelyto acquirenuclearweapons.126ForthereasonsI argued
above,therelationship
betweennuclearassistanceand proliferation
is broader.
in
Training nuclear the
engineering, supply of researchor and
powerreactors,
neousModelofInterdependence andArmedConflict/' Journal Vol.66,No. 4 (November

ofPolitics,
2004),pp. 1155-1179; HyungMinKimand David L. Rousseau,'The ClassicalLiberalsWereHalf
Right(orHalfWrong): New Testsofthe'LiberalPeace/1960-88," ofPeaceResearch,
Journal Vol.42,
No. 5 (September 2005),pp. 523-543;and CameronThies,"OfRules,Rebels,and Revenue:State
Capacity, CivilWarOnset,andPrimary Commodities/7 paperpresented atthePan-European Con-
ference on InternationalRelations,Torino,Italy,September 12-15,2007.
123. I did notincludetheinteraction termin thesimultaneous equationsmodel.It is possibleto
includeinteraction termsin suchmodelsby calculating thepredicted value of theendogenous
variable(peacefulnuclearcooperation), interacting thispredictedvariablewiththeexogenous
variable(militarized disputes),estimating the secondequation.This approachis problematic,
however, becauseitdoesnotappropriately correct thestandarderrors. See JeffreyM. Wooldridge,
IntroductoryEconometrics:A Modern Approach (New York:South-Western College,2000),pp. 501-
528.
124. One oftheweaknesses ofsimultaneous equationsmodelsis thattheindependent variablesin
thefirstequationshouldbe exogenous.In otherwords,theyshouldbe unrelated tothedependent
variableinthesecondequation.In international itis difficult
relations, forscholarstomeetthisas-
sumption whenusingsimultaneous equationsmodels.Forinstance, internationaltradeand mili-
tarizedconflict are endogenousvariablesbecause tradesuppressesconflict but conflictalso
reducestrade.Thisis whysomescholarsuse thesameestimator appliedin thisarticletoexamine
thetrade-conflictnexus.Butmanyofthecorrelates oftrade- suchas thedistancebetweentwo
countries- arealso correlatedwithconflict.See Keshk,Pollins,and Reuveny, "TradeStillFollows
theFlag."ThebestI can do to addressthisissueis to reestimate themodelswhileexcludingthe
variablesin thefirstequationthatareclearlyrelatedtonuclearproliferation. Thisalterationdoes
notchangemycorefindings.
125. Joand Gartzke,"Determinants ofNuclearWeaponsProliferation."
126. Kroenig, "Importing theBomb."
| 39
SpreadingTemptation
the transferof certainnuclearmaterialsalso affectproliferation.To test

whethermyresultsmaybe drivenby a fewsensitivedeals,I excludedthem
fromthecodingofmyindependent variable.Thistypeofsensitiveagreement
is extremely
rare,so thischange in theremovalofa smallnumberof
resulted
agreements.I thenestimatedall modelsdisplayedintable4 withthisalternate
codingoftheindependent variable.Thefindings relevantto myargument are
generallyunalteredwhen sensitive
agreements are excludedfrommycoding
ofatomicassistance.127
Conclusion
Aidedby a new data set,thisarticlesystematically exploredtherelationship

betweenciviliannuclearcooperation and nuclearproliferation.It arguedthat
civilianassistanceand weaponsproliferation are linkedbecause the former
leads to thesupplyoftechnology and materials thathave applications fornu-
clearenergyand nuclearweapons,and becausecivilianassistanceestablishes
an indigenousbase ofknowledgein nuclearmatters thatcouldbe usefulfora
weapons program. These linkages reduce the expectedcosts of a nuclear
weaponsprogram, making more
states likely beginsucha campaignwhen
to
theyhave accumulatedpeacefulassistance - especiallywhena crisisor secu-
ritythreatarises.Similarly, countries receivingcivilianaid are morelikelyto
acquire nuclear bombs because important technologicalhurdlesare lowered.
The analysis conducted in this articlelends support thesearguments,
for
evenwhencontrolling fortheothervariablesbelievedto influence prolifera-
tion.Otherfactors are also strongpredictors ofproliferation,butpeacefulnu-
clearcooperation is one ofthemoresalientvariablesin explaining whyatomic
weapons spread. Thus, this articlesuggeststhat students of proliferation
shouldtakegreater stockofciviliannuclearassistance.Thisis particularly true
given that thelinksbetween the and
peaceful military uses ofthe atom appear
broaderthanpreviously believed.Evenseemingly "innocuous"nuclearcoop-
erationsuchas providingtraining to nuclearscientistsor supplyingpower/
researchreactorscan producedeleteriouseffects. Thereis no such thingas
"proliferation-proof"atomicassistance.
Sincetheearlydaysoftheatomicage,policymakers haveattempted topro-
127. In a relatedrobustnesscheckunreported here,I removedthesensitive agreements frommy

independent variableand includeda separatedichotomous variablethatis coded1 beginning in
thefirstyeara statereceivedsensitivenuclearassistance.I thenreestimated all ofthemodelsdis-
playedintable4. Theresultsstillshowthatatomicassistancehas a strongeffect on bothstagesof
nuclearproliferation.Theonlynoteworthy differenceis thatat highlevelsofconflict (morethan
sevenmilitarized disputesperyear),nuclearassistancelosesitsstatistical
significance. Butitis un-
clearthatsensitive aid explainswhythishappens.Thedummyvariablemeasuring onlysensitive
nuclearassistance didnotattainconventionallevelsofstatistical
significanceinanyofthemodels.
International
Security34:1 | 40
motethepeacefuluses ofnuclearenergy. werebased,at least

Theseinitiatives
in part,on thebeliefthatspreadingtechnology would makestatesless likely
towantnuclearweapons.Thisanalysisrevealsthat"atomsforpeace"policies
have,on average,facilitated - notconstrained - nuclearproliferation. Atoms
forpeace becomeatomsforwar.Froma nonproliferation standpoint, is a
this
troubling conclusionthatcarriestremendous policyimplications, especially
giventheloomingrenaissancein nuclearpower.The globalnuclearmarket-
place is moreactivetodaythanithas beenin at leasttwenty years.Countries
in LatinAmerica,SoutheastAsia,theMiddleEast,and Africahaveexpressed
a desireto beginor reviveciviliannuclearprograms. And manyofthemare
receiving assistancein developing such programs from France,Japan,Russia,
theUnitedStates,and othercapablesuppliers.
Thisarticlesuggeststhatproliferation willoccuras thenuclearrenaissance
unfolds.But thereare measurespolicymakers can implement to reducethe
risksthataccompanythespreadofnucleartechnology. Afterall,as former U.S.
senatorand nonproliferation advocateSam Nunn frequently argues,policy-
makersareinthebusinessof"riskreduction," not"riskelimination." Toreiter-
ate a pointmadepreviously, mostinstancesofcivilianassistancedo notresult
in proliferation,
and thereis littlereasonto expectdeterministic linksbetween
thesetwophenomena.Thus,swiftand meaningful actionbytheinternational
community mightbe able to reversepast trends.In particular, countries
shouldprovideadditionalresourcesto theIAEA. Safeguardsagreements im-
plemented bytheIAEA allow itto monitor nuclearfacilities
to ensure that they
areused strictlyforpeacefulpurposes.Buttheagencyis grosslyunderfunded.
IAEA Director-General MohamedElBaradeirecently statedthattheagency's
budget"does notbyanystretch oftheimagination meetourbasic,essentialre-
quirements," and "our abilityto carryout our essentialfunctions is being
chippedaway."128 This is troubling because therisein demand for nuclear en-
ergy will increasethe IAEA's requirements forsafeguardsand inspections.
Countries mustensurethattheagencyhas adequateresources tofulfillitsmis-
sion.Itwouldalso be prudentto considerwaysthattheIAEA'smissioncould
be expandedto further decreasethelikelihoodthatciviliannuclearcoopera-
tionwill aid weaponsacquisition.
Additionally, nuclearsuppliersshouldadopt responsibleexportpractices
and avoid the temptation to sacrificelong-term nonproliferation objectives
in pursuitof short-term economicor politicalgains.Theyshouldbe espe-
ciallycautiouswhen supplyingtechnology or know-howto countriesthat
128. Quotedin Paul Kerr,"ElBaradei:IAEA BudgetProblemsDangerous/'ArmsControl

Today,
Vol.37,No. 6 (July/
August2007),http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_07-08/IAEABudget.
facesignificant security threats.Manyofthecountries currently beginningor

expanding their civilian nuclear programs are in the Middle -
East the
world'smostdangerousregion.Algeria,Jordan,Libya,Saudi Arabia,and
theUnitedArabEmirateshave all receivedpledgesof supportfromat least
one suppliercountry since2006.None ofthesecountries currently intendsto
if
build nuclearweapons. But thatcould change Iran crossesthe nuclear
threshold orifIsraelconductsan atomictestand reversesitspolicyofopacity.
One of the important conclusionsof thisarticleis thatthe combination of
atomic assistance and security threats is a recipe for the spread of nuclear
weapons.Supplierssuchas Franceand theUnitedStates,therefore, shouldre-
thinktheiroffers of atomicassistanceto statesin theMiddleEast and other
dangerousregions.
Thereis stillmoreworkto be done to advancescholarly understanding of
therelationship betweenpeacefulnuclearcooperationand proliferation. Fu-
tureresearch shouldexamineillicitnucleartradeand explorehow itrelatesto
peacefulnuclearassistance. Itwouldbe productive toanalyzeadditionalcases
oflicitand illicitnuclearcommerce to confirm or invalidate thepropositions
advancedin thisarticle.Additionalcase studiesthatexaminewhysomecoun-
triesreceivingpeacefulassistancepursuethe bomb whereasothersdo not
wouldbe particularly welcomebecausetheymightrevealusefulpolicyrecom-
mendations forhowtopromotenuclearenergywhileminimizing proliferation
risks.
Thisstudyalso raisesan interesting puzzle:Whydo suppliersprovidecivil-
ian assistance?If countries generally want tolimitthespreadofnuclearweap-
ons and ifnuclearcooperation agreements lead to proliferation,thenit seems
puzzling thatsupplier stateswould engage in civiliannuclear cooperation.Re-
centresearchsuggeststhatcountriesignoreproliferation risksin pursuitof
strategicor economicbenefits.129 For example,France'srecentNCAs with
Saudi Arabiaand theUnitedArabEmiratesaremotivated in partby a desire
to obtainassuranceson thesupplyofoil. Anotherpossibility is thatcountries
offerassistanceto intentionally spread the bomb and constrain othercoun-
tries.130Additionalwork examiningsuppliers' motivations would be wel-
come,as itcouldshedfurther lighton howand whynuclearweaponsspread.
129. Fuhrmann,"Takinga Walkon theSupplySide/'

130. Kroenig,
"ExportingtheBomb."

Fuhrmann, M. (2009) - Spreading Temptation Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements

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Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements

Author(s): Matthew Fuhrmann

The authorthanksHassan Abbas,Katherine Barbieri, GaryBertsch,

International Vol.34,No. 1 (Summer2009),pp. 7-41

portanceofthesupplyside ofproliferation arguethatcertaintypesofnuclear

HopkinsUniversityPress,1973);EtelSolingen, 'The PoliticalEconomyofNuclearRestraint/'In-

theprobability thatcountries willsuccessfully

8. I endtheanalysisin2000becauseofdatarestrictions. Morethan2,000agreements weresigned

proliferators,"sellingweapons-relevant technology to Iran,NorthKorea,and

consider,however,thattechnology-based argumentsare probabilistic, not

14. Formoreon thispoint,see SonaliSinghand Christopher R. Way,'The CorrelatesofNuclear

Decades ago scholarsoffered a "technological momentum" hypothesis,sug-

21. LawrenceScheinman, Atomic Energy PolicyinTrance undertheFourthRepublic(Princeton,

clearprograms necessitate withthehandlingofradioactive

25. Donald MacKenzieand GrahamSpinardi,'Tacit Knowledge,WeaponsDesign,and the

absenceofa security threat,therelationshipbetweensuchassistanceand pro-

videthepoliticalmotivation tobuildthebomb,coupledwithatomicaid area

In thissectionI brieflydiscusswhy my argumentis salientin explaining

concernsaboutthecostsofsucha program.38 In the1970sRouxthenlobbied

38. VerneHarris,Sello Hatang,and PeterLiberman, "UnveilingSouthAfrica'sNuclearPast/'

tion also plays a majorrole in enablingcountriesto manufacture nuclear

THE ORIGINS OF INDIA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM, 1964

45. Bunn,"CivilianEnergyPrograms and NuclearWeaponsPrograms/'

ingdrawingsregarding thedesignand construction ofnuclearpowerstations

onlyforpeacefulpurposes.Nevertheless, developments in theciviliansector

Pakistan's bombacquisition, 1987

63. CentralIntelligenceAgency,"Pakistan'sNuclearProgram/' NationalIntelligence Estimate,

AfterPakistansuffered a humiliating defeatat the hands of India in the

73. See, for example, Kapur, Pakistan'sNuclear Development;Corera, Shoppingfor Bombs;and

Netherlands and returnedto Pakistanwithstolenblueprints forcentrifuges

I have no place fromwhichto drawtalentedscientists

otherthingsthatwe'd getalongtheway,thenwe couldsetup separateplants

Giventhateveryempiricalapproachhas drawbacks,a multimethod assess-

86. Quotedin GeorgePerkovich, "NuclearPowerand NuclearWeaponsin India,Pakistan, and

Christopher Way to identifythe determinants I

93. Singhand Way,'The Correlates ofNuclearProliferation/'

Figure 1. Total Number of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements Signed, 1950-2000

SOURCES:Matthew Fuhrmann,"Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinantsof Civil-

2000.The figureshowsa generalincreasein thenumberofNCAs overtime,

Table 1. Top Recipients of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements, 1945-2000

Country Total Number of Agreements

NOTE: summary statistics: N = 186; mean = 15.34; minimum= 0; maximum = 396

To operationalize I createda variablemeasuringthefive-

statesareremovedoncetheypursueor acquirenuclearweapons.ThefirstNCA was notsigned

99. Theseare generally thesamevariablesused by Singhand Way,"TheCorrelates ofNuclear

Beforemovingto themultivariate analysis,I consideredcrosstabulations of

106. GaryKingand LangcheZeng,"LogisticRegression in RareEventsData/'Political

Table 2. Nuclear Cooperation, MilitarizedDisputes, and Nuclear Weapons Program Onset,

Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and

Nuclear No 4,066 2,865 6,931 5,080 1,851 6,931

Table 3. Nuclear Cooperation, MilitarizedDisputes, and Nuclear Weapons Acquisition,

Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and

Nuclear No 4,077 3,050 7,127 5,099 2,028 7,127

a weaponsprogramby about 638 percent.This simpleanalysisemphasizes

Similarpatterns emergedbetweennuclearassistanceand weaponsacquisi-

108. One could arguethatthereis a threshold effect

tweenatomicassistanceand bombacquisition.As shownin models5-6, the

110.Thesecalculations arebased on theresultsfrommodel6.

Figure 2. Marginal Effectof Nuclear Assistance on Weapons Program Onset as Number

*NCAs = nuclear cooperation agreements

averagecountrythatexperienceseighteenmilitarized disputesin a yearre-

114.Figure3 is based on theresultsin model7.

Figure 3. Marginal Effectof Nuclear Assistance on Weapons Acquisition as Number of