EN BANC

[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal
profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of
law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he
passes the bar examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation
of law, and grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May
2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the
Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that
respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent
filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of
Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for
and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan
(Bunan).

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as
counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for
vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents services.Complainant
claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty
candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from
signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required
respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before the MBEC.
Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the
law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the
canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney
in the pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on
11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of
Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that
the complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and
that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his
appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May
2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor.
Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the
MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer;
and (2) he was an employee of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative
case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.

OBCs Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections.
The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC
likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May
2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of
the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to
the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he
appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his
resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as
counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May
2001, respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent
stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T.
BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel
to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel. On the same
date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-
PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14
May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for
the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before
the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law
without being a member of the Philippine Bar.

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters
of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind
of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and
filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out
as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member
of the Philippine Bar.[3]

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes
possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of
the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The
practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person
seeking admission had practiced law without a license.[5]

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar
examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for
practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person
who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.[7]

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the
Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. [8] Respondent should know that
two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered
by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.[9]

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a
private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as
constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor
and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon your
acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the evidence
does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized
respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[1]
105 Phil. 173 (1959).

[2]
G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991, 201 SCRA 210.

[3]
Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 211 Phil. 252 (1983).

[4]
In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name Ozaeta, Romulo, etc., 30 July 1979, 92
SCRA 1.

[5]
Ui v. Bonifacio, Administrative Case No. 3319, 8 June 2000, 333 SCRA 38.

[6]
Bar Matter No. 139, 28 March 1983, 121 SCRA 217.

[7]
People v. Santocildes, Jr., G.R. No. 109149, 21 December 1999, 321 SCRA 310.

[8]
Diao v. Martinez, Administrative Case No. 244, 29 March 1963, 7 SCRA 475.

[9]
Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, B.M. No. 139, 28 March 1983, 121 SCRA 217.

[10]
Respondents Comment, Annex A.

[11]
Ibid., Annex B.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,

vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co.,
Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of
the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of
the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection
therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa
& Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:

. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement
entered into between me and your company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of
your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said
contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made
said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests. He then proceeded to expound in
considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith. deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and closed with the
plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically
state on record that I am terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said
onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence
the need to annul the controversial contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.
The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand
corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage - PD 26," had been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit &
Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in
connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other
things, he said:

. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the "manipulated
contract" entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales
agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully
secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to
be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud,
deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me and the
swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me.

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalous actuations of
Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3,
1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and
discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms.
Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of
this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous
manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on
Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996." and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. " for the buy-back of . . .
(Alauya's) mortgage. and . . the refund of . . (his) payments." c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified
complaint dated January 25, 1996 — to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned
envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage - PD 26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad
faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of
evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all
concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her
dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be
dismissed from the senice, or be appropriately desciplined (sic) . . ."

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably with established usage that notices of
resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was
signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.2

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" 3 in which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an
explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an
Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the
suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also
averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of
Court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ."4

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious tones,5 Alauya
requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon. 6 He stated that his
acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales
agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing
monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had
suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering
that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 7 He declared that there was no basis for
the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any
abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he
entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage - PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope
by some other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and
sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); 8 and as far as he knew, his
subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed
mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.9

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-
law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because
"counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. 11 He was induced
to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for
correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the
property — subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. — is situated; 12 He says Alawi
somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so
until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his
signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of
the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw. 13

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations." and complainant Alawi having come to
the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996
and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty.
Ashary M. Alauya" — in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as
"DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. 14

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges (against
Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith, resulting in "undue injury to (her) and
blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to . . (his) rights and
interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and
pursued the housing loan without . . (his) authority and against . . (his) will," and "concealed the real facts . . ."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of his rights, and
doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering, considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been
deducted from his salary. 15
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the
State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. 16 Section 4 of the
Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees . . at all times respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from
doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest." 17 More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee
of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among
others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary." 18

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for the
rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed — however sincerely — to be deceitful, fraudulent or
malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right
of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or
vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good
faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright
name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more
stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive,
offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord
respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by
prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but
cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who
pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a
courts. 21 While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar,
may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only
the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the
study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in
this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in his region, there are
pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid
or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of
attorney.

22
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record contains no evidence
adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and
he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

a Annexes B, B, B-1, B-3 of Alauya's Comment dated June 5, 1996.

b Annexes F and G, id.

c Annex C-2, id.

1 Annexes A and A-1 of complaint; Rollo at p. 14; copies of the letter were also furnished the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation, The Finance Management and Budget Office and-the Financial Division of the
Supreme Court.

2 Resolution dated March 25, 1996.

3 Dated April 19, 1996.

4 Rollo at p. 23.

5 Evidently, he had since become aware of the immemorial practice that NOTICES (or communications informing) of
Resolutions adopted by the Court En Banc or any of its three (3) Divisions are sent to the parties by and over the
signature of the corresponding Clerk or Court or his Assistant, the Court's Resolutions being incorporated verbatim in
said notices.

6 Dated April 22, 1996.

7 Rollo at p. 28.

8 Id at p. 60.

9 id. at p. 32.

10 Id. at p. 34.

11 Id. at p. 35, et seq.

12 Id. at p. 35.

13 Id.

14 See Resolution of the Court en banc dated August 21, 1996; Rollo at p. 61 et seq.

15 SEE footnote No. 7, supra.

16 Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275.

17 R.A. No. 6713. Section 11 of the same law punishes any violation of the Act with (1) a fine not exceeding the
equivalent of six (6) months' salary, or (2) suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or (3) removal, depending on the
gravity of the offense, after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency, and even if no criminal
prosecution is instituted against him.

18 Apaga v. Ponce, 245 SCRA 233, 240, citing Callejo, Jr. v. Garcia, etc., 206 SCRA 491; Angeles v. Bantug, et al.,
209 SCRA 413; Icasiano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 2109 SCRA 377; Medilo, et al. v. Asodisen, etc., 233 SCRA
68: SEE also Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275.

19 Art. 19, Civil Code.

20 Rules 8.01 and 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which should apply by analogy to Members of
the Shari'a Bar. The Code also proscribes behavior in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession
(Rule 7.03).

21 Resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 5, 1993 in Bar Matter No. 681, entitled "Petition to allow Shari'a
lawyers to exercise their profession at the regular courts;." SEE Rule 138 (secs. 1, 4), Rules of Court.