Possible conceptions/ cognitions of crisis

Crisis as drivers of integration

Crisis as a phase in continuous/ Why regional Possible outcomes

endless equilibrium initiatives were
accepted or rejected? How does norms of
cooperation feature here?
Relevant Theories
Crisis as causes/ Opportunity for Neofunctionalism Vertical
windows of sponsors to
opportunity initiate regional Intergovernmentalism
Spillover effects initiatives,
into other policy other member Normative Theory
domains states accept
(Estonia Critical Political
accession to Economy
the EU)
Historical
Sponsors institutionalism Horizontal (Estonia
initiate regional accession to
initiatives, Diffusion the EU)
other members
feel threatened
and reject (AFC Useful concepts: Sectoral
1997) Norms

Legitimacy

Regional identity

Networks
No Impact
Governance

Lessons (Affirmation/ Criticism)

Crisis as the peak Initiate Vertical AFC  CMI

intensity of a regional EFSF
problem, signs of initiatives,
brewing accepted or
(undetected/ not rejected but
given sufficient crisis
attention) unresolved, Horizontal
Issue specific search for
- AFC, GFC response
- Brexit continues.
- NTS Initiate
regional
initiatives,
 accepted, crisis Sectoral National
solved policy
coordination?

No Impact

ASEAN and the Asian Crisis – Jürgen Rüland (2000)

ASEAN policies are characterised by a policy mix of a strong dose of realism, as exacerbated by the
crisis, compared to institutionalism. The Asian crisis also threw the ASEAN identity into question
despite giving rise an East Asian identity.

Ruland argues that institutionalism places too much emphasis on the gains of economic cooperation
which will eventually lead to economic integration in ASEAN, since ASEAN cooperation has been
dominated by negative integration rather than positive integration.

When the crisis spread from Thailand to the regional economies, ad hoc responses to combat the
crisis were not easily implemented as they were ill-studied. Much of the proposals were emulations
of the other regional and international organisations, such as an Asian Monetary Fund from the IMF,
ASEAN-wide common market, ASEAN currency and financial surveillance mechanism of the Manila
Framework of the EU. Other than the lack of regional responses, the turn towards unilateralism and
protectionism to combat the crisis and the rise of bilateral disputes shattered the image of ASEAN
unity.

While the formation of the EAEC, later ASEAN+3 cooperation displayed the rise of an East Asian
identity, it ultimately an issue-based alliance that had limited stock of shared values amongst the
East Asian countries.

Effects of crisis on regional politics and regional integration

Asian Financial Crisis and ASEAN

The AFC coincided with the Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN, as ASEAN was searching for a new
regional balance-of-power in the post-Cold War order. While ASEAN sought institutional deepening
and enlargement to complement existing institutional mechanisms against the rise of China, it was
also a way to manage the threat of natural resource competition and gain early market access to the
Indochina market.

The AFC had implications for ASEAN’s developmental regionalism. The AFC exacerbated the
economic disparity between the ASEAN-6 and the CLMV countries. ASEAN’s market-driven approach Commented [PT1]: Webber Indochinese enlargement,
to the CLMV countries had to take a back seat since no member could be in the driving seat because Ruland
of the AFC. Furthermore, external sources of development aid remained uncertain despite the
Miyazawa Plan in lieu of Japan’s recession. The implications of the crisis is the increased urgency for
greater economic convergence and national resilience in order to contribute to ASEAN’s
development or bolster regional resilience. Hence, the AFC heightened the urgency for ASEAN to
pursue sub-regional and extra-regional developmental initiatives in the AFC aftermath. Commented [PT2]: Search for case studies. Oxford
Handbook
The AFC also challenged ASEAN’s cooperation norms. Prior to the AFC, ASEAN’s non-intervention
norm has been challenged in the case of the Burma’s conditional accession. New proposals surfaced,
such as flexible or constructive engagement and constructive intervention, allowing member states
to openly discuss other members’ domestic affairs. It was intended to localise conflicts and Commented [PT3]: Ruland p441, Yuen and Nesadurai
externalities that could potentially spillover into neighbouring territories. The Asian crisis exposed
the ideational divide between the younger and older elites, where younger leaders became
uncomfortable with the ASEAN Way, which sidestepped sensitive yet crucial issues and hindered
decision-making. ASEAN’s political diversity exacerbated the repercussions of the AFC, since Commented [PT4]: Ruland p442
institutionalist reforms are limited. Neofunctionalist theories laid the preconditions of democracy,
pluralism and peace needed for the deepening of regional integration. Neofunctionalist theories
henceforth present democratic regimes as willing sponsors of the integration project. However, the
weakness of Neofunctionalist hypothesis is that it requires ASEAN states to possess the capability to
sponsor regional initiatives, which none seem to possess, at least, in the present moment. Commented [PT5]: Mattli 1998

Conflict over cooperation principles and norms, as well as inherent weaknesses, create a power
vacuum in which other regional powers can choose to fill up. It remains that Sino-Japanese rivalry,
and other major powers will shape the trajectory of the integration project. Commented [PT6]: Webber Sino-Japanese chapter,
Henning
Thus, the AFC exposed the inadequacy of the states’ regulatory powers in combating global market
forces and cross-border non-traditional security issues. (What’s the definition of regulatory
regionalism?) Commented [PT7]: Webber Higgot chapter