1. PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan (5th Division), Lucio C. Tan, et. al.

FACTS:

Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza was the Solicitor General until 1986. He resumed his private practice of
law. He appeared as counsel for Lucio C. Tan, et. al. before the Sandiganbayan involving civil cases
of sequestration of properties allegedly ill-gotten wealth.

When still the Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank on how to proceed with the liquidation
of GENBANK which became saddled with banking problems. GENBANK was later bought by the
ALLIED Bank owned by Lucio C. Tan, et. al. Atty. Mendoza continues defending both the interests of
the Central Bank and Lucio Tan, et. al.

PCGG filed a Motion to Disqualify Atty. Mendoza anchored on Rule 6.03 reading ---

“A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mendoza is disqualified to appear as counsel for Lucio Tan, et. al. under
Rule 6.03.

HELD: Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of
paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase
“investigated and passed upon” with the word “intervened.” It is, therefore, properly applicable to
both “adverse-interest conflicts” and “congruent-interest conflicts.”

The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent
Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp.
Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et. al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil
Case No. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether
there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
representing respondents Tan, et. al.

xxx

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

xxx

Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the
client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting disqualification
motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably in individual lawyer in
whom the client has confidence. The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without
the benefit of the work done by the latter. The effects of the prejudice to the right to choose an
effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due process.

xxx

No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the
freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former
government lawyer may extend to all members of his law firm. Former government lawyers stand
in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.

It is however, preferred that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence
in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly
speculative exercise at best which can lead to untoward results. No less than Judge Kaufman doubts
that the lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have any detrimental
effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and its attorneys which the
canons seek to protect. Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in the
1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and some courts have abandoned per se
disqualification based on Canon 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and demand an
evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and the public.

Atty. Mendoza was not disqualified by the Supreme Court.

2. WILFREDO M. CATU vs. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor who were
occupying one of the units in a building in Malate which was owned by the former. The said
complaint was filed in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of
Manila where Respondent was the punong barangay. The parties, having been summoned for
conciliation proceedings and failing to arrive at an amicable settlement, were issued by the
respondent a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.

Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila where respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants.
Because of this, petitioner filed the instant administrative complaint against the respondent on the
ground that he committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as
counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings
between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he performed his task without bias
and that he acceded to Elizabeth’s request to handle the case for free as she was financially
distressed.

The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where after
evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. According to them, respondent
violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, as an elective official, the
prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA6713. Consequently, for the violation of the latter
prohibition, respondent committed a breach of Canon 1. Respondent was then recommended for
suspension from the practice of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: Yes. A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be
fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the
written permission of the head of the department concerned in accordance with Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules.

Notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have procured a prior permission or
authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations. For this
failure, responded violated his oath as a lawyer, that is, to obey the laws, Rule 1.01, CPR and, for not
complying with the ethical standards of the legal profession, Canon 7, CPR.

Respondent was found GUILTY of professional misconduct, SUSPENDED from the practice of law
and was strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.