SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
LLB 3 2017-2018
1. General Provisions/Preliminary Matters
RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioners,
vs. HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG,
MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS, substituted by her son, EDUARDO
S. BALAJADIA, Respondents.
Facts:
Sometime between November 25, 2002 and December 3, 2002, the
respondents filed a Complaint against the petitioners and Stronghold
Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu
Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and
Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon) and
his successors-in-interest.
The Complaint, captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of
Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of
Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the]
Issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary
Injunction,". In the complaint, the respondents alleged six(6) causes of action:
that (1) they are the heirs of Antonio Ching and that Ramon misrepresented
himself as Antonios son when he was, in fact, adopted and his birth certificate
merely simulated; (2) Antonio was killed with Ramon as the prime suspect and
prior to the conclusion of the investigations, Ramon made an inventory of the
formers estate and illegally transferred to his name the titles to Antonios
properties; (3) Ramon sweet-talked respondent Mercedes into surrendering to
him a Certificate of Time Deposit of P4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio and
the TCTs of two condo units registered under Ramon’s name; (4) Ramon illegally
transferred to his own name through a forged document 40,000 shares in Po
Wing Corporation; (5) Ramon executed an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement
of Estate adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's entire estate to the prejudice of
the respondents; and (6) Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in Navotas to
co-defendant Asia Atlantic Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which
was part of Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena Tiu Del
Pilar at an unreasonably low price.
Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez
The respondents thus prayed for the (1) issuance of a TRO to restrain Ramon or
his representatives from disposing or selling any property that belongs to the
estate of Antonio; (2) that Ramon be declared as disqualified from inheriting from
Antonio Ching; and (3) declaring null the unauthorized transfers made by Ramon.
The petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the respondents' Amended Complaint on
the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the Complaint. The petitioners argued that since the Amended Complaint sought
the release of the CPPA to the respondents, the latter's declaration as heirs of
Antonio, and the propriety of Ramon's disinheritance, the suit partakes of the
nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for declaration
of nullity. Hence, jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and not to
the RTC acting as an ordinary court.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC should have granted the Motion to Dismiss as the
issues could only be resolved in a special proceeding and not in an ordinary civil
action
Held: NO.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person
such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of
a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific
rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. A special proceeding is a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. It is distinguished from an ordinary civil action where a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong. To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a
complaint should be filed.
Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through
a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees with
the RTC and the CA that while the respondents in their Complaint and Amended
Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument
supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever
mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No.
02-105251 does not partake of the nature of a special proceeding and does not
call for the probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
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The petitioners also argue that the prayers in the Amended Complaint,
seeking the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA under Metrobank's
custody and the nullification of the instruments subject of the complaint,
necessarily require the determination of the respondents' status as Antonio's
heirs.
It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was that they be
declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA which was in Mercedes' possession
prior to the execution of the Agreement and Waiver. The respondents also prayed
for the alternative relief of securing the issuance by the RTC of a hold order
relative to the CPPA to preserve Antonio's deposits with Metrobank during the
pendency of the case. It can thus be said that the respondents' prayer relative to
the CPPA was premised on Mercedes' prior possession of and their alleged
collective ownership of the same, and not on the declaration of their status as
Antonio's heirs. Further, it also has to be emphasized that the respondents were
parties to the execution of the Agreement and Waiver prayed to be nullified.
Hence, even without the necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the
respondents have the standing to seek for the nullification of the instruments in
the light of their claims that there was no consideration for their execution, and
that Ramon exercised undue influence and committed fraud against them.
Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the Affidavit of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Antonios estate executed by Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the
authority of the said affidavit, are null and void as well. Ramon's averment that a
resolution of the issues raised shall first require a declaration of the respondents'
status as heirs is a mere defense which is not determinative of which court shall
properly exercise jurisdiction.
In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the
documents subject of Civil Case No. 02-105251 could be achieved in an ordinary
civil action, which in this specific case was instituted to protect the respondents
from the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon.
The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not
be strategically sound, because a settlement proceeding should thereafter still
follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have
been illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in the exercise
of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of
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Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez
respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the
prayers indicated therein are matters which need not be threshed out in a special
proceeding.
2. Rule 72- Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR., LILLIBETH
MONTAÑER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAÑER-DALUPAN
vs. SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
MARAWI CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S.
MONTAÑER
Facts:
Private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S.
Montañer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of
properties before the Shari’a District Court n the said complaint, private
respondents made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro
Montañer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3)
petitioners are the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the
widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montañer is the daughter of the
decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and a list of the properties comprising
the estate of the decedent. Private respondents prayed for the Shari’a District
Court to order, among others, the following: (1) the partition of the estate of the
decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the
decedent.
The Shari’a District Court dismissed the private respondents’ complaint. The
district court held that Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its
jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of
deceased Muslims.
Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In its first assailed order
dated August 22, 2006, the Shari’a District Court reconsidered its order of
dismissal dated November 22, 2005. The district court allowed private
respondents to adduce further evidence. In its second assailed order dated
September 21, 2006, the Shari’a District Court ordered the continuation of
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trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial
conference.
Hence, this Petition
Issue: WON the Complaint filed by the respondents before the Shari’a District
Court is an ordinary civil action
Held: NO. The complaint filed by the respondents in the Shari’a District Court for
the settlement of the estate is a special proceeding.
The underlying assumption in petitioners’ second argument, that the proceeding
before the Shari’a District Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased
person, rests on an erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the court a
quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the Shari’a
District Court, where the parties were designated either as plaintiffs or
defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil action. We reiterate
that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which
is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a
special proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact." This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules
on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
Muslim.31 In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement,
and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the
decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s heirs, which
would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and
liquidation of the estate of the decedent. Here, the respondents seek to establish
the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and, subsequently, for private
respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among his heirs, if
such is the case in fact.
Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from
being a party defendant in a civil action applies to a special proceeding such as
the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action
which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse
party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
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Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez
the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which "a party sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong" necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or
defendant. On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to
establish a status, right, or a particular fact," has one definite party, who
petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no
definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the
decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the
purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the
assets of the estate, pay its liabilities, and to distribute the residual to those
entitled to the same.
ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, Petitioner, vs. ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER,
VICTORIA S. MEDINA-Administratrix, Respondent.
Facts:
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and
thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims
against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a
contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to
approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land
belonging to the estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for
expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating
the sale of said realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the
dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the
requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against
non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why
the money claim was not filed and served personally.
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate
proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a written
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explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon filing of
the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides
that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only
in a suppletory manner.
Issue: WON rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special
proceedings is not entirely correct.
Held:
Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern
special proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided
for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to
special proceedings, as far as practicable.
The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of
being put into practice, done or accomplished.4 This means that in the absence of
special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings
as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said
proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in
ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings.
Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum
shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for
non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims
against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they
are applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person as in the present case.
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS
HOLDING CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
LLB 3 2017-2018
Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez
APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS
BENEDICTO, Respondents.
Facts:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May
2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto
(administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-
Paulino. At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against
Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then
pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with
petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case
No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with
petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as
one of the plaintiffs therein.
Thereafter, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor,
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Manila RTC
issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of
her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor. In
January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of
Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased
husband. In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent
included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then
being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.
Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex
Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes
and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed
the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in
the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on
the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the
Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the
required inventory of the decedent’s estate. Petitioners also filed other pleadings
or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent
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in her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been
submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.
The Manila RTC denied the manifestation/motion, on the ground that
petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of
Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The CA likewise dismissed the
petition.
Issue 1: WON the creditors whose credit is based on contingent claim have the
right to participate in the settlement proceedings by way of intervention under
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
Issue 2: WON the creditors petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate
estate of the deceased person, are entitled to copies of all processes and orders
pertaining to the intestate proceedings
Held:
Issue 1: Notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under
Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a
contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not
accommodate contingent claims.
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an
intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody
of the court x x x" While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally
preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has
consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be actual
and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."
Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed
under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86. 20 These actions, being as
they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against
the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87.
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Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez
Issue 2: In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not
provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate
in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for
specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those proceedings,
we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the
petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the
intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief
sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other
modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected.
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate
proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of
court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the
creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in
accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to
access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court order
or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less
cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the
decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors
in the estate are preserved.1awphi1
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require
notice to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will
be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to
interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time
and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or
administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the
executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or
otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing
for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all,
even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the
existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
Heirs of TEOFILO GABATAN, namely: LOLITA GABATAN, POMPEYO
GABATAN, PEREGRINO GABATAN, REYNALDO GABATAN, NILA GABATAN
AND JESUS JABINIS, RIORITA GABATAN TUMALA and FREIRA
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GABATAN, Petitioners,
vs. Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES EVERO PACANA, Respondents.
Facts:
Case Filed: Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession commenced by
respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana against petitioners, heirs of Teofilo Gabatan,
Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado.
Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land, identified
as Lot 3095 C-5 and situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. This
lot was declared for taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint
before the RTC, respondent alleged that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5,
having inherited the same from her deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero
(Hermogena). Respondent further claimed that her mother, Hermogena, is the
only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito.
Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was
entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilo’s wife, Rita
Gabatan, for administration. It was also claimed that prior to her death
Hermogena demanded for the return of the land but to no avail. After
Hermogena’s death, respondent also did the same but petitioners refused to heed
the numerous demands to surrender the subject property. According to
respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died, petitioners Jesus Jabinis and Catalino
Acantilado took possession of the disputed land despite respondent’s demands for
them to vacate the same.
In their answer, petitioners denied that respondent’s mother Hermogena was the
daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or
respondent is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan
Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived by
one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners’ predecessor-in-
interest), Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the
subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public,
adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of
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Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez
owners for more than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements
thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including respondent. Petitioners
clarified that Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado have no interest in the subject
land; the former is merely the husband of Teofilo’s daughter while the latter is
just a caretaker. Petitioners added that a similar case was previously filed by
respondent against Teofilo’s wife, Rita Vda. de Gabatan, on February 21, 1978,
docketed as Civil Case No. 5840 but the case was dismissed on May 3, 1983 for
lack of interest. Finally, petitioners contended that the complaint lacks or states
no cause of action or, if there was any, the same has long prescribed and/or has
been barred by laches.
Issue: WON the determination of the legal heirs of the deceased person be made
in special proceedings
Held: YES.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of
the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in
an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must
take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership.
The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration
can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress
of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the
petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y.
BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y.
PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
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Facts:
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins filed a
complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages
(subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a.
"Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso).
In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate
and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J
which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-
77-A. Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned
certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT
Nos. T-2637 and T-2638, to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno's
collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as
evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic
School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.[9] Further, by way of
affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action
against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is
not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the
petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno's lawful heirs.
The RTC ruled for Gaudioso. It held that while the petitioners had established
their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the
issuance of a letter of administration, this did not mean that they could already
be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs.
Issue: WON heirship may be determined in an ordinary suit
Ruling: NO.
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration
of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an
independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of
Appeals x x x:
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Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court
reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and
heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special
proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such
rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an
illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be
adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery
of property.] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality,
as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the
trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship,
and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereonor when a special
proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and
hence, cannot be re-opened.[24]
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear
to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in
order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the
dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the
same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material
to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. [25] Thus, concordant with
applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an
ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil
Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that
the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso's heirship which should, as herein discussed,
be threshed out and determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the
foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
__________________________________________________________
JOSE S. MATUTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division)
and MATIAS S. MATUTE, respondents.
Facts:
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August 20, 1965 when Carlos S. Matute, one of the Matute heirs and a full-blood
brother of both the petitioner and the herein respondent Matias S. Matute, filed in
special proceeding 25876 (settlement of the Matute estate) a petition praying
for the removal of Matias as co-administrator and his (Carlos')
appointment in such capacity. Carlos alleged that "for a period of more than
two years from the date of his appointment (on May 29, 1963), said Matias S.
Matute has neglected to render a true, just and complete account of his
administration," and that he "is not only incompetent but also negligent in his
management of the estate under his charge consisting of five haciendas on
account of a criminal charge for murder filed against him which is occupying most
of his time."
The Court removed co-administrator, Matias S. Matute, as such co-administrator
of the estate and orders him to submit a final accounting of his administration
together with his past administration accounts which have not been approved.
Issue: WON the removal of Matias S. Matute was proper
Ruling: NO.
The settled rule is that the removal of an administrator under section 2 of Rule
82 lies within the discretion of the court appointing him. As aptly expressed in
one case, 3 "The sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus be determined
by the said court, whose sensibilities are, in the first place, affected by any act or
omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of
the rules or the orders of the court." Consequently, appellate tribunals are
disinclined to interfere with the action taken by a probate court in the matter of
the removal of an executor or administrator unless positive error or gross abuse
of discretion is shown. 4
In the case at bar, we are constrained, however to nullify the disputed order of
removal because it is indubitable that the probate judge ousted the respondent
from his trust without affording him the full benefit of a day in court, thus
denying him his cardinal right to due process.
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It appears that shortly after the reception of evidence for the movants Carlos
Matute and the Candelario-Matute heirs, the respondent filed on January 8,
1966a verified objection to the admission in evidence of the movants' exhibits on
the ground that the same were hearsay, self-serving, irrelevant and/or mere
photostatic copies of supposed originals which were never properly identified nor
produced in court. Four days later, or on January 12, 1966, the respondent
filed with leave of court a "Motion to Dismiss and/or Demurrer to Evidence".
Instead of resolving the foregoing motion, the probate judge issued the
controverted order removing the respondent as co-administrator without giving
him the opportunity to adduce his own evidence despite his explicit reservation
that he be afforded the chance to introduce evidence in his behalf in the event of
denial of his motion to dismiss and/or demurrer to evidence. We are of the view
that the above actuation of the probate judge constituted grave abuse of
discretion which dooms his improvident order as a nullity. In fact, even without
the respondent's reservation, it was the bounden duty of the probate judge to
schedule the presentation and reception of the respondent's evidence before
disposing of the case on the merits because only the movants at that time had
presented their evidence. This duty is projected into bolder relief if we consider,
which we must, that the aforesaid motion is in form as well as in substance
a demurrer to evidence allowed by Rule 35, by virtue of which the defendant
does not lose his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is denied.
Said Rule states:
After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the
defendant without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is
not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. (emphasis supplied)
The application of the abovecited Rule in special proceedings, like the
case at bar, is authorized by section 2 of Rule 72 which direct that in the
"absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary civil
actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings."
8

PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, PAULA S.
PAUG, and its officers and members, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and VITALIANO N. NAÑAGAS II, as Liquidator of
Pacific Banking Corporation, respondents._
Facts:
On July 5, 1985, the Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under
receivership by the Central Bank of the Philippines pursuant to Resolution No.
699 of its Monetary Board. A few months later, it was placed under
liquidation1 and a Liquidator was appointed.
On April 7, 1986, the Central Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila
Branch 31, a petition entitled "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific
Banking Corporation." 3 The petition was approved, after which creditors filed
their claims with the court.
On March 13, 1989 the Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization
(Union for short), petitioner in G.R. No. 109373, filed a complaint-in-
intervention seeking payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay differential,
salary increase differential, Christmas bonus, and cash equivalent of Sick Leave
Benefit due its members as employees of PaBC.
The Liquidator received a copy of the order on September 16, 1991. On October
16, 1991, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the order. In
his order of December 6, 1991, the judge modified his September 13, 1991 6 but
in effect denied the Liquidator's motion for reconsideration. This order was
received by the Liquidator on December 9, 1991. The following day,
December 10, 1991, he filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Additional
Time to Submit Record on Appeal. On December 23, 1991, another Notice of
Appeal was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of Nañagas.
In his order of February 10, 1992, respondent judge disallowed the
Liquidator's Notice of Appeal on the ground that it was late, i.e., more
than 15 days after receipt of the decision. The judge declared his September
13, 1991 order and subsequent orders to be final and executory and denied
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reconsideration. On March 27, 1992, he granted the Union's Motion for issuance
of a writ of Execution.
In his order dated September 11, 1992, respondent judge of the RTC directed the
Liquidator to pay private respondents the total amount of their claim as preferred
creditors.
The Liquidator received the order on September 16, 1992. On September 30,
1992 he moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the court on
October 2, 1992. He received the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration on
October 5, 1992. On October 14, 1992 he filed a Notice of Appeal from the orders
of September 16, 1992 and October 2, 1992. As in the case of the Union,
however, the judge ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off the record on the
ground that it had been filed without authority of the Central Bank and beyond
15 days. In his order of October 28, 1992, the judge directed the execution of his
September 11, 1992 order granting the Stockholders/ Investors' claim.
The Liquidator filed separate Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in
the Court of Appeals to set aside the orders of the trial court denying his appeal
from the orders granting the claims of Union and of the Stockholders/Investors.
The two Divisions of the Court of Appeals, to which the cases were
separately raffled, rendered conflicting rulings.
In its decision of November 17, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27751 (now G.R. No.
09373) the Fifth Division held in the case of the Union that the proceeding
before the trial court was a special proceeding and, therefore, the period
for appealing from any decision or final order rendered therein is 30
days. Since the notice of appeal of the Liquidator was filed on the 30th day of his
receipt of the decision granting the Union's claims, the appeal was brought on
time. The Fifth Division, therefore, set aside the orders of the lower court and
directed the latter to give due course to the appeal of the Liquidator and set the
Record on Appeal he had filed for hearing.
On the other hand, on December 16, 1993, the Fourteenth Division ruled in CA-
G.R. SP No. 29351 (now G.R. No. 112991) in the case of the
Stockholders/Investors that a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary
action. Therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final
9

order rendered therein is 15 days and that since the Liquidator's appeal
notice was filed on the 23rd day of his receipt of the order appealed from,
deducting the period during which his motion for reconsideration was pending,
the notice of appeal was filed late. Accordingly, the Fourteenth Division dismissed
the Liquidator's petition.
Issue: WON liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action or a special proceeding
Ruling: Special Proceeding
§1. Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by
which the party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
§2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other remedy, including one to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact, shall be by special
proceeding.
Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special
proceeding, Chief Justice Moran states:" 11
Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong
while special proceeding is the act by which one seeks to establish the status or
right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished from special
proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right by one against
another, while the latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status, right or
fact. Where a party litigant seeks to recover property from another, his remedy is
to file an action. Where his purpose is to seek the appointment of a guardian for
an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish the fact or status of
insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship.
Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent
corporation should be classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary
action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor
the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for
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affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or omission nor
state a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.
3. Rule 73- Subject Estate of Deceased Persons
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
QUIAZON vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES
ELISE QUIAZON
FACTS:
Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma.
Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before
the RTC of Las Piñas City. Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo
having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both
capacitated to marry each other.
Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia Quizaon by claiming
that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the
latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico. To prove her filiation to the
decedent, Elise attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her
Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. It was alleged that Eliseo
left real properties worth P2,040,000 and personal properties worth P2,100,000.
In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its
value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, with her
children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of
administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners asserted
that as
shown by his Death Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of
Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should
have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their
claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and
legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
10
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The RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in
the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual
properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. consistency.

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the CA and held
that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband
and wife by establishing a common residence in Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to
the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of Eliseo’s estate, CA upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that
the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Eliseo Quiazon was a resident of Las PiÑas and therefore, the
petition for Letter's of Administration was properly filed with the RTC of Las
PiÑas.
RULING: YES We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing"
and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue
statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between
the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special
It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue
for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
G.R. No. 95536 March 23, 1992
ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., MARIA SALVACION SALUDO, LEOPOLDO G.
SALUDO and SATURNINO G. SALUDO, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
(no relevance to Rule 73)
GR No. L-33929 September 02, 1983
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK v. GREGORIO T. LANTIN
(no relevance to Rule 73)
G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982
RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S. ASENETA
(no relevance to Rule 73)
FACTS:
Clemencia, left a holographic will which provides that all her properties shall be
inherited by Dra. Maninang with whose family Clemencia has lived continuously
for the last 30 years. The will also provided that she does not consider Bernardo
11

as his adopted son. Bernardo, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of
decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings.
ISSUE:
Was Bernardo preterited?
HELD:
In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the
terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or
disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition
and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.
By virtue of the dismissal of the testate case, the determination of that
controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. The conclusion of the
trial court was that Bernardo has been preterited. The SC is of opinion, however,
that from the face of the will, that conclusion is not indubitable. Such preterition
is still questionable. The Special Proceeding is REMANDED to the lower court.
G.R. No. L-3039 December 29, 1949
VICTORIA REYNOSO and JUAN REYNOSO
vs.
VICENTE SANTIAGO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, PIA
REYNOSO, AGUSTINA REYNOSO, MELITON PALABRICA, LEONCIO CADIZ,
ET AL.
no relevance to Rule 73 (applies Rules 79, 87)
G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012
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ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L.
MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A. PACHECO, VIRGILIO
REGALA, JR., and RAFAEL TITCO vs. LORENZO LAXA
no relevance to Rule 73, (applies Rules 75, 76)
FACTS: Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster when she made her last will and
testament in the Pampango dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in the
house of retired Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia
expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her
last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the
said document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4
thereof.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her
properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their
children Luna and Katherine. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as
her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his own
mother.
More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or on Apr. 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed
a petition with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of
Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor.
On Jun 23, 2000 one of petitioners, Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition to
Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will
belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia
had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo. Also, one of the petitioners, Rosie
Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the state of being “mangulyan” or forgetful
making her unfit for executing a will and that the execution of the will had been
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence.
Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the Letters of Administration in Lorenzo’s
favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a
citizen and resident of the USA. Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration
be instead issued in favor of Antonio.
12

RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when Paciencia
signed the will, she was no longer possessed of the sufficient reason or strength
of mind to have the testamentary capacity. On appeal, CA reversed the decision
of the RTC and granted the probate of the will. The petitioner went up to SC for a
petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently
established to warrant its allowance for probate.
RULING: Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful
compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix,
Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and
evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical
requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses attested and
subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact,
even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be
authentic although they question of her state of mind when she signed the same
as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the
execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree with
the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make
a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will.
Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Art. 799 of the
NCC states: “To be of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in
full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient
if the testator was able at the time of making the Will to know the nature of the
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of
the testamentary act.”
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO
vs.HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO
D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR
D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D.
SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO
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-no relevance to Rule 73 (applies Rule 76)
FACTS:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio. Petitioners Dy
Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They
contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her
faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor
of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision
over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and
qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a
certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated
September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo
Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred
that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate
proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings
for the probate of the will. On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the
holographic will of Segundo, was filed by petitioners before the RTC.
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo’s holographic will is
entitled as: “Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana”
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is preterition in the case at bar
RULING:
The Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not
preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last expression to
bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of
Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other
compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners,
Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir.
Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo
and his son, Alfredo. Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s
holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of
the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no
will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
13

accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of
a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding
Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and
AGUSTINA B. GARCIA
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE
vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA
FACTS:
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of
administration, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a
property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving
real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places,
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even
date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and
supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of
jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G.
Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special administratrix.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition was filed in the proper court with jurisdiction
considering the residence of the decedent.
RULING: NO.
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We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at
11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba,
Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent
at the time of his death.
We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi
termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile."
This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time
of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.
G.R. No. 128314 May 29, 2002
RODOLFO V. JAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO
FACTS:
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and
Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively.The decedents
left real estate, cash, shares of stock and other personal properties.
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over
14

the estate of his parents. Rodolfo moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of
improper venue. He argued that their parents did not reside in Quezon City either
during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. Their actual residence was in
Angeles City, Pampanga, and moved to Rodolfo’s residence at 61 Scout Gandia
Street, Quezon City, solely for medical treatment and hospitalization purposes.
Perico countered that their parents actually resided in Rodolfo’s house in Quezon
City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared
in their death certificates that their last residence before they died was at 61
Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City. Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry
appearing on the death certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his own
signature on the said document. The RTC denied Rodolfo’s motion to dismiss. The
CA affirmed the RTC’s order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper venue for the settlement proceedings should be held
in Quezon City.
RULING: YES.
In determining residence at the time of death, the following factors must be
considered, namely, the decedent had:
(a) capacity to choose and freedom of choice;
(b) physical presence at the place chosen; and
(c) intention to stay therein permanently.
There is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to petitioner’s
Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondent’s
assertion that their elderly parents stayed in his house for some three to four
years before they died in the late 1980s. The decedents’ respective death
certificates state that they were both residents of Quezon City at the time of their
demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late mother’s
death certificate. This unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least,
petitioner recognized his deceased mother’s residence to be Quezon
City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in Ignacio’s death certificate,
accomplished a year earlier by respondent.
InGarcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals, the Court clarified that the term “resides”
means “the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence
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Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez
or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat.
In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or
domicile.” In addition, there is no distinction between venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings. They have one and the same meaning.
As thus defined, “residence”, in the context of venue provisions, means nothing
more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided
he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
G.R. No. L-6379 September 29, 1954
In the matter of the petition of WILFRED UYTENGSU to be admitted a
citizen of the Philippine. WILFRED UYTENGSU vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
no relevance to Rule 73
FACTS:
Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental
on October 6, 1927. Early in 1946, he studied, for one semester, in the Mapua
Institute of Technology, in Manila. Soon after, he went to the United States,
where, from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in the Leland Stanford Junior
University, in California, and was graduated, in 1950, with the degree of Bachelor
of Science. In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4)
months vacation. Then, to be exact, on July 15, 1950, his present application for
naturalization was filed. Forthwith, he returned to the United States and took a
post-graduate course, in chemical engineering, in another educational institution,
in Fort Wayne, Indiana. He finished this course in July 1951; but did not return to
the Philippines until October 13, 1951. Hence, the hearing of the case, originally
scheduled to take place on July 12, 1951, had to be postponed on motion of
counsel for the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the application for naturalization may be granted,
notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the
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filing of his petition and did not return until several months after the first date set
for the hearing thereof.
RULING: NO.
Immediately after the filing of his application — and notwithstanding the explicit
promise therein made by him, under oath, to the effect that he would reside
continuously in the Philippines "from the date of the filing of his petition up to the
time of his admission to Philippine citizenship" — he returned to the United
States, where he stayed, continuously, until October 13, 1951.
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to
indicate the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another."
"Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the
same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His
place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means
necessarily as, since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.
Petitioner has not complied with the requirements of section 7 of Commonwealth
Act No. 473, and with the aforementioned promise made by him in his
application, and, accordingly, is not entitled, in the present proceedings, to a
judgment in his favor.
VALERA vs OFILADA, G.R. No. L-27526, Sep. 12, 1974
FACTS:
Civil Case No. 64, R-1 of the Court of First Instance of Abra is a special
proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of Francisco Valera. Virgilio
Valera was the administrator of the estate, He died on March 21, 1961. He was
survived by his widow, Angelita Garduque Vda. de Valera and their ten (10)
children, named Amanda, Oscar, Dionisio, Benito, Felixberto, Eva, Lita, Toniette,
Vicenta and Teresita, all petitioners herein, except Vicenta and Teresita, who
were abroad.
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Later, Adoracion Valera Bringas, who claims to be an acknowledged natural child
of Francisco Valera, was appointed administratrix. She filed on April 16, 1964 in
the intestate proceeding a petition to require "Celso Valera and family and
Angelita de Valera and family to pay P100.00" as monthly rental for the one-
third pro-indiviso portion of the Valera residence located in Bangued, Abra.
Celso Valera interposed an opposition to it on the ground that Francisco Valera
had no interest in the Valera residence, that the property was never leased and
that the remedy of Mrs. Bringas was "in a appropriate remedy and/or procedure"
and not in the intestate proceeding. The lower court subsequently granted the
petition.
The said heirs, through Atty. Angel V. Colet, a son-in-law of Mrs. Valera, filed a
motion for the reconsideration of that order. They contended that the Valera
residence "should be excluded from the inventory," because that was their
"absolute property of which they have been in complete possession and
occupation". Mrs. Bringas replied that Francisco Valera's estate had "already
consolidated" its ownership over that one-third partition "through the submission
of the inventory and its approval" by the probate court.
In an order dated April 15, 1966, respondent Judge Macario M. Ofilada denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by the heirs of Virgilio Valera and granted the
motion of Mrs. Bringas for execution and for the delivery of certain funds and
properties.
In this present case, petitioners assail the brief, three-sentence order of July 10,
1964 on the following grounds: (a) that it decided the issue of ownership as to
the one-third pro-indiviso share of Francisco Valera in the Valera residence, an
issue, which according to them, is beyond the court's probate jurisdiction; (b)
that it was issued without the benefit of a trial on the merits and without hearing
all the parties involved; (c) that it does not contain findings of fact and law; (d)
that it is a judgment for a money claim which should have been filed in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor, Virgilio
Valera, and (e) that the order has no basis in substantive law.
The petitioners attack Judge Ofilada's order of April 15, 1966 on the following
grounds: (a) that, as a probate judge, he had no jurisdiction to require the heirs
of Virgilio Valera to account for the fruits of the six parcels of land administered
by him and that a separate action should be filed or the proper claim should be
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made against his estate; (b) that he had no jurisdiction to order the heirs of
Virgilio Valera to deliver to Mrs. Bringas the sum of P4,784.98 as "insurance and
war damage monies collected by Virgilio Valera"; (c) that Section 8, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court contemplates that "double the value of the fruits and monies"
should be recovered in an "action" and not in an intestate proceeding, and (d)
that the order was issued without any trial on the merits and it does not contain
findings of fact and law.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court, sitting as a probate court in the
intestate proceeding for the estate of Francisco Valera, could hold the
heirs of Virgilio Valera answerable for certain supposed monetary
liabilities of the latter to the estate and enforce said liabilities against
the properties of the deceased Virgilio Valera.
HELD:
We hold that the trial court, as a probate court, erred in adjudging in the said
intestate proceeding the monetary liabilities of the late Virgilio Valera to the
estate of Francisco Valera and in issuing a writ of execution against his properties
to enforce the supposed liabilities.
There is merit in the petitioners' contention that the probate court generally
cannot issue a writ of execution. It is not supposed to issue a writ of execution
because its orders usually refer to the adjudication of claims against the estate
which the executor or administrator may satisfy without the necessity of
resorting to a writ of execution. The probate court, as such, does not render any
judgment enforceable by execution.
The circumstance that the Rules of Court expressly specifies that the probate
court may issue execution (a) to satisfy the contributive shares of devisees,
legatees and heirs in possession of the decedent's assets (Sec. 6, Rule 88), (b) to
enforce payment of the expenses of partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90), and (e) to satisfy
the costs when a person is cited for examination in probate proceedings (Sec. 13,
Rule 142) may mean, under the rule of inclusion unius est exclusion alterius, that
those are the only instances when it can issue a writ of execution.
The record reveals that there is a dispute between Mrs. Bringas and the heirs of
Virgilio Valera as to whether one-third of the Valera residence and the six parcels
of land listed in the "Amended Incomplete Inventory, etc." dated August 31,
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1965 belong to the estate of Francisco Valera. The tax declarations for those
properties are in the name of the deceased Virgilio Valera.
Their inclusion in the inventory is not conclusive as to the ownership. "Questions
on title to real property cannot be determined in testate or intestate proceedings.
It has, however, been held that for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may
pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is not conclusive and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action to he instituted between the
parties."
MACIAS vs UY KIM, G.R. No. L-31174, May 30, 1972
FACTS:
Petitioner-appellant Manuel Y. Macias filed on December 2, 1969 a petition for
review by certiorari against respondents Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nemesio Co, Nicasio
Co, Manuel Sosantong, Reliable Realty Corporation, and Branch X of the Manila
Court of First Instance. It appearing from the complaint that there is presently
pending in Branch VIII of this Court Special Proceeding No. 63866 for the
settlement of the inheritance of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson. That
the plaintiff claims to be a beneficiary by hereditary title of her estate. It being
unquestionable that the authority to distribute the inheritance of a deceased
person and determine the persons entitled thereto belongs exclusively to the
court or branch thereof taking cognizance of the proceedings for its settlement
(Branch VIII) in this case. The orders sought to be annulled and set aside by
herein petitioner-appellant in his complaint against private respondents which
was assigned to Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance presided over by
Judge Jose L. Moya, were issued by Judge Barcelona presiding over Branch VIII
of the same court. The Petitoner filed a separate civil case in Branch X, seeks to
recover his distributive share of the estate of the decedent Rosina.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge of Branch X of the Manila Court of First
Instance can legally interfere with, or pass upon the validity of said
orders of the Judge of Branch VIII, as the probate court.
HELD:
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No, Branch VIII as the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of
the decedent, including the validity of the will, the declaration of heirs, the
disposition of the estate for the payment of its liabilities, and the distribution
among the heirs of the residue thereof. Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of
Court, "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estates of the
deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." Pursuant
to this provision, therefore all questions concerning the settlement of the estate
of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson should be filed before Branch VIII of
the Manila Court of First Instance, then presided over by former Judge, now
Justice of the Court of Appeals, Manuel Barcelona, where Special Proceedings No.
63866 for the settlement of the testate estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite
Wolfson was filed and is still pending. The reason for this provision of the law is
obvious. The settlement of the estate of a deceased person in court constitutes
but one proceeding. For the successful administration of that estate it is
necessary that there should be but one responsible entity, one court, which
should have exclusive control of every part of such administration. To intrust it to
two or more courts, each independent of the other, would result in confusion and
delay. The Court cannot ignore the proclivity or tendency of appellant herein to
file several actions covering the same subject matter or seeking substantially
identical relief, which is unduly burdening the courts.
VALERA vs INSERTO, G.R. No. L-56504, May 17, 1987
FACTS:
Rafael Valera was granted leasehold rights over an 18hectare fishpond in Iloilo
by the government to last during his lifetime.
He transferred it by “fictitious sale” to his daughter Teresa to support her children
with the agreement that when the children finishes schooling, the fishpond will be
returned to him.
Valera and his spouse Consolacion Sarosa and their child Teresa died. The heirs
of Teresa- her husband Jose Garin and their children bought the fishpond from
the government, acquiring title thereto.
The administrators of the spouses Rafael Valera and Consolacion Sarrosa claim
that the fishpond should be returned to the spouses’ estates.
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The Probate Court presided by Judge Adil held that there has been an implied
trust created, therefore the fishpond should be restored to the estate of the
spouses pursuant to Arts. 1453 and 1455 of the Civil Code
.Pursuant thereto, he directed the sheriff to enforcere conveyance of the fishpond
to the estate. The fishpond was leased by the Garin Heirs to Fabiana, who
although willingly surrendered it to the sheriff, later filed a complaint-in-
intervention. This was dismissed so he instituted a separate action for
injunction and damages.
Court of Appeals reversed (fishpond to be returned to Garin Heirs and their
lessee Fabiana) saying that:
(1) Probate Court had no jurisdiction;
(2) that the Title of the Garin Heirs is a stronger claim that rebuts the
presumption that the estate owns the fishpond; and
(3) that assuming the Probate Court had competence toresolve ownership, a
separate action has to be filed.
Issue:
WON Probate Court had authority to order reconveyance of the fishpond?
Held:
NO.
Ratio:
The CFI (now RTC), acting as Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction,
and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to
property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the
claimant and all the Other parties having legal interest in the property consent,
expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for
adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced. This is
issue is not a jurisdictional, but procedural, involving a mode of practice which
may be waived.
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The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the
exception to the rule. It was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the
parties that if cognizance was being taken of the question of title over the
fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and
permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for
determination "in an ordinary civil action," but merely to determine whether it
should or should not be included in the inventory. This function of resolving
whether or not property should be included in the estate inventory is, to be sure,
one clearly within the Probate Court's competence, although the Court's
determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to
the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.
Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the
fishpond was merely provisional, the fishpond cannot be the subject
of execution, as against its possessor who has set up title in himself (or in
another) adversely to the decedent, and whose right to possess has not been
ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate action. These considerations assume
greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in the
decedents' names but in others.
A separate action must be instituted by the administrator to recover the property.
Decision of the CA AFFIRMED.
CUIZON vs RAMOLETE, G.R. No. L-51291, May 29, 1984
FACTS:
As early as 1961, Marciano Cuizon applied for the registration of several parcels
of land in Mandaue City docketed as L.R. Case No. N-179. In 1970, he distributed
his property between his two daughters, Rufina and Irene, to whom the salt beds
subject of the controversy was given. In 1971, Irene executed a Deed of Sale
with Reservation of Usufruct involving the said salt beds in favor of petitioners
Franciso et al.
Although the decision in L.R. Case No. N-179 was rendered way back in 1972,
the decree of registration and the corresponding O.C.T. was issued only in 1976
in the name of Marciano Cuizon. In that same year, T.C.T No. 10477 covering the
property in question was issued to Irene. The latter died in 1978.
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During the extrajudicial settlement of the estate, Rufina, the mother of Francisco
et al., adjudicated to herself all the property of Irene including the salt beds in
question. She then executed a deed of Confirmation of Sale wherein she
confirmed and ratified the 1971 deed of sale and renounced and waived whatever
rights and interests and participation she may have in the property in question in
favor of the petitioners. The deed was annotated in T.C.T. No. 10477.
Subsequently, T.C.T. No. 12665 was issued in favor of the petitioners.
In 1978, Domingo Antigua, who allegedly was chosen by the heirs of Irene to act
as administrator, was appointed administrator by the CFI of Cebu. Antigua
included the salt bed in the inventory of Irene’s estate and asked the Cebu CFI to
order petitioners to deliver the salt to him. The Cebu CFI granted the same.
ISSUE: Whether a court handling the intestate proceedings has
jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a TCT issued in favor
owners who are not parties to the intestate proceedings if the said
parcels of have been?
HELD:
No. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings
whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to
outside parties. All said court could do is to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is dispute, then the administrator and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
In the instant case, the property involved is not only claimed by outside parties
but it was sold seven years before the death of the decedent and is duly titled in
the name of the vendees who are not party to the proceedings.
In Bolisay vs. Alcid, the Court held that “if a property covered by Torrens Title is
involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due
weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the
holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy
until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action.”
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Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was covered by a
TCT issued in the name of third parties, the respondent court should have denied
the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question
from the inventory of the property of the estate.
Doctrine: Probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be part of the estate and equally claimed to belong to outside parties.
REYES vs YSIP, G.R. No. L-7516, May 12, 1955
FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ to compel the judge of the CFI of Bulcan to permit and
allow petitioner to submit evidence of her claim that she is a natural daughter of
the deceased, Juan Reyes Panlilio. Probate of the last will and testament of
decedent was filed in the CFI. Leonor P. Reyes, herein petitioner filed an
opposition. The special administratix, who had presented the will for probate,
object to the personality and right of the petitioner herein to contest the will and
asked that the court resolve her right to contest the will before the hearing
thereon. The Honorable Judge held that only the probate of the will was at issue
and that the question of the presentation of evidence as to the filiation of the
oppositor, petitioner herein was out of place. Counsel for petitioner made
attempts to have the court reconsider its order but the court refused to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not the natural child is allowed to intervene in the
proceedings for the probate of the will.
HELD:
In distribution proceedings where a will is sought to be admitted to probate, a
person who can have no interest in the succession cannot be allowed to intervene
and oppose such probate. A person intervening in the proceedings should be
required to show interest in the will or the property affected thereby. For such
purpose, it is sufficient that he shows or produces prima facie evidence of his or
her relationship to the testator. The court did not amount to a prohibition to take
part in the hearing for the probate of the will and was motivated by desire to
avoid multiplicity of the issues and the limitation thereof to the execution of the
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will. The court did not therefore deprive the petitioner of any right which she is
entitled to under the rules of law.
GAAS ET AL vs FORTICH, G.R. No. L-31454, December 28, 1929
FACTS:
On January 23, 1926, Francisco Arquiza, of Cebu, made his last will and
testament in which, subject to certain devises, he bequeathed all of his property
to Pilar Fortich his then wife. Later, upon his death, this will was admitted to
probate as his last will and testament. Pending the adminisrration of his estate,
Isidra Gaas filed a petition alleging among others that he was previously married
to Federico Arquiza during the year 1908 and as a result of said marriage there
were born to said Federico Arquiza and this petitioner three children namely
Felicisimo Arquiza, Dioscoro Arquiza deceased, and Soledad Arquiza.; That the
deceased Francisco Arquiza is survived by his widow, Pilar Fortich but left no
legitimate children or descendants nor did the said deceased leave legitimate
parents or ascendants; and that the minors, Felicisimo Arquiza and Soledad
Arquiza are therefore the legitimate children of the deceased, Federico Arquiza
and the petitioner herein, Isidra Gaas and as such are by representation the duly
constituted legal heirs of the deceased Don Francisco Arquiza as provided by the
Civil Code. Isidra as natural guardian of the minors, Felicisimo Arquiza and
Soledad Arquiza, respectfully prays this honorable court to declare said minors to
be the legal heirs of the deceased Francisco Arquiza and for such other and
further relief to which they may be entitled.
To which the executrix made a general and specific denial, and alleged the
following special defences:
1. That the petitioners Soledad and Felicisimo, surnamed Arquiza, alleged
acknowledged natural children of the deceased Francisco Arquiza,
represented by their guardian ad litem Isidra Gaas, have no right to
succeed in the properties of the herein deceased Francisco Arquiza;
2. That assuming that there is merit in the petition which is objected to by
this pleading, the action to acknowledge the aforesaid minors Soledad and
Felicisimo, surnamed Arquiza, as natural children, has prescribed.
The lower court sustained the petition and found that all of the legal rights of
Federico Arquiza was vested in the petitioners, who were his legitimate children,
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and that, as such, they were entitled to one-third of the estate left by Francisco
Arquiza.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring them entitled
to one-third of the estate left by Francisco Arquiza, and in not dismissing
the petition of the appellees.
HELD:
As to the fifth assignment of error, the lower court cites and relies upon the case
of Larena and Larena vs. Rubio (43 Phil., 1017), and says:
This is not an action to compel the recognition of Federico Arquiza under the
provisions of the Civil Code. Such an action is barred. This is a proceeding to
obtain a declaration of the rights of the petitioners as the legitimate children of
Federico Arquiza to inherit in representation of their father from their
grandfather. It was not necessary for Federico Arquiza to bring an action for
recognition because he had acquired the status of a recognized natural child
under Law 11 of Toro by the tacit recognition of his father. His vested rights were
transmitted to his legitimate children, and they had no need to bring an action
against Francisco Arquiza or his heirs to compel the recognition of their father,
Federico Arquiza, as the natural son of Francisco Arquiza.
If Federico Arquiza were still living, he could intervene in these proceedings for
the distribution of the estate of his natural father, without the necessity of a
proceeding to compel his recognition, as is required by the Civil Code; and
Francisco Arquiza having left no legitimate descendants, or ascendants, Federico
Arquiza, if he had survived his father, would have been entitled to one-third of
the latter's estate.
Article 842 of the Civil Code provides:
If the testator leaves no legitimate ascendants or descendants, the acknowledged
natural children shall be entitled to a third of the estate.
And article 843 provides:
The rights granted natural children by the preceding articles are transmitted on
their death to their legitimate descendants.
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The facts found by the trial court and sustained by the evidence bring the
appellees within those provisions.
In the matter of administration of the estate of Tan Po Pic- TORRES vs
JAVIER, G.R. No. L-10560, March 24, 1916
FACTS:
This is an appeal in proceeding to appoint an administrator of the estate of Tan
Po Pic, deceased. The trial court refused to appoint Marta Torres who claimed to
be the lawful wife of the deceased, and, instead, appointed Juan L. Javier
administrator. The appeal is taken by Marta Torres from that order of
appointment.
It appears that two women are claiming to be the legal wife of Tan Po Pic,
deceased, Marta Torres and a Chinese woman named Yu Teng New. Marta Torres
objected to the appointment of any one except herself, while Juan Cailles Tan
Poo, on behalf of the Chinese woman, opposed the appointment of Marta Torres.
The probate court being unable to determine who, if either, was the lawful wife of
the deceased, appointed a disinterested third person to act as administrator.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the probate court was correct.
HELD:
We are of the opinion that the decision of the probate court is so far correct that
it must be affirmed. Section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that
letters of administration should be granted, first, to the surviving husband or
wife; second, to other relatives in the order named; third, in case the surviving
wife or next of kin or person selected by them be unsuitable, the administration
may be granted to some other person, such as one of the principal creditors; and
fourth, if there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, the
administration may go to such person as the court may appoint.
The first error assigned is that the court erred in allowing Tan Y. Soc to appear in
the proceeding. It appears that Tan Y. Soc was appointed administrator of the
said Tan Po Pic, deceased, the Court of First Instance of Manila under the
misapprehension that Tan Po Pic was a resident of the city of Manila at the time
of his death. After it had been ascertained that the deceased was a resident of
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the Province of Rizal, the Court of First Instance of Manila transferred the case to
the Court of First Instance of Rizal. In that court, as we have already seen, the
appointment by the Court of First Instance of Manila was disregarded the
proceedings were begun for the appointment of an administrator by the Court of
First Instance of Rizal. Tan Y. Soc and Juan Cailles Tan Poo appeared in those
proceedings, apparently representing the interests of Yu Teng New, the alleged
Chinese wife of the deceased. Messrs. Crossfield & O'Brien, attorneys for the
appellee in this case, appeared for the alleged Chinese wife and acted in
conjunction with Tan Y. Soc and Juan Cailles Tan Poo in protecting her interests.
The second error assigned is that the court erred in taking into consideration the
claim that Tan Po Pic, deceased, had a Chinese wife in China. It must be
remembered that the probate court did not find as a fact that there was a wife in
China; nor does his appointment of a third person determine the fact of the
existence of another wife in China. The court considered the facts and
circumstances as they were presented in the proceedings and upon the whole
believed it for the best interest of all concerned to appoint as administrator a
disinterested third person, particularly in view of the fact that there was likely to
be litigation between Marta Torres and the Chinese wife as to which is in fact his
legal wife and entitled to an interest in the estate of the deceased Tan Po Pic. We
do not find the errors assigned sufficient to warrant any action on the part of this
court.
The third error assigned is to the effect that the trial court erred in not finding
that Marta Torres was the lawful wife of the deceased Tan Po Pic. We do not
believe the court erred in this respect. The court had a right in view of the
controversy between the women to name a disinterested third person as
administrator and leave the controversy between them to be settled in the
administration proceedings at the proper time.
BOROMEO-HERERA VS BOROMEO ET. AL.
JULY 23, 1987
FACTS:
Vito Boromeo, a widower died without forced heirs. Jose Junquera filed with the
CFI of Cebu a petition for the probate of a one page document as the last will and
testament left by the said deceased. The case was docketed as Special
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Proceedings No. 916-R. Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. After
due trial, the probate court held that the document presented as the will of the
deceased was a forgery. On appeal to this Court, the decision of the probate
court disallowing the probate of the will was affirmed. The testate proceedings
was converted into an intestate proceedings. Several parties came before the
court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate
of Vito Borromeo. The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of
Vito Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal
and equitable shares among the 9 declared intestate heirs.
Respondent Fortunato Boromeo, who was originally one of the heirs in the will,
filed a motion to be declared as one of the heirs of the deceased, alleging that he
is an illegitimate child and that he was omitted in the declared heirs. As an
acknowledged illegitimate child, he asserts that he is entitled to 4/5 of the
legitime of an acknowledged natural child. The court dismissed the motion. He
then filed a motion for reconsideration changing the basis for his claims to the
portion on the estate. He asserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary
Rights. In the waiver, 5 of the 9 heirs relinquished their shares to Fortunato their
shares in the disputed estate. The trial court concluding that the five heirs who
signed the waiver agreement assigning their shares to Fortunato Boromeo has
lost the same rights, declared the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of the
decedent.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Waiver of Hereditary Rights executed is valid to entitle
Fortunato to the estate of Vito Borromeo.
2. Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of
the waiver.
RULING:
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1. In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot
be considered to be effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are
essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the existence
thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right. (People v. Salvador,
(CA) 53 O.G. No. 22, p. 8116, 8120). The intention to waive a right or
advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly, and when the only
proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act should be so
manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent to, voluntarily
relinquish the particular right or advantage that no other reasonable
explanation of his conduct is possible.
2. The trial court had jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver
agreement. It must be noted that in Special Proceedings No. 916-R the
lower court disallowed the probate of the will and declared it as fake.
Upon appeal, this Court affirmed the decision of the lower court on March
30, 1967. Subsequently, several parties came before the lower court filing
claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of
Vito Borromeo. There is no impediment to the trial court in exercising
jurisdiction and trying the said claims or petitions. Moreover, the
jurisdiction of the trial court extends to matters incidental and collateral to
the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the
estate.
Republic v. Cantor
G.R. No. 184621; December 10, 2013
FACTS:
Sometime in January 1998, Jerry F. Cantor left his wife Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor
after a violent quarrel. After more than four years of not seeing or hearing from
Jerry, Maria Fe filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her
husband. She alleged that she conducted a diligent search for her husband and
exerted earnest efforts to find him. The RTC granted her petition. Dissatisfied
with the ruling, the OSG filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Nolasco
ISSUES:
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1. Did Maria Fe have a well-founded belief that Jerry was dead in pursuant
with Article 41 of the Family Code?
2. Whether or not certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question
the RTC’s order declaring Jerry presumptively dead was proper.
HELD:
1. No. A “well-founded belief” that his or her spouse is dead depends on the
unique circumstance of each case and that there is no set standard or
procedure in determining the same. Maria Fe’s alleged “well-founded”
belief arose when: 1) Jerry’s relatives and friends could not give her any
information on his whereabouts; and 2) she did not find Jerry’s name in
the patient’s directory whenever she went to a hospital. It appears that
Maria Fe did not actively look for her husband in hospitals and it may be
sensed that her search was not intentional or planned. Her search for
Jerry was far from diligent. Were it not for the finality of the RTC ruling,
the declaration of presumptive death should have been recalled and set
aside for utter lack of factual basis.
2. Yes. By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of
course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment
ina summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying,
however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to
question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such
petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the
Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum
23

FACTS:
Nolasco, a seaman, first met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in England. After that,
she lived with him on his ship for 6 months. After his seaman's contract has
expired, he brought her to his hometown in San Jose, Antique. They got married
in January 1982.
After the marriage celebration, he got another employment contract and left
the province. In January 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother that
15 days after Janet gave birth to their son, she left. He cut short his
contract to find Janet. He returned home in November 1983.
He did so by securing another contract which England is one of its port calls. He
wrote several letters to the bar where he and Janet first met, but all were
returned to him. He claimed that he inquired from his friends but they too had no
news about Janet. In 1988, Nolasco filed before the RTC of Antique a petition for
the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet.
RTC granted the petition. The Republic through the Solicitor-General, appealed to
the CA, contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet presumptively
dead because Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well-founded belief
for such declaration. CA affirmed the trial court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
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RULING:
No. Nolasco failed to prove that he had complied with the third requirement
under the Article 41 of the Family Code, the existence of a "well-founded belief"
that Janet is already dead.
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been
shortened to 4 years; however, there is a need for judicial declaration of
presumptive death to enable the spouse present to marry. However, Article 41
imposes a stricter standard before declaring presumptive death of one spouse. It
requires a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
In the case at bar, the Court found Nolasco's alleged attempt to ascertain about
Janet's whereabouts too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-
founded belief that she was already dead.
Nolasco, after returning from his employment, instead of seeking help of local
authorities or of the British Embassy, secured another contract to London. Janet's
alleged refusal to give any information about her was too convenient an excuse
to justify his failure to locate her. He did not explain why he took him 9 months
to finally reached San Jose after he asked leave from his captain. He refused to
identify his friends whom he inquired from. When the Court asked Nolasco about
the returned letters, he said he had lost them. Moreover, while he was in London,
he did not even dare to solicit help of authorities to find his wife.
The circumstances of Janet's departure and Nolasco's subsequent behavior make
it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet was dead a well-founded
one.
24
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On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition.The OSG
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which rendered judgment on
August 4, 2003, affirming the decision of the trial court.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. Issue:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Whether or not the declaration of presumptive death of the wife is valid
G.R. No. 159614. December 9, 2005.
Ruling:
FACTS:
No. In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court for Code for the declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of
the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia “Lea” A. Julaton. due diligence set by the Court in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse
must be strictly complied with. It is the policy of the State to protect and
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January
strengthen the family as a basic social institution. Marriage is the foundation of
20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar. He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea
the family. Since marriage is an inviolable social institution that the 1987
arrived home late in the evening and he berated her for being always out of their
Constitution seeks to protect from dissolution at the whim of the parties. For
house. He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be
respondent’s failure to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his wife is
better for her to go back to her parents. Lea did not reply. Alan narrated that,
already dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in searching
when he reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when
for his missing wife, the petition for declaration of presumptive death should have
he arrived home later in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found. Alan thought that
been denied by the trial court and the Honorable Court of Appeals. For the
Lea merely went to her parents’ house in Bliss, Sto. Niño, Catbalogan, Samar.
purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage, the spouse present must
However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
Alan further testified that, he inquired Lea’s whereabouts but to no avail. presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to
Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his
prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that
mother asked him to leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea
the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a
may come home for the fiesta. Alan agreed. However, Lea did not show up. Alan
subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded
then left for Manila on August 27, 1995. He went to a house in Navotas where
belief. Cuello Callon writes that “es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde
Janeth, Lea’s friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth told him
en motivos racionales.” The Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to
that she had not seen her. He failed to find out Lea’s whereabouts despite his
prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the trial
repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his
court, that his spouse Rosalia “Lea” Julaton was already dead. The Decision of the
free time, he would look for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He returned to
Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.
Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed.
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station.
The police authorities issued an Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001. Alan also reported REPUBLIC V. GRANADA
Lea’s disappearance to the National Bureau of Investigation on July 9, 2001.
G.R. No. 187512, [June 13, 2012]
DOCTRINE:

25

Even if the RTC erred in ruling that the respondent was able to prove her “well-
founded belief” that her absent spouse was already dead, such order already final
and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, “[n]nothing is more settled in
law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes
immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law.”
FACTS:
Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company, got
married in 1993.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus
went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did
not receive any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to
locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus
regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail. After nine (9) years of waiting,
Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead with the RTC
Lipa City. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as
presumptively dead. On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision.
Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus
and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. The
motion was denied. The OSG then elevated the case on appeal to the Court
of Appeals. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no
jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was
a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final and
executory and, thus, not appealable. The appellate court granted Yolanda’s
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v.
Bermudez-Lorino, the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive
death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus,
judgment thereon is immediately final and executory upon notice to the
parties.Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the
present petition under Rule 45.
ISSUES:
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1. Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties
and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal.
2. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the petition for
declaration of presumptive death based on evidence that respondent had
presented.
HELD:
Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is fina land immediately executory.
Even if the RTC erred in granting the petition, such order can no longer be
assailed.
RATIO:
1. A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the
purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family
Code is a summary proceeding “as provided for” under the Family Code. Taken
together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a
petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the
judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding
shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no
appeal can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance
with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court
of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court
may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which
are the proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in
a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a
petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment
26

thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the
matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
2. Petitioner also assails the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent on the ground that she
had not adduced the evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her
absent spouse was already dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the
Family Code.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided
in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent
and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead
before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not
define what is meant by a well-grounded belief is a state of the mind or condition
prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the
inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact
or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments,
prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are
the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize
their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence evidence on
the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse
and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not
the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse
depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature
and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted,
underscoring supplied.)
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that
respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent
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husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about
the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not
presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was
allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she
were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or
assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She
could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she
failed to explain these omissions. The Republic’s arguments are well-taken.
Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition. The RTC ruling on the
issue of whether respondent was able to prove her “well-founded belief” that her
absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him
presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed.
Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes
final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.
ROSE BUSH MALIG and JOE, THOMAS, and JOHN all surnamed BUSH,
represented in this suit by their attorney-in-fact, ROSE BUSH MALIG vs
MARIA SANTOS BUSH
May 31, 1969
FACTS:
On September 19, 1962 the plaintiffs filed the complaint, alleging that they were
the acknowledged natural children and the only heirs in the direct line of the
deceased John T. Bush, having been born of the common-law relationship of their
father with Apolonia Perez from 1923 up to August, 1941. John T. Bush and
Apolonia Perez, during the conception of the plaintiffs, were not suffering from
any disability to marry each other; that they lived with their alleged father during
his lifetime and were considered and treated by him as his acknowledge natural
children and at the time of his death left several real and personal properties.
27

Defendant falsely alleging that she was the legal wife of the deceased was able to
secure her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased in Testate
Proceedings No. 29932 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. She submitted to
the court for approval a project of partition, purporting to show that the deceased
left a will whereby he bequeathed his estate to three persons, namely: Maria
Santos Bush, Anita S. Bush and Anna Berger. Defendant then knew that the
plaintiffs were the acknowledged natural children of the deceased; and that they
discovered the fraud and misrepresentation perpetrated by the defendant only in
July, 1962.
Petitioners prayed that the partition be annulled; submit a complete inventory
and accounting of all the properties left by the deceased and another project of
partition adjudicating to the plaintiffs their legal participation in the said estate
and/or in the event that the defendant had disposed of all or part of the estate,
that she be ordered to pay them the market value thereof.
The defendant moved to dismiss the case, alleging lack of jurisdiction, res
judicata, and statute of limitations. However, said motion was denied by the trial
court. When the case was set foe hearing, defendant then filed another motion to
dismiss challenging the jurisdiction of court stating that since the action was one
to annul a project of partition duly approved by the probate court it was that
court alone which could take cognizance of the case, citing Rule 75, Section 1, of
the Rules of Court. On October 31, 1963 the lower court granted the motion and
dismissed the complaint, not on the ground relied upon by the defendant but
because the action had prescribed. The plaintiffs moved to reconsider but were
turned down; hence, this appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether or not an action may be dismissed based on the grounds not
alleged in a motion to dismiss.
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Ruling:
1. In dismissing a complaint upon a ground not relied upon by the defendant
in the motion to dismiss, the lower court in effect did so motu proprio
without offering the plaintiffs a chance to argue the point, without any
arguments or evidences on the question. This the court cannot do. The
only instance on which the court may dismiss upon the court’s own motion
an action is when the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or to comply with
the Rules or any other order of the court.
Ratio:
Sec 1, Rule 73 of Rules of Court fixes jurisdiction for purposes of the special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, "so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate." The matter really concerns venue, as the caption of Rule cited indicates,
and in order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction
from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of all other courts."
pec
RODRIGUEZ vs. BORJA
17 SCRA 41
FACTS:
28

In this case, there were 2 proceedings. First was an intestate proceeding
instituted meaning, a proceeding to settle the estate of a deceased person who
died without a will. But subsequently, a will was found and again another
proceeding was instituted, this time, testate proceeding wherein the estate of the
deceased person is settled if that person has left a will. We are confronted here
of 2 proceedings, one was instituted ahead of the other.
ISSUE:
Which proceeding should be preferred?
RULING:
As long as there is a will, even if that will is found later and even if the
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a person with a will is filed
later, that should be preferred. The will should be probated. The will should
be given effect as much as possible in order to give effect to the wishes of the
testator. The wishes of the testator must be given such preference first. Probate
of the will is needed in order to determine whether or not the will was indeed
valid, whether or not the will was executed in observance with the formalities
required by law and whether or not the testator executed it with a sound mind.
If later on in the probate proceeding, the will is found not to have validly
executed, then you go to intestate proceeding. But first you go to testate.
CUENCO VS. CA G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
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FACTS: This is a Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent CA in
CA-G.R. No. 34104-R and its subsequent Resolution denying petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration.
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and
two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage,
residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu,
alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with
properties in Cebu and Quezon City. The petition still pending with CFI Cebu,
Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the
probate of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also
filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in
abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the
probate proceedings. Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI
Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that
CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition
and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and
issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition;
(2) Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the
probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in
deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings.
RULING: (1) Yes. The Supreme Court found that the CA erred in law in issuing
the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the
testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions,
particularly its admission to probate of the last will and testament of the
deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond
pursuant to the deceased testator's wish for the following considerations:
1. The Judiciary Act concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of
First Instance over "all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate estates."
On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of
venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict
among the different courts which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction
29

from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of all other courts."
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his
estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely
of venue. It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court
with whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive
jurisdiction. The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." A fair reading of the Rule — since
it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate
jurisdiction — indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must
also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise
jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may, upon learning that a petition for probate of the
decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent
obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and
their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it
stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to
take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and
instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of
the decedent's alleged last will.
2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a
motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in
abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City
court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. the
residence of the decedent within its territory and venue.
3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of
the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither
could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73,
section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the
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decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the
Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays
down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal
and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental 12 with facts analogous to the present case 13 is authority against
respondent appellate court's questioned decision. In said case, the Court upheld
the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate proceedings.
It cannot be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the
distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in
accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance
with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the
settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in
accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that
the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the
latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state
an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being
required to render final account and turn over the estate in his
possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This however,
is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last
will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as
an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that
proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings.
(2) On Venue and Jurisdiction under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The residence of the decent or the location of his
estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of
venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration
of justice. The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take
30

cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it
to the exclusion of all other courts.
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that
"(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a
pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole
world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon
everybody, even against the State. The probate of a will by a court having
jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The
Quezon City court acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be
conceded that Quezon City was not the proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu
court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting the decedent's last will to
probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon
city court's action should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition for supposed
lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision, and should
instead be sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in dismissing
the certiorari petition challenging the Manila court's action admitting the
decedent's will to probate and distributing the estate in accordance therewith in
the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered that this Court is not
inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was
not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same
proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction."
Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory
authority over all inferior courts, it may properly determine, as it has done in the
case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by and transferred to the Quezon
City court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay
that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the
decedent (with the due deference and consent of the Cebu court) and its
admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment of petitioner-
widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will
and all its orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be
approved and authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had
and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to
revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that indeed
and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the strength of
incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal
residence of the decedent.
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ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with the CA ordered
dismissed.
DE SANDOVAL VS. SANTIAGO,
G.R. No. L1723
May 30, 1949
FACTS: This is a special civil action of certiorari filed by the petitioner
against the respondent Judge Hon. Vicente Santiago.
Petitioner instituted a special proceeding in the CFI of Quezon Province for then
probate of the will and codicil executed by the deceased Daniel Marquez in which
she was designated as executrix. The will and codicil were allowed and the
petitioner was appointed as executrix in accordance with the will. But before the
petitioner qualified as executrix, the three heirs instituted in the will made an
extrajudicial partition of all the properties of the deceased on October 5, 1946
and entered into the possession of their respective share without the authority
and approval of the court. One year after the probate of the will and appointment
of the petitioner as executrix, the respondent judge required the petitioner to
qualify as such and file a bond of P5,000. In response thereto the petitioner
informed the respondent judge that it was not necessary for her to qualify
because the heirs had already made an extrajudicial partition in accordance with
the will as shown by the copy of the said partition which she submitted to the
court. In view of the answer of the petitioner the respondent judge ordered the
executrix to qualify as such within forty-eight hours and declared the extrajudicial
agreement of partition entered into by the heirs null and void, on the ground that
the probate proceedings having been commenced judicially it must also be
terminated judicially. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner and
denied by the court hence, the filing of the present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI Judge of Quezon Province, wherein the deceased
was residing at the time of his death has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to settle
the estate of the deceased.
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RULING: The court ruled that the respondent Judge of Court CFI Quezon
Province, wherein the deceased was residing at the time of his death, has
acquired exclusive jurisdiction to settle the testate estate of the deceased Daniel
Marquez and over the heirs and other person interested in the estate of the
deceased from the moment the application for the probate of the decedent's will
was filed with the said court and the publication required by law were made; and
the heirs of the deceased Marquez could not divest the CFI of its already acquired
jurisdiction by the mere fact of dividing extrajudicially the estate of the deceased
among themselves.
An extrajudicial partition of the estate of a deceased by the heirs becomes a
judicial partition after its approval by the court which had previously acquired
jurisdiction of the estate by the filing of an application for the probate of the
decedent's will; but as the testate proceeding is terminated in such case without
the necessary publication of notices to creditors and other persons interested in
the estate required ina required in a regular judicial administration, the effect of
such judicial partition would be the same as if it had been effected extrajudicially
without the intervention of the court under the provisions of section1,of Rule 74,
that is, subject to the claims against the distributees by persons mentioned in
sections 4 and 5, of the same rule.
Thus, the petition for certiorari is denied with costs against the petitioner,
because the respondent judge did not exceed his jurisdiction in not giving the
deed of extrajudicial settlement or partition of the estate of the deceased the
effect of terminating the testate proceeding over which the court has acquired
exclusive jurisdiction since said partition was not submitted to said court for
approval.
BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the deceased EUSEBIO
CAPILI; and the instituted heirs, namely: ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTURO
BERNARDO, ET AL. VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-18148 February 28, 1963
FACTS: This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of the CA
affirming that of the CFI Bulacan holding that the probate court in Special
Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the deed of donation
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in question and to pass upon the question of title or ownership of the properties
mentioned therein.
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died in
1958 and a testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate was instituted in
the CFI of Bulacan. His will was admitted to probate on that same year disposing
of his properties in favor of his widow and his cousins all surnamed Capili and
Bernardo. Hermogena Reyes herself died in 1959. Upon petition of Bernardo,
executor of the estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by her
collateral relatives and intestate heirs all surnamed Reyes and four others all
surnamed Isidoro.
In 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding in
accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili
among the testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena Reyes, whose
share was alloted to her collateral relatives aforementioned. These relatives filed
an opposition to the executor's project of partition and submitted a counter-
project of partition of their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the
will of the deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not to the
latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
The probate court set the two projects of partition for hearing. In the
memorandum for the executor and the instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that
the properties disposed of in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to
him exclusively and not to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyes
had donated to him her half share of such partnership; (2) that the collateral
heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing or grounds to question the
validity of the donation; and (3) that even assuming that they could
question the validity of the donation, the same must be litigated not in
the testate proceeding but in a separate civil action.
The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part, argued that the
deed of donation itself was determinative of the original conjugal character to the
properties and that since the donation was null and void the deceased Eusebio
Capili did not become owner of the share of his wife and therefore could not
validly dispose of it in his will.
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The probate court issued an order declaring the donation void without making
any specific finding as to its juridical nature, that is, whether it was inter vivos or
mortis causa, for the reason that, considered under the first category, it falls
under Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits donations between spouses
during the marriage; and considered under the second category, it does not
comply with the formalities of a will as required by Article 728 in relation to
Article 805 of the same Code, there being no attestation clause. In the same
order the court disapproved both projects of partition and directed the executor
to file another," dividing the property mentioned in the last will and testament of
the deceased Eusebio Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed of
donation, Exhibit B, between the instituted heirs of the deceased Eusebio Capili
and the legal heirs of the deceased Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that the
said properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses." On
September 27, 1960, the executor filed a motion for new trial, reiterating and
emphasizing the contention previously raised in their memorandum that the
probate court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of the legal heirs
of Hermogena Reyes involving title to the properties mentioned in the will of
Eusebio Capili and taking exception to the court's declaration of the nullity of the
donation "without stating facts or provision of law on which it was based." The
motion for new trial was denied in an order dated October 3, 1960.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being affirmed,
petitioners filed this present petition for review by certiorari.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the appellate court erred in not declaring that the
probate court, having limited and special jurisdiction, had generally no power to
adjudicate title and erred in applying the exception to the rule.
(2) Whether or not the trial court as well as the CA erred in upholding the
power of the probate court in this case to adjudicate in the testate proceedings
the question of title or ownership of the properties mentioned therein.
RULING: (1) In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general
rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or
intestate proceedings "except where one of the parties prays merely for the
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the
probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its
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final determination in a separate action. However, we have also held that when
the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to
submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so
submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v.
Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Manalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661); and that with the
consent of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial administration
may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding,
provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80
Phil. 229, 232).
(2) As has been stated in the case of Cunanan v. Amparo (supra) the Supreme
Court speaking through Mr. Justice Tuason: "Determination of title to property is
within the jurisdiction of CFI. The responding Soriano's objection (that the
probate court lacked jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the
lots to the estate) relates exclusively to the procedure, which is distinct from
jurisdiction. It affects only personal rights to a mode of practice (the filing of an
independent ordinary action) which may be waived".
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership
of certain of the properties involved — whether they belong to the conjugal
partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the
jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal
partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be
distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of
course, the widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who have
been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared
voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. It is true
that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but
the widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this
right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes.
Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of the probate court, for the purpose of the determination of the
question of ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borne by the
admitted facts. On the contrary, it is undisputed that they were the ones who
presented the project of partition claiming the questioned properties as part of
the testator's asset. The respondents, as representatives or substitutes of the
deceased widow opposed the project of partition and submitted another. As the
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Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of them must be deemed to have
submitted the issue for resolution in the same proceeding. Certainly, the
petitioners cannot be heard to insist, as they do, on the approval of their project
of partition and, thus, have the court take it for granted that their theory as to
the character of the properties is correct, entirely without regard to the
opposition of the respondents". In other words, by presenting their project of
partition including therein the disputed lands (upon the claim that they were
donated by the wife to her husband), petitioners themselves put in issue the
question of ownership of the properties — which is well within the competence of
the probate court — and just because of an opposition thereto, they cannot
thereafter withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction of
the court. Certainly, there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the
objection are the ones who set the court in motion. They cannot be permitted to
complain if the court, after due hearing, adjudges question against them.
Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the
question of ownership of the properties involved because the widow herself,
during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of these properties in
the inventory of the assets of her deceased husband, but also signed an extra-
judicial partition of those inventoried properties. But the very authorities cited by
appellants require that to constitute estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of
the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time he performs the act
constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no estoppel. In
the present case, the deceased widow acted as she did because of the deed of
donation she executed in favor of her husband not knowing that such deed was
illegal, if inter-vivos, and ineffectual if mortis-causa, as it has not been executed
with the required formalities similar to a will.
Thus, the decision of the CA being in accordance with law, the same is hereby
affirmed with costs against appellants.
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the
Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner,
vs.
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THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No.
1307). TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES (Sp.
Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
BANK, administrator-appellant,
vs.
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR
GUZMAN, BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION
CORONADO, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES
BATISANAN, PEPITO IYULORES, ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO
ESPADA, ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO
PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the last as Administratrix in Sp.
Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
INC., movant-appellee.
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS
FYI: March 29, 1974; Barredo, J.*This case is lengthy. Court admitted several
times that it was clueless as to some facts so it copied into the decision entire
pleadings. Plus, PCIB raised 78 assignment of errors.
FACTS: Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were originally from
Texas, USA. During their marriage, they had acquired and accumulated
considerable assets and properties in the Philippines and in Oklahoma and Texas
in the US. They both lived, worked and were domiciled in Iloilo City for around 50
years. Before her death, Linnie Jane executed a will leaving her estate, less her
debts and funeral expenses, to her husband Charles. Should Charles die, the will
provided that the remainder of her estate go to her brothers and sisters, share
and share alike. Should any of the brothers and sisters die before the husband,
Linnie willed that the heirs of the said sibling be substituted in the deceased’s
sibling’s place. When Linnie died, Charles took the will to probate court, and was
appointed Executor, then later, Special Administrator. He moved to be allowed to
continue administering the family business, as per Linnie Jane’s wishes, and to
engage in sales, conveyances, leases, mortgages and other necessary
transactions. He also filed the necessary and appurtenant
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administration/accounting records, and income tax returns for the estate. Charles
named seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as his heirs but the order
admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon,
so Charles filed a verified motion to have Roy’s name included. As an executor,
he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was administering under
American law. He did file such as estate tax return in 1958. In Schedule "M" of
such return, he answered "Yes" to the question as to whether he was
contemplating "renouncing the will". On the question as to what property
interests passed to him as the surviving spouse, he answered “None, except for
purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal
charges.” It is the intention of the surviving husband of deceased to distribute
the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their Community estate
to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes
and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid.
Charles died in Iloilo in December 1962 without having liquidated Linnie’s estate,
which includes her share in the conjugal partnership. A longtime employee of the
Hodges, Avelina Magno, was appointed Administratrix (for Linnie’s estate) and a
Special Administratrix (for Charles’). Magno was appointed, but later Davies
(representative of Charles’ heirs in the US) was designated Co-Special
Administrator, who was then replaced by one Joe Hodges, Charles’ nephew. One
Atty. Mirasol was also appointed as co-administrator, and an order of probate and
letters of administration were issued to Hodges and Mirasol. At this point, the SC
was already very much confused about the gaps in the facts, convinced that the
parties representing both estates had cooked up a modus operandi to settle
money matters (a settlement with records the Court never saw which, however,
went awry, with more and more heirs from the US flocking to the Iloilo shores,
and Lawyers filing their respective claims for retainer fees. Later, PCIB became
the administrator of Charles’ estate, asserting a claim to all of his estate,
including those properties/assets that passed to him upon Linnie Jane’s death.
Magno naturally opposed this, as Linnie Jane’s other heirs (the Higdons) would be
prejudiced, so she continued acting in her capacity as administrator. For these
acts, the PCIB dismissed her as an employee of Charles’ estate, to which she
responded by locking up the premises being used by PCIB as offices, which were
among the estate’s properties. PCIB’s Claims Linnie Jane’s will should be
governed by Philippine Law, with respect to the order of succession, the amount
of successional rights, and the intrinsic validity of its testamentary provisions.
Linnie intended Philippine laws to govern her Will.
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ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the provision in Mrs. Hodges’ will in favor of her
brothers and sisters constitutes ineffective hereditary substitutions.
(2) Whether or not a Special Proceeding for the settlement of Mrs. Hodges
estate should already be closed, based on the December 1957 Court Order
allegedly adjudicating Mr. Hodges as the sole heir?
RULING: (1) NO. The court overruled PCIB’S contention that the provision in
Mrs. Hodges’ will in favor of her brothers and sisters constitutes ineffective
hereditary substitutions. The Court ruled that by said provision, Mrs. Hodges
simultaneously instituted her brothers and sisters as co-heirs with her husband,
with the condition, however, that the latter would have complete rights of
dominion over the whole estate during his lifetime and what would go to the
former would be only the remainder thereof at the time of Hodge’s death. In
other words, whereas they are not only to inherit only in case of default of
Hodges, on the other hand, Hodges was not obliged to preserve anything for
them. Clearly then, the essential elements of testamentary substitution are
absent. The provision in question is a simple case of conditional simultaneous
institution of heirs, whereby the institution of Hodges is subject to a partial
resolutory condition, the operative contingency of which is coincidental with that
of the suspensive condition of the institution of his brothers and sisters-in-law,
which manner of institution is not prohibited by law.
Contrary to Avelina’s view, however, it was not the usufruct alone of Linnie’s
estate, as contemplated in Article 869, that she bequeathed to Charles during his
lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during
his lifetime only, even as there was no restriction whatsoever against his
disposing or conveying the whole or any portion thereof to anybody other than
himself. The Court saw no legal impediment to this kind of institution, except that
it cannot apply to the legitime of Charles as the surviving spouse, consisting of
one-half of the estate, considering that Linnie had no surviving ascendants nor
descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904.) Hodges’ acts of administration and
accounting strongly negate PCIB’s claims that he had adjudicated to himself all of
Linnie’s estate. While he may have used language like ―herein executor (being)
the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and
testament already probated… there is no other person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place of examining herein account to be given notice,
he would’ve known that doing so would impute bad faith unto him.
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(2) NO. No final distribution yet made to all parties concerned to the estate. After
the residue has been assigned to the parties entitled to it, the Special Proceeding
is deemed ready for Final Closure.
a) Order issued for distribution/assignment of estate among those
entitled.
b) Debts such as funeral expenses, taxes, widow allowance, etc. should be
paid already.
Until the estate is finally settled and adjudicated to the heirs who may be found
entitled to it, the administration must continue to cover Linnie's entire conjugal
share.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED GELACIO SEBIAL. BENJAMINA
SEBIAL VS. ROBERTA SEBIAL, JULIANO SEBIAL and HEIRS OF BALBINA
SEBIAL.
G.R. No. L-23419 June 27, 1975
Matters affecting property under the administration may be taken cognizance of
by the probate court in the course of the intestate proceedings provided that the
interest of third persons are not prejudiced. However, the third person to whom
the decedent's assets had been fraudulently conveyed may be cited to appear in
court and may be examined under oath as to how they came into the possession
of the decedent's assets but a separate action is necessary to recover said
assets.
FACTS: Gelacio Sebial died intestate in 1943 in Pinamungajan Cebu. According to
the appellants, Gelacio Sebial, by his first wife Leoncia Manikis, who allegedly
died in 1919, begot three children named Roberta, Balbina and Juliano. By his
second wife, Dolores Enad, whom he allegedly married in 1927, he supposedly
begot six children named Benjamina, Valentina, Ciriaco, Gregoria, Esperanza and
Luciano. Benjamina Sebial filed a petition for settlement and prayed that she be
appointed administratrix thereof. Roberta Sebial opposed the petition on the
ground that the estate of Gelacio Sebial had already been partitioned among his
children and that, if an administration proceeding was necessary, she, Roberta
Sebial, a resident of Guimbawian, a remote mountain barrio of Pinamungajan,
where the decedent's estate was supposedly located, should be the one
appointed administratrix and not Benjamina Sebial, a housemaid working at
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Talisay, Cebu which is about seventy kilometers away from Pinamungajan. In a
supplemental opposition the children of the first marriage contended that the
remedy of Benjamina Sebial was an action to rescind the partition. The lower
court appointed Benjamina Sebial as administratrix. It found that the descedent
left an estate consisting of lands with an area of twenty-one hectares, valued at
more than six thousand pesos, and that the alleged partition of the decedent's
estate was invalid and ineffective. The oppositors moved for the reconsideration
of the order appointing Benjamina Sebial as administratrix. They insisted that the
decedent's estate had been partitioned on August 29, 1945. On April 27, 1961
Benjamina Sebial filed an inventory and appraisal of the decedent's estate
allegedly consisting of seven unregistered parcels of land. The oppositors
registered their opposition to the inventory on the ground that the seven parcels
of land enumerated in the inventory no longer formed part of the decedent's
estate. On May 6, 1961, the administratrix filed a motion to require Lorenzo
Rematado, Demetrio Camillo and the spouses Roberta Sebial and Lazaro Recuelo
to deliver to her the parcels of land. The lower court required the administratrix
to furnish the court with another inventory. The administratrix reproduced her
earlier inventory but added two houses allegedly received by the children of the
first marriage. An opposition was interposed to the said inventory. Oppositors-
appellants appealed from the two orders of the probate court both dated
December 11, 1961, one approving the amended inventory of the decedent's
estate filed by the duly appointed administratrix and the other directing the heirs
or persons in possession of certain properties of the estate to deliver them to the
administratrix. Oppositors- appellants claim, among many points, that the
valuation of the inventoried properties were fake, fictitious and fantastic; that the
inventory is not supported by documentary evidence; and that an ordinary civil
action is necessary to recover the lands in possession of third persons.
ISSUE: Whether an ordinary civil action for recovery of property and not an
administration proceeding is the proper remedy, considering oppositors'
allegation that the estate of Gelacio Sebial was partitioned in 1945 and that some
of his heirs had already sold their respective shares
RULING: The probate court should ascertain what assets constituted the estate
of Gelacio Sebial, what happened to those assets and whether the children of the
second marriage (the petitioner was a child of the second marriage and the
principal oppositor was a child of first marriage) could still have a share,
howsoever small, in the decedent's estate. The said order is erroneous and
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should be set aside because the probate court failed to receive evidence as to the
ownership of the said parcels of land. The general rule is that questions of title to
property cannot be passed upon in a testate or intestate proceeding. However,
when the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit
to the probate court the question of title to property and, when so submitted, the
probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon. Lorenzo Rematado and
Lazaro Recuelo are not heirs of the decedent. They are third persons. The rule is
that matters affecting property under administration may be taken cognizance of
by the probate court in the course of the intestate proceeding provided that the
interests of third persons are not prejudiced. However, third persons to whom the
decedent's assets had been fraudulently conveyed may be cited to appear in
court and be examined under oath as to how they came into the possession of
the decedent's assets (Sec. 6, Rule 87, Rules of Court) but a separate action
would be necessary to recover the said assets. The probate court should receive
evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of
decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of
some of the assets. The probate court should require the parties to present
further proofs on the ownership of the seven parcels of land and the materials of
the two houses enumerated in the amended inventory of November 17, 1961, on
the alleged partition effected in 1945 and on the allegations in oppositors'
inventory dated November 7, 1961. Probate court’s order set aside. Case
remanded for further proceedings.
G.R. No. L-27082 January 31, 1978
Intestate Estate of the Spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba.
FILOMENO COCA, Administrator, PRIMA PANGILINAN, and HEIRS OF
CONCEPCION PANGILINAN-YAMUTA, namely, MARIA P. YAMUTA DE
ATAY, EUSEBIO P. YAMUTA, and APOLINAR P. YAMUTA,
VS.
GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN, HEIRS OF FRANCISCO
PANGILINAN, namely, FRANCIS, ALGERIAN, BENJAMIN, PERLA and
FRANCISCO, JR., all surnamed PANGILINAN, and CRISPIN BORROMEO
G.R. No. L-29545 January 31, 1978
FILOMENO COCA VS. CRISPIN BORROMEO and GUADALUPE PIZARRAS
VDA. DE PANGILINAN and her Children
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FACTS: The spouses Juan Pan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in 1943 and
1948, respectively. They possession a homestead, consisting of two parcels of
land, located at Barrio Bunawan or Mauswagon, Calamba, Misamis Occidental.
The spouses were survived by the following heirs: (1) Prima Pangilinan, (2)
Maria, Eusebio and Apolinar all surnamed Yamuta, the children of Concepcion
Pangilinan Yamuta and (3) Francis, A Benjamin Perla and Francisco, Jr., all
surnamed Pan the children of Francisco Pangilinan and who was also survived by
his widow, Guadalupe Pizarras. (It is not clear whether Roseller, Demosthenes
and Eliza, all surnamed Japay, were the children of the deceased Helen
Pangilinan, presumably a daughter of Francisco Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba.
A Special Proceeding in CFI of Misamis Occidental was instituted for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa
Magtuba. The administrator presented a project of partition wherein the
combined areas of Lots Nos. 1112 and 1927 were partitioned. It was also
provided in the project of partition that the alleged debt of the estate to
Concepcion Pangilinan should be divided equally among the three sets of heirs
and that Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should pay that
amount to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan.
The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan opposed that project of partition. They
contended that the proposed partition contravened the lower court's order which
recognized the right of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan to a twelve-hectare
portion of Lot No. 1112; that Prima Pangilinan, who sold her share to Francisco
Pan should be excluded from the partition; that the total share of the heirs of
Francisco Pangilinan in Lot No. 1112 is 12.6720 hectares, while that of the heirs
of Concepcion Pangilinan is 6.3360 hectares, and that the claim of the heirs of
Concepcion Pangilinan for 115,088.50 had not been properly allowed.
The lower court directed the administrator to pay the debt of the estate to the
heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. It deferred action on the project of partition until
the ownership of the twelve hectares, which were claimed by the heirs of
Francisco Pangilinan and the six hectares, which were claimed by Crispen
Borromeo is determined in an ordinary action. The lower court reiterated its order
of October 2, 1965 that the administrator should pay the heirs of Concepcion
Pangilinan the amount to be reimbursed to her estate. The court further directed
the administrator to account for the income of the estate, to recover any amount
due from the special administrator, and to pay the claim of Crispin Borromeo and
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the amount due to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan as directed in its order of
August 31, 1966 and in its approval of the accounting of the special
administrator.
The appellant contend that the lower court, as a probate court, has no
jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion of Lot No.
1112. On the other hand, the appellees" or the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan
counter that the lower court did not decide the ownership of the twelve hectares
when it ordered their exclusion from the project of partition. So, the problem is
how the title to the twelve hectares should be decided, whether in a separate
action or in the intestate. proceeding. It should be clarified that whether a
particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise
of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a
jurisdictional question.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ownership of a parcel of land, whether belonging to
the deceased spouses or to their heirs, should be decided in the intestate
proceeding or in a separate action.
RULING: As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not
passed upon in the estate or intestate proceeding. That question should
ventilated in a separate action. (Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976,
SCRA 262, 266). That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified
expediency and convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a
piece of property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action
Lachenal vs. Salas, supra).
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or
ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction
by the probate court and the rights of 'third parties are not impaired, then the
probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.
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We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the
general rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate
action.
Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the
twelve-hectare portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from
title inventory .The only interested parties are the heirs who have all appeared in
the intestate proceeding.
Thus, (1) the lower court's amended order of August 31, 1966, excluding twelve
hectares from the partition of the estate of the deceased Pangilinan spouses (L-
27082) and (2) the two orders dated May 11, 1968, regarding the claim of
Guadalupe.
The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance
with the guidelines already set forth.
MORALES VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, BR. V, ATTY.
ROLANDO DIAZ, in his capacity as Administrator of the Intestate Estate
be of SIMONA PAMUTI, ROBERTO MELGAR and FELISA JARDIN
be G.R. No. L-47125 December 29, 1986
71
by
As gleaned from the pleadings together with the annexes filed by the parties to
this petition, the property is a salt bed fishpond located at Bacoor, Cavite,
Simona Pamuti mortgaged the property in favor of petitioner Princesita Santero
Morales in consideration of the sum of P15,000.00. The property, following
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, was sold at public auction to Princesita.
FACTS: Simona Pamuti was the spouse of Pascual Santero with whom she begot
a son named Pablo Santero. During the lifetime of Pablo, he cohabited and had
children with three women, namely, Adela, Anselma and Feliberta. Pablo had a
child with Adela, seven children with Anselma and five with Feliberta. The
petitioner Princesita Santero Morales is Pablo's eldest natural child with Feliberta.
Simona survived both her husband Pascual and son Pablo. Petitions for letters of
administration of the intestate estate of Pascual and Pablo Santero, Special
Proceedings Nos. N-2061 and N-2062 were filed by Juanito Santero, Pablo's
eldest natural child with Anselma as petitioner. Princesita was an oppositor in
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these proceedings whereas the respondent Clerk of Court, Atty. Rolando Diaz,
was appointed, first, as special administrator and later as regular administrator.
During the pendency of the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate
estates of Pascual and Pablo, Juanito filed a petition for guardianship over the
properties of Simona Pamuti. ln this guardianship proceeding, the respondent
Clerk of Court was appointed legal guardian of Simona Pamuti. As such guardian,
he filed a motion to use the funds of the estates of Pascual and Pablo to redeem
Simona's property that had been sold at auction to petitioner Princesita..
Princesita opposed the motion on the ground that the funds that are in the
possession of the respondent Clerk of Court in his capacity as administrator are
held by him in trust for the benefit of Pascual's and Pablo's heirs who "have not
yet been judicially determined".
In 1976, Simona Pamuti died intestate. In the special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of Simona, where one Felisa Pamuti-Jardin who claimed
to be Simona's sole surviving heir was the petitioner, the herein petitioner
Princesita was allowed to intervene not as heir but as "creditors of the intestate
estate of the late Simona Pamuti, or as co-owners, together with said intestate
estates, of certain properties as the interests of said oppositors may appear". The
respondent Clerk of Court in his capacity as administrator of the intestate estate
of Simona Pamuti, filed a "Motion to Order the Provincial Sheriff of Cavite To
Issue Certificate of Redemption" alleging that before the expiration of the
redemption period on August 4, 1975, payment of the redemption amount had
been tendered and accepted by the Provincial Sheriff of Cavite; that upon request
of the sheriff, another amount was tendered and accepted by the sheriff's deputy
and that the sheriff, having received the full redemption price, is duty bound to
issue a certificate of redemption in favor of the estate of Simona. The provincial
sheriff was the only party furnished with a copy of the motion.
In 1977, the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the
grounds that the respondent probate court does not have jurisdiction to
resolve the validity of the redemption of the property in question; that
there was no valid redemption and that the motion was resolved without
giving the herein petitioners a chance to be heard.
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The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. The respondent Court
reiterated the facts mentioned in its January 13, 1977 Order, and justified its
order for the issuance of the certificate of redemption as within its power "to
inquire regarding the proper implementation" of the previous order of August 4,
1975 requiring the immediate redemption of the property. This Court, sitting as a
probate court was acting upon a mere incident of redemption that arose in the
settlement of the estates under reference and that, as such, this Court did not
rule categorically as to which party is the rightful owner of the property in
question as the right of ownership could and should be ruled upon in case of any
dispute in a separate action before the proper court.
ISSUE: The instant petition was filed questioning the validity of the Orders of
January 13, 1977, May 17, 1977 and June 16, 1977 on the principal ground that
the issue regarding the validity of the redemption involves a question of
ownership which is outside the jurisdiction of the respondent court as a probate
court and that the petitioners may be deprived of possession of the property only
through a separate civil action.
RULING: The petition is meritorious. As stated in Cuizon vs. Ramolete, 129
SCRA 495, 499 - It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of
proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to
belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said
properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is
no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and
the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination
of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
Similarly, in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, (91 SCRA 540) we
held that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or
should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the
title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the
parties.
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In the case at bar, the question regarding the validity of the redemption which
was supposed to have been made by the respondent clerk of court as guardian
and then later as administrator of the estate of Simona Pamuti, is determinative
of the ownership of the property in question. The Order wherein the validity of
the redemption was upheld is effectively a judgment that the property is owned
by the estate of Simona Pamuti. At that time, the petitioners had already
asserted ownership having executed the affidavit of consolidation on August 8,
1975, and the administrator of Simona's estate, on the other hand had likewise
asserted his redemption of the property, having deposited with the sheriff the
check in the amount which was believed to be the proper redemption price. Since
the sheriff did not issue a final deed in favor of the petitioners, and neither did he
issue a certificate of redemption in favor of the estate of Simona, there was,
then, a clearly existing ownership contest between the parties.
According to settled jurisprudence, such controversy is outside the jurisdiction of
the probate court. Parenthetically, it must be mentioned that the respondent
court itself had, at that time, already determined that the petitioners are
intervenors in the settlement proceedings of Simona's estate not as heirs but as
"co-owners" with the intestate estates, and the respondent court in fact would
later state in the January 13, 1977 order that the petitioners have "not been
called to participate in the proceedings." The petitioners, are, therefore, outside
parties claiming title to property included in the inventory of properties under
administration.
To use the language of Bolisay vs. Alcid, 85 SCRA 213, it does appear strange
that the respondent court, after saying that it "did not rule categorically as to
which party is the rightful owner of the property in question", proceeded to Order
thereafter that the possession should be surrendered by the petitioners. Such
latter Order clearly indicated that the respondent court stated the opposite of
what it meant.
Thus, the questioned Orders are declared VOID for having been issued beyond
the jurisdiction of the probate court.
G.R. No. 171206 September 23, 2013
HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES FLA VIANO MAGLASANG and SALUD
ADAZA-MAGLASANG, namely, OSCAR A. MAGLASANG, EDGAR A.
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MAGLASANG, CONCEPCION CHONA A. MAGLASANG, GLENDA A.
MAGLASANG-ARNAIZ, LERMA A. MAGLASANG, FELMA A. · MAGLASANG,
FE DORIS A. MAGLASANG, LEOLINO A. MAGLASANG, MARGIE LEILA A.
MAGLASANG,MA. MILALIE A. MAGLASANG, SALUD A. MAGLASANG, and
MA. FLASALIE A. MAGLASANG, REPRESENTING THE ESTATES OF THEIR
AFORE-NAMEDDECEASED PARENTS VS. MANILA BANKING
CORPORATION, now substituted by FIRST SOVEREIGN ASSET
MANAGEMENT SPV-AMC, INC. FSAMI,
DOCTRINE: There are 3 remedies/options by secured creditor under Sec. 7, Rule
86: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the
mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove
the deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or
other security and foreclose the same before it is barred by prescription, without
the right to file a claim for any deficiency. These may be ALTERNATIVELY
adopted for the satisfaction of his indebtedness. However, these
remedies are distinct, independent and mutually EXCLUSIVE from each
other; the election of one effectively BARS the exercise of the others.
FACTS: On June 16, 1975, Sps. Flaviano and Salud Maglasang obtained a credit
line from Manila Banking Corp. for P350,000 which was secured by a real estate
mortgage executed over 7 of their properties in Ormoc City and Kananga, Leyte.
They availed of their credit line by securing two loans both due and demandable
within 1 year with interest at 12% per annum and additional 4% penalty charged
upon default. When Flaviano Maglasang died, his son Edgar was appointed as
Atty-in-fact by Flaviano’s heirs. He filed a petition for letters of administration of
Flaviano’s intestate estate w/c the probate court granted. Court issued a Notice
to Creditors for filing of money claims against the estate. MBC notified the court
of its claim. When the Court terminated the proceedings and executed an extra-
judicial partition over the properties, the loan obligations owed to MBC remained
unsatisfied though the court recognized the rights of MBC to foreclose the
mortgage.
During the pendency of the intestate proceedings, Edgar and Oscar were able to
obtain several loans from Manila Banking Corp, secured by promissory notes
which they signed.
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MBC extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage; however, after auction sale, a
deficiency remained on Maglasangs’ obligation. Thus, it filed a suit to recover the
deficiency. RTC-former probate court directed the Maglasangs to pay Manila
Banking Corp. jointly and severally, P434,742.36 representing the deficiency of
the former’s total loan obligation to the latter after the extra-judicial foreclosure
of the REM with interest at the rate of 12% p.a., plus a 4% penalty charge,
reckoned from Sept. 5, 1984 until fully paid + attys. fees (10% of the
outstanding obligation).
The Maglasangs appealed to CA contending that under Remedies available to
Manila Banking Corp. under Sec. 7, Rule 86 of ROC are alternative and exclusive,
such that the election of one operates as a waiver of the others and since MBC
filed a claim in the probate court, it has abandoned its right to foreclose the
property and is barred from recovering any deficiency. CA denied the appeal and
contended that Act. 3135 applies w/c allows MBC to extrajudicially foreclose and
recover the deficiency. Maglasang’s MR was subsequently denied; hence, this
petition for review on certiorari by Heirs of Sps. Maglasang contending that it is
not Act No. 3135 but Sec. 7, Rule 86 of ROC which applies in this case. The
extra-judicial foreclosure of the subject properties was null and void, not having
been conducted in the capital of the Province of Leyte in violation of the
stipulations in the real estate mortgage contract.
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s award of the
deficiency amount in favor of Manila Banking Corporation? (YES) [corollarily,
Whether Sec. 7, Rule 86 of ROC and not Act. 3135 applies in this case? (Both
apply concordantly)]
2) Whether extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject properties was null and
void? (NO)
RULING: The petition is partly meritorious.
(1) Both Sec. 7, Rule 86 of ROC and Act. 3135 apply complementarily in the case
at bar. Foreclosure under the 3rd remedy in Sec. 7, Rule 86 of ROC includes
extrajudicial foreclosure under Act. 3135. However, upon choosing said remedy,
creditor waives his right to recover the deficiency. Claims against deceased
persons should be filed during the settlement proceedings of their
estate. Such proceedings are primarily governed by special rules found
under Rules 73 to 90 of the Rules, although rules governing ordinary
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actions may, as far as practicable, apply suppletorily. Among these special
rules, Sec. 7, Rule 86 of ROC provides the rule in dealing with secured claims
against the estate.
Sec. 7, Rule 86 of ROC: Mortgage debt due from estate. – A creditor holding a
claim against the deceased secured by a mortgage or other collateral security,
may abandon the security and PROSECUTE his claim in the manner provided in
this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; OR he
may FORECLOSE his mortgage or realize upon his security, by ACTION in court,
making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a
judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the
property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the
security, he may CLAIM HIS DEFICIENCY judgment in the manner provided in the
preceding section; OR he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone,
and FORECLOSE the same at any time within the period of the statute of
limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall
receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing
herein contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming the
property mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held as
security, under the direction of the court, if the court shall adjudged it to be for
the best interest of the estate that such redemption shall be made.
The application of the procedure under Act No. 3135 must be concordant with
Sec. 7, Rule 86 as the latter is a special rule applicable to claims against the
estate. At the same time, since Sec. 7, Rule 86 does not detail the procedure for
extra-judicial foreclosures, the formalities governing the manner of availing of the
3rd option – such as the place where the application for extra-judicial foreclosure
is filed, the requirements of publication and posting and the place of sale – must
be governed by Act No. 3135.
Hence, Extra-judicial foreclosure subject of this case was properly conducted in
accordance with the formalities of Act No. 3135. The same was a valid exercise of
Manila Banking's third option under Section 7, Rule 86. Manila Banking cannot,
however, file any suit to recover any deficiency amount since it effectively waived
its right thereto when it chose to avail of extra-judicial foreclosure as
jurisprudence instructs. DISPOSITIVE: Petition PARTLY GRANTED. The complaint
for the recovery of the deficiency amount after extra-judicial foreclosure.
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ROBERTS VS. JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First
Instance of Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II
and LINDA GRIMM
G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984
FACTS: Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died on November 27,
1977. He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two
children, named Pete and Linda and by Juanita and Ethel his two children by a
first marriage which ended in divorce. He executed in 1959 two wills in San
Francisco, California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate which he described
as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second will disposed of
his estate outside the Philippines. In both wills, the second wife and two children
were favored. The two children of the first marriage were given their legitimes in
the will disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the will dealing with his
property outside this country, the testator said: “I purposely have made no
provision in this will for my daughter, Juanita Grimm Morris, or my daughter, Elsa
Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have provided for each of
them in a separate will disposing of my Philippine property.”
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm in
Utah. Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in
Manila by Ethel. In its order, the Third Judicial District Court of Utah admitted to
probate the two wills and the codicil.
Maxine and her two children as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita and their
mother as the second parties, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in
Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. It
was signed by the lawyers of the parties, by Pete and Linda and the attorney-in-
fact of Maxine and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and
Juanita Kegley Grimm. In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and
Ethel would be designated as personal representatives (administrators) of
Grimm's Philippine estate. It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half conjugal
share in the estate should be reserved for her and that would not be less than
$1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila. The agreement
indicated the computation of the "net distributable estate". It recognized that the
estate was liable to pay the fees of the Angara law firm.
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It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall share
equally in the Net Distributable Estate" and that Ethel and Juanita Morris should
each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate and
marital share. A supplemental memorandum also dated April 25, 1978 was
executed by the parties.
At this juncture, it should be stated that forty-three days after Grimm's death, his
daughter of the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers filed with Branch 20 of
the Manila CFI intestate proceeding No. 113024 for the settlement of his estate.
She was named special administratrix.
The second wife, Maxine filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate
proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the
probate of Grimm's will. She also moved that she be appointed special
administratrix. She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his
Philippine estate.
The intestate court noted that Maxine, through a new lawyer, withdrew that
opposition and motion to dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete,
appointed them joint administrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant to the
aforementioned Utah compromise agreement. The court ignored the will already
found in the record.
The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and approval
of the court, they sold the so-called Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned by
the deceased. Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and
Juanita, they sold 193,267 shares of RFM Corporation.
Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by
lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two children),
Judge Molina adjudicated to Maxine onehalf (4/8) of the decedent's Philippine
estate and one-eighth (1/8) each to his four children. Six days later, or on August
2, Maxine and her two children replaced Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their
lawyer who moved to defer approval of the project of partition. The court
considered the motion moot considering that it had already approved the
declaration of heirs and project of partition.
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Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979 alleged that he was
no longer connected with Makiling Management Co., Inc. when the Palawan Pearl
Project was sold: that it was Maxine's son Pete who negotiated the sale with Rex
Roberts and that he (Limqueco) was going to sue Maxine for the lies she imputed
to him (Annex H, p. 78, testate case).
On September 8, 1980, Atty. Vinluan of the Angara law firm in behalf of Maxine,
Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition praying for the
probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition
approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration
revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be
ordered to account for the properties received by them and to return the same to
Maxine.
Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to the
machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement
was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and
that the partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of
merit. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court,
praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or. alternatively that the two
proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the
annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for
probate.
ISSUE: The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and
to annul a partition, approved in an intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the
Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after a
probate in the Utah district court).
RULING: YES. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died
with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed". The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that
the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate
proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate
proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue
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hearing the two cases. Hence, the respondent judge did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to
dismiss.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an
opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss
and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in
the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices and other
papers in the testate case.
WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is
dissolved. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
URIARTE VS. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
(12th Judicial District) THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA,
BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and HIGINIO URIARTE,
G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970
FACTS: On November 6, 1961, Vicente Uriarte filed with the CFI Negros a
petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte alleging
therein that as a natural son of the latter, he was the sole heir and that during
the lifetime of said decedent, Vicente had instituted a civil case in CFI Negros for
his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son CFI Negros appointed the
PNB as special administrator and later set the date for the hearing of the petition
and ordered that the requisite notices be published in accordance with law. The
record discloses, however, that, for one reason or another, PNB never actually
qualified as special administrator. On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte filed an
opposition to the petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan
Uriarte who had executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain, a duly
authenticated copy whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted to
the court upon receipt and further questioning Vicente’s capacity and interest to
commence the intestate proceeding.
On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona commenced a special proceeding in
CFI Manila for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the
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deceased Juan Uriarte and filed with CFI Negros a Motion to Dismiss on these
grounds:
 As a deceased left a last will, there was no basis to proceed with the
intestate proceedings
 Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate the
intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the
decedent.
Vicente opposed the Motion to Dismiss contending that, as CFI Negros was first
to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of Juan Uriarte, it had acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over the same. CFI Negros granted Juan Uriarte
Zamacona’s Motion and dismissed the proceeding before it. The Motion for
Reconsideration was denied. He filed a notice of appeal, appeal bond and record
on appeal. The administrator appointed by CFI Manila objected to the approval of
the record on appeal. While this was pending, Vicente Uriarte filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Therefore, the CFI of Negros disapproved the record on appeal to give way to the
certiorari. Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in CFI Manila asking for leave
to intervene therein, for the dismissal of the petition and for the annulment of the
proceedings had in the special proceeding therein but the Motion was denied. It
appears from the records that Vicente had filed a civil case in the CFI of Negros
during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte to obtain judgment for his compulsory
acknowledgement as his natural child. It is likewise clear that at the time he filed
the action, as well as when he commenced the petition for settlement of estate,
he had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte. The record
further discloses that the special proceeding before CFI Negros has not gone
further than the appointment of PNB as special administrator (who failed to
qualify).
On the other hand, CFI Manila admitted to probate the document submitted to it,
as the last will of Juan Uriarte, the petition for probate appearing not to have
been contested.
ISSUE: Whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have filed the petition for
probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte with CFI Negros or was entitled to
commenced the corresponding separate proceedings in CFI Manila.
RULING: Rule 73, Section: the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines
at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first
instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is
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an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in
which he had estate.
The deceased Juan Uriarte was a non-resident alien. Therefore, the CFIs in
provinces where he left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the proper special proceedings for the settlement of his estate.
Vicente argues that when CFI Negros took cognizance, CFI Manila no longer had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the special proceeding. It cannot be denied that
a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a
deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or
in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the
settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with
settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement
of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings
for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of
intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the
decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should
replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had
already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn
over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. These
facts support the view that Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have submitted the will
for probate in CFI Negros either in a separate special proceeding or in an
appropriate motion in the already pending special proceeding: 1. It is not in
accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of
justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be
involved. 2. When Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente’s petition for the
issuance of letters of sdministration, he had already informed the Negros Court
that the deceased Juan Uriarte had left a will in Spain, of which a copy had been
requested for submission to CFI Negros. When Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed his
MTD in CFI Negros, he had submitted there a copy of the alleged will of the
decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that he knew before filing the
petition for probate with the Manila Court that there was already a special
proceeding pending in CFi negros for the settlement of the estate of the same
deceased person. It is well settled that wrong venue is merely a waivable
procedural defect, and in the light of the circumstances obtaining in this case,
Vicente has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so
by laches. He knew of the existence of the will since 1961 when Higinio Urirate
opposed the initial petition in CFI Negros. He was also served with notice of the
alleged will and of the filing of petition for its probate when Juan Uriarte
44

Zamacona filed an MTD in CFI Negros on 1962. He only filed the omnibus motion
in the Manila Court on April 1963. By then, The Manila Court had already
appointed an administrator and had admitted the will to probate. Toa llow him
now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila
court and the validity of all the proceedings therein would put a premium on his
negligence. SC is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court
even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to
have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction;
more so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is
raised too late. DISPOSITIVE petition dismissed.
Codoy v. Calugay
312 SCRA 333
FACTS:
On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas,
devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda.
de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the said will. They attested to the
genuineness and due execution of the will on 30 August 1978.
Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that
the will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. They raised doubts as
regards the repeated appearing on the will after every disposition, calling the
same out of the ordinary. If the will was in the handwriting of the deceased, it
was improperly procured.
Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various documentary
evidence.
The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who produced and
identified the records of the case bearing the signature of the deceased.
The second witness was election registrar who was made to produce and identify
the voter’s affidavit, but failed to as the same was already destroyed and no
longer available.
The third, the deceased’s niece, claimed that she had acquired familiarity with
the deceased’s signature and handwriting as she used to accompany her in
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collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings and
the deceased always issued receipts. The niece also testified that
the deceased left a holographic will entirely written, dated and signed by
said deceased.
The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the intestate
proceedings of her late husband, who said that the signature on the will was
similar to that of the deceased but that he can not be sure.
The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she was familiar with
the signature of the deceased which appeared in the latter’s application for
pasture permit. The fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she had
lived with the deceased since birth where she had become familiar with her
signature and that the one appearing on the will was genuine.
Codoy and Ramonal’s demurrer to evidence was granted by the lower court. It
was reversed on appeal with the Court of Appeals which granted the probate.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses
explicitly declare the signature in a contested will as the genuine signature of the
testator, is mandatory or directory.
2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity and due
execution of the deceased’s holographic will.
HELD:
1. YES. The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation
and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that
the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory.
In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the
wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that
unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the
wishes of the testator.
45

The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true
intent of the deceased.
2. NO. We cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of
the deceased.
The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature
appearing in the holographic will was that of the deceased.
The election registrar was not able to produce the voter’s affidavit
for verification as it was no longer available.
The deceased’s niece saw pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased and
did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note.
The will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the
possession of the said niece, who kept the fact about the will from the children of
the deceased, putting in issue her motive.
Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the decreased write a note or
sign a document.
The former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the
signature in the holographic will.
(As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness requirement was not complied
with.)
A visual examination of the holographic will convinces that the strokes are
different when compared with other documents written by the testator.
The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce evidence in support
of their opposition.
The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
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guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should
be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other
hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law
to restrain and curtail the exercise the right to make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged
as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, the
law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of
the deceased.
Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: “In the probate of a holographic will, it shall
be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature
of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such
witnesses shall be required.”
The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word
“shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory.
Gerilla v. Carolina vda. de Figuracion, et. al.,
G.R. No.154322, August 22, 2006;
Facts:
Spouses Leandro and Carolina Figuracion, now both deceased, had six children:
the petitioner and respondents herein. Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over
his real properties in favor of his six children. When Leandro died, he left behind
two parcels of land, a portion of Lot 2299 and 705 in Urdaneta, both of which he
inherited from his deceased parents. Another parcel of land, Lot 707, was
inherited by Carolina and her half-sister Agripina when their father Eulalio
Adviento died. Agripina then executed a quitclaim over the one-half eastern
portion of the lot in favor of petitioner, Emilia, who died single and without any
issue. Before her half-sister’s death, however, Carolina adjudicated unto herself,
via affidavit under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court the entire Lot 707 which she
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later sold to respondents Felipe and Hilaria. Petitioner and her family went to the
United States where they stayed for ten years. When she returned, she built a
house made of strong materials on the eastern half-portion of Lot 707. Sometime
later, petitioner sought the extrajudicial partition of all properties held in common
by her and respondents. The Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, upon a
complaint filed by petitioner, rendered judgment nullifying Carolina’s affidavit of
self-adjudication and deed of absolute sale of Lot 707. The RTC, however,
dismissed the complaint for partition, reconveyance and damages on the ground
that reliefs prayed for cannot be granted without any prior settlement
proceedings. The CA upheld the dismissal of petitioner’s action for partition for
being premature but reversed the decision with respect to the nullification and
the deed of absolute sale. Hence, this present petition.

Issue: Whether or not there needs to be a prior settlement of Leandro’s intestate

estate (that is, an accounting of the income of Lots 2299 and 705, the payment
of expenses and liabilities and taxes, etc.) before the properties can be
partitioned or distributed

Ruling:

Yes. Partition is inappropriate in a situation where there remains an issue as to

the expenses chargeable to the estate. Although petitioner points out that the
estate is allegedly without any debt and respondents are the only legal heirs, she
does not dispute the finding of the CA that certain expenses including those
related to her father’s final illness and burial have not been properly settled.
Thus, with respect to Lot 2299, the heirs have to submit their father’s estate to
settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an
action for partition. The heirs or distributees, however, may take possession of
the estate even before the settlement of accounts as long as they file a bond
conditioned on the payment of the estate’s obligations.With respect to the
partition of Lot 705, partition was deemed premature since ownershipof the lot is
still in dispute. As regards Lot 707, the Court made no ruling on the validity of
Carolina’s affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of sale since a separate case is
still pending in the same Division of the Court.

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RULE 74 The Court ruled that this case falls under the exception of the rule on separate
intestate proceedings.
G.R. No. 204029 June 4, 2014
The general rule is that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding, not in an independent civil action. However, the Court also ruled that
AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her heirs, except
recourse to administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned
Emelinda R. Gualvez] and SALVADOR A. OROSCO, Petitioners,
only if there is a good and compelling reason for such recourse.
vs.
SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the CITY
ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY,Respondents. The Court had allowed exceptions to the rule requiring administration
proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered
FACTS:
judgment upon the issues it defined during the pre-trial.

Petitioner Avelina was one of the children of Eulalio who died intestate. On his
Similar to the case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, in the present case, there
death, Eulalio left behind an untitled parcel of land in Legazpi City.
appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as
the inheritance from Eulalio.
In 2001, Avelina was supposedly made to sign two documents by her daughter
Emelinda and her son-in-law Domingo, respondents in this case, on the pretext
It would be more practical, as Portugal teaches, to dispense with a separate
that the documents were needed to facilitate the titling of the lot. It was only in
special proceeding for the determination of the status of petitioner Avelina as sole
2003, so petitioners claim, that Avelina realized that what she signed was an
heir of Eulalio, especially in light of the fact that respondents spouses
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents.
Gualvez admitted in court that they knew for a fact that petitioner
Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador was
Petitioners filed a complaint for annulment and revocation of an Affidavit of Self- one of the other living heirs with rights over the subject land.
Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale. After trial, RTC held the annulment of
the subject documents. CA reversed RTC’s decision. CA held that the RTC erred in
Accordingly, the court a quo had properly rendered judgment on the validity of
annulling the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication simply on petitioners’ allegation of the
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Avelina. As pointed out by the trial
existence of the heirs of Eulalio, considering that issues on heirship must be
court, an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper when the affiant is the sole
made in administration or intestate proceedings, not in an ordinary civil action.
heir of the decedent.
Further, the appellate court observed that the Deed of Absolute Sale cannot be
nullified as it is a notarized document that has in its favor the presumption of
regularity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner,
vs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue on heirship in this case must be raised in a COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO, ANTONIO
separate administration or intestate proceedings. AVELINO, JR., TRACY AVELINO, PATRICK MICHAEL AVELINO and MARK
ANTHONY AVELINO, respondents.
RULING: No.
FACTS:

48

Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late
Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent Angelina Avelino.
The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark
Anthony all surnamed Avelino are likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr.
Sharon, an American, is the second wife of Avelino Sr. The other private
respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.
Ma. Socorro filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Antonio
Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on She asked that she be appointed the
administrator of the estate.
On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by filing a
motion to convert the said judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition
which petitioner duly opposed.
Trial Court ruled that the petition is converted into judicial partition of the estate
of deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr. The parties are directed to submit a complete
inventory of all the real and personal properties left by the deceased.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated
June 16, 1993.
Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, in granting private respondents' motion
to convert the judicial proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration to
an action for judicial partition.
ISSUE: w/n respondent appellate court committed an error of law and gravely
abused its discretion in upholding the trial court's finding that a partition is
proper.
RULING:
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When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will
or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish
the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be
judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified
administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78.5 The exceptions to
this rule are found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 746
The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased
at the moment of the latter's death. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court,
allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves without need of delay and
risks of being dissipated. When a person dies without leaving pending obligations,
his heirs, are not required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor
apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court.
The basis for the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It
provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate
and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for partition
may be resorted to, as in this case. We have held that where the more
expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the
majority of them may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings.
The trial court appropriately converted petitioner's action for letters of
administration into a suit for judicial partition, upon motion of the private
respondents. No reversible error may be attributed to the Court of Appeals when
it found the trial court's action procedurally in order.
G.R. No. 161220 July 30, 2008
SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO
substituted by their heirs, namely: Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and
Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and SPOUSES RENATO C. BENATIRO
and ROSIE M. BENATIRO, Respondents,
vs.
HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia
Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos, represented by
their attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos, Respondents.
FACTS:
49

Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with nine
children, namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia,
Numeriano, and Enrique. On August 28, 1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of
land, all under the name of Agatona Arrogante.
On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian represented by Atty.
Victor Elliot Lepiten, filed before the CFI a petition4 for Letters of Administration.
The petition was opposed by Gloria’s brother, Francisco, who was represented by
Atty. Jesus Yray.
In the hearing, both parties together with their respective counsels appeared.
Both counsels manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle
their case. Both counsels suggested that the Clerk of Court, Atty. Andres C.
Taneo (Atty. Taneo), be appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the
agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of partition for the approval
of the court. Hence, Atty Taneo was appointed.
In Atty Taneo’s Commissioner's Report, he stated that he issued subpoenae
supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to cause their appearance on
February 28 and 29, 1976 in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties
are located, for a conference or meeting to arrive at an agreement; that out of
the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed to attend;
that per return of the service, these three heirs could not be located in their
respective given addresses; that since some of the heirs present resided outside
the province of Cebu, they decided to go ahead with the scheduled meeting.
Quoting the Commissioner’s Report, the CFI issued the assailed Order ruling that
the compromise agreement as embodied in the report of the commissioner is
hereby approved.
Respondents, Salud Cuyos, for herself and in representation16 of the other heirs
of Evaristo Cuyos, filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the Order of the
CFI under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. They alleged that the CFI Order was null
and void and of no effect, the same being based on a Commissioner's Report,
which was patently false and irregular; that such report practically deprived them
of due process in claiming their share of their father's estate.
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ISSUE: whether the heirs were notified before the compromise agreement was
arrived at.
Ruling: No
In Cua v. Vargas, in which the issue was whether heirs were deemed
constructively notified of and bound by an extra-judicial settlement and partition
of the estate, regardless of their failure to participate therein, when the extra-
judicial settlement and partition has been duly published, we held:
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding.
The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or
had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It
contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed
of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all
interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial
settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already
been executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication
of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the
heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was
notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the
protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful
participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the
present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement
documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the
present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind
respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is
invalid insofar as they are concerned 36 (Emphasis supplied)
Nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a hearing to
validate the Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the
absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI
adopted the Report despite the statement therein that only six out of the nine
heirs attended the conference, thus, effectively depriving the other heirs of their
chance to be heard. The CFI's action was tantamount to a violation of the
50

constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due
process of law. We find that the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976, which
approved a void Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of due
process.
Utulo v. Pasion vda. de Garcia, 66 Phil. 303
Facts:
Juan Sanchez died intestate leaving his widow and 3 children as heirs. His widow,
Vda. de Garcia was appointed administratix. One of their children Luz, died
leaving her spouse Pablo Utulo and her mother as forced heirs. Utulo commenced
the judicial administration of her properties where Vda. de Garcia opposed
arguing that there is no need for judicial administration and in case it should be
granted by court that she be appointed administratix. The CFI appointed Utulo as
judicial administrator hence this appeal.
Issue: W/N there was need of judicial administration
Held: NO
The general rule as provided for in Sec. 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that
that “if no executor is named in the will, or if a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted”. However this is subject to 2 exceptions provided
by Secs. 596 and 597 of the same Code. Sec. 596 provides that when all the
heirs are of lawful age, and there are no debts due from the estate, they may
agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator. Sec. 597
provides that if the property left does not exceed P6,000, the heirs may apply to
the competent court to proceed with the summary partition without instituting
the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator.
When a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his
heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a
judicial administration, which is always long and costly or to apply for
the appointment of an administrator by the court. Rights to the succession
of a person are transmitted from the moment of death hence his heirs succeed
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immediately to all the property of the deceased. It is at their option if they want
to enter upon the administration of the property or if they want to partition it.
When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is no need for the
intervention of an administrator.
Delgado vs. Heirs of Damian
Facts:
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, the sister of Josefa, filed a Petition on Letters of
Administration of the estate of deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo
Rustia (died 1972 and 1974 respectively). Such letter was opposed by Marciana
Rustia, a sister of Guillermo, claiming that they should be the beneficiaries of the
estate. The trial court then allowed Guillerma Rustia, a legitimate child of
Guillermo, to intervene in the case as she claimed that she possessed the status
of an acknowledged legitimate natural child, hence, she should be the sole heir of
the estate. Later, Luisa Delgado said that the spouses were living together
without marriage. Luisa Delgado died and was substituted dela Rosa (herein
petitioner) in this case. The RTC appointed dela Rosa as the administrator of the
estates of the deceased.
Issue: Whether or not dela Rosa should be the sole administrator of the estate
Ruling: No
The petitioners are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces
of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of
representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of
brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised
by grandnephews and grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of
Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her
brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death
on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the
inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial
court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children)
of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they
are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the
new Civil Code.
51

Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not
have validly adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to
himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the
estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – If the
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are
represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the
purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in
the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in
an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate
to himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
FERNANDEZ, ET AL V. DIMAGIBA, L-23638, OCTOBER 12, 1967
FACTS: Ismaela Dimagiba filed a petition for probate of the will of Benedicta de
los Reyes. Such petition was opposed by Dionisio Fernandez, et al. The court
ruled in favor of probate. Fernandez et al appealed, but it was beyond the
reglamentary period. They argued that they were entitled to await the other
grounds for opposition before appealing.
ISSUE: Whether the probate of the will become final for lack of appeal
HELD: Yes. A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions
concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of
the will. As such, probate order is final and appealable. They do not have to await
the resolution of its other oppositions since the Rules of Court enumerates six
different instances when appeal may be taken in special proceedings.
MUNSAYAC-DE VILLA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 414 SCRA 436
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FACTS: DE VILLA, SUNGA and ROY, three of the five children of the late Spouses
GELACIO and VICENTA MUNSAYAC filed for a petition for letters of administration
nominating DE VILLA as administratrix of the intestate estate of their parents.
DE VILLA’s nomination was opposed by the two (2) other children namely
MUNSAYAC, JR. and VISPERAS, who nominated MUNSAYAC, JR. as administrator
of the late Munsayac Couple’s intestate estate.
"MUNSAYAC, JR. was eventually appointed administrator pursuant to respondent
Judge’s Order thus, replacing Atty. Ceasar G. Oracion as special administrator of
the said intestate estate.
Subsequently, DE VILLA and SUNGA filed for a Request to Inhibit Respondent
Judge. Barely a week after such request and before respondent Judge could act
on it, DE VILLA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
questioning respondent Judge’s Order in directing/ordering him (DE VILLA) to
produce certain bank time deposit certificates/documents; and the order of arrest
for failure to produce the said bank certificates/documents.
Pending the resolution, DE VILLA filed an administrative case before the Supreme
Court, which prayed for respondent Judge’s suspension and his permanent
removal from office on grounds of grave misconduct and serious inefficiency.
Acting on the Omnibus Motion which was filed by the administrator of the
intestate estate, respondent Judge issued the Order to surrender, under pain of
contempt, (a) the amount of the bank investment discovered in the names of the
late VICENTA, DE VILLA and SUNGA made with the United Coconut Planter’s
Bank, Baguio City (‘UCPB’) worth P13,506,343.33, and which amount was not
disclosed by the petitioners in the estate return tax, (b) as well as the surrender
of all the pieces of jewelry given by the late VICENTA to DE VILLA and SUNGA,
subject of the ‘freeze order’ with the China Banking Corporation.
For their failure to comply with the Order the petitioners DE VILLA, SUNGA and
ROY were arrested and were likewise ORDERED to surrender in custodia legis
amount of P15,298,835.95 and P3,010,822.02 plus the legal interest.
A Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed before the CA. CA
nullified the arrest order only. Hence this petition, arguing that the
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inhibition is still needed as the issue on withdrawal/release of the money
deposited in custodia legis and the lifting of the freeze order on certain jewelry is
pending.
ISSUE: Whether properties in custodia legis must be released. YES
HELD: The Court ordered the TC to lift the freeze order and cause the return of
property or money still in custodia legis. The inhibition of the respondent judge
became moot and academic.
It should be clear that the CA Decision terminating Special Proceedings No. 704-R
found that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition executed by all the parties was the
"final, complete and absolute settlement of their respective shares and claims as
heirs of deceased spouses Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and Vicenta Munsayac." As
such, any and all incidents relating to the special proceedings should also be
deemed to have been terminated.
When Judge Reyes issued his Orders commanding the bank manager of the China
Bank branch in Baguio City to freeze the safety deposit box of petitioners and to
deposit certain amounts in custodia legis, he did so as the presiding judge in the
probate court that was hearing Special Proceedings No. 704-R. Now that the case
has finally been terminated, it follows that neither he nor his court has any more
right to hold the properties that were the subject of his Orders in the special
proceedings.
Needless to say, the lifting of any freeze order and the return of any property
previously deposited with the court should be effected. The judge had no more
discretion to decide whether the amounts and the property deposited should be
released. Likewise, any standing order on any property in relation to the special
proceedings should be lifted. This ruling reiterates the long-standing principle
that a tribunal acting as a probate court exercises limited jurisdiction. However,
the determination of whether a property should be included in the inventory is
within its probate jurisdiction. Such determination is only provisional -- not
conclusive -- in character and subject to the final decision in a separate action
that may be instituted by the parties.
Neither are we unmindful of the rule that questions on an advance made or
allegedly made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the
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court that has jurisdiction over the estate proceedings; and that the final order of
the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the
heirs.
In a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated this settled,
corollary principle: generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title
or ownership, but it may do so if the interested parties are all heirs; or the
question is one of collation or advancement; or the parties consent to its
assumption of jurisdiction and the rights of third parties are not impaired. These
principles, however, have no more application in this case, since the main
proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased couple
have already been decided and terminated. Indeed, every litigation must come to
an end.
To be sure, this Court is not tasked to look into the ownership of the properties
deposited with or ordered frozen by the lower court during the progress of the
special proceedings. Neither can Judge Reyes do so now. Whether those
properties should have been adjudicated by the legal heirs of the Munsayac
spouses is beside the point at this time. The former have already entered into an
Extrajudicial Partition representing the final, complete and absolute settlement of
their shares as heirs of the latter. What is left to be done is simply the lifting of
any freeze order and the release of any property originally deposited by
petitioners in custodia legis.
In view of the above ruling, we deem it necessary to direct Judge Reyes to
immediately lift any freeze order still pending and to order the release of any
property deposited in custodia legis. It is already an accepted rule of procedure
for this Court to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding,
leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. To achieve that
end and to expedite the case in the interest of substantial justice, a directive to
the trial judge to lift the freeze order and release the property deposited with the
court becomes indispensable.
FELIX AZUELO V. COURT OF APPEALS, GR NO. 122880, APRIL 12, 2006
FACTS: Petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of
Eugenia E. Igsolo. However, this was opposed by Geralda Castillo, who was the
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attorney-in-fact of “the 12 legitimate heirs” of the decedent. According to her,
the will was forged, and imbued with several fatal defects. Particularly, the issue
relevant in this subject is that the will was not properly acknowledged. The
notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, only wrote “Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko
ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is fatally defective as it was not properly
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses as
required by Article 806 of the Civil Code.
HELD: Yes, the will is fatally defective. By no manner of contemplation can
those words be construed as an acknowledgment.
An acknowledgement is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before
some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves
an extra step undertaken whereby the signore actually declares to the notary
that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the same is
his/her own free act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not
hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the
notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to
by the executor.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will
would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is
that the will be “acknowledged,” and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The
will does not present any textual proof, much less one under oath that the
decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own
free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-
important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free
consent of the testator.
ANG V. LEE, GR NO. 176831, JANUARY 5, 2010
FACTS: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages
against his mother Uy Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to
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compel petitioner to produce the holographic will of his father so that probate
proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Respondent had
already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to
deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do
so without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the
original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. The RTC heard the
case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondent’s evidence, petitioner
demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody
the original holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence.
However, it granted the same on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied. Hence,
the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the
appellate court. The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent
moved for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, set aside its
earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the
payment of attorney’s fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show
by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic
will. Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. The appellate court denied this motion. Left with no other
recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in the main
that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial
evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.
ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.
HELD: The Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of the writ.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in
the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal,
or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a
particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the
party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition
recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that
it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in
which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who
seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty,
most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution.
As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation,
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board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do
anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to
the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus
issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial
doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be
disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus
will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court,
officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has
unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the
issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the
thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the
act required.
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be
used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to
enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless
some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ
is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.] The writ of
mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would
be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to
the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative
character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in
matters relating to the public.
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there
should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus
can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of
remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy,
mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by
equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound
discretion of the court.
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In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the
obligation involved here—the production of the original holographic will—is in the
nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot
be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent
has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for
purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from
instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is
in his possession or not.
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed
of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition.
Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.
BALANAY, JR. V. MARTINEZ, ET AL, L- 39247, JUNE 27, 1975
FACTS: Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February
12, 1973 in Davao City at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her
husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate childrenincluding herein
petitioner Felix Balanay Jr. Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition
dated February 27, 1973 for the probate of his mother's notarial will dated
September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In that will Leodegaria Julian
declared (a) that she was the owner of the "southern half of nine conjugal lots
(par. II); (b) that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she
inherited from her father (par. III), and (c) that it was her desire that her
properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime
and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties.
Although initially opposing, Felix Balanay, Sr. signed a Conformation of Division
and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights manifesting that out of respect for his
wife's will he waived and renounced his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of
their 6 children. In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he
and his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would
be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.
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Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and
conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void for illegally claiming the conjugal
lands while David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the lawyer of Felix Balanay, Jr.,
Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon filed a motion
for leave of court to withdraw probate of the will and requesting authority to
proceed by intestate estate proceeding also referring to the provisions relating to
the conjugal assets as compromising the future legitimes.
The lower Court ruled that the will was void and converted to intestate
proceedings. Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas,
asked for the reconsideration of the lower court's order on the ground that Atty.
Montaña had NO authority to withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will
but the lower court denied and clarified that it declared the will void on the basis
of its own independent assessment of its provisions and not because of Atty.
Montaña's arguments.
ISSUE: WON the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the
will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
HELD: No. The SC are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of
the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the
petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the
petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the
will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. But
the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974 that the
will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate
proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave
effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of
his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the
conjugal estate.
Ratio: The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a
will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be
presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the
first invalid disposition had not been made". "Where some of the provisions of a
will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be
separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or
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interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the
beneficiaries"
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal
lands is contrary to law because, although she was a co-owner thereof, her share
was inchoate and pro indiviso. But That illegal declaration does not nullify the
entire will. It may be disregarded.
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided
among her heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that
the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080.
Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half
share of the conjugal but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of
his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal, it should be subject
to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of
the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance.
Or at least his legitime should be respected.
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is
intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not
prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition
would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime,
the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving
spouse.
It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his
wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal
share became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect
of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of
course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.
The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, where the testatrix instituted
as heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void
because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Article 854 of the
Civil Code provides that "the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of
the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir;
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but the devises and legacies, shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious."
Since the preterition of the parents annulled the institution of the sister of the
testatrix and there were no legacies and devises, total intestacy resulted.
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition
did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will
and renounced his hereditary rights.
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will
as contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme
case where the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to
pass first upon the formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is
mandatory.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28, and June 29, 1974 are set
aside and its order of June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the petition for probate,
is affirmed. The lower court is directed to conduct further proceedings in Special
Case No. 1808.
ACAIN V. IAC, ET AL., GR NO. 72706, OCTOBER 27, 1987
FACTS: On May 1984, Constantino Acain (petitioner hereinafter Acain) filed on
the RTC of Cebu City, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio
Acain and for the issuance to Acain of letters testamentary. When Nemesio died,
he left a will in which Acain and his siblings were instituted as heirs. The will
allegedly executed by Nemesio was submitted by petitioner without objection
raised by private respondents.
Segundo, the brother of Nemesio, was initially instituted as the heir, in case
Segundo pre-deceases Nemesio, Segundo’s children would then succeed.
After the petition was set for hearing, the respondents (Virginia Fernandez,
legally adopted daughter of Nemesio, and the latter's widow, Rosa Acain) filed a
motion to dismiss on the following grounds: for the petitioner has no legal
capacity to institute these proceedings; he is merely a universal heir and the
Rosa and Fernandez have been pretirited. Motion was denied.
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After the denial, respondents filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the
IAC. The IAC granted the private respondents' petition and ordered the TC to
dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio.
His MR having been denied, Acain filed this present petition for the review of
IAC’s decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether private respondents have been preterited. No for the widow, yes for
Fernandez.
2. Whether Acain has legal standing to intervene in the probate proceedings. No.
**3. Whether the probate court went beyond its authority. No.
HELD:
1. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Insofar as the widow is concerned, there is no preterition, for she is not in the
direct line. However, the same cannot be said for Fernandez. It cannot be denied
that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator. Neither can
it be denied that she was not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of
preterition of the Fernandez. The universal institution of Acain and his siblings to
the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will.
2. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding
he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be
affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested
party is one who would be benefited by the estate. Acain, at the outset, appears
to have an interest in the will as an heir, however, intestacy having resulted from
the preterition of Fernandez and the universal institution of heirs, Acain is in
effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the
probate of the will left by the deceased and must then be dismissed.
**3. The general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the
extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the
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Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. The rule, however,
is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court
is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the will. Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions be passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of
the will is resolved, the probate court should meet the issue.
The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private
respondents. The petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
NEPOMUCENO V. CA, ET AL., GR NO. 62952, OCTOBER 9, 1985
FACTS: Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last Will and
Testament before he died. Petitioner was named as sole executor. It is clearly
stated in the Will that he was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom
he had two legitimate children, but he had been estranged from his lawful wife.
In fact, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner were married despite the
subsisting first marriage. The testator devised the free portion of his estate to
petitioner. On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for probate. On May
13, 1975, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging undue and
improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of
the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner
having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator.
The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator
admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA.
On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent court declared
the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and
void.
ISSUE: W/N the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring
the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on
to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision.
HELD: No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after
declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon
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the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the
petitioner null and void. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the
court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic
validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to
be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that
the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the
court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid)
The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be void: (1)
Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the
time of the donation; and Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739,
concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage
when Martin Jugo executed his Will. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the
legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person
with whom he had been living in concubinage.
4. Rule 74 – SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES
MANINANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-57848, June 19, 1982
FACTS:
Clemencia Aseneta, single, died and left a holographic will. The will states
that all her properties shall be inherited by Dra. Maninang and her family whose
family the testatrix has lived with continuously for 30 years. The will further
stated that she is troubled with her nephews and that she did not consider
Bernardo as her adopted son for letting her do acts against her will.
Maninag filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will while the
adopted son instituted intestate proceedings. Bernardo filed a Motion to Dismiss
the testate case on the ground that as the only compulsory heir, he was
preterited in the holographic will. The testate proceeding was dismissed by the
trial court following the court’s reasoning that the adopted son was preterited and
intestacy should ensue. Maninag filed a petition for certiorari arguing that the
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court’s findings should be limited to the extrinsic validity of the will and not the Therefore, in ordering the dismissal of the testate case, the trial court has acted
intrinsic validity. in grave abuse of its discretion in excess of its jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the testate case.

Ruling: YES.

Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory. Unless the will is probated and
notice thereof is given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
properties by will may be rendered nugatory. Moreover, the probate of the will,
normally, does not look into its intrinsic validity. Opposition to the validity or
legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in a probate
proceeding; its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed
in accordance with the requirements of the law.

However, by way of exception, the intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon
even before probate because of “practical considerations”. Such considerations
include those enunciated in the cases of Nuguid vs Nuguid and Balanay vs Hon.
Martinez relied upon by Bernardo in his argument which was favored by the trial
court.

The Supreme Court, however, stated that the aforementioned cases provide for
the exception rather than the rule. For instance, in the Nuiguid case, the will was
found to be intrinsically invalid as it completely preterited the testator’s parents.
In the case at hand, the crucial issue to be resolved first is whether under the
terms of the decedent’s will, Bernardo had been preterited or disinherited.

By virtue of the dismissal of the testate case by the trial court judge, the
determination of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered.
The Court gathered from the order of the trial court which concluded that
Bernardo had been preterited. As for the Court, such conclusion is not
indubitable.

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DELGADO VS HEIRS OF MARCIANA

480 SCRA 334

Facts:

On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, the sister of Josefa, filed a Petition on

Letters of Administration of the estate of deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia (died 1972 and 1974 respectively). Such letter was opposed by
Marciana Rustia, a sister of Guillermo, claiming that they should be the
beneficiaries of the estate. The trial court then allowed Guillerma Rustia, a
legitimate child of Guillermo, to intervene in the case as she claimed that she
possessed the status of an acknowledged legitimate natural child, hence, she
should be the sole heir of the estate. Later, Luisa Delgado said that the spouses
were living together without marriage. Luisa Delgado died and was substituted
dela Rosa (herein petitioner) in this case. The RTC appointed dela Rosa as the
administrator of the estates of the deceased.

Issue:

Whether or not Dela Rosa should be the sole administrator of the estate noting
that Josefa and Guillermo did not contract marriage.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that through the testimonies of the of the witnesses,
that marriage between Josefa and Guillermo never took place. Although it is
presumed that a man and a woman departing themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, such testimonies shall prevail.
Since no marriage had occurred between the two, the estate must be settled in
different proceedings. Therefore, dela Rosa cannot be appointed as the sole
administrator of the estate of the deceased.

In this case, the Court also ruled that in the appointment of administrator, the
principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed.
The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-adminstrators,
especially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the estates.

60

SAMPIO V. CA.
103 Phil 71
RE: Raising an Objection to an Extrajudicial Partition After the Expiration
of Two (2) Year Prescriptive Period
There are two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74.
In Section 1, it is required that if there are two or more heirs, both or all of
them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is made
more imperative in the old law (Section 596, Act No. 190) by the addition of the
clause "and not otherwise."
By the title of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" indicates the persons
to answer for rights violated by the extrajudicial settlement. On the other hand, it
is also significant that no mention is made expressly of the effect of the
extrajudicial settlement on persons who did not take part therein or had no
notice or knowledge thereof.
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settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect is made, either
directly or by implication.
The provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from
objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such
extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who have participated or
taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when
the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that
all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial
settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.
There is nothing in Section 4 of Rule 74, or in its source (Section 596 of Act
190), which shows clearly a statute of limitations and a bar of action against third
persons. It is only a bar against the parties who had taken part in the
extrajudicial proceedings but not against third persons not parties thereto.

There cannot be any doubt that those who took part or had knowledge of
the extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to them the law is clear that if
they claim to have been in any manner deprived of their lawful right or share in
the estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or
interest within the period of two (2) years, and both the distributes and estate
would be liable to them for such rights or interest. Evidently, they are the
persons in accordance with the provision who may seek to remedy the prejudice
to their rights within the two-year period.

On the other hand, as to those who did not take part in the settlement or
had no notice of the death of the decedent or of the settlement, there is no direct
or express provision that is unreasonable and unjust that they also be required to
assert their claims within the period of two years. To extend the effects of the
settlement to them, to those who did not take part nor had no knowledge
thereof, without any express legal provision to that effect, would be violative of
the fundamental right to due process of law.

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement,

or by affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be
contended that such settlement or distribution would affect third persons who
had no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial
61

5. Rule 75 – PRODUCTION OF WILL; ALLOWANCE OF WILL NECESSARY
EMILIO PACIOLES V. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING
Question of Title of Ownership; YES, for the purpose of inventory, that is
incidental and provisional.
Facts:
Miguelita died intestate. She was survived by her huband, Emilio Pacioles, herein
petitioner, and two minor children. Emilio filed a verified petition for the
settlement of Miguelita’s estate.
Miguelita’s mother filed an opposition to the petition for issuance of letters of
administration; contending that the bulk of the estate is composed of paraphernal
properties. She also said that she has direct and material interest in the estate
because she gave half of her inherited properties to the deceased on condition
that they would undertake a business endeavor as partners. The mother asked
that one Emmanuel be appointed.
The trial court, acting as an intestate court appointed Emilio and Emmanuel as
joint-administrator. No claims were filed. Thereafter, Emilio filed an inventory;
meanwhile, Emmanuel failed to file one.
The court declared Emilio and his children as the only compulsory heirs of the
deceased. Emilio then petitioned the court for the payment of estate tax and the
partition and distribution of the estate. The trial court denied the petition as to
the partition and distribution; the Court of Appeals affirmed the same.
Issue:
Whether or not a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon
questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s
estate.
Ruling: NO.
As a rule, the question of ownership is an extrataneous matter which the
probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining
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whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of
estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in
a separate action to resolve title. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the
above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a
hearing on respondent’s claim.
However, the Supreme Court finds that such reliance is misplaced.
Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate
or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to
determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. The
facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.
First, the inventory was not disputed. Respondent could have opposed
petitioner’s inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific properties which
she believed or considered to be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly
adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the
real estate properties.
Second, Emmanuel did not file an inventory. He could have submitted an
inventory, excluding there from those properties which respondent considered to
be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one shows that he
acquiesced with petitioner’s inventory.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its
jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance
on the matter. It is well- settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a
long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of property
alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some
other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such
question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate
proceedings.
The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such
contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction as a regional trial court.
62

Jurisprudence states that: probate court or one in charge of proceedings
whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well
and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing
parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of
general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the
resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging
to Miguelita's estate.
MANAHAN V. MANAHAN
58 Phil. 4448, 45
Facts:
Tiburcia Manahan, the niece of testatrix Donata and her named executrix,
instituted special proceedings for the probate of the will of the deceased. The will
was admitted to probate. One year and seven months later, Engracia, the sister
of Donata, filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial praying that the order
to probate be vacated and the will be declared null and void ab initio. Trial Court
denied the motions. Engracia, under the pretext of appealing the last order,
likewise appealed from the judgement admitting the will to probate. She assigns
the following errors:
1. That she was an interested party and as such, was entitled to be notified
of the probate of the will;
2. That the court did not really probate but merely authenticated the will;
and
3. That the will is null and void as the external formalities have not been
complied with.
Issue: Whether or not Engarcia’s contentions are meritorious?
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Held: NO.
First contention is untenable. The appellant was not entitled to notification
of the probate of the will and neither had she the right to expect it, inasmuch as
she was not an interested party, not having filed an opposition to the petition for
the probate thereof. Her allegation that she had the status of an heir, being the
deceased's sister, did not confer on her the right to be notified on the ground that
the testatrix died leaving a will in which the appellant has not been instituted
heir. Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not acquire any successional
right.
Second contention is puerile. There is no essential difference between the
authentication of the will and the probate thereof.
Once the will has been admitted to probate, questions as to its validity can
no longer be raised on appeal. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to
the due execution thereof and cannot be impugned, except on the ground of
fraud. Moreover, proceedings in a testamentary case are in rem, hence it is
binding upon her.
In the phraseology of the procedural law, there is no essential difference
between the authentication of a will and the probate thereof. The words
authentication and probate are synonymous in this case. All the law requires is
that the competent court declared that in the execution of the will the essential
external formalities have been complied with and that, in view thereof, the
document, as a will, is valid and effective in the eyes of the law.
The decree admitting a will to probate is conclusive with respect to the due
execution thereof and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by
law, except that of a fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceeding.
The proceedings followed in a testamentary case being in rem, the decree
admitting the will to probate was effective and conclusive against her, in
accordance with the provisions of section 306 of the said Code of Civil Procedure.
The appellant could not appeal from the trial court’s order denying the
motion for reconsideration and a new trial in view of the fact that said order was
interlocutory in character.
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PASTOR V. CA,
G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983 (122 SCRA 85)
Facts:
When PASTOR, SR. died in 1966, he was survived by his wife, his two
legitimate children and one illegitimate son. There is therefore a need to liquidate
the conjugal partnership and set apart the share of PASTOR, SR.'s wife in the
conjugal partnership preparatory to the administration and liquidation of the
estate of PASTOR, SR. which will include, among others, the determination of the
extent of the statutory usufructuary right of his wife until her death.
A Probate Order was issued on December 5, 1972 by the probate court. The said
order held that private respondent is entitled to the payment of his legacy
pursuant to the will of the deceased.
However, there had been no liquidation of the community properties of PASTOR,
SR. and his wife. Hence, there was no prior definitive determination of the assets
of the estate of PASTOR, SR. Although there was an inventory of his properties
presumably prepared by the special administrator, but it does not appear that it
was ever the subject of a hearing or that it was judicially approved. In addition,
there are properties allegedly owned, but not in the name of PASTOR, SR. The
reconveyance or recovery of those properties was still being litigated in another
court. There was no appropriate determination, much less payment, of the debts
of the decedent and his estate as well.
Issue:
Whether or not a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon
questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s
estate
Ruling:
As a general rule, the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or
a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the
estate and probate of will of deceased persons; it does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The
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patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited
jurisdiction.
On the other hand, a well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle
that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of
ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be
included in the inventory.
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is
restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1;
Rule 76, Section 9.)
As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of
estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in
a separate action to resolve title.
The main consideration is the purpose of the intestate or probate court in
hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether
or not a property must be included in the inventory of the estate of the deceased.
64

IN RE ESTATE OF JOHNSON
39 Phil. 156
Facts:
On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a
naturalized citizen of the United States, died in the city of Manila, leaving a will
by which he disposed of an estate valued at Php 231,800.
This document is a holographic instrument, being written in the testator's
own handwriting, and is signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of
three witnesses required by Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This will,
therefore, was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally
applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of the Philippines.
Thereafter a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the City
of Manila for the probate of the said will on the ground that Johnson was, at the
time of his death, a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; that
the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence
could properly be probated here pursuant to Section 636 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Thereafter the document was declared to be legal and was admitted
to probate.
Three months after the will had been probated, the attorneys for Ebba
Ingeborg Johnson entered an appearance in her behalf and asserted that Ebba is
a legitimate heir of the testator. Thus, she cannot be deprived of the legitime to
which she is entitled under the law governing testamentary successions in the
Philippines. She, therefore, moved to annul the decree of probate and put the
estate into intestate administration in order for her to claim the estate as the sole
legitimate heir of her father.
Issue:
W/N the order of the probate can be set aside on the ground that the testator
was not a resident of the State of Illinois and that the will was not made in
conformity with the laws of that State.
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Ruling: NO.
The court finds that it was impossible for the testator, to expatriate himself
from the United States and change his political status from a citizen of the United
States to a citizen of the Philippines because there is no law in force at that time
by virtue of which any person of foreign nativity can become a naturalized Filipino
citizen.
Although he remained in the Philippines for some time after he came as a
soldier in the United States Army to the Philippine Islands, there was no evidence
adduced showing that at the time he returned to the United States, in the
autumn of 1902, he had then abandoned Illinois as the State of his permanent
domicile. This being true, it is to be presumed that he retained his his status as a
citizen of the United States
The Supreme Court held that the probate of the will does not affect the
intrinsic validity of its provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as
regards the due execution of the will.
Furthermore, the intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be
determined by the law of Illinois and not of the Philippines. In paragraph 2 of
article 10 of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal and testamentary
successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as to the amount of
the successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the laws of the nation of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property and the country where it may be
situate."
In this case, the petition submitted to the lower court was insufficient to
warrant the setting aside of the order, probating the will in question, whether
said petition be considered as an attack on the validity of the decree for error
apparent. Thus, the trial court committed no error in denying the relief sought.
The order appealed from is accordingly affirmed
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FERNANDEZ V. DIMAGIBA
G.R. No. L-23638, October 12, 1967

Facts:

Ismaela Dimagiba (respondent) submitted petition for probate of purported

will of Benedicta delos Reyes as the sole heir of deceased. Later, heirs Dionisio
Fernandez, et. al. filed opposition to the probate on grounds of forgery, vices of
consent, laches, and revocation of the will on deeds of sale.

The Court of First Instance found will genuine and properly executed but
deferred resolution on estoppel and revocation grounds until intrinsic validity will
be passed upon. Oppositors insisted that estoppel and revocation issues be
considered but CFI overruled claim until opportune time. Later, CFI ruled that
Benedicta’s will was unrevoked by deeds of sale. The court ruled in favor of
probate.

Fernandez et al appealed, but it was beyond the reglamentary period. The

Court of Appeals admitted will to probate and upheld finality for lack of opportune
appeal. Accordingly, it was appealable independently of issue of revocation,
affirmed CFI. They argued that they were entitled to await the other grounds for
opposition before appealing.

Issue: Whether the probate of the will become final for lack of appeal.

Ruling: Yes.

A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning

capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of the will. As
such, probate order is final and appealable. They do not have to await the
resolution of its other oppositions since the Rules of Court enumerates six
different instances when appeal may be taken in special proceedings.

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MUNSAYAC DE VILLA V CA proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased couple
G.R. No. 148597, October 24, 2003 have already been decided and terminated. Indeed, every litigation must come to
an end.

Facts:
Three of the five children of the deceased Spouses Gelacio and Vicenta
Munsayac filed for a petition for letters of administration nominating De Villa as
administratrix of the intestate estate of their parents.
De Villa’s nomination was opposed by the two (2) other children namely
Munsayac, Jr. and Visperas, who nominated Munsayac, Jr. as administrator of the
late Munsayac Couple’s intestate estate. Munsayac, Jr. was eventually appointed
administrator pursuant to respondent Judge’s order.
Acting on the Omnibus Motion which was filed by the administrator of the
intestate estate, respondent Judge issued the Order to surrender, under pain of
contempt, (a) the amount of the bank investment discovered in the names of the
late VICENTA, DE VILLA and SUNGA made with the United Coconut Planter’s
Bank, Baguio City (‘UCPB’), and which amount was not disclosed by the
petitioners in the estate return tax, (b) as well as the surrender of all the pieces
of jewelry given by the late VICENTA to DE VILLA and SUNGA, subject of the
‘freeze order’ with the China Banking Corporation.
To be sure, this Court is not tasked to look into the ownership of the
properties deposited with or ordered frozen by the lower court during the
progress of the special proceedings. Neither can Judge Reyes do so now. Whether
those properties should have been adjudicated by the legal heirs of the Munsayac
spouses is beside the point at this time. The former have already entered into an
Extrajudicial Partition representing the final, complete and absolute settlement of
their shares as heirs of the latter. What is left to be done is simply the lifting of
any freeze order and the release of any property originally deposited by
petitioners in custodia legis.
In view of the above ruling, the Supreme Court directed Judge Reyes to
immediately lift any freeze order still pending and to order the release of any
property deposited in custodia legis. It is already an accepted rule of procedure
for this Court to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding,
leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.

For their failure to comply with the Order the petitioners De Villa, Sunga
and ROY were arrested and were likewise ordered to surrender in custodia legis
amount of P15,298,835.95 and P3,010,822.02 plus the legal interest.

Issue:

Whether or not a probate court may decide on a question of title or ownership.

Ruling:

In a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated this settled,

corollary principle: generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title
or ownership, but it may do so if the interested parties are all heirs; or the
question is one of collation or advancement; or the parties consent to its
assumption of jurisdiction and the rights of third parties are not impaired. These
principles, however, have no more application in this case, since the main
67

PIO BARRETTO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs. CA
G.R. No. L-62431-33 August 31, 1984
Facts:
Nicolai Drepin died testate on August 23, 1972. He left behind threeparcels
of titled land. Since the filing of the petition for probate of the Drepin’s will nine
offers had been made for the purchase of the Drepin lands, among them, that of
GM Management Phils through its President Honor P. Moslares.
Moslares alleged that on October 9,1970, Despin executed a deed of sale
with mortgage executed by the decedent in hisfavor. He also alleged that on June
25, 1971, Drepin and Moslares entered into a "Joint Venture Agreement" where it
was agreed that Drepin shall be the registered "owner" of the lots and
denominated Moslares as "developer" tasked with converting the lands into
a residential subdivision.
However before the agreement could be implemented, Drepin died. Upon
learning of the existence of Special Proceedings, Moslares informed the
Judicial Administrator that he is already the owner of the properties made subject
matter of the Special Proceedings and proposed that he be permitted to pay the
balance on the sale with mortgage in accordance with the terms of
his written proposal.
On September 25,1979, with the court’s permission, a Deed
of Undertaking was entered into by respondent Moslares and the Administrator
to implement the Contract of Sale with Mortgage. Such deed provided for the
mode of payment which Moslares was to follow. Moslares failed to pay as agreed.
Thus, the administrator reported the matter to the probate court which approved
the sale of the property to Pio Barretto Realty, Inc.
The deed of sale was duly registered. Mosrales filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was not acted by the probate court. Under the
theory of Moslares, it is insisted that the probate court has no authority
to cancel his unfulfilled offer to buy, notwithstanding the fact that he failed
miserably to comply with the terms of his own offer to buy. On May 18, 1981, Pio
Barreto Realty filed Civil Case No. 41287 before the CFI of Rizal to determine
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title and ownership over the Drepin lands. A petition for certiorari was filed by
respondent Moslares before the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
(1) Can the probate court order the execution of the deed of sale with Pio
Barreto?
Ruling: YES.
The actions of the probate court, in the case at bar, do not refer to the
adjudication of rights under the contract entered into by the deceased during his
lifetime. It is to be noted that the dealings of the respondent with the court arose
out of the latter's bid to sell property under its authority to sell, mortgage
or otherwise encumber property of the estate to pay or settle against the estate.
Thus, by estoppel, respondent bound himself under an agreement with the court
separate and distinct from that which he had with the decedent. In rescinding
such contract, the court merely seeks to enforce its right to put an end to an
agreement which had ceased to be a working proposition. Surely, this is well
within the power of the probate court. We cannot allow an absurd situation to
arise where the Drepin estate will never be settled and liquidated because even if
Moslares cannot pay the agreed purchase price of the Drepin lands, still the
probate court can no longer sell the lands to other prospective buyers. It is also
to be emphasized that it was not respondent's contract of sale with decedent that
had been invalidated but rather the administrator's authority to sell to
respondent. Moreover, the respondent is not without remedy if truly his claim of
ownership is proper and meritorious. Since the probate court has no jurisdiction
over the question of title and ownership of the properties, the respondents may
bring a separate action if they wish to question the petitioner's titles and
ownership.
ONGSINGCO vs. TAN
Tasiana Ongsingco vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan and Jose de Borja
97 Phil. 330
Petitioner Tasiana Ongsingco is the wife and judicial guardian of Francisco de
Borja, who was declared incompetent by the CFI of Rizal in Spec. Pro. No. 1764.
Francisco de Borja is the surviving spouse of Josefa Tangco whose estate is being
68

settled in Spec. Pro. No. 7866 in the same court. Respondent Jose de Borja is the
son of Francisco de Borja and administrator of the estate of Josefa Tangco.
After Francisco was declared incompetent, Tasiana took possession of two parcels
of land situated in Santa Rosa, Nueva Ejica and commenced the threshing of the
palay crop standing thereon. Jose filed a motion in the estate proceedings of
Josefa praying that Tasiana be restrained from threshing the palays until the
ownership of the lands has been resolved by the court or by agreement of the
parties.
Tasiana opposed the motion and stated that the question of ownership can only
be threshed out elsewhere and not by the probate court. She then filed an action
in the CFI of Nueva Ecija to prevent Jose from interfering with the harvest. The
CFI of Nueve Ecija granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by Tasiana.
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Based from the foregoing, it thus appears obvious that the CFI of Rizal exceeded
its jurisdiction in acting upon the question of ownership in its capacity as probate
court. Such question has been squarely raised in an action pending in the CFI of
Nueva Ecija. It is of no consequence that what respondent court merely did was
look into the identity of said properties. This question is necessarily imbibed in
the greater issue of ownership and being interwoven one can hardly draw the line
of demarcation that would separate one from the other.
Doctrine: A probate court cannot act on questions of ownership lest it exceeds
its jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, the CFI of Rizal issued an order restraining Tasiana in the threshing of
the palay harvested in the disputed lands. Tasian filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied. She then filed a petition for certiorari
with prohibition in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction to resolve the ownership dispute
between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja?

HELD:
No. In Franco vs. O’Brien, it was held that “the question of ownership is
one which should be determined in an ordinary action and not in probate
proceedings, and this whether or not the property is alleged to belong to the
estate”. In another case it was held that “the general rule is that questions as to
title to property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings”[1] or
stating the rule more elaborately, “When questions arise as to the ownership of
property alleged to be a part of the estate of a deceased person but claimed by
some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance
from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate,
such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administrative
proceedings”.[2]
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POMPILLO VALERA and CABADO vs. HON. JUDGE SANCHO Y. INSERTO
Nos. L-59867-68 May 7, 1987
The fishpond originally belonged to the Government, and had been given in lease
to Rafael Valera in his lifetime. Rafael Valera ostensibly sold all his leasehold
rights in the fishpond to his daughter, Teresa Garin; but the sale was fictitious,
having been resorted to merely so that she might use the property to provide for
her children's support and education, and was subject to the resolutory term that
the fishpond should revert to Rafael Valera upon completion of the schooling of
Teresa Garin's Children; and with the income generated by the fishpond, the
property was eventually purchased from the Government by the Heirs of Teresa
Garin, collectively named as such in the Original Certificate of Title issued in their
favor.
In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent
spouses, Rafael Valera and Consolacion Sarrosa 1 — in which Eumelia Cabado
and Pompiro Valera had been appointed administrators 2 — the heirs of a
deceased daughter of the spouses, Teresa Garin, filed a motion asking that the
Administratrix, Cabado, be declared in contempt for her failure to render an
accounting of her administration. Cabado replied that no accounting could be
submitted unless Jose Garin, Teresa's husband and the movant heirs' father,
delivered to the administrator an 18-hectare fishpond in Baras, Barotoc Nuevo,
Iloilo, belonging to the estate and she in turn moved for the return thereof to the
estate, 4 so that it might be partitioned among the decedents' heirs. Jose Garin
opposed the plea for the fishpond's return to the estate, asserting that the
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property was owned by his children and this was why it had never been included
in any inventory of the estate
The Court, presided over by Hon. Judge Midpantao Adil, viewed the Garin Heirs'
motion for contempt, as well as Cabado's prayer for the fishpond's return to the
estate, as having given rise to a claim for the recovery of an asset of the estate
within the purview of Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, the
Court issued an Order dated September 17, 1980 commanding the Heirs of
Teresa Garin "to reconvey immediately the fishpond in question * * to the
intestate Estate of the Spouses.
Thereafter, the Court issued an Order dated September 17, 1980 commanding
the Heirs of Teresa Garin "to reconvey immediately the fishpond in question * *
to the intestate Estate of the Spouses. Judge Adil afterwards granted the
administrators' motion for execution of the order pending appeal, and directed
the sheriff to enforce the direction for the Garin Heirs to reconvey the fishpond to
the estate.
Later however, Fabiana filed a complaint-in-intervention with the Probate Court
seeking vindication of his right to the possession of the fishpond, based on a
contract of lease between himself, as lessee, and Jose Garin, as lessor
G.R. No. 56504
Fabiana thereupon instituted a separate action for injunction and damages, with
application for a preliminary injunction. This was docketed as Civil Case No.
13742 and assigned to Branch I of the Iloilo CFI, Hon. Sancho Y. Inserto,
presiding. The estate administrators filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and
to dissolve the temporary restraining order, averring that the action was barred
by the Probate Court's prior judgment which had exclusive jurisdiction over the
issue of the lease, and that the act sought to be restrained had already been
accomplished, Fabiana having voluntarily surrendered possession of the fishpond
to the sheriff
G.R. Nos. 59867-68
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In the meantime, Jose Garin — having filed a motion for reconsideration of the
above mentioned order of Judge Adil (declaring the estate to be the owner of the
fishpond), in which he asserted that the Probate Court, being of limited
jurisdiction, had no competence to decide the ownership of the fishpond,
These two special civil actions were jointly decided by the Court of Appeals. The
Court granted the petitions
ISSUE:
WON Probate Court had authority to order reconveyance of the
fishpond?
HELD :
As regards the first issue, settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court), acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited
jurisdiction, 28 and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the
issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent,
unless the claimant and all the Other parties having legal interest in the property
consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate
Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced
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Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the
fishpond was merely provisional, not binding on the property with any character
of authority, definiteness or permanence, having been made only for purposes of
in. conclusion in the inventory and upon evidence adduced at the hearing of a
motion, it cannot and should not be subject of execution, as against its possessor
who has set up title in himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and
whose right to possess has not been ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate
action. These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens
title to the property is not in the decedents' names but in others, a situation on
which this Court has already had occasion to rule Since, too, both the Probate
Court and the estate administrators are one in the recognition of the proposition
that title to the fishpond could in the premises only be appropriately determined
in a separate action, 36 the actual firing of such a separate action should have
been anticipated, and should not therefore have come as a surprise, to the latter.
And since moreover, implicit in that recognition is also the acknowledge judgment
of the superiority of the authority of the court in which the separate action is filed
over the issue of title, the estate administrators may not now be heard to
complain that in such a separate action, the court should have issued orders
necessarily involved in or flowing from the assumption of that jurisdiction.

The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the
exception to the rule. As already earlier stressed, it was at all times clear to the
Court as well as to the parties that if cognizance was being taken of the question
of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely
and permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for
determination "in an ordinary civil action," but merely to determine whether it
should or should not be included in the inventory.Parenthetically, in the light of
the foregoing principles, the Probate Court could have admitted and taken
cognizance of Fabiana's complaint in intervention after obtaining the consent of
all interested parties to its assumption of jurisdiction over the question of title to
the fishpond, or ascertaining the absence of objection thereto. But it did not. It
dismissed the complaint in intervention instead. And all this is now water under
the bridge.

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FELIX AZUELA v. COURT OF APPEALS and GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO
G.R. 122880, 12 April 2006
Felix Azuela filed a petition with the trial court for the probate of a notarial will
purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo on June 10, 1981 and notarized on the
same day. The will consisted of two (2) pages and was written in Filipino. The
attestation clause did not state the number of pages and it was not signed by the
attesting witnesses at the bottom thereof. The said witnesses affixed their
signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will though. Geralda
Castillo opposed the petition, claiming that the will was a forgery. She also
argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law.
She pointed out that the decedent’s signature did not appear on the second page
of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged.
The trial court held the will to be authentic and to have been executed in
accordance with law and, thus, admitted it to probate, calling to fore “the
modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will…with
the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last
wishes.” According to the trial court, the declaration at the end of the will
under the sub-title, “Patunay Ng Mga Saksi,” comprised the attestation clause
and the acknowledgement, and was a substantial compliance with the
requirements of the law. It also held that the signing by the subscribing
witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will containing the
attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof,
substantially satisfied the purpose of identification and attestation of the will.
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The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court’s decision and ordered
the dismissal of the petition for probate. It noted that the attestation clause
failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will
void and undeserving of probate.
Azuela argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that
“the number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation
clause” is merely directory, rather than mandatory, and thus susceptible to
what he termed as “the substantial compliance rule.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject will complied with the requirements of
the law and, hence, should be admitted to probate
HELD:
The petition is DENIED.
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on
which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not
signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most
importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat,
is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A
notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.
Prior to the New Civil Code, the statutory provision governing the formal
requirements of wills was Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Extant
therefrom is the requirement that the attestation state the number of pages of
the will. The enactment of the New Civil Code put in force a rule of interpretation
of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause is
concerned, that may vary from the philosophy that governed the said Section
618. Article 809 of the Civil Code, the Code Commission opted to recommend a
more liberal construction through the “substantial compliance rule.” However,
Justice J.B.L. Reyes cautioned that the rule “must be limited to disregarding
those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all
72

the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each
and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was
notarized...But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to
sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the
attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate
proceedings.” The Court suggested in Caneda v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
103554, May 28, 1993, 222 SCRA 781): “the rule, as it now stands, is that
omission which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the
need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly,
would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However,
those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would
result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will
itself.”
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which
the will was written remains a fatal flaw, despite Art. 809. This requirement aims
at safeguarding the will against possible interpolation or omission of one or some
of its pages and thus preventing any increase or decrease in the pages. Following
Caneda, there is substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states
elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the situation in
Singson and Taboada. In this case, however, there could have been no
substantial compliance with the requirements under Art. 805 of the Civil Code
since there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself
as to the number of pages which comprise the will. There was an incomplete
attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted for the
insertion of the number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was
never filled in.
The subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by
the instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses
appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of
the attestation clause. Art. 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the
instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the will
be attested and subscribed by them. The signatures on the left-hand corner of
every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page
they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the
attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements
contained in the attestation clause itself. An unsigned attestation clause results in
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an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin
of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot
demonstrate these witnesses’ undertakings in the clause, since the signatures
that do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.
The notary public who notarized the subject will wrote, “Nilagdaan ko at
ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.”
By no manner of contemplation can these words be construed as an
acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed
in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or
deed. It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it
does not follow to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit
where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and
sworn to by the executor.
It may not have been said before, but a notarial will that is not
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally
defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public. The
importance of the requirement of acknowledgment is highlighted by the fact that
it had been segregated from the other requirements under Art. 805 and
entrusted into a separate provision, Art. 806. The express requirement of Art.
806 is that the will be “acknowledged”, and not merely subscribed and sworn to.
The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to
declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the
will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain
of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate
in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of
the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of
certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she
had designated in the will.
73

UY KIAO vs NIXON LEE
GR NO. 176831 January 15, 2010
Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against his
mother Uy Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel
petitioner to produce the holographic will of his father so that probate
proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Respondent had
already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to
deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do
so without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the
original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. The RTC heard the
case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondent’s evidence, petitioner
demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody
the original holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence.
However, it granted the same on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied. Hence,
the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the
appellate court. The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent
moved for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, set aside its
earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the
payment of attorney’s fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show
by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic
will. Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. The appellate court denied this motion. Left with no other
recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in the main
that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial
evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.
HELD:
The Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of the writ.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent
jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior
court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the
performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the
official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law.
This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly
excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the
performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper
recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is
mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will
lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust or station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do
anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to
the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus
issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial
doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be
disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus
will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court,
officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has
unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the
issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the
thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the
act required.
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Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus
cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not
lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual
unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed.
The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.] The
writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise,
justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the
public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve
its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private
wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is

that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other
words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of
procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified
as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is
generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of
mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether

the obligation involved here—the production of the original holographic will—is in
the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus
cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that
respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the
original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent
him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the
same is in his possession or not.
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be
availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his
petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.
BALUYOT v. PANIO
(1976)
Soltero Baluyut died on January 6, 1975 at the age of 86, leaving an estate
valued at not less than Php2M. A few weeks later, his nephew Alfredo Baluyut
filed before the CFI of Quezon City a verified petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in his favor, alleging that Encarnacion Lopez Baluyut, Soltero’s
widow, was mentally incapable of acting as administratrix of the decedent’s
estate. Believing that Soltero executed a will, Alfredo prayed that he be
appointed as special administrator in the meantime. The CFI granted Alfredo’s
petition.
Mrs. Baluyut filed an opposition to the appointment. She claimed that the
allegation as to her mental incapacity was libelous, and that she was unaware
that her husband executed a will. Finding that Mrs. Baluyut was mentally
qualified, the CFI cancelled Alfredo’s appointment. However, upon filing of a

75

motion for reconsideration, Alfredo’s appointment was again appointed as special
administrator, together with Jose Espino, an acknowledged natural child of
Soltero.
Mrs. Baluyut again countered, arguing that Jose effectively rid Alfredo of any
interest in the estate of Soltero by exclusion, he being a collateral relative.
Alfredo naturally opposed, arguing that Jose was not a natural child of the
decedent, at the same time insisting that Mrs. Baluyut was incapable of becoming
an administratrix, as declared by another court in a separate guardianship
proceeding.
Based on the testimony of Mrs. Baluyut herself, the probate court terminated the
appointment of Jose and Alfredo as adminstrators and ordered that the former be
appointed as administratrix, due to her preferential right to be appointed as such.
Letters of administration were issued in her favor after posting a Php20,000.00
bond. In appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix, the court proceeded upon the
assumption that as a collateral relative, Alfredo had no interest in the estate of
Soltero.
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A hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the person to be
appointed administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications
and affording oppositors a chance to contest the petition. Whether Sotero Baluyut
died testate or intestate, it is imperative in the interest of the orderly
administration of justice that a hearing be held to determine Mrs. Baluyut's
fitness to act as executrix or administratrix. Persons questioning her capacity
should be given an adequate opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.
2. Yes.
It is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court into a testamentary
proceeding. The probate of the will cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of
public policy. After the will is probated, the prior letters of administration should
be revoked and proceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary or of
administration under the will should be conducted.

Aggrieved, Alfredo elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a special civil
action for certiorari.

During the course of the proceedings, the alleged will of the decedent was
apparently discovered and presented to the court. Although the decision did not
dwell on the contents of the will and the manner through which it was
discovered, the decision did mention that Alfredo was named a legatee therein,
giving him standing to question the qualifications of the administratrix.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the court erred in finding Mrs. Baluyut mentally capable of becoming
an administratrix on the basis of her testimony
2. W/N the proceeding in the lower court must be converted into a
testamentary proceeding after the alleged will has been presented

HELD:
1. Yes.
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BALTAZAR vs. LAXA
G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012
Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster when she made her last will and testament in the
Pampango dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in the house of retired
Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in
the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and
testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document
on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her
properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their
children Luna and Katherine. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as
her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his own
mother.
Six days after the execution of the Will (Sept. 19, 1981), Paciencia left for USA.
There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on Jan. 4, 1996. In
the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.
More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or on Apr. 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed
a petition with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of
Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor.
On Jun 23, 2000 one of petitioners, Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition to
Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will
belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia
had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo. Also, one of the petitioners, Rosie
Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the state of being “mangulyan” or forgetful
making her unfit for executing a will and that the execution of the will had been
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence.
Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the Letters of Administration in Lorenzo’s
favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a
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citizen and resident of the USA. Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration
be instead issued in favor of Antonio.
RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when Paciencia
signed the will, she was no longer possessed of the sufficient reason or strength
of mind to have the testamentary capacity. On appeal, CA reversed the decision
of the RTC and granted the probate of the will. The petitioner went up to SC for a
petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently
established to warrant its allowance for probate.
HELD:
Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful
compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix,
Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and
evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical
requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses attested and
subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact,
even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be
authentic although they question of her state of mind when she signed the same
as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of
the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree
with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily
make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will.
Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Art. 799 of the
NCC states: “To be of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in
full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
77

unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient
if the testator was able at the time of making the Will to know the nature of the
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of
the testamentary act.”
COCA vs. PANGILINAN
G.R. No. L-27082 January 31, 1978
These two cases involve the question of whether the ownership of a parcel of
land, whether belonging to the deceased spouses or to their heirs, should be
decided in the intestate proceeding or in a separate action. Also in issue in these
two cases is the liability of the decedents' estate for the litigation expenses
allegedly incurred in a case regarding that same land.
Being related cases, their adjudication in a single decision was allowed in this
Court's resolution.
Spouses Juan Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba had 3 children named:
1. Concepcion (deceased) has 3 children Maria, Eusebio and Apolinar all
surnamed Yamuta
2. Prima
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3. Francisco (deceased) married to Guadalupe Pizarras has 7 children
named Francis, Algeran, Benjamin, Perla, Francisco Jr. and Helen
(deceased) with children named Roseller, Demosthenes and Eliza
The spouses died intestate in 1943 and 1948, respectively. They possess a
homestead, consisting of two parcels of land, located at Misamis Occidental. 1st
parcel has an area of 3.9791 hectares in the name of Juan Pangilinan, 2nd parcel
has an area of 18.0291 hectares in the name of the Heirs of Juan Pangilinan,
represented by Concepcion P. de Yamuta. According to Guadalupe Pizarras , a
3rd parcel with an area of 8 hectares which was surveyed in the name of
Concepcion P and which adjoins the 1st and 2nd lot
Special Proceeding was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, Juan C.
Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba.
The administrator presented a project of partition for lot 1 and 2.
The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Guadalupe Pizarras, et al.) opposed that
project of partition. They contended that the proposed partition contravened the
lower court's order of December 6, 1963 which recognized the right of the heirs
of Francisco Pan to a twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112; that Prima
Pangilinan, who sold her share to Francisco Pan should be excluded from the
partition; that the total share of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan in Lot No. 1112
is 12.6720 hectares, while that of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan is 6.3360
hectares, and that the claim of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan for 115,088.50
had not been properly allowed.
CFI ordered - partitioned the properties:
1. Giving atty’s fees to Crispin Borromeo
2. Without taking into consideration ownership of a 12-hec land claimed
by the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan, of a 6 hec land claimed by Crispin
Borromeo and
a. ) Debt to Concepcion’s estate
b. ) If Prima sold her share to Francisco WON Prima was excluded as an
heir.
CFI ordered that a separate ordinary action is needed to determine ownership of
theland in dispute. Later on, they approved the project of partition but excluded
78

the 12 ha and did not bother to decide how the remainder should be partitioned
and WON Prima had a share in that remainder.
CA sustained CFI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not separate proceedings should be filed to determine
ownership.
HELD:
No, the case is an exception. The probate court may provisionally pass
upon the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of
property without prejudice to its finaldetermination in a separate action.
The general rule is that Probate Court may not pass upon ownership.
Except: If the interested parties are all heirs, (case at bar)-or if the question is
one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court, and the rights of 3rd parties are not impaired,
then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.The
appellees belong to the poor stratum of society. They should not be forced to
incur additional expenses by bringing a separate action to determine ownership
of the 12 hectare portion.
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EMILIO B. PACIOLES, Jr. et. al. vs. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING
G.R. No. 12790 [DATE] August 9, 2005
On 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value
of P10.5M, stock investments worth P518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to
P6.54M, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband
(Petitioner) and their 2 minor children.
Consequently, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition for the settlement
of Miguelita’s estate. He prayed that (a) letters of administration be issued in his
name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be divided among the
compulsory heirs.
Miguelita’s mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching (Respondent) filed an opposition,
specifically to petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of letters of administration on
the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of
an administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of
“paraphernal properties.” Respondent prayed that the letters of administration be
issued to her instead. Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as
special administratrix.
Petitioner’s allegations: That the resp. had no direct and material interest in the
estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse,
has the preferential right to be appointed as administrator under the law.
Respondent’s contentions: That she has direct and material interest in the estate
because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that
both of them “would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in
the capacity of business partners.” In her omnibus motion, she nominated her
son Emmanuel to act as special administrator.
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The RTC appointed petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of
the estate. Both were issued letters of administration after taking their oath and
posting the requisite bond.
No claims were filed against the estate within the period set. Thereafter,
petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s estate.
Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.
The RTC declared petitioner and his 2 minor children as the only compulsory heirs
of Miguelita.
Petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion praying, among
others, that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2)
partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment
of attorney’s fees.
The intestate court partially allowed the motion. It denied petitioner’s prayer for
partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is “premature.” The
intestate court ratiocinated as follows: The Court finds the prayer of petitioner in
this regard to be premature. Thus, a hearing is necessary to determine, whether
the properties listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are entirely
conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-ownership
between the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture.‟
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside
the intestate court’s Order and Resolution. (CA dismissed)
ISSUE:
Whether or not a trial court (acting as an intestate court) can hear and
pass upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the
decedents estate?
HELD:
No, the question of ownership of properties alleged to be part of the
estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction. (Petition GRANTED. CA Reversed)
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The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an
intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special
and limited jurisdiction.
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or
a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its
purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the
inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and provisional.
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining
the jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondent’s claim.
Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that
the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon
questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should
be included in the inventory.
The facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate
court. Respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a
ruling of what properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She
wanted to secure from the intestate court a final determination of her claim of
ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its
jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance
on the matter. It is well settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a
long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of property
alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some
other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such
question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate
proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such
contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction as a regional trial court. Jurisprudence teaches us that:
A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All
that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute,
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well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so.
Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of
general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the
resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging
to Miguelita’s estate.
Doctrine: When a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a
part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to
be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but
by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be
determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings.
Sanchez vs CA GR No 108947
Facts:
“[Herein private respondent] Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan
C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while [herein private respondents] Arturo S.
Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod are the legitimate children of
[herein private respondent] Rosalia.
[Herein petitioners] Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed
Sanchez, are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez.
On October 30, 1969, however, [herein private respondent] Rosalia and [herein
petitioners] assisted by their respective counsels executed a compromise
agreement (Annex ‘D’, Petition) wherein they agreed to divide the properties
enumerated therein of the late Juan C. Sanchez.
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This compromise agreement was not approved by the probate court.
Issue:
Is the Compromise Agreement partitioning the property of the estate without
approval of the probate court valid?
Held:
Yes.
Petitioners contend that, because the compromise agreement was executed
during the pendency of the probate proceedings, judicial approval is necessary to
shroud it with validity. They stress that the probate court had jurisdiction over
the properties covered by said agreement. They add that Petitioners Florida
Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna were all minors represented only by their
mother/natural guardian, Laureta Tampus.
These contentions lack merit. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a
compromise agreement as “a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.” Being
a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the
parties. Judicial approval is not required for its perfection. Petitioners’ argument
that the compromise was not valid for lack of judicial approval is not novel; the
same was raised in Mayuga vs. Court of Appeals,] where the Court, through
Justice Irene R. Cortes, ruled:
“It is alleged that the lack of judicial approval is fatal to the
compromise. A compromise is a consensual contract. As such, it is
perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract.
(Hernandez v. Barcelon, 23 Phil. 599 [1912]; see also De los Reyes v. de
Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505 [1945].) And from that moment not only does it
become binding upon the parties (De los Reyes v. De Ugarte, supra ), it
also has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata (Civil Code,
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Art. 2037), even if not judicially approved (Meneses v. De la Rosa, 77
Phil. 34 [1946]; Vda. De Guilas v. David, 132 Phil. 241, L-24280, 23
SCRA 762 [May 27, 1968]; Cochingyan v. Cloribel, L-27070-71 [April 22,
1977], 76 SCRA 361).” (Italics found in the original.)
In the case before us, it is ineludible that the parties knowingly and freely
entered into a valid compromise agreement. Adequately assisted by their
respective counsels, they each negotiated its terms and provisions for four
months; in fact, said agreement was executed only after the fourth draft. As
noted by the trial court itself, the first and second drafts were prepared
successively in July, 1969; the third draft on September 25, 1969; and the fourth
draft, which was finally signed by the parties on October 30, 1969, followed.
Since this compromise agreement was the result of a long drawn out process,
with all the parties ably striving to protect their respective interests and to come
out with the best they could, there can be no doubt that the parties entered into
it freely and voluntarily. Accordingly, they should be bound thereby. To be valid,
it is merely required under the law to be based on real claims and actually agreed
upon in good faith by the parties thereto.
Indeed, compromise is a form of amicable settlement that is not only allowed but
also encouraged in civil cases. Article 2029 of the Civil Code mandates that a
“court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some
fair compromise.”
In opposing the validity and enforcement of the compromise agreement,
petitioners harp on the minority of Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna. Citing
Article 2032 of the Civil Code, they contend that the court’s approval is necessary
in compromises entered into by guardians and parents in behalf of their wards or
children.
It is also significant that all the parties, including the then minors, had already
consummated and availed themselves of the benefits of their compromise. This
Court has consistently ruled that “a party to a compromise cannot ask for a
rescission after it has enjoyed its benefits.”By their acts, the parties are ineludibly
estopped from questioning the validity of their compromise agreement.
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Heirs of Reyes vs Reyes GR No. 139587 2000
Facts:
Leoncia Reyes and three out of four children decided to execute a deed
denominated Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli, where they sold land to the
Spouses Benedicto Francia and Monica Ajoco (Spouses Francia) for P500.00,
subject to the vendors right to repurchase for the same amount sa oras na
sila'y makinabang. Leoncia and her children did not repay the amount of
P500.00. Alejandro Reyes, one Leoncia’ grandchildren, repaid the P500.00 from
the Spouses Francia. By virtue of his payment, Alejandro executed a Kasulatan
ng Pagmeme-ari, wherein he declared that he had acquired all the rights and
interests of the heirs of the Spouses Francia, including the ownership of the
property, after the vendors had failed to repurchase within the given period.
Nevertheless, Alejandro, Leoncia, and his father Jose, Sr. executed an additional
document Magkakalakip na Salaysay, by which Alejandro acknowledged the right
of Leoncia, Jose, Jr., and Jose, Sr. to repurchase the property at any time for the
same amount of P500.00.
After Alejandro’s death, Amanda Reyes, the wife of Alejandro Reyes, asked his
deceased husband’s cousins to vacate the property because she and her children
already needed it. Respondents alleged that their predecessor Alejandro had
acquired ownership of the property by virtue of the deed Pagsasa-ayos ng Pag-
aari at Pagsasalin; that on the basis of such deed of assignment, Alejandro had
consolidated his ownership of the property via his Kasulatan ng Pagmeme-ari;
and that under the Magkasanib na Salaysay, Alejandro had granted to Leoncia,
his father Jose, Sr., and his uncles, Teofilo and Jose, Jr. the right to repurchase
the property, but they had failed to do so.
The petitioners averred that the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli was an
equitable mortgage, not a pacto de retro sale; that the mortgagors had retained
ownership of the property; that the heirs of the Spouses Francia could not have
validly sold the property to Alejandro through the Pagsasaayos ng Pag-aari at
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Pagsasalin; that Alejandros right was only to seek reimbursement of the P500.00
he had paid from the co-owners.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents declaring that Alejandro had acquired
ownership of the property in 1965 by operation of law upon the failure of the
petitioners predecessors to repurchase the property; that the joint affidavit
executed by Alejandro, Leoncia and Jose, Jr. and Jose, Sr., to extend the period
of redemption was inefficacious, because there was no more period to extend due
to the redemption period having long lapsed by the time of its execution.
The CA reversed the finding of the trial court and ruled that that the transaction
covered by the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli was not a pacto de retro sale
but an equitable mortgage under Article 1602 of the Civil Code; that even after
the deeds execution, Leoncia, Teofilo, Jose, Jr. and their families had remained in
possession of the property and continued paying realty taxes for the property;
that the purported vendees had not declared the property for taxation purposes
under their own names; and that such circumstances proved that the parties
envisaged an equitable mortgage in the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are now barred from claiming that the
transaction under the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli was an equitable
mortgage by their failure to redeem the property for a long period of time?
Held: No, considering that sa oras na silay makinabang, the period of
redemption stated in the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli, signified that no
definite period had been stated, the period to redeem should be ten years from
the execution of the contract, pursuant to Articles 1142 and 1144 of the Civil
Cod. The acceptance of the payments even beyond the 10-year period of
redemption estopped the mortgagees heirs from insisting that the period to
redeem the property had already expired. Their actions impliedly recognized the
continued existence of the equitable mortgage. The conduct of the original
parties as well as of their successors-in-interest manifested that the parties to
the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli really intended their transaction to be an
equitable mortgage, not a pacto de retro sale.
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ALABAN VS. CA G.R. NO. 156021, SEPT. 23, 2005
DOCTRINE:
Extrinsic Fraud. – An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud
lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as
extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his
entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining no to the
judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding
consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition for the probate
of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad ProvidoElevencionado
(decedent), who died on Oct. 26, 2000 in Janjuay, Iloilo. Respondent that
he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will. The RTC
allowed the probate of the will of the decedent and directed the issuance
of letters testamentary to respondent.
2. More than 4 months later or on Oct. 4, 2001, petitioners filed a motion for
reopening of the probate proceedings. Likewise, they filed an opposition to
the allowance of the will of the decedent. As well as the issuance of letters
testamentary to respondent, claiming that they are the intestate heirs of
the decedent. On Jan. 11, 2002, RTC issued an order denying the
petitioners’ motion for being unmeritorious. Moreover, the RTC’s decision
was already final and executory even before petitioner’s filing of the
motion to reopen.
3. Petitioners thereafter filed a petition with an application for preliminary
injunction with the CA, seeking the annulment of the RTC’s Decision and
Order. They argued that the RTC decision should be annulled and set
aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the RTC.
4. CA dismissed the petition. It found that there was no showing that
petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial,
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appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies
through no fault of their own. Moreover, the CA declared as baseless
petitioners’ claim that the proceedings in the RTC was attended by
extrinsic fraud. Neither was there any showing that they availed of this
ground in a motion for new trial or petition for relief from judgment in the
RTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but the same was denied.
5. Petitioner maintains that they were not made parties to the case in which
the decision sought to be annulled was rendered and, thus could not have
availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
from judgment and other appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of
the CA. They aver that respondent’s offer of a false compromise and his
failure to notify them of the probate of the will constitute extrinsic fraud
that necessitates the annulment of the RTC’s judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proceedings in the RTC was attended by extrinsic
fraud that necessitates the annulment of the RTC’s judgment.
HELD: Petition is devoid of merit.
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case
where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such
action is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be
a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, and is based only on
two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A
person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only
essential that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the
use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud only lies if the fraud is
extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it
prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the
court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but
to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic
is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a
party from having his day in court.
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In the present case, to sustain their allegation of extrinsic fraud, petitioners
assert that as a result of respondent’s deliberate omission or concealment of their
names, ages and residences as the other heirs of the decedent in his petition for
allowance of the will, they were not notified of the proceedings, and thus they
were denied their day in court. In addition, they claim that respondent’s offer of a
false compromise even before the filing of the petition prevented them from
appearing and opposing the petition for probate.
The Court is not convinced. According to the Rules, notice is required to be
personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. A perusal
of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent.
Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor
testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the
Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition
for probate, or to personally notify them of the same.
Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the
purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal
notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a
jurisdictional requisite.
The non-inclusion of petitioners’ names in the petition and alleged failure to
personally notify them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they were not prevented from
participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before the probate
court.
SUMILANG V. RAMAGOSA 21 SCRA 1369
FACTS
Mariano Sumilang filed a petition for theprobate of a document alleged to be
thelast will and testament of HilarionRamagosa. Said document institutesMariano
as the sole heir of the testator.The petition was opposed by two
SaturninaRamagosa, et. al, who questioned the dueexecution of the document,
claiming thatit was made under duress and was notreally intended by the
deceased to be hislast will and testament. Saturnino andSantiago Ramagosa also
claimed thatthey, instead of Mariano, were entitled toinherit the estate of the
84

deceased.After Mariano presented evidence andrested his case, oppositors moved
for thedismissal of the petition on the ground thatdecedent revoked his will by
implication oflaw six years before his death by selling theparcels of land to
Mariano Sumilang andhis brother Mario so that at the time of thetestator's death,
the titles to said landswere no longer in his name.On the other hand, Mariano
moved tostrike out oppositors pleadings on theground that the oppositors have
no interestin the probate of the will as they have norelationship with the
decedent within thefifth degree. The lower court ruled in favor of Mariano stating
that the allegations ofthe oppositors go to the very intrinsic valueof the will and
since the oppositors have nostanding to oppose the probate of the willas they are
strangers, their pleadings areordered stricken out from the record.
ISSUE
Whether the probate court should passupon the intrinsic validity of the will.
HELD
The petition being for the probate of a will,the court's area of inquiry is limited to
theextrinsic validity only. The testator'stestamentary capacity and thecompliance
with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the onlyquestions
presented for the resolution ofthe court. Any inquiry into the intrinsicvalidity or
efficacy of the provisions of thewill or the legality of any devise or legacy
ispremature (Nuguid vs. Nuguid).To establish conclusively as againsteveryone
and once for all, the facts that awill was executed with the formalitiesrequired by
law and that the testator wasin a condition to make a will, is the onlypurpose of
the proceedings . . . for theprobate of a will. The judgment in suchproceedings
determines and candetermine nothing more. (Alemany, et al.vs. CFI of
Manila)True or not, the alleged sale is no groundfor the dismissal of the petition
for probate.Probate is one thing the validity of thetestamentary provisions is
another. The firstdecides the execution of the documentand the testamentary
capacity of thetestator; the second relates to descentand distributionThe
revocation invoked by the oppositors isnot an express one, but merely
impliedfrom subsequent acts of the testatrixallegedly evidencing an abandonment
ofthe original intention to bequeath or devisethe properties concerned. As such,
therevocation would not affect the will itself,but merely the particular devise or
legacy
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Guevara v. Guevara Digest 98 Phil 249
Facts:
1. Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t
his wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto
and a natural daughter Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural
daughter.
2. In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor
was there any settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son
Ernest possessed the land which he adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who
had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as well as
the devise given to her.
3. Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from
Ernesto, a portion of a large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment
contained in the will and based on the assumption that the decedent died
intestate because his will was not probated. She alleged that the disposition in
favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.
4. The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.
Issue: Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with
RULING: No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an
attempt to circumvent the last will and testament of the decedent. The
presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance is
essential and indispensable to its efficacy.
Suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy for without probate,
the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.
Cuenco vs. CA G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973
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FACTS:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and
two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage,
residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu,
alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with
properties in Cebu and Quezon City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife,
filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where
she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in
CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI
Quezon shall have acted on the probate proceedings.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of
lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already
acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to
dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ
of prohibition to CFI Quezon.
ISSUEs:
 Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition
 Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over
the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly
consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate
proceedings
HELD:
The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition
against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and
annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to
probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-
widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's
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wish.
On Venue and Jurisdiction
Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of
jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it
would affect the prompt administration of justice.
The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of
the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the
exclusion of all other courts.
SALAZAR vs. CFI OF LAGUNA AND RIVERA, 64 PHIL 78 (1937)
FACTS:
Crispin Oben instituted special proceeding and prayed for the probate of
the will allegedly made by his deceased mother on May 13, 1924. The petition
was opposed by Sabina Rivera and prayed for the probate of the will of the
deceased alleged made on May 11, 1930, copy of which was attached thereto,
and for the issuance, to that effect, of the order setting the hearing thereof and
directing such publications as required by law.
The court denied the motion for publication and ordered the Rivera to
institute another proceeding and apply separately for the probate of the alleged
will. The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and the court, on March
31, 19937, issued an order setting aside the former one and directing that the
will presented by the respondent be set for hearing, that the publications
required by law be made and that said will be heard jointly with the will
presented by the petitioner in the same proceeding instituted by the latter.
Sometime later, the court ordered that the expenses for the publications made in
the newspapers be defrayed by the respondent.
The petitioner filed two motions for reconsideration which were denied
and, finally, instituted this certiorari proceeding. In order that the hearing and
publications ordered by the court may be carried out, the respondent, on July 20,
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1937, deposited P24 and filed the original of the will the probate of which had
been sought by her.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the court acquired no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
counter-petition for the probate of the second will, or to set the same for hearing
of said will to be held in the same proceeding jointly with the first will, on the
ground that the respondent had not previously filed her pleading nor paid the
fees of the clerk of court.
HELD:
YES. Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction to probate a will when it is
shown by evidence before it:
(1) That a person has died leaving a will;
(2) in the case of a resident of this country, that he died in the province where
the court exercises territorial jurisdiction;
(3) in the case of a nonresident, that he has left a estate in the province where
the court is situated, and (4) that the testament or last will of the deceased
has been delivered to the court and is in the possession thereof.
According to the facts alleged and admitted by the parties, it is evident that
the court has acquired jurisdiction to probate the second will, in view of the
presence of all the jurisdictional facts above-stated. The respondent's counter-
petition should, in this case, be considered as a petition for the probate of the
second will, the original of which was filed by her on July 20, 1937.
The payment of the fees of the clerk of court for all services to be rendered by
him in connection with the probate of the second will and for the successive
proceedings to be conducted and others to be issued is not jurisdiction in the
sense that its omission does not deprive the court of its authority to proceed with
the probate of a will
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF
RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS AND BENJAMIN
GREGORIO PALAGANAS VS. ERNESTO PALAGANAS
G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011
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FACTS:
Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized
United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and
testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C.
Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the
Philippines and in the U.S.
Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta,
filed with the a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment
as special administrator of her estate. However, petitioners Manuel Miguel
Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of
Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be
probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it
The RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b)
appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio,
the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of
Special Administration to Ernesto.
Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that
an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be
probated for the first time in the Philippines.
The CA affirmed order of the RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowed
the probate of the will. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules
of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of
its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The present case is
different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed
abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the
Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the
country where it was executed.
HELD:
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Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the
decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he
has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the
will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the
death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must
show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the
names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has
not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of
it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at
the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The rules
do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated
in the country of its execution.
In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed
by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in
mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But,
reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign
country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time
before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the
Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule applies only
to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In
reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign
probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
Besides, petitioners’ stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted
heirs do not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good
as depriving them outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved and
allowed by the proper court.
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G.R. No. L-9633 January 29, 1957
EMILIO SORIANO, vs. ANTONIO ASI,
Facts:
On April 22, 1952, Emilio Soriano filed a petition to vacate the order admitting his
aunt's will to probate, on the ground that, because of the omission of his name as
detailed above, and because of his unfamiliarity with Spanish, petitioner had
been deprived of his day in court, and of opportunity to object to the probate;
and that he learned of the questioned proceedings only on April 4, 1952, through
a communication from the lawyer of Antonio Asi.
Now appellant first alleges that, notwithstanding the lack of personal notice, the
Court of First Instance acquired jurisdiction over the case, by virtue of the
newspaper publication, probate proceedings being proceedings in rem. The
objection is improperly raised, because Emilio Soriano does not question the
jurisdiction of the probate court; his petition for relief on the ground of fraud
precisely assumes that the Court had jurisdiction to issue the order complained
of. Without jurisdiction, said order would be a total nullity, and no petition for
relief would be required.
Because of the facts aforesaid, Judge Edilberto Soriano, then of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, overruled the objections of Antonio Asi, and vacated the
probate order complained of as obtained through extrinsic fraud to the detriment
of Emilio Soriano. It is next averred that the petition for relief was filed out of
time, because the order admitting the will to probate was rendered on October
10, 1951, while the petition for relief only six (6) months and twelve (12) days
afterward, on April 22, 1952.
Issue: Whether or not the petition filed out of time?
Held: No, the petition was not filed out of time.
The period of six months is incorrectly computed by the appellant from the
rendition of the judgment or order complained of; it should be counted from the
entry of such judgment or order. This is evident from section 3 of Rule 38:
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SEC. 3. When petition filed; contents and verification. — A petition
provided for in either of the preceding sections of this rule must be
verified, filed within sixty days after the petition learns of the judgment,
order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six months
after such judgment or order was entered, or such proceeding was taken;
and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting
the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the
case may be, which he may prove if his petition be granted.
Under Rule 35, section 2, a judgment or order is entered by the clerk after
expiration of the period for appeal or motion for new trial, i.e., after thirty days
(Rule 37 and 41). This means that the probate order of October 10, 1951, could
be entered, at the earliest, on November 9, 1951; wherefore, the petition for
relief, filed on April 22, 1952, was within the six months allowed by law.
Maloles II vs. Philips GR No. 129505
FACTS: In 1995, Dr. Arturo De Los Santos filed a petition for probate of his
will. He declared that he has no compulsory heirs and that he is naming as sole
devisee and legatee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. (ASF). The named
executrix is Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips. The petition was filed in RTC Makati
Branch 61. Judge Fernando Gorospe of said court determined that Arturo is of
sound mind and was not acting in duress when he signed his last will and
testament and so Branch 61 allowed the last will and testament on February 16,
1996.
Ten days from the allowance, Arturo died. Thereafter, Pacita, as executrix, filed a
motion for the issuance of letters of testamentary with Branch 61. She however
withdrew the motion but later on refilled it with RTC Makati Branch 65.
Meanwhile, a certain Octavio Maloles II filed a motion for intervention with
Branch 61 claiming that as a next of kin (him being the full blooded nephew of
Arturo) he should be appointed as the administrator of the estate and that he is
an heir.
Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order transferring the motion filed by
Pacita to Branch 61. Judge Santos ratiocinated that since the probate proceeding
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started in Branch 61, then it should be the same court which should hear Pacita’s
motion. Branch 61 however refused to consolidate and referred the case back to
Branch 65. Branch 65 subsequently consolidated the case per refusal of Branch
61. Eventually, Branch 65 allowed the motion for intervention filed by Octavio.
ISSUE: Whether or not Octavio Maloles II has the right to intervene in the
probate proceeding.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court first clarified that the probate of will filed in
Branch 61 has already terminated upon the allowance of the will. Hence when
Pacita filed a motion with Branch 65, the same is already a separate proceeding
and not a continuance of the now concluded probate in Branch 61. There is
therefore no reason for Branch 65 to refer back the case to Branch 61 as it
initially did. Further even if the probate was terminated, under Rule 73 of the
Rules of Court concerning the venue of settlement of estates, it is provided that
when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to
the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches.
Anent the issue of Octavio being an heir, such contention has no merit. He is not
an heir. Arturo died testate. Next of kins may only inherit if a person dies
intestate. In this case, Arturo left a valid will which expressly provided that ASF is
the sole legatee and devisee of his estate.
Tan vs Gedorio G.R. No. 166520 March 14, 2008
FACTS: Upon the death of Gerardo Tan on Oct. 14, 2000, private respondents
Rogelo Lim Suga and Helen Tan Racoma, who were claiming to be the children of
the decedent moved for the appointment of their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo Lim
as special administrator. This was opposed by the petitioner Vilma Tan, Jake Tan
and Geraldine Tan, claiming that none of the respondents can be appointed since
they are not residing in the country, that Romualdo does not have the same
competence as Vilma Tan who was already acting as the de facto administratrix
of the estate, and that the nearest of kin, being the legitmate children, is
preferred in the choice of administrator (claiming that the respondent were
illegitmate children).
However, upon failure of Vilma to follow a court directive to account for the
income of the estate, the court granted Romualdo's appointment as special
administrator.
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Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals and was denied, hence the petition
for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court violated Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court in
their selection of a special administrator.
RULING: The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the
next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a
special administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the
discretion of the court, and is not appealable.
If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference , they
should pursue the appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end the
delay which necessitated the appointment of a special administrator.
G.R. No. 187879 July 5, 2010
DALISAY E. OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA CARLA E. OCAMPO,
and LEONARDO E. OCAMPO, JR.,
vs.
RENATO M. OCAMPO and ERLINDA M. OCAMPO,
FACTS: Petitioners Dalisay E. Ocampo (Dalisay), Vince E. Ocampo (Vince),
Melinda Carla E. Ocampo (Melinda), and Leonardo E. Ocampo, Jr. (Leonardo, Jr.)
are the surviving wife and the children of Leonardo Ocampo (Leonardo), who died
on January 23, 2004. Leonardo and his siblings, respondents Renato M. Ocampo
(Renato) and Erlinda M. Ocampo (Erlinda) are the legitimate children and only
heirs of the spouses Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who died intestate on
December 19, 1972 and February 19, 1996, respectively. Vicente and Maxima
left several properties, mostly situated in Biñan, Laguna. Vicente and Maxima left
no will and no debts.
On June 24, 2004, five (5) months after the death of Leonardo, petitioners
initiated a petition for intestate proceedings, entitled In Re: Intestate Proceedings
of the Estate of Sps. Vicente Ocampo and Maxima Mercado Ocampo, and
Leonardo M. Ocampo, in the RTC, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna, docketed as Spec.
Proc. No. B-3089. The petition alleged that, upon the death of Vicente and
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Maxima, respondents and their brother Leonardo jointly controlled, managed,
and administered the estate of their parents. Under such circumstance, Leonardo
had been receiving his share consisting of one-third (1/3) of the total income
generated from the properties of the estate. However, when Leonardo died,
respondents took possession, control and management of the properties to the
exclusion of petitioners. The petition prayed for the settlement of the estate of
Vicente and Maxima and the estate of Leonardo. It, likewise, prayed for the
appointment of an administrator to apportion, divide, and award the two estates
among the lawful heirs of the decedents.
After long side by side filing of motions, petitions and oppositions, Renato and
Erlinda were appointed as special administrators but refused to give an inventory
of properties as petitioned by herein petitioners until after the court ruled in their
petition for exemption in posting a bond. Meanwhile, petitioners subsequently
learned that respondents has disposed of real properties for P2,700,000.00
saying it was only for P1,500,000.00 then move the court through a petition in
removing the respondents as administrators and proceed to partitioning the
estate. The RTC ruled in the affirmative and appointed Melinda as regular
administrator conditioned with the posting of P200,000.00 as bond which the
later complied. The respondents appealed in the CA and they received a favorable
decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the court should have acted with grave abuse of discretion
in revoking and terminating the appointment of Renato and Erlinda as joint
special administrators, on account of their failure to comply with its Order,
particularly the posting of the required bond, and to enter their duties and
responsibilities as special administrators and in appointing Melinda as regular
administratrix, subject to the posting of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00.
RULING: The court ruled that the trial court did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in revoking the appointment of the respondents as special
administrators and otherwise in appointing Melinda as regular administrator
opining and ordering that she should instead be appointed as special
administration as according to the rules.
A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision
and control, expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a
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view to its smooth administration and speedy settlement. When appointed, he or
she is not regarded as an agent or representative of the parties suggesting the
appointment. The principal object of the appointment of a temporary
administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass to the hands of a person
fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to
Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their
deceased parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not
a mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled that the
selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules
regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The probate court
may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those
enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon
and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of
preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a
regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised
without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles,
interference by higher courts is unwarranted. The appointment or removal of
special administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be
assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the duties
and obligations of an administrator namely: (1) to administer the estate and pay
the debts; (2) to perform all judicial orders; (3) to account within one (1) year
and at any other time when required by the probate court; and (4) to make an
inventory within three (3) months. More specifically, per Section 4 of the same
Rule, the bond is conditioned on the faithful execution of the administration of
the decedents estate requiring the special administrator to (1) make and return a
true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased
which come to his possession or knowledge; (2) truly account for such as
received by him when required by the court; and (3) deliver the same to the
person appointed as executor or regular administrator, or to such other person as
may be authorized to receive them.
Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as
it compels the administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the trust
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reposed in, and discharge the obligations incumbent upon, him. Its object and
purpose is to safeguard the properties of the decedent, and, therefore, the bond
should not be considered as part of the necessary expenses chargeable against
the estate, not being included among the acts constituting the care,
management, and settlement of the estate. Moreover, the ability to post the
bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office of administration.
G.R. No. L-21917 November 29, 1966
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED CARLOS GURREA Y MONASTERIO.
MARCELO PIJUAN, special administrator-appellee,
vs.
MANUELA RUIZ VDA. DE GURREA, movant-appellant.
FACTS:
Appellant Manuela Ruiz (Mrs. Gurrea) and Carlos Gurrea were married in
Spain, where they lived together until 1945, when he abandoned her and came,
with their son Teodoro, to the Philippines. Here he lived maritally with Rizalina
Perez by whom he had two (2) children. Having been informed by her son that
his father was residing in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, Manuela came to the
Philippines but, Carlos Gurrea refused to admit her to his residence.
She instituted, against Carlos Gurrea, Civil Case No. 5820 of the CFI of
Negros Occidental, for support and the annulment of some alleged donations of
conjugal property, in favor of his common-law wife. Said court issued an order
granting Mrs. Gurrea a monthly alimony, pendente lite, of P2,000.00 which was
reduced by the Court of Appeals to P1,000.00.
Carlos Gurrea died leaving a document purporting to be his last will and
testament, in which he named Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof and
disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and their son, Teodoro. Pijuan instituted Special
Proceedings No. 6582 , for the probate of said will. Thereafter Pijuan was, upon
his ex parte motion, appointed special administrator of the estate, without bond.
Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed by Mrs. Gurrea, her son,
Teodoro.
Mrs. Gurrea filed in said Special Proceedings No. 6582, a motion praying
that the Special Administrator be ordered to continue paying it pending the final
determination of the case. This motion was denied. Mrs. Gurrea moved for a
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reconsideration. She further moved for her appointment as administratrix of the
estate of the deceased. But the same was denied.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the the lower court erred in denying her petition for appointment as
administratrix (for, as widow of the deceased, she claims a right of preference
under Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.)
RULING: Said preference exists "if no executor is named in the will or
the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to
give bond, or a person dies intestate." None of these conditions obtains,
however, in the case at bar. The deceased Carlos Gurrea has left a document
purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it cannot be said,
as yet, that he has died intestate. Again, said document names Marcelo Pijuan as
executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is incompetent therefor. What is
more, he has not only not refused the trust, but, has, also, expressly accepted it,
by applying for his appointment as executor, and, upon his appointment as
special administrator, has assumed the duties thereof. It may not be amiss to
note that the preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of the Rules
of Court to the surviving spouse refers to the appoint of a regular administrator
or administratrix, not to that of a special administrator, and that the order
appointing the latter lies within the discretion of the probate court, and is not
appealable.
Co vs Rosario
G.R. No. 160671, April 30, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner Luis Co and Vicente Yu were appointed by the Regional Trial
Court of Makati on March 4, 1998, as special co-administrators of the estate of
petitioner's father. However, upon motion of other heirs, petitioner's appointment
was set aside, whereby petitioner nominated his son, Alvin Co, in his place, which
was granted by the court.
Four years later, however, the RTC, upon motion of one the heirs, revoked the
appointment of Alvin in view of the several criminal cases filed against the latter.
Petitioner files petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in revoking Alvin Co's appointment as
special co-administrator.
RULING: The trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking
Alvin’s appointment as special co-administrator. Settled is the rule that the
selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules
regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. Courts may appoint
or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated
in the Rules, at their discretion.
The special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its
supervision and control and who is expected to work for the best interest of the
entire estate, especially with respect to its smooth administration and earliest
settlement.
G.R. No. 193161 August 22, 2011
DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, Petitioner,
vs.
MARGARITA AVILA LORETO and FLORENCIA AVILA
PARREÑO, Respondents.
FACTS: Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had
no children. Florentino Manungas died intestate.Thereafter, Engracia Manungas
filed a Motion for Partition of Estate in the intestate estate proceedings of
Florentino Manungas, of which she was the administratrix. There, she stated that
there are no other legal and compulsory heirs of Florentino Manungas except for
herself, and a Ramon Manungas, an acknowledged natural child. Thereafter, a
Decree of Final Distribution was issued distributing the properties to Engracia
Manungas and Ramon Manungas, the surviving heirs.
The RTC Panabo City, appointed Parreño, the niece of Engracia Manungas,
as the Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of her incompetent aunt.
Engracia Manungas, through Parreño, then instituted Civil Case No. 5196-96
against the spouses Diosdado Manungas for illegal detainer and damages. In
their answer, the spouses Salinas claimed that Diosdado is the illegitimate son of
Florentino Manungas. However, the answer was filed beyond the reglementary
period. Thus, the MTC issued a summary judgment in favor of Engracia
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Manungas, ordering the spouses to vacate the premises and to restore
possession to Engracia Manungas.
Thereafter, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over the Estate of Engracia Manungas in his favor. He alleged that
he, being an illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas, is an heir of Engracia
Manungas.
The petition was opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto (Loreto) and Parreño
alleging that Diosdado was incompetent as an administrator of the Estate of
Manungas claiming that 1he was not a Manungas, that 2he was not an heir of
Engracia Manungas, 3he was not a creditor of Engracia Manungas or her estate
and that 4he was in fact a debtor of the estate having been found liable to
Engracia Manungas by virtue of the illegal detainer case. Thus, RTC issued an
Order appointing Parreño as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In his motion, Diosdado
argued that Parreño’s appointment as special administrator of the Estate of
Manungas was by virtue of her being the judicial guardian of the latter but which
relation ceased upon Engracia Manungas’ death. The RTC issued an Order
reversing itself and ordering the revocation of its earlier appointment of Parreño
as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas while appointing Diosdado as the
Special Administrator.
Parreño and Loreto appealed to the CA. CA: RTC acted with grave abuse
of discretion.
ISSUE: W/N The Court a Quo committed a grave error when it ruled to annul the
appointment of petitioner, Diosdado Manungas as judicial administrator and
reinstating the appointment of Florencia Parreño as special administrator.
RULING: Yes. The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino
Manungas does not mean that he is entitled or even qualified to become the
special administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies
within the discretion of the court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-
Gabriel,24 it was stated that:
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It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of
certain persons to the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as
well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or
administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not
apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. x x x As the law does
not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the
appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the
person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or
contrary to reason, justice or equity.
The role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until a regular
administrator is appointed. Given this duty on the part of the special
administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and reasonable to appoint someone
interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs. Such
choice would ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that
would effectively diminish his or her share. There is no logical reason to appoint a
person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased.
To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
The trial court erred in revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila
Parreño as Special Administrator on the ground that it found merit in Diosdado’s
contention that he is the illegitimate child of the late Florentino Manangus. In
fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate and would have no interest in preserving
its value. There is no reason to appoint him as its special administrator.
Vicente Uriarte vs. CFI Negros Occidental, CFI Manila, Juan
UriarteZamanoca and HiginioUriarte ;May 29, 1970
SIEFACTS: November 6, 1961 – Vicente filed with CFI Negros a petition for the
settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte alleging therein that as a
natural son of the latter, he was the sole heir and that during the lifetime of said
decedent, Vicente had instituted a civil case in CFI Negros for his compulsory
acknowledgment as such natural son
CFI Negros appointed the PNB as special administrator and later set the date for
the hearing of the petition and ordered that the requisite notices be published in
accordance with law.
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The record discloses, however, that, for one reason or another, PNB never
actually qualified as special administrator.
December 19, 1961 – HiginioUriarte filed an opposition to the petition alleging
that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte who had executed a Last Will
and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy whereof has been requested
and which shall be submitted to the court upon receipt and further questioning
Vicente’s capacity and interest to commence the intestate proceeding.
August 28, 1962 – Juan UriarteZamacona commenced a special proceeding in CFI
Manila for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased
Juan Uriarte and filed with CFI Negros a Motion to Dismiss on these grounds:
 As a deceased left a last will, there was no basis to proceed with the
intestate proceedings
 Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate the
intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the
decedent.
Vicente opposed the MTD contending that, as CFI Negros was first to take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of Juan Uriarte, it had acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over the same.
CFI Negros granted Juan UriarteZamacona’s MTD and dismissed the proceeding
before it. MR denied. He filed a notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on
appeal. The administrator appointed by CFI Manila objected to the approval of
the record on appeal. While this was pending, Vicente Uriarte filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court. Therefore, CFI Negros disapproved the record
on appeal to give way to the certiorari.
Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in CFI Manila asking for leave to
intervene therein, for the dismissal of the petition and for the annulment of the
proceedings had in the special proceeding therein. Motion was denied.
It appears from the records that Vicente had filed a civil case in CFi Negros
during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte to obtain judgment for his compulsory
acknowledgement as his natural child. It is likewise clear that at the time he filed
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the action, as well as when he commenced the petition for settlement of estate,
he had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte.
The record further discloses that the special proceeding before CFI Negros has
not gone further than the appointment of PNB as special administrator (who
failed to qualify).
On the other hand, CFI Manila admitted to probate the document submitted to it,
as thelast will of Juan Uriarte, the petition for probate appearing not to have been
contested.
ISSUE: Whether Juan UriarteZamacona should have filed the petition for probate
of the last will of Juan Uriarte with CFI Negros or was entitled to commenced the
corresponding separate proceedings in CFI Manila
RULING: Rule 73, Section: the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the
court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any
province in which he had estate.
The deceased Juan Uriarte was a non-resident alien. Therefore, the CFIs in
provinces where he left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the proper special proceedings for the settlement of his estate.
Vicente argues that when CFI Negros took cognizance, CFI Manila no longer had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the special proceeding.
It cannot be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of
the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate
succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding
for the settlement of his estate.
It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this
jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it
has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending
before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will,
proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings
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even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter
being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession
to the executor subsequently appointed.
These facts support the view that Juan UriarteZamacona should have submitted
the will for probate in CFI Negros either in a separate special proceeding or in an
appropriate motion in the already pending special proceeding:
1. It is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive
administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if
several courts would be involved.
2. When HiginioUriarte filed an opposition to Vicente’s petition for the
issuance of letters of sdministration, he had already informed the Negros
Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte had left a will in Spain, of which a
copy had been requested for submission to CFI Negros. When Juan
UriarteZamacona filed his MTD in CFI Negros, he had submitted there a
copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may be inferred
that he knew before filing the petition for probate with the Manila Court
that there was already a special proceeding pending in CFinegros for the
settlement of the estate of the same deceased person.
It is well settled that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and in
the light of the circumstances obtaining in this case, Vicente has waived the right
to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. He knew of the
existence of the will since 1961 when HiginioUrirate opposed the initial petition in
CFI Negros. He was also served with notice of the alleged will and of the filing of
petition for its probate when Juan UriarteZamacona filed an MTD in CFI Negros
on 1962. He only filed the omnibus motion in the Manila Court on April 1963. By
then, The Manila Court had already appointed an administrator and had admitted
the will to probate. Toa llow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the
probate of the will by the Manila court and the validity of all the proceedings
therein would put a premium on his negligence.
SC is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the
latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the
same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in
a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is raised too
late. DISPOITIVE petition dismissed.
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Luzon Surety v Quebrar & Kilayko G.R. No. L-40517 January 31, 1984
FACTS:
Luzon Surety issued two administrator's bond in behalf of defendant Quebrar as
administrator of 2 estates (Chinsuy and Lipa). The plaintiff and both Quebrar and
Kilayko bound themselves solidarily after executing an indemnity agreement
where both the defendants agreed to pay the premiums every year. In the years
1954-55, the defendants paid the premiums and the documnetary stamps. In
1957, the Court approved the project of partition, while in 1962, Luzon Surety
demanded payments of premiums from 1955 onwards. It was also in the same
year when the court granted the motion of the defendants to have both bonds
cancelled. Hence, plaintiff file a case in the CFI. The court (CFI) allowed the
plaintiff to recover since the bonds were in force and effect from the filing until
1962. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court on questions
of law.
ISSUE: Are the bonds still in force and effect from 1955 to 1962?
RULING: YES. Under Rule 81 (Sec.1) of the Rules of COurt, the administrator is
required to put up a bond for the purpose of indemnifying creditors, heirs,
legatees and the estate. It is conditioned uponthe faithful performance of the
administrator's trust. Hence, the surety is then liable udner the administrator's
bond.
Even after the approved project of partitio, Quebrar as administrator still had
something to do. The administration is for the purpose of liquidation of the estate
and the distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation
means the determination of all the assets of the estate and the payment of all
debts and expenses. it appears that there are still deblts and expenses to be paid
after 1957.
Moreover, the bond stipulationdd not provide that it will terminate at the end of
the 1st year if the premium remains unpaid. Hence, it does not necessariy
extinguish or terminate the effectivity of the coutner bond in the absence of an
express stipualtion to this effect. As such, as long as the defendant remains the
administrator of the estate, the bond will be held liable and the plaintiff's
liabilities subsist being the co-extensive with the administrator.
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COTIA VS JIMENEZ, 104 PHIL 966
FACTS:
Elena Cotia was appointed administratrix of the estate of the deceased Mariano
Cotia. Failing to submit an account of her administration, she was ordered by the
lower court to submit said accounting. During the hearing of the statement of
accounts subsequently presented by Elena Cotia, it was established that she
spent for family expenses and attorney’s fees the total sum of P64,650 without
prior judicial authority. The oppositors-appellees therefore filed a motion for her
removal as administratrix not only because she neglected to submit the
accounting required by the Rules and to settle the estate, but because she had
made unauthorized disbursements.
ISSUE: Whether or not Elena Cotia should be removed as an
administrator of the subject estate?
RULE: Yes, Elena Cotia should be removed as an administrator of the
estate of the deceased Mariano Cotia.
Under Section 2, Rule 83, of the Rules of Court, the court may remove an
administrator who neglects to render his account and settle the estate according
to law. As the administratrix herein not only neglected to submit an accounting of
her administration and settle the estate according to law but also had made
unauthorized disbursements in violation of Section 3, Rule 84, of the Rules of
Court, the lower court did not abuse its discretion in removing her.
COBARRUBIAS VS DIZON, 76 PHIL 209 (full text written in Spanish but
found a digest in English. sorry)
The petitioner Magdalena Cobarrubias filed an urgent motion, alleging that the
deceased Pilar Leyba had deposited an amount worth P4,500 in the Bank
of the Philippine Islands; That said bank notified all interested parties that they
withdraw the contents of their section within the shortest possible time, so she
asked to be appointed special administrator and that she was authorized to
withdraw said jewelry from the bank. In her application Magdalena Cobarrubias
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stated that she was the only forced heiress of the late Pilar Leyba. Accepting as
good these allegations, the Honorable Judge Dizon on the same date, July 5,
1945, appointed Magdalena Cobarrubias special administrator on bail of P200.
The petitioner filed a brief alleging that since the Court "has rescinded its order
dated 5 of said month and year," requested that the Court order the cancellation
of the bond of P200 and its return to the lawyer of the applicant.
Issue: Whether or not appointed special administrator can be revoked?
Held: Yes.
Revoking the appointment of the appellant as special administrator and revoking
the order authorizing her to withdraw the deposited jewels, the Court does not
abuse its discretion, nor work outside its jurisdiction. The power of the Court of
First Instance to render ineffective the appointment of an administrator, when
the appointment has been obtained through false or incorrect representations, is
indisputable. When the Court appointed the appellant special administrator with
authorization to withdraw from the bank jewels valued at P4,500 under a P200
bond, it took into account its essential claim that "it was the sole forced heiress
of the deceased." There was no danger of possible embezzlement. They could
even name it without bail. But upon receiving a report that this allegation was
inaccurate. Which was confirmed by the motion of the same petitioner who
requested the "suspension of publication and postponement of the hearing"
because he wished to "have time to arrange an extrajudicial partition with his
co-heirs," the court had ample grounds to revoke those orders even without
notification to the administrator: the intestate is not initiated for the benefit of
the administrators but of the heirs. The court should act immediately and not put
in danger. With his indifference, the jewels. If he allowed a few hours to pass,
without taking drastic action, the jewels valued at P4,500 could be withdrawn by
the special administrator who was only secured in P200 to the detriment of the
interests of the minors. The zeal shown by the court was well founded. The
position of special administrator is one of trust. As soon as it lost its confidence in
the integrity of the applicant, the Court was fully justified in revoking its
appointment as special administrator and withdrawing its authorization to remove
the jewels from the bank.
GARCIA VS. VASQUEZ, 32 SCRA 490
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FACTS:
Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried leaving no descendents, ascendants,
brother or sister. Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. de Precilla, a niece of the deceased,
petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for probate of the alleged last will
and testament of Gliceria A. del Rosario and for her appointment as special
administratrix of the latter’s estate pending the appointment of a regular
administrator thereof.
The petition was opposed separately by several groups of alleged heirs who
invariably charged that the instrument was not intended by the deceased to be
her true will. Oppositor Lucio V. Garcia, who also presented for probate the 1956
will of the deceased registered opposition to the appointment of petitioner
Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. de Precilla as special administratrix, on the ground
that the latter possesses interest adverse to the estate.
The probate court granted petitioner Consuelo’s prayer and appointed her special
administratrix. Said oppositors petitioned the court for the immediate removal of
the special administratrix. It was their claim that the special administratrix and
her deceased husband, Alfonso Precilla, had caused Gliceria A. del Rosario to
execute a simulated and fraudulent deed of absolute sale dated allegedly
conveying unto said spouses for the paltry sum of P30,000.00 ownership of 3
parcels of land and the improvements. Oppositors contended that since it is the
duty of the administrator to protect and conserve the properties of the estate,
and it may become necessary that, an action for the annulment of the deed of
sale and for recovery of the aforementioned parcels of land be filed against the
special administratrix, as wife and heir of Alfonso Precilla, the removal of the said
administratrix was imperative.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Elena should be removed as special
administratrix for annulment of the deed of sale and for recovery of the
subject parcels of land?
RULE: Yes, Elena should be removed as special administratrix for annulment of
the deed of sale and for recovery of the same.
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The alleged deed of sale having been executed by Gliceria del Rosario, when she
was already practically blind; and that the consideration of P30,000.00 seems to
be unconscionably small for properties with a total assessed value of
P334,050.00, there was likelihood that a case for annulment might indeed be
filed against the estate or heirs of Alfonso Precilla. And the administratrix, being
the widow and heir of the alleged transferee, cannot be expected to sue herself in
an action to recover property that may turn out to belong to the estate. Not only
this, but the conduct of the special administratrix in securing new copies of the
owner’s duplicates of TCT Nos. 66201, 66202, and 66204, without the court’s
knowledge or authority, and on the pretext that she needed them in the
preparation of the inventory of the estate, when she must have already known by
then that the properties covered therein were already "conveyed" to her husband
by the deceased, being the latter’s successor, and having the contract bind the
land through issuance of new titles in her husband’s name cannot but expose her
to the charge of unfitness or unsuitableness to discharge the trust, justifying her
removal from the administration of the estate.
_____________________________________________________________
DE BORJA VS. TAN, 93 PHIL 167
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco de Borja filed a petition in the lower court for the probate of
the Last Will and Testament of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco. The will was
probated and named Francisco de Borja as executor thereof. One of the heirs
who is now one of the respondents herein Jose de Borja appealed the case to the
Court of Appeals but later his motion for dismissal of the appeal was granted.
Due to Francisco's physical inability to fully administer the estate he being quite
weak and unable to see, the lower court appointed Crisanto de Borja, another
heir, as co-administrator. Crisanto qualified as co-administrator.
Trial court appointed respondent Jose de Borja as co-administrator. Francisco,
Matilde and Crisanto moved for reconsideration of the appointment of Jose de
Borja. The heirs of Jose, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed De Borja,
revoked the appointment of Crisanto as co-administrator and directed
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administrator Jose de Borja to comment on the amended account filed by
Francisco de Borja.
FACTS:
An order appointing a regular administrator is appealable. On the other hand,
according to Rule 105, section 1 (e) an order appointing a special administrator is
not appealable. Respondents contend that a co-administrator is not a regular or
Dr. Maximo Borromeo died without ascendants or descendants, but leaving his
general administrator, and his duties and functions rather partake those of a
widow Johanna Hofer Borromeo, and a will wherein he designated the Borromeo
special administrator; consequently, his appointment is not subject to appeal.
Bros. Estate Inc. as his sole heir, even as he named his brother Canuto O.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Borja is a special administrator, thus, his Borromeo as the executor. The said corporation is owned entirely by the
appointment not appealable? deceased and his brothers and sisters.
RULE: No, Jose De Borja is a co-administrator. A co-administrator performs all
Proceedings having been instituted, the court of first instance of that province
the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of a regular administrator,
only that he is not alone in the administration. Further taking into consideration probated the will in due course, and granted letters testamentary to Canuto O.
Borromeo, who duly qualified as such executor.
the circumstances obtaining in this case, that petitioner Francisco de Borja
though originally designated administrator, is and has for several years been one
only in name due to his physical and mental disability, as a result of which The attorneys for the widow submitted an "Urgent Motion" whereby they prayed
for the removal of the executor on the grounds of negligence in the performance
respondent Jose de Borja is now practically the sole administrator there is no
of his duties and unfitness to continue discharging the powers of the office.
question that for all practical and legal purposes the appointment of Jose de
Borja as co-administrator is equivalent to and has the same effect as a sole
regular or general administrator. Such appointment is appealable. However, taking advantage of the postponement and after a subpoena had been
served on the Bank of the Philippine Islands seeking information on the cash
On the other hand, the powers and functions of a special administrator are quite deposits therein of the deceased Maximo Borromeo, the executor withdrew,
limited. Under Rule 81, section 1, a special administrator is appointed only when without authority from the court, the total amount of P23,930.39 from a joint
there is a delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned current account, in said Bank, of Canuto Borromeo and Maximo Borromeo, and
by an appeal from allowance or disallowance of a will or from any other cause, then deposited portion of the sum thus withdrawn in the joint account of said
and such special administrator is authorized to collect and take charge of the Canuto Borromeo and his brother Exequiel.
estate until the questions causing the delay are decided and an executor or
administrator thereon appointed. Under Rule 87 section 8, a special administrator In time the petition was heard, and voluminous evidence, oral and documentary,
is also appointed when the regular executor or administrator has a claim against was submitted. The Judge, for several reasons, one of them the above
the estate he represents and said special administrator shall have the same withdrawal of funds, decreed the removal of the executor. On motion for
power and subject to the same liability as a regular executor or administrator. In reconsideration the executor’s attorney prayed that the order be revoked.
other words, a special administrator is appointed only for a limited time and for a
specific purpose. Naturally, because of the temporary and special character of his ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient ground to remove Canuto O.
appointment, it was deemed by the law not advisable for any party to appeal Borromeo as the executor?
from said temporary appointment.
_____________________________________________________________ RULE: Yes, there is sufficient ground for the removal of Canuto O. Borromeo as
the executor. An executor or administrator should be removed where his personal
BORROMEO VS BORROMEO, 97 PHIL 549, 551 interests conflict with his official duties, but a mere hostile feeling towards

98

persons interested in the estate is not ground for removal unless it prevents the
management of the estate according to the dictates of prudence.
He claims, in effect, that the money deposited was his at the time he withdrew it.
But would the Bank have allowed him to withdraw the whole amount if he were
not the executor? He got it then as executor, and should have kept it in his
account as executor. Instead, he deposited it in a joint account with his brother
Exequiel, thereby placing it at the latter’s disposal, and hiding it from the widow.
Another reason is that the executor claimed as his own certain shares of the
Interisland Gas Service, in the name of Maximo Borromeo. Conflict between the
interest of the executor and the interest of the deceased is ground for removal or
resignation of the former, who was thereby become unsuitable to discharge the
trust. (Section 2, Rule 83.)
An executor will be removed where it appears that he asserts claims against the
estate of the testator to the extent of two thirds of the value of the estate, and
such claims are disputed by the beneficiary under the will.
ARANAS VS MERCADO
FACTS:
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate survived by his second wife,
Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children which includes petitioner
Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned
corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson
Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties in
exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in to
Mervir Realty.
Thelma filed a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of
Emigdio’s estate (Special Proceedings No. 3094–CEB) which the RTC granted. As
the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio and
indicated therein the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had “left no
real properties but only personal properties”. Thelma again moved to require
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Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory, and that she (Thelma) be
allowed 30 days within which to file a formal opposition to or comment on the
inventory and the supporting documents Teresita had submitted. Thelma
opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to examine
Teresita on the inventory.
RTC ordered finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had
excluded properties that should be included. Teresita sought the reconsideration
of the order on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353
located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the
parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment had already come into the
possession of and registered in the name of Mervir Realty.Thelma opposed the
motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the real property sold by the decedent herein to Mervir
Realty Corporation be included in the inventory of the estate?
RULE: Yes, the subject property must be included in the inventory of the estate.
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties
for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by
the administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional unless the
interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation
or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of
the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether
property included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the
deceased spouse.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration
may be granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is
competent and willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the
letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty–bound to
direct the preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the
estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and
responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of
letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz:
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Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. – Within
three (3) months after his appointment every executor or administrator shall
return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal
estate of the deceased which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the
appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or more of the inheritance
tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the
real and personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word
all is qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge,
which signifies that the properties must be known to the administrator to belong
to the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no
exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to
belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their
being in the possession of another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the
estate of the decedent is “to aid the court in revising the accounts and
determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a
final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate
the administration of the estate.”23 Hence, the RTC that presides over the
administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what
properties should be included in the inventory.
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the
inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the
RTC as an intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with
circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to
include all properties in the possession of the administrator or were known to the
administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could
turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate.
HEIRS OF JOSE SY BANG V. SY
FACTS:
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Sy Bang died intestate in leaving behind real and personal properties, including
several businesses.
Respondent Rolando Sy filed a Complaint for Partition against spouses Jose Sy
Bang and Iluminada Tan, spouses Julian Sy and Rosa Tan, Zenaida Sy, Ma.
Emma Sy, Oscar Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy, Bartolome
Sy, Florecita Sy, Lourdes Sy, Julieta Sy, Rosita Ferrera-Sy, and Renato Sy.
Respondents Rolando Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy,
Bartolome Sy, Julieta Sy, Lourdes Sy, and Florecita Sy are the children of Sy
Bang by his second marriage to respondent Rosita Ferrera-Sy, while petitioners
Jose Sy Bang, Julian Sy and Oscar Sy are the children of Sy Bang from his first
marriage to Ba Nga, and petitioners Zenaida Tan and Ma. Emma Sy are the
children of petitioner spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan.
Herein petitioners and respondents agreed that the income of the three cinema
houses, namely, Long Life, SBS and Sy-Co Theaters, shall exclusively pertain to
respondents for their support and sustenance and the income from the vast parts
of the entire estate and other businesses of their common father, to pertain
exclusively to petitioners. Hence, since the year 1980, private respondents,
through respondent Rosauro Sy, had taken charge of the operation and
management of the three cinema houses, with the income derived therefrom
evenly divided among themselves for their support and maintenance.
The Judge rendered a First Partial Decision based on the Compromise Agreement.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and for Inhibition, alleging,
among others, that the Judge had patently shown partiality in favor of their co-
defendants in the case.
Rosita Ferrera-Sy filed a Motion for Payment of Widow’s Allowance. She alleged
that her deceased husband, Sy Bang, left an extensive estate. The properties of
the estate were found by the trial court to be their conjugal properties. From the
time of Sy Bang’s death in 1971 until the filing of the motion, Rosita was not
given any widow’s allowance as provided in Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of
Court by the parties in possession and control of her husband’s estate, or her
share in the conjugal partnership.
Petitioners argued that Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court specifically
provides that the same is granted only "during the settlement of the estate" of
the decedent, and this allowance, under Article 188 of the Civil Code (now Article
133 of the Family Code), shall be taken from the "common mass of property"
during the liquidation of the inventoried properties.
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The Court granted the Motion for Payment of Widow’s Allowance and ordered
petitioners jointly and severally to pay Rosita ₱25,000.00 as the widow’s
allowance to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang. Petitioners informed the Court
that Rosita and co-petitioner Enrique Sy had executed a waiver of past, present
and future claims against petitioners and, thus, should be dropped as parties to
the case.
Petitioners said that the trial court, acting as a Guardianship Court, and limited
jurisdiction, had no authority to enforce payment of widow’s allowance. The
payment of widow’s allowance cannot be implemented at [the] present because
the estate of Sy Bang – the source from which payment is to be taken – has not
been determined with finality.
ISSUE: Whether or not allowance of the widow Rosita is chargeable to the estate
of the deceased?
RULE: Yes, allowance of the widow Rosita is chargeable to the estate of the
deceased despite having not determined with finality yet.
Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 3. Allowance to widow and family. – The widow and minor or incapacitated
children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive
therefrom, under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by
law.
Correlatively, Article 188 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the
surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried
property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be
deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents
pertaining to them.
Obviously, "the court" referred to in Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court is the
court hearing the settlement of the estate. Also crystal clear is the provision of
the law that the widow’s allowance is to be taken from the common mass of
property forming part of the estate of the decedent.
Thus, as evident from the foregoing provisions, it is the court hearing the
settlement of the estate that should effect the payment of widow’s allowance
considering that the properties of the estate are within its jurisdiction, to the
exclusion of all other courts. It has been 13 years since this Court ordered
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petitioners to pay Rosita Ferrera-Sy her monthly widow’s allowance. Petitioners
Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma have since fought tooth and nail against
paying the said allowance, grudgingly complying only upon threat of
incarceration. We remind petitioners again that they are duty-bound to comply
with whatever the courts, in relation to the properties under litigation, may order.
The widow’s allowance, as discussed above, is chargeable to Sy Bang’s estate.
That the full extent of Sy Bang’s estate has not yet been determined is no excuse
from complying with this Court’s order. Properties of the estate have been
identified – i.e., those in the names of petitioners – thus, these properties should
be made to answer for the widow’s allowance of Rosita. In any case, the amount
Rosita receives for support, which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to her,
will be deducted from her share of the estate.
ESTATE OF RUIZ VS. CA, 118671, 252 SCRA 541
FACTS:
Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son,
Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes,
and his three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice
Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator
bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named
Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.
Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was
distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the
decedent's will. Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real
estate taxes on the real properties of the estate. Petitioner Testate Estate of
Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release
of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the
Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently
filed a "Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of
Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will." Montes prayed for the release of the said
rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for
the distribution of the testator's properties in accordance with the provisions of
the holographic will.
The probate court ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only "such
amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and
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allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation
and deductible from their share in the inheritance. Edmond M. Ruiz is hereby
ordered to submit an accounting of the expenses necessary for administration
including provisions for the support Of Maria Cathryn Veronique Ruiz, Candice
Albertine Ruiz and Maria Angeli Ruiz before the amount required can be
withdrawn.
Edmond assails the order of the CA disallowing him, as executor, to take
possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Edmond, as the executor, has the absolute right in the
possession and administration of the real and personal properties of the
deceased?
RULE: No, the right of an executor or administrator to the possession and
management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute
and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts
and expenses of administration," Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of
Court explicitly provides:
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and
to administer estate not willed. — An executor or administrator shall have
the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the
personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment
of the debts and expenses for administration.28
When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of
court, he had been previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for
repair and maintenance expenses on the properties of the estate, and payment of
the real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved again for the release of
additional funds for the same reasons he previously cited. It was correct for the
probate court to require him to submit an accounting of the necessary expenses
for administration before releasing any further money in his favor.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it
only a portion of the one-year rental income from the Valle Verde property.
Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding rents after renewal of the lease. Neither
did he render an accounting of such funds.
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his
father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and
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partitioned. As executor, he is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of
the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and
responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot unilaterally assign to
himself and possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first
submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the
deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of
administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are
subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and
justness.
__________________________________________________________
MANANQUIL V. ATTY. VILLEGAS, A.M. No. 2430
FACTS:
Atty. Villegas was counsel of record of one Felix LEONG, the administrator for the
testate estate of one Felomina Zerna. LEONG, as administrator of Zerna’s estate,
entered into a lease contract with the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS over
several lots included in Zerna’s estate. The said lease contract was renewed
several times henceforth. It is important to note at this point that VILLEGAS was
both counsel of LEONG and a partner in the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS.
When LEONG died, this disbarment suit was filed by MANANQUIL, the appointed
administrator for LEONG’s estate. MANANQUIL alleged that the lease contracts
were made under iniquitous terms and conditions. Also, MANANQUIL alleged that
VILLEGAS should have first notified and secured the approval of the probate
court in Zerna’s estate before the contracts were renewed, VILLEGAS being
counsel of that estate’s administrator.
ISSUE: Whether VILLEGAS should have first secured the probate court’s
approval regarding the lease?
RULING:
NO. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial
executor or administrator has the right to the possession and management of the
real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for
the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He may, therefore,
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exercise acts of administration without special authority from the court having
jurisdiction of the
estate. For instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the power
to enter into lease contracts involving the properties of the estate even without
prior judicial authority and approval. Thus, considering that administrator Felix
Leong was not required under the law and prevailing jurisprudence to seek prior
authority from the probate court in order to validly lease real properties of the
estate, respondent, as counsel of Felix Leong, cannot be taken to task for failing
to notify the probate court of the various lease contracts involved herein and to
secure its judicial approval thereto.
However, the Court sustains the Solicitor General's holding that there is no
sufficient evidence on record to warrant a finding that respondent allowed the
properties of the estate of Filomena Zerna involved herein to be leased to his
family partnership at very low rental payments. At any rate, it is a matter for the
court presiding over Special Proceedings No. 460 to determine whether or not the
agreed rental payments made by respondent's family partnership is reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of the estate properties.
Considering thus the nature of the acts of misconduct committed by respondent,
and the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court finds sufficient grounds to
suspend respondent from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months.
RULE 85 – ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPENSATION OF EXECUTORS AND
ADMINISTRATORS
3.
MOISES SAN DIEGO, SR. vs. ADELO NOMBRE and PEDRO ESCANLAR
G.R. No. L-19265, May 29, 1964, PAREDES, J.
FACTS:
On May 1, 1960, Nombre, in his capacity was judicial administrator of the
intestate estate subject of the Sp. Proc. stated above, leased one of the
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properties of the estate (a fishpond identified as Lot No. 1617 of the cadastral
survey of Kabankaban, Negros Occidental), to Pedro Escanlar, the other
respondent.
The terms of the lease was for three (3) years, with a yearly rental of
P3,000.00 to expire on May 1, 1963, the transaction having been done,
admittedly, without previous authority or approval of the Court where the
proceedings was pending.
On January 17, 1961, Nombre was removed as administrator by Order of
the court and one Sofronio Campillanos was appointed in his stead.
On March 20, 1961, Campillanos filed a motion asking for authority to
execute a lease contract of the same fishpond, in favor of petitioner herein,
Moises San Diego, Sr., for 5 years from 1961, at a yearly rental of P5,000.00.
Nombre, the deposed administrator, presented a written opposition to the
motion of Campillanos on April 11, 1964, pointing out that the fishpond had been
leased by him to Escanlar for 3 years, the period of which was going to expire on
May 1, 1963.
ISSUE:
1. Whether a judicial administrator can validly lease property of the estate
without prior judicial authority and approval.
2. Whether the provisions of the New Civil Code on Agency should apply
to judicial administrators.
RULING:
1. YES. We believe that the Court of Appeals was correct in sustaining the
validity of the contract of lease in favor of Escanlar, notwithstanding the lack of
prior authority and approval.
The Rules of Court provide that —
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An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession of the
real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of
administration, and shall administer the estate of the deceased not
disposed of by his will. (Sec. 3, Rule 85, old Rules).
Lease has been considered an act of administration (Jocson v. Nava; Gamboa v.
Gamboa; Rodriguez v. Borromeo; Ferraris v. Rodas, supra).
2. NO. While it may be admitted that the duties of a judicial administrator
and an agent (petitioner alleges that both act in representative capacity), are in
some respects, identical, the provisions on agency (Art. 1878, C.C.), should not
apply to a judicial administrator.
A judicial administrator is appointed by the Court. He is not only the
representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the estate (Chua
Tan v. Del Rosario, 57 Phil. 411). A judicial administrator before entering into his
duties, is required to file a bond. These circumstances are not true in case of
agency. The agent is only answerable to his principal. The protection which the
law gives the principal, in limiting the powers and rights of an agent, stems from
the fact that control by the principal can only be thru agreements, whereas the
acts of a judicial administrator are subject to specific provisions of law and orders
of the appointing court.
4.
LUZ CARO vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and BASILIA LAHORRA
VDA. DE BENITO, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF
MARIO BENITO
G.R. No. L-4600, March 25, 1982, GUERRERO, J.
FACTS:
Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito and Benjamin Benito were the original co-
owners of two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-609
and T-610 of the Registry of Deeds of Sorsogon.
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Mario died sometime in January, 1957. His surviving wife, Basilia Lahorra
and his father, Saturnino Benito, were subsequently appointed in Special
Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon as joint
administrators of Mario's estate.
On August 26, 1959, one of the co-owners, Benjamin Benito, executed a
deed of absolute sale of his one-third undivided portion over said parcels of land
in favor of herein petitioner, Luz Caro, for the sum of P10,000.00.
Subsequently, with the consent of Saturnino Benito and Alfredo Benito as
shown in their affidavits both dated September 15, 1960, Exhibits G and F
respectively, a subdivision title was issued to petitioner Luz Caro over Lot I-C,
under T.C.T. No. T-4978.
Sometime in the month of May, 1966, private respondent Basilia Lahorra
Vda. de Benito learned from an allegation in a pleading presented by petitioner in
Special Proceeding No. 508 that the latter acquired by purchase from Benjamin
Benito the aforesaid one-third undivided share in each of the two parcels of land.
Private respondent, thus, filed the present case as an independent one
and in the trial sought to prove that as a joint administrator of the estate of Mario
Benito, she had not been notified of the sale as required by Article 1620 in
connection with Article 1623 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito exercise the right of
legal redemption with respect to the lots in question.
RULING:
NO. The fact is that as early as 1960, co-ownership of the parcels of land
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-609 and T-610 was terminated
when Alfredo Benito, Luz Caro and the Intestate Estate of Mario Benito,
represented by administrators Saturnino Benito, as trustee and representative of
the heirs of Mario Benito, agreed to subdivide the property.
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Even on the assumption that there still is co-ownership here and that
therefore, the right of legal redemption exists, private respondent as
administratrix, has no personality to exercise said right for and in behalf of the
intestate estate of Mario Benito. She is on the same footing as co-administrator
Saturnino Benito. Hence, if Saturnino's consent to the sale of the one-third
portion to petitioner cannot bind the intestate estate of Mario Benito on the
ground that the right of redemption was not within the powers of administration,
in the same manner, private respondent as co-administrator has no power
exercise the right of redemption — the very power which the Court of Appeals
ruled to be not within the powers of administration.
While under Sec. 3, Rule 85, Rules of Court, the administrator has the
right to the possession of the real and personal estate of the deceased, so
far as needed for the payment of the expenses of administration, and the
administrator may bring and defend action for the recovery or protection
of the property or right of the deceased (Sec. 2, Rule 88), such right of
possession and administration do not include the right of legal redemption
of the undivided share sold to a stranger by one of the co-owners after
the death of another, because in such case, the right of legal redemption
only came into existence when the sale to the stranger was perfected and
formed no part of the estate of the deceased co-owner; hence, that right
cannot be transmitted to the heir of the deceased co-owner. (Butte vs.
Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., 4 SCRA 526).
5.
ESTATE OF AMADEO MATUTE OLAVE, as represented by JOSE S. MATUTE,
Judicial Co-Administrator in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, Court of First Instance
of Manila
vs. HONORABLE MANASES G. REYES, Presiding Judge of Branch III, Court
of First Instance of Davao, Davao City; SOUTHWEST AGRICULTURAL
MARKETING CORPORATION also known as (SAMCO); CARLOS V. MATUTE,
as another Administrator of the Estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, Sp. Proc.
No. 25876 CFI, Manila; and MATIAS S. MATUTE, as former Co-
Administrator of the Estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, Sp. Proc. No.
25876, CFI, Manila
G.R. No. L-29407, July 29, 1983, RELOVA, J.
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FACTS:
The petition alleged that the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave is the owner
in fee simple of a parcel of land containing an area of 293,578 square meters,
situated in sitio Tibambam, barrio Tibambam, municipality of Sigaboy (now
Governor Generoso), province of Davao.
In April 1965 herein private respondent Southwest Agricultural Marketing
Corporation (SAMCO), as plaintiff, filed Civil Case No. 4623 with the respondent
Court of First Instance of Davao against respondents, Carlos V. Matute and
Matias S. Matute, as defendants, in their capacities as co-administrators of the
estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, for the collection of an alleged indebtedness of
P19,952.11 and for attorney's fees of P4,988.02.
On October 20, 1967, the parties (plaintiff and defendants) in Civil Case
No. 4623 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, submitted to the respondent
court an Amicable Settlement whereby the property of the estate covered by OCT
No. 0-27 of Davao was conveyed and ceded to SAMCO as payment of its claim.
The said Amicable Settlement signed by the herein respondents was not
submitted to and approved by the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
IV, in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, nor notice thereof made to the beneficiaries and heirs
in said special proceedings.
That on November 10, 1967, respondent court, despite the opposition of
the other parties who sought to intervene in Civil Case No. 4623 and despite the
utter lack of approval of the probate court in Manila, approved the said Amicable
Settlement and gave the same the enforceability of a court decision which, in
effect, ceded the property covered by OCT No. 0-27, containing an area of
293,578 square meters and with an assessed value of P31,700.00 to SAMCO in
payment of its claim for only P19,952.11.
Made to answer, herein respondent SAMCO and respondent judge, among
others, contend that the Amicable Settlement need not be approved by the
probate court, "the same having been entered into in another independent action
and in another court of co-equal rank.
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ISSUE:
Whether the administrator can enter into an amicable settlement involving
the estate of the decedent without prior approval of the probate court.
RULING:
NO. Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, provides that "no action
upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be
commenced against the executor or administrator; ..." The claim of private
respondent SAMCO being one arising from a contract may be pursued only by
filing the same in the administration proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Sp. Proc. No. 25876) for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Amadeo Matute Olave; and the claim must be filed within the period prescribed,
otherwise, the same shall be deemed "barred forever." (Section 5, Rule 86, Rules
of Court).
The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the estate in
the probate court is to protect the estate of deceased persons. That way, the
executor or administrator will be able to examine each claim and determine
whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. Further, the primary object of
the provisions requiring presentation is to apprise the administrator and the
probate court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and timely
arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by pro-rata portion in the
due course of the administration, inasmuch as upon the death of a person, his
entire estate is burdened with the payment of all of his debts and no creditor
shall enjoy any preference or priority; all of them shag share pro-rata in the
liquidation of the estate of the deceased.
It is clear that the main purpose of private respondent SAMCO in filing
Civil Case No. 4623 in the then Court of First Instance of Davao was to secure a
money judgment against the estate which eventually ended in the conveyance to
SAMCO of more than twenty-nine (29) hectares of land belonging to the estate of
the deceased Amadeo Matute Olave in payment of its claim, without prior
authority of the probate court of Manila, in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, which has the
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exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave. It was a mistake
on the part of respondent court to have given due course to Civil Case No. 4623,
much less issue the questioned Order, dated November 10, 1967, approving the
Amicable Settlement.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "the court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." (Emphasis supplied). The law is
clear that where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a
testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any
transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court.
6.
SOCIEDAD DE LIZARRAGA HERMANOS vs. FELICISIMA ABADA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 13910, September 17, 1919, MOIR, J.
FACTS:
Francisco Caponong died in October, 1906, owing the plaintiffs a sum of
money which was then less than the amount allowed by the commissioners.
His widow, Felicisima Abada, was appointed administratrix of the estate,
commissioners to appraise the estate and to pass on the claims against the
estate were duly appointed, and plaintiffs presented their claim which was
allowed by the commissioners in the sum of P12,783.74. The commissioner's
report was dated in February, 1909.
The administratrix leased the hacienda [farm] known as "Coronacion" to
Hilario Zayco for a term of years, but afterwards she married Vicente Alvarez,
one of the defendants, and the lease was transferred to Alvarez by Zayco,
October 2, 1908.
On the 11th of April, 1913, nearly seven years after the death of
Caponong, the plaintiffs herein filed a suit in the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Negros against Felicisima Abada personally and as administratrix of
the estate of Francisco Caponong, alleging that Francisco Caponong owed
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plaintiffs P12,783.74, and that Felicisima Abada in her own name and as
administratrix, had been receiving from the plaintiffs money and effects from
1908 to 1912 which money and effects were used by the defendant in "the
expense of cultivation and the exploitation of the Hacienda 'Coronacion,' "and
that defendant had delivered to plaintiffs the sugar produced until the last crop
which she refused to deliver to them.
On the 25th of August, 1914, the parties, including the guardian of the
minors, presented a motion in court stating that they had made an amicable
settlement of the litigation, and prayed the court to dismiss the action, which was
done.
The settlement agreed upon was, briefly, that the defendants, including the
guardian of the minor children, "recognized that the deceased Francisco
Caponong's estate was indebted to the plaintiffs, according to a liquidation of the
accounts on the 30th of June, 1913, in the sum of P68,611.01, which was to be
paid with 10 per cent interest in seven equal annual installments;" and to secure
this debt, the defendants agreed to give plaintiffs a first mortgage on all the
property of Francisco Caponong, except the growing sugar cane, and on all the
property belonging exclusively to Felicisima Abada, and the defendants agreed to
secure judicial approval of the settlement. The defendants also agreed to
mortgage the carabaos then on the hacienda to plaintiffs.
ISSUE:
Whether the court in approving the compromise intended to hold
the defendant estate liable only for the original debt, which was only P12,783.74.
RULING:
YES. The law declares that commissioners shall pass upon all claims
against the estate. They had done so in this case. The law fixed the limit of the
estate's liability. The court could not charge it with debts that were never owed
by it. The administratrix could only charge the estate with the reasonable and
proper expenses of administration.
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The estate owed plaintiffs less than P13,000 when the commissioners
passed on their claim. Part of this has been paid, and there was a balance due
plaintiffs of P8,555.78 at the time of the trial, plus interest. The plaintiffs, after
their claim had been presented and allowed by the commissioners, made
advances to the administratrix till their claim was more than P68,000.
It is urged that the major part of this debt of P68,000 is administration
expenses, and as such is chargeable against the assets of the estate. No reason
is given why the expense of administration should be so great, and the evidence
fails to sustain this position.
The administration expense would be the necessary expenses of handling
the property, of protecting it against destruction or deterioration, and possibly
producing a crop, but if plaintiffs, holding a claim originally for less than P13,000
against the estate, let the administratrix have money and effects till their claim
grow to P68,000 they cannot be permitted to charge this amount as expense of
administration. They might be allowed to charge it against the current revenue
from the hacienda or the net proceeds of the "exploitation of the hacienda" for
which it was obtained and used, as plaintiffs allege, but it cannot relate back to
the presenting of their claim to the commissioners, and be a charge against the
inheritance of the heirs, or even a claim to prorate with other creditors' claims
allowed by the commissioners. By expense of administration we understand to be
the reasonable and necessary expense of caring for the property and managing it
till the debts are paid, as provided by law, and of dividing it, if necessary, so as
to partition it and deliver to the heirs.
The court could not approve a settlement saddling upon the estate debts it
never owed, and if it did, its approval would be a nullity.
To give effect to the compromise as written would result in great wrong,
and destroy every chance the minor children had to participate in the inheritance
of their father.
That the mortgage given at the same time and as a result of the
agreement was without legal warrant is equally clear. No mortgage can be placed
by an administrator on the estate of a descendant, unless it is specifically
authorized by statute.
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7. 3. Repair of terrace and interior of house — P5,928.00 — P10,399.59

Testate Estate of the Late Felix J. de Guzman. VICTORINO G. DE GUZMAN II. Living expenses of Librada de Guzman while occupying the family home
vs. CRISPINA DE GUZMAN-CARILLO, ARSENIO DE GUZMAN and without paying rent:
HONORATA DE GUZMAN-MENDIOLA
1. For house helper — P1,170.00
G.R. No. L-29276, May 18, 1978, AQUINO, J.
2. Light bills — 227.41

3. Water bills — 150.80

FACTS:
4. Gas oil, floor wax and switch nail — 54.90 — P 1,603.11
The deceased testator was survived by eight children named Victorino,
Librada, Severino, Margarita, Josefina, Honorata, Arsenio and Crispina. His will III. Other expenses:
was duly probated. Letters of administration were issued to his son, Doctor
Victorino G. de Guzman. 1. Lawyer's subsistence — P 19.30

One of the properties left by the dent was a residential house located in the 2. Gratuity pay in lieu
poblacion. In conformity with his last will, that house and the lot on which it
stands were adjudicated to his eight children, each being given a one-
of medical fee — 144.00
eighth proindiviso share in the project of partition dated March 19, 1966, which
was signed by the eight heirs and which was approved in the lower court's order
of April 14, 1967 but without prejudice to the final outcome of the accounting. 3. For stenographic notes — 100.00

The administrator submitted four accounting reports for the period from 4. For food served on decedent's first death anniversary — 166.65
June 16, 1964 to September, 1967. Three heirs Crispina de Guzmans-Carillo
Honorata de Guzman-Mendiola and Arsenio de Guzman interposed objections to 5. Cost of publication of death anniversary of decedent — 102.00
the administrator's disbursements in the total sum of P13,610.48:
6. Representation expenses — 26.25 — P558.20
I. Expense for the improvement and renovation of the decedent's residential
house. IV. Irrigation fee P1.049.58

1. Construction of fence — P3,082.07 TOTAL P13,610.48

2. Renovation of bathroom — P1,389.52

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ISSUE:
Whether the above-mentioned expenses allowed as items for legitimate
expenses of administration.
RULING:
An executor or administrator is allowed the necessary expenses in the
care, management, and settlement of the estate. He is entitled to possess and
manage the decedent's real and personal estate as long as it is necessary for the
payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He is accountable for
the whole decedent's estate which has come into his possession, with all the
interest, profit, and income thereof, and with the proceeds of so much of such
estate as is sold by him, at the price at which it was sold (Sec. 3, Rule 84; Secs.
1 and 7, Rule 85, Rules of Court).
One of the Conditions of the administrator's bond is that he should render
a true and just account of his administration to the court.
As clarified in the Lizarraga case, administration expenses should be those
which are necessary for the management of the estate, for protecting it against
destruction or deterioration, and, possibly, for the production of fruits. They are
expenses entailed for the preservation and productivity of the estate and its
management for purposes of liquidation, payment of debts, and distribution of
the residue among the persons entitled thereto.
It should be noted that the family residence was
partitioned proindiviso among the decedent's eight children. Each one of them
was given a one-eighth share in conformity with the testator's will. Five of the
eight co-owners consented to the use of the funds of the estate for repair and
improvement of the family home. It is obvious that the expenses in question
were incurred to preserve the family home and to maintain the family's social
standing in the community.
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Obviously, those expenses redounded to the benefit of an the co- owners.
They were necessary for the preservation and use of the family residence. As a
result of those expenses, the co-owners, including the three oppositors, would be
able to use the family home in comfort, convenience and security.
We are of the opinion that those expenses were personal expenses of
Librada de Guzman, inuring only to her benefit. Those expenses, not being
reasonable administration expenses incurred by the administrator, should not be
charged against the income of the estate.
Librada de Guzman, as an heir, is entitled to share in the net income of
the estate. She occupied the house without paying rent. She should use her
income for her living expenses while occupying the family residence.
Among these expenses is the sum of P100 for stenographic notes which,
as admitted by the administrator on page 24 of his brief, should be disallowed.
Another item, "representation expenses" in the sum of P26.25 (2nd accounting),
was not explained. It should likewise be disallowed.
The probate court erred in allowing as expenses of ad. administration the
sum of P268.65 which was incurred during the celebration of the first death
anniversary of the deceased. Those expenses are disallowed because they have
no connection with the care, management and settlement of the decedent's
estate (Nicolas vs. Nicolas 63 Phil 332).
The other expenses, namely, P19.30 for the lawyer's subsistence and
P144 as the cost of the gift to the physician who attended to the testator during
his last s are allowable expenses.
The explanation is not quite clear but it was not disputed by the
appellants. The fact is that the said sum of P1,049.58 was paid by the
administrator to the Penaranda Irrigation System as shown in Official Receipt No.
3596378 dated April 28, 1967. It was included in his accounting as part of the
farming expenses. The amount was properly allowed as a legitimate expense of
administration.
8.
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TEODORICO UY TIOCO vs. CARLOS IMPERIAL, Judge of First Instance of The attorney can therefore not hold the estate directly liable for his fees;
Manila, and ALEJANDRO M. PANIS such fees are allowed to the executor or administrator and not to the attorney.

G.R. No. L-29414, July 17, 1928, OSTRAND, J. The liability for the payment rests on the executor or administrator, but if
the fees paid are beneficial to the estate and reasonable, he is entitled to the
reimbursement from the estate. Such payment should be included in his accounts
and the reimbursement therefore settled upon the notice prescribed in section
FACTS: 682 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Respondent Panis was counsel for the administration of said estate and For the reasons stated the respondent judge is hereby prohibited from
that he on October 31, 1927, before the final settlement of accounts, presented a enforcing the payment of the attorney's fees above-mentioned until the appeal
motion in the probate proceedings for the allowance of attorney's fees in the sum taken by Jacinto Yangco, as guardian ad litem for the minor Pedro Uy Tioco, has
of P15,000. been passed upon by this court or dismissed.

On December 5, 1927, the respondent judge, over the objections in 9.

writing presented by the administrator, granted the motion and allowed the fees
claimed by Panis. HUGO P. RODRIGUEZ vs. JOSE YNZA

The administrator, the herein petitioner, did not appeal from the order of 97 Phil 1003, 1955
the court, but on February 8, 1928, Jacinto Yangco, in his capacity as
guardian ad litem of the minors Pedro and Bruno Uy Tioco, the sons and then the (unreported; cannot find a full text of this case online)
only heirs of the deceased, presented a motion for reconsideration under section
113 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the grounds that he was not notified of the
motion for the allowance of fees and had no knowledge thereof or of the order
granting the motion until a few days before the filing of there motion for
FACTS:
reconsideration.

CFI Iloilo authorized the payment for Atty Tirol's legal services.

Ynza opposed and appealed arguing that Atty Tirol's service was rendered
ISSUE:
to a trustee and admin of the estate and NOT the estate itself.
Whether the allowance of attorney’s fees be directly charged to the estate.

ISSUE:
RULING:
Whether the payment for Atty Tirol's services is chargeable to the estate.
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RULING:
YES. In this case, Atty Tirol was counsel for the trustee in 8 cases all of
which involved estate property. Atty Tirol's success in those 8 cases undoubtedly
benefited the estate.
10.
GAVINO ALDAMIZ, as administrator of the estate of the deceased
Santiago Rementeria y Aldamizcogeascoa vs. THE JUDGE OF THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MINDORO, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF
MINDORO and JUAN L. LUNA
G.R. No. L-2360, December 29, 1949, MORAN, C.J.
FACTS:
Santiago Rementeria y Aldamizcogeascoa, the decedent was a Spaniard
and member of the commercial partnership "Aldamiz y Rementeria." The other
members were the brothers, Gavino and Jose, surnamed Aldamiz.
Santiago Rementeria died in Spain in 1937, and probate proceeding No.
705 was instituted in the same year in the Court of First Instance of Mindoro by
Gavino Aldamiz represented by Atty. Juan L. Luna.
Gavino Aldamiz was appointed administrator and as such was represented
by respondent Atty. Juan Luna up to January 21, 1947, when the order
complained for was issued. In that order it is said that "said attorney is the one
who instituted this testate proceeding ten years ago and has from its incipiency
to the present stage of the proceedings actively intervened in the same.
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On January 15, 1947, After ten years from the date of his appointment,
Gavino Aldamiz, as administrator, through his attorney, Juan L. Luna, submitted
his accounts for the years 1944, 1945 and 1946 and also a project of partition
with a view to closing the proceedings. On said date, the court approved the
accounts by refused to approve the project of partition unless all debts including
attorney's fees be first paid.
In the project of partition, it was expressly stated that attorney's fees,
debts and incidental expenses would be proportionately paid by the beneficiaries
after the closure of the testate proceedings, but the court refused to sanction this
clause of the project. It is for this reason that right then and there, Attorney
Luna, to comply with the wishes of the court, without previously preparing and
filing a written petition to have his professional fees fixed, and without previous
notice to all the interested parties, submitted evidence of his services and
professional standing so that the court might fix the amount of his compensation
and the administrator may make payment thereof. This failure to file a written
claim and to notify the interested parties thereof was not due to bad faith or
fraudulent purpose but to an honest belief on the part of the respondent attorney
that such requirements were not necessary under the circumstance.
At the time respondent's evidence was submitted to the court, the
interested parties who were residing in the Philippines were Gavino Aldamiz and
his brother Jose Aldamiz. The others were then residing in Spain. No written
claim had ever been filed for respondent's fees, and the interested parties had
not been notified thereof nor of the hearing, not even Gavino Aldamiz who did
not know when he was called to testify that he would testify in connection with
respondent's fees.
The Court, after considering the whole evidence presented, issued its
order of January 21, 1947, awarding respondent Attorney Luna, in payment of
his professional services, an aggregate sum of P28,000.
The Court ordered payment of these amounts within thirty days.
Petitioner Gavino Aldamiz received copy of this order on February 21,1948. Out
of the total amount of P28,000, petitioner was able to pay P5,000 only, and upon
his failure to pay the balance of P23,000 after several demands made upon him
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by respondent attorney, the latter on April 17, 1948, filed an ex-parte motion for
execution which was granted by the respondent Court on April 19,1948.
ISSUE:
Whether the procedure of fixing the amount of respondent attorney’s fees
is proper.
RULING:
NO. We believe and so hold that the order of the respondent court issued
on January 21,1948, fixing the amount of respondent attorney's fees is null and
void.
The correct procedure for the collection of attorney's fees, is for the
counsel to request the administrator to make payment and file an action against
him in his personal capacity and not as an administrator should he fail to pay
(Palileo vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. 47106, 40 Off. Gaz. [8th Supp.], 132.)
If the judgment is rendered against the administrator and he pays, he
may include the fees so paid in his account to the court. (Uy Tioco vs. Imperial,
53 Phil., 802.) The attorney also may, instead of bringing such an action, file a
[petition in the testate or intestate proceeding "asking that the court, after notice
to all persons interested, allow his claim and direct the administrator to pay it as
an expense of administration." (Emphasis ours.) (Escueta vs. Sy Juilliong, 5 Phil.,
405.)
In the instant case, as above stated, no written petition for the payment
of attorney's fees has ever been filed by the respondent attorney and the
interested parties had not been previously notified thereof nor of the hearing held
by the court. Consequently, the order issued by the respondent court on January
21, 1947, and all subsequent orders implementing it, are null and void, as having
been issued on excess of jurisdiction.
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We also hold that the order of execution issued on April 19,1948, is null
and void, not only because it was intended to implement the order of January 21,
1947, which in itself was null and void, but because a writ of execution is not the
proper procedure allowed by the Rules of the Court for the payment of debts and
expenses of administration.
The proper procedure is for the court to order the sale of personal estate
or the sale of mortgaged of real property of the deceased and all debts or
expenses of administration should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale or
mortgage. The order for the sale or mortgage should be issued upon motion of
the administrator and with the written notice to all the heirs, legatees and
devisees residing in the Philippines, according to Rule 89, section 3, and Rule 90,
section 2. And when sale or mortgage of real estate is to be made, the
regulations contained in Rule 90, section 7, should be complied with.
Execution may issue only where the devisees, legatees or heirs have
entered into possession of their respective portions in the estate prior to
settlement and payment of the debts and expenses of administration and it is
later ascertained that there are such debts and expenses to be paid, in which
case "the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose,
after hearing, settle the amount of their several liabilities, and order how much
and in what manner each person shall contribute, and may issue execution if
circumstances require" (Rule 89, section 6; see also Rule 74, section 4; Emphasis
ours). And this is not the instant case.
11.
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS
HOLDING CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO
G.R. No. 164108, May 8, 2009, TINGA, J.
FACTS:
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The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15
May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos
Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-
Paulino.
At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against
Benedicto involving the petitioners.
The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of
the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with
the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and
First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with
the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her
favor.
On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private
respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing
letters of administration in her favor.
In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the
Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her
deceased husband. In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private
respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending
claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts. Private respondent
stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases as
₱136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and ₱35,198,697.40 for Civil Case
No. 11178. Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a
complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.
On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,praying that they be furnished with
copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings.
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On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the
manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties
within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate
proceedings.
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
decision dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings.
The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against
the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these were still pending
litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings
of the estate of Roberto Benedicto.
RULING:
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an
intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody
of the court x x x" While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally
preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has
consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be actual
and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the
Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings.
The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special
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proceedings under the Rules of Court,18 not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section
2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to
special proceedings."
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72,
intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent
whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of "intervention"
under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.
However, it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as
they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders
Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of
claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86. 20 These
actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be
commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed,
the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its
administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the
other civil case21 was already pending review before this Court at the time of
Benedicto’s death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be
settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate
proceedings.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide
a creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every
aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific
instances when such persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem
that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners,
they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court
not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is
necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other modality
under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under this
standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.
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Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do
require notice to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested
parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given
to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the
time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or
administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the
executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or
otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing
for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all,
even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the
existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a
true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased
within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires
the administrator to render an account of his administration within one (1) year
from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt
that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty,
but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party
entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of
these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are
protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those
with contingent claims against the estate.
RULE 86 – CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE
1.
SUILIONG & CO., as liquidators of The Yek Tong Lim Fire, Marine, and
Insurance Co., Ltd. vs. SILVINA CHIO-TAYSAN, FRANCISCA JOSE
G.R. No. L-4777, November 11, 1908, CARSON, J.
FACTS:
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Avelina Caballero, deceased, owned during her lifetime a certain tract of
land, which was duly inscribed in her name in the land registry of the city of
Manila. On March 27, 1903, she borrowed from Francisca Jose, the intervener
and appellant in this action, 1,000 pesos, Mexican currency, and turned over her
title deeds to this tract of land to the lender as security for the loan, but no entry
touching the transaction was noted in the land registry.
Avelina Caballero died on the 5th day of June, 1903, and thereafter Silvina
Chio-Taysan, the defendant in this action, instituted in the Court of First Instance
of Manila an action, known, under the system of civil procedure in existence prior
to the adoption of the present code, as an "action for the declaration of heirship"
and on the 5th day of August, 1903, the following order declaring her to be the
only and exclusive heir of Avelina Caballero, deceased.
On the 26th day of May, 1904, the said Silvina Chio-Taysan borrowed the
sum of P2,500 from the Fire and Marine Insurance and Loan Co., of which the
plaintiff is the lawfully appointed liquidator, and mortgaged the land in question
as security for the repayment of the loan.
Thereafter the husband of Silvina Chio-Taysan instituted special
proceedings under the provisions of the present Code of Civil Procedure, for the
administration of the estate of Avelina Caballero, deceased, and on the 16th day
of October, 1905, he was, in accordance with his petition, appointed
administrator; and thereupon, submitted as such administrator, an inventory of
the property of the estate, in which was included the land in question.
On the 28th of November, 1905, Francisca Jose, the intervener in this
action, submitted her claim to the commissioner appointed in these proceedings,
for the sum of 1,000 pesos, Mexican currency, loaned the deceased, as above set
out, on the 28th day of March, 1904, which claim was duly approved on the 31st
of August, 1906.
ISSUE:
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Whether the claim of intervenor, Francisca Jose, against the estate
prosper.
RULING:
YES. The prayer of her complaint in intervention, however, is merely for
the rescission and annulment of the mortgage contract between the loan
company and the defendant and of the inscription in the land registry of the title
of the defendant, and a declaration that as a creditor of the estate she has a
superior right to that of the plaintiff company in the proceeds of any sale of the
land in question. She does not seek to enforce her claim and recover her debt in
this proceeding, but merely to prevent the plaintiff from securing a judgment in
this action which would take out of the estate property which she believes to be
subject to her claim set up in the administration proceedings. If her contentions
are well founded, and if the estate of the deceased is subject to the payment of
the debts of the deceased in such form that the heirs of the deceased could not
alienate this land free of the claims of the creditors of the deceased against the
land, for the payment of their claims against the deceased, the intervener is
clearly entitled to at least so much of the relief she seeks in this action as will
have the effect of preventing the sale of this land under the plaintiff's foreclosure
proceedings, free of the claims of creditors of the deceased, because, if the
plaintiffs in this action were permitted to foreclosure their mortgage and to
recover their debt from the sale of the land in question, it might well be that
there would not be sufficient property in the estate to pay the amount of the
claim of the intervener against the estate.
It appears also from an examination of these provisions that the
legislature has provided no machinery whereby an absolute right on the part of
the heir to succeed by the mere fact of death to all the rights and property of the
deceased may be enforced, without previous payment or provision of the
payment of the debts.
It has provided machinery for the enforcement of the debts and other
obligations of the deceased, not as debts or obligations of the heir, but as debt or
115

obligations of the deceased, to the payment of which the property of the
deceased may be subjected wherever it be found.
The new Code of Procedure furnishing no remedy whereby the provisions
of article 661 of the of the Civil Code may be enforced, in so far as they impose
upon the heredero (heir) the duty of assuming as a personal obligation all the
debts of the deceased, at least to the extent of the value of the property received
from the estate; or in so far as they give to the heredero the reciprocal right to
receive the property of the deceased, without such property being specifically
subjected to the payment of the debts to the deceased by the very fact of his
deceased, these provisions of article 661 may properly be held to have been
abrogated; and the new code having provided a remedy whereby the property of
the deceased may always be subjected to the payment of his debts in whatever
hands it may be found, the right of a creditor to a lien upon the property of the
deceased, for the payment of the debts of the deceased, created by the mere fact
of his death, may be said to be recognized and created by the provisions of the
new code. (Pavia vs. De la Rosa, 8 Phil. Rep., 70).
It is evident that her death created a lien upon her property in favor of the
intervener Francisca Jose, for the payment of the debt contracted by her during
her lifetime, and that this lien ought to have and has priority to any lien created
upon this property by the heir of the deceased; that the judicial declaration of
heirship in favor of Silvina Chio-Taysan, could not and did not furnish a basis for
an entry in the land registry of the name of Silvina Chio-Taysan as the absolute
owner of the property of Avelina Caballero; that such entry, improperly made,
could not and did not prejudice the lien of the intervener, Francisca Jose, for the
debt due her by the deceased (Mortgage Law, art. 33); and that the mortgage of
the property of the deceased by her heir, Silvina Chio-Taysan, was subject to the
prior lien of the intervener, Francisca Jose, for the payment of her debt.
SUILIONG & CO.
vs.
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SILVINA CHIO-TAYSAN
FACTS: Avelina Caballero, deceased, owned during her lifetime a certain tract of
land, which was duly inscribed in her name in the land registry of the city of
Manila. On March 27, 1903, she borrowed from Francisca Jose, the intervener
and appellant in this action, 1,000 pesos, Mexican currency, and turned over her
title deeds to this tract of land to the lender as security for the loan, but no entry
touching the transaction was noted in the land registry.
Avelina Caballero died on the 5th day of June, 1903, and thereafter Silvina Chio-
Taysan (daughter of deceased), the defendant in this action, instituted in the
Court of First Instance for the declaration of heirship" and on the 5th day of
August, 1903, the following order declaring her to be the only and exclusive heir
of Avelina Caballero, deceased, was issued in that proceeding.
On March 9, 1904, the registrar of deeds of the city of Manila by virtue of this
order entered inscription in the land registry whereby Silvina Chio-Taysan is
made to appear as the owner of the land in question:
On the 26th day of May, 1904, the said Silvina Chio-Taysan borrowed the sum of
P2,500 from the Fire and Marine Insurance and Loan Co., of which the plaintiff is
the lawfully appointed liquidator, and mortgaged the land in question as security
for the repayment of the loan.
Thereafter the husband of Silvina Chio-Taysan instituted special proceedings
under the provisions of the present Code of Civil Procedure, for the
administration of the estate of Avelina Caballero, deceased, and on the 16th day
of October, 1905; and on the 28th of November, 1905, Francisca Jose, the
intervener in this action, submitted her claim to the commissioner appointed in
these proceedings, for the sum of 1,000 pesos, Mexican currency, loaned the
deceased, as above set out, on the 28th day of March, 1904, which claim was
duly approved on the 31st of August, 1906.
On the 10th day of October, 1906, the plaintiff in this action filed its complaint
against the defendant, Silvina Chio-Taysan, praying for judgment for the amount
loaned her as above set out, and the foreclosure of its mortgage upon the land.
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On the 30th of October, 1907, Francisca Jose was permitted to intervene and file
her separate "complaint in intervention" wherein she set out the facts touching
the loan made by her to Avelina Caballero, deceased, and prayed that the court
declare the mortgage executed by Silvina Chio-Taysan rescinded and of no
effect; and further that it annul the inscription in the land registry of the title of
Silvina Chio-Taysan to the land in question; and declare this land subject to her
claim against the estate of Avelina Caballero, deceased.
The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against both the
defendant and the intervener in conformity with the prayer of the complaint, and
the intervener brings that judgment before this court for review upon her bill of
exceptions duly signed and certified.
ISSUE: whether or not the relief sought by Jose must be denied
HELD: NO.
We do not think that the judgment of the trial court can be sustained in so far as
it wholly denies relief to the intervener, Francisca Jose. The trial judge denied the
relief prayed for by the intervener, on the ground that her intervention in this
action was for the purpose of the written title deeds on the land, and that, since
she admitted that she had admitted her claim against the estate of Avelina
Caballero, deceased, to the committee appointed in the administration
proceedings, she must be taken to have abandoned, whatever lien she may have
held as security therefor, in accordance with the provisions of section 708 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
The prayer of her complaint in intervention, however, is merely for the rescission
and annulment of the mortgage contract between the loan company and the
defendant and of the inscription in the land registry of the title of the defendant,
and a declaration that as a creditor of the estate she has a superior right to that
of the plaintiff company in the proceeds of any sale of the land in question. She
does not seek to enforce her claim and recover her debt in this proceeding, but
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merely to prevent the plaintiff from securing a judgment in this action which
would take out of the estate property which she believes to be subject to her
claim set up in the administration proceedings. If her contentions are well
founded, and if the estate of the deceased is subject to the payment of the debts
of the deceased in such form that the heirs of the deceased could not alienate
this land free of the claims of the creditors of the deceased against the land, for
the payment of their claims against the deceased, the intervener is clearly
entitled to at least so much of the relief she seeks in this action as will have the
effect of preventing the sale of this land under the plaintiff's foreclosure
proceedings, free of the claims of creditors of the deceased, because, if the
plaintiffs in this action were permitted to foreclosure their mortgage and to
recover their debt from the sale of the land in question, it might well be that
there would not be sufficient property in the estate to pay the amount of the
claim of the intervener against the estate.
FRANCISCO QUISUMBING
vs.
MARIANO GUISON
FACTS: The deceased, Consuelo Syyap, during her life time executed a
promissory note dated November 9, 1940 for P3,000 in favor of Leonardo Guison
payable sixty (60) days from the date thereof, with interest at the rate of 12 per
cent per annum.
The debtor Consuelo Syyap died on November 30, 1940. On December 5 of the
same year, intestate proceedings were instituted and notice given to creditors to
file their claim within six (6) months, which period for filing claims expired on
August 31, 1941.
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In the inventory filed on April 30, 1941, by the administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the said obligation of P3,000 was acknowledged as one of the liabilities
of the decedent.
The creditor Leonardo Guison died on December 31, 1941, and his son Mariano
Guison, who was appointed as administrator of the intestate estate of his
deceased father, filed the claim of P3,000 against the estate on March 9, 1943.
The attorney for the claimant, in his reply to the answer of the attorney for the
administrator of the estate of Consuelo Syyap, stated that the claimant believed
in good faith that he was relieved of the obligation to file a claim with the court,
because said administrator had assured him that he should not worry about it,
since the debt was in the inventory and he would pay it as soon as he was
authorized by the court to do so, and that the same administrator had been
paying the interest due on the note up to January, 1943.
The lower court taking into consideration that the appellant administrator did not
deny in his answer to the claim the existence if the debt, that the latter was
admitted in the inventory submitted by said administrator to the court, and that
the appellant had been paying interest on the debt up to January, 1943, allowed
the appellees claim and ordered the appellant to pay the claimant the sum of
P3,000 with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from February 1, 1943.
ISSUE: (1) whether the claim filed by the claimant may be allowed by the court
after hearing both parties, without necessity on the part of the claimant to file a
previous application for, and on the part of the court to grant, an extension of
time not exceeding one month within which the claim may be filed; and (2)
whether cause was shown by the claimant why he did not file the claim within the
time previously limited..
HELD:
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While it is true that under section 5 of Rule 87, "all claims for money against the
decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due,
not due, or contingent, ... must be filed within the time limited in the notice," it is
also true that, under section 2 of the same Rule, "at any time before an order of
distribution is entered, on application of a creditor, who has failed to file his claim
within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such
terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding
one month.".
(1) the claim filed by the appellee may be considered as implying an application
for time within which to file said claim, and the order of the lower court allowing
such claim impliedly granted said appellee an extension of time within which to
file said claim. It would have been a waste of time on the part of the court and
the parties in this case, if the court had dismissed the claim and required the
appellee to file, first, an application for a period not exceeding one month within
which to file his claim, and then to file his claim within the time granted by the
court, when the latter would allow the claim after all. Strict compliance with the
said requirement of section 2 of Rule 87 would be necessary if a claim had to be
presented to and passed upon by the committee on claims according to the old
law; but now as it is to be filed with and passed upon by the court itself, no harm
would be caused to the adverse party by such a procedure as was followed in the
present case.
Moreover, the appellant, in his answer to the claim filed by the appellee, did not
object to it on the ground that the former had not previously applied for an
extension of time not exceeding one month within which to present his claim. It
is to be presumed that both the attorneys for the appellant as well as for the
appellee knew that the claim was being filed under the provisions of section 2,
Rule 87, of the Rules of Court, because the time previously limited had then
already expired, and had appellant objected to the claim on the above-mentioned
ground and the court considered it necessary for the appellee to do so, the latter
would have complied literally with the law.
Section 2, Rule 87, of the Rules of Court contains a more liberal provision
regarding the time for the filing of a claim by a creditor who has failed to file his
claim within the time previously limited, than section 690 of the old Code of Civil
Procedure on which the rulings in the cases quoted by the appellant are based.
118

Under said section 690, the court may, on application of a creditor who has failed
to present his claim, renew the commission and allow further time not exceeding
one month for the committee to examine such claim if the application is filed
within six months after the time previously limited had expired, or if the
committee has failed to give the notice required by law, provided that such
application be presented before the final settlement of the estate. So, although
the estate has not yet been finally settled, if such application is filed after six
months from the expiration of the time previously limited, or if the committee
has not failed to give the notice required by law, the court has no power to renew
the commission and allow further time not exceeding one month for the filing and
examination by the committee of such claim, whatever might be the cause for
such failure to file the claim in time.
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existence of the debt, but does not deny it in his answer to the claim filed by the
appellee in the court below, and had been paying interest due thereon up to
January, 1943, that is, two months before the filing of the claim. Attorney for
appellant, in opposing the claim and appealing to this court from the decision of
the court below, relies only on the technicality that no previous application for
extension of time has been filed by the claimant-appellee.

While, under section 2 of Rule 87, there is no limitation as to the time within
which a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited,
may file an application for extension of time within which to file his claim, and the
court may for cause shown grant such application fixing a period not exceeding
one month for that purpose, provided that the application is presented before an
order of distribution has been entered..

(2) The last sentence of section 2, Rule 87, provides that the court may, for
cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed
within a time not exceeding one month. As it does not state what cause shall be
considered sufficient for the purpose, it is clear that it is left to the discretion of
the court to determine the sufficiency thereof; and when the court allows a claim
to be filed for cause or causes which it considers as sufficient, on appeal this
court can not reverse or set aside the action of the court below unless the latter
has abused its discretion, which has not been shown by the appellant in this
case.

. . . .Whether the period fixed by law for the presentation of claims may be
extended is within the sound discretion of the court, and the decision of the trial
judge in this regard should not be disturbed until it is clearly shown that he
abused such discretion.

That nothing is more equitable than what was done by the lower court in this
case, is evident. Appellant does not only acknowledge in the inventory the

119

VILLANUEVA
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
For the administration of the estate of her deceased husband, Pascual Villanueva,
the widow Mauricia G. Villanueva, on December 19, 1949, petitioned the Court of
First Instance of Agusan, for letters of Administration (Sp. Proc. No. 67). The
petition was set for hearing and Notice thereof was published. The name of Atty.
Teodulo R. Ricaforte, suggested as administrator and all the parties agreed. After
the taking the required oath, Atty. Ricaforte entered upon the performance of his
duties. Under date of November 9, 1950 the Clerk of the Agusan CFI, issued a
Notice to Creditors requiring them to file their claims with the clerk of court
within six but not beyond twelve months after date of the first publication of this
notice, serving copies of such claims upon administrator, the said Teodulo R.
Ricaforte.
On July 20, 1953, the defendant-appellant Philippine National Bank filed in the
administration proceedings, Creditor's Claim.
Original amount thru Agusan Agency on Dec. 20, 1939
........................................................ P600.00
To int. at 10%: on P600.00 fr. 12-20-39 to 6-5-53
...................................................................... 747.45
Total due as of June 5, 1953 (Daily int. of P0.1644 after June 5, 1953)
.......................... P1,347.45
That the said obligation has been due demandable since Dec. 20, 1940;
that the same is true and just claim and that it is still unpaid without any
set-off.
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On October 12, 1954, the Philippine National Bank filed a Motion for Admission of
claim.
The administrator, on November 5, 1954, opposed the alleging that he had no
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations therein. As special defenses, he interposed —
That the same indebtedness, if it existed, has already been paid;
That the caused action for the recovery of the aforesaid amount of
P1,847.45 is barred by the statute of limitations, for more than ten (10)
Years have elapsed since the cause of action accrued up to present time;
That the said claim is barred forever on the ground that notice to creditors
having been published in the MORNING TIMES of Cebu City, a newspaper
of general circulation in on November 16, 23 and 30, 1950, ... the
Philippine National Bank failed to file its claim within the time limited in
the notice, ....
The appellant PNB, on November 14, 1958, more than four (4) Years after the
opposition of the claim presented by the administrator, filed a pleading captioned
"Petition for an Extension of time within which to File the Claim of Philippine
National Bank", alleging, among others, that Sec. 2, Rule 87 of the Rules, allows
the filing of claims even if the period stated in the notice to creditors elapsed,
upon cause shown and on such terms as equitable; that its failure to present the
claiming with the period stated in the notice, was its lack of knowledge of
administration proceedings, for while said maintains a branch office in Agusan,
the employees did not come to know of the proceedings, the notice has been
published in the Morning Times, a newspaper very limited circulation.
ISSUE: Whether or not PNB may still be allowed to institute its claim
HELD: NO
120

The important issue presented is whether or not the in question is already
barred. Admittedly, the claim was filed outside of the period provided for in the
Order of the lower court, within which to present claims against the estate. The
period fixed in the notice lapsed on November 16, 1951 and the claim was filed
on July 20, 1953 or about 1 year and 8 months late. This notwithstanding,
appellant contends that it did not know of such administration proceedings, not
even its employees in the Branch Office in Butuan City, Agusan. It is to be noted
that the petition for Letters of Administration and the Notice to Creditors were
duly published in the Manila Daily Bulletin and in the Morning Times, respectively,
which was a full compliance with the requirements of the Rules. Moreover, the
supposed lack of knowledge of the proceedings on the part of appellant and its
employees had been belied by uncontested and eloquent evidence, consisting of
a deposit of an amount of money by the administrator Of the estate in said Bank
(Agusan Agency). The deposit was made on December 1, 1951, inspite of which
the appellant Bank only filed its claim on July 20, 1953. It is quite true that the
Courts can extend the period within Which to present claims against the estate,
even after the period limited has elapsed; but such extension should be granted
under special circumstances. The lower did not find any justifiable reason to give
the extension and for one thing, there was no period to extend, the same had
elapsed.
Having reached the above conclusions, We deem it necessary to determine the
question as to whether or not the Moratorium Law had suspended the
prescriptive period for filing of the claim under consideration
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY v. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION
FACTS: On October 5, 2000, Sherwood Holdings Corporation, Inc. (SHCI) filed a
complaint for sum of money against Absolute Management Corporation (AMC).
SHCI alleged in its complaint that it made advance payments to AMC for the
purchase of 27,000 pieces of plywood and 16,500 plyboards in the sum
of P12,277,500.00, covered by Metrobank Check Nos. 1407668502, 140768507,
140768530, 140768531, 140768532, 140768533 and 140768534. These checks
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Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez
were all crossed, and were all made payable to AMC. They were given to Chua,
AMCs General Manager, in 1998.
Chua died in 1999, 8 and a special proceeding for the settlement of his estate was
commenced before the RTC of Pasay City. This proceeding was pending at the
time AMC filed its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint.9
SHCI made demands on AMC, after Chuas death, for allegedly undelivered items
worth P8,331,700.00. According to AMC, these transactions could not be found in
its records. Upon investigation, AMC discovered that in 1998, Chua received from
SHCI 18 Metrobank checks worth P31,807,500.00. These were all payable to AMC
and were crossed or "for payees account only."
In its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint, AMC averred that it
had no knowledge of Chuas transactions with SHCI and it did not receive any
money from the latter. AMC also asked the RTC to hold Metrobank liable for the
subject checks in case it is adjudged liable to SHCI.
In the meantime, Metrobank filed a motion to dismiss14 against AMC on the
ground that the latter engaged in prohibited forum shopping. According to
Metrobank, AMCs claim against it is the same claim that it raised against Chuas
estate in Special Proceedings.
In its answer23 dated December 1, 2003, Metrobank admitted that it deposited
the checks in question to the account of Ayala Lumber and Hardware, a sole
proprietorship Chua owned and managed. The deposit was allegedly done with
the knowledge and consent of AMC. According to Metrobank, Chua then gave the
assurance that the arrangement for the handling of the checks carried AMCs
consent. Chua also submitted documents showing his position and interest in
AMC. These documents, as well as AMCs admission in its answer that it allowed
Chua to manage AMC with a relative free hand, show that it knew of Chuas
arrangement with Metrobank. Further, Chuas records show that the proceeds of
the checks were remitted to AMC which cannot therefore now claim that it did not
receive these proceeds.
Metrobank also raised the defense of estoppel. According to Metrobank, AMC had
knowledge of its arrangements with Chua for several years. Despite this
121

arrangement, AMC did not object to nor did it call the attention of Metrobank
about Chuas alleged lack of authority to deposit the checks in Ayala Lumber and
Hardwares account. At this point, AMC is already estopped from questioning
Chuas authority to deposit these checks in Ayala Lumber and Hardwares account.
Lastly, Metrobank asserted that AMC gave Chua unbridled control in managing
AMCs affairs. This measure of control amounted to gross negligence that was the
proximate cause of the loss that AMC must now bear.
Subsequently, Metrobank filed a motion for leave to admit fourth-party
complaint24 against Chuas estate. It alleged that Chuas estate should reimburse
Metrobank in case it would be held liable in the third-party complaint filed against
it by AMC.
ISSUE:
are quasi-contracts included in claims that should be filed pursuant to Rule 86,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court? Second, if so, is Metrobanks claim against the
Estate of Jose Chua based on a quasi-contract?
HELD: Quasi-contracts are included inbclaims that should be filed under Rule 86,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court
Metrobanks fourth-party complaint is based on quasi-contract
Both the RTC and the CA described Metrobanks claim against Chuas estate as
one based on quasi-contract. A quasi-contract involves a juridical relation that
the law creates on the basis of certain voluntary, unilateral and lawful acts of a
person, to avoid unjust enrichment.42 The Civil Code provides an enumeration of
quasi-contracts,43 but the list is not exhaustive and merely provides
examples.44?r?l1
According to the CA, Metrobanks fourth-party complaint falls under the quasi-
contracts enunciated in Article 2154 of the Civil Code.45 Article 2154 embodies
the concept "solutio indebiti" which arises when something is delivered through
mistake to a person who has no right to demand it. It obligates the latter to
return what has been received through mistake.46?r?l1
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Solutio indebiti, as defined in Article 2154 of the Civil Code, has two
indispensable requisites: first, that something has been unduly delivered through
mistake; and second, that something was received when there was no right to
demand it.47?r?l1
In its fourth-party complaint, Metrobank claims that Chuas estate should
reimburse it if it becomes liable on the checks that it deposited to Ayala Lumber
and Hardwares account upon Chuas instructions.
This fulfills the requisites of solutio indebiti. First, Metrobank acted in a manner
akin to a mistake when it deposited the AMC checks to Ayala Lumber and
Hardwares account; because of Chuas control over AMCs operations, Metrobank
assumed that the checks payable to AMC could be deposited to Ayala Lumber and
Hardwares account. Second, Ayala Lumber and Hardware had no right to demand
and receive the checks that were deposited to its account; despite Chuas control
over AMC and Ayala Lumber and Hardware, the two entities are distinct, and
checks exclusively and expressly payable to one cannot be deposited in the
account of the other. This disjunct created an obligation on the part of Ayala
Lumber and Hardware, through its sole proprietor, Chua, to return the amount of
these checks to Metrobank.
The Court notes, however, that its description of Metrobanks fourth-party
complaint as a claimclosely analogous to solutio indebiti is only to determine the
validity of the lower courts orders denying it. It is not an adjudication
determining the liability of Chuas estate against Metrobank. The appropriate trial
court should still determine whether Metrobank has a lawful claim against Chuas
estate based on quasi-contract.
Metrobanks fourth-party complaint, as a contingent claim, falls within theclaims
that should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court
A distinctive character of Metrobanks fourth-party complaint is its contingent
nature the claim depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged
liable to AMC, a future event that may or may not happen. This characteristic
unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent one that must be included in
the claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court:cralawlibrary
122

Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred;
exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract,
express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims
for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited
in the notice. [italics ours]
Specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court prevail over general
provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court
Metrobank argues that Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court should apply
because it impleaded Chuas estate for reimbursement in the same transaction
upon which it has been sued by AMC. On this point, the Court supports the
conclusion of the CA, to wit:cralawlibrary
Notably, a comparison of the respective provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 and
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court readily shows that Section 11, Rule 6
applies to ordinary civil actions while Section 5, Rule 86 specifically applies to
money claims against the estate. The specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 x x
x must therefore prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6.48?r?l1
We read with approval the CAs use of the statutory construction principle of lex
specialis derogat generali, leading to the conclusion that the specific provisions of
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court should prevail over the general
provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court; the settlement of the
estate of deceased persons (where claims against the deceased should be filed) is
primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the rules provided
for ordinary claims, including Section 11, Rule 6 ofthe Rules of Court, merely
apply suppletorily.49?r?l1
In sum, on all counts in the considerations material to the issues posed, the
resolution points to the affirmation of the assailed CA decision and resolution.
Metrobank's claim in its fourth-party complaint against Chua's estate is based on
quasi-contract. It is also a contingent claim that depends on another event. Both
belong to the category of claims against a deceased person that should be filed
under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Comi and, as such, should have been so
filed in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023.
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STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
vs.
REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION,
FACTS: "On May 24, 1989, [respondent] Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation
(Republic-Asahi) entered into a contract with x x x Jose D. Santos, Jr., the
proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS), for the construction of roadways and a
drainage system in Republic-Asahi’s compound in Barrio Pinagbuhatan, Pasig
City, where [respondent] was to pay x x x JDS five million three hundred
thousand pesos (P5,300,000.00) inclusive of value added tax for said
construction, which was supposed to be completed within a period of two
hundred forty (240) days beginning May 8, 1989. In order ‘to guarantee the
faithful and satisfactory performance of its undertakings’ x x x JDS, shall post a
performance bond of seven hundred ninety five thousand pesos (P795,000.00). x
x x JDS executed, jointly and severally with [petitioner] Stronghold Insurance
Co., Inc. (SICI) Performance Bond.
"On May 23, 1989, [respondent] paid to x x x JDS seven hundred ninety five
thousand pesos (P795,000.00) by way of downpayment.
"Several times prior to November of 1989, [respondent’s] engineers called the
attention of x x x JDS to the alleged alarmingly slow pace of the construction,
which resulted in the fear that the construction will not be finished within the
stipulated 240-day period. However, said reminders went unheeded by x x x JDS.
"On November 24, 1989, dissatisfied with the progress of the work undertaken
by x x x JDS, [respondent] Republic-Asahi extrajudicially rescinded the contract
pursuant to Article XIII of said contract, and wrote a letter to x x x JDS informing
the latter of such rescission. Such rescission, according to Article XV of the
contract shall not be construed as a waiver of [respondent’s] right to recover
damages from x x x JDS and the latter’s sureties.
123

"[Respondent] alleged that, as a result of x x x JDS’s failure to comply with the
provisions of the contract, which resulted in the said contract’s rescission, it had
to hire another contractor to finish the project, for which it incurred an additional
expense of three million two hundred fifty six thousand, eight hundred seventy
four pesos (P3,256,874.00).
"On January 6, 1990, [respondent] sent a letter to [petitioner] SICI filing its
claim under the bond for not less than P795,000.00. On March 22, 1991,
[respondent] again sent another letter reiterating its demand for payment under
the aforementioned bond. Both letters allegedly went unheeded.
"[Respondent] then filed [a] complaint against x x x JDS and SICI. It sought from
x x x JDS payment of P3,256,874.00 representing the additional expenses
incurred by [respondent] for the completion of the project using another
contractor, and from x x x JDS and SICI, jointly and severally, payment
of P750,000.00 as damages in accordance with the performance bond;
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the
amount of at least P100,000.00.
"On July 10, 1991, [petitioner] SICI filed its answer, alleging that the
[respondent’s] money claims against [petitioner and JDS] have been
extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr. Even if this were not the case,
[petitioner] SICI had been released from its liability under the performance bond
because there was no liquidation, with the active participation and/or
involvement, pursuant to procedural due process, of herein surety and contractor
Jose D. Santos, Jr., hence, there was no ascertainment of the corresponding
liabilities of Santos and SICI under the performance bond.
ISSUE: Whether or not the obligation is extinguished
HELD:
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As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not
extinguish the obligation.8 Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when
the transmission is prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the
nature of the obligation.9 Only obligations that are personal 10 or are identified
with the persons themselves are extinguished by death.11
Section 5 of Rule 8612 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of
money claims arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor.
Evidently, those claims are not actually extinguished.13 What is extinguished is
only the obligee’s action or suit filed before the court, which is not then acting as
a probate court.14
In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had
under his contracts with respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by
stipulation, or by provision of law. Hence, his death did not result in the
extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to his
estate.15 Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the
obligations under the performance bond. Consequently, petitioner as surety
cannot use his death to escape its monetary obligation under its performance
bond.
The liability of petitioner is contractual in nature, because it executed a
performance bond worded as follows:
"KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
"That we, JDS CONSTRUCTION of 208-A San Buena Building, contractor, of Shaw
Blvd., Pasig, MM Philippines, as principal and the STRONGHOLD INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC. a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of
the laws of the Philippines with head office at Makati, as Surety, are held and
firmly bound unto the REPUBLIC ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION and to any
individual, firm, partnership, corporation or association supplying the principal
with labor or materials in the penal sum of SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY FIVE
THOUSAND (P795,000.00), Philippine Currency, for the payment of which sum,
well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors,
administrators, successors and assigns, jointly and severally, firmly by these
presents.
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"The CONDITIONS OF THIS OBLIGATION are as follows; hereinbefore stated, to institute action on the penal bond, pursuant to the
provision of Act No. 3688, is hereby acknowledge and confirmed."16
"WHEREAS the above bounden principal on the ___ day of __________, 19__
entered into a contract with the REPUBLIC ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION
represented by _________________, to fully and faithfully. Comply with the site
preparation works road and drainage system of Philippine Float Plant at
Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, Metro Manila.

"WHEREAS, the liability of the Surety Company under this bond shall in no case
exceed the sum of PESOS SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY FIVE THOUSAND BIENVENIDO P. BUAN
(P795,000.00) Philippine Currency, inclusive of interest, attorney’s fee, and other vs.
damages, and shall not be liable for any advances of the obligee to the principal. SYLVINA C. LAYA, ET AL.

"WHEREAS, said contract requires the said principal to give a good and sufficient
bond in the above-stated sum to secure the full and faithfull performance on its
part of said contract, and the satisfaction of obligations for materials used and
FACTS; On December 15, 1953, petitioners herein filed a contingent claim for
labor employed upon the work;
more than P500,000 against the intestate estate of the deceased spouses
Florencio P. Buan and Rizalina Paras Buan. The contingent claim was based on
"NOW THEREFORE, if the principal shall perform well and truly and fulfill all the the fact that on August 3, 1952, a Philippine Rabbit Bus, owned and operated by
undertakings, covenants, terms, conditions, and agreements of said contract the deceased spouses Buan, collided with a car in which Juan C. Laya, Rodolfo
during the original term of said contract and any extension thereof that may be Escosa, Jose S. Palma, and Juan de Leon, were riding.
granted by the obligee, with notice to the surety and during the life of any
guaranty required under the contract, and shall also perform well and truly and
The heirs of Juan C. Laya, petitioners herein, reserved the civil action for
fulfill all the undertakings, covenants, terms, conditions, and agreements of any
damages, and on October 12, 1953, they filed an independent civil action in the
and all duly authorized modifications of said contract that may hereinafter be
Court of First Instance of Manila against the administrator of the deceased
made, without notice to the surety except when such modifications increase the
spouses Buan. The petition for the admission of a contingent claim was
contract price; and such principal contractor or his or its sub-contractors shall
accompanied with a copy of the complaint filed in the civil case above-mentioned
promptly make payment to any individual, firm, partnership, corporation or
and a sentence in the criminal case filed against Ernesto Triguero, driver of the
association supplying the principal of its sub-contractors with labor and materials
Philippine Rabbit Bus.
in the prosecution of the work provided for in the said contract, then, this
obligation shall be null and void; otherwise it shall remain in full force and effect.
Any extension of the period of time which may be granted by the obligee to the When the administrators learned of the filing of the contingent claim in the Court
contractor shall be considered as given, and any modifications of said contract of First Instance of Tarlac, they filed an opposition thereto on the ground that the
shall be considered as authorized, with the express consent of the Surety. same was not filed before the death of the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina
Paras Buan, which took place on January 3, 1953, and that it was also not filed
within the period prescribed by Rule 89, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
"The right of any individual, firm, partnership, corporation or association
supplying the contractor with labor or materials for the prosecution of the work

125

The Court of First Instance of Tarlac admitted the claim in an order dated
December 16, 1953, but denied the prayer that a portion of the estate be set
aside to respond for the amount of the contingent.
In the meantime and on January 7, 1954, the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, on
a motion for reconsideration filed by the administrators dated January 2, 1954,
set aside its previous order of December 16, 1953, admitting the contingent
claim of petitioners. The reason for the admission of the claim, according to the
court, had ceased to exist and even the plaintiffs had filed the amended
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila, the same has not yet been
acted upon by the said court. A motion to reconsider this order of the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac having been denied, petitioners have prosecuted this
appeal to Us.
ISSUE: Whether or not the claim should be dismissed.
HELD: NO. A contingent claim is one which, by its nature, is necessarily
dependent upon an uncertain event for its existence or validity. It may or may
not develop into a valid and enforceable claim, and its validity and enforceability
depending upon an uncertain event.
A 'contingent claim' against an estate within the statute providing for the
settlement hereof, as one where the absolute liability depends on some future
event which may never happen, and which therefore renders such liability
uncertain and indeterminable. . . It is where the liability depends on some future
event after the debtor's death which may or may not happen, and therefore
makes Words and Phrases, p. 113.).
A 'contingent claim' against an estate is one in which liability depends on some
future event which may or may not occur, so that duty to pay may never become
absolute.
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Whether or not the heirs of the deceased, Juan C. Laya, would succeed in the
action brought in Manila against the administrators of the estate of the deceased
spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, is the uncertain event or
contingency upon which the validity of the claim presented in the administration
proceedings depends. While the said action has not yet been finally decided or
determined to the effect that the petitioners herein, heirs of the deceased Juan C.
Laya, have no right of action against the estate of the deceased spouses
Florencio P. Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, the contingent claim that petitioners have
filed in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in the proceedings for the
administration of the deceased spouses Florencio P. Buan and Rizalina P. Buan,
may not be dismissed. The order of the court dismissing the claim and declaring
that the same may again be entertained if another valid complaint by the
petitioners herein is filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila, is inconsistent
with the nature and character of a contingent claim. A contingent claim does not
follow the temporary orders of dismissal of an action upon which it is based; it
awaits the final outcome thereof and only said final result can cause its
termination. The rules provide that a contingent claim is to be presented in the
administration proceedings in the same manner as any ordinary claim, and that
when the contingency arises which converts the contingent claim into a valid
claim, the court should then be informed that the claim had already matured.
(Secs. 5. 9, Rule 87.) The order of the court subject of the appeal should,
therefore, be set aside.
The first order of the court admitted the claim but denied the petition for the
setting aside of a certain amount from the estate to respond therefor. The
validity of the contingent claim is apparent; as the driver of the bus belonging to
the deceased spouses, Florencio P. Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, was found guilty
of negligence, as a result of which Juan C. Laya died, the said deceased
spouses—the employers of the driver—can be made responsible, as masters of a
servant, for damages for the death of the petitioner's father. A portion of the
estate should therefore, be set aside to respond for such damages as petitioners
herein may subsequently recover in the action they have brought in the Court of
First Instance of Manila. This amount should be fixed in the court below.
126

THE FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK
vs.
SILVIO CHENG TAN alias SILVIO CHENG PAN
FACTS: On July 2, 1947 the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment
in an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage — ordering the defendants
therein, — Silvio Cheng Tan alias Silvio Cheng Pan amongst them — to pay,
jointly and severally, The First National City Bank of New York the sum of
P142,000.56, with the stipulated interest on the sum of P129,361.13, plus costs,
and providing that in case of default of payment within the period of time therein
given, the properties mortgaged by said defendants be sold at Public auction to
satisfy the judgment. After the sale of the mortgaged properties a deficiency
judgment was rendered on March 25, 1950 for P98,256.13. After the issuance of
the corresponding writ of execution and the sale of two parcels of land located in
San Miguel, Bulacan, there remained unsatisfied the sum of P38,090.06, with the
7% stipulated interest thereon from October 3, 1941, until paid.
As the other defendants in the case had died or could nowhere be found, and the
five-year period for the enforcement of the deficiency judgment by mere motion
had elapsed without the same having been satisfied, on June 26, 1957 The First
National City Bank of New York instituted the present action against Silvio Cheng
Tan in the Court of First Instance of Manila to revive the judgment aforesaid.
During the pendency of the case Cheng Tan died and was substituted by his legal
representative, Serafin Cheng, who filed a motion to dismiss the action on the
ground that under Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 5, Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court, plaintiff should file its claim in the intestate estate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of said deceased pending in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal since February 27, 1958, an administrator having been appointed by said
court on April 7, 1958.
ISSUE: Whether or not the claim must be filed against the estate.
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HELD:
We have heretofore held in Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Concepcion e
Hijos, 53 Phil. 806, and Government, etc. vs. Concuya et al., G.R. No. L-45994,
promulgated on January 20, 1944, that deficiency judgment is a contingent claim
and must be filed with the probate court where the settlement of the estate of
the deceased mortgagor is pending, within the period of time fixed for the filing
of claims. On the other hand, Section, 5 Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, provides
that, among others, judgments for money against the decedent whose estate is
in the process of judicial settlement must be filed with the private court within
the time limited in the notice given for that purpose, otherwise they will be
deemed barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaim in any
action that the executor or administrator may bring against the judgment
creditor.
It is true that a judgment rendered in a civil action remaining unsatisfied after 5
years from its date of entry, is reduced to the condition of a mere right of action,
but this, in our opinion, does not argue against the proposition that it should be
filed with the probate court for corresponding action. To the contrary, reduced, as
it has been, to the condition of a mere right of action, it can well be likened to a
promissory note. Like the latter, therefore, it should be submitted as a claim to
the probate court where the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor is
pending.
Even reasons of expediency militate in favor of our conclusion. Were the present
preceedings allowed to continue, they could end with nothing more than a
judgment reviving the one subject matter of the action. Thus revived said
judgment could not be enforced except through the probate court because the
judgment debtor died before execution could be actually levied upon any of his
properties (Section 7, Rule 39, Rules of Court). There is, therefore, no need to
prosecute the present action the herein plaintiff-appellee having the right to go
directly to the probate court to file his claim based on the deficiency judgment
mentioned heretofore.
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PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ALLAN M. CHUA
FACTS:
The spouses Antonio M. Chua and Asuncion M. Chua were the owners of a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-142 and registered in
their names. Upon Antonios death, the probate court appointed his son, private
respondent Allan M. Chua, special administrator of Antonios intestate estate. The
court also authorized Allan to obtain a loan accommodation of five hundred fifty
thousand (P550,000.00) pesos from petitioner Philippine National Bank to be
secured by a real estate mortgage over the above-mentioned parcel of land.
On June 29, 1989, Allan obtained a loan of P450,000.00 from petitioner PNB
evidenced by a promissory note, payable on June 29, 1990, with interest at 18.8
percent per annum. To secure the loan, Allan executed a deed of real estate
mortgage on the aforesaid parcel of land.
On December 27, 1990, for failure to pay the loan in full, the bank
extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage, through the Ex-Officio Sheriff,
who conducted a public auction of the mortgaged property pursuant to the
authority provided for in the deed of real estate mortgage. During the auction,
PNB was the highest bidder with a bid price P306,360.00. Since PNBs total claim
as of the date of the auction sale was P679,185.63, the loan had a payable
balance of P372,825.63. To claim this deficiency, PNB instituted an action with
the RTC, against both Mrs. Asuncion M. Chua and Allan Chua in his capacity as
special administrator of his fathers intestate estate.
Despite summons duly served, private respondents did not answer the
complaint. The trial court declared them in default and received evidence ex
parte.
Petitioner contends that under prevailing jurisprudence, when the proceeds
of the sale are insufficient to pay the debt, the mortgagee has the right to
recover the deficiency from the debtor.[5] It also contends that Act 3135,
otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers
Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages, is the law applicable to this
case of foreclosure sale and not Section 7 of Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of
Court[6] as held by the Court of Appeals.[7]
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Private respondents argue that having chosen the remedy of extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgaged property of the deceased, petitioner is precluded
from pursuing its deficiency claim against the estate of Antonio M. Chua. This
they say is pursuant to Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: whether or not petitioner may no longer pursue by civil action the
recovery of the balance of indebtedness after having foreclosed the property
securing the same.
HELD: NO
Section 7, Rule 89, that once the deed of real estate mortgage is recorded in
the proper Registry of Deeds, together with the corresponding court order
authorizing the administrator to mortgage the property, said deed shall be valid
as if it has been executed by the deceased himself. Section 7 provides in part:
Sec. 7. Rule 89. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise
encumber estate The court having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may
authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell,
mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules
when it appears necessary or beneficial under the following regulations:
xxx
(f) There shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province in which the
real estate thus sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered is situated, a certified
copy of the order of the court, together with the deed of the executor or
administrator for such real estate, which shall be valid as if the deed had been
executed by the deceased in his lifetime.
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In the present case, it is undisputed that the conditions under the aforecited
rule have been complied with. It follows that we must consider Sec. 7 of Rule 86,
appropriately applicable to the controversy at hand.
Case law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee three distinct,
independent and mutually exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued
by the mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor
dies, among them:
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of
the mortgagor as an ordinary claim;
(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an
ordinary claim; and
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time
before it is barred by prescription without right to file a claim for any
deficiency.[9]
In Perez v. Philippine National Bank,[10] reversing Pasno vs. Ravina,[11] we
held:
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result of extrajudicial foreclosure is that the creditor waives any further deficiency
claim. The dissent in Pasno, as adopted in Perez, supports this conclusion, thus:
When account is further taken of the fact that a creditor who elects to foreclose
by extrajudicial sale waives all right to recover against the estate of the deceased
debtor for any deficiency remaining unpaid after the sale it will be readily seen
that the decision in this case (referring to the majority opinion) will impose a
burden upon the estates of deceased persons who have mortgaged real property
for the security of debts, without any compensatory advantage.
Clearly, in our view, petitioner herein has chosen the mortgage-creditors
option of extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgaged property of the Chuas. This
choice now bars any subsequent deficiency claim against the estate of the
deceased, Antonio M. Chua. Petitioner may no longer avail of the complaint for
the recovery of the balance of indebtedness against said estate, after petitioner
foreclosed the property securing the mortgage in its favor. It follows that in this
case no further liability remains on the part of respondents and the late Antonio
M. Chuas estate.

The ruling in Pasno vs. Ravina not having been reiterated in any other case, we
have carefully reexamined the same, and after mature deliberation have reached
the conclusion that the dissenting opinion is more in conformity with reason and
law. Of the three alternative courses that section 7, Rule 87 (now Rule 86), offers
the mortgage creditor, to wit, (1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire Heirs of Maglasang vs Manila Banking Corp
debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (2) foreclose the
mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (3) to rely Facts:
on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred
by prescription, without right to file a claim for any deficiency, the majority
opinion in Pasno vs. Ravina, in requiring a judicial foreclosure, virtually wipes out
the third alternative conceded by the Rules to the mortgage creditor, and which The spouses Flaviano and Salud Maglasang (Sps.Maglasang) obtained a credit
would precisely include extra-judicial foreclosures by contrast with the second line from respondent in the amount of ₱350,000.00 which was secured by a real
alternative. estate mortgage executed over seven of their properties. They availed of their
credit line by securing loans in the amounts of ₱209,790.50 and ₱139,805.83 on
October 24, 1975 and March 15, 1976, respectively, both of which becoming due
The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor
and demandable within a period of one year.
waives his right to recover any deficiency from the estate.[12] Following
the Perez ruling that the third mode includes extrajudicial foreclosure sales, the

129

After Flaviano Maglasang (Flaviano) died intestate, his widow Salud Maglasang
(Salud) and their surviving children, herein petitioners appointed their brother
petitioner Edgar Maglasang (Edgar) as their attorney-in-fact. Edgar filed a
verified petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Flaviano
before the then Court of First Instance.
The probate court, issued a Notice to Creditors for the filing of money claims
against Flaviano’s estate. Accordingly, as one of the creditors of Flaviano,
respondent notified the probate court of its claim in the amount of ₱382,753.19.
During the pendency of the intestate proceedings, Edgar and Oscar were
able to obtain several loans from respondent, secured by promissory
notes which they signed.
In an order, the probate court terminated the proceedings with the
surviving heirs executing an extra-judicial partition of the properties of
Flaviano’s estate. The loan obligations owed by the estate to respondent,
however, remained unsatisfied due to respondent’s certification that
Flaviano’s account was undergoing a restructuring. Nonetheless, the
probate court expressly recognized the rights of respondent under the
mortgage and promissory notes executed by the Sps. Maglasang,
specifically, its "right to foreclose the same within the statutory period."
In this light, respondent proceeded to extra-judicially foreclose the
mortgage covering the Sps. Maglasang’s properties and emerged as the
highest bidder at the public auction. There, however, remained a
deficiency on Sps. Maglasang’s obligation to respondent. Thus respondent
filed a suit to recover the deficiency amount of ₱250,601.05 as of May 31,
1981 against the estate of Flaviano.
The RTC decided in favor of the respondent.
The petitioners elevated the case to the CA on appeal, contending, inter
alia, that the remedies available to respondent under Section 7, Rule 86 of
the Rules of Court (Rules) are alternative and exclusive, such that the
election of one operates as a waiver or abandonment of the others. Thus,
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when respondent filed its claim against the estate of Flaviano in the
proceedings before the probate court, it effectively abandoned its right to
foreclose on the mortgage.
The CA denied the petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
Issue: Whether or not, after the respondent foreclosed the mortgage, the
respondent may still file a claim against the estate? (No)
Held:
Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the settlement
proceedings of their estate. Such proceedings are primarily governed by
special rules found under Rules 73 to 90 of the Rules, although rules
governing ordinary actions may, as far as practicable, apply suppletorily.
Among these special rules, Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules (Section 7,
Rule86) provides the rule in dealing with secured claims against the
estate:
SEC. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. – A creditor holding a claim
against the deceased secured by a mortgage or other collateral security,
may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner provided
in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the
estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by
action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant,
and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged
premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding
to realize upon the security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the
manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely upon his
mortgage or other security alone, and foreclose the same at any time
within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall
not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the
distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein contained
shall prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming the property
mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held as security,
under the direction of the court, if the court shall adjudged it to be for the
best interest of the estate that such redemption shall be made.
130

As the foregoing generally speaks of "a creditor holding a claim against the
deceased secured by a mortgage or other collateral security" as above-
highlighted, it may be reasonably concluded that the aforementioned section
covers all secured claims, whether by mortgage or any other form of collateral,
which a creditor may enforce against the estate of the deceased debtor.
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed
alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a
waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing
of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for
foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected
by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice
but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made, in
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.4118.
In this case, respondent sought to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage
of the properties previously belonging to Sps. Maglasang (and now, their
estates) and, therefore, availed of the third option. Lest it be
misunderstood, it did not exercise the first option of directly filing a claim
against the estate, as petitioners assert, since it merely notified the
probate court of the outstanding amount of its claim against the estate of
Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring the account. Thus, having
unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extra-judicial
foreclosure under Section 7, Rule 86, respondent is now precluded from
filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as earlier discussed.
Union Bank of the Philippines vs Ariola
Facts:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M.
Santibañez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of ₱128,000.00. The
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amount was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford
6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son,
Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum
payable in five equal annual amortizations. In 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered
into another loan agreement, this time in the amount of ₱123,156.00. It was
intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600
Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor.
Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said
amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed
a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the loan.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.
Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before the
RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the
special administrator of the estate of the decedent. During the pendency
of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister
Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement dated July 22,
1981, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take
possession of the three (3) tractors; Each of them was to assume the
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor
respectively taken by them.
Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner
Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to
heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the
petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC.
Ariola filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind
her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint
agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by
the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the
petitioner under the joint agreement.
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The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed
with the probate court as the sum of money being claimed was an
obligation incurred by the said decedent.
Issue: 1st issue: Whether or not the partition in the Agreement executed
by the heirs is valid? (No)
2nd Issue: whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation
of the deceased (No)
Held:
1st Issue: In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition
among the heirs until after the will has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until
after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and
the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof
given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property
by will may be rendered nugatory.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired
jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3)
tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate court’s
approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court
cannot allow.Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be
in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court
approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its
jurisdiction over that part of the estate.
2nd Issue:
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’
assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule
in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the
heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to divide between themselves
and take possession and use the above-described chattel and each
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of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel
taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside
Credit Corp." The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the
happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession
and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was
made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were
to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they
were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier
discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It
follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any
force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The
petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez,
should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed
barred; exceptions. — All claims for money against the decedent,
arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be
due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the
last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the
decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set
forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or
administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor
or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action
already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor
may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent,
instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein
provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in
such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the
defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true
balance against the estate, as though the claim had been
presented directly before the court in the administration
proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved
at their present value.
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The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate
court is mandatory.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private
respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her
late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the
promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed
and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the
petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it
may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said
promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any
defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner.
Saligumba vs Palanog
Facts:
Monica Palanog, assisted by her husband Avelino Palanog (spouses Palanogs),
filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages against defendants, spouses
Valeria Saligumba and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. (spouses Saligumbas), before the
Regional Trial Court.
The RTC decided in favor of the spouses Palanogs. Monica Palanog (respondent),
now a widow, filed a Complaint seeking to revive and enforce the Decision.
Petitioner Generoso Saligumba, for himself and in representation of his brother
Ernesto who was out of the country, filed an Answer, contending that the spouses
Saligumbas died while Civil Case No. 2570 was pending and no order of
substitution was issued and hence, the trial was null and void.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent may file a claim against the petitioners?
(Yes)
Held:
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Civil Case No. 2570 is an action for quieting of title with damages which is an
action involving real property. It is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 87 as the claim is not extinguished by the death of a party. And when a
party dies in an action that survives, Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides for the procedure, thus:
Section 17. Death of Party. - After a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the
legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for
the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as
may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said
time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment
of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by
the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on
behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in
procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be
recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs. (Emphasis supplied)
Civil Case No. 2570 is an action for quieting of title with damages which is
an action involving real property. It is an action that survives pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 8716 as the claim is not extinguished by the death of a
party. And when a party dies in an action that survives, Section 17 of Rule
3 of the Revised Rules of Court17 provides for the procedure, thus:
Section 17. Death of Party. - After a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the
legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for
the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as
may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said
time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment
of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by
the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on
behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in
procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be
recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
133

substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the express terms of Section 17, in case of death of a party, and upon
proper notice, it is the duty of the court to order the legal representative or heir
of the deceased to appear for the deceased. In the instant case, it is true that the
trial court, after receiving an informal notice of death by the mere notation in the
envelopes, failed to order the appearance of the legal representative or heir of
the deceased.
It appears that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. died on 18 February 1984 while
Valeria Saligumba died on 2 February 1985. No motion for the substitution
of the spouses was filed nor an order issued for the substitution of the
deceased spouses Saligumbas in Civil Case No. 2570. Atty. Miralles and
petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr., despite notices sent to them to appear,
never confirmed the death of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba.
The record is bereft of any evidence proving the death of the spouses,
except the mere notations in the envelopes enclosing the trial court’s
orders which were returned unserved.
Section 17 is explicit that the duty of the court to order the legal representative
or heir to appear arises only "upon proper notice." The notation "Party-Deceased"
on the unserved notices could not be the "proper notice" contemplated by the
rule. As the trial court could not be expected to know or take judicial notice of the
death of a party without the proper manifestation from counsel, the trial court
was well within its jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the case. Moreover, there
is no showing that the court’s proceedings were tainted with irregularities.
Rivera vs Ramirez
Facts: The spouses Adolfo Ramirez (Adolfo) and Rosita Rivera (Rosita) owned
the Sta. Teresita General Hospital and other properties. Rosita died in September
1990, followed by her husband Adolfo. In 1995 petitioner Eleuterio P. Rivera
(Eleuterio) filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) covering the estate of Rosita, who allegedly died
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without a will and with no direct ascendants or descendants.Eleuterio claimed
that he was Rosita’s nephew. Eleuterio submitted to the intestate court a list of
the names of the decedent’s other nephews and nieces all of whom expressed
conformity to Eleuterio’s appointment as administrator of her estate.
In 1995 the RTC issued letters of administration appointing Eleuterio as Rosita’s
estate administrator.In 1996 he filed in his capacity as administrator a motion
with the court to compel the examination and production of documents relating
to properties believed to be a part of her estate, foremost of which was the Sta.
Teresita General Hospital that respondent Robert Ramirez (Robert) had been
managing.Robert claims, together with Raymond Ramirez (Raymond) and Lydia
Ramirez (Lydia), that they were children of Adolfo by another woman. Robert
opposed the issuance of the subpoena.
Subsequently, Robert filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of
Appeals (CA), imputing grave abuse of discretion by the RTC for allowing the
production and examination of the subject documents and for not inhibiting Atty.
Pacheo from the case. Essentially, the CA ruled that Eleuterio and Rosita’s other
collateral relatives were not her heirs since she had an adopted child in Raymond
and that, consequently, Eleuterio, et al. had no standing to request production of
the hospital’s documents or to institute the petition for the settlement of her
estate.
Issue: Whether or not Eleuterio had a legal standing to subpoena the documents
in Robert’s possession? (Yes)
Held:
As for the right of the administrator of Rosita’s estate to the production
and examination of the specified documents believed to be in Robert’s
possession, Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court provides that these
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can be allowed based on the administrator’s belief that the person named
in the request for subpoena has documents in his possession that tend to
show the decedent’s right to real or personal property. Thus:
Section 6. Proceedings when property concealed, embezzled, or
fraudulently conveyed. – If an executor or administrator, heir, legatee,
creditor, or other individual interested in the estate of the deceased,
complains to the court having jurisdiction of the estate that a person is
suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the
money, goods or chattels of the deceased, or that such person has in his
possession or has knowledge of any deed, conveyance, bond, contract or
other writing which contains evidence of or tends to disclose the right,
title, interest, or claim of the deceased to real or personal estate, or the
last will and testament of the deceased, the Court may cite such
suspected person to appear before it and may examine him on oath on
the matter of such complaint; and if the person so cited refuses to appear,
or to answer on such examination or such interrogatories as are put to
him, the court may punish him for contempt, and may commit him to
prison until he submits to the order of the court. The interrogatories put to
any such person, and his answers thereto, shall be in writing and shall be
filed in the clerk’s office. (Emphasis supplied)
The production and examination is nothing to be afraid of since the
intestate court has no authority to decide who the decedent’s heirs are in
connection with such incident which is confined to the examination of
documents which may aid the administrator in determining properties
believed to belong to the decedent’s estate. What is more, that court has
no authority to decide the question of whether certain properties belong to
the estate or to the person sought to be examined.
In fact, if after the examination the court has good reason to believe that the
person examined is in possession of properties that belong to the deceased, the
administrator cannot detain the property. He has to file an ordinary action for
recovery of the properties.The purpose of the production and examination of
documents is to elicit information or secure evidence from persons suspected of
having possession of, or knowledge of properties suspected of belonging to the
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estate of the deceased. The procedure is inquisitorial in nature, designed as an
economical and efficient mode of discovering properties of the estate.
Lopez vs Olbes
Facts:
On October 13, 1908, Ricardo Lopez et al. brought suit against Adolfo Olbes, the
testamentary executor of the deceased Martina Lopez (the mother of Ricardo and
grandmother of the other plaintiffs), alleging in their complaint that Martina
executed a public instrument whereby she donated to plaintiffs a parcel of hemp
land situated at the place called Ali, in the pueblo of Guinobatan, Albay and that
the said Olbes, as executor, claimed to have rights of ownership and possession
to the said land adverse to those then held by the plaintiffs, inasmuch as the said
estate still continued to belong to the deceased Martina Lopez and was then in
charge of a trustee by virtue of an agreement had between the attorneys of the
executor and the plaintiff Ricardo, and of the order issued by the court in the
aforesaid probate proceedings. The complaint concluded by asking that judgment
be rendered in the latter’s favor and against the defendant for the ownership and
possession of the said land.
The defendant filed a demurrer in writing alleging that the plaintiffs, as the heirs
or donees could not maintain any suit against the testamentary executor to
recover the title or possession of the land so long as the court had not
adjudicated the estate to them or until the time allowed for paying the debts
should have expired, unless they be given possession of the said land by the
executor. The trial court sustained the demurrer of the defendant and dismissed
the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiffs have the right of ownership and possession over the
parcel of hemp land?
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Held:
Yes. The action exercised by Ricardo et al is based on the rights which as such
donees had acquired by virtue of the donation inter vivos made by Martina Lopez
during her lifetime on favor of plaintiffs by an instrument the donor, a donation
expressly accepted on the same date by the donees and of which acceptance the
donor was also informed on the same date; wherefore, these requirements of the
law having been complied with, it is unquestionable that the dominion over the
land donated was properly transmitted to the donees who in fact and by
operation of law acquired the ownership of the property, as customarily occurs in
all contracts of transfer of dominion.
Property of the testate estate of the deceased Martina Lopez is not here
concerned. During her lifetime she gave away the land mentioned, in the exercise
pertained to her as owner. By virtue of the said donation the sole and true
owners of the land donated are the plaintiffs, so long as said donation is not
proven null, inefficacious, or irregular. All the questions which by reason of the
same are raised by the interested parties must be heard in a regular trial and
decided by a final judgment absolutely independent of the probate proceedings
concerning the estate of the deceased, who was the previous owner of the land
concerned; and therefore the complaint of the donees should not have been
dismissed, but the trial should have been proceeded with to final judgment.
Rioferio vs CA
Facts:
Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and real
properties. He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada. and with
whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents, namely: Lourdes P.
Orfinada, Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada, Nancy P. Orfinada-Happenden, Alfonso
James P. Orfinada, Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P. Orfinada (deceased)
and Angelo P. Orfinada.
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Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning
his paramour and their children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero, and
co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena.
Respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that on June
29, 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her children executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim
involving the properties of the estate of the decedent.
Respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra
Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real
Estate Mortgage with Damages against petitioners.
Petitioners also raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not
the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr.
in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings.The petitioners
filed a Motion to Set Affirmative Defenses for Hearing.
The lower court denied the motion in its Order dated June 27, 1996, on
the ground that respondents, as heirs, are the real parties-in-interest
especially in the absence of an administrator who is yet to be appointed.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the RTC
decision.
Issue: Whether or not the heirs may bring a suit involving the estate of
the deceased pending the appointment of an administrator? (Yes)
Held:
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the
heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been
appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence
to the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3
and Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of
Gochan v. Young,28 this Court recognized the legal standing of the heirs to
represent the rights and properties of the decedent under administration
pending the appointment of an administrator. Thus:
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The above-quoted rules,29 while permitting an executor or administrator to
represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the
heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily
applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been
appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in
which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have
already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed.
In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the
appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the
rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing
while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or
dissipated.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two
exceptions, viz: (1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses
to bring suit;30 and (2) when the administrator is alleged to have
participated in the act complained of31 and he is made a party
defendant.32 Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to
recover property of the estate is as compelling when there is no appointed
administrator, if not more, as where there is an appointed administrator
but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties
himself.
All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for
the recovery of property of the estate during the pendency of
administration proceedings has three exceptions, the third being when
there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.
REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE RELATIVE TO SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
NO. 28 PENDING AT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF HIMAMAYLAN,
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH 55, PRESIDED BY JUDGE JOSE Y.
AGUIRRE, JR.
Facts:
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The complainant Constancia Amar requested assistance relative to Special
Proceedings No. 28, entitled "Intestate Estate of Spouses Dioscoro & Emperatriz
Rubin," assigned to Judge Jose Y. Aguirre.
Complainant states that she obtained a favorable decision for wage
differentials in a labor case. A writ of execution was issued by the NLRC
against the Estate of Spouses Rubin. In relation thereto, in Special
Proceedings No. 28, respondent judge issued an order directing the
judicial administrator of the Estate of Spouses Rubin to settle Amar's
claim.
Subsequently the complainant filed a motion for the issuance of an order
of contempt against the judicial administrator, Feliciano Rubin, for not
heeding the court order. Respondent judge failed to resolve the motion for
more than three years. Suspecting a possible collusion between
respondent judge and the judicial administrator, complainant sought the
assistance of the Office of the Court Administrator.
Respondent judge, in his letter, explained that the court could not direct
the sheriff to sell the property of the estate for being inconsistent with
Section 3, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court.
The OCA ruled stating that Judge Aguirre is correct when he said that
Amar's motion to order the sheriff to sell in public auction or to mortgage
the properties of the estate is contrary to law. The motion contravenes
Section 3, Rule 88 of the Revised Rules of Court which specifically
provides that it is only the executor or administrator of the estate whom
the court may authorize to dispose of the properties of the estate so that
the proceeds of the sale or mortgage may be applied to its obligations.
However, Judge Aguirre still has the duty to resolve the motion within the
90-day reglementary period. What he should have done was simply to
deny the motion on the ground that it is contrary to law.
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Issue: Whether or not the act of Judge Aguirre in failing to resolve the
motion by virtue of Sec 3, Rule 88 is valid? (No)
Held:
The motion to cite the judicial administrator for contempt was never
resolved by respondent judge. The explanation that he could not grant the
motion because the judicial administrator was sickly certainly is no
excuse. The motion to require the sheriff to sell or mortgage the real
properties of the estate was also not resolved by respondent judge,
stating that to grant the motion would be contrary to Section 3, Rule 88,
of the Revised Rules of Court. If respondent judge indeed felt so, then he
should have forthwith issued an order denying the motion instead of
allowing the motion to remain unresolved.
WHEREFORE, for his failure to timely resolve the two pending incidents in
Special Proceedings No. 28, Judge Jose Y. Aguirre of the Regional Trial
Court of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, Branch 55 is meted a FINE
Pahamotang vs PNB
Facts:
Melitona Pahamotang died. She was survived by her husband Agustin
Pahamotang, and their eight (8) children.Agustin filed with the then Court of
First Instance of Davao City a petition for issuance of letters administration over
the estate of his deceased wife.In his petition, Agustin identified petitioners
Josephine and Eleonor as among the heirs of his deceased spouse. It appears
that Agustin was appointed petitioners' judicial guardian.The intestate court
issued an order granting Agustin’s petition.
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Respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Agustin executed an
Amendment of Real and Chattel Mortgages with Assumption of
Obligation. It appears that earlier, or on December 14, 1972, the intestate court
approved the mortgage to PNB of certain assets of the estate to secure an
obligation. Agustin signed the document in behalf of the estate of Melitona.
Meanwhile, the obligation secured by mortgages on the subject properties
of the estate was never satisfied hence mortgagor PNB filed a petition for
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
The petitioners Josephine and Eleanor, together with their sister Susana,
filed their complaint for Nullification of Mortgage Contracts and
Foreclosure Proceedings and Damages against Agustin and PNB.
It is petitioners’ posture that the mortgage contracts entered into by
Agustin with respondent PNB, as well as his subsequent sale of estate
properties to PLEI and Arguna are void because they [petitioners] never
consented thereto. They assert that as heirs of their mother Melitona,
they are entitled to notice of Agustin's several petitions in the intestate
court seeking authority to mortgage and sell estate properties. Without
such notice,which the 4 orders that allowed Agustin to mortgage and sell
estate properties, are void on account of Agustin’s non-compliance with
the mandatory requirements of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners can obtain relief from the effects of
contracts of sale and mortgage entered into by Agustin without first
initiating a direct action against the orders of the intestate court
authorizing the challenged contracts.(Yes)
Held:
The action filed by the petitioners before the trial court is for the
annulment of several contracts entered into by Agustin for and in behalf of
the estate of Melitona, namely: (a) contract of mortgage in favor of
respondent PNB, (b) contract of sale in favor of Arguna involving seven
(7) parcels of land; and (c) contract of sale of a parcel of land in favor of
PLEI.
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The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
upon the allegations in the complaint that said contracts were entered into
despite lack of notices to the heirs of the petition for the approval of those
contracts by the intestate court.
In the exercise of its jurisdiction, the trial court made a factual
finding in its decision that petitioners were, in fact, not notified by
their father Agustin of the filing of his petitions for permission to
mortgage/sell the estate properties. The trial court made the
correct conclusion of law that the challenged orders of the intestate
court granting Agustin’s petitions were null and void for lack of
compliance with the mandatory requirements of Rule 89 of the
Rules of Court, particularly Sections 2, 4, 7 thereof, which
respectively read:
"Sec. 2. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or other
encumbrance of realty to pay debts and legacies through
personalty not exhausted. - When the personal estate of the
deceased is not sufficient to pay the debts, expenses of
administration, and legacies, or where the sale of such personal
estate may injure the business or other interests of those
interested in the estate, and where a testator has not otherwise
made sufficient provision for the payment of such debts, expenses,
and legacies, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator and on written notice to the heirs, devisees, and
legatees residing in the Philippines, may authorize the executor or
administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber so much as
may be necessary of the real estate, in lieu of personal estate, for
the purpose of paying such debts, expenses, and legacies, if it
clearly appears that such sale, mortgage, or encumbrance would
be beneficial to the persons interested; and if a part cannot be
sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered without injury to those
interested in the remainder, the authority may be for the sale,
mortgage, or other encumbrance of the whole of such real estate,
or so much thereof as is necessary or beneficial under the
circumstances".
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"Sec. 4. When court may authorize sale of estate as beneficial to
interested persons. Disposal of proceeds. - When it appears that
the sale of the whole or a part of the real or personal estate, will be
beneficial to the heirs, devisees, legatees, and other interested
persons, the court may, upon application of the executor or
administrator and on written notice to the heirs, devisees and
legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold, authorize the
executor or administrator to sell the whole or a part of said estate,
although not necessary to pay debts, legacies, or expenses of
administration; but such authority shall not be granted if
inconsistent with the provisions of a will. In case of such sale, the
proceeds shall be assigned to the persons entitled to the estate in
the proper proportions".
"Sec. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or
otherwise encumber estate. - The court having jurisdiction of the
estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator
to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber
real estate; in cases provided by these rules and when it appears
necessary or beneficial, under the following regulations:
(a) The executor or administrator shall file a written petition setting
forth the debts due from the deceased, the expenses of
administration, the legacies, the value of the personal estate, the
situation of the estate to be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise
encumbered, and such other facts as show that the sale,
mortgage, or other encumbrance is necessary or beneficial;
(b) The court shall thereupon fix a time and place for hearing such
petition, and cause notice stating the nature of the petition, the
reason for the same, and the time and place of hearing, to be
given personally or by mail to the persons interested, and may
cause such further notice to be given, by publication or otherwise,
as it shall deem proper; (Emphasis supplied)".
xxx xxx xxx
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Settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that when an order authorizing the
sale or encumbrance of real property was issued by the testate or
intestate court without previous notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees
as required by the Rules, it is not only the contract itself which is null and
void but also the order of the court authorizing the same.
Silverio vs CA and Silverio-Dee
Facts:
The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased
Beatriz Silverio. After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed
an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate.
During the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate.The RTC
subsequently issued an order against private respondent to vacate the premises
of the property located at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City.Private
respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA (With Prayer
for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction). The CA granted the prayer for the
issuance of a TRO.
Issue: Whether or not the occupancy of private respondent Nelia Silverio-Dee is
valid, despite without any authority from the intestate court? (No)
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Held:
The alleged authority given by SILVERIO, SR. for Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to occupy
the property is null and void since the possession of estate property can only be
given to a purported heir by virtue of an Order from this Court (see Sec. 1 Rule
90. In fact, the Executor or Administrator shall have the right to the possession
and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased only
when it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration.
With this in mind, it is without an iota of doubt that the possession by
Nelia S. Silverio-Dee of the property in question has absolutely no legal
basis considering that her occupancy cannot pay the debts and expenses
of administration, not to mention the fact that it will also disturb the right
of the new Administrator to possess and manage the property for the
purpose of settling the estate’s legitimate obligations.
Similarly, under Rule 90, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, the properties of
the estate shall only be distributed after the payment of the debts, funeral
charges, and other expenses against the estate, except when authorized
by the Court.
Verily, once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the
court, the properties included therein are under the control of the
intestate court. And not even the administrator may take possession of
any property that is part of the estate without the prior authority of the
Court.
In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she
allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate
court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the specific property located
at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park.
UY
ESCHEAT
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY
JULY 16, 2008
J. CARPIO
SUMMARY: The Republic filed for reversion of title against the heirs of a Chinese
citizen, since aliens were disqualified by the Constitution to own real property in
the Philippines. Court ruled that reversion could no longer prosper. Although the
sale of the lot to the Chinese citizen violated the constitutional prohibition on
aliens acquiring land, the lot had already been acquired by Elizabeth and Pacita
through succession. The transfer of Lot No. 398 to Elizabeth and Pacita, who are
Filipino citizens qualified to acquire lands, can no longer be impugned on the
basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer. The flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is deemed valid considering that
the objective of the constitutional proscription against alien ownership of lands,
that is to keep our lands in Filipino hands, has been achieved.
FACTS:
In 1936, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, bought Lot No. 398 (1,574 sq. m. located
at the corner of Roxas Ave. and Pavia St. in Roxas City) from the Dinglasans.
Subsequently, Lee Liong died intestate and was survived by his widow and his
sons Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting. The heirs extrajudicially settled the estate
and partitioned among themselves the lot.
When the sons of Lee Liong died, Lot No. 398 was transferred by succession to
their respective wives, Elizabeth Lee (Elizabeth) and Pacita Yu-Lee (Pacita).
The sellers Dingalasans wanted to recover the lot on the ground that Lee Liong
was an alien; thus, their sale to him was void.
In the 1956 case Dinglasan v. Lee Bun Ting, the Court held that even if the sale
of the property was null and void for violating the constitutional prohibition on
the sale of land to an alien, still the doctrine of in pari delicto barred the sellers
from recovering the title to the property.
11 years later, in Lee Bun Ting v. Judge Aligaen, the Court ordered the trial court
to dismiss the complaint of the Dinglasans for recovery. Applying the doctrine
of res judicata, the Court held that the case was a mere relitigation of the same
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issues previously adjudged with finality in the Dinglasan case, involving the same
parties or their privies and concerning the same subject matter.
In 1993, Elizabeth and Pacita (Lee Liong’s daughters-in-law) filed a petition for
reconstitution of title of the lot because the records of the Register of Deeds,
Roxas City were burned during the war.
Court held that the reconstitution was void for lack of factual support because it
was based merely on the plan and technical description approved by the Land
Registration Authority.
In 1995, the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Roxas City a Complaint for Reversion of Title against Elizabeth,
Pacita, and the Register of Deeds of Roxas City, praying that the sale of Lot No.
398 to Lee Liong be set aside for being null and void ab initio; andLot No. 398 be
reverted to the public domain for the State’s disposal in accordance with law.
Pacita and Elizabeth invoked as affirmative defenses: prescription; private
ownership of Lot No. 398; and Lee Liong’s being a buyer in good faith and for
value. Furthermore, they claimed that as Filipino citizens, they are qualified to
acquire Lot No. 398 by succession.
The trial court rendered a decision ordering the reversion of the lot to the State.
It held that Elizabeth and Pacita could not have acquired a valid title over the lot
because the sale of the lot to their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong was null and
void.
Being an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value did not cure Lee Liong’s
disqualification as an alien who is prohibited from acquiring land under the
Constitution.
Lastly, Prescription cannot be invoked against the State as regards an action for
reversion or reconveyance of land to the State.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and declared Elizabeth
and Pacita as the absolute and lawful owners of Lot No. 398.
It reasoned that it is true that the State is not barred by prescription. However,
reversion was still not proper.
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Although the sale of the lot to Lee Liong violated the constitutional prohibition on
aliens acquiring land, the lot had already been acquired by Elizabeth and Pacita
through succession. The transfer of Lot No. 398 to Elizabeth and Pacita, who are
Filipino citizens qualified to acquire lands, can no longer be impugned on the
basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer. The flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is deemed valid considering that
the objective of the constitutional proscription against alien ownership of lands,
that is to keep our lands in Filipino hands, has been achieved.
The Republic moved for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Are Elizabeth and Pacita the absolute and lawful owners and possessors of Lot
No. 398, considering that their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong, an alien
constitutionally prohibited to own real property in the Philippines, acquired no
right or title over the lot which he could have transmitted by succession?
RULING: YES.
The Republic argues that since the sale of the lot to Lee Liong was void, Lot No.
398 never became part of the deceased Lee Liong’s estate. Hence, Lot No. 398
could not be transmitted by succession to Lee Liong’s surviving heirs and
eventually to Elizabeth and Pacita. This position cannot be sustained.
De Castro v. Teng Queen Tan: A residential lot was sold to a Chinese citizen.
Upon the death of the alien vendee, his heirs entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of the deceased and the subject land was transferred to
a son who was a naturalized Filipino. Subsequently, the vendor of the lot filed a
suit for annulment of sale for alleged violation of the Constitution prohibiting the
sale of land to aliens. Independently of the doctrine of in pari delicto, the Court
sustained the sale, holding that while the vendee was an alien at the time of the
sale, the land has since become the property of a naturalized Filipino citizen who
is constitutionally qualified to own land.
Similarly, in this case, upon the death of the original vendee who was a Chinese
citizen, his widow and two sons extrajudicially settled his estate, including Lot
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No. 398. When the two sons died, Lot No. 398 was transferred by succession to
their respective spouses Elizabeth and Pacita who are Filipino citizens.
ISSUE:
Are reversion proceedings still viable considering that Lot 398 has already been
transferred to Filipino citizens? NO.
RULING:
In Lee v. Republic of the Philippines involving Lot No. 398, the Court explained
that the OSG may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of lands which were
sold to aliens disqualified from acquiring lands under the Constitution. However,
in the case of Lot No. 398, the fact that it was already transferred to Filipinos
militates against escheat proceedings, thus: Although ownership of the land
cannot revert to the original sellers, because of the doctrine of pari delicto, the
Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the land to the
State, subject to other defenses, as hereafter set forth.
In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings
because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong,
has since died and the land has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently
their heirs, Elizabeth and Pacita. They are Filipino citizens, a fact not disputed.
The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private
domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos.
In this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the
land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. If land is
invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers
it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title
of the transferee is rendered valid. Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property
to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of invalidity of the
initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in
Filipino hands has been achieved.
In this case, the reversion proceedings was initiated only after almost 40 years
from the promulgation of the court that the sale was null and void for violating
the constitutional prohibition on the sale of land to an alien. If Republic had
commenced reversion proceedings when Lot No. 398 was still in the hands of the
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original vendee who was an alien disqualified to hold title thereto, then reversion
of the land to the State would undoubtedly be allowed. However, this is not the
case here. When Republic instituted the action for reversion of title in 1995, Lot
No. 398 had already been transferred by succession to private respondents who
are Filipino citizens.
Since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to Filipino citizens, the flaw in the
original transaction is considered cured. As held in Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority: Thus, the Court has ruled consistently that where a Filipino citizen sells
land to an alien who later sells the land to a Filipino, the invalidity of the first
transfer is corrected by the subsequent sale to a citizen. Similarly, where the
alien who buys the land subsequently acquires Philippine citizenship, the sale was
validated since the purpose of the constitutional ban to limit land ownership to
Filipinos has been achieved. In short, the law disregards the constitutional
disqualification of the buyer to hold land if the land is subsequently transferred to
a qualified party, or the buyer himself becomes a qualified party.
Clearly, since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred Elizabeth and Pacita who
are Filipino citizens, the prior invalid sale to Lee Liong can no longer be assailed.
Hence, reversion proceedings will no longer prosper since the land is now in the
hands of Filipino citizens.
Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, Petitioner, vs.Hi-Tri Development
Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa, Respondents.
June 13, 2012
SERENO, J.:
FACTS:
Luz and Manuel Bakunawa are registered owners of 6 parcels of land. Sometime
in 1990,Teresita Millan offered to buy said lots for P 6, 724,085.71 with a
promise that she will take care of clearing whatever preliminary obstacles to
effect completion of sale. Millan failed to comply with the condition. Spouses
Bakunawa rescinded the sale and filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
91-10719 against Millan to return the copies of Transfer of Certificate Titles and
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ordered to receive the Manager’s check of P 1,019,514.29 for the down payment
made by the latter. Upon advice of their counsel, the spouses retained the
custody of the check and are refrained from negotiating and canceling it. Millan
was informed that it was available for her withdrawal.
On January 31, 2003, during pendency of the above mentioned case and without
the knowledge of Hi tri, RCBC reported P 1,019,514.29- credit existing in favor
“Rosmil” to Bureau of Treasury as among its unclaimed balances.
On December 14, 2006, OSG filed in the RTC for escheat proceedings. On April
30, 2008,Bakunawa and Millan settled amicably, the former agreed to pay Rosmil
and Millan P 3,000,000.00 inclusive of the P 1,019,514.29. However when
Bakunawa inquired from RCBC the availability of P1,019,514.29 the amount was
already subject for escheat proceedings. On May 19, 2008, the RTC rendered a
decision pursuant to PD 679 declaring the amount as subject for escheat
proceedings and ordered the amount to be deposited in favor of the Republic.
Consequently, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion seeking partial
reconsideration contending that the said amount was subject to an ongoing
dispute and that they be include as party defendants allowed to intervene. Motion
was denied.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of RTC and ruled that the bank’s
failure to notify respondents deprived them of an opportunity to intervene in the
escheat proceedings and to present evidence to substantiate their claim, in
violation of their right to due process. Furthermore, the CA pronounced that the
Makati City RTC Clerk of Court failed to issue individual notices directed to all
persons claiming interest in the unclaimed balances, as well as to require them to
appear after publication and show cause why the unclaimed balances should not
be deposited with the Treasurer of the Philippines. Thus, herein a petition for
Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the allocated funds may be escheated in favor of the Republic
RULING:
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Petitioner asserts that the CA committed a reversible error when it required RCBC
to send prior notices to respondents about the forthcoming escheat proceedings
involving the funds allocated for the payment of the Manager’s Check. It explains
that, pursuant to the law, only those "whose favor such unclaimed balances
stand" are entitled to receive notices. Petitioner argues that, since the funds
represented by the Manager’s Check were deemed transferred to the credit of the
payee upon issuance of the check, the proper party entitled to the notices was
the payee – Rosmil – and not respondents. Petitioner then contends that, in any
event, it is not liable for failing to send a separate notice to the payee, because it
did not have the address of Rosmil. Petitioner avers that it was not under any
obligation to record the address of the payee of a Manager’s Check.
In contrast, respondents Hi-Tri and Bakunawa allege that they have a legal
interest in the fund allocated for the payment of the Manager’s Check. They
reason that, since the funds were part of the Compromise Agreement between
respondents and Rosmil in a separate civil case, the approval and eventual
execution of the agreement effectively reverted the fund to the credit of
respondents. Respondents further posit that their ownership of the funds was
evidenced by their continued custody of the Manager’s Check.
An ordinary check refers to a bill of exchange drawn by a depositor (drawer) on a
bank (drawee), requesting the latter to pay a person named therein (payee) or to
the order of the payee or to the bearer, a named sum of money. The issuance of
the check does not of itself operate as an assignment of any part of the funds in
the bank to the credit of the drawer. Here, the bank becomes liable only after it
accepts or certifies the check. After the check is accepted for payment, the bank
would then debit the amount to be paid to the holder of the check from the
account of the depositor-drawer.
There are checks of a special type called manager’s or cashier’s checks. These
are bills of exchange drawn by the bank’s manager or cashier, in the name of the
bank, against the bank itself. Typically, a manager’s or a cashier’s check is
procured from the bank by allocating a particular amount of funds to be debited
from the depositor’s account or by directly paying or depositing to the bank the
value of the check to be drawn. Since the bank issues the check in its name, with
itself as the drawee, the check is deemed accepted in advance. Ordinarily, the
check becomes the primary obligation of the issuing bank and constitutes its
written promise to pay upon demand.
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Nevertheless, the mere issuance of a manager’s check does not ipso facto work
as an automatic transfer of funds to the account of the payee. In case the
procurer of the manager’s or cashier’s check retains custody of the instrument,
does not tender it to the intended payee, or fails to make an effective delivery,
we find the following provision on undelivered instruments under the Negotiable
Instruments Law applicable:
Sec. 16. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed. – Every contract on a
negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the
instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As between immediate parties
and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the delivery, in
order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the authority of the party
making, drawing, accepting, or indorsing, as the case may be; and, in such case,
the delivery may be shown to have been conditional, or for a special purpose
only, and not for the purpose of transferring the property in the instrument. But
where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery
thereof by all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is conclusively
presumed. And where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a party
whose signature appears thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is
presumed until the contrary is proved. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner acknowledges that the Manager’s Check was procured by respondents,
and that the amount to be paid for the check would be sourced from the deposit
account of Hi-Tri. When Rosmil did not accept the Manager’s Check offered by
respondents, the latter retained custody of the instrument instead of cancelling it.
As the Manager’s Check neither went to the hands of Rosmil nor was it further
negotiated to other persons, the instrument remained undelivered. Petitioner
does not dispute the fact that respondents retained custody of the instrument.
Since there was no delivery, presentment of the check to the bank for payment
did not occur. An order to debit the account of respondents was never made. In
fact, petitioner confirms that the Manager’s Check was never negotiated or
presented for payment to its Ermita Branch, and that the allocated fund is still
held by the bank. As a result, the assigned fund is deemed to remain part of the
account of Hi-Tri, which procured the Manager’s Check. The doctrine that the
deposit represented by a manager’s check automatically passes to the payee is
inapplicable, because the instrument – although accepted in advance – remains
undelivered. Hence, respondents should have been informed that the deposit had
144

been left inactive for more than 10 years, and that it may be subjected to
escheat proceedings if left unclaimed.1âwphi1
After a careful review of the RTC records, we find that it is no longer necessary to
remand the case for hearing to determine whether the claim of respondents was
valid. There was no contention that they were the procurers of the Manager’s
Check. It is undisputed that there was no effective delivery of the check,
rendering the instrument incomplete. In addition, we have already settled that
respondents retained ownership of the funds. As it is obvious from their foregoing
actions that they have not abandoned their claim over the fund, we rule that the
allocated deposit, subject of the Manager’s Check, should be excluded from the
escheat proceedings. We reiterate our pronouncement that the objective of
escheat proceedings is state forfeiture of unclaimed balances. We further note
that there is nothing in the records that would show that the OSG appealed the
assailed CA judgments. We take this failure to appeal as an indication of
disinterest in pursuing the escheat proceedings in favor of the Republic.
Petition is DENIED. The 26 November 2009 Decision and 27 May 2010 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107261 are hereby AFFIRMED.
LUIS B. MANESE, ANTONIA ELLA, HEIRS OF ROSARIO M. ORDOñEZ,
represented by CESAR ORDOñEZ, SESINANDO PINEDA and AURORA
CASTRO, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES DIOSCORO VELASCO and GLICERIA
SULIT, MILDRED CHRISTINE L. FLORES TANTOCO and SYLVIA L. FLORES,
Respondents
January 29, 2009
FACTS:
Dioscoro Velasco was granted a property which is a foreshore land based on
Homestead Patent. Velaco sold the property and it had a series of transfers
through the subsequent buyers.
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Manese and his co-petitioners or the Manese group filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Title and Damages against Velasco and the subsequent buyers
alleging that the issuance of the homestead patent and the series of transfers of
the same property were null and void. They claimed that they were in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and use of said foreshore land.
Velasco et al moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Manese
group does not have the legal personality to file the complaint since the property
forms part of the public domain and only the Solicitor General could bring any
action which may have the effect of cancelling a free patent and the
corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis of the patent.
ISSUE:
WON Manese group are real parties in interest with authority to file a complaint
for annulment of title of foreshore land.
RULING: NO.
It is admitted by both parties that the subject matter of controversy is foreshore
land which is a part of the public domain. Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No.
141 provides that in all actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of
the public domain or improvements thereon, the Republic of the Philippines is the
real party in interest. The action shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the
officer acting in his stead, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. As the
Manese group is not the real party in interest in this case, it is only proper to
dismiss the case pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
And Section 2, Rule 3 of Rules of Civil Procedure provides: x x x Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest.
ON CONTENTION OF EQUITY:
As to petitioners’ contention that they should be deemed real parties in interest
based on the principle of equity, we rule otherwise. Equity, which has been aptly
described as "justice outside legality," is applied only in the absence of, and
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never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. Positive rules prevail
over all abstract arguments based on equity contra legem.
CATALINA BALAIS-MABANAG v. THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF QUEZON
CITY, CONCEPTION D. ALCARAZ AND RAMONA ALCARAZ
G.R. No. 153142, March 29, 2010
FACTS:
The Coronel brothers executed a document entitled “Receipt of Down payment”
in favor of Ramona Alcaraz upon the receiving P50,000.00 as a down payment for
the sale of their inherited house and lot in Quezon City. In the agreement with
Ramona, they will execute a deed of absolute sale immediately upon the transfer
of the TCT to the name of the brothers Coronel because the same was named to
their father. On Feb.18, 1985, they sold the same property to petitioner herein
for a higher contract price than that of Ramona. For this reason, Coronel
rescinded the first agreement with Ramona by depositing to her the down
payment of P50, 000.00. Consequently, respondents filed a case for specific
performance and caused the annotation of lis pendens over the property. On
June 5, 1985, TCT 351382 was issued in the name of petitioner herein.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents herein ordering the cancellation of the
TCT in the name of petitioner. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the registration by the
Registry of Deeds of the DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE despite the lack of indication
of citizenship of the buyer.
RULING:
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The High Court ruled that it should be pointed out that the petitioner was not the
proper party to challenge Ramona’s qualification to acquire land. Only the
Government through the Solicitor General has the personality to file the case
challenging the capacity of person to acquire or own land based on non-
citizenship. The limitation is based on the fact that the violation is committed
against the State and not against individual. And that in the event that the
transferee is adjudged to be not a Filipino citizen, the affected property reverts to
the State, not to the previous owner or individual. It will not inure to the benefit
of the petitioner, instead the subject property will be escheated in favor of the
State according to BP Blg. 185.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF PASAY CITY, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL
FORMER 3RD DIVISION) AND AMADA H. SOLANO, ASSISTED BY HER
HUSBAND ROMEO SOLANO, RESPONDENTS.
JANUARY 31, 2002
BELLOSILLO , J.
FACTS:
Private respondent Amada Solano, for more than 3 decades, served as the all-
around personal domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a
French national.
During Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most especially during the waning years of her
life, respondent Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion
since no close relative was available to tend to her needs.
Because of Solano’s faithfulness and dedication, Ms. Hankins executed in her
favor 2 deeds of donation involving 2 parcels of land (TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808)
Private respondent alleged that she misplaced the deeds of donation and were
nowhere to be found.
Republic filed a petition for the escheat of the estate of Hankins before
the RTC of Pasay City.
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During the proceedings, a motion for intervention was filed by Romeo Solano,
spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio Regosa.
But on June 24, 1987 the motion was denied by the trial court for the reason
that "they miserably failed to show valid claim or right to the properties in
question.”
Since it was established that there were no known heirs and persons entitled to
the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower court escheated the estate in favor
of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
The Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 and
issued new ones in the name of Pasay City, by virtue of the decision of the trial
court.
In the meantime, private respondent claimed that she accidentally found the
deeds of donation she had been looking for a long time.
In view of this development, respondent Solano filed on January 28, 1997 a
petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals.
CONTENTIONS:
The deceased Elizabeth Hankins having donated the subject properties to the
petitioner, did not and could not form part of her estate when she died on1985.
Consequently, they could not validly be escheated to the Pasay City Government;
Even assuming arguendo that the properties could be subject of escheat
proceedings, the decision is still legally infirm for escheating the properties to an
entity, the Pasay City Government, which is not authorized by law to be the
recipient thereof. The property should have been escheated in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines under Rule 91, Section 1 of the New Rules of Court.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on March 1997, representing public
respondents RTC and the Register of Deeds (petitioner) filed an answer setting
forth their affirmative defenses, to wit: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the nature of
the action; and, (b) the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations.
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The Court of Appeals, on November 1998, issued the assailed Resolution
upholding the theory of respondent Solano.
CA’S RULING:
Petitioner (Solano) invokes lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter on the part
of respondent RTC to entertain the escheat proceedings because the parcels of
land have been earlier donated to herein petitioner prior to the death of said
Hankins; and therefore, respondent court could not have ordered the escheat of
said properties in favor of the Republic of the Philippines x x x
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifically laid down the grounds of
annulment filed before this Court, to wit: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and this jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations of the complaint. It is axiomatic that the
averments of the complaint determine the nature of the action and consequently
the jurisdiction of the courts.
The issues presented in the petition can only be resolved only after a full blown
trial.
It is for the same reason that respondent’s espousal of the statute of limitations
against herein petition for annulment cannot prosper at this stage of the
proceedings.
Sec 4, Rule 91 of the Rules of Court which provides for the period for
filing claim in escheat proceeding (5 years) is not applicable.
Petitioner (Solano) is not claiming anything from the estate of the deceased at
the time of her death; rather she is claiming that the subject parcels of land
should not have been included as part of the estate of the said decedent as she is
the owner thereof by virtue of the deeds of donation in her favor.
Petitioner is claiming ownership of the properties in question and the
consequent reconveyance thereof in her favor which cause of action prescribes
ten (10) years after the issuance of title in favor of respondent Pasay City on
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August 7, 1990. Therefore, the petition was seasonably filed on February 3,
1997.
The CA likewise denied the motion for reconsideration filed by public
respondents.
Petitioner contends that the lower court had jurisdiction when it escheated the
properties in question in favor of the city government and the filing of a petition
for annulment of judgment on the ground of subsequent discovery of the deeds
of donation did not divest the lower court of its jurisdiction on the matter.
Petitioner also insists that notwithstanding the execution of the deeds of donation
in favor of private respondent, the 5-year statute of limitations within which to
file claims before the court as set forth in Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of Court
has set in.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not private respondent Solano, allegedly a donee, have the
personality to be a claimant within the purview of Sec. 4, Rule 91 of the
Rules of Court.
2. Whether or not the petition for annulment of judgment filed by private
respondent is barred by prescription.
RULING:
In the case of Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna v. Colegio de San Jose,
Inc.
“In a special proceeding for escheat the petitioner is not the sole and
exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or
interest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested party
and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat.”
Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the
state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal
property of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a
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lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to forestall an open "invitation to
self-service by the first comers.“
Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually
does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such
property may be made. The procedure by which the escheated property may be
recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within
which such action must be brought.
In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within
five (5) years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have possession
of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to
him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim not made shall be
barred forever.“
The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud
any claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be
claimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose
them forever in a final judgment.
In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower
court as early as June 1989 but it was only on January 1997, more or less seven
(7) years after, when private respondent decided to contest the escheat
judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of
Appeals.
Obviously, private respondent's belated assertion of her right over the escheated
properties militates against recovery.
In the mind of this Court the subject properties were owned by the decedent
during the time that the escheat proceedings were being conducted and the lower
court was not divested of its jurisdiction to escheat them in favor
of Pasay City notwithstanding an allegation that they had been previously
donated.
The certificates of title covering the subject properties were in the name of the
decedent indicating that no transfer of ownership involving the disputed
properties was ever made by the deceased during her lifetime.
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In the absence therefore of any clear and convincing proof showing that the
subject lands had been conveyed by Hankins to Solano, the same still remained
part of the estate of the decedent and the lower court was right not to assume
otherwise.
DISPOSITION: Petition is granted, the CA’s resolutions are SET ASIDE and the
RTC’s decision is REINSTATED.
VENUE
MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, petitioners, vs. ROSARIO,
ALFREDO, MARIANO, PACIFICO, ONOFRE, TEOFILO, LOLOY and
TRINIDAD, all surnamed LORENZO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-23096 April 27, 1972
DIONISIO, PERFECTO, MARIA REBECCA, ASUNCION, MAURO, and,
LOURDES, all surnamed LORENZO, petitioners, vs. MARTIN NERY and
LEONCIA L. DE LEON, respondents.
G.R. No. L-23376 April 27, 1972
FERNANDO, J.
FACTS:
Bienvenida de la Isla (“Bienvenida”), the guardian of her minor children sold a
parcel of land to Spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon (hereafter, the
“Spouses”). The validity of the sale was however challenged by her two elderly
children on the ground that they were not informed of such a move
notwithstanding the order issued by the court. Moreover, they contended that the
guardianship proceeding was heard without them being notified although.
In the said case the heirs of Silvestra Ferrer, who originally owned one-fourth of
the property in question filed an intervetion.
The lower court ruled that it acquired no jurisdiction over the guardianship
proceedings of the minors over 14 years of age who were not notified of the
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proceedings and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the real property of
the minors and could not have validly authorized its sale.
Petitioner spouses elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals which
decided the case in its insofar as the undivided 3/4 portion of the land in question
is concerned and declared the intervenors as owners in common of the remaining
undivided 1/4 portion of the said land. Dissatisfied, both parties instituted the
petitions for review to this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA is correct in ignoring the jurisdictional defects that tainted the
guardianship proceeding
RULING: NO.
The CA is not correct in ignoring the jurisdictional defects that tainted the
guardianship proceeding. Service of the notice upon the minor if above 14 years
of age or upon the incompetent, is jurisdictional. Without such notice, the court
acquires no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian.
The failure of respondent Court of Appeals to give due weight to the grave
jurisdictional defect that tainted the guardianship proceeding resulted in its
judgment suffering the corrosion of substantial legal error.
The rights of the children of Leoncio as upheld by the lower court must, to
repeat, be maintained.
“When a petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court
shall fix a time and place for hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition residing in the
province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent
himself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given."
LUIS PARCO and VIRGINIA BAUTISTA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. UNION C. KAYANAN, Judge, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH IV), CALAUAG, and FRANCISCO
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RODRIGUEZ, JR., Legal Guardian of the Incompetent SOLEDAD
RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. L-33152 January 30, 1982
DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
The Judge of CFI Quezon, Branch IV, Calauag authorized and approved, upon
motion of Francisco Rodriguez Jr, guardian of Soledad Rodriguez, the sale to
spouses Luis Parco and Virginia Bautista 3 parcels of land to answer for the
medical expenses of the ward Rodriguez.
Almost a year and five months later, the guardian of Rodriguez filed a petition in
the CFI invoking Sec. 6 Rule 96, praying that an order be issued requiring the
couple Parco and Bautista to appear before the court so that they can be
examined as regards to the 3 lots which are allegedly in danger of being lost,
squandered, concealed, and embezzled and upon failure to do so or to comply
with any order that may be issued in relation therewith. The guardian alleges that
the transaction was in fact a loan to be paid in 3 months but upon the expiration
of the period thereof, the couple refused to sell back such property of the ward.
CFI judge, exercising limited and special jurisdiction as a guardianship court
under Sec 6 Rule 96 ruled in favor of the of the guardian and ordered the
reconveyance and delivery of the property to the ward.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI judge, exercising limited and special jurisdiction as a
guardianship court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue of ownership and order
the reconveyance and delivery of the property to the ward?
RULING: NO.
Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction
cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be
embezzled, concealed or conveyed. In categorical language of this Court, only in
extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title
thereto has been already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to
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the guardian. In effect, there can only be delivery or return of embezzled,
concealed or conveyed property of the ward, where the right or title of said ward
is clear and undisputable. However, where title to any property said to be
embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, as in this case, the
determination of said title or right whether in favour of the person said to have
embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a
separate ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings.
Apparently, there is a cloud of doubt as to who has a better right or title to the
disputed properties. This, the Court believes, requires the determination of title
or ownership of the three parcels of land in dispute which is beyond the
jurisdiction of the guardianship court and should be threshed out in a separate
ordinary action not in a guardianship proceeding.
ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA. DE BALUYUTvs. HON. JUDGE LEONOR INES
LUCIANO, G.R. No. L-42215. July 13, 1976
FACTS:
In the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, probate proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Sotero Baluyut was instituted by his
alleged nephew, Alfredo Baluyut claiming mental incapacity of the surviving
widow, Encarnacion vda. de Baluyut, to administer her affairs and that of the
decedent's estate. He prayed for appointment as administrator. However, upon a
counter petition, the widow was appointed administratrix and qualified as such.
This appointment, was set aside by the Supreme Court in Baluyut vs. Judge
Paño, etc., G.R. L-42088, May 7, 1976, because the persons contesting her
capacity to act were not given an adequate opportunity to be heard and to
present evidence.
Meantime, in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City, two
successive petitions were filed to declare Mrs. Baluyut an incompetent and to
place her under guardianship. The first petition, which was filed by Alfredo
Baluyut, was dismissed. The second, which was filed by her sisters, were given
due course. Acting on the latter petition, the court summarily declared the widow
as incompetent on the basis of a report of a psychiatrist who was not cross-
examined, and without hearing the evidence of the parties, particularly Mrs.
Baluyut. The court denied a motion for reconsideration of the order making such
declaration. Hence, this petition.
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ISSUES:
1. Whether the resolution in the guardianship proceeding of the question as to
Mrs. Baluyut's alleged incompetency should await the adjudication in the
administration proceeding (pending in the probate court) of the issue as to her
competency to act as administratrix.
2. Whether Mrs. Baluyot was denied due process of law when the guardianship
court summarily announced its verdict on her incompetency notwithstanding that
her lawyer had not cross-examined the psychiatrist.
Ruling:
1. Yes. In consonance with the last sentence of section 29-A of the Charter of
Quezon City which divests the Juvenile and Domestic Relation Court of
jurisdiction or authority to resolve questions already in issue as an incident in any
case pending in the ordinary court, the guardianship proceeding should be
suspended and should await the jurisdiction of the issue of petitioner's
competency to act as administratrix pending with the probate court.
2. Yes. A finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear,
positive and definite evidence (Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of Manila, 29
Phil. 183, 190). That kind of proof has not yet been presented to the
guardianship court to justify its precipitate conclusion that Mrs. Baluyut is an
incompetent.
In the nature of things, the guardianship court should have first set for hearing
the psychiatrist's report and examined Mrs. Baluyut before prematurely
adjudging that she is an incompetent. Its hasty and premature pronouncement,
with its derogatory implications, was not the offspring of fundamental fairness
which is the essence of due process.
Moreover, the lower court should have adhered strictly to the procedure laid
down in Rule 93 of the Rules of Court for appointment of guardians. Rule 93
provides that after the filing of the petition, the court should fix a time and place
for hearing and give the proper notices. At the hearing, "the alleged incompetent
must be present if able to attend, and it must be shown that the required notice
has been given. Thereupon, the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in
support of their respective allegations" (Sec. 5, Rule 93).
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FELICIANO FRANCISCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-57438 January
31, 1984
FACTS:
Feliciano Francisco (“Feliciano”) is the duly appointed guardian of the
incompetent Estefania San Pedro (“Estefania”) in Special Proceedings No. 532 of
CFI Bulacan presided over by respondent Judge. On August 30, 1974 Pelagio
Francisco (“Pelagio”), claiming to be a first cousin of Estefania, petitioned the
court for the removal of Feliciano and for the appointment in his stead. Among
other grounds, the petition was based on the failure of the guardian to submit an
inventory of the estate of his ward and to render an accounting. The respondent
judge found the claim to be true, ordered the retirement on the ground of old
age. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that he was still fit
to continue with the management of the estate of his ward but the court denied
the motion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court is correct in ordering the retirement of petitioner on
the ground of old age.
RULING:
YES. In determining the selection of a guardian, the court may consider the
financial situation, the physical condition, the sound judgment, prudence and
trustworthiness, the morals, character and conduct, and the present and past
history of a prospective appointee, as well as the probability of his being able to
exercise the powers and duties of guardian for the full period during which
guardianship will be necessary. A guardian, once appointed may be removed in
case he becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or
unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty
(30) days after it is due to render an account or make a return.
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There is need for petitioner Feliciano Francisco to be retired from the
guardianship over the person and property of incompetent Estefania San Pedro.
As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, this finds direct support in the
delay of the accounting and inventory made by petitioner. To sustain petitioner
as guardian would, therefore, be detrimental to the ward. While age alone is not
a controlling criterion in determining a person's fitness or qualification to be
appointed or be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for consideration.
LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI vs. ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA,
all surnamed PABALE G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008
FACTS:
A handwritten "Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell) was entered into by
and between Sesinando M Fernando (“Fernando”) and Nelly S. Nave (“Nave”)
involving a piece of land in Calamba, Laguna. However, Nave reneged on their
agreement when the latter refused to accept the partial down payment because
she did not want to sell her property to him anymore. Thereafter, Fernando filed
a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages before RTC Laguna. Nave
filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could not be ordered to execute the
corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of Fernando because she repudiated the
contract and besides she already sold the property in good faith to the Pabale
siblings before she received a copy of the complaint. Subsequently, the Pabale
siblings filed a Motion to Intervene alleging that they are now the land owners of
the subject property. Unfortunately, the trial court denied Nave’s Motion to
Dismiss.
Unsatisfied, Nave and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo (“Atty. Gesmundo”) filed another
motion, this time including the fact of her incapacity to contract for being
mentally deficient based on the psychological evaluation report conducted by
Dra. Virginia P. Panlasigui, M. A., a clinical psychologist. Finding the motion
unmeritorious, the same was denied by the court a quo. Temporarily, the
proceedings in this case was suspended in view of the filing of a Petition for
Guardianship of Nave with the RTC, Branch 36 of Calamba, Laguna with Atty.
Gesmundo as the petitioner. Subsequently, a decision was rendered in the said
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guardianship proceedings, finding Nave an incompetent placing her and her
estate under guardianship. Accordingly, Atty. Leonardo C. Paner (“Atty. Paner”)
is appointed as her regular guardian without need of bond, until further orders
from the Court.
On December 9, 1992, Nave died. Upon her death, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo,
Nave’s sole heir, executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pertaining to his
inherited properties from Nave. In this connection, Atty. Gesmundo filed an
issuance of a writ of execution of the petition for guardianship. The Pabale
siblings filed their Opposition on the grounds that they were not made a party to
the guardianship proceedings and thus cannot be bound by the Decision and that
the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale was never raised in the guardianship
case. Surprisingly, out of nowhere, Lolita R. Alamayri (“Alamayri”) filed a motion
for substitution alleging that the subject property was sold to her by Atty.
Gesmundo. In his answer, Atty. Gesmundo refuted by stating that what he
executed is a Deed of Donation and not a Deed of Absolute Sale and the same
was already revoked. Subsequently, the trial court rendered its Decision
recognizing Alamayri as the owner of the property. Fernando filed an appeal with
the Court of Appeals. CA, granted the appeals and uphold the VALIDITY of the
Deed of Absolute Sale. Alamayri and Atty. Gesmundo sought reconsideration of
the Decision of the appellate court but were denied for lack of merit. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nave was an incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of
the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings rendering the said sale void.
RULING:
NO, Nave was not incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject
property in favor of the Pabale siblings.
A finding that she was incompetent in 1986 does not automatically mean that she
was so in 1984. Hence, the significance of the two-year gap herein cannot be
gainsaid since Nave’s mental condition in 1986 may vastly differ from that of
1984 given the intervening period. Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a
person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is
presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved; that is, that at the
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moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind.23 The
burden of proving incapacity to enter into contractual relations rests upon the
person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity
will be presumed. Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally
incapacitated only in 1986 and she was not judicially declared an incompetent
until 22 June 1988 when a Decision in said case was rendered by the RTC,
resulting in the appointment of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Thus,
prior to 1986, Nave is still presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter
into contracts such as the Deed of Sale over the subject property, which she
executed in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984. The burden of
proving otherwise falls upon Alamayri, which she dismally failed to do. Alamayri
did not bother to establish with her own evidence that Nave was mentally
incapacitated when she executed the Deed of Sale over the subject property in
favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to render the said deed void.
BONIFACIA P. VANCIL vs. HELEN G. BELMES G.R. No. 132223 June 19,
2001
FACTS:
Reeder Vancil, the father of the minors Valerie (6 yrs. Old) and Vincent (2 yrs
old) died as a US navy serviceman. Bonfacia Vancil, the mother of Reeder and
the grandmother of the minors, filed guardianship proceedings over the persons
and properties of the said minors consisting of proceeds from their fathers
pension benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00 in the RTC of Cebu City.
Helen Belmes, the natural mother of the minors, opposed to the guardianship
proceedings asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and
exercising parental authority over the subject minors in Zamboanga del Sur
where they are permanently residing. She further alleged that Bonifacia Vancil is
a naturalized American citizen and a resident of Colorado, USA.
The trial court rejected the opposition and appointed the grandmother as the
guardian of the minors. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision. Hence, this
present petition alleging that Helen is unfit to be a guardian of the minors
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considering that Valerie was raped seven times by the mother’s live-in partner
while under her custody.
ISSUE:
Who between the biological mother and the grandmother should be appointed
guardian of the minors.
RULING:
As to Valerie, the issue has become moot since she has attained the age of
majority.
As to Vincent, respondent being the natural mother of the minor, has the
preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. Art. 211 of the Family
Code provide that the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. Indeed, being the natural
mother of the minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding natural and legal
right to his custody.
Petitioner’s claim to be the guardian of the same minor can only be realized by
way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Art. 214 of the Family Code,
which is only available in case of parent’s death, absence or unsuitability. In the
case at bar, petitioner did not show proof that Helen is an unsuitable guardian for
the minor Vincent.
Further, notwithstanding the fact that there is nothing in the law which requires
the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians, this Court
has held that courts should not appoint persons as guardians those who are not
within the jurisdiction of the courts for they will find it difficult to protect the
wards.
SALVACION LOPEZ vs. JOSE TEODORO, SR EULALIO LOPEZ, JR., and
JESUS JALBUENA G.R. No. L-3071. May 29, 1950
FACTS:
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Eulalio Lopez Sr., an incapacitated under the judicial guardianship of Eulalio
Lopez Jr. was the exclusive and absolute owner of a 100-hectare land in Silay,
Negros Occidental. Acting upon the motions filed in the proceedings for
guardianship, the court ordered the guardian to pay the movants the loans
properly authorized by the court for the support and maintenance of the
incapacitated.
In pursuance of this authority, the guardian sold the only property of the
incapacitated to Jesus Jalbuena. However, in authorizing the said sale, the court
did not follow the requirement of Sec. 2 of Rule 96 that the court shall direct the
next of kin of the ward, and all persons interested in the estate, to appear at a
reasonable time and place to show cause why the prayer for the sale should not
be granted.
Although Lopez Jr. was the judicial guardian, the incapacitated was and is under
the actual care and custody of his sister, Salvacion Lopez. Believing the sale is
prejudicial to her brother’s interest, Salvacion filed a petition for
certiorari/mandamus praying that the sale be revoked after the motion for recon
was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the property should be declared null and void.
RULING:
The guardianship court where the proceeding was pending had the jurisdiction to
order the questioned sale. It was also undisputed that the outstanding
indebtedness of the guardianship was property and legally incurred for the
support and maintenance of the incapacitated.
Petitioner has no legal interest in the complaint. The incapacitated has children,
all of age, one of whom is the judicial guardian, while the petitioner is only the
ward’s sister. Not being the ward’s forced heir, she was not prejudiced by the
sale she seeks to impugn. Petitioner is wrong in asserting that she is “next of
kin”. “Next of Kin” within the meaning of Rule 96 are relatives whose relationship
is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributes.
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VICENTE G. SINCO, PILAR G. SINCO vs. AGAPITO LONGA and AGUEDA
LONGA. G.R. No. 27962. February 14, 1928
FACTS:
Hacienda Rosario was originally owned by Don Rafael Sinco y Librado, the
plaintiff’s great grandfather, from whom it is passed to his son Escolastic Sinco
who died during the Spanish regime. The latter left a widow, Saturnina Lopez and
3 children, Sergio, Maria Paz and Coloma all surnamed Sinco. Of these, Sergio
and Maria Paz are still living, but Coloma died leaving 3 children who are the
plaintiffs in this case, namely Vicente, Pilar and Desemparados.
The estate of Escolastico appears to have been encumbered with debts and in
order to liquidate this indebtedness, the widow and three children leased the
property. The lease was continually extended until Saturnina died in 1904. After
the death of the mother, Sergio was hard pressed for money to sustain numerous
family and sold his undivided 1/3 share in the hacienda. The buyer, Longa
insisted in acquiring the whole property and subsequently the 1/3 share of Maria
Paz was included in the sale.
In order to accomplish the said end, Emilio Tevez, the guardian of the then minor
plaintiffs petitioned for the approval of the sale alleging that the estate was
heavily encumbered and that the minors had no cash assets to meet their
subsistence and education. Subsequently, the court issued its order authorizing
the guardian to make the sale as requested.
After the minors attained majority age, they instituted this petition seeking to
annul the said sale pertaining to their 1/3 undivided interest in the hacienda
alleging that the subject sale was attended with fraud. Emilio Tevez, the
guardian, was anxious for the sale to obtain money for his own uses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale should be annulled.
RULING:
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In passing upon controversies involving charges of fraud alleged to have been
committed many years before the litigation was begun, the proof of such fraud,
to be accepted by the court, should be full and convincing. Experience teaches
the danger of lightly accepting charges of fraud made many years after the
transaction which is the subject of question was accomplished, when death may
have sealed the lips of the principal actors and changes affected by time may
have given a totally different color to the questioned transaction.In this case, the
participants to the alleged fraud such as the guardian Emilio Tevez, were already
dead.
As to the irregularity in the guardianship proceedings, the jurisdiction of the court
to authorize the sale of the property of minors rests upon the averments of the
petition and adequate publication or appearance of the parties interested. The
fact that the statements of the petition may be untrue with respect to the
existence of encumbrances on the property and necessity of the sale, does not
affect the jurisdiction of the court, which rests upon the averments and not upon
the truth of those averments.
J. ANTONIO ARANETA vs. ANTONIO PEREZ G.R. No. L-18872 July 15,
1966
FACTS:
A trust was established pursuant to the will of the late Angela S. Tuason. J.
Antonio Araneta was appointed trustee and he qualified when he took his oath of
office. The beneficiaries of the trust are Benigno, Angela and Antonio, all
surnamed Perez y Tuason, the last two being represented by appellant Antonio
Perez, who is their father and judicial guardian. In the order appealed from the
lower court approved, upon petition of the trustee, a deed of donation executed
by him in favor of the City of Manila covering a lot pertaining to the trusteeship.
Such approval was given over the opposition of appellant Antonio Perez. On the
lot in question the trustee had been paying an annual realty tax.
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Appellant does not deny the beneficial aspects of the donation. But he maintains
that it is invalid on the ground that under Article 736 of the Civil Code "guardians
and trustees cannot donate the properties entrusted to them".
ISSUE:
Whether guardians and trustees cannot donate the properties entrusted to them.
RULING:
In this case, the guardian may donate the properties entrusted to him. Although
Article 736, New Civil Code provides that, "guardians and trustees cannot donate
the properties entrusted to them", the same cannot be applied considering that
the aforecited provision only took effect on August 30, 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386)
and does not apply retroactively to the testamentary trust established upon the
death of Angela S. Tuason on March 20, 1948.
There being nothing in the old Civil Code which prohibits a trustee from donating
properties under trusteeship, and considering that the powers given to herein
appellee as trustee are of a plenary character, subject only to the limitation that
they should be permissible under the law; considering further that when the
testatrix conferred such powers she must have had in mind the law that was in
force at the time; and considering finally that after all a trust is created for the
benefit of the cestuis que trust and that in this particular case the acts of the
trustee are subject to the supervision of the Court.
Tonog vs CA
Facts: On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United
States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed
a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August
31, 1986;Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987; and Eugene
Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989.The minors are the natural
children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19,
1990, the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos;
their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two
children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children
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by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the institution
of the adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the petitioner and
her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000,
petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written
consent to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is
a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are already married, gainfully
employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in
Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server.
She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her children
gave their written consent to the adoption of the minors. Petitioners brother,
Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and
commitment to support the minors while in petitioners custody.
The Social Welfare Officer of the DSWD of Tarlac submitted a Child Study Report,
recommending that Elain, Elma and & Eugene are eligible for adoption.The
petitioner, however, failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence
the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise,
failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the
adoption.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption. The OSG, appealed to the CA. The CA
reversed the RTC’s ruling.
Issue: WON the CA erred when it reversed the RTC’s ruling.
Held: NO. Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed
decision. Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family
Code provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of
their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that “[n]o child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.” It will be observed that in both
provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is specially
evident in Article 213 where it may be said that the law presumes that the
mother is the best custodian. This is not intended, however, to denigrate the
important role fathers play in the upbringing of their children. Indeed, we have
recognized that both parents “complement each other in giving nurture and
providing that holistic care which takes into account the physical, emotional,
psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child.” Neither does the
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law nor jurisprudence intend to downplay a father’s sense of loss when he is
separated from his child.
For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child
who is below seven years of age for “compelling reasons.” Instances of
unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction
with a communicable illness. If older than seven years of age, a child is allowed
to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may
exercise its discretion by disregarding the child’s preference should the parent
chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other
parent, or even to a third person.
Pablo-Gualberto vs Gualberto
Facts: Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for
custody pendent lite of their almost 4 year old son, Rafaello, whom her wife took
away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school when she left him.
The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife
failed to appear despite notice.
A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for the
child as she very often goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the
child.
Another witness testified that after surveillance he found out that the wife is
having lesbian relations.
Court of Appeals - The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous
order, and this time awarded the custody of the child to the mother.
Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a compelling reason as
provided in Art 213 of the Family Code.
Issue: Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded
to the mother.
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Held: Yes, Crisanto did not present sufficient evidence against the fitness of the
mother that will compel the court to rule against the mandatory character of Art.
213
Article 213 of the Family Code provided: “Art 213. In case of separation of
parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
court. The court shall take into account all relevant consideration, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.”
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise,” This Court has held that when
the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the
custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil
Code, w/c reads:
Art 363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property of children,
the latter welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her
child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reason for such
measure.”
Order of the RTC only temporary custody
Provisional & subject to change as circumstance may warrant Art. 213
mandatory in character
No evidence that the son was exposed to the mother’s alleged sexual proclivities
(lesbian) or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a
result.
Caniza v. CA
Facts: Carmen Cañiza was declared incompetent because of her advanced age,
so her niece, Amparo Evangelista, was appointed her legal guardian. Pursuant to
her authority, Amparo commenced an ejectment suit against Spouses Estrada
who were occupying a house belonging to Carmen. The Spouses argued that they
have been occupying the house in consideration of their faithfully service to
Carmen, and that, in fact, Carmen had already executed a will bequeathing to
them the disputed property. When the case reached the CA, it ruled in favor of
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the Spouses, holding that though not yet probated, the will was indicative of
intent and desire on Carmen’s part that the Spouses were to remain and continue
in their occupancy and possession, so much so that Carmen’s supervening
incompetency cannot be said to have vested in Amparo, her guardian, the
right/authority to drive them out.
Issue: Whether or not the holographic will, though not yet probated,
vested title to the Spouses Estrada.
Ruling:No. Under law, no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it
is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. An owner's intention
to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not
inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for any
reason deemed sufficient. In this case, that there was sufficient cause for the
owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate income
from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from
her extreme age.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is
limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will.
Neri vs Heirs of Uy
FACTS: Anunciacion Neri had seven children: first marriage with Gonzalo Illut,
namely: Eutropia and Victoria and second marriage with Enrique Neri, namely:
Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa.
Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired
several homestead properties located inSamal, Davao del Norte.
In 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Enrique, in his personal capacity and as
natural guardian of his minor childrenRosa and Douglas, with Napoleon, Alicia,
and Visminda executed an
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate withAbsolute Deed of Sale on 7/7/1979,
adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties and thereafter,
conveying them to the late spouses Uy for a consideration of P 80,000.00.
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In June 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of
the homestead properties against spouses Uy before the RTC, assailing the
validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period. The
complaint was later amended to include Eutropia and Victoria additional plaintiffs
for having been excluded and deprived of their legitimes as children of
Anunciacion from her first marriage.
RTC RULING:
Rendered the sale void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their
hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares of
his minor children, Rosa and Douglas.
CA RULING:
Reversed the RTC ruling and declared the extrajudicial settlement and sale valid.
While recognizing Rosa and Douglas to be minors at that time, they were deemed
to have ratified the sale when they failed to question it upon reaching the age of
majority. It also found laches to have set in because of their inaction for a long
period of time.
ISSUES: Whether the father or mother, as the natural guardian of the
minor under parental authority, has the power to dispose or encumber
the property of the minor?
Held: All the petitioners are legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first and
second marriages and consequently, they are entitled to inherit from her in equal
shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code. In the execution of
the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of
spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering
that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa
and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid
and binding upon them. While the settlement of the estate is null and void, the
subsequent sale of the properties made by Enrique and his children, Napoleon,
Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the spouses is valid but only with respect to their
proportionate shares.
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution
of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique,
represented them in the transaction.
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However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely
clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of
their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother. Administration includes all acts
for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according to the
natural purpose of the thing.
Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the
patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration.
Thus, A FATHER OR MOTHER, as the natural guardian of the minor under
parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property
of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the
ward’s property and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in
accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.
O’ Laco vs Co Cho Chit
Breach of Trust; Half-Sisters; Resulting and Constructive Trusts.
Facts: Emila is the half-sister of O Lay Kia who is, as is her husband Co Cho Chit,
a Chinese nationaland cannot own property in the Philippines. O lay kia bought a
piece of land and had it named under her sister, Emilia. Emilia on the other hand
sold the property to the Church without the knowledge of her sister. When O Lay
Kia found out, they immediately filed a case for breach of contract.
Issue: WON there was a trust relationship between the sisters.
Held: Yes. ”… trust relations between parties may either be express or implied.
Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the
parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an intention to
create a trust.
Implied trusts are those which, without being express, are deducible from the
nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are super induced on the
transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the
particular intention of the parties. Implied trusts may either be resulting or
constructive trusts, both coming into being by operation of law. Resulting trusts
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are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title
determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been
contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature or circumstances of the
consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes
invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the
benefit of another. On the other hand, constructive trusts are created by the
construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent
unjust enrichment.
They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of
confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in
equity and good conscience, to hold.” In this case, the court cited five instances
that prove a trust relationship. First, sps O Lay Kia were in possession of all the
pertinent documents of the sale from the beginning until the end of the
transaction. Second, there is a previous case of similar facts involving O lay kia
and her brother on a different parcel of land decided in her favor. Third, the
circumstances leading to Emilia acquiring a title to the landwas dubius. Fourth,
until the sale to the church, Emilia actually recognized the trust (by promising to
take care of the transfer to the actual owners as soon as she is able.)
A resulting trust is repudiated if the following requisites concur: (a)the trustee
has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the
cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to
the cestui qui trust ; and, (c) the evidence thereon is clear and convincing.
And finally, fifth, Emilia actually had no source of income to show how it was
possible for her to purchase the land.
Ceniza vs CA
FACTS: This is a petition for review dismissing the petitioners' complaint for
reconveyance of their shares in co-ownership property and reversing the decision
of the trial court in their favor.
Petitioners are the descendants of Manuel Ceniza while the private respondents
are the descendants of his sister, Sofia Ceniza. Sofia Ceniza was childless but she
had an adopted daughter named Flaviana Ceniza, who begot a daughter named
Marced Ceniza and who in turn had a daughter named Marcelina (or Marcela)
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Ceniza who married Vicente Dabon. Private respondents are the children of this
marriage and they are the great-great-grandchildren of Sofia Ceniza.
On the other hand, Manuel Ceniza had an only son, Pablo, who had two sons,
Santiago and Jose Ceniza. Petitioners Restituto and Jesus Ceniza and a certain
Nemesia Ceniza-Albina are their children and the great-grandchildren of Manuel
Ceniza.
The records disclose that when Hacienda de Mandaue was subdivided for resale
to the occupants in 1929, Jose Ceniza and Vicente Dabon, who were residing in
the hacienda, jointly purchased Lot 627 on installment basis and they agreed, for
convenience, to have the land registered in the name of Dabon. Since then, Jose
Ceniza, Vicente Dabon, and their heirs have possessed their respective portions
of the land, declared the same for taxation, paid real estate taxes on their
respective shares, and made their respective installment payments to the
Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu.
The present controversy arose because the private respondents refused to
convey Lots Nos. 627-B and 627-C to the petitioners. They claimed that their
predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Dabon, was the sole and exclusive owner of Lot
627, by purchase from the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu. In their answer to
the petitioners' complaint for reconveyance in June 1967, they alleged that the
petitioners' right of action had already prescribed.
Petitioners replied that Vicente Dabon held the land in trust for them, as co-
owners, hence, their action for reconveyance was imprescriptible.
ISSUE: whether the registration of the title of the land in the name of
one of the co-owner, constituted a repudiation of the co-ownership for
purposes of acquisitive prescription.
HELD: The trial court correctly ruled that since a trust relation and co-ownership
were proven to exist between the predecessors- in-interest of both petitioners
and private respondents, prescription did not run in favor of Dabon's heirs except
from the time that they repudiated the co-ownership and made the repudiation
known to the other co-owners, Restituto and Jesus Ceniza.
The registration of Lot No. 627 in the name of Vicente Dabon created a trust in
favor of his co-owner Jose Ceniza, and the latter's heirs.
This Court has ruled in numerous cases involving fiduciary relations that, as a
general rule, the trustee's possession is not adverse and therefore cannot ripen
into a title by prescription. Adverse possession requires the concurrence of the
following circumstances:
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a) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to
the ouster of the cestui que trust;
b) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que
trust; and
c) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive.
The above elements are not present here for the petitioners/ co-owners have not
been ousted from the land. They continue to possess their respective shares of
Lot 627 and they have been paying the realty taxes thereon. Restituto's house
stands on his portion of the Land. Assuming that the private respondents'
rejection of the subdivision plan for the partition of the land was an act of
repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set in when the
petitioners instituted the present action for reconveyance. These circumstances
were overlooked by the Court of Appeals.
In this case, since the statutory period of limitation within which to file an action
for reconveyance, after the defendants had repudiated the co-ownership in 1961,
had not yet run its course when the petitioners filed said action in 1967, the
action was not barred by prescription.
WHEREFORE. the decision of the Court of appeals is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE
Lazatin vs Campos
Facts: Margarita de Asis, widow of Dr. Mariano Lazatin, died leaving a
holographic will providing for a legacy of cash, jewelry, and stocks to respondents
Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son
of her late sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of
petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara.
During her lifetime, the deceased kept a safety deposit box at the bank that could
only be opened by her and her adopted daughter, respondent Nora de Leon.
Five days after her death, Nora opened the safety deposit box and removed its
contents. After learning of this, petitioners filed a motion in the probate court,
claiming that the deceased had executed a will and demanded for its production.
Petitioner Lazatin filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis as
an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin,
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brother-in-law of the deceased, that the petitioner was an illegitimate son of Dr.
Lazatin and was later adopted by him.
Renato failed to present a decree of adoption. Instead, he attempted to prove
that he had recognized the deceased spouses as his parents; that he was
formerly known as “Renato Lazatin” before he was forced to change his surname
to “Renato Sta. Clara”; that he and his wife are staying at the Mercy Hospital at
Taft Avenue, Manila, which is owned by the deceased spouses.
Issue: WON Renato has established his status as an adopted child.
Held: NO. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as
provided by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child has
lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a child to establish
such adoption. Even evidence of declaration of the deceased, made in his
lifetime, that he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that he had adopted
him, and of the fact that the child resided with the deceased, as a member of his
family, from infancy until he attained his majority, is not sufficient to establish
the fact of adoption. Nor does the fact that the deceased spouses fed, clothed,
educated, recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child,
necessarily establish adoption of the child. Withal, the attempts of petitioner to
prove his adoption by acts and declarations of deceased do not discharge the
mandatory presentation of the judicial decree of adoption. The thrust of
petitioner’s evidence is rather to establish his status as an admitted illegitimate
child, not an adopted child—which statuts of an admitted illegitimate child was
the very basis of his petition for intervention in the estate proceedings of the late
Dr. Lazatin, as above stated.
Republic vs CA and Bobiles
Facts: On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt
Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living with her family
since he was four (4) months old, before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City,
docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 1386.
The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance,
issued an order dated February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing on
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March 28, 1988. The order was duly published, with copies thereof seasonably
served on the Solicitor General; Assistant Provincial Fiscal Mediavillo, Jr. of Albay;
Salvador Condat, father of the child; and the social worker assigned to the court.
A copy of said order was posted on the bulletin board of the court and in the
other places it hadmrequired for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the
petition.
The RTC ruled that Jason was to be freed from all legal obligations of obedience
and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and
purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the
surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the
petitioner. The CA affirmed such ruling.
Issue: WON the Family Code can be applied retroactively to the petition
for adoption by Zenaida Bobiles.
Held: NO. When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No.
1386, the trial court acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the
governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule
is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action. We do not find in the present case such
facts as would constitute it as an exception to the rule.
We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not apply
to this case and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule therein
that adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up to adoption,
should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the adoption
institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and privileges coming to
it as a result of the adoption. The modern tendency of the courts is to hold that
there need not be more than a substantial compliance with statutory
requirements to sustain the validity of the proceeding; to refuse would be to
indulge in such a narrow and technical construction of the statute as to defeat its
intention and beneficial results or to invalidate proceedings where every material
requirement of the statute was complied with.
Republic vs Vergara
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Facts: On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye
filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City to adopt Maricel R.
Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively, younger siblings of
Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr. a member of the United States Air Force, is an
American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife
Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They have two
children. Both Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their
consent to the adoption.
The trial court granted the petition, granting Alvin and Maricel to be the children
of the spouses Dye by adoption. The RTC disregarded the 16-year age gap
requirement of the law. The spouses were only 15 years and 3mos and 15 years
and 9mos older than Maricel Due, respectively. The court’s reason for doing is
that a literal implementation of the law would defeat the very philosophy behind
adoption statues, namely to promote the welfare of the child.
The republic filed the petition for review on a pure question of law, contending
that the Spouses Dye are not qualifed to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due.
Issue: WON the Republic’s contention is meritorious.
Held: YES. The main purpose of adoption statutes is the promotion of the
welfare of children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a
manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be
applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that
it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate
children. Regrettably, the SC is not in a position to affirm the trial court’s decision
favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified
without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time
however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the
respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption.
Landingin vs Republic
Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition
for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s
brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother
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died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the
mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the
marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution time of adoption.
of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were
being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written
consent for their adoption.

A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption
and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption
plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily
consented.

However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer
in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner
also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to
the adoption.

Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written

consent of the adoptee’s biological mother.

Held: NO. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the
biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The
written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the
biological parents cannot be obtained.

The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended
to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by
interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the
child in the manner of the proposed adoption.

The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of
the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires
that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be
terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to
submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.

Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal
obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time
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