1
TOPIC: Possession and Kinds (Elements)
SPS. ERNESTO V. YU and ELSIE ONG YU, Petitioners, vs. BALTAZAR N.
PACLEB, (Substituted by ANTONIETA S PACLEB, LORNA PACLEB-
GUERRERO, FLORENCIO C. PACLEB, and MYRLA C. PACLEB),
Respondents.G.R. No. 172172. February 24, 2009
FACTS: Respondent Pacleb and his late first wife are the registered owners of a parcel
of land in Barrio Langcaan, Dasmarias, Cavite, covered by a TCT aka. (The Langcaan
Property).
The Langcaan Property became the subject of three (3) documents purporting to
transfer its ownership.
1. A Deed of Absolute Sale entered into between Spouses Pacleb and Del
Rosario.
2. A Deed of Absolute Sale entered into between Del Rosario and Javier.
3. A Contract to Sell entered between Javier and petitioner spouses Yu
 Sps. Yu agreed to pay Javier a total consideration of P900,000.
 P600,000 (P200,000 as previous payment and P400,000 to be paid upon
execution of the contract) was acknowledged as received by Javier
and P300,000 remained as balance.
 Javier undertook to deliver possession of the Langcaan Property and to
sign a deed of absolute sale within thirty (30) days from execution of the
contract.
All the aforementioned sales were not registered.
Petitioner spouses Yu filed with the RTC for specific performance and damages against
Javier to compel the latter to deliver to them ownership and possession, as well as title
to the Langcaan Property.
In their Complaint, they alleged that Javier represented to them that the Langcaan
Property was not tenanted. They discovered it was tenanted by Ramon. Petitioner
spouses demanded the cancellation of their agreement and the return of their initial
payment.
Ramon was however willing to vacate the property. Javier then promised to make
arrangements with Ramon to vacate the property and to pay the latter his disturbance
compensation. Hence, they proceeded to enter into a Contract to Sell canceling the
Agreement mentioned. However, Javier failed to comply with his obligations.
Javier did not appear in the proceedings and was declared in default
RTC Decision: Javier is directed to deliver the certificate of title of the land to the Sps.
Yu. Said Decision and its Certificate of Finality were annotated on the TCT.
Petitioner spouses Yu and Ramon and the latter’s wife executed a Kusangloob na
Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at Pagpapahayagng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan whereby
Ramon waived his tenancy rights over the Langcaan Property for P 500,000.
Later, Respondent Pacleb filed a Complaint for annulment of deed of sale and other
documents arising from it. He alleged that the deed of sale between Del Rosario was
spurious as their signatures thereon were forgeries. Respondent later dismissed the
case without prejudice.
Petitioner spouses Yu filed an action for forcible entry against respondent Pacleb with
the MTC. They alleged that they had prior physical possession of the Langcaan
Property through their trustee, Ramon, until the latter was ousted by respondent.
MTC Decision: In favor of petitioner spouses Yu
RTC Decision: Affirmed
CA Decision: SET aside lower court’s decision. CA said that it was respondent Pacleb
who had prior physical possession of the property as shown by his payment of real
estate taxes thereon.
Subsequently, Respondent Pacleb filed the instant case for removal of cloud from title
with damages to cancel the annotated Decision (*the one involving Javier*) and its
Certificate of Finality, from the title of the Langcaan Property. Alleging that the deed
of sale between him & late first wife with Del Rosario could not have possibly been
executed on February 27, 1992 as he was residing in the US and his late first wife had
already died 20 years ago.
During pendency of the instant case, respondent died. He was substituted by his
surviving spouse and the children with the first wife.
RTC Decision: Dismissed respondents case and held that petitioner spouses are
purchasers in good faith. The successive sales sealed the regularity of the purchase by
petitioner spouses. Further, the *Javier Case* is already final and can no longer be
altered thus the RTC ordered cancellation of TCT in the name of respondent and the
issuance of a new title in the name of petitioner spouses.
CA Decision: Reversed and set aside RTC. Petitioner spouses are not purchasers in
good faith and that the Decision (*Javier Case*) did not transfer ownership of the
Langcaan Property to petitioners. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner spouses are innocent purchasers for value and in
good faith.
2. Whether or not ownership over the Langcaan Property was properly vested in
petitioner spouses by virtue of the Decision in Civil Case No. 741-93 (*Javier
Case*)
RULING:
1. We find petitioner spouses contentions without merit.
Petitioner Ernesto Yu testimony, stated that he inspected the Langcaan Property and
talked with the tenant, Ramon, before he purchased the same. However, in his
Complaint for specific performance and damages which he filed against Javier, he
alleged that it was only after he had entered into an Agreement for the sale of the
property and his initial payment of P200,000 that he discovered that the property was
indeed being tenanted by Ramon who lives in the said farm
This inconsistency casts grave doubt as to whether petitioner spouses personally
inspected the property before purchasing it.
More importantly, however, several facts should have put petitioner spouses on inquiry
as to the alleged rights of their vendor, Javier, over the Langcaan Property.
a) the property remains to be registered in the name of respondent despite the
two (2) Deeds of Absolute SaleBoth deeds were not even annotated in the
title of the Langcaan Property.
b) a perusal of the two deeds of absolute sale reveals that they were executed
only about two (2) months apart and that they contain identical provisions.
c) it is undisputed that the Langcaan Property is in the possession of Ramon, the
son of the registered owner. This bare fact alone should have made petitioner
spouses suspicious as to the veracity of the alleged title of their
vendor. Moreover, petitioner spouses could have easily verified the true status
of the Langcaan Property from Ramons wife, since the latter is their relative
The case law is well settled, viz.:
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The law protects to a greater degree a purchaser who buys from the
registered owner himself. Corollarily, it requires a higher degree of prudence
from one who buys from a person who is not the registered owner, although
the land object of the transaction is registered. While one who buys from the
registered owner does not need to look behind the certificate of title, one who buys
from one who is not the registered owner is expected to examine not only
the certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for him to
determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in his
capacity to transfer the land.
This Court has consistently applied the stricter rule when it comes to
deciding the issue of good faith of one who buys from one who is not the registered
owner, but who exhibits a certificate of title. (Emphasis supplied)
d) Finally, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1199-95 (*Javier Case*) cannot serve
to validate the sale to petitioner spouses since the dismissal was ordered
because Del Rosario and Javier could no longer be found. Indeed, the
dismissal was without prejudice.
Based on the foregoing, therefore, petitioner spouses cannot be considered as
innocent purchasers in good faith.
2. Petitioner spouses argue that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 741-
93 as to the rightful owner of the Langcaan Property is conclusive and binding
upon respondent even if the latter was not a party thereto since it involved
the question of possession and ownership of real property, and is thus not
merely an action in personam but an action quasi in rem.
In Domagas v. Jensen,[35] we distinguished between actions in personam and
actions quasi in rem .
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action
determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in
personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its
nature and purpose, and by these only.
In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as
defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject
his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the
property.
Civil Case No. 741-93 is an action for specific performance and damages filed by. The
obligations of Javier under the contract to sell attach to him alone, and do not burden
the Langcaan Property.
We have held in an unbroken string of cases that an action for specific performance is
an action in personam.
Being a judgment in personam, Civil Case No. 741-93 is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. It
cannot bind respondent since he was not a party therein. Neither can respondent be
considered as privy thereto since his signature nor that of his late first wife, Angelita
Chan, were forged in the deed of sale.
All told, we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals finding that, as between
respondent and petitioner spouses, respondent has a better right over the Langcaan
Property as the true owner thereof.
TOPIC: Doctrine of Constructive Possession
2
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SOCORRO P. JACOB,
respondent.
G.R. No. 146874, July 20,2006
FACTS: On August 14, 1970, then President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 739,
Establishing as Reservation for the Purpose of the Exploration, Development,
Exploitation and Utilization of Geothermal Energy, Natural Gas and Methane Gas a
Parcel of Land in the Province of Albay, Island of Luzon, Philippines. Lot No. 4094 of
the Malinao Cadastre is covered by the said proclamation.
Private respondent, a retired public school teacher, filed an application with the RTC of
Albay for the confirmation and registration of her alleged title over Lot No. 4094.
The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, opposed the application for the
following reasons:
3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish
title or grant can no longer be availed of by the applicant/s
4. That the parcel/s applied for is/are portions of the public domain
belonging to them
Private respondent appended to her application the tracing cloth plan of the property
under the name of Sotero Bondal. The blue print,[3] dated February 27, 1991, was
prepared and signed by Geodetic Engineer Bonifacio C. del Valle and approved by
Ernesto L. Llave, Chief, Regional Surveys Division of the Lands Management Service.
Per Report[4] of the Land Registration Authority dated September 27, 1994, the
property was the subject of an application for registration (Cadastral Case No. 42, GLRO
Cadastral Record No. 1324), but no decision has been rendered thereon, or if there
had been any, no copy of the same was furnished to the [Land Registration
Authority]. The report also states that the property is covered by Free Patent No. V-
13062 dated May 21, 1955.[5] Private respondent had also applied for a free patent
over the property, but withdrew her application in a Letter[6] dated October 27,
1994 addressed to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region
V, Legaspi City.
Private respondent adduced the following evidence and factual allegations to support
her application before the RTC:
The previous owner of Lot No. 4094, Sotero Bondal, sold the property
to Macario Monjardin, a brother of private respondents mother (her
Uncle). Macario declared the property in his name under a Tax Declaration in 1930 and
again in 1949 Since Macario was residing inManila and was unable to cultivate the
property, he asked his sister, respondent’s mother, to be his encargado. By then,
private respondent was already a 17-year old substitute teacher who then accompanied
her mother in supervising the planting and harvesting of palayand the improvement of
the lot.
Sometime in 1946, Macario sold the property and executed a deed of salein favor of
the respondent’s motherand father but failed to declare the property for taxation
purposes under their names. Her parents later died intestate. Private respondent
executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Adjudication where she declared that as sole heir
of the spouses Igmedio Patricio, she was the sole owner of the property.
However, Lot No. No. 4094 was declared for taxation purposes under the name of
Socorro where she paid the realty taxes over the property. When cross-examined,
private respondent admitted that she had no copy of the deed of sale executed
by Sotero Bondalin favor of Macario Monjardin.
RTC Decision: In favor of the applicant Jacob. The Republic of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the decision to the CA alleging
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405

that private respondent failed to prove her claim that the original owner of the
property, Sotero Bondal, sold the property to her uncle Macario Monjardin. It was
likewise pointed out that private respondent admitted that she had no copy of any such
deed of sale.
CA Decision: Affirrmed RTC decision. It declared that although private respondent
failed to adduce in evidence the deed of sale executed by Sotero Bondal in favor
of Macario Monjardin, her testimony that the sale took place was enough. Her claims
were likewise buttressed by her documentary evidence.
The Republic of the Philippines filed the instant petition
ISSUE: Whether or not Jacob can register the subject land under her name under the
Public Land Act
RULING: The petition is meritorious. Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title
must, therefore, prove the following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same under
a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. No public land can be acquired
by private persons without any grant from the government, whether express or
implied. It is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the State.
In the case at bar, when private respondent filed her application with the RTC on May
6, 1994, Lot No. 4094 was no longer alienable and disposable property of the public
domain, since as of August 14, 1970, by virtue of Proclamation No. 739, it was
segregated from the public domain and declared part of the reservation for the
development of geothermal energy. Private respondent filed her application for
confirmation 24 years after the said proclamation was issued.
It bears stressing that one claiming private rights under the Public Land Act, as
amended, must prove by clear and convincing evidence that all the substantive
requisites for acquisition of public lands (along with the procedural) had been complied
with.
Secondly, private respondent failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that
by August 14, 1970, she had already acquired ownership over the property by herself
or through her predecessors-in-interest through open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the property since 1945 or earlier.
Indeed, the law speaks of possession and occupation. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. Unless, therefore, the
law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing
effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation seems to highlight the facts that for an
applicant to qualify, her possession of the property must not be a mere fiction.
Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion of such a
nature as a party would naturally exercise over her own property. A mere casual
cultivation of portions of land by the claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a
claim of ownership. Such possession is not exclusive and notorious as it gives rise to a
presumptive grant from the State. The applicant is burdened to offer proof of specific
acts of ownership to substantiate the claim over the land. The good faith of the person
consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom she received the property
was the owner thereof and could transfer ownership.
3
In this case, however, private respondent failed to offer in evidence the deed of sale
purportedly executed by Sotero Bondal in favor of Macario Monjardin as vendee. On
cross-examination, she admitted that the only deed of sale she had was the deed of
absolute sale Macario Monjardin executed in favor of her parents, the
spouses Igmedio Patricio. The documentary evidence adduced by private respondent
even belies her claim that Sotero Bondal sold the property to her uncle. She even failed
to identify B.C. Monjardin, much less explain whether such person was really her
uncle. She even failed to adduce in evidence any tax declaration over the property
under his name and that he paid the realty taxes for the property from 1930 to 1946.
Private respondents also promised to submit proof based on the records in the Register
of Deeds and other government agencies showing that Sotero Bondal sold the property
to Macario Monjardin; and that if such records had been destroyed during the Second
World War, she would submit proof of said destruction. Private respondent failed to
comply with her undertaking and rested her case without presenting said evidence.
Significantly, the spouses Igmedio Patricio applied for a free patent over the property
after the Second World War, which, according to private respondent, was rejected by
the Bureau of Lands. Private respondents testimony is further belied by the request to
withdraw her application for a free patent over Lot No. 4094 which she made
on October 27, 1994.The records also show that the property is the subject of Cadastral
Case No. 42, G.L.R.O. No. 1324 and there is no evidence on record that this case has
been terminated. There are thus two applications for registration of the same lot: (1)
the application of private respondent in the court below; and (2) Cadastral Case No.
42.
Furthermore, the fact that the blue print copy of the tracing cloth plan covering the
subject lot as of 1991 was still in the name of Sotero Bondal is proof that not all the
records of the Land Management Authority relative to the property had been lost.
Unless and until respondent offered credible evidence that Monjardin had purchased
the property from Bondal, it cannot be said that the spouses Igmedio Patricio acquired
the rights and interests of Bondal over the property through Monjardin; private
respondent cannot even tack her own possession of the property to that of her parents.
In fact, she failed to adduce evidence that her uncle had been in open, continuous and
adverse possession of the property. While she claimed that her mother was designated
as encargado, private respondent failed to even mention the portion of the property
that was cultivated, or at least where and who planted the palay. Such declaration
(that Macario designated her mother as encargado) without more does not constitute
preponderant evidence to prove adverse, continuous, open, public, and peaceful
possession in the concept of owner. Private respondents testimony that after her
parents purchased the lot, they began receiving the share of the produce of the
property does not in itself constitute proof of such adverse possession.
The Regional Trial Court is ordered to DISMISS private respondent’s application for
confirmation of title over Lot No. 4094.
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TOPIC: Doctrine of Constructive Possession
ALEJANDRA BUGARIN VDA. DE SARMIENTO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSEFA
R. LESACA, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-15385, June 30, 1960
FACTS: On January 18, 1949, plaintiff bought from defendant two parcels of land.
After the sale, plaintiff tried to take actual physical possession of the lands but was
prevented from doing so by one Martin Deloso who claims to be the owner thereof;
Plaintiff instituted an action before the Tenancy Enforcement Division of the DOJ to
oust said Martin Deloso, which action she later abandoned
Plaintiff wrote defendant asking the latter either to change the lands sold with another
of the same kind and class or to return the purchase price together with the expenses
she had incurred in the execution of the sale. Defendant did not agree to this
proposition.
On December 31, 1949, plaintiff filed a complaint in the CFI of Zambales praying for
the rescission of the contract of sale executed between her and defendant for failure
of the latter to place the former in the actual physical possession of the lands she
bought.
RTC Decision: declaring the deed of sale rescinded,
Defendant, in due time, appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the case was certified
to us on the ground that the questions involved are purely legal.
ISSUE: W/O the execution of the deed of sale in a public document (Exhibit A) is
equivalent to delivery of possession of the lands sold to appellee thus relieving her of
the obligation to place appellee in actual possession thereof.
RULING:
Articles 1461 and 1462 of the old Civil Code provide:
ART. 1461. The vendor is bound to deliver and warrant the thing which is the
subject-matter of the sale.
ART. 1462. The thing sold shall be deemed delivered when the vendee is
placed in the control and possession thereof.
If the sale should be made by means of a public instrument, the execution
thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the subject-
matter of the contract unless the contrary appears or is clearly to be inferred
from such instrument.
From the above it is clear that when a contract of sale is executed the vendor is bound
to deliver to the vendee the thing sold by placing the vendee in the control and
possession of the subject-matter of the contract. However, if the sale is executed by
means of a public instrument, the mere execution of the instrument is equivalent to
delivery unless the contrary appears or is clearly to be inferred from such instrument.
It can be clearly seen therein that the vendor intended to place the vendee in actual
possession of the lands immediately as can be inferred from the stipulation that the
vendee "takes actual possession thereof ... with full rights to dispose, enjoy and make
use thereof in such manner and form as would be most advantageous to herself." The
possession referred to in the contract evidently refers to actual possession and not
merely symbolical inferable from the mere execution of the document.
Has the vendor complied with this express commitment? she did not.
As provided in Article 1462, the thing sold shall be deemed delivered when the vendee
is placed in the control and possession thereof, which situation does not here obtain
because from the execution of the sale up to the present the vendee was never able
to take possession of the lands due to the insistent refusal of Martin Deloso to surrender
them claiming ownership thereof. And although it is postulated in the same article that
the execution of a public document is equivalent to delivery, this legal fiction only holds
4
true when there is no impediment that may prevent the passing of the property from
the hands of the vendor into those of the vendee. This is what we said in a similar
case:
“….It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and right of
possession. The thing sold must be placed in his control. When there is no
impediment whatever to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of
the purchaser by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the
execution of a public instrument is sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the
execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and
material tenancy of the thing and make use of it himself or through another
in his name, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by the
interposition of another will, then fiction yields to reality — the delivery has
not been effected. (Addison vs. Felix and Tioco, 38 Phil., 404; See
also Garchitorena vs. Almeda, 48 Off. Gaz., No., 8, 3432; 3437)
The next question to resolve is: Can plaintiff rescind the contract of sale in view of
defendant's failure to deliver the possession of the lands?
YES, this action is based on Article 1124 of the same Code, which provides:
Art 1124. The right to resolve reciprocal obligations, in case one of the obligors
should fail to comply with that which is incumbent upon him, is deemed to be
implied.
The person prejudiced may choose between exacting the fulfillment of the obligation
or its resolution with indemnity for losses and payment of interest in either case. He
may also demand the resolution of the obligation even after having elected its
fulfillment, should the latter be found impossible.
Topic: POSSESSION; Concept
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009
Facts: Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of
land. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,
and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
Malabanan presented his witness, AristedesVelazco, who testified that the property
originally belonged to a 22 hectare property owned by his great-grandfather,
LinoVelazco. Lino had four sons, two of which were Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth
being Aristedes’ grandfather.
Upon Lino’s death, his sons inherited and divided the property among themselves, but
by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties
inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and
Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties,
including the lot which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco.
It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.Malabanan also
presented, among other documentary evidence, a Certificationissued by CENRO-DENR,
which stated that the subject property was “ verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land...”
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan.
The Republic interposed an appeal, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that
the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405

that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application of Malabanan, ruling that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and
disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR
certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only
on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos’ possession prior to that date could not be factored in
the computation of the period of possession.
Issues:
1. Whether or not it is sufficient that the classification of land as alienable and
disposable occurs at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration
provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier
2. As for purposes of Section 14(2) of the PD 1529, whether or not a parcel of land
classified as alienable and disposable may be deemed private land and therefore
susceptible to acquisition by prescription
Ruling: 1. In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on
the length and quality of their possession.
Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title
thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe
imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
2. In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, under the Civil
Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial
property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only
with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable.
There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national
wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public
dominion begin to run.
Clearly, the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property as there is no substantive evidence to
establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners
can date back their possession, according to their own evidence is to the year 1948.
Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While
the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that it is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code.
5
The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article
420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Topic: POSSESSION; How exercised
CRISTETA CHUA-BURCE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
G.R. No. 109595, April 27, 2000
Facts: Ramon Rocamora, the Manager, requested FructuosoPeñaflor, Assistant
Cashier, to conduct a physical bundle count of the cash inside the vault, which should
total P4,000,000.00, more or less. During this initial cash count, they discovered a
shortage of fifteen bundles of One Hundred Pesos denominated bills totalling
P150,000.00.
The next day, to determine if there was actually a shortage, a re-verification of the
records and documents of the transactions in the bank was conducted. There was still
a shortage of P150,000.00. The bank initiated investigations totalling four (4) in all.
The person primarily responsible was the bank's Cash Custodian, Cristeta Chua-Burce,
the herein accused. Unable to satisfactorily explain the shortage of P150,000.00, the
accused's service with the bank was terminated.
To recover the missing amount, Metrobank filed a Civil Case for Sum of Money and
Damages with Preliminary Attachment and Garnishment against petitioner and her
husband, Antonio Burce. Also, information for Estafa was filed against petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the elements of the crime of estafa were duly proven beyond
reasonable doubt
Ruling: We find the first element absent. When the money, goods, or any other
personal property is received by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or
(2) on commission or (3) for administration, the offender acquires both material or
physical possession and juridical possession of the thing received.
Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the
thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. Petitioner was a cash
custodian who was primarily responsible for the cash-in-vault. Her possession of the
cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a bank teller, both being mere bank
employees.
Payment by third persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere
custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no independent right or title to
retain or possess the same as against the bank.
Petitioner herein being a mere cash custodian had no juridical possession over the
missing funds. Hence, the element of juridical possession being absent, petitioner
cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa.
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405

Topic: POSSESSION; Concept of Holder
MARIA CARLOS, represented by TERESITA CARLOS VICTORIA, Petitioners,
vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Responden
G.R. No. 164823, August 31, 2005
Facts: Petitioner Maria Carlos, represented by her daughter, Teresita Carlos Victoria,
filed an application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land.
Petitioner alleged, among others, that she is the owner of said parcel of land which she
openly, exclusively and notoriously possessed and occupied since July 12, 1945 or
earlier under a bona fide claim of ownership; that there is no mortgage or encumbrance
affecting said property, nor is it part of any military or naval reservation; that the
property is being used for industrial purposes; and that there are no tenants or lessees
on the property. Petitioner further claimed that she has been in possession of the
subject land in the concept of an owner; that her possession has been peaceful, public,
uninterrupted and continuous since 1948 or earlier; and tacking her possession with
that of her predecessors-in-interest, petitioner has been in possession of the land for
more than 50 years.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, filed an
opposition to petitioner’s application.
Petitioner later presented testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of her
neighbors, Sergio Cruz and Daniel Castillo, and Teresita Carlos Victoria herself. Victoria
admitted that her mother had sold the land to Ususan Development Corporation in
1996 but failed to deliver the title. Hence, the heirs of Maria Carlos made a commitment
to the corporation to deliver the certificate of title so that they could collect the unpaid
balance of the purchase price.Petitioner also presented in court the concerned officers
of the DENR to establish that the land in question is alienable and disposable.
The trial court granted the application. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the
decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was in possession of the property at the time of
the application for confirmation of title.
Ruling: No. The applicant at the time she filed her application for registration of title
was no longer in possession and occupation of the land in question since on October
16, 1996, the applicant's mother and predecessor-in-interest sold the subject land to
Ususan Development Corporation. Possession and occupation of the land in question
pertains not to the applicant but to Ususan Development Corporation, thus it can be
said that the applicant has no registrable title over the land in question.
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that the land
forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and
(b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner has met the first requirement but not the
second. Carlos no longer had possession of the property at the time of application for
the issuance of the certificate of title.Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his own property.
Nonetheless, even if it were true that it was petitioner who had actual possession of
the land at that time, such possession was no longer in the concept of an owner.
Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and
possession of a holder. A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner
6
himself or one who claims to be so. On the other hand, one who possesses as a mere
holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership,
whether his belief be right or wrong.
Topic: POSSESSION; Possessor in Good Faith/Bad Faith (Requisites)
SPOUSES ROY PO LAM and JOSEFA ONG PO LAM, Petitioners. vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and FELIX LIM now JOSE LEE, Respondents
G.R. No. 116220,December 6, 2000
Facts: Lots No. 1557 and 1558 are prime commercial lots located in the heart of
Legaspi City's commercial district. These were sold by Lim KokChiong to the Legaspi
Avenue Hardware Company (hereafter referred to as LAHCO). Felix Lim, Lim
KokChiong's brother, filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Albay
against his brother and LAHCO to annul the deeds of sale covering said lots on the
ground that the sale included the 3/14 pro-indivisoportion of the lots which Felix Lim
had inherited from his foster parents. Felix Lim filed with the Register of Deeds of Albay
a notice of lispendensover the two lots.
The trial court, on motion of Felix Lim, dropped the case against Lim KokChiong. The
trial court rendered a decision declaring LAHCO to be the absolute owner of the two
above-mentioned lots. The trial court ordered the cancellation of the notice of
lispendensinscribed on the titles of the two lots. The notice of lispendensinscribed on
TCT No. 2580 was cancelled.
However, the notice of lispendensannotated on TCT No. 2581 remained uncancelled,
allegedly becausethe duplicate owner's copy of said TCT was with the Continental Bank,
Lot No.1558 having been mortgaged by LAHCO to said bank.
Felix Lim appealed to the Court of Appeals. LAHCO sold the two lots to spouses Roy Po
Lam and Josefa Ong Po Lam. Thereafter, said certificates of title were themselves
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 8102 and 13711, respectively, in the name of
petitioners.
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
After the Po Lam spouses purchased the two lots from LAHCO, they leased the
commercial building erected on Lot No. 1557 to private respondent Jose Lee for one
year. Jose Lee refused to pay rentals to the Po Lam spouses, informing them that he
would deposit the same in court since Felix Lim had promised to sell the property to
him.
Issue: Whether or not Spouses Po Lim were purchasers in good faith or transferees
pendente lite
Ruling: We held that the Po Lam spouses could not be deemed buyers in good faith.
The annotation of lispendenson TCT No. 2581 which covers Lot 1558, served as notice
to them that the said lot is involved in a pending litigation.
The sole basis for finding petitioners to be purchasers in bad faith was the subsistence
of the notice of lispendensinscribed on TCT No. 2581, which covered Lot No. 1558, at
the time petitioners-spouses purchased the lots in dispute. And since Lot No. 1558 was
sold simultaneously with Lot No. 1557, even if the notice of lispendenson Lot No. 1557
had already been cancelled, petitioners were held to be purchasers in bad faith even
in regard to Lot No. 1557.
However, it must be pointed out that even if a notice of lispendenson TCT No. 2581
(Lot No. 1558) was still subsisting at the time petitioners bought the property from
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405

LAHCO, there also was a court order ordering that the annotation be cancelled, as in
fact, it was cancelled.
In this case, while petitioners bought Lot No. 2581from LAHCO while a notice of
lispendenswas still annotated thereon, there was also existing a court order cancelling
the same. On this ground alone, petitioners can already be considered buyers in good
faith.
Since the doctrine rests on public policy, not notice, upon the cancellation of the notice
of lispendens, the Po Lam spouses cannot then be considered as having constructive
notice of any defect in the title of LAHCO as to make them transferees pendente lite
and purchasers in bad faith of Lots No. 1557 and 1558. Conversely, cancellation of the
notice of pendency terminates the effects of such notice. The effects of such notice
were terminated, resulting in the Po Lam spouses not being bound thereby.
In fine, they cannot be considered transferee’s pendente lite and purchasers in bad
faith of the property.
Petitioners-spouses are PURCHASERS IN GOOD FAITH and Transfer Certificates of Title
No. 8102 and 13711 in their name valid, without prejudice on the part of private
respondent Jose Lee to file a separate action for reimbursement for the value of said
property from the Legaspi Avenue Hardware Company.
TOPIC: POSSESSION; Concept of good faith
Heirs of MARCELINO CABAL, represented by VICTORIA CABAL, petitioner,
vs. Spouses LORENZO CABAL1 and ROSITA CABAL, respondents.
G.R. No. 153625, July 31, 2006
FACTS: Marcelo Cabal was the owner of a 4,234-square meter parcel of land situated
in Iba, Zambales, described as Lot G. In August 1954, Marcelo died, survived by his
wife Higinia and his children (Marcelino, Lorenzo, Daniel, Cecilio, Natividad, Juan
xxx) . Sometime in 1949, five years before he died, Marcelo allowed his son, Marcelino,
to build his house on a portion on Lot G, now the southernmost portion of Lot 1-E.
Since then, Marcelino resided thereon. Later, Marcelino's son also built his house on
the disputed property.
In August 17, 1964, Marcelo's heirs extra-judicially settled among themselves the parcel
of land owned by Marcelo (Lot G). A consolidated subdivision plan revealed that
Marcelino and his son occupied and built their houses on the southernmost portion of
another lot (Lot 1-E) and not the adjacent lot designated to him (Lot G-1). The owners
of the said lot, spouses Lorenzo and Rosita Cabal (respondents), confronted Marcelino
on this matter which resulted to an agreement to a re-survey and swapping of lots for
the purpose of reconstruction of land titles. However, the agreed resurvey and
swapping of lots did not materialize.
Lorenzo and Rosita Cabal filed a complaint for Recover of Possession with damages
against Marcelino before the MTC of Iba, Zambales. They alleged that Marcelino
introduced improvements in bad faith on their land with knowledge that the adjacent
lot is titled in his name. Marcelino contends that respondents have no cause of action
against him because he has been in possession in good faith since 1949 with the
respondents’ knowledge and acquiescence. He further avers that acquisitive
prescription has set in.
MTC rendered a decision in favor of Marcelino. The RTC reversed the decision of the
MTC saying that Marcelino's possession was in the concept of a co-owner and therefore
prescription does not run in his favor; that his possession, which was tolerated by his
co-owners, does not ripen into ownership. Marcelino filed a petition for review with the
CA but the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
7
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcelino is a builder in good faith.
DISCUSSION ON GOOD FAITH: It has been said that good faith is always
presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the
burden of proof. Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical
meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest
belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an
unconscionable advantage. An individual's personal good faith is a concept of his own
mind and, therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his protestations alone. It
implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which
ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief
in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to
overreach another. Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not
aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
RULING: Marcelino's possession of the disputed lot was based on a mistaken belief
that Lot G-1 is the same lot on which he has built his house with the consent of his
father. There is no evidence, other than bare allegation, that Marcelino was aware that
he intruded on respondents' property when he continued to occupy and possess the
disputed lot after partition was effected in 1976.
Moreover, the fact that in 1977 Marcelino mortgaged Lot G-1 subject of TCT No. 22656
is not an indication of bad faith since there is no concrete evidence that he was aware
at that time that the property covered by the title and the one he was occupying were
not the same. There is also no evidence that he introduced improvements on Lot G-1.
In fact, the agreement on March 1, 1989 to a resurvey and swapping of lots for the
purpose of reconstructing the land titles is substantial proof of Marcelino's good faith,
sincerity of purpose and lack of intention to hold on to two lots.
Marcelino is deemed a builder in good faith at least until the time he was informed by
respondents of his encroachment on their property.
TOPIC: POSSESSION; Concept of good faith
IGNACIA NEGRETE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MARINDUQUE and IGMEDIO MADERAZO, represented by his legal
representative CATALINO MADERAZO, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. 31267 November 24, 1972
Facts: Claiming that since 1945 she and her late husband had been in continuous and
peaceful possession of a parcel of land with an area of nine (9) hectares more or less
in sitio Puting Buhangin, Mogpog, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 8431 in her
name, Ignacia Negrete filed on July 28, 1956 a forcible entry suit against the Igmedio
Maderazo in the municipal court of Mogpog alleging among others that on January 7,
1956, said defendant, through strategy, force, intimidation, and stealth unlawfully
entered the northern portion of said parcel of land, said northern portion comprising
an area of about four hectares.
To expedite the proceedings, the municipal court directed the chief of police of Mogpog
to conduct an ocular inspection of the disputed land to determine whether the land
area cultivated by the defendant is the same land claimed by the plaintiff-appellant as
the northern portion of her land under Tax Declaration No. 8431.
MTC found that the defendant has not unlawfully entered the land in dispute on January
7, 1956 as alleged by the plaintiffs, he being in the material and physical possession of
the said land prior to the date of the incident.
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Instead of appealing from the aforesaid decision of the municipal court of Mogpog,
plaintiff-appellant filed on January 18, 1967 — after the lapse of ten (10) years — an
action for recovery of ownership of property (reivindicacion) against defendant.
Defendant contends that he bought for P150.00 on August 30, 1954 the northern
portion of about 3,5700 square meters which is now covered by a tax declaration in
his name from Tito Oriendo, who declared it for taxation in 1949 and interposes as
special defense that the action had been barred by the statute of limitation for plaintiff-
appellant filed this present action over ten (10) years after he purchased the property.
Issue: Whether or not action has prescribed.
Ruling: No, the action has not prescribed. Defendant insists that he has acquired
ownership over the disputed parcel by ordinary prescription through adverse
possession of only ten (10) years. But ordinary acquisitive prescription of immovables
and other real rights thru adverse possession of ten (10) years, requires possession "in
good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law". In the absence of a just title or
good faith, ownership of immovables can be acquired by extraordinary prescription
thru an uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty (30) years. The law defines a
possessor in good faith as one who is not aware of any flaw in his title or mode of
acquisition; and conversely, one who is aware of such a flaw is a possessor in bad faith.
The essence of the bona fides or good faith, therefore, lies in honest belief in the
validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to
overreach another.
A deed of sale, to constitute a just title and to generate good faith for the ordinary
acquisitive prescription of ten (10) years, should refer to the same parcel of land, which
is adversely possessed. In the case at bar, the deed of sale in favor of the deceased
Igmedio Maderazo covers a parcel of land patently different from the disputed land
owned by plaintiff-appellant as to area, location and boundary owners. The disputed
parcel contains an area of about nine (9) hectares, and is situated in sitio Puting
Buhangin, Mogpog, Marinduque. On the other hand, the parcel of land purchased on
August 30, 1954 by the defendant from Tito Oriendo for P150 is situated in barrio
Puyog, Boac, Marinduque. It was also found that the ocular inspection commissioned
by the lower court in the ejectment case appears to have been signed by only two
commissioners, namely, Constancio Marte and Igmedio Maderazo. It was not signed
by Teodoro Lagustin, the alleged commissioner of the plaintiff. Defendant admits that
he is a resident of barrio Puting Buhangin, Mogpog, Marinduque. As the buyer, he knew
what lot was sold to him. And having signed as vendee the deed of sale in his favor,
he is conclusively presumed to have read the deed of sale, which clearly states that
the parcel he acquired is located in barrio Puyog, Boac, Marinduque.
Hence, not being a possessor in good faith, defendant can acquire ownership over the
disputed parcel of land of about nine (9) hectares belonging to plaintiff-appellant only
by extraordinary acquisitive prescription thru an uninterrupted adverse possession of
thirty (30) years. Since he occupied the same for only about thirteen (13) years from
1954 until 1967, when his adverse possession was interrupted by the filing of the action
for reivindicacion on January 18, 1967.
Topic: Concept of Good Faith
NATY BALTAZAR, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellees, vs. SILVINA CARIDAD, ET
AL., defendants and appellants.
G.R. No. L-23509, June 23,1966
8
Facts: -In a cadastral proceeding, the trial court rendered decision dated January 23,
1941 awarding Lot No. 8864 to the sps Julio Baltazar and Constancia Valencia as their
conjugal property. Said decision became final.
Julio Baltazar, the registered owner of said Lot died. On December 6, 1961, his
surviving wife and children, as petitioners, filed a motion, in the cadastral case praying
for writ of possession against respondents Silvina Caridad and her daughter, Eduarda
Caridad, who had been in possession of the southern portion of said Lot since 1939,
while the cadastral case involving said lot was pending before the trial court, and before
the decision was rendered and the corresponding decree issued in 1941.
The trial court granted petitioners' motion. The order having become final, the sheriff
enforced the writ and placed petitioners in possession of the southern portion of the
lot.
Petitioners presented a motion to compel respondents Eduarda Caridad and her mother
to remove their respective houses which they built in 1958 and 1959, respectively, in
the southern portion of the disputed lot, and, in the event of their failure to do so, to
order the sheriff to demolish the same.
Trial court granted petitioners' motion, ordering respondents to remove their respective
houses within 30 days from receipt of said order.
Respondents-appellants question the power or jurisdiction of the trial court, sitting as
a cadastral court, to order the removal of their respective houses which were built in
the disputed lot long after the issuance of the final decree of registration. They insist
that they are builders in good faith of the houses in question, and, as such,
they are accorded rights under Article 448 of the new Civil Code.
Issues: 1.Whether or not Silvina and Eduarda Caridad were builders in good faith.
(Topic)
2. Whether or not the Court erred in compelling Silvina and Eduarda Caridad to remove
their respective houses from the disputed lot.
Held: 1. Appellants cannot be regarded as builders in good faith because they are
bound by the 1941 decree of registration that obligated their parents and predecessors-
in-interest. Good faith must rest on a colorable right in the builder, beyond a mere
stubborn belief in one's title despite judicial adjudication. The fact that in 1959
appellants demolished and replaced their old house with new and bigger ones cannot
enervate the rights of the registered owners. Otherwise, the rights of the latter to enjoy
full possession of their registered property could be indefinitely defeated by an
unsuccessful opponent through the simple subterfuge of replacing his old house with
a new one from time to time.
2. Respondents do not dispute that during the pendency of the cadastral proceeding,
rendition of the judgment and issuance of the final decree of registration in favor of
Julio Baltazar, the late Andres Caridad, his surviving spouse, respondent Silvina
Caridad, and their children, one of whom is respondent Eduarda Caridad, were in
possession of the southern portion of the disputed lot; and that respondent Eduarda
Caridad claims right and title thereto as a mere heir and successor-in-interest of said
Andres Caridad. Neither do respondents dispute the propriety and validity of the order
of the cadastral court, granting the writ of possession in favor of petitioners as well as
its enforcement. Under these circumstances, we hold that the order of the cadastral
court, granting petitioners' motion to compel respondents to remove their respective
houses from the disputed lot, is valid and enforceable against respondents. In the case
of Marcelo vs.Mencias, etc., et al., this Court had already upheld the jurisdiction or
authority of the court of first instance, sitting as a land registration court, to order, as
a consequence of the writ of possession issued by it, the demolition of improvements
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405

introduced by the successor-in-interest of a defeated oppositor in the land registration
case.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order should be, as it is hereby, affirmed.
Other Principles:
Rules of Court are applicable to land registration cases in a suppletory character.
If the writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of
possession of the land to the successful litigant therein, a writ of demolition must,
likewise, issue, especially considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the
former which without said writ of demolition would be ineffective.
When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs,
processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such
court or officer.
Independent of any statutory provision, every court has inherent power to do all things
reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its
jurisdiction.
TOPIC: Concept of Bad Faith
HEIRS OF TRINIDAD DE LEON VDA. DE ROXAS, petitioners vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and MAGUESUN MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 138660 February 5, 2004
FACTS: Maguesun Corporation filed an Application for Registration of two parcels of
unregistered land located in Tagaytay. In support of its application for registration they
presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990, executed by Zenaida Melliza
as vendor who bought the property from Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas two and a
half months earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March 26, 1990 and an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990.Notices of the initial hearing were
sent by the Land Registration Authority to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna while
Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not notified because she was not named as an
adjoining owner, occupant or adverse claimant.
Publication was made in the Official Gazette and the Record Newsweekly. After an
Order of general default was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear the land
registration case. On October 4, 1990, LRA reported that the subject parcels of land
had previously been applied for registration at the CFI of Cavite by Manuel A. Roxas
and Trinidad de Leon but no decision has been made.
On February 13, 1991, the RTC granted Maguesun Corporation's application for
registration.
Consequently RTC issued the Order for Issuance of the Decree on March 14, 1991,
after it ordered the application of Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon dismissed. It
was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the land that
petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. De Roxas learned of its sale and the registration of
the lots in Maguesun Corporation's name. Hence, she filed a petition for review before
the RTC to set aside the decree of registration on the ground that Maguesun
Corporation committed actual fraud, alleging that her signature was forged in both the
Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication; that Maguesun Corporation
intentionally omitted her name as an adverse claimant, occupant or adjoining owner in
the application for registration submitted to the LRA, such that the latter could not send
her a Notice of Initial Hearing RTC that Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual
fraud and dismissed the petition for review of decree of registration April 15, 1992.
9
CA affirmed the findings of RTC, ruling that Roxasí failed to and demonstrate that there
was actual or extrinsic fraud, not merely constructive or intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite
for purposes of annulling a judgment or reviewing a decree of registration. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Was there actual fraud on the part of Maguesun Corporation to warrant the
reopening and the setting aside of the registration decree.
HELD: The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual
fraud in obtaining the decree of registration sought to be reviewed by Roxas.
Actual Fraud; Defined. Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive.
Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of
the misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Constructive fraud is
construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public interests and public
or private confidence, even though the act is not done or committed with an actual
design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons. Fraud may also be either
extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to
an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were
or could have been litigated therein, and is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a
party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it
operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which
it is procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. Extrinsic fraud
is also actual fraud, but collateral to the transaction sued upon. The distinctions are
significant because only actual fraud or extrinsic fraud has been accepted as grounds
for a judgment tobe annulled or, as in this case, a decree of registration reopened and
reviewed. The "fraud" contemplated by the law in this case (Section 32, P.D. No 1529)
is actual and extrinsic, which includes an intentional omission of fact required by law.
Intentional Omission of Name
In the corporation's application for registration filed with the RTC only the following
names appeared: Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Provincial Road. The court found
that the some words are typed in with a different typewriter, with the first five letters
of the word "provincial" typed over correction fluid. However, Maguesun Corporation,
annexed a differently-worded application for the petition to review the application of
the Roxasí where in instead of PROVINCIAL ROAD, the name ROXAS appeared. The
discrepancy which is unexplained appears intentional.
It is reasonable to assume that the reason is to mislead the court into thinking that
"Roxas" was placed in the original application as an adjoining owner, encumbrance,
occupant or claimant, the same application which formed the basis for the LRA in
sending out notices of initial hearing. Section 15 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 also
requires the applicant for registration to state the full names and addresses of all
occupants of the land and those of adjoining owners, if known and if not known, the
extent of the search made to find them. Maguesun Corporation failed to comply with
this requirement.
Possession in OCENO
The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the property
uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez. Maguesun Corporation also that
the subject land was unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family caretaker
resided in the subject property. Maguesun Corporation is likewise charged with the
knowledge of such possession and occupancy, for its President, who signed the Deed
of Sale over the property, knew fully well that her grandaunt Trinidad de Leon vda. de
Roxas owned the property. It is reasonable to expect her as a buyer to have inspected
the property prior to the sale such that the ascertainment of the current possessors or
occupants could have been made facilely.
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405

Maguesun Corporation intentional concealment and representation of Roxasí interest
in the subject lots as possessor, occupant and claimant constitutes actual fraud
justifying the reopening and review of the decree of registration.
Concealment of the Existence of Trinidad Roxas
Mention of the late President's name as well as that of Trinidad was made principally
in the Formal Offer of Exhibits for Maguesun Corporations tax declarations and as
predecessor-in-interest. However, this is not sufficient compliance with what the law
requires to be stated in the application for registration. Disclosure of petitioner's
adverse interest, occupation and possession should be made at the appropriate time,
i.e., at the time of the application for registration, otherwise, the persons concerned
will not be sent notices of the initial hearing and will, therefore, miss the opportunity
to present their opposition or claims.
Publication of Notice of Initial Hearing
While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the court, publication in a newspaper of general circulation remains an
indispensable procedural requirement. Couched in mandatory terms, it is a component
of procedural due process and aimed at giving "as wide publicity as possible" so that
all persons having an adverse interest in the land subject of the registration
proceedings may be notified thereof. Although jurisdiction of the court is not affected,
the fact that publication was not made in a newspaper of general circulation is material
and relevant in assessing the applicant's right or title to the land.
Forgery and Discrepancies
A close scrutiny of the evidence on record leads the Court to the irresistible conclusion
that forgery was indeed attendant in the case at bar. Although there is no proof of
respondent Maguesun Corporation's direct participation in the execution and
preparation of the forged instruments, there are sufficient indicia which proves that
Maguesun Corporation is not the “innocent purchaser for value" who merits the
protection of the law.
The questioned signatures taken from the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication are starkly different from the sample signatures in several documents
executed by Trinidad. The questioned signatures are smooth and rounded and have
none of the jagged and shaky character of petitioner's signatures characteristic of the
penmanship of elderly persons. The fact that petitioner was not the sole heir was known
to the general public, as well as the demise of the late President on April 15, 1946 while
delivering a speech at Clark Field, Pampanga. The aforementioned irregularities are too
glaring to have been ignored. If Tinidad did in fact execute said Affidavit, there is no
reason why she should state facts other than the unadulterated truth concerning
herself and her family. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
TOPIC: Concept of Bad Faith
VICTOR BENIN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MARIANO SEVERO TUASON
y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., defendant-
appellant.
G.R. No. L-26127, June 28, 1974
FACTS: Three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints containing substantially
the same allegations. The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners of the three
parcels of agricultural land located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in
10
Caloocan. The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged, in their respective
complaint, that sometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful
possession of their lands, the defendants, particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason and
Co. Inc., through their agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men, using
bulldozers and other demolishing equipment, illegally entered and started defacing,
demolishing and destroying the dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as
well as the improvements thereon.
When the plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the probable claim of defendants in 1953,
they discovered for the first time that their lands, as described in their respective
complaint, had either been fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct or
constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the province of Rizal in the
names of the original applicants for registration, now defendants, Mariano Severo
Tuason y de la Paz, et al.
The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the registered owners
had applied for the registration of two parcels of land (known as the Santa Mesa Estate
and the Diliman Estate) located in Caloocan and San Juan del Monte, province of Rizal,
of which Parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) contained an area of 8,798,617 square
meters but the boundaries and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and
amended; that the area of parcel No. 1 as mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is bigger
than the area of parcel No. 1 appearing in the application for registration as published
in the Official Gazette; that the amendments and alterations, which were made after
the publication of the original application, were never published; that on March 7, 1914
a decision was rendered in LRC No. 7681 based on the amended plan; that pursuant
to the decision of March 7, 1914 a decree of registration was issued on July 6, 1914,
known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the registration in the names of the applicants
of the two parcels of land (Santa Mesa Estate and Diliman Estate). They contend that
the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is null and void because the Land
Registration Court had no jurisdiction to render the decision for lack of publication; that
Decree No. 17431 issued pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is
likewise null and void from the beginning, because it was issued pursuant to a void
decision and that Original Certificate of Title No. 735, referring to parcel 1 (Santa Mesa
Estate), is also null and void from the beginning because it was issued pursuant to a
void decree of registration.
The lower court rendered a decision in favour of the plaintiffs. A motion for new trial
was filed by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. on January 30, 1965. However, before
the motion for new trial was resolved by the court, said defendant, on February 11,
1965, filed a notice of appeal to this Court and an appeal bond, and on February 12,
1965 he filed the record on appeal.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the judgment was valid?
2. Whether or not JM Tuason is a buyer in good faith?
RULING: We believe that the lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration
Court was without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681. Under Section
23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order, an amendment of the
application for registration when it appears to the court that the amendment is
necessary and proper. Under Section 24 of the same act the court may at any time
order an application to be amended by striking out one or more parcels or by severance
of the application. The amendment may be made in the application or in the survey
plan, or in both, since the application and the survey plan go together. If the
amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an area or
parcel of land not previously included in the original application, as published, a new
publication of the amended application must be made. (so no publication if lesser, but
if added, then kailangan og publication)
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405

In the case at bar We find that the original plan covering Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 that
accompanied the application for registration in LRC No. 7681 was amended in order to
exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, or which were the subject of
another registration case.
Trial Court also ruled that the one published is bigger than the one being approved.
But the Supreme Court found out that the difference was only around 27 square
meters.
Even granting that the registration court had no jurisdiction over the increased area of
27.10 square meters (as alleged by appellees), the most that the lower court could
have done was to nullify the decree and the certificate of title insofar as that area of
27.10 square meters is concerned, if that area can be identified. But, certainly, the
lower court could not declare, and should not have declared, null and void the whole
proceedings in LRC No. 7681; and, certainly, the lower court erred in declaring null and
void ab initio Original Certificate of Title 735 which covers not only the supposed excess
area of 27.10 square meters but also the remaining area of 8,798,617 square meters
of Parcel 1 and the entire area of 15,961,246 square meters of Parcel 2.
In the description of Parcel 1 as published, it appears that one of the boundaries on
the southwestern side is Santa Clara Monastery, while in the decree of registration the
words "Santa Clara Monastery" do not appear but, instead, are replaced by the words
"C. W. Rosenstock & Co." It will be remembered that during the registration
proceedings the plan of Parcel 1 was ordered amended, and the surveyor, who
prepared the amended plan must have found that what used to be the property of the
Santa Clara Monastery at the time of the original Survey was already the property of
C. W. Rosenstock & Co. when the amended plan was prepared. This can simply mean
that there was a change of ownership from Santa Clara Monastery to C.W. Rosenstock
& Co.
Topic: Interruption of Good Faith
SPOUSES ANDRES and SOCORRO SUOBIRON, JOSE SULLANO JR. and
IRENEO FERRARIS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, LAND
REGISTRATION COMMISSION, REGISTER OF DEEDS of the PROVINCE OF
ILOILO, FORTUNATA PONCE VDA. DE ADELANTAR, REMEDIOS ADELANTAR,
CARIDAD A. CHANCO, FLORECITA A. MONTILLA, EVANGELINA A.
COSCOLUELA, LYNDE ADELANTAR, DOUGLAS M. ADELANTAR, PROTACIO
ADELANTAR himself and as Administrator of the INTESTATE ESTATE of the
late LUIS ADELANTAR, respondents
G.R. No. 109903, November 20, 1995
FACTS: Petitioner-spouses Andres Suobiron and Socorro Suobiron, Jose Sullano Jr.
and Ireneo Ferraris instituted an action to annul the orders of the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) and the corresponding decrees issued by the Land Registration
Commission. Petitioners alleged in their complaint that the land registration court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing both orders because the requirements of
the law on reconstitution of court records were not complied with thus rendering void
not only the orders but also the decrees and certificates of title issued thereunder.
Private respondents denied the allegations for the annulment of the orders and
decrees. They counterclaimed for the delivery to them of the property in litigation. They
could have received had they not been deprived of possession thereof.
The trial court found that the two (2) parcels of land were previously subject of LRC
Case No. 673, GLRO Record No. 54404, before the CFI of Iloilo and that aside from the
Director of Lands, the other oppositors. After due notice, publication and hearing, the
CFI rendered judgment adjudicating the parcels of land in favor of spouses Luis
Adelantar and Fortunata Ponce.
11
All court records were destroyed or burned as a result of the battle for liberation. The
court issued an order directing the reconstitution of the records. Luis Adelantar filed a
motion for reconstitution of the records of LRC Case No. 673 furnishing copies thereof
to oppositors.
Taking advantage in the meantime of the chaotic conditions during the war, Quintin
Lorezo and Bernabe Lorezo entered the litigated property and appropriated the produce
thereof to the damage and prejudice of the registered owners. The Adelantars filed an
action in the CFI of Iloilo against the Lorezos for recovery of possession.
The CFI rendered judgment declaring the Adelantar spouses owners of the property
and ordering the receiver earlier appointed by the court to deliver to them the
possession thereof as well as the produce received by the receiver since his
appointment. The decision having become final and executory the trial court issued a
writ of execution which was implemented by the Provincial Sheriff. Respondent Court
of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court except with respect to the award of
attorney's fees which was deleted as no reason was given therefor.
ISSUE:
Whether the decision in Civil Case No. 938 is conclusive upon them.
RULING:
YES. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals as we find no reversible error
therein. The procedure laid down by Act 3110 for the reconstitution of a court record
in case of loss or destruction.
The requirements of the law for the reconstitution of a court record were fulfilled. The
clerk of court, soon after liberation, sent a notice to the then presiding judge of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo informing him of the destruction of all court records in
the province. Copies of the motion for reconstitution were served by the movant (the
now deceased Luis Adelantar) on the oppositors through their respective counsel.
It appearing that Atty. Felix Evidente was not the oppositors' counsel of record the
allegation that no notice was served on him may no longer be relevant.
The Adelantar spouses might have failed to submit in the reconstitution proceedings
an authentic copy of respondent court's resolution.
The decision in Civil Case No. 938 declaring the Adelantar spouses owners of the two
(2) parcels of land claimed by Basilia Lorezo, Isabel Lorezo and Canuto Lucero is
conclusive upon the parties therein as well as their successors-in-interest, the parties
herein, under the doctrine of res judicata.
The trial court held petitioners liable to private respondents for the net produce of the
properties in question from the time the former's possession in good faith was legally
interrupted when they were served summons in connection with private respondents'
complaint for recovery of possession with damages. It may be that petitioners acquired
the disputed properties in good faith and had since then occupied the same but such
bona fide character of possession ceased when they were served summons.
TOPIC: Interruption of Good Faith
ADELAIDA S. MANECLANG, in her capacity as Administrator of the Intestate
Estate of the late Margarita Suri Santos, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
JUAN T. BAUN and AMPARO S. BAUN, ET AL., defendants. CITY OF
DAGUPAN, defendant-appellant
.G,R. No. 27876, April 22, 1992
FACTS: Margarita Suri Santos died intestate. She was survived by her husband Severo
Maneclang and nine (9) children. A petition for the settlement of her estate was filed
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405

by Hector S. Maneclang, one of her legitimate children. Pedro M. Feliciano, the
administrator of the intestate estate of Margarita, filed a petition in SP Proc. No. 3028
asking the court to give him "the authority to dispose of so much of the estate that is
necessary to meet the debts enumerated" in the petition. While notice thereof was
given to the surviving spouse, Severo Maneclang, through his counsel, Atty. Teofilo
Guadiz, no such notice was sent to the heirs of Margarita.
Despite the absence of notice to the heirs, the intestate court issued an Order
"authorizing the administrator to mortgage or sell so much of the properties of the
estate for the purposes (sic) of paying off the obligations" referred to in the petition.
Pursuant to this Order, Oscar Maneclang, the new administrator of the intestate estate,
executed a deed of sale in favor of the City of Dagupan.
The new judicial administratrix of the intestate estate, Adelaida S. Maneclang, daughter
of the late Margarita Suri Santos, filed with the Court of First Instance an action for the
annulment of the sales made by the previous administrator pursuant to the Order,
cancellation of titles, recovery of possession and damages against the vendees Juan T.
Baun and Amparo Baun, etc.
The cause of action against the City of Dagupan centers around the deed of sale
executed in its favor by former judicial administrator Oscar S. Maneclang.
The evidence adduced by plaintiff discloses that Oscar Maneclang was induced by its
then incumbent Mayor.
The trial court rendered a partial decision against the City of Dagupan, Annulling (sic)
the Deed of Sale executed by the Administrator being null and void ab initio. It is
essential and mandatory that the interested parties be given notices of the application
for authority to sell the estate or any portion thereof which is pending settlement in a
probate court. An order issued by a probate court for the sale of real property belonging
to the estate of a deceased person would be void if no notice for the hearing of the
petition for such sale is given.
The City of Dagupan is not a purchaser in good faith and for value as the former judicial
administrator, Oscar Maneclang, testified that he was induced by then incumbent
Mayor.
ISSUEs:
1. Whether or not the sale executed by the judicial administrator to the City of
Dagupan is null and void ab initio
2. Whether or not defendant City of Dagupan is not a purchaser in good faith
and for value
3. Whether or not defendant City of Dagupan to pay the plaintiff the sum of
accumulated rentals or reasonable value of (sic) the use of the property in
question, plus interest
RULING:
1. In this case, however, only the surviving spouse, Severo Maneclang, was notified
through his counsel. Two of the heirs, Hector Maneclang and Oscar Maneclang, who
were then of legal age, were not represented by counsel. The remaining seven (7)
children were still minors with no guardian ad litem having been appointed to represent
them. Obviously then, the requirement of notice was not satisfied. Without them, the
authority to sell, the sale itself and the order approving it would be null and void ab
initio.
2. Their failure to do so for thirteen (13) years amounted to such inaction and delay as
to constitute laches. This conclusion, however, cannot apply to the rest of the children
— Adelaida, Linda, Priscila, Natividad and Teresita — who were then minors and not
represented by any legal representative. They could not have filed an action to protect
their interests.
12
3. Even if it is to be assumed that Mayor Fernandez and Councilor Guadiz induced Oscar
Maneclang to sell the property, the fact remains that there was already the order
authorizing the sale. He was disputably presumed to have acted in the lawful exercise
of jurisdiction and that his official duty was regularly performed. The filing of a case
alleging bad faith on the part of a vendee gives cause for cessation of good faith. Its
Answer, however, was filed on 5 November 1965. Accordingly, its possession in good
faith must be considered to have lasted up to that date. As a possessor in good faith,
it was entitled to all the fruits of the property and was under no obligation to pay any
rental to the intestate estate of Margarita for the use thereof.
However, upon the filing of the Answer, the City of Dagupan already became a
possessor in bad faith.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the decision in all respects,
except to the extent as above modified. As modified, (a) the sale in favor of the City
of Dagupan, is hereby declared null and void; however, by reason of estoppel and
laches as abovestated, only 5/9 of the subject property representing the presumptive
shares of Adelaida, Linda, Priscila, Natividad and Teresita, all surnamed Maneclang,
may be recovered; (b) subject, however, to its right to retain the property until it shall
have been refunded, City of Dagupan is hereby ordered to reconvey to the intestate
estate of Margarita Suri Santos 5/9 of the property in question.
Topic: ACQUISITION OF POSESSION; Recourse to Courts
REYNALDO VILLAFUERTE and PERLITA T. VILLAFUERTE, petitioners, vs.]
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EDILBERTO DE MESA and GONZALO DALEON,
respondents.
GR No. 134239, May 26, 2005
Facts: Sps. Villafuerte operated a gasoline station on the premises of three adjoining
lots owned by several persons. One of these lots were owned by Edilberto de Mesa
while another is owned by Gonzalo and Federico Daleon. The remaining lots were
owned by Anicia Yap-Tan, the mother of the wife of Villafuerte. De Mesa and Daleon
acquired their lots subject to the lease by Petrophil Corporation which had built the
gasoline station managed by the Villafuertes. When the lease to Petrophil expired, the
Villafuertes obtained a new lease from de Mesa for a period of one year. However, with
regard to the lot owned by Daleon, the Villafuertes were not able to secure a lease
renewal, but instead received demand letters for them to vacate which the
subsequently ignored.
Due to this, a complaint for ejectment was filed by Daleon against the Villafuertes
wherein no settlement was reached. After the expiration of the lease contract with de
Mesa, the Villafuertes continued to operate the gas station despite the demands to
vacate.
On an early morning, de Mesa and Daleon, with the aid of several persons and without
the knowledge of the Villafuertes, caused the closure of the gasoline station by
constructing fences around it. Due to this, the Villafuertes countered with a complaint
for damages with preliminary mandatory injunction against de Mesa and Daleon. The
Villafuertes amended their complaint to include the computation for damages. De Mesa
and Daleon, in their defense, stated that they did the fencing because of the
Villafuerte’s refusal to vacate. The lower court denied the application for preliminary
mandatory injunction stating that they have no more right to stay on the premises. For
the damages claimed by the Villafuertes, the Court ruled in favor of the spouses and
ordered de Mesa and Daleon to pay damages. The Court ruled that though the spouses
were deemed undersirable lessees, it was improper for de Mesa and Daleon to resort
to fencing their properties to remove them. The CA affirmed the lower court’s decision
but with modification of the amount for damages.
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in substantially reducing the amount of damages awarded
by the trial court.
Ruling:
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals concluded that the lease contracts
between the Villafuertes and de Mesa and Daleon over the latters respective lots had
already expired. There was also a congruence of findings that it was wrong for private
respondents to fence their properties thereby putting to a halt the operation of the
gasoline station.
Article 536 of the Civil Code explicitly provides for the proper recourse of one who
claims to be entitled to the possession of a thing. When private respondents personally
took it upon themselves to evict petitioners from their properties, which act was in clear
contravention of the law, they became liable for all the necessary and natural
consequences of [their] illegal act. (actually mao rani ang related sa topic. the rest was
a discussion on the award for damages)
Topic: ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION; Possession by mere tolerance
VICTORIA R. ARAMBULO and MIGUEL R. ARAMBULO III, Petitioners, vs.
EMERENCIANA R. GUNGAB, Respondent.
G.R. No. 156581, September 30, 2005
Facts: Emerciana Gungab is the registered owner of the contested parcel of land with
improvements in Quezon City. In separate letters, Gungab made a formal demand to
Victoria and Miguel Arambulo to vacate the subject property which the latter refused.
Because of their falure to amicably settle the issue in the barangay, Gungab filed a
separate ejectment complaint against Arambulo, alleging that she tolerated the
occupancy of Arambulo without rent and that they refused to vacate upon demand.
Arambulo, in defense, asserting that Arambulo is a co-owner of the property.Arambulo
alleged that after Pedro Reyes, the father of Emerciana and Victoria, died, the property
became part of the common properties of the Reyes clan. Through the permission
given by the wife of Pedro (Anastancia), the Arambulos have been occupying the
property for the last 20 years and that the possession of the said portion was with the
knowledge, consent, and tolerance of the co-owners.
The MeTC dismissed the ejectment case which was upheld by the RTC, citing that the
theArambulos have the right to retain possession of the property pursuant to Article
448 of the CC. However, the CA reversed the ruling, citing that Gungab, having a
genuine TCT, has the preferred right to possess. They deemed that the claim of co-
ownership was unsubstantiated.
Issue: Whether or not Gungab can eject the Arambulos
Ruling: The evidence showed that respondent has a Torrens Title over the land.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that respondent, as registered owner, is preferred
to possess it. The age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land
is entitled to possession thereof. Except for petitioners unsubstantiated claim that
Victoria Arambulo is a co-owner of the property, they have not presented other
justification for their continued stay thereon.
Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without
any contract between them is bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the
same upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy
against them. Notably, Anastacia Reyes only allowed petitioners to use and occupy
13
certain portions of the subject property. They admitted their use and possession of
these portions of the subject property had been with the knowledge, consent and
tolerance of all the other co-owners. Consequently, after respondent obtained title to
the subject property and withdrew her tolerance later on, Arambulo’s refusal to vacate
it rendered their possession thereof unlawful.
Since Arambulo’s occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance, they are
not entitled to retain its possession under Article 448 of the Civil Code. They are aware
that their tolerated possession may be terminated any time and they cannot be
considered as builders in good faith.
Moreover, as aptly found by the Court of Appeals, the Arambuloshave not presented
evidence to prove that they made improvements on the subject property and defrayed
the expenses therefor. Moreover, the Courtdid not sustain the Arambulos contention
that since they had possession of the subject property, they are entitled to remain
there. Again, they confuse unlawful detainer with forcible entry. Prior physical
possession by the plaintiff is not necessary in an unlawful detainer case. It is enough
that she has a better right of possession. Prior physical possession of a property by a
party is indispensable only in forcible entry cases. In unlawful detainer cases, the
defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property, but his possession
eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess.
Thus, the Arambulos’ prior physical possession of the property does not automatically
entitle them to continue in said possession and does not give them a better right to
the property.
Topic: ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION; Possession by mere tolerance
SPS. NARCISO BARNACHEA and JULITA BARNACHEA (now heirs of
deceased Julita Barnachea), Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. OSCAR C. HERRERA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 20, Malolos,
Bulacan, HON., HORACIO T. VIOLA, Presiding Judge, MTC Pulilan, Bulacan,
and SPS. AVELINO and PRISCILLA IGNACIO, Respondents.
GR No. 150025, July 23, 2008
Facts: Ignacio filed a complaint for ejectment against Barnachea before the MTC. The
subject matter were lots titled to the Ignacios which are adjacent to the propert that
Barnachea owns and occupies. The properties were originally part of the land owned
by a certain Luis Santos in which it was inherited by his daughter Purificacion Santos
Imperial. The land was then subdivided and transferred to tenant-farmers Santiago
Isidro and Procopio de Guzman. The Ignacios own the land from Usudri while the
Ignacios own the land from de Guzman. To avert the implementation of the writ of
exection obtained by Ignacio, Barnachea filed a Notice of Appeal. Pending the
resolution on the issue of ejectment, Ignacio’s sister (Leticia) filed a petition for
Quieting of Title with the RTC. Due to this, Barnachea filed an urgent motion for
suspension of proceedings which was denied by the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the pendency of an action involving the issue of ownership is sufficient
basis for the suspension of an ejectment proceeding between the same parties and the
same subject matter.
Ruling: No.
The actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are similar because they are both
summary actions where the issue is purely physical possession.[8] Other than these
commonalities, however, they possess dissimilarities that are clear, distinct, and well
established in law.
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405

In forcible entry, (1) the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession
of the property until he was deprived of possession by the defendant; (2) the defendant
secures possession of the disputed property from the plaintiff by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; hence, his possession is unlawful from the
beginning; (3) the law does not require a previous demand by the plaintiff for the
defendant to vacate the premises; and (4) the action can be brought only within one-
year from the date the defendant actually and illegally entered the property.
In marked contrast, unlawful detainer is attended by the following features: (1) prior
possession of the property by the plaintiff is not necessary; (2) possession of the
property by the defendant at the start is legal but the possession becomes illegal by
reason of the termination of his right to possession based on his or her contract or
other arrangement with the plaintiff; (3) the plaintiff is required by law to make a
demand as a jurisdictional requirement; and (4) the one-year period to bring the
complaint is counted from the date of the plaintiffs last demand on the defendant.
In this case, a plain reading of the complaint shows Ignacio positions that they was in
prior possession of the disputed property; that Ignacio allowed them to occupy the
disputed property by tolerance; that Ignacio eventually made a demand that the
Barnachea vacate the property (on August 26, 1998, which demand them received on
August 31, 1998); and that the Barnachea refused to vacate the property in light of
the defenses they presented. Separately from the complaint, Ignacio characterized the
action they filed against Barnachea in the MTC as an unlawful detainer when they
stated in their memorandum that as alleged in the complaint, what was filed by Ignacio
was an ejectment suit for unlawful detainer.
The issue in an unlawful detainer case is limited to physical possession. When a claim
of ownership is used as a basis for de facto possession or to assert a better possessory
right, the court hearing the case may provisionally rule on the issue of ownership. As
a rule, however, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does
not justify the suspension of the ejectment proceedings.
Topic: ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION; Possession by mere tolerance
SPS. RICARDO AND LYDIA LLOBRERA, et.al., Petitioners, vs. JOSEFINA V.
FERNANDEZ, Respondent
GR No. 142882, May 2, 2006
Facts: Fernandez, as one of the registered co-owners of the subject land, served a
writted demand letters to the Sps. Llobrera. The latter refused to vacate which led to
the filing of a formal complaint in the Barangay. With the failure to amicably settle the
dispite, Fernandez filed a complaint for ejectment and damages against Llobrera before
the MTCC. Llobrera alleged in their Answer that they had been occupying the property
in question beginning the year 1945 onwards, when their predecessors-in-interest, with
the permission of Gualberto de Venecia, one of the other co-owners of said land,
developed and occupied the same on condition that they will pay their monthly rental
of P20.00 each. From then on, they have continuously paid their monthly rentals to
Gualberto de Venecia or Rosita de Venecia or their representatives, such payments
being duly acknowledged by receipts. Beginning sometime June 1996, however, the
14
representative of Gualberto de Venecia refused to accept their rentals, prompting them
to consign the same to Banco San Juan, which bank deposit they continued to maintain
and update with their monthly rental payments.
The MTCC ruled in favor of Fernandez and ordered Llobrera to vacate the premises.
The RTC and CA affirmed this judgement of the lower court.
Issue: Whether or not Llobrera’s possession of the property is founded on contract or
not.
Ruling: No. This factual issue was resolved by the three (3) courts below in favor of
Fernandez, citing that there is an absence of any written memorandum of the alleged
lease arrangements.From the absence of proof of any contractual basis for
Llobrera’spossession of the subject premises, the only legal implication is that their
possession thereof is by mere tolerance.InRoxas vs. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled:
A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
The judgment favoring the ejectment of petitioners being consistent with law and
jurisprudence can only be affirmed. The alleged consignation of the P20.00 monthly
rental to a bank account in respondents name cannot save the day for the petitioners
simply because of the absence of any contractual basis for their claim to rightful
possession of the subject property. Consignation based on Article 1256 of the Civil Code
indispensably requires a creditor-debtor relationship between the parties, in the
absence of which, the legal effects thereof cannot be availed of.
Topics: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Possessor v. Owner
SPOUSES ELPIDIO APOSTOL and AMELIA APOSTOL, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and SPOUSES EMMANUEL CHUA and EDNA L. CHUA,
respondents.
G.R No. 125375, June 17, 2004
Facts: On September 3, 1993, the respondents, Spouses Emmanuel and Edna Chua,
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioners, Spouses Elpidio and
Amelia Apostol, in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Metro Manila. The
respondents alleged Luz B. Pascua was the owner of the parcel of land located in
Quezon City covered by TCT No. 198936 with an area of 315 square meters. She sold
a portion of the property to the respondents on July 8, 1976 for P45,548. On June 7,
1993, the Spouses Pascua executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property and the
improvements thereon in favor of the respondents. On the basis of the said deed, the
respondents were issued (TCT) No. 87610 over the property on June 8, 1993.
In the meantime, the petitioners filed a complaint against the respondents, the Spouses
Chua, the Spouses Pascua, and the Register of Deeds in the RTC of Quezon City, for
annulment of deed of sale and TCT No. 86338, and for reconveyance with
damages. The petitioners alleged that they had been in possession of the property
since 1973; their adverse claim over the property was annotated on June 20, 1979 as
Entry No. PE 8812; Luz Pascua died on December 2, 1984 but Paulo Pascua did not
inherit the property from her because the same had already been sold to the
respondents; Paulo Pascua executed a falsified affidavit for self-adjudication over the
property on the basis of which he was able to secure, on May 20, 1993, TCT No. 86338.
Issues: Who is entitled to the lawful possession of the subject property?
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405

Ruling: It is an accepted rule that a person who has a Torrens title over the property,
such as the respondents, is entitled to the possession thereof. As discussed in
the Pangilinan Case in Javelosa v. Court of Appeals, and declared that the registered
owners are entitled to the possession of the property covered by the said title from the
time such title was issued in their favor. Moreover, the fact that the respondents were
never in prior physical possession of the subject land is of no moment, as prior physical
possession is necessary only in forcible entry cases.
Article 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in
two different personalities except in cases of co-possession. Should a question
arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be
preferred, if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the
dates of the possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all
these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending
determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.
In this case, defendants were able to establish the fact that they have been in physical
and material possession of the subject premises from the time they purchased the
same from Luz B. Pascua on July 8, 1976. Defendants, therefore, are in possession of
the property in the concept of an owner, and under the law, a possessor in the concept
of an owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title
and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it (Art. 541, NCC).
Moreover, it is important to note that defendants purchased the subject premises from
Luz B. Pascua on July 8, 1976 while plaintiffs purchased the same from Paulo Pascua
only on June 4, 1993, a much later date. This is shown by the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Luz B. Pascua in favor of defendants on July 8, 1976 which is evidenced
by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Unsegregated Portion of Land executed by Luz B.
Pascua and Paulo Pascua in favor of the defendants on July 14, 1977 and a Deed of
Confirmation of Deed of Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Land with Waiver dated July 14,
1977 executed by Paulo Pascua .These documents put in doubtful validity the
subsequent sale of the same land by Paulo Pascua in favor of the plaintiffs. Paulo
Pascua had no right, therefore, to transfer ownership of the subject land to plaintiffs
because, Luz B. Pascua, the original owner, had already sold the same land to
defendants during her lifetime. And upon the death of Luz B. Pascua, Paulo Pascua had
no right to adjudicate the subject lot to himself because he even confirmed such sale
and waived any rights, interest and participation over the subject residential house and
lot in a Deed of Confirmation of Absolute Sale with Waiver dated July 14, 1977.
Topics: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Possessor v. Owner
LOLITA R. AYSON, petitioner, vs. MARINA ENRIQUEZ vda. DE CARPIO,
respondent.
G.R No. 152438, June 17, 2004
Facts: Petitioner was the owner of three (3) parcels of land in Manibang, Porac,
Pampanga and has been in possession of the aforesaid properties being the owner
thereof. On August 29, 1980, petitioner mortgaged said properties to the Philippine
National Bank, Angeles City Branch (Bank). These were subsequently foreclosed by the
Bank. After failing to redeem within the prescribed period, petitioners TCTs were
canceled and new ones were issued in the name of the Bank on May 14, 1985. On April
14, 1999, the Bank sold the property to the respondent herein and is now covered by
TCT No. 466519-R in favor of the respondent.
On October 22, 1999, petitioner filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City for the annulment of TCT No. [466519-R] and the deed of sale between
the Bank and the respondent as well as for reconveyance and damages. With said Civil
Case No. 9582 still pending, respondent, on January 3, 2000, sent demand letters dated
December 29, 1999 demanding petitioner to vacate the premises
15
Issues: 1,) Who has jurisdiction over the case; 2.) Who has a better right over the
property
Ruling: The trial brought to light the true nature of the right of possession of
respondent over the property, and the circumstances surrounding her
dispossession. The facts, as culled from the evidence presented by both parties,
unequivocally show that the instant case is one for unlawful detainer.
Respondent was able to present evidence showing that after the foreclosure of the
property, petitioner failed to redeem it within the redemption period. Thus, the latter
was divested of her ownership and right to retain possession thereof. Respondent
acquired a better right to possess the property after acquiring title to it through a sale
between her and the mortgagee-bank.
The CA correctly held that Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals was applicable to the
controversy. The continued occupation of the property by petitioner was merely
tolerated by respondent. Consequently, the former was bound by an implied promise
that she would vacate the premises upon demand. Her failure to do so justified
respondents action for ejectment filed in the MTC.
TOPIC: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Remedies of Person Deprived of
Possession
DANILO DUMO and SUPREMA DUMO, Petitioners, vs. ERLINDA ESPINAS,
JHEAN PACIO, PHOL PACIO, MANNY JUBINAL, CARLITO CAMPOS, and
SEVERA ESPINAS, Respondents.
G.R No. 141962, January 25, 2006
Facts: Spouses Dumo are the owners-possessors of a parcel of sandy beach resort in
Bauang, La Union. Severa J. Espinas filed a "Quieting of Title and/or Ownership and
Possession against spouses Sandy and Presnida Saldana, subject matter of the case
being the same resort. Although a decision has been rendered against the defendants
in the case against spouses Saldana, the same was not enforced.
Disgruntled with the refusal of the sheriff to put them in possession over the questioned
real property, and in open defiance with the official action taken by the sheriff, all
defendants acting for the interest of Espinas took it upon themselves, employing force,
intimidation, and threat, to enter the property.
Despite protests made by Spouses Dumo, who were there then present and visibly
outnumbered by defendants and their agents who were armed with sticks, bolos,
hammers, and other deadly weapons, successfully drove out plaintiffs, and took over
the premises.
Spouses Dumo prayed for the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages. The
MTC rendered judgment holding that petitioners were able to prove their right of
possession over the subject property. Respondents appealed the case to the RTC of
Bauang, La Union. The RTC reversed and set aside the Decision of the MTC. It also
ruled that as regards damages, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental
value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased
property.
Spouses Dumo filed a petition for review with the CA. The CA held that the MTC
correctly found that the petitioners were in possession of the subject land and agreed
with the ruling of the RTC that in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the only
damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of the property concerned.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the only damage that can be
recovered is the fair rental value for use of the property
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405

Ruling: No. The CA is correct. There is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral
and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only
damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of the property.
The reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is
that of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered are those
which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the
loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may
have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession.
Although the MTC’s order for the reimbursement to petitioners of their alleged lost
earnings over beach resort could have been considered as compensation for their loss
of the use and occupation of the property while it was in the possession of the
respondents, records do not show any evidence to sustain the same.
TOPIC: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Remedies of Person Deprived of
Possession
CGR CORPORATION herein represented by its President ALBERTO RAMOS,
III, HERMAN M. BENEDICTO and ALBERTO R. BENEDICTO, Petitioners,vs.
ERNESTO L. TREYES, JR., Respondent
G.R. No. 170916, April 27, 2007
FACTS: CGR Corporation, Herman M. Benedicto and Alberto R. Benedicto (petitioners)
claimed to have occupied 37.3033 hectares of public land
in Barangay Bulanon, SagayCity, Negros Occidental for 25 years.
However, Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr., with his men, forcibly entered the leased properties
and barricaded the entrance to the fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence along the
road going to CRG Corporation‘s fishponds, and harvested several tons of milkfish, fry
and fingerlings. It was alleged that the respondents also ransacked the church.
CGR filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Sagay City separate complaints for
Forcible Entry with Temporary Restraining Order with Preliminary Injunction and
Damages and reserved a separate civil action. The MTC found Treyes and his men
guilty of forcible entry.
CGR filed a separate complaint alleging therein that he suffered damages for the
actions of Treyes during and after the forcible entry. A claim for additional damages
which arose from incidents occurring after the dispossession by Treyes of the premises
was thereafter prayed for. The MTC awarded the claims of CGR.
RTC dismissed the complaint for damages on the ground of prematurity saying that
“damages may only be maintained after a final determination on the forcible entry
cases has been made.”
Issue: Whether or not a complainant in a forcible entry case can file an independent
action for damages arising after the act of dispossession had occurred even during
the pendency of their separate complaints for forcible entry.
RULING: YES, Corporation may institute a separate and independent complaint for
damages even during pendency of separate complaints for forcible entry, arising after
the act of dispossession had occurred based on the separate acts done after the
dispossession such as the stealing of fish and ransacking of the church.
16
As per Dumo v. Espinas, it was settled that the only form of damages that may be
recovered in an action for forcible entry is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the property.
This is because the only issue to be resolved in a case for forcible entry is rightful
possession and the only damages one could recover from such action for forcible
entry is that which the plaintiff could have had if he was still the possessor of the
property. The only damages you can get is what you lost when you are deprived of
material possession. Everything else should be claimed by ordinary action.
The respondents assert their claim by citing Progressive Development Corporation v.
CA. However, this case is different from Progressive Development Corporation v. CA in
which the claim for damages separate from forcible entry with damages was dismissed
on the ground of litis pendentia (identity between two pending actions with respect to
rights asserted, reliefs prayed for, is such that when judgment is done on one, res
judicata will result in the remaining action or simply put, two cases are so similar that
judgment of one will render affect the other decision considerably).
In Progressive Development Corporation case, the separate action for damages is
based on the alleged forcible takeover of the leased premises by the petitioner in that
case while the action for forcible entry with damages is an action claiming for damages
for the loss sustained by the plaintiff. Basically, the damages asked for are from the
same injury in the forcible entry case (they are both for the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property).
In the present case, the damages asked for in the forcible entry case is based on the
dispossession while the action for damages is based on acts done AFTER dispossession
such as the carting away of fish and the ransacking of the church.
Hence, order of the RTC is reversed and set aside.
TOPIC: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Remedies of Person Deprived of
Possession
WILMON AUTO SUPPLY CORPORATION, ILOILO MULTI PARTS SUPPLY
CORP., VIRGILIO ANG, SOUTHERN SALES CORP. and CHANG LIANG, JR.,
petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and STAR GROUP RESOURCES
AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 97637, April 10, 1992
FACTS: Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation (or Ramon Que), Iloilo, Multi Parts Supply
Corporation (or Ramon Que), Virgilio Ang, Henry Tan, Southern Sales Corporation, and
Chang Liang, Jr. were lessees of a commercial building and bodegas standing on
registered land in Iloilo City owned in common by Lucy A. Solinap, Fr. Jerry R. Locsin,
Lourdes C. Locsin, Manuel C. Locsin and Ester L. Jarantilla. After the expiration of the
period in the lease agreement, lessor executed an Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of
Star Group Resources and Development.
In the Deed of Sale, it was stated that vendee shall henceforth deal with the lessees
and occupants of the properties herein sold without any further warranty or obligation
on the part of the Vendors.
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405

Being the vendee, Star Group then filed an action of unlawful detainer against Wilmon
Auto Supply.
Petitioner refused to concede invoking that the lessors violated their leasehold rights
because they were not accorded with: 1) rights of pre-emption; 2) buyer is not
required to honor leases; 3) the lessees were denied the option to renew
their leases upon the expiration thereof.
These same propositions were also raised in the case it filed with the RTC. In the
unlawful detainer cases, it was decided by the MTC that the case should proceed
against some of the lessees but not with the others. The lessees filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied. They filed a petition for certiorari and the RTC held
in the end that the pendency of the case in the RTC did not warrant suspension of the
unlawful detainer case with the MTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the unlawful detainer suits in MTC against petitioner, lessees,
for the reason that their lease had expired, should be abated by the action filed in RTC
by lessees based on the contention that they are entitled to a right of pre-emption/prior
purchase of the leased premises.
RULING: No, an ejectment suit cannot be suspended by an action filed with the RTC
based on a tenant’s claim of his right of pre-emption being violated.
The Court gave relevant precedents such as:
 injunction suits do not abate ejectment
 accionpubliciana does not suspend an ejectment suit
 writ of possession does not bar execution of judgment
 action for quieting title does not bar an ejectment suit.
The reason for the above rulings of the precedence were that the actions in the
Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession, and on not a few
occasions, that the case in the RTC was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the
ejectment proceeding or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily
be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved.
SC said that the cases cited by the petitioners were exceptions such as in Vda. De
Legazpi v. Avendano case, it was based on strong reasons of equity not found in the
present petition. In Vda. De Murga v. Chan, the essential requisite of an unequivocal
demand to vacate and surrender the premises had not been fulfilled.
SC stressed that in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the MTC, MeTC and MCTC have the
competence to resolve “the issue of ownership....only to determine the issue of
possession.” Hence, Petition was dismissed
TOPIC: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Remedies of Person Deprived of
Possession
JOSE DE LUNA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SANTIAGO G.
MALIWANAG, RTC EXECUTIVE JUDGE, BRANCH 71, IBA, ZAMBALES; JUAN
DIMAANO, JR. and GERINO DOBLE, respondents.
G.R. 94490, August 6, 1992
FACTS: De Luna filed a case for forcible entry, alleging that he is the owner of an
unregistered parcel of land in San Juan, Zambales since 1938. However, on December
18 and 19 1971 Daclison et al (Daclison, Crispin, Doble and Dimaano) entered the land
17
and began plowing it and even fenced the land with barbed wire and began planting
sugar cane.
Petitioners prayed that the defendants be ordered to vacate the land and pay him the
amount of P45.00 monthly per hectare until possession thereof would be transferred
to him, with litigation expenses and costs.
Defendants denied the allegations in the complaint. Daclison, Crispin and Doble deny
ever entering the and occupying the disputed property. Dimaano for his part claimed
that De Luna was not the owner of the property, it was owned by Dequina who had
declared the property in his name for taxation. It was alleged that when Dequina died,
his son took over and leased the property to Dimaano. Dequina is actually the uncle of
De Luna.
MTC ruled in favor of De Luna. RTC revered the decision of the MTC, CA affirmed RTC
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Luna is entitled to the possession of the property
RULING: Yes, De Luna is entitled to the possession.
Well-established is the rule in ejectment cases that the only issue to be resolved therein
is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises, or possession
de facto, independent of any claim of ownership that either party may set forth in their
pleadings. If petitioner can prove prior possession in himself, he may recover such
possession from even the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior
possession, if he has in his favor priority time, he has the security that entitles him
to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by
either accionpubliciana or accionreindivicatoria.
Dimaano may have claimed to possess the property by virtue of a lease agreement by
the alleged owner, but the RTC is wrong to conclude that Dequina owns the subject
property.
De Luna proved through substantia evidence that he had prior possession of the
property and established by witnesses, notably by his own tenants (possession by
Dilag, his lessee, can be proven since 1953 and since possession can be exercised in
the name of another, it positively redounds to De Luna)
Witnesses also state that De Luna has cultivated the land from 1938 to 1941 with his
mother and leased the property to the witness
On the other hand, Dimaano failed to prove DequinaJr’sprior possession, much less
ownership over the land. The mere fact that Dequina Sr. declared the property for
taxation purposes does not constitute possession.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Agustin Dequiña, Jr. was the owner
of the disputed property since there is no evidence whatsoever to support such a
conclusion.
However, it goes without saying that this case does not bar petitioner and Agustin
Dequiña, Jr. from resolving the issue of ownership over the disputed property in an
appropriate proceeding. Hence, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Costs against private respondents.
TOPIC: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Remedies of Person Deprived of
Possession
MIGUEL SEMIRA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BUENAVENTURA
AN, respondents.
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405

G.R. No. 76031, 2 March 1994
Facts:
Lot 4221of petitionerSemira, the subject parcel of the present controversy, was once
owned by private respondent Buenaventura An. Private respondent previously acquired
the subject parcel from a certain Juana Gutierrez for P850.00 bymeans of a "Kasulatan
ng Bilihan ng Lupa" executed on 4 January 1961. Aside from the estimated area of
822.5 square meters appearing in the deed of sale, the boundaries of the lot were also
stated.
Buenaventura An sold the same to his nephew, Cipriano Ramirez, in 1972 for the lump
sum of P2,500.00 also by means of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" whichlikewise
incorporated both the estimated area and the definite boundaries of the land. Cipriano
Ramirez, in turn, sold the lot to petitionerSemira in 1979 with the very same boundaries
mentioned in the deed of sale executed in his favor by his uncle Buenaventura
An.However, the area stated in the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" was 2,200 square
meters and not 822.5 appearing in the previous document. As delimited by its
boundaries, the lot is actually much bigger than 822.5 square meters. This was
confirmed by the Taysan Cadastral Mapping Survey conducted in 1974 where it is
definitely stated that the area of Lot 4221 is 2,200 square meters; hence, the reason
for the change.
On 17 March 1979, petitionerSemira entered the subject parcel and began the
construction of a new rice-mill. However, on 18 April 1979, a complaint for forcible
entry was filed against him by Buenaventura An in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Taysan-Lobo. The latter claimed that the area of Lot 4221 was 822.5 square meters
only and that the excess of 1,377 square meters forcibly occupied by petitioner formed
part of the land he owned. Private respondent insists that he only sold 822.5 square
meters, hence, his nephew could not have transferred a bigger area to petitioner.On
the other hand, petitionerSemira claims that he owns the entire 2,200 square meters
since it is the size of Lot 4221following its established boundaries.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the question of ownership is so necessarily involved that it
would be impossible to decide the question of bare possession without first
setting that of ownership.
2. Whether or not petitioner Semira’s ejectment from the disputed area, despite
the absence of clear and indubitable proof that private respondent had prior
physical possession, was proper; and
Ruling: 1. In the instant case, the issue of possession cannot be decide independently
of the question of ownership. The question of who has prior possession hinges on the
question of who the real owner of the disputed portion is. And the latter, in turn,
depends on whether such portion is part of Buenaventura An’s property or that of Lot
4221 of petitioner Semira.
We sustain petitioner Semira’s contention that he owns the entire 2,200 square meters
since it is the size of Lot 4221 following its established boundaries. We have repeatedly
ruled that where land is sold for a lump sum and not so much per unit of measure or
number, the boundaries of the land stated in the contract determine the effects and
scope of the sale, not the area thereof. Hence, the vendors are obligated to deliver all
the land included within the boundaries, regardless of whether the real area should be
greater or smaller than that recited in the deed. This is particularly true where the area
is described as" humigitkumulang," that is, more or less.
Hence, when private respondent Buenaventura An sold Lot 4221 to his nephew Cipriano
Ramirez by means of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" which incorporated both the
area and the definite boundaries of the lot, the former transferred not merely the 822.5
square meters stated in their document of sale but the entire area circumscribed within
its boundaries.
18
2. No, the ejectment for forcible entry was not proper, absent any clear and indubitable
proof that private respondent had prior physical possession.
Considering the facts established in this case, it is not difficult to sustain petitioner
Semiraover private respondent Buenaventura Anwhen the latter failed even to prove
prior possession in his favor. Absent such element, it cannot be said that he was forcibly
deprived of the disputed portion. Hence, his action for forcible entry must fail.
It should be emphasized, however, that the case before us is merely an action of
forcibleentry and that the issue of ownership was decided for the sole purpose of
resolving priority of possession. Hence, any pronouncement made affecting ownership
of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar
nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land
TOPIC: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Remedies of Person Deprived of
Possession
JOSE REYNANTE, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
HON. VALENTIN CRUZ, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Bulacan,
Branch VIII, and the HEIRS OF LEONCIO CARLOS and DOLORES A.
CARLOS, and HEIRS OF GORGONIO CARLOS and CONCEPCION CARLOS,
respondents.
G.R. No. 95907, 8 April 1992
Facts: More than 50 years ago, petitioner Jose Reynante was taken as tenant by the
late Don Cosme Carlos, owner and father-in-law of herein private respondents, over a
fishpond.
During the tenancy, petitioner Jose Reynante constructed a nipa hut where he and his
family lived and took care of the nipa palms (sasahan) he had planted on lots 1 and 2
covering. These lots are located between the fishpond and the Liputan (formerly
Meycauayan) River.Petitioner harvested and sold said nipa palms without interference
and prohibition from anybody.
After the death of Don Cosme Carlos, his heirs (private respondents' predecessors-
ininterest) entered into a written agreement denominated as with petitioner Jose
Reynantewhereby the latter for and in consideration of the sum of P200,000.00 turned
over the fishpond he was tenanting to the heirs of Don Cosme Carlos and surrendered
all his rights therein as caretaker.
Pursuant to the said written agreement, petitioner surrendered the fishpond and the
two huts located therein to private respondents. Private respondents thereafter leased
the said fishpond to one Carlos de la Cruz. Petitioner continued to live in the nipa hut
constructed by him on lots 1 and 2 and to take care of the nipa palms he had planted
therein.
On February 17, 1988, private respondents formally demanded that the petitioner
vacate said portion since according to them petitioner had already been indemnified
for the surrender of his rights as a tenant. Despite receipt thereof, petitioner refused
and failed to relinquish possession of lots 1 and 2. Hence, on April 22, 1988, private
respondents filed a complaint for forcible entry with preliminary mandatory injunction
against petitioner alleging that the latter by means of strategy and stealth, took over
the physical, actual and material possession of lots 1 and 2 by residing in one of the
kubos or huts bordering the Liputan River and cutting off and/or disposing of the sasa
or nipa palms adjacent thereto.
Issues:
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405

1. Who between the petitioner and privaterespondents has prior physical
possession of lots 1 and 2; and
2. Whether or not thedisputed lots belong to private respondents as a result of
accretion.
Ruling: 1.Petitioner has clearly proven that he had prior possession over lots 1 and 2.
An action for forcible entry is merely a quieting process and actual title of the property
is never determined. A party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior
possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him
to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right
by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria
On the other hand, if a plaintiff cannot prove prior physical possession, he has no right
of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the property.
The evidence on record shows that petitioner was in possession of the questioned lots
formore than 50 years. It is undisputed that he was the caretaker of the fishpond
owned by the late Don Cosme Carlos for more than 50 years and that he constructed
a nipa hut adjacent to the fishpond and planted nipa palms therein. In addition, as
culled from the records, what was surrendered to the plaintiffs was the fishpond and
not the'sasahan' or the land on which he constructed his hut where he now lives.
2. No, the disputed lots do not automatically belong to private respondents by
accretion.
Assuming private respondents had acquired the alluvial deposit (the lot in question),
byaccretion, still their failure to register said accretion for a period of fifty (50) years
subjected said accretion to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
It is undisputed that petitioner has been in possession of the subject lots for more
thanfifty (50) years and unless private respondent can show a better title over the
subject lots,petitioner's possession over the property must be respected.
TOPIC: EFFECTS OF POSSESSION; Remedies of Person Deprived of
Possession
SPS. REV. ELMER J. BAÑES & ANGELA BAÑES, SPS. REV. MANUEL DEL
ROSARIO & GUIA DEL ROSARIO, and SPS. PEDRO SAN RAMON & NENITA
SAN RAMON, Petitioners, vs. LUTHERAN CHURCH IN THE PHILIPPINES,
OSCAR ALMAZAN, JAMES CERDENOLA, LUIS AO-AS, EDWINO MERCADO,
ANTONIO REYES and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 142308, 15 November 2005
Facts: On August 16, 1990, certain members of the Lutheran Church in the Philippines
(LCP) filedan action against its President, Thomas Batong, and six other members of
the Board of Directors, before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for
accounting and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction and appointment of a
management committee. This resulted in the division of the LCP into two factions,
namely: the Batong/Saguilayan group which includes herein petitioners and the
Ladlad/Almazan group which includes herein respondents.
By virtue of an injunction issued by SEC, herein respondents, with the aid ofcertain
members of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Philippine
National Police (PNP), and Sheriff Primo Alimurong of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Manila, tried to dispossess petitioners, as previous clergymen and occupants of the
residential houses owned by LCP and form part of the compound where the principal
19
office of LCP is located.Petitioners however refused to leave the same. Thus, the main
gate of the subject property was padlocked by respondents, preventing the petitioners
and their families from going in and out of said place. Security guards were also
stationed at the premises with an instruction not to allow petitioners entry and exit.
Almost a month thereafter, or on September 9, 1993, petitioners Manuel G. Del
Rosarioand Elmer J. Bañes wrote letters addressed to Rev. Eduardo Ladlad, as LCP
President expressing their intention to leave the premises. Petitioners Bañes and Del
Rosario eventually left the premises; however, petitioners-spouses SanRamon did not
write any letter but they were able to leave the premises by befriending theguards
posted at the gate.
On December 3, 1993, petitioners filed an action for forcible entry with prayer for
issuanceof temporary restraining order and preliminary mandatory injunction against
the respondents herein.Petitioners claim that they had been in possession of the
subject premises long before the SEC case was filed and it was only because petitioners
refused to recognize the duly constituted boardof directors that they were made to
suffer by being taken out of the house they had long been occupying. They further
claim that the respondents, together with several armed security guards, forcibly took
possession of the residential houses, occupied by petitioners, and evicted petitioners
therefrom.
On the other hand, respondents assert that petitioners did not possess the subject
propertiesin their own right but as mere agents and/or representatives of the
respondent LCP, thus, they never had any cause of action to file a case for forcible
entry. Respondents also assert that the dispossession of the petitioners was effected
without force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, and that petitioners were willing
to voluntarily leave the subject premises and merely requested for an extension of their
stay therein, showing there was no force, intimidation or stealth.
Issue: Whether petitioners were removed from the premises by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth.
Ruling: Petitioners were removed from the premises by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth.
There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land
or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In such cases,
the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has
the prior possession de facto. In filing forcible entry cases, the law tells us that two
allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: first, the
plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the property, and second, he must
also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in
Section 1, Rule 70 of theRules of Court i.e., by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth. It is also settled that in the resolution thereof, what is important is determining
who is entitled to the physical possession of the property.Indeed, any of the parties
who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the
owner himselfsince such cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership and
the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation
thereof.
In order to constitute force that would justify a forcible entry case, the trespasser does
nothave to institute a state of war. The act of going to the property and excluding the
lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property
which is all that is necessary and sufficient to show that the action is based on the
provisions of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405

Clearly in the instant case, the presence of the security guards in the subject property
restricting petitioners' mobilityconstitutes force contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court.
It is true that petitioners Bañes and Del Rosario wrote LCP expressing their willingness
tovoluntarily vacate the premises upon finding another place to live in, but this is after
respondents had padlocked the premises and used armed men to prevent their coming
to and from the premises. Otherwise stated, said letters do not negate the initial use
of force by respondents which constituted forcible entry. It is undisputed that
respondents owned the property occupied by petitioners, still their use of force in
evicting petitioners therefrom was not justified.
Indeed, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in
peaceablequiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror.
The owner who has title over the property cannot take the law into his own hands to
regainpossession of said property. He must go to court.
TOPIC: POSSESSION AS A BASIS FOR ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP
FLORENCIO BALATERO and HEIRS OF JOSEFA BADELLES, petitioners, ]vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and JUAN VELOSO, respondents.GR
73889 September 30, 1982
FACTS: Property in dispute was originally owned by parents of Josefa and
AlejoIglupas. After death of parents, the lot was given to Alejo and his wife Tomasa.
After Alejo died, Tomasa sold the lot t Josefa and her husband Juan Badelles.
On June 9, 1930, Josefa mortgaged the property to Juan Veloso in order to secure a
loan. (Loan was paid in 1947). On April 30, 1954, Josefa and her children sold a portion
of the lot to petitioner Florencio
Balatero.
During the court proceeding for the lots in dispute, the trial court finds Balatero and
heors of Badelles as registrable owners over the lots as they had title over the lots.Juan
Veloso appealed the decision and so IAC reversed lower court’s decision adjudicating
the entire lot to respondent finding tha the contract was a contract of sale of the land.
ISSUE: Was the contract that of a contract of sale or an equitable mortgage?
RULING: Juan Veloso's contract with Josefa was that of an equitable mortgage and
not of sale.SC said that the price consideration to Veloso of P68 was unusually
inadequate when the same parcel of land was bought by Josefa herself from Tomasa
for P111. If the contract was indeed of sale then why did Josefa sell it for a price almost
half of what she laid for 12 years earlier? This fact shows that the contract was an
equitable mortgage than a contract of sale.
As such, Veloso was merely a holder and so even if he executed an affidavit to
consolidate his right of ownership over the land 4 years after executionof contract, it
was of no use because the constructive possession over the parcel of land did not ripen
into ownership because the contract was an equitable mortgage and not contract of
sale.
TOPIC: POSSESSION AS A BASIS FOR ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF ISABEL TESALONA and the
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
GR 66130 September8, 1994
20
FACTS: Isabel, Consuelo, and Serapia were sisters who filed a petition to register 6
parcels of land under their name. The land has an area of 10,481 sq m. The same was
inherited by them from their parents who acquired the same from Spanish grant. The
sisters showed possessory information. The lower court ruled in their favor but only
awarded 4 parcels of land. Parcel no. 1 and 2 were not yet decided upon as there was
a separate case involving one Constanciodela Pena Tan. The heirs appealed to have
lots 1 & 2 be included.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs have rights over lots 1 & 2.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court noted that they do not even have rights over the other
parcels of land (but no need to disturb ruling as it was not appealed for by the Director
of Lands). The original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for was not submitted in
evidence by the heirs. Such omission is fatal to their application as the submission of
the original tracing cloth plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. While
a blue print of survey Plan Psu 215382 (lot 1) was presented before the trial court, the
same falls short of the mandatory requirement of law.
The basis of the claim of the Heirs of Tesalona is a Spanish title, a possessory
information title issued on May 20, 1896 to Maria Rosita Lorenzo pursuant to the Royal
Decree of February 13, 1894 for 1.0481 hectares (but the actual land area being applied
for (lot 1) was 7000+ sq m. But the heirs did not submit the original of the possessory
information title. What was submitted was an unclear, illegible copy of a Spanish
document purporting to be the title evidencing the land grant of 1896. Moreover, proof
of loss or unavailability of the original document as required by Section 5, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court was not established thus, rendering admissibility of the said
secondary evidence questionable and dubious. PD 982 was also in effect which
mandated Spanish titles to be registered but the heirs never registered the same
(purpose of the law was to avoid falsified titles after the war).
TOPIC: INDICIA OF OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION
RESURRECCION BARTOLOME, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT (now Court of Appeals) and HEIRS OF SPOUSES
BERNABE BARTOLOME and URSULA CID, respondents.
GR 76792 March 12, 1990
FACTS: The lot in dispute is originally owned by EpitacioBitara and Maria Gonzales.
The lot is located in Laoag, IlocosNorte has 725 square meters with Lot No. 11165
under tax declaration no. 5708, bounded by the propert of Pedro Manuel in the North,
the road in the east, property of Esteban in the West and property of DoroteoBartolome
in the South.
The tax declaration of the lot was superseded by Tax declaration no 37576 on April 23,
1914 already containing an area of 772 square meters with improvements thereon.
Epistacio and his wife Maria had 2 children: Catalina and Pedro, Pedro died a bachelor
while Catalina married a certain surnamed Bartolome bore five children named Isabela,
Tarcila, Calixto, Resurreccion and Ruperta.
In 1912, Epistacio left Laog and settled in Isabela and entrusted his lot to
DoroteoBartolome who owned the adjacent lot in the South. Maria on the other hand
remained in the lot before she followed her husband in Isabela. In 1916, Epistacio died
in Isabela. Five years later, Maria, with her grandchildren: Calixto and Resurrection
(Petitioner) returned to Laoag and found out that their house situated in the lot they
owned was destroyed by fire, thus, they boarded someone else’s house. Calixto built a
bamboo fence around his grandfather’s lot while Resurreccion returned to Isabela in
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405

1926 when her grandmother (Maria G.) died. In the same year Doroteo went to Davao
City and died there after 2 years.
Thereafter, Director of Land instituted a cadastral proceeding over the lot (Cadastral
No. 53). In 1933, Ursula Cid (decendent of the Respondent), the widow of
Bernabe (the son of Doroteo) files an answer in the cadastral case claiming ownership
over the lot alleging an area of 1660 square meters through inheritance.
In 1934, Resurrection also filed an answer in the same cadastral proceeding claiming
ownership over the lot with an area of 864 square meters (take note on the difference
in the area of lot claimed by Ursula). Resurrection alleged that the lot was inherited
from her grandparents.
While no further proceedings were held thereon, Resurrection entrusted the portion
she claimed to MARIA BARTOLOME (daughter of Doroteo).
In 1939, Ursula and her children migrated to Davao City leasing the lot she claimed to
a certain Severino Ramos. She instructed Maria B. to receive the rentals and to pay
taxes to the property. Dominador (son of Ursula) took over the task, but on 1950,
Philippine United Trading Inc. rented the property until the company was burned down
in 1968. The rentals of the property were given to Dominador. Resurrection, who was
at that time living in Isabela received 50 pesos from Maria in consideration of the lease
contract.
In 1968, CFI of Ilocos sent a notice for the continuation of the hearing. A year later,
Maria filed a motion to intervene alleging co-ownership with Ursula since she is one of
the child of DoroteoBartolome (Daghanniog children siDoroteo, si Maria B. langangni
represent). Ursula buttress the claim of Maria alleging that she and her husband
purchased the lot. She presented 3 deed of sales: [a] dated 1917, purchasing 374 sq.
m. from Doming Augustin, [b] 1913, from IgnaciaManrique and [c] from Maria Gonzales
(take note, grandmother nisiyani Resurrection ogmaonisiyaanggi claim ni Resurrection)
in 1917 for 772 sq. m. of lot for 103.75 pesos.
RTC Decision: In 1984, The RTC only entertained the answers filed by Resurrection
and Ursula, it rendered a decision in favor of Resurrection. RTC ruled that the deed of
sale executed by Maria Gonzales in favor of Ursula has no probative value and is
incomplete and undersigned. The possession of Ursula over the proper was also
interrupted and merely tolerated during the pendency of the case. Thus, no ownership
conferred upon Ursula.
IAC Decision: IAC reversed the ruling of RTC. IAC ruled that the document presented
by Ursula was an ancient document covered under Section 22, Rule 132 of the ROC.
Further ruled, that ownership over it was vested with the legal presumption that she
possessed it with just title.
ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not the provisions of Rule 132 is applicable with respect to
the deed of sale in question? 2.) Whether or not acquisitive prescription runs during
the pendency of the cadastral proceeding?
HELD: 1.NO, it was not applicable. The deed of sale presented consists of 3 pieces of
paper. The first page; is blank, apparently serves as a cover page. The second page;
stated therein the consideration of the sale in the amount of 103.75 pesos sold by
Maria Paguyo to Sps. Bernabe and Ursula. The third page; contains the warranty
against eviction and the execution date of the instrument.
Dominador (the heir/son of Ursula) testified that when he was 11 years old, he saw
the FOUTH PAGE of the document containing the signature of Maria Gonzales. It was
also entrusted to him by his mother in 1947. However, the 4th page was lost during the
21
Japanese Occupation. Dominador presented in the court a sworn statement executed
by Ursula in 1937 declaring that the sale was evidenced by a written document; that it
was transferred in the name of her husband, that she was paying taxes thereon and
that they had been in continuous possession of the lot for more than. 30 years.
Rule 132 provides that:
Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary. – Where a private writing is
more than 30 years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally
be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances
of suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authority need be given.
In this case, it appeared that the document was executed in 1917, it was more than
30 years when it was offered as an evidence in 1983. It was also presented in the court
by the proper custodian (Dominador, the heir of Ursula). However, the IAC failed to
consider and discuss THAT NO ALTERATION OR CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUSPICION ARE
PRESENT.
On its face, the document appeared without alteration, but the MISSING PAGE,
nonetheless affected the authenticity of the document. The signature is a vital proof in
the voluntary transmission of rights over the sale of the lot. IT’S INCOMPLETENESS IS
FAR MORE WORSE THAN A DOCUMENT WITH AN ALTERED CONTENT (char sad sa SC
uy.)
Moreover, the genuineness of the document is also suspicious. The sale was executed
in 1917. Ursula would have had it in her possession in 1933 when she answered the
cadastral proceeding. But it turned out, she only claimed that purchase was the mode
of acquisition of the lot after he sister in law (MARIA BARTOLOME) sought the
intervention in the proceeding allrging co-ownership.
ALL OF THE ABOVE CIRCUMSTANCES NEGATES THE CONCLUSION OF THE APPELEATE
COURT THAT THE DOCUMENT IS COVERED UNDER THE RULES IN ANCEINT
DOCUMENT.
The Supreme Court also discussed that even if rules of ancient document would apply,
it is still infirm. Under article 834 of the OLD CIVIL CODE, Maria Gonzales, as a surviving
spouse, shall be entitled to a portion IN USUFRUCT equal to that corresponding by way
of legitime to each of the legitimate children or descendants who has not received any
betterment, until it had been determined by means of liquidation of the deceased
spouse’s estate that a portion of the conjugal property remained after all the debts and
obligations had been paid. Hence, in the absent of proof that the estate of Epitacio
(deceased spouse of Maria G.) had been settled, Maria G. has no right to sell not even
the portion of the lot in dispute in this case.
2. No, SC holds that the institution of the cadastral proceeding, or atleast the
publication of notice, has the effect of suspending the running of prescriptive period.
IAC erred in ruling acquisitive prescription in favour of Ursula.
Neither Ursula can assert that acquisitive prescription was already in effect before the
institution of the cadastral proceeding because Bernabe (husband of Ursula) declared
the lot 11165 as his own only on 1925. The cadastral proceeding started in 1933. It
fell short of the 10 years actual, adverse and uninterrupted period of possession.
OTHERS:
Payment of taxes (as declared by Ursula during the pendency of the cadastral case)
does not prove ownership. It merely is an indicium of a claim of ownership.
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405

WHEREFORE, IAC decision was reversed and set aside. The eastern portion of Lot.
11165 with an area of 772 sq. m. was adjudicated in favor to the heirs of Epitacio while
the remaining area is hereby adjudicated in favour to the heirs of Doroteo.
TOPIC: INDICIA OF OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION
FRANCISCO M. ALONSO, substituted by his heirs, petitioners, vs. CEBU
COUNTRY CLUB, INC., respondent.
GR 130876 January 21, 2002
FACTS: Petitioner Francisco Alonso, who died pendente lite and substituted by his legal
heirs, was the only son and sole heir of the late Tomas Alonso and Asuncion Medalle.
Sometime in 1992, petitioner discovered documents and records showing that his
father acquired Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the Government of
the Philippine Islands in or about the year 1911 in accordance with the Friar Lands Act
(Act No. 1120). The documents showed that the original vendee of the subject lot
assigned his sales certificate to petitioner's father, who completed the required
installment payments thereon under Act No. 1120 and was consequently issued a
patent. The Director of Lands executed a final deed of sale in favor of petitioner's
father. However, the deed was not registered with the Register of Deeds because of
lack of technical requirements as required by law.
Upon investigation of the status of the land, petitioner found out that the title of Lot
No. 727 had been administratively reconstituted from the owner's duplicate under a
Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of United Service Country Club, Inc.,
predecessor of Cebu Country Club, Inc. Upon order of the court, the name of the
registered owner in the said TCT was changed to Cebu Country Club, Inc.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, a complaint for declaration of nullity and
non-existence of deed/title, cancellation of certificates of title and recovery of property
against defendant Cebu Country Club, Inc. which the trial court decided in favor of the
defendant. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: Who has the better right over the said lot?
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that neither Tomas Alonso nor his son petitioner
Francisco Alonso, or the latter's heirs, are the lawful owners of Lot No. 727 in dispute.
The petitioner was not able to secure a Torrens title, in fact the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources declined their application.
Neither has the respondent Cebu Country Club, Inc. been able to establish a clear title
over the contested estate. The reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of a
lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition. It does not determine
or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. A
reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest ownership
of the land or estate covered thereby.
TOPIC: INDICIA OF OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF DEMOCRITO O. PLAZA , respondents.
G.R. No. 146874, July 20, 2006
FACTS: Subject property was first owned by Santos de la Cruz who declared this under
Tax Declaration for the year 1913; 1917; and 1921. Property was successively bought
by Pedro Cristobal, Regino Gervacio, Diego Calugdan and Gil Alhambra. To evidence
their respective acquisition of the property in question, Tax Declaration 1923; 1927,
22
and for 1934. After Gil Alhambra died, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned the property
and declared it in their names under Tax Declaration for the year 1960
On 5 July 1966, the heirs executed a "Deed of Sale With Mortgage" deeding the subject
property to petitioner appellee. After the sale, Plaza took possession and paid the taxes
due for the years 1966 up to 1986, and in 1985 declared it in his name under Tax
Declaration. He appointed Mauricio Plaza and Jesus Magcanlas as the administrator
and caretaker, respectively. Due to losses, the property in question was cultivated only
for a while—Five (5) years according to Mauricio Plaza, and from 1966 up to 1978
according to Jesus Magcanlas
On 14 November 1986, Plaza filed a petition for the registration and confirmation of
his title over the property. ON 24 February 1988, the Republic opposed because (1)
Plaza and his predecessors-in-interest have not been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945 or
prior thereto; (2) the muniment of title and tax declarations as well as tax payments
relied upon do not constitute sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land
by petitioner-appellee and of his open, continuous possession and occupation thereof
in the concept of owner since 12 June 1945, or prior thereto, and (3) the subject
property pertains to the public domain and is not subject to private appropriation.
Others who opposed the decision:
 Heirs of Santos de la Cruz argue that: (1) their PII, Santos de la Cruz, is the
'primitive owner'; and, (2) he, his heirs, and upon their tolerance, some other
persons have been in OCEN possession of the land in question since time
immemorial until the present
 Kadakilaan Estate contends that: (1) by reason of its Titulo de Propiedad de
Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree with approved plans registered under the
Torrens System and petitioner-appellee or his predecessors-in-interest have
not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945 or earlier
Republic contended that the land in question had been withdrawn from the alienable
portion of the public domain pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 679 issued on
January 7, 1991, almost 6 months prior to the issuance of the TC’s decision.
On 3 January 1991 Proclamation No. 679 was issued by the President withdrawing the
subject property from sale or settlement and reserve for slum improvement and sites
and services program
On 31 May 1991 Plaza filed his memorandum. Only the Republic and the Heirs of Santos
de la Cruz offered their evidence.
CA Decision: affirmed the decision confirming Plaza's title over Rel. Plan 1059, which
is the relocation plan of Psu-97886
ISSUE: Whether or not Plaza has a registrable title over the property sought to be
titled
HELD: Plaza and his PII have acquired and have been in OCEN possession of the
subject property for a period of 30 years under a bona fide claim of ownership
Proof:
1. tax declarations of his predecessors-in-interest
2. the deed of sale,
3. tax payment receipts and
4. own tax declarations.
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405

Plaza had introduced some improvements on the subject property from the time he
purchased it. His witnesses testified that he developed the subject property into a
ricefield and planted it with rice, but only for about five years because the return on
investment was not enough to sustain the continued operation of the riceland. Though
not in the category of permanent structures, the preparation of the land into a ricefield
and planting it with rice are considered 'improvements'.
Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept
of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not
in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all
other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
The issuance of the proclamation did not have any effect on the subject property as
the proclamation only withdrew it from sale or settlement and reserved the same for
slum improvement and sites and services program, but subject to actual survey and
existing private rights. The proclamation did not prohibit the registration of title of one
who claims, and proves, to be the owner
Registration does not vest title. It is merely evidence of such title.
When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by
operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity
of a certificate of title being issued. The Torrens system was not established as a means
for the acquisition of title to private land, as it merely confirms, but does not confer
ownership.
Plaza has proven his claim of ownership over the subject property. As provided in the
proclamation itself, his ownership of the subject property must be respected and he
cannot be barred from having the land titled in his name. This does not contravene or
negate the intention of the proclamation. Besides, its implementing Letters of
Instruction recognize that there may be lands declared included in the Slum
Improvement Resettlement (SIR) program that are privately owned.
TOPIC: INDICIA OF OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION
FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUEÑA and RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO,
petitioners, vs. HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE, respondent.
GR 137944 April 6, 2000
FACTS: On October 15, 1975, respondent HonorataBolante and Miguel Mendoza,
brother of petitioners, had a dispute on the ownership of the land during the cadastral
survey. Because of this dispute, herein petitioners filed a civil case against respondent
claiming ownership and possession of the parcel of land in question.
During the pre-trial conference, parties stipulated the following facts:
1. The land subject of the case was formerly declared for taxation purposes in
the name of Sinforoso Mendoza prior to 1954 but isnow declared in the name
of Margarito Mendoza.
2. The parties agree[d] as to the identity of the land subject of instant case.
3. [Petitioners] are the daughters of Margarito Mendoza while the [respondent]
is the only daughter of Sinforoso Mendoza.
4. Margarito Mendoza and Sinforoso Mendoza [were] brothers, now deceased.
23
5. During the cadastral survey of the property on October 15, 1979 there was
already a dispute between Honorata M. Bolante and Miguel Mendoza, brother
of [petitioners].
6. [Respondent was] occupying the property in question.
ISSUE: The only issue involved [was] who [was] the lawful owner and possessor of
the land subject of the case.
RULING: The Supreme Court found the petition not meritorious. The Court ruled that
the appellate court was correct in not giving credence to the affidavit presented by the
petitioner for the reason that it cannot be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule
under the dead man's statute. Likewise, the affidavit cannot be considered an ancient
document as the petitioner failed to explain how the purported signature of one of the
respondents could have been affixed as she was an illiterate woman who had never
had any formal schooling.
Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father
claimed the land. But by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner —
public, peaceful, and uninterrupted— had already ripened into ownership. Furthermore
she herself, after her father's demise, declared and paid realty taxes for the disputed
land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof
of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through
prescription.
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did
not acquire ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere
occupation. Unless coupled with the element of hostility toward the true owner,
occupation and use, however long, will not confer title by prescription or adverse
possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that their possession was public,
peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their father and brother arguably acquired
ownership through extraordinary prescription because of their adverse possession for
thirty-two years (1953-1985), this supposed ownership cannot extend to the entire
disputed lot, but must be limited to the portion that they actually farmed.
Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they
constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which
taxes had been paid. In the
absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax
purposes does not prove ownership. In sum, the petitioners' claim of ownership of the
whole parcel has no legal basis. Accordingly, the Court denied the petition and the
assailed decision and resolution of the appellate court were affirmed.
TOPIC: INDICIA OF OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION
DR. JESUS SERIÑA and ENRIQUETA SERIÑA (deceased), represented by
DR. JESUS SERIÑA, JR., ANTONIO SERIÑA, VIOLETA SERIÑA TAN,
REYNALDO SERIÑA and EMMANUEL SERIÑA, petitioners, vs. VICTOR
CABALLERO, TEODORO DONELA, OLIVER DONELA, COURT OF APPEALS,
and THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 20, MISAMIS
ORIENTAL, respondents.
GR 127382 August 17, 2004
FACTS: On August 11, 1982, Dr . Jesus Seriña and his wife, Enriqueta Seriña
filed a Complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession, and damages with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against respondents Victor
Caballero and his tenants, Teodoro Donela and Oliver Donela. Seriñas alleged in their
complaint that they are the absolute owners and have been in actual and constructive
possession of the land for 35 years. They averred that sometime in March 1982, they
discovered that respondent Caballero was claiming ownership over the said land and
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405

offering it for sale or mortgage to third parties. They also discovered that the
respondents Donela were occupying the land as tenants and caretakers of the land.
The petitioners claimed that their father, Dr . Seriña, bought the land from Lucia Vda.
de Marbella who inherited it from her father, Ramon Neri. They presented a Deed of
Sale 6 dated August 23, 1947 showing that Dr .Seriña bought 5 hectares of ricefield,
bounded on the North by RaymundoSeriña, on the East by TeofiloSaburnido, on
the South by Obdelio Caballero, on the West by Obdullo Caballero from Lucia Vda.
de Marbella.
In his answer, respondent Caballero alleged that he was the lawful owner, and had
been in actual physical possession of the disputed land since time immemorial. He
averred that the disputed land is part of Cadastral Lot originally owned by his
grandfather, Eustaquio Caballero. They averred that Eustaqio Caballero declared the
entire parcel of land for tax purposes. This tax declaration indicated that the 119,490
square-meter parcel of land was located at Pontacon, Iponan, Cagayan de Oro
City, bounded on North by RusticoDablio, on the East by J. Seriña and T. Saburnido,
on the South by Victor Obsioma, and on the West by Victorino Caballero.
RTC - in favor of Caballero (the boundaries of the land stated in complaint did not
coincide with what was stated in the Deed of Sale and that it was not clearly shown
that the land bought by Dr. Serina was the same land owned by Victor Caballero)
CA - affirmed decision of RTC
ISSUE/s: The issues in this petition are, therefore, the following: (1) whether the
petitioners were able to establish the identity of the land being claimed by
them; and (2) whether acquisitive prescription should be appreciated in favor of the
petitioners.
RULING: The CA was correct in concluding that the petitioners failed to establish that
the parcel of land in the possession of the respondents is the same as that subject of
their complaint. The CA noted that the land subject of the complaint has boundaries
different from the land in possession of the respondents. In fact, the land described in
the complaint appears to be different from the land described in the Deed of Sale which
the petitioners invoke as the basis of their ownership.
The complaint 24 of the petitioners states that the property they are claiming
has an area of 2.5 hectares. On the other hand, the Deed of Sale provides that
the subject property has an area of 5 hectares. The complaint alleged that the
property is located in "Mantadiao, Opol, Misamis Oriental," while the Deed of Sale
shows that the property purchased is located in "Puntakon, Igpit, Cagayan Or.
Misamis." We agree with the CA that there was no showing that Tax Declaration No.
2442 in the name of Eustaquio Caballero was cancelled. Absent any specific
statement therein to that effect, it cannot be presumed that Tax Declaration No. 4029
in the name of Dr. Seriña cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2442. Moreover, the land
covered by Tax Declaration No. 2442 is different from that covered by Tax
Declaration No. 4029.
The documentary and testimonial evidence presented by the petitioners did not prove
the identity of the land being claimed. The petitioners did not present evidence to
prove that the land registered in the name of Eustaquio Caballero was sold to Lucia
Vda. de Marbella or her predecessor-in-interest from whom they purchased the land
subject of their complaint. The failure to establish the identity of the land is obviously
fatal to the petitioners' case. In Beo vs. Court of Appeals,
Corollarily, the rule is likewise well-settled that in order that an
action for recovery of possession may prosper, it is
indispensable that he who brings the action fully proves not only his
ownership but also the identity of the property claimed, by
describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. As the appellate
24
court succinctly stated, he who claims to have a better right to the
property must clearly show that the land possessed by the
other party is the very land that belongs to him.
On the second issue, the CA ruled that inasmuch as the petitioners failed to
establish that the parcel of land in possession of the respondents is the same as the
subject of their complaint, their claim of acquisitive prescription is clearly untenable.
We agree with the respondents. Since the property has not been clearly identified by
the petitioners, their claim of acquisitive prescription cannot be considered.
Insufficient identification of the portion of land claimed in absolute ownership
cannot ripen into ownership. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it
may be constructive, is not a mere fiction. Assuming, however, that the disputed land
has been clearly identified, acquisitive prescription will still not lie in favor of the
petitioners because they were not able to prove that they have been in possession of
the property for the requisite number of years. Prescription requires public, peaceful,
uninterrupted and adverse possession of the property in the concept of an owner for
ten years, in case the possession is in good faith and with just title.
The petitioners' argument that the payment of taxes on the property since May 31,
1948 constitutes proof of their possession of the subject land for thirty-five years is
untenable. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At
most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership of the property for
which taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual, public and adverse possession,
the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.
TOPIC: Expenses: Right of Possessor with Respect to Useful Expenses
LAURENCIO C. RAMEL, SOCORRO B. RAMEL and RENE LEMAR B. RAMEL,
petitioners, vs. DANIEL AQUINO and GUADALUPE ABALAHIN, respondents.
BENJAMIN AQUINO and VIRGINIA AQUINO, respondents-Intervenors.
G.R. No. 133208 July 31, 2006
FACTS: Daniel Aquino is a registered owner of a land which he mortgaged to the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). As the property was in danger of being
foreclosed, respondents sold to petitioners a portion of the land with the agreement
that petitioners would assume the remaining mortgage obligation of respondents with
the DBP and the balance shall be paid to respondents.
Petitioners were allowed by respondents to take possession of the land. Subsequently,
petitioners applied for a re-structuring of the mortgage loan win the DBP for a period
of ten years. Petitioners then went to DBP to pay for the amortization but they found
out that respondents had paid the bank and the latter told the former that they would
return whatever the petitioners paid for the land and threatened to withdraw the title
from the bank.
Petitioners filed with the trial court for Specific Performance with Preliminary Injunction
and Damages and three days later, respondents withdrew the amount which they had
paid to the bank. During the pendency of the case, petitioners were able to fully settle
the loan with the DBP.
The trial court rendered a decision assailed by herein petitioners on the ground, among
others, that the offsetting the claim of improvements by petitioners and the claim of
the fruits derived from the land by respondents is erroneous citing Articles 546 and 547
of the Civil Code.
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Petitioners argue that as possessors in good faith and in the concept of an owner, they
are entitled to the fruits received before possession was legally interrupted and they
must be reimbursed for their expenses or for the increase in the value the subject
property may have acquired by reason thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is legal ground to order the offsetting of the claim of
improvements by petitioners to the claim of fruits derived from the land by respondents
RULING: YES. The records show that both parties failed to prove their claims through
any receipt or document. Despite the lack of proof, the trial court ordered that whatever
improvements spent on the land shall be offset from the fruits derived therefrom.
The plaintiffs claimed that they were able to improve the land after possession was
given to them. No receipts were shown to guide the court as to how much were the
costs of the improvements. Likewise the defendants claimed that the plaintiffs were
able to cultivate the land and harvest palay although their testimonies to this effect are
based on their presumptions and calculations not on actual harvest such that the court
also cannot make determination of the real fruits derived from the land.
This being so, the court shall just offset the claim of improvements to the
claim of fruits derived from the land and then place the parties in their
previous positions before the agreement. Whatever improvements spent on
the land shall be compensated from the fruits derived therefrom.
Topic: Rights and Liabilities of Possessor in Bad Faith
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) vs. CA and City of
Dagupan
GR L-54526 August 25, 1986
FACTS: The City of Dagupan (City) filed a complaint against NAWASA (now MWSS)
for recovery of ownership and possession of Dagupan Waterworks System. NAWASA
invoked RA 1383 which vested upon it the ownership, possession and control of all
waterworks systems throughout Philippines and as one of its counterclaims, asked for
reimbursement of its necessary and useful expenses in making improvements.
Trial court ruled in favor of City and found NAWASA to be possessor in bad faith and
not entitled to reimbursement.
NAWASA appealed to CA and argued that City must be liable for amortization of the
balance of the loan NAWASA secured for the improvement of Dagupan Waterworks
System. CA affirmed lower court’s decision and ruled that:
“..expenses were made in utter bad faith for they were made after the complaint was
filed and after numerous SC decisions declaring unconstitutional the taking by NAWASA
of the patrimonial waterworks systems of cities, municipalities and provinces w/o just
compensation.
Under Art 456 of NCC, it is clear that a builder or possessor in bad faith is not entitled
to indemnity for any useful improvement on the premises”
MWSS, successor-in-interest of NAWASA appealed to SC raising as sole issue of WON
it has the right to remove all the useful improvements introduced by NAWASA to
Dagupan Waterworks System, notwithstanding the fact that NAWASA was found to be
possessor in bad faith. It argues that Art. 546, 547 and 549 do not definitely settle the
question of whether a possessor in bad faith has the right to remove useful
improvements. It invoked cases of Mindanao Academy v. Yap and Carbonell v. CA.
ISSUE:
Whether a possessor in bad faith has the right to remove useful improvements?
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RULING: No. Article 449 of CC provides that “he who builds, plants or sows in bad
faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to
indemnity." As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful improvements it
had made without right to indemnity
Moreover, under Art 546, only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded for useful
expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed; and under Art 547, only a
possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if it can be done w/o damage
to the principal thing and if the person who recovers the possession does not exercise
the option of reimbursing the useful expenses.
The right given a possessor in bad faith to remove improvements applies only to
improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing suffers no injury
thereby and lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they
have at the time he enters into possession.
Mindanao Academy v. Yap does not support stand of MWSS. In that case, Court ruled
that if the defendant constructed a new building, as he alleges, he cannot recover its
value because the construction was done after the filing of the action for annulment,
thus rendering him a builder in bad faith who is denied by law any right of
reimbursement. What Court allowed Yap to remove were the equipment, books,
furniture and fixtures brought in by him, because they were outside the scope of the
judgment and may be retained by him.
In Carbonell v CA, both the trial court and CA found that respondents Infantes were
possessors in good faith. On appeal, Court reversed decision and declared Carbonell to
have superior right to the land. On issue of WON the Infantes were possessor in good
faith, 4 members ruled that they were not, but as a matter of equity, allowed them to
remove the useful improvements. Inasmuch as only four Members concurred in ruling
that respondents Infantes were possessors in bad faith and two Members ruled that
they were possessors in good faith, said decision does not establish a precedent.
Moreover, the equitable consideration present in said case are not present in the case
at bar.
(In that case, Justice Teehankee (now Chief Justice) concurred on the same premise
as the dissenting opinion of Justice Muñoz Palma that both the conflicting buyers of
the real property in question, namely petitioner Carbonell as the first buyer and
respondents Infantes as the second buyer, may be deemed purchasers in good faith
at the respective dates of their purchase. Justice Muñoz Palma dissented on the ground
that since both purchasers was undoubtedly in good faith, respondents Infantes' prior
registration of the sale in good faith entitled them to the ownership of the land.)
TOPIC: Rights and Liabilities of Possessor in Bad Faith
PELICULA SABIDO and MAXIMO RANCES, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DOMINADOR
STA. ANA, respondents.
GR 73418 September 20, 1988
FACTS: Spouses Dasal and Pecunio filed a case for queiting of title against herein
respondents Spouses Sabido and Rances for the subject Lots B and C.
The Lower Court ruled in favor of Spouses Dasal. The sheriff then executed the Writ of
Execution as ordered by then Presiding Judge Sunga. During the execution of the writ,
the sheriff learned that a certain Dominador Sta. Ana was occupying a portion of lot B
together with two other persons (tenants of Sta. Ana).
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Third party Sta. Ana was given an opportunity to present evidences to prove his
ownership upon Lot B which according to him he purchased in good faith.
Subsequently, it was proved that the lot he claims was different from that of the subject
Lot B.
Furthermore, it was established that Sta. Ana has a relationship with the Spouses Dasal
which should alerted him that the subject lot was under litigation and that he was also
present during the ocular inspection made in which he fails to invoke his right upon the
issuance of the decision of the ownnership of the subject Lot B which estabilshed bad
faith on his part.
The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Spouses Sabido. However, part of the decision of the
Appellate Court grants Sta.Ana an option to either remove his improvements or make
an offer to the lawful owners to pay for the price of the lot where his improvements
were introduced.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Appellate Court erred in granting Sta. Ana the right to
exercise the option.
RULING: Yes, the Appellate Court erred in granting such right to Sta. Ana.
The right to exercise the option is only given to a builder in good faith (previous
discussions). The only option for a possessor in bad faith is only granted with regards
to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure. Provided, two conditions must be
satisfied.
(1) removal will not cause damage to the principal thing
(2) the lawful owner does not prefer to retain them by paying the reasonable price.
Topic: POSSESSION OVER MOVABLES
ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Commissioner of Land Transportation,
EDUARDO DOMINGO, CARLOS RODRIGUEZ and PATRICIO YAMBAO in their
capacity as ANCAR Agents, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE AMADOR E.
GOMEZ, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch 1, THE SHERIFF of Quezon City, and LUCILA ABELLO, respondents.
GR L-33397 June 22, 1984
FACTS: The 1968 model Volkswagen, bantam car, allegedly owned by Lt.
Walter A. Bala under whose name it was originally registered was reported to
the Office of the Commission on Land Transportation as stolen on June 29, 1970 from
the residence of Lt. Bala. Upon receipt of such information the agents of
Anti-Carnapping Unit (ANCAR) of the Philippine Constabulary, on detail with the
Land Transportation Commission recognized subject car on 2 February 1971 in the
possession of LUCILA ABELLO and immediately seized and impounded the car as stolen
property. Romeo F. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation, seized the car
pursuant to Section 60 of Republic Act4136 which empowers him to seize the
motor vehicle for delinquent registration aside from his imp licit
power deducible from Sec. 4(5), Sec. 5 and 31 of said Code, "to seize motor vehicles
fraudulently or otherwise not properly registered. “Lucia Abello filed a complaint for
replevin with damages in the Court of First Instance of Manila. CFI ruled in favor of
ABELLO.
CFI found that the car was acquired by ABELLO by purchase from its registered owner
Marcelino Guansing for P9,000 and that she has been in possession thereof since then
until when the car was seized from her by ANCAR who acted in belief that the car was
stolen from Lt. Bala
ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure of the car by the officials are valid.
26
RULING: NO. There is no merit in the petition considering that the acquirer or the
purchaser in good faith of a chattel of movable property is entitled to be
respected and protected in his possession as if he were the true owner
thereof until a competent court rules otherwise. In the meantime, as the
true owner, the possessor in good faith cannot be compelled to surrender
possession nor to be required to institute an action for the recovery of the chattel,
whether or not an indemnity bond is issued in his favor. The filing of
information charging that the chattel was illegally obtained through estafa
from its true owner by the transferor of the bona fide possessor does not warrant
disturbing the possession of the chattel against the will of the possessor. Finally, the
claim of petitioners that the Commission has the right to seize and impound the car
under Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 which reads Sec.60. The lien upon motor
vehicles. Any balance of fees for registration, re -registration
or delinquent registration of a motor vehicle, remaining unpaid and all
fines imposed upon any vehicle owner, shall constitute a first lien upon the motor
vehicle concerned is untenable.
It is clear from the provision of said Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 that the
Commissioner's right to seize and impound subject property is only good for the proper
enforcement of lien upon motor vehicles. The Land Transportation Commission
may issue a warrant of constructive or actual distraint against motor
vehicle for collection of unpaid fees for registration, re-registration or delinquent
registration of vehicle.
Topic: Possession Over Movables
EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP., petitioner, vs. THE SPOUSES
LEONOR and GERARDO SANTOS, doing business under the name and style
of "SANTOS BOOKSTORE," and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
GR 80298 April 26, 1990
FACTS: A person identifying himself as Professor Jose Cruz placed an order by
telephone with the petitioner company for 406 books, payable on delivery. EDCA
prepared the corresponding invoice and delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz
issued a personal check covering the purchase price. On October 7, 1981, Cruz sold
120 of the books to private respondent Leonor Santos who, after verifying the seller's
ownership from the invoice he showed her, paid him.
Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz even
before clearing of his first check, made inquiries with the De la Salle College where he
had claimed to be a dean and was informed that there was no such person in its
employ. Further verification revealed that Cruz had no more account or deposit with
the Philippine Amanah Bank, against which he had drawn the payment check. EDCA
then went to the police, which set a trap and arrested Cruz. Investigation disclosed his
real name as Tomas de la Peña.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has been unlawfully deprived of the books
because the check issued by the impostor in payment therefor was dishonored.
RULING: Ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of
the purchase price only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that
such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet been paid.
Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to
criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above
Property Digests Pre-Finals |EH 405
 27
noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who
can in turn transfer it to another.
ART. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been
unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of
the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully
deprived has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain
its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the
books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he
had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not
impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books. It bears repeating
that in the case before us, Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first that the books
belonged to Cruz before she agreed to purchase them. The EDCA invoice Cruz showed
her assured her that the books had been paid for on delivery. By contrast, EDCA was
less than cautious — in fact, too trusting — in dealing with the impostor. Although it
had never transacted with him before, it readily delivered the books he had ordered
(by telephone) and as readily accepted his personal check in payment. It did not verify
his identity although it was easy enough to do this. It did not wait to clear the check
of this unknown drawer. Worse, it indicated in the sales invoice issued to him, by the
printed terms thereon, that the books had been paid for on delivery, thereby vesting
ownership in the buyer.
Surely, the private respondent did not have to go beyond that invoice to satisfy herself
that the books being offered for sale by Cruz belonged to him; yet she did. Although
the title of Cruz was presumed under Article 559 by his mere possession of the books,
these being movable property, Leonor Santos nevertheless demanded more proof
before deciding to buy them.
While we sympathize with the petitioner for its plight, it is clear that its remedy is not
against the private respondents but against Tomas de la Peña, who has apparently
caused all this trouble.
In the case, Sta. Ana being a possessor in bad faith has no option but to vacate the
lot.

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