Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1 - Ramirez vs. Ramirez donor partake of the nature of testamentary provisions, and shall be
SECOND DIVISION governed by the rules established in the Title on Succession. (620)
[G.R. No. L-27952. February 15, 1982.]
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA
PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appellee, vs. MARCELLE D. VDA. 2 - Cuevas vs Cuevas
DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, G.R. No. L-8327 December 14, 1955
Legatees, oppositors-appellants. ANTONINA CUEVAS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CRISPULO
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate CUEVAS,defendant-appellee.
estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, FACTS: On September 18, 1950, Antonina Cuevas executed a
namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two notarizedconveyance entitled “Donacion Mortis Causa”, ceding to her
grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda nephew CrispuloCuevas the northern half of a parcel of unregistered
de Wrobleski. land.
The widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the Subsequently on May 26, 1952, the donor executed anothernotarial
companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the instrument entitled “Revocacion de Donacion Mortis Causa”
testator provided for substitutions. purportingto set aside the conveyance. She brought an action in the
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December CFI to recover theland conveyed, on the ground (1) that the donation
11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was being mortis causa, it hadbeen lawfully revoked by the donor; and (2)
admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance Maria Luisa Palacios even it if were a donation intervivos, the same was invalidated
was appointed administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted because (a) it was not properly accepted; (b)because the donor did
an inventory of the estate. not reserve sufficient property for her own maintenance,and (c)
because the donee was guilty of ingratitude, for having refused
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition tosupport the donor.
as follows, the property of the deceased is to be divided into two
parts: The crux of the controversy revolves around the followingprovisions of
the deed of donation:
1. One part shall go to the widow "en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of
her legitime; Dapat maalaman niCrispulo Cuevas na samantalang ako ay
nabubuhay, and lupa na ipinagkakaloob kosa kaniya ay ako pa rin and
2. the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto patuloy na mamomosecion, makapagparatrabaho,makikinabang at ang
Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." iba pang karapatan sa pagmamayari ay sa akin pa rinhanggang hindo
Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the ko binabawian ny buhay ng Maykapal at ito naman ay hindi ko ngaiya-
widow's usufruct and the remaining two-third (2/3) with a usufruct in alis pagkat kung ako ay mamatay na ay inilalaan ko sa kaniya.
favor of Wanda. ISSUE: WON thedonation is a donation inter vivos YES
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition: HELD: The decisive proof that the present donation is
operativeinter vivor lies in the final phrase to the effect that the donor
1. xxx
2. xxx will notdispose or take away ("hindi ko nga iya-alis" in the original)
theland "because I am reserving it to him upon my death." By these
3. that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the
Philippines in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates wordsthe donor expressly renounced the right to freely dispose of the
the Constitution property infavor of another (a right essential to full ownership) and
4. xxx manifested the irrevocability of the conveyance of the naked title to
the property in favor ofthe donee. As stated in our decision in Bonsato
Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition. Hence, vs. Court of Appeals, ante,such irrevocability is characteristic of
this appeal. donations inter vivos, because it isincompatible with the idea of a
disposition post mortem.
WON the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in
favor of Wanda is violative of the Constitution. It is apparent from the entire context of the deed ofdonation that the
donor intended that she should retain the entire beneficialownership
Held: No, it is not violative of the Constitution.
during her lifetime, but that the naked title should irrevocably passto
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows: the donee. It is only thus that all the expressions heretofore discussed
canbe given full effect; and when the donor stated that she would
"SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural
continue toretain the "possession, cultivation, harvesting and all other
land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
rights andattributes of ownership," she meant only the dominium utile,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
not the fullownership.
public domain in the Philippines." (Art. XIII.).
As the Court below correctly observed, the words "rightsand attributes
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on
of ownership" should be construed ejusdem generis with thepreceding
the ground that the Constitution covers not only succession by
rights of "possession, cultivation and harvesting"expressly enumerated
operation of law but also testamentary succession.
in the deed. Had the donor meant to retain full orabsolute ownership
The Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private she had no need to specify possession, cultivation andharvesting, since
lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the all these rights are embodied in full or absolute ownership;nor would
prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be she then have excluded the right of free disposition from the"rights
able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine and attributes of ownership" that she reserved for herself. Hence, the
landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land. Court rightly concluded that the deed was a validdonation inter vivos.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of 3 - Jutic v CA August 27, 1987
Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the
CONSUELO SEVILLE JUTIC, JUAN JUTIC, CELESTINO SEVILLE,
land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of
TIBURCIO SEVILLE, RAVELLO SEVILLE, SONITA SEVILLE,
aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
LUCY SEVILLE, EPIFANIA SEVILLE, NARACY SEVILLE,
Art. 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the EMMANUEL SEVILLE, ORLANDO MANICAN, and PACIFICO
1
Wills and Succession Case Digests
MANICAN, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, House and Lot" covering one-half (½) portion of the former's house
VICENTE SULLAN, TRINIDAD SULLAN, TERESITA SULLAN, and lot located in Mandaue, Cebu.
ULYSSES SULLAN, ALEJANDRINO SULLAN, BUENAVENTURA
4 other deeds of donation were executed in favor of herein petitioners.
SEVILLE, and ZOILO SEVILLE, respondents.
Such deeds contained the following provisions:
The petitioners are the surviving heirs of Melquiades Seville.
"That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR
Melquiades in turn is the brother of the deceased Arsenio Seville.
for the DONEE, x x x the DONOR does hereby, by these presents,
Arsenio died ahead. Melquiades died later and was survived by his
transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-
children (petitioners). During the lifetime of Arsenio Seville he
described property, together with the buildings and all improvements
executed an affidavit which reads:
existing thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR;
I, ARSENIO SEVILLE, of legal age, WIDOWER, Filipino, and a resident PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die
of Anquibit, Cambanogoy, Saug, Davao, Philippines, after having been before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
duly sworn to in accordance with law do hereby depose and say, as automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect;
follows:
On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died.
xxx
The respondents, heirs of Cabatingan filed an action for annulment
That I am a widower as indicated above and that I have no one to and/or declaration of nullity of deeds of donations and accounting.
inherit all my properties except my brother Melquiades Seville who They alleged that petitioners, through their sinister machinations and
appears to be the only and rightful person upon whom I have the most strategies and taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's fragile
sympathy since I have no wife and children; condition, caused the execution of the deeds of donation, and, that the
documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil
That it is my desire that in case I will die I will assign all my rights,
Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that
interest, share and participation over the above- mentioned property
these are donations mortis causa.
and that he shall succeed to me in case of my death, however, as long
as I am alive I will be the one to possess, enjoy and benefit from the The trial Court rendered partial judgment in favor of respondents.
produce of my said land and that whatever benefits it will give me in
Petitioners instituted this present petition insisting that the donations
the future I shall be the one to enjoy it;
are inter vivos donations as these were made by the late Conchita
xxx Cabatingan "in consideration of the love and affection of the donor" for
the donee, and there is nothing in the deeds which indicate that the
The children of Melquiades are now claiming exclusive ownership of
donations were made in consideration of Cabatingan's death. In
the properties and improvements thereon on the basis of the affidavit
addition, petitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in case
executed by Arsenio in favor of Melquiades, alleging that the affidavit
petitioners die ahead of Cabatingan is a resolutory condition that
was a donation inter vivos.
confirms the nature of the donation as inter vivos.
Vicente Sullan and the other respondents filed a complaint against the
ISSUE: Was the donation inter vivos or mortis causa? Mortis Causa
petitioners for partition and accounting of the properties of Arsenio,
alleging they are heirs of the decedent. HELD: In a donation mortis causa, "the right of disposition is not
transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive."In determining
ISSUE: WON the affidavit was a donation inter vivos. No.
whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics
A close reading reveals that the affidavit is not a donation inter vivos must be taken into account:
or mortis causa but a mere declaration of an intention and a desire.
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death
Certainly, it is not a concrete and formal act of giving or donating. The
of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the
form and contents of said affidavit amply support this conclusion.
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of
A discussion of the different kinds of donations and the requisites for the property while alive;
their effectivity is irrelevant in the case at bar. There clearly was no (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
intention to transfer ownership from Arsenio Seville to Melquiades transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
Seville at the time of the instrument's execution. It was a mere indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
intention or a desire on the part of Arsenio Seville that in the event of properties conveyed;
his death at some future time, his properties should go to Melquiades And
Seville.
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
It is quite apparent that Arsenio Seville was thinking of succession ("... transferee.
in case I win die, I will assign all my rights, share and participation
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is
over the above-mentioned properties and that he shall succeed to me
confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear
in case of my death ..."). Donations which are to take effect upon the
provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to
death of the donor partake of the nature of testamentary provisions
Cabatingan's death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death
and shall be governed by the rules established in the title on
of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan
succession (Art. 728, Civil Code).
did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners
The petitioners likewise contend that the document was a valid during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the
donation as only donations are accepted by the donees. However, the donations as mortis causa in the following Acceptance and Attestation
petitioners could not have accepted something, which by the terms of clauses, uniformly found in the subject deeds of donation, to wit:
the supposed "donation" was not given to them at the time. The
"That the DONEE does hereby accept the foregoing donation mortis
affidavit could not transmit ownership except in clear and express
causa under the terms and conditions set forth therein, and avail
terms.
herself of this occasion to express her profound gratitude for the
4 - Maglasang v Cabatingan kindness and generosity of the DONOR."
G.R.No. 131953, June 5 2002 x x x
"SIGNED by the above-named DONOR and DONEE at the foot of this
FACTS: Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother,
Deed of Donation mortis causa, which consists of two (2) pages x x x."
Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation Inter Vivos for
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
Also, a transfer mortis causa can also be made "in consideration of the the property above, described, to become effective upon the death of
love and affection of the donor” so the contention of the petitioner the DONOR; but in the event that the DONEE should die before the
does not stand. DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no
further force and effect. xxx
This is similar to the case of National Treasurer of the Phils. v. Vda. de
• On June 10, 1967, Celestina executed a document denominated as
Meimban which held that the donation is a mortis causa donation and
Revocation of Donation purporting to set aside the deed of donation.
the formalities of a will should have been complied with under Article
More than a month later or on August 18, 1967, Celestina died without
728 of the Civil Code, otherwise, the donation is void and would
issue and any surviving ascendants and siblings.
produce no effect. As we have held in Alejandro v. Geraldez (78 SCRA
• In 1982, or twenty-four years after the execution of the Deed of
245,253), "If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's
Donation, Ursulina secured the corresponding tax declarations, in her
death, meaning that the full or naked ownership of the donated
name, over the donated properties and since then, she refused to give
properties will pass to the donee because of the donor's death, then it
private respondents (other nieces of Clestina) any share in the produce
is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation
of the properties despite repeated demands.
mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament.
• Private respondents filed a complaint against Ursulina et al. The
(Citing Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 481)."
complaint alleged that the Deed of Donation executed by Celestina in
In the present case, subject deeds expressly provide that the donation favor of Ursulina was void for lack of acknowledgment by the attesting
shall be rescinded in case petitioners predecease Conchita Cabatingan. witnesses thereto before notary public Atty. Henry Valmonte, and the
As stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda, one of the decisive characteristics of donation was a disposition mortis causa which failed to comply with
a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and
if the donor should survive the donee. This is exactly what Cabatingan testaments, hence, it was void. The plaintiffs-herein private
provided for in her donations. If she really intended that the donation respondents thus prayed that judgment be rendered ordering Ursulina
should take effect during her lifetime and that the ownership of the to return to them as intestate heirs the possession and ownership of
properties donated be transferred to the donee or independently of, the properties.
and not by reason of her death, she would have not expressed such • Ursulina et al argue that the donation contained in the deed is inter
proviso in the subject deeds. vivos as the main consideration for its execution was the donor’s
Considering that the disputed donations are donations mortis causa, affection for the donee rather than the donor’s death; that the
the same partake of the nature of testamentary provisions and as provision on the effectivity of the donation—after the donor’s death—
such, said deeds must be executed in accordance with the requisites simply meant that absolute ownership would pertain to the donee on
on solemnities of wills and testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the donor’s death; and that since the donation is inter vivos, it may be
the Civil Code, to wit: revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760, 764[ and 765 of
the Civil Code.
"ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by ISSUE: Whether the donation was mortis causa or inter vivos? MORTIS
his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more CAUSA
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
HELD: Crucial in the resolution of the issue is the determination of
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
whether the donor intended to transfer the ownership over the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each
properties upon the execution of the deed.
and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the
part of each page. former, the act is immediately operative even if the actual execution
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter,
will is written , and the fact that the testator signed the will and every nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the
page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under donor-testator.
his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses,
The following ruling of this Court in Alejandro v. Geraldez is
and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages
illuminating:
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor’s death,
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it
meaning that the full or naked ownership of the donated properties
shall be interpreted to them. (n)
will pass to the donee only because of the donor’s death, then it is at
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by
that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis
the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required
causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament.
to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk
But if the donation takes effect during the donor’s lifetime or
of Court. (n)"
independently of the donor’s death, meaning that the full or naked
The deeds in question although acknowledged before a notary public ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties passes to the
of the donor and the donee, the documents were not executed in the donee during the donor’s lifetime, not by reason of his death but
manner provided for under the above-quoted provisions of law. because of the deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos.
5 - GANUELAS VS CAWED The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is
[G. R. No. 123968. April 24, 2003] important as the validity or revocation of the donation depends upon
its nature. If the donation is inter vivos, it must be executed and
Facts: • On April 11, 1958, Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin
accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 and 749 of the
(Celestina) executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property (7 parcels of
Civil Code, except when it is onerous in which case the rules on
land) in favor of her niece Ursulina Ganuelas (Ursulina.
contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation must be in the
The pertinent provision of the deed of donation reads, quoted
form of a will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise
verbatim:
it is void and cannot transfer ownership.
xxx
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection which the The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the
DONOR has for the DONEE, and of the faithful services the latter has following:
rendered in the past to the former, the said DONOR does by these 1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death
presents transfer and convey, by way of DONATION, unto the DONEE of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the
3
Wills and Succession Case Digests
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ, and
the property while alive; RAMONA PATRICIA ALCARAZ, assisted by GLORIA F. NOEL as
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the attorney-in-fact, respondents.
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for MELO, J.:p
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
The petition before us has its roots in a complaint for specific
properties conveyed;
performance to compel herein petitioners (except the last named,
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
Catalina Balais Mabanag) to consummate the sale of a parcel of land
transferee.
with its improvements located along Roosevelt Avenue in Quezon City
In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein entered into by the parties sometime in January 1985 for the price of
which indicates that any right, title or interest in the donated P1,240,000.00.
properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of
FACTS: On January 19, 1985, defendants-appellants Romulo
Celestina.
Coronel, et al. executed a document entitled "Receipt of Down
The phrase “to become effective upon the death of the DONOR” Payment" in favor of plaintiff Ramona Patricia Alcaraz which is
admits of no other interpretation but that Celestina intended to reproduced hereunder:
transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not
during her lifetime. RECEIPT OF DOWN PAYMENT
More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee
should die before the donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded P1,240,000.00 — Total amount
and of no further force and effect shows that the donation is a 50,000 — Down payment
postmortem disposition. ———————————
As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a P1,190,000.00 — Balance
donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if
the donor should survive the donee. Received from Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz of 146 Timog,
Quezon City, the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos purchase
More. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the price of our inherited house and lot, covered by TCT No.
donation as mortis causa: 119627 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, in the total
SIGNED by the above-named donor, Celestina Ganuelas, at the foot of amount of P1,240,000.00.
this deed of donation mortis causa, consisting of two (2) pages and on
the left margin of each and every page thereof in the joint presence of We bind ourselves to effect the transfer in our names from
all of us who at her request and in her presence and that of each other our deceased father, Constancio P. Coronel, the transfer
have in like manner subscribed our names as witnesses. (Emphasis certificate of title immediately upon receipt of the down
supplied) payment above-stated.
To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on On our presentation of the TCT already in or name, We will
considerations of love and affection is erroneous. That the donation immediately execute the deed of absolute sale of said
was prompted by the affection of the donor for the donee and the property and Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz shall immediately
services rendered by the latter is of no particular significance in pay the balance of the P1,190,000.00.
determining whether the deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not, Clearly, the conditions appurtenant to the sale are the
because a legacy may have an identical motivation. In other words, following:
love and affection may also underline transfers mortis causa.
1. Ramona will make a down payment of Fifty Thousand
In the case of Maglasang v. Heirs of Cabatingan, this Court held that (P50,000.00) Pesos upon execution of the document
the donations were mortis causa, for the above-quoted provision aforestated;
conclusively establishes the donor’s intention to transfer the ownership
and possession of the donated property to the donee only after the 2. The Coronels will cause the transfer in their names of the
former’s death. Like in the present case, the deeds therein did not title of the property registered in the name of their deceased
contain any clear provision that purports to pass proprietary rights to father upon receipt of the Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
the donee prior to the donor’s death. Pesos down payment;
As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, 3. Upon the transfer in their names of the subject property,
the formalities of a will under Article 728 of the Civil Code should have the Coronels will execute the deed of absolute sale in favor
been complied with, failing which the donation is void and produces no of Ramona and the latter will pay the former the whole
effect. balance of One Million One Hundred Ninety Thousand
(P1,190,000.00) Pesos.
As noted by the trial court, the attesting witnesses failed to
acknowledge the deed before the notary public, thus violating Article On the same date, plaintiff-appellee Concepcion D. Alcaraz (hereinafter
806 of the Civil Code. referred to as Concepcion), mother of Ramona, paid the down
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the payment of P50,000.00. On February 6, 1985, the property originally
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the registered in the name of the Coronels' father was transferred in their
inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another names under TCT No. 327043.
or others either by his will or by operation of law. (n) On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold the property covered by TCT
No. 327043 to intervenor-appellant Catalina B. Mabanag
P1,580,000.00 after the latter has paid P300,000.00. For this reason,
6 - G.R. No. 103577 October 7, 1996 Coronels canceled and rescinded the contract with Ramona by
ROMULO A. CORONEL, ALARICO A. CORONEL, ANNETTE A. depositing the down payment paid by Concepcion in the bank in trust
CORONEL, ANNABELLE C. GONZALES (for herself and on for Ramona Patricia Alcaraz.
behalf of Florida C. Tupper, as attorney-in-fact), CIELITO A.
CORONEL, FLORAIDA A. ALMONTE, and CATALINA BALAIS On February 22, 1985, Concepcion, et al., filed a complaint for specific
MABANAG, petitioners, performance against the Coronels and caused the annotation of a
vs. notice of lis pendens at the back of TCT No. 327403.
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On April 2, 1985, Catalina caused the annotation of a notice of adverse TERESITA A. LOY and ESTATE OF JOSE VAÑO, [G.R. No.
claim covering the same property with the Registry of Deeds of 145982. September 13, 2004]
Quezon City. On April 25, 1985, the Coronels executed a Deed of
FACTS: The Loys seek a reconsideration of the Decision dated 3 July
Absolute Sale over the subject property in favor of Catalina. On June
2003 of this Court declaring void the deeds of sale of Lot Nos. 5 and 6
5, 1985, a new title over the subject property was issued in the name
executed by Teodoro Vaño in favor of Alfredo Loy, Jr. and Teresita
of Catalina under TCT No. 351582.
Loy.
In the course of the proceedings before the trial court the parties
The Loys insist that the transaction between Teodoro Vaño and Benito
agreed to submit the case for decision solely on the basis of
Liu, the predecessor-in-interest of Frank Liu, is a
documentary exhibits. The judgment is in favor of the plaintiffs. MFR
contract to sell. In contrast, the transactions between Teodoro Vaño
was denied. concepcion and ramona - and Alfredo Loy, Jr. and Teresita A. Loy were contracts of sale.
Petitioners thereupon interposed an appeal, but on December 16, According to the Loys, the contract to sell did not transfer ownership
1991, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision fully agreeing with the of Lot Nos. 5 and 6 to Benito Liu or Frank Liu because it was only a
trial court. promise to sell subject to the full payment of the consideration. On the
other hand, the contracts of sale in favor of the Loys transferred
Petitioners also argue there could been no perfected contract
ownership, as the conveyances were absolute.
on January 19, 1985 because they were then not yet the
absolute owners of the inherited property. The Loys reiterate their contention that Teodoro Vaño, as
administrator and sole heir to the properties, can sell the lots to them
We cannot sustain this argument.
since the rights of an heir are transmitted from the moment of death
RULING: Article 774 of the Civil Code defines Succession as a mode of of the testator. Although a property under estate proceedings cannot
transferring ownership as follows: be sold without judicial approval, the Loys allege that in their case, the
probate court later approved the sales to them, thereby ratifying the
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by
sales.
virtue of which the property, rights and obligations
to be extent and value of the inheritance of a ISSUE: W/N there was a valid sale byTeodoro to the Loys. None
person are transmitted through his death to
HELD: The orders of the probate court dated 19 and 23 March 1976
another or others by his will or by operation of
approving the contracts of the Loys are void. The orders did not ratify
law.
the sales because there was already a prior order of the probate court
Petitioners-sellers in the case at bar being the sons and dated 24 February 1976 approving the sale of Lot Nos. 5 and 6 to
daughters of the decedent Constancio P. Coronel are Frank Liu. Hence, the probate court had already lost jurisdiction over
compulsory heirs who were called to succession by operation Lot Nos. 5 and 6 since the lots no longer formed part of the Estate of
of law. Thus, at the point their father drew his last Jose Vaño. In fact, the administratrix of the estate filed a motion for
breath, petitioners stepped into his shoes insofar as reconsideration of the orders of the probate court approving the
the subject property is concerned, such that any contracts of the Loys because she already executed a deed of sale
rights or obligations pertaining thereto became covering Lot Nos. 5 and 6 in favor of Frank Liu.
binding and enforceable upon them. It is expressly
As we held in our Decision, a prior contract to sell made by the
provided that rights to the succession are
decedent during his lifetime prevails over a subsequent contract of sale
transmitted from the moment of death of the
made by the administrator without probate court approval. It is
decedent (Article 777, Civil Code; Cuison vs. Villanueva, 90
immaterial if the prior contract is a mere contract to sell and does not
Phil. 850 [1952]).
immediately convey ownership. Frank Liu’s contract to sell became
Be it also noted that petitioners' claim that succession may not be valid and effective upon its execution and bound the estate to convey
declared unless the creditors have been paid is rendered moot by the the property upon full payment of the consideration.
fact that they were able to effect the transfer of the title to the
It is apparent from Teodoro Vaño’s letter dated 16 October 1954 that
property from the decedent's name to their names on February 6,
the reason why Frank Liu stopped further payments on the lots,
1985.
leaving a balance of P1,000, was because Teodoro Vaño could not yet
Aside from this, petitioners are precluded from raising their supposed transfer the titles to Benito Liu, the predecessor-in-interest of Frank
lack of capacity to enter into an agreement at that time and they Liu. It would appear that Frank Liu and Teodoro Vaño lost contact with
cannot be allowed to now take a posture contrary to that which they each other thereafter and it was only on 25 January 1964 that Frank
took when they entered into the agreement with private respondent Liu wrote Teodoro Vaño informing the latter that he was ready to pay
Ramona P. Alcaraz. The Civil Code expressly states that: the balance of the purchase price of the lots. Teodoro Vaño did not
reply to Frank Liu’s letter. On 22 April 1966, Benito Liu sold to Frank
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or
Liu the lots, including Lot Nos. 5 and 6, which Benito Liu purchased
representation is rendered conclusive upon the
from Teodoro Vaño on 13 January 1950. Frank Liu sent three letters
person making it, and cannot be denied or
dated 21 March 1968, 7 June 1968 and 29 July 1968 to Teodoro Vaño
disproved as against the person relying thereon.
reiterating his request for the execution of the deed of sale covering
Having represented themselves as the true owners of the subject the lots in his favor but to no avail. On 19 August 1968, Teodoro Vaño
property at the time of sale, petitioners cannot claim now that they sold Lot No. 6 to Teresita Loy and on 16 December 1969, he sold Lot
were not yet the absolute owners thereof at that time. No. 5 to Alfredo Loy, Jr. The sales to the Loys were made after Frank
Liu offered to pay the balance of the purchase price of the lots and
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and after he repeatedly requested for the execution of the deeds of sale in
obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death. (659) his favor.
The sale of the lots by Teodoro Vaño to Benito Liu was valid. The sale
7 - FRANK N. LIU, deceased, substituted by his surviving was made by Teodoro Vaño on 13 January 1950 in his capacity as
spouse Diana Liu, and children, namely: Walter, Milton, Frank, attorney-in-fact of Jose Vaño. The sale to Benito Liu was made during
Jr., Henry and Jockson, all surnamed Liu, Rebecca Liu Shui the lifetime of Jose Vaño, not after the death of Jose Vaño who died
and Pearl Liu Rodriguez, petitioners, vs. ALFREDO LOY, JR., on 28 January 1950.The power of attorney executed by Jose Vaño in
favor of Teodoro Vaño remained valid during the lifetime of Jose Vaño.
5
Wills and Succession Case Digests
In his letter dated 16 October 1954, Teodoro Vaño stated that on 30 ISSUE: W/N the widow and the legitimate minor children of a
June 1954, the Supreme Court allowed the probate of the will of Jose deceased resident Chinese merchant have the right to enter the
Vaño. Teodoro Vaño likewise mentioned in the letter that in July 1954, Philippine Islands.
the Supreme Court held that all the sales made by Teodoro Vaño of
RULING: We have held in the case of Ng Hian vs. Collector of
the properties of his father were legal.[6] Thus, Benito Liu’s deed of
Customs that the widow and minor children of a deceased Chinese
sale in favor of Frank Liu covering the lots sold to him by Teodoro
merchant resident and doing business in the Philippine Islands at the
Vaño constitutes a valid charge or claim against the estate of Jose
time of his death are not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands solely
Vaño.
by reason of such relationship. Counsel for the appellant asks us to
8 - CONDE vs. ABAYA overrule that decision and admit the applicants in this case, setting
G. R. No. 4275 forth with ability arguments to that end. We must say, however, that,
March 23, 1909 after a careful consideration of such arguments, we are unable to see
our way clear to overrule the former decision and accordingly decline
Casiano Abaya died on April 6, 1899. Paula Conde, as the mother of
to do so.
the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde [both deceased], whom
she states she had by Casiano Abaya claimed succession to the With regard to the second question, it may be said that it does not
hereditary rights of her children with respect to the inheritance of their appear in the record of this case that the applicant is a merchant. It
deceased father Jose and Teopista were unacknowledge natural appears simply that her husband was, at the time of his death, a
children. resident Chinese merchant doing business in the Philippine Islands,
and that he died leaving property including a mercantile business. The
Roman Abaya, Casiano’s brother, opposed Paula’s claim, saying that
assumption of the appellant is that the mere fact of the death of a
he is the nearest relative of the deceased and should therefore be
merchant makes his wife and children also merchants, as it leaves to
declared his sole heir.
them as heirs and next of kin a mercantile business as a part of their
W/N after the death of a person claimed to be an unacknowledged inheritance. We do not believe that this necessarily follows. But if it
natural child, the mother of such presumed natural child, as heir to the does, the fact remains that she is not a resident merchant. She is still
latter, may bring an action to enforce acknowledgment of her outside of the Philippine Islands and has never held the status of
deceased child. a resident merchant. She must, therefore, establish her right to enter
as a merchant in the first instance. This she did not do. She did not
NO. The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his legitimacy is
present the section six certificate which is the only evidence upon
in all respects superior to that of the child who claims
which her right to enter can be based.
acknowledgement as a natural child. And it is evident that the right of
action to claim his legitimacy is not one of those rights which the From these observations it necessarily follows that the applicant is not
legitimate child may transmit by inheritance to his heirs; it forms no entitled to enter the Philippine Islands upon the status of her deceased
part of those rights which the legitimate child may transmit by husband; and that when she seeks to enter upon her own personal
inheritance to his heirs; it forms no part of the component rights of his status she must produce the evidence which the law requires to
inheritance. If it were so, there would have been no necessity to establish that status. Not having done this her application to enter was
establish its transmissibility to heirs as an exception in the terms and properly denied.
conditions of Article 118 [now Article 268] of the Civil Code. So that, in
10 - GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE vs. CA
order that it may constitute a portion of the child’s inheritance, it is
necessary that the conditions and the terms contained in Article 118 FACTS: A contract of group life insurance was executed between Great
[now Article 268] shall be present since without them, the right that Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife) and Development Bank
the child held during his lifetime, being personal and exclusive in of the Philippines (DBP)) where Grepalife agreed to insure the lives of
principle and therefore as a general rule not susceptible of eligible housing loan mortgagors of DBP.
transmission would and should have been extinguished by his death.
In 1983, Dr. Wilfredo Leuterio, a physician and a housing debtor of DB
Therefore where no express provision like that of Article 118 [now P applied for membership in the group life insurance plan where he de
268] exists, the right of action for the acknowledment of a natural clared himself as physically healthy.
child is, in principle and without exception, extinguished by his death,
Grepalife issued Certificate No. B18558, as insurance coverage of Dr. L
and can not be transmitted as a portion of the inheritance of the
euterio, to the extent of his DBP mortgage indebtedness of 86,200.00.
deceased child.
In 1984, Dr. Leuterio died due to "massive cerebral hemorrhage." Cons
9 - LAO HU NIU v. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
equently, DBP submitted a death claim to Grepalife.
FACTS: This case involves the exclusion from the Philippine Islands of
Grepalife denied the claim alleging that Dr. Leuterio’s non-
a Chinese woman and her minor children. She claims to be the wife of
disclosure that he had been suffering from hypertension
a former resident Chinese merchant who, prior to the attempt of the
(which caused his death) constituted concealment that justified the de
appellant to enter, died in the Philippine Islands owning property
nial of the claim.
therein and leaving as his only heirs at law and next of kin his widow,
the appellant herein, and her minor children. In1986, the widow of the late Dr. Leuterio, Medarda Leuterio,
filed a complaint with the RTC against Grepalife for specific
The board of special inquiry refused them permission to enter and that
performance with damages.
refusal was affirmed by the CFI of Manila. This appeal is from the
action taken by the CFI. Grepalife alleges, among other things, that the complaint was institute
d by the widow of Dr. Leuterio, not the real party in
Counsel for appellant says in his brief that: "The question involved
interest, hence the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over the case.
here is a double one: First, as to the right of the widow and the
legitimate minor children of a deceased resident Chinese merchant to (While the case was pending before the SC, DBP collected the debt fro
enter the Philippine Islands as such widow and children; and, second, m the mortgagor and took the necessary action of foreclosure on the r
the right of such widow, as a merchant and the successor to her esidential lot of the Leuterios.)
husband, to enter the said Islands and to bring her children with her."
ISSUE: WON the widow of the decedent Dr. Leuterio may file the suit
Counsel then says: "It would appear that the first part of the foregoing against the insurer, Grepalife. YES.
questions has been resolved by this honorable tribunal against such
RULING:
right of entrance."
6
Wills and Succession Case Digests
A policy of insurance upon life or health may pass by FACTS:
transfer, will or succession to any person, whether he -GSIS sold to a certain Macaria Vda. de Caiquep a parcel of residential
has an insurable interest or not, and such person may land of the GSIS low cost Housing Project. This was evidenced by a
recover it whatever the insured might have recovered. The wid Deed of Absolute Sale.
ow of the decedent Dr. Leuterio may therefore file the suit against the -An encumbrance was annotated at the back of the title, not to sell,
insurer, Grepalife. convey, lease or sublease, or otherwise encumber the property within
5 years from the time that the final and absolute ownership thereof
The rationale of a group insurance policy of mortgagors,
becomes vested in the vendee.
otherwise known as the "mortgage redemption insurance," is
- A day after the issuance of TCT in favor of Macaria, she sold the
device for the protection of both the mortgagee and the
subject lot to private respondent, Maximo Menez, Jr., as evidenced by
mortgagor. On the part of the mortgagee (DBP herein), it has
a Deed of Absolute Sale.
to enter into such form of contract so that in the event of the
-GSIS prohibited him from registering it since it was prohibited but he
unexpected demise of the mortgagor (Dr. Leuterio herein)
was able to get a TCT later. The said TCT was lost, but private
during the subsistence of the mortgage contract, the proceeds from su
respondent subsequently obtained a duplicate after judicial
ch insurance will be applied to the payment of the
proceedings.
mortgage debt, thereby relieving the heirs of the mortgagor
-Petitioner San Agustin, nephew of Macaria, who was the present
from paying the obligation. In a similar vein, ample protection
occupant and heir of Macaria, claimed that he was not notified and so
is given to the mortgagor under such a concept so that in the event of
he file a motion to reopen a Reconstitution Proceedings. Both RTC and
death; the mortgage obligation will be extinguished
CA ruled in favor of private respondent.
by the application of the insurance proceeds to the mortgage
indebtedness. ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Sale between Macaria Vda. de Caiquep
Grepalife failed to clearly and satisfactorily establish that there was con
and private respondent is valid upon San Agustin being an heir of
cealment made by the insured, hence, it cannot refuse
Macaria. YES
payment of the claim. However, the SC noted that while the
case was pending before it, DBP foreclosed the residential lot RULING:
of the Leuterios, in satisfaction of Dr. Leuterio’s outstanding -The said contract of sale is binding upon the heirs of Macaria Vda. de
loan. Considering this supervening event, the insurance Caiquep, including petitioner who alleges to be one of her heirs, in line
proceeds shall inure to the benefit of the heirs of the deceased with the rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
person or his beneficiaries. Equity dictates that DBP should notunjustly predecessors-in-interest. The general rule is that a party’s contractual
enrich itself at the expense of another. Hence, it rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. Moreover,
cannot collect the insurance proceeds, after it already obligations arising from sale is transmissible.
foreclosed on the mortgage. The proceeds now rightly belong - San Agustin is said to be not entitled to a notice having no interest in
to Dr. Leuterio's heirs represented by his widow, Medarda Leuterio. the property based on the memorandum annotated at the back of the
TCT.
11 - ERNESTO ROBLES, petitioner,
-The contract of sale remains valid between the parties, unless and
vs.
until annulled in the proper suit filed by the rightful party, the GSIS. In
HON. DELFIN FL. BATACAN, HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ,
this case, the GSIS, the proper party, has not filed any action for the
HON. JOSE B. JIMENEZ. ATANACIO GERONIMO and
annulment of Deed of Sale between them and Macaria Vda. de
BENEDICTO GERONIMO, respondents.
Caiquep, nor for the forfeiture of the lot in question.
FACTS: Severino Geronimo worked in the petitioner’s land for twenty -Since, both were aware of the existence of the stipulated condition in
years until 1969. Following Severino’s death, an ejectment suit was favor of the original seller, GSIS, yet both entered into an agreement
filed by petitioner, Robles, against Severino’s two sons – Benedicto and violating said condition and nullifying its effects, said parties should be
Atanacio. held in estoppel to assail and annul their own deliberate acts.
Benedicto did not choose to answer and was declared in default.
Atanacio, however, averred that he was entitled to succeed his father,
as Robles’ agricultural tenant, in accordance with R.A. No. 1199 and
Sec. 9 of R.A. No. 3844 which provides that he could remain in Robles’
13 - JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
land under the same terms and conditions of the original tenancy
AND MARIA MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA
share arrangement entered into between his father and Robles.
VILLACARLOS, respondents.
Robles, for his part, insists that Severino was never an agricultural
[G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000]
tenant but worked merely as a watcher in his land.
Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) rendered judgment in favor of FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament
Atanacio. CA affirmed the decision of CAR. of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, (predecessor-in-
interest of Johnny S. Rabadilla) was instituted as a devisee of 511,
ISSUE: WON Atanacio has the right to succeed his father as an
855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of
agricultural tenant. YES
the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil was duly probated and
HELD: As the son of Severino Geronimo, Atanacio had the right to admitted. The relevant provision of the said Codicil which is put to
take over as agricultural tenant in the petitioner’s land in accordance issue is:
with R.A. No. 1199 and R.A. No. 3844.
SIXTH
Obviously, Atanacio was the only heir interested in succeeding his
father as his brother, Benedicto, had not seen fit to claim his right and I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the
in fact defaulted in resisting the petitioner’s claims in the ejectment event that the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir
suit. Significantly, when in his prayer the petitioner asks for authority shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee,
to appoint the said Benedicto to succeed his father, it is presumably as mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver yearly
his watcher only and not as agricultural tenant. The petitioner’s ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
consistent claim, it should be noted, is that Severino Geronimo was not Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of
his tenant but only his watcher. Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina
shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot,
12 - San Agustin vs CA, 371 SCRA 346, December 4, 2001
not have respected my command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria
7
Wills and Succession Case Digests
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 Aniceto died and was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe
from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near and Teodora, who inherited said lots.
desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation to give
Record, however, showed that Fortunato Santiago was
the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I
issued a TCT covering Lot 773 and that he,
further command in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his
MonicoFuentebella and Rosendo Alvarez were in possession
heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should
of the same.
they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others
than my near descendants and my sister. Subsequently, the lots were sold by Santiago to
MonicoFuentebella.
Pursuant to the same Codicil, the lot in dispute was
transferred to Dr. Jorge Rabanilla (deceased) who was survived by his When Fuentebella died, his administratix sold the lots to
wife Rufina and children,Johnny, Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida. Rosendo Alvarez.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos In 1960, the Yanes heirs filed a complaint before the CFI
brought a complaint against the heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce against Santiago, Fuentebella and Alvarez for the return of
the provisions of subject Codicil. The plaintiff then prayed that the ownership and possession of the lots.
judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot
During the pendency of the case, Alvarez sold the lots to
No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the
Rodolfo Siason, and a TCT was issued in Sison’s name.
cancellation of TCT in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the CFI ruled in favor of Yanes heirs. However, the decision
surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza. could not be executed because Siason was in possession and
had a TCT over the lots issued in his name. The CFI had to
On November 15, 1998, an amicable settlement was entered into a
nullify its previous order.
Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred
piculs of sugar to Maria. However, there was no compliance with the In 1968, the Yanes heirs filed another action for the
aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial delivery of recovery of the lots with damages. They prayed that the TCT
50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989. issued to Siason be cancelled for being null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the rights and obligations of Dr. Jorge The lower court dismissed the case against Siason for being
Rabadilla were transferred/transmitted to his heirs upon his death. a buyer in good faith. However, Alvarez, who sold the land
to Siason, was adjudged to pay the Yanes heirs P20,000 for
HELD: YES. It is a general rule under the law on succession
the value of the lots with damages.
that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to Rosendo Alvarez died and was succeeded by his heirs.
succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and
descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the According to the Alvarez heirs, the liability incurred by the
widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner, deceased Rosendo Alvarez and his obligation to pay the
his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Yanes heirs should be his sole liability alone or of his estate,
Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need after his death and that such obligations are not
of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to transmissible to his heirs.
them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. ISSUE:
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all WON the liability of Rosendo Alvarez to pay the
the property, rights and obligations of a person, not Yanes heirs as adjudged by the court is transmissible
extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge by operation of law to his legal heirs? – YES.
Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his
forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not HELD:
extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; YES. The liability or obligation of Rosendo Alvarez to pay the
corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Yanes heirs as adjudged by the court is transmissible by
Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs operation of law to his legal heirs.
upon his death.
The following are the bases for the ruling:
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue
would be delivered to the herein private respondent every year. Upon of which the property, rights and obligations to the
the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
rights and title over the said property, and they also assumed his transmitted through his death to another or others
(decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein either by his will or by operation of law.
private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property,
corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the rights and obligations of a person which are not
fulfillment or performance of which is now being demanded by the extinguished by his death.
latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private
respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the
erred in dismissing the complaint below. parties, their assigns and heirs except in case where
the rights and obligations arising from the contract are
14 - ALVAREZ vs. IAC and YANES not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
GR No. L-68053 May 7, 1990 provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value
FACTS: of the property received from the decedent.
In 1917, two parcels of land, Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B, The general rule is that a party's contractual rights and
originally known as Lot 773, were registered in the name of obligations are transmissible to the successors.
the heirs of AnicetoYanes.
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the
deceased party is not altered by the provision of Rule 89 of
8
Wills and Succession Case Digests
the Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be At the time of the sale, the co-ownership constituted or covered
liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is these three lots adjacent to each other. And since Flaviano
distributed among said heirs. Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land area or
1,173 sq. meters as his share, he had a perfect legal and lawful right
The reason is that whatever payment is made from the
to dispose of 781 sq.meters of his share to the Pamplona spouses.
estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs, since the
Indeed, there was still a remainder of some 392 sq. meters belonging
amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the
to him at the time of the sale.
shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.
Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which
The rule is a consequence of the progressive private respondents received from their deceased parents
"depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties that, as and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the property
observed by VictorioPolacco, has characterized the history of rights and obligations which were not extinguished by their
these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation parents' death. And under Art. 1311, paragraph1, New Civil
from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a Code, the contract of sale executed by the deceased
relation from patrimony to patrimony with the persons FlavianoMoreto took effect between the parties, their assigns
occupying only a representative position, barring those rare and heirs, who are the private respondents
cases where the obligation is strictly personal, in herein. Accordingly, to the private respondents is transmitted
consideration of its performance by a specific person and by the obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole area of
no other. 781sq. meters to the petitioners (which was the original
obligation of their predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and not only
Petitioners, being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez,
one-half thereof. Private respondents must comply with said
cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's
obligation.
transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for
damages. It is of no moment that petitioners did not inherit 16 - G.R. No. L-44837 November 23, 1938
the property herein because,by legal fiction, the monetary SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA, plaintiffs-
equivalent thereof became their father's hereditary estate, appellees,
vs.
We have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in
CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL., defendants-appellants
their totality for the payment of debts of the estate.
Facts: In the year 1916, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the
maritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco. Out of the cohabitation, a child was
extent of the value of their inheritance.
born, plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma, who was acknowledged by Lorenzo
15 - PAMPLONA V MORETO as his natural daughter. Subsequently, Lorenzo issued in favor of
FACTS: Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega werehusband and wife. Socorro a promissory note amounting to P2000.00 which remained
During their marriage, they acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495,4545, unpaid.
and 1496 situated in Calamba, Laguna. They begot 6 children during
Lorenzo died in 1930 without any property, leaving defendant
theirmarriage.
Mclachlin and her children as her compulsory heirs. Two years later,
On May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega died intestatein Calamba, Laguna.
Lorenzo's father Eusebio died, and because Eusebio left some personal
On July 30, 1952, Flaviano Moreto, withoutthe consent of the heirs of
and real properties without a will, an intestate proceeding was
his Monica, and before any liquidation of theconjugal partnership could
instituted.
be effected, executed in favor of GeminianoPamplona, married to
defendant Apolonia Onte, a deed of absolute sale coveringlot No. 1495 Upon the institution of the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco
for P900.00. As a result of the sale, a new transfer certificateof title and the appointment of the committee on claims and appraisal,
was issued in the name of Geminiano Pamplona married to Apolonia Socorro Ledesma filed for the payment of the promissory note before
Onte. the Committee. Subsequently, the court issued an order of declaration
After the execution of the deed of sale, thePamplona and Onte as well of heirs in the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco but however,
as their son, Rafael Pamplona, constructed theirhouse on the eastern Ana Quitco Ledesma was not included among the declared heirs.
part of lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the time of thesale, pointed to
Plaintiffs now sought recovery of the sum out of the properties
it as the land which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona.
inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by
On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto diedintestate.
representation which were subject to the payment of debts and
In 1961, the plaintiffs demandedon the defendants to vacate the
obligations of their deceased father, who died without leaving any
premises where they had their house and piggeryon the ground that
property.
Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the lot which he soldto Geminiano
Pamplona as the same belongs to the conjugal partnership ofFlaviano Issue: WON the plaintiffs may recover from the defendants the debt
and his deceased wife and the latter was already dead when the contracted by Lorenzo.
salewas executed without the consent of the plaintiffs who are the
Held: While it is true that under the provisions of articles 924 to
heirs of Monica.
927 of the Civil Code, a child presents his father or mother who died
Pamplona and Onte refused tovacate the premises occupied by them
before him in the properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this
and hence, this suit was instituted by theheirs of Monica Maniega
right of representation does not make the said child answerable for the
seeking for the declaration of thenullity of the deed of sale as regards
obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as
one-half of the property subject matter of said deed and among
may be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
others.
referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with
RTC ruled in favor of plaintiffs. CA affirmed.
the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the
ISSUE: WON PLAINTIFFS AS MONICA'S HEIRSARE OBLIGED
properties received from their predecessor.
TO DELIVER THE PROPERTY TO PAMPLONA; YES
We have ruled that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of
partnership was already dissolved six years before (upon death of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness
Monica) and therefore, the estate became a co- of their said father from whom they did not inherit anything.
ownership between Flaviano Moreto, the surviving husband, and the
Therefore, the claim for the payment of an indebtedness contracted by
heirs of his deceased wife, Monica Maniega.
a deceased person cannot be filed for its collection before the
committee on claims and appraisal, appointed in the intestate of his
9
Wills and Succession Case Digests
father, and the properties inherited from the latter by the children of Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes
said deceased do not answer for the payment of the indebtedness two exceptions, viz: (1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or
contracted during the lifetime of said person. refuses to bring suit and (2) when the administrator is alleged to have
participated in the act complained of and he is made a party
Art. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the
defendant. Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief
moment of the death of the decedent. (657a)
to recover property of the estate is as compelling when there is no
appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is an appointed
17 - RIOFERIO vs CA administrator but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the
FACTS: On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will. guilty parties himself.
He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, and 7 children All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue
(respondents). Apart from the respondents, he has a paramour for the recovery of property of the estate during the pendency of
Teodora Riofero, and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena. administration proceedings has three exceptions, the third being when
Respondents discovered that on June 29, 1995, petitioners executed there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.
anExtrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with
Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent and 18 - HEIRS OF CALPATURA, SR vs. PRADO
that accordingly, the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan issued Certificates January 20, 2004
of Titles in favor of petitioners Teodora. Petitioners were able to obtain FACTS: Spouses Patricio Prado Sr. and Narcisa Prado owned a
a loan of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by residential land. Subsequently, Patricio died. Narcisa subsequently
executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties subject of the married Bonifacio Calpatura. In order to support her minor children
extra-judicial settlement. with her first husband, Narcisa sold to her brother-in-law, Tomas
Respondent Alfonso “Clyde” P. Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters Calpatura, Sr., the northern half portion of the said property.
of Administration before the RTC of Angeles City, praying that letters
of administration be issued to him. Respondents filed a Complaint for On April 8, 1991, respondents, Prado, et al, filed a complaint for
the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a declaration of nullity of sale and delivery of possession of the northern
Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and half portion of the subject property against petitioners Calpatura, et al.
Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles with and Other Related Respondents alleged among others that Narcisa, as natural guardian of
Documents with Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of her children, had no authority to sell the northern half portion of the
Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City before the property which she and her children co-owned.
Regional Trial Court. ISSUE: WON the sale of Narcisa’s conjugal share is valid.
PETITIONERS contend that the property pertained to the properties
originally belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero and that the RULING: YES. The property being conjugal, upon the death of Patricio
titles thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the Prado, Sr., one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved
decedent had managed to register them in his name. They contend to the surviving spouse, Narcisa, as her share in the conjugal
that the respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the partnership. Patricio’s rights to the other half, in turn, were transmitted
Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the upon his death to his heirs, which includes his widow Narcisa, who is
administration proceedings entitled to the same share as that of each of the legitimate children.
TC: court denied the motion saying that respondents, as heirs, are the
Inasmuch as Narcisa inherited one-seventh (1/7) of her husband's
real parties-in-interest especially in the absence of an administrator
conjugal share in the said property and is the owner of one-half (1/2)
who is yet to be appointed in S.P. Case No. 5118.
thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a total of 9/14 of the subject
CA: affirmed the decision.
property. Hence, Narcisa could validly convey her total undivided share
ISSUE: WON the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the
in the entire property to Tomas. Narcisa and her children are deemed
estate pending the appointment of an administrator? YES
co-owners of the subject property.
HELD: Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs
without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the While Narcisa could validly sell one half of the subject property, her
estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 share being 9/14 of the same, she could not have particularly
of the New Civil Code “that (t)he rights to succession are conveyed the northern portion thereof before the partition, the terms
transmitted from the moment of the death of the of which was still to be determined by the parties before the trial
decedent.” The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle court.
that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the
19 - EDUARDO FELIPE, HERMOGENA V. FELIPE AND VICENTE
inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another
V. FELIPE, petitioners,
or others by his will or by operation of law
vs.
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the
HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON, NAMELY: GIMENA ALMOSARA,
heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been
SOFIA ALDON, SALVADOR ALDON, AND THE HONORABLE
appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely
Section 3, Rule 3 and Section 2, Rule 8] of the Rules of Court. FACTS: Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara in 1936. The spouses
Gochan v. Young this Court recognized the legal standing of the heirs bought several pieces of land in Masbate. In 1951, Gimena Almosara
to represent the rights and properties of the decedent under sold the THREE lots to the spouses Eduardo Felipe and Hermogena V.
administration pending the appointment of an administrator. Thus: Felipe. The sale was made without the consent of her husband,
These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an Maximo.
administrator has already been appointed. But no rule
On 1976, the heirs of Aldon filed a complaint against the Felipes to
categorically addresses the situation in which special
recover the said properties alleging that were the owners of the lots
proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been
that they had orally mortgaged the same to the defendants and an
instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed.
offer to redeem the mortgage had been refused.
In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the
appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the The RTC ruled in favor of the Felipes however, this was reversed by
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the the CA ruling that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the ownership of
rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do the lots in question. Concerning the sale made in 1951 of the disputed
nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are lots, it is not a forgery. The fact is that the sale made by Gimena
violated or dissipated.
10
Wills and Succession Case Digests
Almosara is "invalid" having been executed without the needed for four years since the loss of the vessel" before he can be presumed
consent of her husband, the lots being conjugal. dead for all purposes. Applied to Capt. LUCERO, it is evidently
premature to presume him dead as four years has not yet expired.
ISSUE 1: What is the nature of the contract
Indeed, by the terms of the appointment of Capt. LUCERO, his
HELD: VOIDABLE . According to Article 166 of the CC, subject to
engagement terminates upon the return of the vessel at the Port of
certain exceptions, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real
Manila. He is considered to be still working entitling his spouse to
property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. In this
allotment until the vessel returns or until it is officially declared totally
case, Gimena,the wife, sold lands belonging to the conjugal
lost, or until the presumption of his death becomes effective in which
partnership without the consent of the husband and the sale is not
case the burden of proving that he is alive is shifted to his wife for
covered by the phrase "except in cases provided by law."
purposes of continuing her allotment.
ISSUE 2: Can the heirs of Aldon ask for the annulment said voidable
Article 391 of the Civil Code provides that:
contract?
HELD: NO. The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to annulment Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
by her husband only during the marriage because he was the victim including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on
who had an interest in the contract. Gimena, who was the party board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
responsible for the defect, could not ask for its annulment. missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the
vessel or aeroplane.
Their children could not likewise seek the annulment of the contract
while the marriage subsisted because they merely had an inchoate Issue: Whether or not presumption of death under Article 391 (1)
right to the lands sold. would apply. NO
The case of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is DIFFERENT. After the death of Held: It is undisputed that on February 16, 1980, the Company
Maximo they acquired the right to question the defective contract received three (3) radio messages from Capt. Lucero on board the M/V
insofar as it deprived them of their hereditary rights in their father's Eastern Minicon the last of which, received at 9:50 p.m. of that day,
share in the lands. The children's cause of action accrued from the was a call for immediate assistance in view of the existing "danger":
death of their father in 1959 and they had thirty (30) years to institute "sea water was entering the hatch"; the vessel "was listing 50 to 60
it (Art. 1141, Civil Code.) They filed action in 1976 which is well within degrees port," and they were "preparing to abandon the ship any
the period. time.' After this message, nothing more has been heard from the
vessel or its crew until the present time.
20 - G.R. No. L-60101 August 31, 1983
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending
vs. the loss and disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its
JOSEPHINE LUCERO crew. The foregoing facts, quite logically, are sufficient to lead
us to a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and that the
Facts: On October 31, 1979, Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed
persons aboard had perished with it. Upon this premise, the rule
by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc, as master/captain to its
on presumption of death under Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code must
vessel M/V Eastern Minicon plying the Hongkong – Manila route. Under
yield to the rule of preponderance of evidence. As this Court said
the contract, his employment was good for one (1) round trip only,
in Joaquin vs. Navarro". Where there are facts, known or knowable,
i.e., the contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of the
from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does
vessel at the Port of Manila, unless renewed. It was further agreed
not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls."
that part of the captain's salary, while abroad, should be paid to Mrs.
Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila. 21 - EMILIO EMNACE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
ESTATE OF VICENTE TABANAO, SHERWIN TABANAO, VICENTE
On February 16, 1980, while the vessel was enroute from Hongkong to
WILLIAM TABANAO, JANETTE TABANAO DEPOSOY, VICENTA
Manila where it was expected to arrive on February 18, 1980, Capt.
MAY TABANAO VARELA, ROSELA TABANAO and VINCENT
Lucero sent three (3) messages to the Company's Manila office. The
TABANAO, respondents.[G.R. No. 126334. November 23,
last message was:
2001]
FEBRUARY 16/80 2150 HRS
Topic: Article 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from
PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD the moment of the death of the decedent.
NEED IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE POSITION 19-35 N 116-40 E Facts:
SEAWATER ENTERING INSIDE HATCH VESSEL INCLINING 15 TO 20
Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and
DEGREES PORT IF POSSIBLE SEND IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE VESSEL
JacintoDivinagracia were partners in a business, the Ma. Nelma
IN DANGER PREPARING TO ABANDON ANYTIME
Fishing Industry.
MASTER
In 1986, they decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an
On July 16, 1980, Mrs. Lucero filed a complaint with the National agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties
Seamen Board, for payment of her accrued monthly allotment and for among them, consequent to Divinagracia’s withdrawal from the
continued payment of said allotments until the M/V Minicon shall have partnership.
returned to the port of Manila. She contended that the contract of
Assets to be distributed: 5 fishing boats, 6 vehicles, 2 parcels of land
employment entered into by her husband with the Company was on a
and cash deposits in BPI and Prudential Bank.
voyage-to-voyage basis, and that the same was to terminate only
upon the vessel's arrival in Manila. Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Tabanao’s
untimely demise in 1994, Emnace failed to submit to Tabanao’s heirs
On May 19, 1981, the Board rendered judgment in favor of Mrs.
any statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership, and to render
Josephine Lucero and against petitioner Company. The Board held that
an accounting of the partnership’s finances. Emnace also reneged on
the presumption of death could not be applied because the four-year
his promise to turn over to Tabanao’s heirs the deceased’s 1/3 share in
period provided for by Article 391(l) of the Civil Code had not yet
the total assets of the partnership, amounting to P30M or the sum of
expired.
P10M.
National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the said decision. It held
Tabanao’s heirs, respondents herein, filed against Emnace an action
that the person to be presumed dead should first "not been heard of
for accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages. In
11
Wills and Succession Case Digests
the amended complaint, the respondents are asking for Emnace to be Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and
ordered to “sell all (the partnership’s) assets and thereafter Laureano Tiambon
pay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield to the plaintiffs” their corresponding
share in the proceeds thereof. In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her
properties appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except, two small parcels of
Emanace’s defense in relation to Art 777: Lack of capacity of the
land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00,
estate of Tabanao to sue. Emnace asserts that the surviving spouse of
a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga
Vicente Tabanao has no legal capacity to sue since she was never
Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her
appointed as administratrix or executrix of his estate.
abovenamed heirs.
Issue: W/N the heirs have legal capacity to sue -- YES
The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her
Ruling:
death thus had a total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the
Petitioner The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to
executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can file the P129,362.11. 3 (1/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime
action. She and her children are complainants in their own right as of legitimate children and descendants).
successors of Vicente Tabanao.
In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in
From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao’s death, his rights insofar accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby
as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children and
the decedent. eight grandchildren.
Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the
partnership and petitioner were transmitted to respondents by Marina as executrix filed a project partition adjudicating the estate of
operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of the deceased. This was opposed by the other 6 of the 7
acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to abovementioned.
the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted.
ISSUE: WON the persons named in the will are considered as heirs or
Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary as devisees or legatees because the repetition of the phrase “I
shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died. A prior settlement of bequeath”
the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as executrix
or administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal Held: As heirs.
capacity to sue. As successors who stepped into the shoes of their
decedent upon his death, they can commence any action originally Articles 788 and 791 of the NCC provide:
pertaining to the decedent. From the moment of his death, his rights
as a partner and to demand fulfillment of petitioner’s obligations as "(I)f a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in
outlined in their dissolution agreement were transmitted to case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be
respondents. operative shall be preferred" and "(T)he words of a will are to receive
They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the court’s an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect,
intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations. rather than one which will render any of .the expressions inoperative;
and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which
will prevent intestacy."
NO 2nd Set In Villanueva vs. Juico 6 for violation of these rules of interpretation
as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of Court, 7 the
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the lower
3rd Set court's decision and stressed that "the intention and wishes of the
ARTICLE 788 testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of
interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its
Dizon Rivera vs Dizon execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith,
following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee, vs. ESTELA DIZON, clearly appears that his intention was otherwise."
TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA
DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants. The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal
law in the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of
FACTS: On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez. a the Supreme Court of Spain. 9 when expressed clearly and precisely in
widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by seven his last will amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively
compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and
Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix- devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the
appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate grand- courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided
daughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of and restricted by these fundamental premises, the Court finds for the
Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent appellee.
Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix'
executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-appellants. testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of
her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will after
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, I960 and commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the
written in the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate
the above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other of her last will and for the administration of her property in accordance
legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I
12
Wills and Succession Case Digests
command that my property be divided" in accordance with the
dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the
each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir same Leonor Villaflor mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as
among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor".
whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition 10 of her
estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article
1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the
partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition administrator of the estate of the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on
shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death, said
compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his estate is plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the real and personal
subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his
will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position, adopted
The repeated use of the words — "I bequeath'' in the testamentary by the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became
dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same absolutely vested in the widow upon her death, on account of the fact
into devises to be taken solely from the free one-half disposable that she never remarried.
portion of the estate, where it clearly appears from the whole context
of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate that
her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her will. ISSUE: W/N the subject properties became absolutely vested in the
The testatrix intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of widow upon her death. NO.
adjudications to her beneficiaries as heirs and not as devisees, and
that said dispositions are on account of the respective legitime of the
RULING: We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of
compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the testamentary
the testator, as manifested in clause 8 of his testament, was to invest
adjudications which state that "in case any of those I name as my
his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties
heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced
described in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition
heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the
(admitted by the appellee) that if the widow remarried, her rights
properties I bequeath to said deceased
would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That the widow
was meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties,
even if she did not remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used
Vda. De Villanueva vs Juico by the deceased "uso y posesion mientras viva" (use and possession
while alive) in which the first half of the phrase "uso y posesion"
G.R. No. L-15737 February 28, 1962 instead of "dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras
LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant, viva"). The testator plainly did not give his widow the full ownership of
vs.DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator these particular properties, but only the right to their possession and
of the testate estate of FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO,defendant- use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the
appellee. remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal heir
together with the testator's brother (clause 6).
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions
child with his wife Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter, already a contained in clause 7 of his testament should not be allowed to
widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of the Court of obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain words, which
First Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of her husband's estate are over the primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note
and in that proceeding, she was appointed judicial administratrix. In that if the testator had intended to impose as sole condition the non-
due course of administration, she submitted a project of partition, In remarriage of his widow, the words "uso y posesion mientras viva"
the order of November 24, 1924, the probate court approved the would have been unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry
project of partition and declared the proceeding closed. As the project during her own lifetime.
of partition now shows Doña Fausta Nepomuceno received by virtue
thereof the ownership and possession of a considerable amount of real Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense,
and personal estate. By virtue also of the said project of partition, she unless the context clearly indicates a contrary intention, or unless it
received the use and possession of all the real and personal properties satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely by the testator,
mentioned and referred to in Clause 7th of the will. The order and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense.
approving the project of partition, however, expressly provided that
approval thereof was "sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en la clausula 8.o
del testamento de Nicolas Villaflor." . The Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate of Calderon,
On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died without having 26 Phil., 233, that the intention and wishes of the testator, when
contracted a second marriage, and without having begotten any child clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation,
with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now being settled in and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and
Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower court, with the defendant fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain
Delfin N. Juico as the duly appointed and qualified judicial and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears
administrator. that his intention was otherwise.
13
Wills and Succession Case Digests
directed to render accounts and to proceed to the partition of the said
As already shown, the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and estates.
unmistakably provided that his widow should have the possession and
use of the legacies while alive and did not remarry. It necessarily The controversy between the parties upon this branch of the case is as
follows that by the express provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the follows:
legacies should pass to the testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant herein, The defendant claims that the plaintiff is entitled to nothing under the
upon the widow's death, even if the widow never remarried in her wills, because the gift to him was conditional, the condition being that
lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose of he should be the natural son of Don Clemente, recognized by the latter
the aforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable to the as such in one of the ways pointed out by the Civil Code; that he can
reversionary legatee for their return, unless they had been lost due to not prove such recognition, the parol evidence presented at the trial
fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent third being prohibited by said Code, and that he has therefore not complied
parties have intervened. with the condition.
The plaintiff claims that such evidence was proper, that both wills state
that Don Ramon del Rosario is the natural son of Don Clemente, and
Del Rosario vs Del Rosario that in any event the bequests are made to the plaintiff by name.
RAMON DEL ROSARIO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CLEMENTE DEL RULING: The court below, holding the parol evidence immaterial,
ROSARIO, defendant-appellant. ordered judgment for the plaintiff as prayed for.
WILLARD, J.: (1) So far as the disposition of that part of the inheritance left in the
aunt's will to Doña Luisa for life is concerned, the question is free from
FACTS: Don Nicolas del Rosario died in this city on July 14, 1897, doubt. It is distinctly declared that Ramon del Rosario and Enrique
leaving a last will, the eighth, ninth, eleventh, and eighteenth clauses Gloria shall take certain parts of it after 1,000 pesos have been
of which are as follows: deducted. They are pointed out by name as the legatees. It is true
that they are called the natural sons of Don Clemente. But this is
Eight. The testator declares that the 5,000 pesos which he brought to merely a further description of persons already well identified, and, if
his marriage he hereby bequeathes to his nephew Enrique Gloria y false, can be rejected in accordance with the provision of article 773 of
Rosario and Ramon del Rosario, natural children of his brother the Civil Code, which by article 789 is applicable to legatees.
Clemente del Rosario, notwithstanding the fact that they purport to be
the issue of the marriage of Escolastico Gloria and Rosendo del
Rosario, successively. Balanay vs Martinez
Ninth. The testator declares that the said sum of 5,000 pesos is to be
divided, 3,000 pesos for the first named and 2,000 pesos for the G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975
second named, the delivery of the said sums to be effected by the wife petitioner, vs. HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the
of the testator, provided that these young men behave themselves as Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI; AVELINA B.
they have done up to the present time, and do not cease to study until ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.
taking the degree of bachelor of arts, and then take a business course,
if their health will permit, their support to be paid out of the Facts:
testamentary estate and they to live in the house of the widow. Leodegaria Julian was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and
by their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B.
Eleventh. The testator declares that in a case the said young men
Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban
should be still engaged in study at the time of the death of the
and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
testator's wife, they shall continue to be supported at the expense of
the testamentary estate, without deducting such expenses from their
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed a petition for the probate of his mother's
legacies, if they should desire to continue the same studies.
notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In
Eighteenth. The testator further states that although his wife is at the
that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of the
present time fifty-five years of age, and consequently is not likely to
"southern half of nine conjugal lots; (b) that she was the absolute
marry again, as she herself says, nevertheless it is impossible that the
owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her father, and
opposite of what she asserts might occur, and, if so, then it is to be
(c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided
regarded as sufficient reason to authorize the young men Ramon and
among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes
Enrique, so often referred to, separate from their aunt, in which event
should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties. Then, in
they are to be supported by the testamentary estate on a small
paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death her
allowance of twenty-five pesos per month, provided that they continue
paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she described as
their studies or should be in poor health, this without in any respect
"my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set
reducing the amount of their shares.
forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal
lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her
Don Ramon del Rosario, one of the persons mentioned in these husband's one half share of the conjugal assets.
clauses, brought this action in 1902 against Don Clemente del Rosario,
the then executor, asking, among other things, that the said executor Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the
pay him an allowance from the death of the widow of the testator at will. Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply attached thereto an affidavit of Felix
the rate of 75 pesos a month, and that the executor allow him to live Balanay, Sr. wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate of the
in the house in which the widow was living at that time. will and signed an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic) of Division
The widow of the testator, Doña Honorata Valdez, died on July 7, and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein he manifested that he
1900. "waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of
The court below ordered judgment in respect to this allowance, and their six children. In that same instrument he confirmed the
the right to live in the house as prayed for by the plaintiff. agreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her death, that
Don Ramon del Rosario claims in this action that he is now entitled, by their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the manner indicated
virtue of both wills, to a certain part of the share of the estates left to in her will.
said Doña Luisa during her life, and he asks that the defendant be
14
Wills and Succession Case Digests
Avelina B. Antonio contended that the affidavit and "conformation" of ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an
Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The lower court "denied" the opposition act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it
and reset for hearing the probate of the will. It gave effect to the does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
affidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr. Mrs. Antonio moved for A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any
the reconsideration of the lower court's order on the grounds (a) that agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail
the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the owner of the southern himself of the right granted him in this article, by ordering that the
half of the conjugal lots and (b) that she could not partition the legitime of the other children to whom the property is not assigned be
conjugal estate by allocating portions of the nine lots to her children. paid in cash. (1056a)
In the meanwhile, David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the lawyer of The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate
petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of record was Atty. Cabreros), among her six children (her husband had renounced his hereditary
filed a motion to withdraw probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian rights and his one-half conjugal share). She did not assign the whole
and requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate proceeding." estate to one or more children as envisaged in article 1080. Hence, she
had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On the other
The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaña, adopted the hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a period of twenty
view of Attys. Montaña and Guyo that the will was void. So, it years. So, the provision that the estate should not be divided during
dismissed the petition for the probate, converted the testate her husband's lifetime would at most be effective only for twenty years
proceeding into an intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a from the date of her death unless there are compelling reasons for
notice to creditors and set the intestate proceeding for hearing. The terminating the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code).
lower court did not abrogate its prior orders of June 18 and October Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his
15, 1973. one-half share of the conjugal partnership (Arts. 179[1] and 1041, Civil
Code) but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his
Felix Balanay, Jr.,asked for the reconsideration on the ground that hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate (Art.
Atty. Montaña had no authority to withdraw the petition for the 1060[1] Civil Code), it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in
allowance of the will. Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should
the motion for reconsideration. The lower court denied the motion. be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at
Issue: least his legitime should be respected.
Whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity
of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity. NO Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the
Whether the probate court erred in declaring the will void. will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if
YES (Article 792) it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The
Held: distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably
validity even before its formal validity had been established. The divided among the children and the surviving spouse.
probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it
appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's
that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is conformity to his wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary
probated, the court should meet the issue. rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased
wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition
But the probate court erred in declaring that the will was void and in made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the
converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.
notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave
effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the
renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included his making of a will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had it at the
one-half share of the conjugal estate. time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will that such
was his intention". Under article 930 of the Civil Code "the legacy or
The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the testator
in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing
unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he made the
such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been will, afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall
made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a take effect."
will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they
can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her
the testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or husband intended to partition the conjugal estate in the manner set
doing injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873). forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose of by
will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had
half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such
she was a co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.
and proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code). But that illegal
declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His
disregarded. preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his
conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights. .
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate
be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime but should of the will as contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973.
be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary
to article 1080 of the Civil Code which reads:
15
Wills and Succession Case Digests
ARTICLE 789 male relative, he must have had in mind his nephew or a son of his
sister, who would be his third-degree relative, or possibly a
Estate of Rigor vs Rigor grandnephew. But since he could not prognosticate the exact date of
his death or state with certitude what category of nearest male relative
ESTATE OF RIGOR VS RIGOR would be living at the time of his death, he could not specify that his
G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979 nearest male relative would be his nephew or grandnephews (the son
of his nephew or niece) and so he had to use the term "nearest male
FACTS: Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on relative".
August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which
was probated by the CFI in its order of December 5, 1935 It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality
intended for Ramon Quiambao, the testator's nephew and godchild,
This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of who was the son of his sister, Mrs. Quiambao. To prove that
ricelands located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around contention, the legal heirs presented in the lower court the affidavit of
forty- four hectares That devise was made in the will of the late Father Beatriz Gamalinda, the maternal grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan,
Pascual Rigor, in favor of his nearest male relative who would study for who deposed that after Father Rigor's death her own son, Valentin
the priesthood. Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the devise, although he was studying for
on February 19, 1954, the parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending the priesthood at the San Carlos Seminary, because she (Beatriz) knew
testate proceeding a petition praying for the appointment of a new that Father Rigor had intended that devise for his nearest male relative
administrator (succeeding the deceased administration Florencia beloning to the Rigor family (pp. 105-114, Record on Appeal).
Rigor), who should deliver to the church the said ricelands, and further Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G.
praying that the possessors thereof be ordered to render an Cunanan, was not the one contemplated in Father Rigor's will and that
accounting of the fruits. Edgardo's father told her that he was not consulted by the parish
The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated priest of Victoria before the latter filed his second motion for
March 25, 1957 praying that the bequest be declared inoperative and reconsideration which was based on the ground that the testator's
that they be adjudged as the persons entitled to the said ricelands grandnephew, Edgardo, was studying for the priesthood at the San
since, as admitted by the parish priest of Victoria, "no nearest male Jose Seminary.
relative of" the testator "has ever studied for the priesthood" Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo
ISSUE: WON the will executed was operative? NO ceased to be a seminarian in 1961. For that reason, the legal heirs
apprised the Court of Appeals that the probate court's order
HELD: The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the adjudicating the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria had no more
matter of testaments. When his intention is clearly and precisely leg to stand on (p. 84, Appellant's brief).
expressed, any interpretation must be in accord with the plain and
literal meaning of his words, except when it may certainly appear that Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is tantamount to evidence
his intention was different from that literally expressed. aliunde as to the testator's intention and which is hearsay, has no
probative value. Our opinion that the said bequest refers to the
From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that testator's nephew who was living at the time of his death, when his
the testator intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male succession was opened and the successional rights to his estate
relative who would become a priest, who was forbidden to sell the became vested, rests on a judicious and unbiased reading of the terms
ricelands, who would lose the devise if he discontinued his studies for of the will.
the priesthood, or having been ordained a priest, he was
excommunicated, and who would be obligated to say annually twenty Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas
masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of the testator and his cercano que estudie la camera eclesiatica" would include indefinitely
parents. anyone of his nearest male relatives born after his death, he could
have so specified in his will He must have known that such a broad
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would provision would suspend for an unlimited period of time the
administer the ricelands only in two situations: one, during the interval efficaciousness of his bequest.
of time that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no
the priesthood and two, in case the testator's nephew became a priest haya legatario acondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he was
and he was excommunicated. referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at the time of his
What is not clear is the duration of "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya death, who would like to become a priest, was still in grade school or
legatario acondicionado", or how long after the testator's death would in high school or was not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish
it be determined that he had a nephew who would pursue an priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands before the nephew
ecclesiastical vocation. It is that patent ambiguity that has brought entered the seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew entered
about the controversy between the parish priest of Victoria and the the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy and administer the
testator's legal heirs. ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship
would be terminated.
SC held that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male
relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether
thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or at the time Father Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was
legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his desire to follow
case of representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code). the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically answered in
paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and
The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "not male
construed. To construe them as referring to the testator's nearest male relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the
relative at anytime after his death would render the provisions difficult priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal).
to apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That
could not have been his intention. Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who
became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in
In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest leagal heirs were his three question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration
sisters or second-degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt
Mrs. Quiambao. Obviously, when the testator specified his nearest was likewise inoperative.
16
Wills and Succession Case Digests
The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was W/N Ramon is entitled to the allowance and the right to live in the
constituted by the testator in is favor assumes that he was a trustee or widow’s house.
a substitute devisee That contention is untenable. A reading of the
W/N Ramon is entitled to his claim over the estate left to Dona Luisa
testamentary provisions regarding the disputed bequest not support
by Don Nicolas.
the view that the parish priest of Victoria was a trustee or a substitute
devisee in the event that the testator was not survived by a nephew Holding:
who became a priest.
1. No. While by the eight clause the support of the plaintiff and of Don
It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become Enrique Gloria is charged against the estate, yet the eleventh clause
a trustee only when the testator's nephew living at the time of his makes it plain that this unconditional right was to last only during the
death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet entered the lifetime of the widow. After her death the right to this allowance is
seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. made to depend on the continuance of their studies. That this is the
Those two contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in correct construction of the will is made more plain by the eighteenth
this case because no nephew of the testator manifested any intention clause above quoted. In the case of their separation from their aunt by
to enter the seminary or ever became a priest. her remarriage, they were entitled to the specified allowance of 25
pesos a month only on condition that they were pursuing their studies
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article
or were in poor health. The court did not find that the plaintiff was still
888 of the old Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the
pursuing his studies. On the contrary, he found that the plaintiff had
bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into
fulfilled the condition by obtaining the degree of Bachelor of Arts in
the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right
1898. The right to live in the house of the widow terminated at her
of accretion exists"
death.
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now
2. Yes. So far as the disposition of that part of the inheritance left in
article 960 (2), which provides that legal succession takes place when
the aunt's will to Doña Luisa for life is concerned, the question is free
the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There
from doubt. It is distinctly declared that Ramon del Rosario and
being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same
Enrique Gloria shall take certain parts of it after 1,000 pesos have been
should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as
deducted. They are pointed out by name as the legatees. It is true
if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.
that they are called the natural sons of Don Clemente. But this is
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and merely a further description of persons already well identified, and, if
partly intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. The old rule false, can be rejected in accordance with the provision of article 773 of
as to the indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer valid. Thus, if a the Civil Code, which by article 789 is applicable to legatees.
conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate
succession as to the property recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon
Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267). Rabadilla vs CA
17
Wills and Succession Case Digests
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to Vda De Villaflor vs Juico
deliver One Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza
Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,
Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they vs. DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator
sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The of the testate estate of FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO,defendant-
Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver appellee.
the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the
property and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non- FACTS: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of
performance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish in his own
of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona
descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal properties,
testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in- giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor.
interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non- The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and
fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir 7th thereof would be deemed annulled from the moment he bore any
and his successors-in-interest. child with Doña Fausta Nepomuceno.
ISSUE 2: WON the will may be subject to compromise agreement; NO
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the child with his wife Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter, already a
amicable settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of the Court of
been assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had First Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of her husband's estate
become the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have and in that proceeding, she was appointed judicial administratrix. In
made a substantial and constructive compliance of his obligation due course of administration, she submitted a project of partition, In
through the consummated settlement between the lessee and the the order of November 24, 1924, the probate court approved the
private respondent, and having consummated a settlement with the project of partition and declared the proceeding closed. As the project
petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of of partition now shows Doña Fausta Nepomuceno received by virtue
the obligation under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of thereof the ownership and possession of a considerable amount of real
subject property. and personal estate. By virtue also of the said project of partition, she
received the use and possession of all the real and personal properties
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free
mentioned and referred to in Clause 7th of the will. The order
act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his
approving the project of partition, however, expressly provided that
death. Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends
approval thereof was "sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en la clausula 8.o
how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator
del testamento de Nicolas Villaflor." .
must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a
On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died without having
compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose
contracted a second marriage, and without having begotten any child
of making a Will.
with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now being settled in
Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower court, with the defendant
Delfin N. Juico as the duly appointed and qualified judicial
administrator.
ARTICLE 791 The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the
same Leonor Villaflor mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as
Dizon Rivera vs Dizon his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor".
FACTS: Agripina J. Valdez's testamentary disposition was in the nature Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the
of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her administrator of the estate of the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on
will, after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death, said
as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the real and personal
probate of her last will and for the administration of her property in properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his
accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position, adopted
wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with by the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became
the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she absolutely vested in the widow upon her death, on account of the fact
specified each real property in her estate and designated the particular that she never remarried.
heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren
to whom she bequeathed the same. ISSUE: W/N the subject properties became absolutely vested in the
In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in widow upon her death. NO.
accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised
and bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the RULING: We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of
entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight the testator, as manifested in clause 8 of his testament, was to invest
grandchildren. his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties
described in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition
It clearly appears from the whole context of the will and the (admitted by the appellee) that if the widow remarried, her rights
disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That the widow
properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) was meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties,
that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her even if she did not remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used
will. The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary by the deceased "uso y posesion mientras viva" (use and possession
dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same while alive) in which the first half of the phrase "uso y posesion"
into devises to be taken solely from the free one-half disposable instead of "dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras
portion of the estate. viva"). The testator plainly did not give his widow the full ownership of
these particular properties, but only the right to their possession and
18
Wills and Succession Case Digests
use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the ISSUE: WON the Trial Court erred in its interpretation of the will. YES
remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal heir
HELD:
together with the testator's brother (clause 6).
The trial court has not properly interpreted the real import of the wish
of the testatrix. Analyzing it carefully we will find that the same
The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as
contains a clear directive to employ appellant as may be seen from the
reversionary legatee, could succeed to the properties bequeathed by
words preceding the word "pahihintulutan", which say: "Dapat din
clause 7 of the testament only in the event that the widow remarried,
naman malaman ng dalawa kong tagapagmana na sila MARIA PABLO
has unwarrantedly discarded the expression "mientras viva," and
at ANGELINA GONZALES na sila ay may dapat TUNGKULIN O
considered the words "uso y posesion" as equivalent to "dominio"
GANGPANAN GAYA ng mga sumusunod." The words 'dapat
(ownership). In so doing, the trial court violated Article 791 of the Civil
TUNGKULIN O GANGPANAN" mean to do or to carry out as a mandate
Code of the Philippines.
or directive, and having reference to the word "pahihintulutan", can
convey no other meaning than to impose a duty upon appellees. To
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions
follow the interpretation given by the trial court would be to devoid the
contained in clause 7 of his testament should not be allowed to
wish of the testatrix of its real and true meaning.
obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain words, which
are over the primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note Article 797 of the old Civil Code, invoked by the trial court, is
that if the testator had intended to impose as sole condition the non- inapplicable. That refers to an institution of an heir intended to be
remarriage of his widow, the words "uso y posesion mientras viva" conditional by providing that a statement to the effect cannot be
would have been unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry considered as a condition unless it appears clearly that such is the
during her own lifetime. intention of the testator. We are not faced here with any conditional
institution of heirship. What we have is a clear-cut mandate which the
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, heirs cannot fail to carry out.
unless the context clearly indicates a contrary intention, or unless it
ARTICLE 792
satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely by the testator,
and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense.
Balanay, Jr. vs Martinez
The Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate of Calderon,
26 Phil., 233, that the intention and wishes of the testator, when BALANAY vs. MARTINEZ
clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, GR No. L-39247 June 27, 1975
and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and
fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain ART 780. Mixed succession is that effected partly by will and
and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears partly by operation of law.
that his intention was otherwise.
FACTS:
As already shown, the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and
unmistakably provided that his widow should have the possession and Leodegaria Julian died and was survived by Felix Balanay Sr. and their
use of the legacies while alive and did not remarry. It necessarily 6 children.
follows that by the express provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the Felix Balanay Jr, one of the 6 children, filed a petition for the probate
legacies should pass to the testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant herein, of their mother’s notarial will.
upon the widow's death, even if the widow never remarried in her Their mother’s will declared that:
lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose of
the aforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable to the
reversionary legatee for their return, unless they had been lost due to 1. She owned the “southern half” of the conjugal lots.
fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent third 2. Her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands be divided
parties have intervened. and distributed in the manner set forth in the will.
Avelina Antonio and Felix Balanay Sr. opposed Balanay Jr’s petition,
Yambao vs Gonzales but an affidavit was filed where Felix Balanay Sr. withdrew his
opposition and renounced his hereditary rights over the estate of his
FACTS: wife.
Delfin Yambao brought the present action to have the Court order Avelina contended that the affidavit of renunciation was void.
Angelina Gonzales and Maria Pablo to appoint him as tenant on the
parcels of land inherited by them from Maria Gonzales.
A new lawyer, Atty. Montana, appeared in behalf of Felix Balanay Jr,
withdrawing the petition for probate of will and requesting for an
The basis of Yambao in the present action is the following provisions of intestate proceeding instead. Such was granted by the probate court.
Maria Gonzales’ will: Felix Balanay Jr. with a new lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration
Dapat din naman malaman ng dalawa kong tagapagmana na sila on the ground that Atty. Montana had no authority to withdraw the
MARIA PABLO at ANGELINA GONZALES na sila ay may dapat petition.
TUNGKULIN O GANGPANAN GAYA ng mga sumusunod: The probate court denied the motion and the will was declared void
x x x x x x x x x because of the disposition where the mother declared that she owned
(2) Pahihintulutan nila na si Delfin Yambao ang makapagtrabajo ng the “southern half” of the properties.
bukid habang panahon, at ang nasabing bukid ay isasailalim ng The disposition was declared illegal because she cannot declare
pamamahala ng Albasea samantalang ang bukid ay nasa usapin at ownership over the undivided conjugal properties, as her right as a co-
may utang pa. owner was inchoate and pro-indiviso.
Defendants averred that the provisions of the will relied upon by The court then ordered for intestate proceedings to commence instead
plaintiff is not mandatory; that the determination of who should be the of testate.
tenant of the land is vested in a special court.
The Court held that the defendants are not legally compelled to follow
such provisions invoking Art. 797 of the Civil Code. ISSUE:
19
Wills and Succession Case Digests
WON mixed succession may occur in this case? YES page, nor did the attestation state these facts. The new law, therefore,
went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of
the testator, without the testator having left a will that conforms to the
new requirements.
HELD:
Issue: The issue which this appeal presents is whether in the
Philippine Islands the law existing on the date of the execution of a
For mixed succession to occur, the invalid disposition must be
will, or the law existing at the death of the testator, controls.
separable from the valid dispositions. The invalid disposition must not
be a condition to the valid disposition. Ruling:
The probate court acted correctly in passing upon the intrinsic validity The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the
of the will before establishing its formal validity. execution of a will must be tested by the statutes in force at the time
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the of its execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have no
will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet retrospective effect.
the issues. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the testator has provided in detail
for the disposition of his property and that his desires should be
respected by the courts. Justice is a powerful pleader for the second
and third rules on the subject.
In reality, the will becomes a completed act when the will is executed
But the probate court erred in declaring that the will was void and in and attested according to the law, although it does not take effect on
converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding. the property until a future time.
The rule is that the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in The language of Act No. 2645 gives no indication of retrospective
a will does not result in the invalidity of the other disposition, unless it effect. The will in question is admittedly not executed and attested as
is presumed that the testator would not have made such other provided by the Code of Civil Procedure as amended. Nevertheless, it
dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made. is proper to observe that the general principle in the law of wills inserts
Hence, if there are certain dispositions in a will that are not valid, it will itself even within the provisions of said section 634. Our statute
not render the whole will invalid. The will remains valid, and the valid announces a positive rule for the transference of property which must
dispositions should be followed. be complied with as completed act at the time of the execution, so far
as the act of the testator is concerned, as to all testaments made
subsequent to the enactment of Act No. 2645, but is not effective as to
testaments made antecedent to that date.
Therefore, the will of Jose Riosa is valid.
The rule is testacy is favored over intestacy. The policy of the State is
to give effect to the wishes of the testator as much as possible.
The illegal disposition of Leodegaria declaring that she owned the
“southern half” of the properties can be rendered invalid, but the Enriquez vs Abadia
entire will is not nullified.
Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO
valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid ABADIA. SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-
without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the appellees, vs. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries. G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of
the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a co-
owner thereof, her share was inchoate and pro-indiviso. But That FACTS: On September 6, 1923, Fr. Sancho Abadia executed a
illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament. He died
disregarded. subsequently on January 14, 1943. He left properties estimated at
Hence, testacy should be favored over intestacy. The valid dispositions P8,000 in value.
of Leodegaria in her will should be followed, while the invalid ones On October 2, 1946, Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees
shall be effected by operation of law. (mixed succession) in said will filed a petition for its probate, in the same proceedings; no
opposition was filed by the other heirs. The trial court found and
declared that said will is a holographic will; that it was in the
handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was
executed and at the time of the testator’s death, holographic wills
were not permitted by law. Still the court upheld its validity reasoning
ARTICLE 795 that at the time of the hearing and when the case was decided, the
New Civil Code was already in force, and such code permitted the
execution of holographic wills. The TC’s ruling is in line with the liberal
In Re Will of Riosa
view and in order to carry out the intention of the testator which
according to the TC is the controlling factor and may override any
Facts:
defect in form.
Jose Riosa died on 1917. He left a will made on 1908, in which he
disposed of an estate. The will was duly executed in accordance with
the law then in force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil ISSUE: WON the provisions of the new Civil Code allowing
Procedure . The will was not executed in accordance with Act No. holographic wills may be applied in order to validate Fr. Abadia’s will?
2645, amendatory of said section 618, prescribing certain additional
formalities for the signing and attestation of wills, in force on and after
July 1, 1916. In other words, the will was in writing, signed by the HELD: NO.
testator, and attested and subscribed by three credible witnesses in
the presence of the testator and of each other; but was not signed by
the testator and the witnesses on the left margin of each and every
20
Wills and Succession Case Digests
Article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides:
"The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of HELD:
the law in force at the time it is made."
The above provision is but an expression or NO, the sale was void as it deprived the children of their right to the
statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the inheritance, which was transmitted upon the death of Winstanley.
validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the When Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel to
time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the seller's
presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided children.
by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One No formal or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's
reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon title, it follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it
and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about included the children's share.
the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is
given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality,
It is immaterial whether a short or long period of time lapses between
the death of the predecessor and the entry into possession of the
the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. (In re Will of
property of the inheritance because the right is always deemed to be
Riosa, 39 Phil., 23.)
retroactive from the moment of death.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the
testator should be the ruling and controlling factor and that all
adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order
to carry out said intention, and that when statutes passed after the
execution of the will and after the death of the testator lessen the Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides that the rights to the
formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death.
statutes should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed in a slightly different language, this article is incorporated in the new
according to the law in force at the time of execution. Civil Code as article 777.
However, we should not forget that from the day of the The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire
death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the a definite right to the inheritance, whether such right is pure or
legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right, contingent.
protected under the due process clause of the constitution On the other hand, the sale to Po having been made by authority of
against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal the competent court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that
requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate it has not been recorded is of no consequence. If registration were
such a will. necessary, still the non-registration would not avail in favor of Ibarle.
By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is
invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the
time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and
declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by Testate Estate of the Late Alipio Abada vs Abaja
intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal
requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO
execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby ABADIA. SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-
divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate appellees, vs. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
succession. The general rule is that the Legislature cannot G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954
validate void wills. (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).
FACTS: On September 6, 1923, Fr. Sancho Abadia executed a
document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament. He died
Ibarle vs Po subsequently on January 14, 1943. He left properties estimated at
P8,000 in value.
BIENVENIDO IBARLE vs. ESPERANZA PO On October 2, 1946, Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees
GR No. L-5064 February 27, 1953 in said will filed a petition for its probate, in the same proceedings; no
opposition was filed by the other heirs. The trial court found and
FACTS: declared that said will is a holographic will; that it was in the
handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was
executed and at the time of the testator’s death, holographic wills
Winstanley and Navarro were husband and wife. Winstanley died, were not permitted by law. Still the court upheld its validity reasoning
leaving Navarro and their minor children as heirs. that at the time of the hearing and when the case was decided, the
Winstanley left a parcel of land in Cebu, which was conjugal property. New Civil Code was already in force, and such code permitted the
Subsequently, Navarro sold the land to spouses Canoy. Canoy sold the execution of holographic wills. The TC’s ruling is in line with the liberal
land to Ibarle. view and in order to carry out the intention of the testator which
The two deeds of the two sales above were not registered. according to the TC is the controlling factor and may override any
Navarro, after being appointed guardian of her minor children, sold defect in form.
one-half of the subject land to Po.
The children alleged that they are the rightful owners of the property ISSUE: WON the provisions of the new Civil Code allowing
and filed an action to annul the sale. holographic wills may be applied in order to validate Fr. Abadia’s will?
HELD: NO.
Article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides:
ISSUE: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of
the law in force at the time it is made."
WON the sale of the property to Po was valid? NO. The above provision is but an expression or
statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the
validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the
21
Wills and Succession Case Digests
time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is 1.) WON the provision in the will of an alien which provides that his
presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided estate be disposed in accordance with Philippine law may be given
by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One effect. NO.
reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon
and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about 2.) WON the failure of the legatee to comply with the provisions of the
the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is will prevented him from receiving his legacy. NO.
given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality,
the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. (In re Will of HELD:
Riosa, 39 Phil., 23.)
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the 1.) A provision of foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall
testator should be the ruling and controlling factor and that all be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with the
adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored.
to carry out said intention, and that when statutes passed after the
execution of the will and after the death of the testator lessen the 2.) The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the
formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will
statutes should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
according to the law in force at the time of execution. nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
However, we should not forget that from the day of the If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee
death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude
legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right, in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as
protected under the due process clause of the constitution expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal
requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to
such a will. law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:
By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall
invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by provide.
intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal
requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly
execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby ignores the testator's national law when, according to article
divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the
succession.The general rule is that the Legislature cannot testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
validate void wills. (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is
considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is
unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.
ARTICLE 16
22
Wills and Succession Case Digests
Assuming that Texas law is in conflict of law rule providing that the he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication whereby he adjudicated unto
domiciliary system (law of domicile) should govern, the same should himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion.
not result in a reference back (renvoi) to the Philippine law since Mr.
Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the
Bellis was both a national and domicile of Texas at the time of his
deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the
death. Nonetheless, if Texas law has a conflict rule, renvoi would not
United States and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate
arise, since the properties covered by the second will are found in the
of the deceased testatrix. She alleges among others that the testatrix
Philippines. The renvoi doctrine applied in the case of Aznar v. Garcia
was a perminent resident of Pennsylvania, USA and was only
cannot be applied since said doctrine is pertinent where the decedent
temporarily residing with her sister in Manila when she died; that
is a national of one country and domiciliary of another country.
during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament
Moreover, it has been pointed out that the decedent executed two (2)
according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo
wills- one to govern his Texas properties and the other his Philippine
Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix death, her
estate; the latter being the basis of the argument of illegitimate
last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and
children that he intended Philippine law to govern. Assuming that such
registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia,
was the intention of the decedent in executing a separate Philippine
U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was
will, it would not alter the law. As rule in Miciano v. Brimo, a provision
appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment
of foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
as executor in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia,
accordance with Philippine law and not with the national law, is illegal
U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the
and void, for his national law cannot be ignored.
appointment of an administratrix to administer and eventually
distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.
The reprobate was opposed by Polly Cayetano alleging among other
Testate Estate of Christensen vs Garcia
things, that the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic
provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent
FACTS:
American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not
Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to
apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him.
California, where he resided and consequently was considered a
California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he Respondent judge issued an order stating that the Last Will and
became a domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos is hereby admitted to and
of his residence in this country he had always considered himself a allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Campos Paguia is
citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent.
instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen
as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen
Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared ISSUE: WON the respondent judge erred in allowing the reprobate of
acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that Adoracion's will, divesting Hermogenes of own his legitime which was
California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter reserved by the law for him.
is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine
law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be
increased in view of the success ional rights of illegitimate children HELD: NO. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited
under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir of the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its
Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently
of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American
courts must immediately apply the internal law of California on the citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
matter; that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which
consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed by respectively provide:
him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not
Art. 16 par. (2).
being entitled to anything and his will remain undisturbed.
xxx xxx xxx
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to
estate of Christensen? the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and
to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
RULING:
by the national law of the person whose succession is under
The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
effect that there are two rules in California on the matter: the internal
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California; and the
conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of Art. 1039.
California. The California conflict rule says: “If there is no law to the
contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is deemed to Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his
domicile.” Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of
domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed. Where it is referred Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent.
back to California, it will form a circular pattern referring to both Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide
country back and forth. for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix
to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not
apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public
policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine
Cayetano vs Leonidas
Law.
FACTS: Adoracion Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions
Hermogenes Campos and her sisters (private respondents) as of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code,
surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, the national law of the decedent must apply.
23
Wills and Succession Case Digests
conjugal estate constituted the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. This is
the only portion of the conjugal estate capable of inheritance by her
PCIB vs Escolin heirs.
xxx If one alleged that a certain provision in the national law of the
decedent, then he must prove that law as a fact like you prove any
other fact in dispute. The exceptions are:
8. Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community estate
of spouses shall, upon dissolution, be divided equally between them.
1. If the foreign laws are within the actual knowledge of the
Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957, one-half
court.
(1/2) of the entirety of the assets of the Hodges spouses constituting
2. When the court has considered before these laws in a
their conjugal estate pertained automatically to Charles Newton
previous case and the parties do not oppose as to the
Hodges, not by way of inheritance, but in his own right as partner in
the conjugal partnership. The other one-half (1/2) portion of the
24
Wills and Succession Case Digests
consideration of the court as to the existence of the foreign Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945,
law. Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his
wife and he visited the Philippines. He discovered that his wife Paula
was pregnant and was “living in” and having an adulterous relationship
with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.
Malang vs Moson
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the
Office of the Registrar of Nabua as “Crisologo Llorente,” with the
FACTS: Abdula contracted marriage with Aida and had 3
certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the
sons with her. Adbula then married for a second time with
father’s name was left blank.
Jubaida and no child was born out of that marriage.
Abdula divorced Aida. Abdula then married Nayo and they
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her.
also had no child. Thereafter, he contracted another
marriage with Mabay and had a daughter with her. Not long
On February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the
after, Abdula married 3 other Muslim women but eventually
effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States
divorced them. Abdula then married his 4th wife Neng,
Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s
excluding the wives he divorced. They were childless.
daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would
Abdula died without leaving a will.
dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3)
they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal
property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not
HELD: Abdula died intestate on December 1993. It is the
prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted
Muslim Code which should determine the identification
her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The
of the heirs in the order of intestate succession and the
agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed
respective shares of the heirs. The Muslim Code took
by Paula’s father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by
effect on February 4, 1977. If a Muslim died before the
Notary Public Pedro Osabel
effectivity of the Muslim Code, the order of succession shall
be governed by the Civil Code.
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed
The status and capacity to succeed on the part of
for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and
the individual parties who entered into each and every
for the County of San Diego. After due proceedings, the Court issued
marriage ceremony will depend upon the law in force at
an interlocutory judgment of divorce. On December 4, 1952, the
the time of the performance of the marriage rite. If the
divorce decree became final.
Muslim marriage took place during the effectivity of the Civil
Code and before the effectivity of the Muslim Code, he
Subsequently, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines and married Alicia F.
cannot marry again because under the Civil Code, only one
Llorente in Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first
marriage is valid. But when the marriage took place when
marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not
the Muslim Code has taken effect, subsequent marriages are
oppose the marriage or cohabitation
allowed and valid. The right of the spouses to inherit will
depend on whether or not they have been validly married. If
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and
they are not validly married, then they do not have
wife. Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul,
successional rights over their partner.
Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.
The status and capacity to succeed of the children
will depend upon the law in force at the time of
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament.
conception or birth of the child.
[read full text for specific contents; in summary, all properties were
As to property relations, it is the Civil Code that
bequeathed to Alicia and their children with Lorenzo, also making
determines and governs the property relations of the
Alicia the sole executor of the said will]
marriages in this case, for the reason that at the time of the
celebration of the marriages in question, the Civil Code was
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court,
the only on marriage relations, including property relations
Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his
between spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim.
last will and testament. On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was
duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate.[20]
Llorente vs CA
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated,
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. Lorenzo died.
LLORENTE, respondents.
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition.
Deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that
United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957 the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that
Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente were children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal
married in Nabua, Camarines Sur. property
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the RTC: the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void
United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he
Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur. contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is
likewise void. ... Alicia is not entitled to receive any share from the
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo
citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1)
his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New
York.
25
Wills and Succession Case Digests
the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in
so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the
dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal law of the State of which the decedent was a resident.[39] Second,
partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called
primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third for or required by New York State law.
of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children,
Raul, Luz and Beverly The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it
contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s
After the denial of Alicia's MR, the RTC modified its earlier decision, opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out,
stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children “legitimate or leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
otherwise” of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him.[29]
Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice
Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one- entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo
third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil
estate. Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of
CA affirmed RTC decision with a modification that Alicia is declared as the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with the
co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual
acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation and legal circumstances here obtaining.
ISSUE: WON the divorce decree was invalid. For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of
Appeals must be reversed:
Held: No.
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2)
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same
marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
established, admitted and undisputed.
In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily
governed by foreign law. Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of
Appeals,[41] that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino
The Civil Code clearly provides: citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van
“Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could “very well lose her
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of right to inherit” from him.
the Philippines, even though living abroad. In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the divorce obtained by
the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany.
“Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
law of the country where it is situated. in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
“However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a
law of the personwhose succession is under consideration, whatever matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the
may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left
wherein said property may be found.” (emphasis ours) to the determination of the trial court.
Note: foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do
other fact, they must be alleged and proved not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered
by our laws on “family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court capacity.”
of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and
the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo
was “referred back” to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and
Philippine law proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the
formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact,
While the trial court stated that the law of New York was not the will was duly probated.
sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit
equally unproven statement that “American law follows the ‘domiciliary This case was remanded to the trial court.
theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of
Lorenzo’s will
Testate Estate of Suntay
First, there is no such thing as one American law.
FACTS:
The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot On May 14, 1934, Jose Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the
possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law Philippines, died in Amoy, China, leaving real and personal properties
governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. in the Philippines and a house in China. On Oct 15, 1934, the surviving
26
Wills and Succession Case Digests
widow filed a petition in CFI of Bulacan for the probate of a last will The Case
and testament claimed to have been executed and signed on the
Philippines on Nov 1929 by the late Jose Suntay. The petition was
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the
denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition
Court of Appeals of 12 January 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 47644. The
A few years after, Silvino Suntay, one of the surviving sons, claimed Court of Appeals sustained the Resolution3 of the Regional Trial Court
that he had found among the documents of his late father, a will and of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61 ("RTC-Kabankalan"),
testament in Chinese characters and executed by the deceased on Jan admitting to probate the last will and testament of Alipio Abada
4, 1931, and that the same was filed, recorded and probated in China. ("Abada").
Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for
the probate of the will executed in the Philippines on November 1929 The Antecedent Facts
(Exhibit B) or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China, on 4
January 1931.
Abada died sometime in May 1940.4 His widow Paula Toray ("Toray")
ISSUE: WON the will executed in China can be probated in the died sometime in September 1943. Both died without legitimate
Philippines NO children.
HELD:
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate On 13 September 1968, Alipio C. Abaja ("Alipio") filed with the then
court must be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (now RTC-Kabankalan) a
allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the petition,5 docketed as SP No. 070 (313-8668), for the probate of the
execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by last will and testament ("will") of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his
competent evidence. There is no proof on these points. testamentary heirs his natural children Eulogio Abaja ("Eulogio") and
In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a Rosario Cordova. Alipio is the son of Eulogio.
probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters,
it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or Nicanor Caponong ("Caponong") opposed the petition on the ground
allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a that Abada left no will when he died in 1940. Caponong further alleged
perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure that the will, if Abada really executed it, should be disallowed for the
same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a following reasons: (1) it was not executed and attested as required by
proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal law; (2) it was not intended as the last will of the testator; and (3) it
notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the
The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the same grounds invoked by
Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by Caponong, the alleged intestate heirs of Abada, namely, Joel, Julian,
the interested parties residing in the Philippines. Paz, Evangeline, Geronimo, Humberto, Teodora and Elena Abada
The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China does not ("Joel Abada, et al."), and Levi, Leandro, Antonio, Florian, Hernani and
purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the Carmela Tronco ("Levi Tronco, et al."), also opposed the petition. The
proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof oppositors are the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada and
cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted Toray.
basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate
and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of On 13 September 1968, Alipio filed another petition6 before the RTC-
proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot Kabankalan, docketed as SP No. 071 (312-8669), for the probate of
be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or the last will and testament of Toray. Caponong, Joel Abada, et al., and
allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot Levi Tronco, et al. opposed the petition on the same grounds they
be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country. cited in SP No. 070 (313-8668).
FIRST DIVISION
In an order dated 23 November 1990, the RTC-Kabankalan designated
Belinda Caponong-Noble ("Caponong-Noble") Special Administratrix of
G.R. No. 147145 January 31, 2005 the estate of Abada and Toray.9 Caponong-Noble moved for the
dismissal of the petition for probate of the will of Abada. The RTC-
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA Kabankalan denied the motion in an Order dated 20 August 1991.10
CAPONONG-NOBLE, petitioner,
vs. Sometime in 1993, during the proceedings, Presiding Judge Rodolfo S.
ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR, respondents. Layumas discovered that in an Order dated 16 March 1992, former
Presiding Judge Edgardo Catilo had already submitted the case for
DECISION decision. Thus, the RTC-Kabankalan rendered a Resolution dated 22
June 1994, as follows:
CARPIO, J.:
27
Wills and Succession Case Digests
There having been sufficient notice to the heirs as required by law; The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the RTC-Kabankalan in
that there is substantial compliance with the formalities of a Will as the admitting to probate the will of Abada.
law directs and that the petitioner through his testimony and the
deposition of Felix Gallinero was able to establish the regularity of the
The Applicable Law
execution of the said Will and further, there being no evidence of bad
faith and fraud, or substitution of the said Will, the Last Will and
Testament of Alipio Abada dated June 4, 1932 is admitted and allowed Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that time
probate. are the Civil Code of 1889 or the Old Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or
the Code of Civil Procedure14 which governed the execution of wills
before the enactment of the New Civil Code.
As prayed for by counsel, Noel Abbellar11 is appointed administrator of
the estate of Paula Toray who shall discharge his duties as such after
letters of administration shall have been issued in his favor and after The matter in dispute in the present case is the attestation clause in
taking his oath and filing a bond in the amount of Ten Thousand the will of Abada. Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
(P10,000.00) Pesos. amended by Act No. 2645,15 governs the form of the attestation clause
of Abada’s will.16Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended, provides:
Mrs. Belinda C. Noble, the present administratrix of the estate of Alipio
Abada shall continue discharging her duties as such until further orders
from this Court. SEC. 618. Requisites of will. – No will, except as provided in the
preceding section,17 shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal,
nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or
SO ORDERED.12
dialect known by the testator and signed by him, or by the testator’s
name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
The RTC-Kabankalan ruled on the only issue raised by the oppositors express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
in their motions to dismiss the petition for probate, that is, whether the credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other.
will of Abada has an attestation clause as required by law. The RTC- The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
Kabankalan further held that the failure of the oppositors to raise any instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each
other matter forecloses all other issues. and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used,
Not satisfied with the Resolution, Caponong-Noble filed a notice of
upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the
appeal.
will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses,
In a Decision promulgated on 12 January 2001, the Court of Appeals and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in
affirmed the Resolution of the RTC-Kabankalan. The appellate court the presence of the testator and of each other.
found that the RTC-Kabankalan properly admitted to probate the will
of Abada.
Requisites of a Will under the Code of Civil Procedure
1. What laws apply to the probate of the last will of Abada; (2) The will must be signed by the testator, or by the
testator’s name written by some other person in his
2. Whether the will of Abada requires acknowledgment presence, and by his express direction;
before a notary public;13
(3) The will must be attested and subscribed by three or
3. Whether the will must expressly state that it is written in more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and
a language or dialect known to the testator; of each other;
4. Whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and (4) The testator or the person requested by him to write his
if so, whether the attestation clause complies with the name and the instrumental witnesses of the will must sign
requirements of the applicable laws; each and every page of the will on the left margin;
5. Whether Caponong-Noble is precluded from raising the (5) The pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in
issue of whether the will of Abada is written in a language letters placed on the upper part of each sheet;
known to Abada;
(6) The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages
6. Whether evidence aliunde may be resorted to in the used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
probate of the will of Abada. testator signed the will and every page of the will, or caused
some other person to write his name, under his express
direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the
The Ruling of the Court witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all pages of the
will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
28
Wills and Succession Case Digests
Caponong-Noble asserts that the will of Abada does not indicate that it Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su ultima
is written in a language or dialect known to the testator. Further, she voluntad y testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el
maintains that the will is not acknowledged before a notary public. She testador firmado en nuestra presencia en el margen izquierdo de todas
cites in particular Articles 804 and 805 of the Old Civil Code, thus: y cada una de las hojas del mismo. Y en testimonio de ello, cada uno
de nosotros lo firmamos en presencia de nosotros y del testador al pie
de este documento y en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de
Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in [a] language or
las dos hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo, las cuales estan
dialect known to the testator.
paginadas correlativamente con las letras "UNO" y "DOS’ en la parte
superior de la carrilla.28
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by
the testator and the witnesses. xxx18
Caponong-Noble proceeds to point out several defects in the
attestation clause. Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause
Caponong-Noble actually cited Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil fails to state the number of pages on which the will is written.
Code.19 Article 804 of the Old Civil Code is about the rights and
obligations of administrators of the property of an absentee, while
The allegation has no merit. The phrase "en el margen izquierdo de
Article 806 of the Old Civil Code defines a legitime.
todas y cada una de las dos hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo"
which means "in the left margin of each and every one of the two
Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code are new provisions. Article pages consisting of the same" shows that the will consists of two
804 of the New Civil Code is taken from Section 618 of the Code of pages. The pages are numbered correlatively with the letters "ONE"
Civil Procedure.20 Article 806 of the New Civil Code is taken from Article and "TWO" as can be gleaned from the phrase "las cuales estan
685 of the Old Civil Code21 which provides: paginadas correlativamente con las letras "UNO" y "DOS."
Art. 685. The notary and two of the witnesses who authenticate the Caponong-Noble further alleges that the attestation clause fails to
will must be acquainted with the testator, or, should they not know state expressly that the testator signed the will and its every page in
him, he shall be identified by two witnesses who are acquainted with the presence of three witnesses. She then faults the Court of Appeals
him and are known to the notary and to the attesting witnesses. The for applying to the present case the rule on substantial compliance
notary and the witnesses shall also endeavor to assure themselves that found in Article 809 of the New Civil Code.29
the testator has, in their judgment, the legal capacity required to make
a will.
The first sentence of the attestation clause reads: "Suscrito y
declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su ultima voluntad y
Witnesses authenticating a will without the attendance of a notary, in testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el testador
cases falling under Articles 700 and 701, are also required to know the firmado en nuestra presencia en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada
testator. una de las hojas del mismo." The English translation is: "Subscribed
and professed by the testator Alipio Abada as his last will and
However, the Code of Civil Procedure22 repealed Article 685 of the Old testament in our presence, the testator having also signed it in our
Civil Code. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a presence on the left margin of each and every one of the pages of the
notary is not necessary in the execution of any will.23 Therefore, same." The attestation clause clearly states that Abada signed the will
Abada’s will does not require acknowledgment before a notary and its every page in the presence of the witnesses.
public.1awphi1.nét
However, Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation
Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one discern clause does not indicate the number of witnesses. On this point, the
that Abada knew the Spanish language. She alleges that such defect is Court agrees with the appellate court in applying the rule on
fatal and must result in the disallowance of the will. On this issue, the substantial compliance in determining the number of witnesses. While
Court of Appeals held that the matter was not raised in the motion to the attestation clause does not state the number of witnesses, a close
dismiss, and that it is now too late to raise the issue on appeal. We inspection of the will shows that three witnesses signed it.
agree with Caponong-Noble that the doctrine of estoppel does not
apply in probate proceedings.24 In addition, the language used in the This Court has applied the rule on substantial compliance even before
will is part of the requisites under Section 618 of the Code of Civil the effectivity of the New Civil Code. InDichoso de Ticson v. De
Procedure and the Court deems it proper to pass upon this issue. Gorostiza,30 the Court recognized that there are two divergent
tendencies in the law on wills, one being based on strict construction
Nevertheless, Caponong-Noble’s contention must still fail. There is no and the other on liberal construction. In Dichoso, the Court noted
statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew thatAbangan v. Abangan,31 the basic case on the liberal construction,
the language or dialect used in the will.25 This is a matter that a party is cited with approval in later decisions of the Court.
may establish by proof aliunde.26 Caponong-Noble further argues that
Alipio, in his testimony, has failed, among others, to show that Abada In Adeva vda. De Leynez v. Leynez,32 the petitioner, arguing for
knew or understood the contents of the will and the Spanish language liberal construction of applicable laws, enumerated a long line of cases
used in the will. However, Alipio testified that Abada used to gather to support her argument while the respondent, contending that the
Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and rule on strict construction should apply, also cited a long series of
his companions would talk in the Spanish language.27 This sufficiently cases to support his view. The Court, after examining the cases
proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language. invoked by the parties, held:
The Attestation Clause of Abada’s Will x x x It is, of course, not possible to lay down a general rule, rigid and
inflexible, which would be applicable to all cases. More than anything
A scrutiny of Abada’s will shows that it has an attestation clause. The else, the facts and circumstances of record are to be considered in the
attestation clause of Abada’s will reads: application of any given rule. If the surrounding circumstances point to
a regular execution of the will, and the instrument appears to have
29
Wills and Succession Case Digests
been executed substantially in accordance with the requirements of EN BANC
the law, the inclination should, in the absence of any suggestion of
bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate,
G.R. No. L-1787 August 27, 1948
although the document may suffer from some imperfection of
language, or other non-essential defect. x x x.
Testacy of Sixto Lopez. JOSE S. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in
AGUSTIN LIBORO, oppositor-appellant.
permanent form, a record of the facts attending the execution of the
will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the subscribing
witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. (Thompson on TUASON, J.:
Wills, 2d ed., sec. 132.) A will, therefore, should not be rejected where
its attestation clause serves the purpose of the law. x x In the Court of First Instance of Batangas the appellant opposed
x 331a\^/phi1.net unsuccessfully the probate of what purports to be the last will and
testament (Exhibit A) of Don Sixto Lopez, who died at the age of 83 in
We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abada’s will. Balayan, Batangas, on March 3, 1947, almost six months after the
Abada’s will clearly shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three document in question was executed. In the court below, the present
other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there are three appellant specified five grounds for his opposition, to wit: (1) that the
witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is deceased never executed the alleged will; (2) that his signature
answered by an examination of the will itself and without the need for appearing in said will was a forgery; (3) that at the time of the
presentation of evidence aliunde. The Court explained the extent and execution of the will, he was wanting in testamentary as well as
limits of the rule on liberal construction, thus: mental capacity due to advanced age; (4) that, if he did ever execute
said will, it was not executed and attested as required by law, and one
of the alleged instrumental witnesses was incapacitated to act as such;
[T]he so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor
and it was procured by duress, influence of fear and threats and undue
does it open the door to serious consequences. The later decisions do
and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries
tell us when and where to stop; they draw the dividing line with
instituted therein, principally the testator's sister, Clemencia Lopez,
precision.They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any
and the herein proponent, Jose S. Lopez; and (5) that the signature of
part of the document or supply missing details that should
the testator was procured by fraud or trick.
appear in the will itself.l^vvphi1.net They only permit a probe
into the will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its
meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the In this instance only one of these objections is reiterated, formulated
requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates in these words: "That the court a quo erred in holding that the
uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results.34 (Emphasis document Exhibit "A" was executed in all particulars as required by
supplied) law." To this objection is added the alleged error of the court "in
allowing the petitioner to introduce evidence that Exhibit "A" was
written in a language known to the decedent after petitioner rested his
The phrase "en presencia de nosotros" or "in our presence" coupled
case and over the vigorous objection of the oppositor.
with the signatures appearing on the will itself and after the attestation
clause could only mean that: (1) Abada subscribed to and professed
before the three witnesses that the document was his last will, and (2) The will in question comprises two pages, each of which is written on
Abada signed the will and the left margin of each page of the will in one side of a separate sheet. The first sheet is not paged either in
the presence of these three witnesses. letters or in Arabic numerals. This, the appellant believes, is a fatal
defect.
Finally, Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause does not
expressly state the circumstances that the witnesses witnessed and The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is guard
signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the testator and of against fraud, and to afford means of preventing the substitution or of
each other. This Court has ruled: defecting the loss of any of its pages. (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil.,
476.) In the present case, the omission to put a page number on the
first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by other forms of
Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is
identification more trustworthy than the conventional numerical words
desirable. However, it is not imperative that a parrot-like copy of the
or characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first
words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if from the language
page by the internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the
employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause
contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the first
fulfills what the law expects of it.35
and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of
the last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause,
The last part of the attestation clause states "en testimonio de ello, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page. Furthermore, the
cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos en presencia de nosotros y del unnumbered page contains the caption "TESTAMENTO," the invocation
testador." In English, this means "in its witness, every one of us also of the Almighty, and a recital that the testator was in full use of his
signed in our presence and of the testator." This clearly shows that the testamentary faculty, — all of which, in the logical order of sequence,
attesting witnesses witnessed the signing of the will of the testator, precede the direction for the disposition of the marker's property.
and that each witness signed the will in the presence of one another Again, as page two contains only the two lines above mentioned, the
and of the testator. attestation clause, the mark of the testator and the signatures of the
witnesses, the other sheet can not by any possibility be taken for other
than page one. Abangan vs. Abangan,supra, and Fernandez vs. Vergel
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 12
de Dios, 46 Phil., 922 are decisive of this issue.
January 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 47644.
Although not falling within the purview and scope of the first
SO ORDERED.
assignment of error, the matter of the credibility of the witnesses is
assailed under this heading. On the merits we do not believe that the
30
Wills and Succession Case Digests
appellant's contention deserves serious consideration. Such written in Tagalog was ordered although it did not say that the testator
contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses as are set knew that idiom. In fact, there was not even extraneous proof on the
out in the appellant's brief are incidents not all of which every one of subject other than the fact that the testator resided in a Tagalog
the witnesses can be supposed to have perceived, or to recall in the region, from which the court said "a presumption arises that said Maria
same order in which they occurred. Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect.
Everyday life and the result of investigations made in the The order of the lower court ordering the probate of the last will and
field of experimental psychology show that the testament of Don Sixto Lopez is affirmed, with costs.
contradictions of witnesses generally occur in the details of a
certain incident, after a long series of questioning, and far
EN BANC
from being an evidence of falsehood constitute a
demonstration of good faith. Inasmuch as not all those who
witness an incident are impressed in like manner, it is but G.R. No. L-13431 November 12, 1919
natural that in relating their impressions they should not
agree in the minor details; hence, the contradictions in their In re will of Ana Abangan.
testimony. (People vs. Limbo, 49 Phil., 99.) GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee,
vs.
The testator affixed his thumbmark to the instrument instead of ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
signing his name. The reason for this was that the testator was
suffering from "partial paralysis." While another in testator's place AVANCEÑA, J.:
might have directed someone else to sign for him, as appellant
contends should have been done, there is nothing curious or
suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the use of mark as the On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu
means of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed July, 1916. From this
preference. Both ways are good. A statute requiring a will to be decision the opponent's appealed.
"signed" is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark.
(De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 108; 28 R. C. L., 117.) Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of
two sheets, the first of which contains all of the disposition of the
With reference to the second assignment of error, we do not share the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name
opinion that the trial court communicated an abuse of discretion in and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The
allowing the appellant to offer evidence to prove knowledge of Spanish following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the
by the testator, the language in which the will is drawn, after the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is
petitioner had rested his case and after the opponent had moved for signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor
dismissal of the petition on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It numbered by letters; and these omissions, according to appellants'
is within the discretion of the court whether or not to admit further contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will should have
evidence after the party offering the evidence has rested, and this been denied. We are of the opinion that the will was duly admitted to
discretion will not be reviewed except where it has clearly been probate.
abused. (64 C. J., 160.) More, it is within the sound discretion of the
court whether or not it will allow the case to be reopened for the In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be
further introduction of evidence after a motion or request for a signed on the left margin by the testator and three witnesses in the
nonsuit, or a demurrer to the evidence, and the case may be reopened presence of each other, Act No. 2645 (which is the one applicable in
after the court has announced its intention as to its ruling on the the case) evidently has for its object (referring to the body of the will
request, motion, or demurrer, or has granted it or has denied the itself) to avoid the substitution of any of said sheets, thereby changing
same, or after the motion has been granted, if the order has not been the testator's dispositions. But when these dispositions are wholly
written, or entered upon the minutes or signed. (64 C. J., 164.) written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and
three witnesses (as the instant case), their signatures on the left
In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed. After the parties have margin of said sheet would be completely purposeless. In requiring
produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer this signature on the margin, the statute took into consideration,
rebutting evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good undoubtedly, the case of a will written on several sheets and must
reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer have referred to the sheets which the testator and the witnesses do
evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in not have to sign at the bottom. A different interpretation would
the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. (Siuliong assume that the statute requires that this sheet, already signed at the
and Co. vs. Ylagan, 43 Phil., 393; U. S. vs. Alviar, 36 Phil., 804.) So, bottom, be signed twice. We cannot attribute to the statute such an
generally, additional evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered, intention. As these signatures must be written by the testator and the
or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or witnesses in the presence of each other, it appears that, if the
where the purpose of the evidence is to the evidence is to correct signatures at the bottom of the sheet guaranties its authenticity,
evidence previously offered. (I Moran's Comments on the Rules of another signature on its left margin would be unneccessary; and if
Court, 2d ed., 545; 64 C. J., 160-163.) The omission to present they do not guaranty, same signatures, affixed on another part of
evidence on the testator's knowledge of Spanish had not been same sheet, would add nothing. We cannot assume that the statute
deliberate. It was due to a misapprehension or oversight. regards of such importance the place where the testator and the
witnesses must sign on the sheet that it would consider that their
signatures written on the bottom do not guaranty the authenticity of
Although alien to the second assignment of error, the appellant the sheet but, if repeated on the margin, give sufficient security.
impugns the will for its silence on the testator's understanding of the
language used in the testament. There is no statutory requirement
that such knowledge be expressly stated in the will itself. It is a matter In requiring that each and every page of a will must be
that may be established by proof aliunde. This Court so impliedly ruled numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of the sheet,
in Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil., 781, in which the probate of a will it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether
31
Wills and Succession Case Digests
any sheet of the will has been removed. But, when all the dispositive 1. In holding that in order to be valid the will in question
parts of a will are written on one sheet only, the object of the statute should have been drawn up in the Ilocano dialect.
disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although
unnumbered, cannot be hidden.
2. In not holding that the testator Piraso did not know the
Ilocano dialect well enough to understand a will drawn up in
What has been said is also applicable to the attestation clause. said dialect.
Wherefore, without considering whether or not this clause is an
essential part of the will, we hold that in the one accompanying the
3. In refusing to admit the will in question to probate.
will in question, the signatures of the testatrix and of the three
witnesses on the margin and the numbering of the pages of the sheet
are formalities not required by the statute. Moreover, referring The fundamental errors assigned refer chiefly to the part of the
specially to the signature of the testatrix, we can add that same is not judgment which reads as follows:
necessary in the attestation clause because this, as its name implies,
appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator since the latter The evidence shows that Piraso knew how to speak the
does not attest, but executes, the will. Ilocano dialect, although imperfectly, and could make
himself understood in that dialect, and the court is of the
Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of opinion that his will should have been written in that dialect.
two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions
and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and Such statements were not unnecessary for the decision of the case,
the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at once it has been proved without contradiction, that the said deceased
the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets Piraso did not know English, in which language the instrument Exhibit
be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, A, alleged to be his will, is drawn. Section 628 of the Code of Civil
or be paged. Procedure, strictly provides that:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills "No will, except as provides in the preceding section" (as to wills
is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of executed by a Spaniard or a resident of the Philippine Islands, before
wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. the present Code of Civil Procedure went into effect), "shall be valid to
Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the
as to attain these primordal ends. But, on the other hand, also one same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the
must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to testator," etc. (Emphasis supplied.) Nor can the presumption in favor
restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an of the will established by this court in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil.,
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other 476), to the effect that the testator is presumed to know the dialect of
interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more the locality where he resides, unless there is proof to the contrary,
requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testator's even he invoked in support of the probate of said document Exhibit A,
last will, must be disregarded. lawphil.net as a will, because, in the instant case, not only is it not proven that
English is the language of the City of Baguio where the deceased
As another ground for this appeal, it is alleged the records do Piraso lived and where Exhibit A was drawn, but that the record
not show that the testarix knew the dialect in which the will is written. contains positive proof that said Piraso knew no other language than
But the circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was the Igorrote dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano; that is, he did not
executed in the city of Cebu and in the dialect of this locality where the know the English language in which Exhibit A is written. So that even if
testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to the such a presumption could have been raised in this case it would have
contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which this will is been wholly contradicted and destroyed.
written.
We consider the other question raised in this appeal needless and
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from immaterial to the adjudication of this case, it having been, as it was,
is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellants. So ordered. proven, that the instrument in question could not be probated as the
last will and testament of the deceased Piraso, having been written in
the English language with which the latter was unacquainted.
EN BANC
Such a result based upon solidly established facts would be the same
G.R. No. L-28946 January 16, 1929
whether or not it be technically held that said will, in order to be valid,
must be written in the Ilocano dialect; whether or not the Igorrote or
In re estate of Piraso, deceased. Inibaloi dialect is a cultivated language and used as a means of
SIXTO ACOP, petitioner-appellant, communication in writing, and whether or not the testator Piraso knew
vs. the Ilocano dialect well enough to understand a will written in said
SALMING PIRASO, ET AL., opponents-appellees. dialect. The fact is, we repeat, that it is quite certain that the
instrument Exhibit A was written in English which the supposed
testator Piraso did not know, and this is sufficient to invalidate said will
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
according to the clear and positive provisions of the law, and inevitably
prevents its probate.
This appeal was taken from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Benguet, denying the probate of the instrument Exhibit A,
EN BANC
as the last will and testament of the deceased Piraso.
32
Wills and Succession Case Digests
TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIA ZUÑIGA VDA. DE PANDO, the same hand that wrote the genuine signatures he had examined
deceased. JUAN REYES, petitioner-administrator-appellant, and which he used as basis of his analytical study, thereby concluding
vs. that said signatures are not genuine. The lower court gave full faith
DOLORES ZUÑIGA VDA. DE VIDAL, oppositor-appellee. and credit to the opinion of this expert witness, and decreed as a
result that the will cannot be admitted to probate.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
There are, however, certain important facts and circumstances which
make us differ from this opinion of the lower court. In the first place,
This concerns the admission to probate of a document claimed to be
we find that the opinion of this expert witness has been rebutted by
the last will and testament of Maria Zuñiga Vda. de Pando who died in
another expert witness Jose C. Espinosa, whose opinion, to our mind,
the City of Manila on October 29, 1945.
deserves more weight and credence. And our reason for reaching this
conclusion is the fact that the standards of the comparison used by
On November 6, 1945, a petition for the probate of said will was filed Espinosa are more reliable than those used by Villanueva in the
in the Court of First Instance of Manila. On December 21, 1945, comparison are two signatures appearing in two documents executed
Dolores Zuñiga Vda. de Vidal, sister of the deceased, filed an on November 10, 1942, one signature in an identification card affixed
opposition based on several grounds. And, after several days of trial, in April 1940, a half signature appearing in a letter written on October
at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court 8, 1943, one signature appearing in a letter written on July 16, 1945,
rendered its decision disallowing the will on the ground that the and one signature appearing in a letter written on January, 1945,
signatures of the deceased appearing therein are not genuine, that it whereas the disputed signatures appearing in the will were affixed on
was not proven that the deceased knew the Spanish language in which October 29, 1945. On the other hand, the standards used by Espinosa
it was written, and that even if the signatures are genuine, the same in making his comparative study bear dates much closer to that of the
reveal that the deceased was not of sound mind when she signed the disputed signatures. Thus, he examined four genuine signatures that
will. From this decision petitioner appealed to this Court. were affixed on October 16, 1945, other four signatures that were
affixed in October 1945, one on January 2, 1945, on January 24, 1945,
While petitioner imputes nine errors to the lower court, we believe, and one on September 24 1945, He also examined one affixed on
however, that for purposes of this appeal of discussion of some would March 12, 1941, only for emphasis. The closeness or proximity of the
be sufficient. Thus, the issues may be boiled down as follows: 1) time in which the standards used had been written to that of the
Whether or not the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will suspected signature or document is very important to bring about an
(Exhibit "C") are genuine; 2) whether or not there is evidence to show accurate analysis and conclusion. the selection of the proper standards
that the testatrix knew the language in which the will was written; and of comparison is of paramount importance especially if we consider the
3) whether or not the testatrix was of sound and disposing mind when age and the state of the health of the author of the questioned
she signed the will. signatures. a signature affixed in 1941 may involved characteristics
different from those borne by a signature affixed in 1945. And this is
because the passing of time and the increase in age may have a
1. To prove that the will was signed by the testatrix in accordance with decisive influence in the writing characteristics of a person. It for this
law, petitioner presented as witnesses the three persons who attested reasons that the authorities of the opinion that in order to bring about
to the execution of the will. These witnesses are: Cornelia Gonzales de an accurate comparison and analysis, the standard of comparison must
Romero, Quintin Ulpindo and Consuelo B. de Catindig. The first used to be as close as possible in point of time to the suspected signature.
provide the deceased with ice every day, and in one of those occasions Such was not followed in the study made by Villanueva. But such was
she went to her house to bring ice, she requested to act witness to the observed in the study made by Espinosa. He followed the standard
execution of the will. The second was a laborer whose job was is to fix practice in handwriting analysis. It is for this reason that we hold that
bed made of rattan, and in one of those days he went to the house of Espinosa's opinion deserves more weight and consideration.
the deceased to work, he was asked also to witness the signing of the
will. And the third was a neighbor of the deceased for many years who
was also requested to act as an instrumental witness. These witnesses The standards should, if possible, have been made by the
testified in their own simple and natural way that the deceased signed same time as the suspected document. It is preferable that
the will seated on her bed but over a small table placed near the bed the standards embraced the time of the origin of the
in their presence, and after she had signed it in the places where her document, so that one part comes from the time after the
signatures appear, they in turn signed it in the presence and in the origin. (Page 423 "Modern Criminal Investigation" by
presence of each other. This is the substance of what they have Soderman and O' Connell, 1936, Funk and Wagnalls
testified and from an examination of their testimony to the court Company, New York and London.)
entertains no doubt that they had told the truth. There is nothing in
their testimony which may in any way reflect against their credibility If possible less than five or six signatures should always be
nor has the oppositor proven fact or circumstance which may give rise examined and preferably double that number." (Page 139,
to the suspicion that they testified out of personal interest or pecuniary Forensic Chemistry and Scientific Criminal Investigation by
consideration. They have impressed the court as simple persons who Lucas, 1935, Edward Arnold & Co., London.)
had intervened in the execution of the will out merely of deference to
the testatrix whom they had served for sometime and had known to
2. Another ground on which the lower court base the disallowance of
be a good and respectable woman.
the will is the failure of the petitioner to prove that the testratrix knew
and spoke the language in which the will in question appears to have
What evidence has the oppositor presented to contradict the testimony been written. According to the lower court, the law requires that the
of these instrumental witnesses? only one expert witness, Jose G. will should be written in the dialect or language known to the testator
Villanueva, who made a comparative analysis of the signatures and this fact having been proven, the probate of the will must fail. And
appearing in the will in relation to some genuine signatures of the the wall was disallowed.
deceased, and in fact testified on the analysis and study he has made
of said signatures and submitted a memorandum on the study and
There is indeed nothing in the testimony of the witnesses presented by
comparison he has made. And in his testimony as well as in his
the petitioner which would indicate that the testatrix knew and spoke
memorandum, this witness has reached the conclusion that the hand
the Spanish language used in the preparation of the will in question.
that wrote the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will is not
33
Wills and Succession Case Digests
But, in our opinion, this failure alone does not in itself suffice to unusual and not exactly like those in the standard writing.
conclude that this important requirement of the law has not been Those who write of difficulty or hesitation through some
complied with, it appearing that there is enough evidence on record physical infirmity may sometimes produced broken and
which supplies this technical omission. In the first place, we have the unfinished signatures and these results, which in themselves
undisputed fact that the deceased was a mestiza española, was are distinctly divergent as compared with signatures
married to a Spaniard, Recaredo Pando, and made several trips to produced under conditions of strength and health, may
Spain. In the second place, we have the very letters submitted as forcefully indicate genuineness . Under conditions of
evidence by the oppositor written in Spanish by the deceased weakness due to diseased or age, parts of a genuine
possessed the Spanish language, oppositor cannot now be allowed to signature may be clumsily written over a second time not at
allege the contrary. These facts give rise to the presumption that the just the same place and in a way when clearly shows that
testatrix knew the language in which the testament has been written, the writer either could not see or was so week and
which presumption should stand unless the contrary is proven inattentive as not to care what the result might be. This
(Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476; Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil. careless, perfectly evident repetition (figure 184), unlike the
750). And this presumption has not been overcome. And finally, we painstaking and delicate retouching of the forger, often
have the very attestation clause of the will which states that the indicates genuineness. (Page 365, Questioned Documents by
testatrix knew and possessed the Spanish language. It is true that this Osborne, 2nd Edition, 1927.)
matter is not required to be stated in the attestation clause, but its
inclusion can only mean that the instrumental witnesses wanted to
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the lower court erred in
make it of record that the deceased knew the language in which the
disallowing the will Exhibit C.
will was written. There is, therefore, no valid reason why the will
should be avoided on this ground.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed. The Court
admits the will Exhibit C to probate, and remands these case to the
3. The remaining ground which the lower court has considered in
lower court for further proceedings, with costs against the appellee.
disallowing the will is the fact that the deceased was not of sound and
disposing mind when she signed the will, and it reached this
conclusion, not because of any direct evidence on the matter, but EN BANC
simply because the deceased signed the will in a somewhat varied
form. On this point the lower court said: G.R. No. L-13781 January 30, 1960
El Juzgado es de opinion que aunque se admita que las Testate Estate of JOSE J. JAVELLANA, Deceased. CRISTETA
firmas arriba indicadas feuran de Maria Zuñiga Vda. de JIMENEA VDA. DE JAVELLANA, and BENJAMIN
Pando, las mismas revelan que ella no estabe en el pleno de JAVELLANA, petitioners-appellees,
sus facultades mentales cuando la hicieron firmar el vs.
documento, Exhibit C, pues el hecho de que en una sola JOSE JAVELLANA y AZAOLA and JOSE JAVELLANA,
ocasion la repetida Maria Zuñiga Vda. de Pando firmo dos JR., oppositors-appellants.
veces, sin escribir su verdadero nombre, demuestra que ella
no se daba cuenta de sus actos por no hallarse mentalmente
sana. Si esto es asi, no se debe legalizar como testamento y BARRERA, J.:
ultima voluntad de la finada Maria Zuñiga Vda. de Pando el
documento, Exhibit C, porque el Articulo 614 de la Ley 190 y On June 29, 1957, a petition to probate the alleged last will and
el Articulo 12, Reglamentos de los Tribunales, disponen que testament of Jose J. Javellana, who died on May 24 of the same year,
solamente pueden otorgar testamento las personas que al was presented in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Crsiteta
tiempo de su otorgamiento estaban en el pleno goce de sus Jimenea Vda. de Javellana and Benjamin Javellana, widow and brother
facultades mentales. respectively of the deceased, alleging that the aforesaid Jose J.
Javellana, at the time of his death, a resident of Ssan Juan Rizal, left
The above conclusion is contrary to what the instrumental witnesses porperties with an approximate value of P400,000.00; that he also left
have said on this point. Cornelio Gonzales de Romero stated that she a will which was delivered to the clerk of court pursuant to the Rules
spoke to the deceased before the signing of the will, and judging from of Court; that Oscar Ledesma, therein named executor, had agreed to
the way she spoke she was of the impression that the deceased was of act as such; that the decedent's next of kin were; the wido., Criteta J.
sound mind at the time. To the same effect is the testimony of Vda. de Javellana, his children — Erlinda Javellana, Jose Javellana y
Consuelo B. de Catindig. She said that her impression when the Azaola, and Jose Javellana, Jr. (Pepito), his sister Juanito J. de
deceased signed the will was that she could still talk and read, only Ledesma, and brother Benjamin Javellana, whose respective addresses
that she was weak. In fact she read the will before signing it. These wre given in the petition.
statements had not been contradicted. They give an idea of the mental
had not contradicted. They give an idea of mental condition of the To this petition, Jose Javellana y Azaola and Jose Javellana, Jr.
deceased in the will differ from each other in certain respects, this is (Pepito) filed separate opposiytions, both claiming that the alleged will
only due to her age and state of health rather than to a defective of Jose J. Javellana deposited by peittioners with the clerk of court was
mental condition. They do not reveal a condition of forgery or lack of null and void, the same not having been executed "in accordance with
genuineness. These differences or irregularities are common in the the formalities required by law" and that "the legal requirements
writings of old people and, far from showing lack of genuineness, are necessary for its validit" had not been complied with.
indicative of the age, sickness, or weak condition of the writer. A
comparison of the three disputed signatures in the will readily give this
impression. At the hearing, petitioners introduced as evidence in support of the
petition, a copy of the will; certification of the date and cause of death
of the testator; proof of publication of the petition, once a week for 3
Abbreviated, distorted and illegible, forms, which are consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation, and thre
sufficiently free and rapid, often actually indicate testimonies of Jose G. Guevarra, Eloisa Villanueva and Jose Yulo, Jr.,
genuineness rather than forgery even though they are very the 3 instrumental witnesses to the will, whi, in sustancer, testified
34
Wills and Succession Case Digests
that sometime in April, 1956, they were asked to witness the execution that she knew the language in which the will was written, in the
of the will of the late Jose. J. Javellana; that on the said occasion, Jose absence of proof to the contrary.4
J. Javellana signed the 4 pages of the will in their presence, and they,
in turn, also signed each and evey page thereof in the presence of the
In the case before us, no such or similar circumstances exist. On the
testator and of one another; and that these acts wetre acknowledge
contrary, there is evidence that the testator is a Visayan although
before notary public Fernando Grey, Jr. on the same occasion.
residing in San Juan, Rizal at the time of his death. The will was
executed in the City of Manila. Undoubtedly, it cannot be said, and
For their part, the oppositor limited their evidence to the presentation there is no evidence, that Spaniards is the language currently used
of two letters in the Visayan dialect allegedly written by the deceased, either in San Juan, Rizal, or Manila. It follows, therefore, that no
the signatures appearing thereon being identified by Jose Javellana, Jr. presumption can rise that the testator knew the Spanish Language.
(Pepito) and Manuel Azaola, as those of the deceased, for the sole
purpose of comparing said signatures woth those appearing in the will.
But petitioner-appellees insist in their brief that the burden is on the
oppositors to allege and prove that the testator did not know the
On December 10, 1957, the court a quo issued an order allowing the Spanish language in the face of the legal presumption that "the law
probate of the will and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to has been obeyed", "that a will executed in the Philippines must be
Oscar Ledesma as executor thereoif, upon the latter's filing a bond in presumed to have been executed in conformity with the laws of the
the sum of P10,000.00. From this order, oppositors appealed to this Philippines".5 and "that things have happened in accordance with the
Court charging the lower court of committing error in allowing ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life", concluding
oprobate of the will, Exhibit C, on 2 grounds: (1) that the 3 sttesting that it woiuld certainly be contrary to the ordinary habits of life for a
witnesses failed to clearly and convincingly estabish the due execution person to execute his will in a language unknown to him. This, we
of the will; and (2) that petitioners failed to prove that the will was believe, is, to use a colloquial term, being the question. If the
written in a language known to the testator. argument of counsel is correct, then every unopposed will may be
probated upon its mere presentation in court, without need of
producing evidence regarding its execution. Counsel's statement is its
The first basis of oppositor's appeal has no merit. It is true that
own refutation.
witnesses, particularly Miss Eloisa Villanueva, apparently found
difficulty recalling who arrived first at the appointed place, or the order
of the witnesses' signing the will, or failed to mention by name the We find, in the record stone indicia, although insufficient to give rise to
persons present at the time of the witnesses was signing the the presumption, that the testator might, in fact, have known the
document. These details, however, are minor and significant and do Spanish language. In oppositor's own Exhibit 3 (a letter admittedly
not enervate their positive testimony that at the execution of the will written by the testator) appear the salutation "Querido Primo" and the
the testator, the 3 witnesses, the notary public and Atty. Vicente complimentary ending "Su primo" which are Spanish terms. Having
Hilado were all together in the private office of the latter; that Jose found that al the formal requisites for the validity of the will have been
Guevarra, Eloisa Villanueva and Jose Yulo, Jr., the instrumental satisfactorily establishment, except the language requirement, we
witnesses, were unanimous in declaring that they actually saw the deem it in the interest of justice to afford the parties a opportunity to
testator sign the will as well as each and every page thereof, and they, present evidence, if they so desire, on this controverted issue.
in turen, affixed their signatures to all of its 4 pages. For the purpose
of determining tjhe due execution of a will, it is not necessary that the
Wherefore, let the records of this case be remanded to the court of
instrumental witnesses should give an accurate and detailed account
origin for furhter proceedings as above indicated, without costs. It is
of the proceeding, such as recalling the order of the signing of the
so ordered.
document by the dsaid wirtneese. It is sufficient that they have seen
or at least were so situated at the moment that they could have seen
each other sign, had they wnated to do so.1 In fact, in the instant SECOND DIVISION
case, at least two witnesses, Yulo and Guevarra, both testified hat the
testator and the 3 witnesses signed in the presence of each and every A.M. No. 2026-CFI December 19, 1981
one of them.
Not content with her motion to set aside the ejectment order (filed on
Marcelina died on November 15, 1974 at the Veterans Hospital in
April 18) and her omnibus motion to set aside the proceedings (filed
Quezon City. At the time of her death, she was a resident of 7374 San
on April 24), Nenita filed the next day, April 25, an opposition to the
Maximo Street, Olimpia, Makati, Rizal. She owned a 150-square meter
probate of the will and a counter-petition for letters of administration.
lot and house in that place. She acquired the lot in 1966 (p. 134,
In that opposition, Nenita assailed the due execution of the will and
Record of testate case).
stated the names and addresses of Marcelina's intestate heirs, her
nieces and nephews (pp. 113-121, Record). Nenita was not aware of
On January 13, 1975, Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundrywoman of the decree of probate dated April 23, 1975.
Marcelina (P. 97, CA Rollo) and the executrix in her will (the alternate
executrix was Juanita Macaraeg, mother of Oscar, Marilyn's husband),
To that opposition was attached an affidavit of Dominga Salvador
filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25, a
Teodocio, Marcelina's niece, who swore that Marcelina never executed
petition for the probate of Marcelina's alleged will. The case was
a win (pp. 124-125, Record).
assigned to Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado.
36
Wills and Succession Case Digests
Marcelina's sonbut merely an anak-anakan who was not legally July 6, 1976 she asked for a thirty day period within which to vacate
adopted (p. 143, Record). the house of the testatrix.
Judge Honrado in his order of July 17, 1975 dismissed Nenita's Evangeline S. Yuipco in her affidavit said that she never talked with
counter-petition for the issuance of letters of administration because of Nenita and that the latter did not mention Evangeline in her letter
the non-appearance of her counsel at the hearing. She moved for the dated September 11, 1978 to President Marcos.
reconsideration of that order.
Evangeline branded as a lie Nenita's imputation that she (Evangeline)
In a motion dated December 5, 1975, for the consolidation of all prevented Nenita from having access to the record of the testamentary
pending incidents, Nenita V. Suroza reiterated her contention that the proceeding. Evangeline was not the custodian of the record.
alleged will is void because Marcelina did not appear before the notary Evangeline " strongly, vehemently and flatly denied" Nenita's charge
and because it is written in English which is not known to her (pp. that she (Evangeline) said that the sum of ten thousand pesos was
208-209, Record). needed in order that Nenita could get a favorable decision. Evangeline
also denied that she has any knowledge of Nenita's pension from the
Federal Government.
Judge Honrado in his order of June 8, 1976 "denied" the various
incidents "raised" by Nenita (p. 284, Record).
The 1978 complaint against Judge Honorado was brought to attention
of this Court in the Court Administrator's memorandum of September
Instead of appealing from that order and the order probating the wig,
25, 1980. The case was referred to Justice Juan A. Sison of the Court
Nenita "filed a case to annul" the probate proceedings (p. 332,
of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. He submitted
Record). That case, Civil Case No. 24276, Suroza vs. Paje and Honrado
a report dated October 7, 1981.
(p. 398, Record), was also assigned to Judge Honrado. He dismissed it
in his order of February 16, 1977 (pp. 398-402, Record).
On December 14, 1978, Nenita filed in the Court of Appeals against
Judge Honrado a petition for certiorari and prohibition wherein she
Judge Honrado in his order dated December 22, 1977, after noting
prayed that the will, the decree of probate and all the proceedings in
that the executrix had delivered the estate to Marilyn, and that the
the probate case be declared void.
estate tax had been paid, closed the testamentary proceeding.
37
Wills and Succession Case Digests
Inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964
carelessness. A judge would be inexcusably negligent if he failed to
observe in the performance of his duties that diligence, prudence and
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA
circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public
VILLACORTE.
service (In re Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134-J, Jan. 21, 1974, 55 SCRA
CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
107, 119).
vs.
NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-
In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it appellants.
was written in English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate
testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila admitting
language "understood and known" to the testatrix. But in its
to probate the document and its duplicate, marked as Exhibits "A" and
concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the
"A-1", as the true last will and testament of Josefa Villacorte,
testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". (p. 16, Record of
deceased, and appointing as executor Celso Icasiano, the person
testate case). That could only mean that the will was written in a
named therein as such.
language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void
because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code
that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the This special proceeding was begun on October 2, 1958 by a petition
testator. Thus, a will written in English, which was not known to the for the allowance and admission to probate of the original, Exhibit "A"
Igorot testator, is void and was disallowed (Acop vs. Piraso, 52 Phil. as the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and for the
660). appointment of petitioner Celso Icasiano as executor thereof.
The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and The court set the proving of the alleged will for November 8, 1958,
notarial acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is and caused notice thereof to be published for three (3) successive
repeatedly referred to as the "testator" instead of "testatrix". weeks, previous to the time appointed, in the newspaper "Manila
chronicle", and also caused personal service of copies thereof upon the
known heirs.
Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have
noted not only the anomaly as to the language of the will but also that
there was something wrong in instituting the supposed granddaughter On October 31, 1958, Natividad Icasiano, a daughter of the testatrix,
as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who filed her opposition; and on November 10, 1958, she petitioned to
was still alive. have herself appointed as a special administrator, to which proponent
objected. Hence, on November 18, 1958, the court issued an order
appointing the Philippine Trust Company as special
Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by respondent deputy clerk
administrator.1äwphï1.ñët
of court, respondent judge could have noticed that the notary was not
presented as a witness.
On February 18, 1959, Enrique Icasiano, a son of the testatrix, also
filed a manifestation adopting as his own Natividad's opposition to the
In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should
probate of the alleged will.
have personally conducted the hearing on the probate of the will so
that he could have ascertained whether the will was validly executed.
On March 19, 1959, the petitioner proponent commenced the
introduction of his evidence; but on June 1, 1959, he filed a motion for
Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of
the admission of an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that
duty to be inexcusable.
the decedent left a will executed in duplicate with all the legal
requirements, and that he was, on that date, submitting the signed
WHEREFORE, for inefficiency in handling the testate case of Marcelina duplicate (Exhibit "A-1"), which he allegedly found only on or about
S. Suroza, a fine equivalent to his salary for one month is imposed on May 26, 1959. On June 17, 1959, oppositors Natividad Icasiano de
respondent judge (his compulsory retirement falls on December 25, Gomez and Enrique Icasiano filed their joint opposition to the
1981). admission of the amended and supplemental petition, but by order of
July 20, 1959, the court admitted said petition, and on July 30, 1959,
oppositor Natividad Icasiano filed her amended opposition. Thereafter,
The case against respondent Yuipco has become moot and academic
the parties presented their respective evidence, and after several
because she is no longer employed in the judiciary. Since September
hearings the court issued the order admitting the will and its duplicate
1, 1980 she has been assistant city fiscal of Surigao City. She is
to probate. From this order, the oppositors appealed directly to this
beyond this Court's disciplinary jurisdiction (Peralta vs. Firm Adm.
Court, the amount involved being over P200,000.00, on the ground
Matter No. 2044-CFI November 21, 1980, 101 SCRA 225).
that the same is contrary to law and the evidence.
SO ORDERED.
The evidence presented for the petitioner is to the effect that Josefa
Villacorte died in the City of Manila on September 12, 1958; that on
ARTICLE 805 June 2, 1956, the late Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and
testament in duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs. Felisa
Abangan vs. Abangan – go to Article 804 Icasiano at Pedro Guevara Street, Manila, published before and
attested by three instrumental witnesses, namely: attorneys Justo P.
Torres, Jr. and Jose V. Natividad, and Mr. Vinicio B. Diy; that the will
EN BANC was acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said three instrumental
witnesses on the same date before attorney Jose Oyengco Ong,
38
Wills and Succession Case Digests
Notary Public in and for the City of Manila; and that the will was acknowledged the will; and Atty. Samson, who actually prepared the
actually prepared by attorney Fermin Samson, who was also present documents; that the will and its duplicate were executed in Tagalog, a
during the execution and signing of the decedent's last will and language known to and spoken by both the testator and the witnesses,
testament, together with former Governor Emilio Rustia of Bulacan, and read to and by the testatrix and Atty. Fermin Samson, together
Judge Ramon Icasiano and a little girl. Of the said three instrumental before they were actually signed; that the attestation clause is also in
witnesses to the execution of the decedent's last will and testament, a language known to and spoken by the testatrix and the witnesses.
attorneys Torres and Natividad were in the Philippines at the time of The opinion of expert for oppositors, Mr. Felipe Logan, that the
the hearing, and both testified as to the due execution and authenticity signatures of the testatrix appearing in the duplicate original were not
of the said will. So did the Notary Public before whom the will was written by the same had which wrote the signatures in the original will
acknowledged by the testatrix and attesting witnesses, and also leaves us unconvinced, not merely because it is directly contradicted
attorneys Fermin Samson, who actually prepared the document. The by expert Martin Ramos for the proponents, but principally because of
latter also testified upon cross examination that he prepared one the paucity of the standards used by him to support the conclusion
original and two copies of Josefa Villacorte last will and testament at that the differences between the standard and questioned signatures
his house in Baliuag, Bulacan, but he brought only one original and are beyond the writer's range of normal scriptural variation. The expert
one signed copy to Manila, retaining one unsigned copy in Bulacan. has, in fact, used as standards only three other signatures of the
testatrix besides those affixed to the original of the testament (Exh.
A); and we feel that with so few standards the expert's opinion and
The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered
the signatures in the duplicate could not be those of the testatrix
simultaneously with the filing of the petition and marked as Exhibit "A"
becomes extremely hazardous. This is particularly so since the
consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page,
comparison charts Nos. 3 and 4 fail to show convincingly that the are
it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses,
radical differences that would justify the charge of forgery, taking into
Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three (3) thereof; but the duplicate
account the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her
copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition and marked
signatures, and the effect of writing fatigue, the duplicate being signed
as Exhibit "A-1" is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting
right the original. These, factors were not discussed by the expert.
witnesses in each and every page.
That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was This appeal arises out of an application on the part of Pedro Barut to
entirely through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony as well probate the last will and testament of Maria Salomon, deceased. It is
as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of alleged in the petition of the probate that Maria Salomon died on the
signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the 7th day of November, 1908, in the pueblo of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, leaving
acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no a last will and testament bearing date March 2, 1907. Severo Agayan,
one was aware of the defect at the time. Timotea Inoselda, Catalino Ragasa, and A. M. Jimenez are alleged to
have been witnesses to the execution thereof. By the terms of said will
Pedro Barut received the larger part of decedent's property.
This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict
and literal application of the statutory requirements, where the
purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal The original will appears on page 3 of the record and is in the Ilocano
tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only dialect. Its translation into Spanish appears at page 11. After disposing
page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the left of her property the testatrix revoked all former wills by her made. She
margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41 also stated in said will that being unable to read or write, the same
Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for the correlative had been read to her by Ciriaco Concepcion and Timotea Inoselda and
lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to make the first page either that she had instructed Severo Agayan to sign her name to it as
by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. testatrix.
429). These precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require
satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud
The probate of the will was contested and opposed by a number of the
and bid faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the
relatives of the deceased on various grounds, among them that a later
testamentary privilege.
will had been executed by the deceased. The will referred to as being
a later will is the one involved in case No. 6284 already referred to.
The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in Proceeding for the probate of this later will were pending at the time.
existence and available, the duplicate (Exh. A-1) is not entitled to The evidence of the proponents and of the opponents was taken by
probate. Since they opposed probate of original because it lacked one the court in both cases for the purpose of considering them together.
signature in its third page, it is easily discerned that oppositors-
appellants run here into a dilemma; if the original is defective and
In the case before us the learned probate court found that the will was
invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly signed carbon
not entitled to probate upon the sole ground that the handwriting of
duplicate (Exh. A-1), and the same is probatable. If the original is valid
the person who it is alleged signed the name of the testatrix to the will
and can be probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate need
for and on her behalf looked more like the handwriting of one of the
not be considered, being superfluous and irrelevant. At any rate, said
other witnesses to the will than that of the person whose handwriting
duplicate, Exhibit A-1, serves to prove that the omission of one
it was alleged to be. We do not believe that the mere dissimilarity in
signature in the third page of the original testament was inadvertent
writing thus mentioned by the court is sufficient to overcome the
and not intentional.
uncontradicted testimony of all the witnesses to the will that the
signature of the testatrix was written by Severo Agayan at her request
That the carbon duplicate, Exhibit A-1, was produced and admitted and in her presence and in the presence of all the witnesses to the
without a new publication does not affect the jurisdiction of the will. It is immaterial who writes the name of the testatrix provided it is
probate court, already conferred by the original publication of the written at her request and in her presence and in the presence of all
petition for probate. The amended petition did not substantially alter the witnesses to the execution of the will.
the one first filed, but merely supplemented it by disclosing the
existence of the duplicate, and no showing is made that new interests
The court seems , by inference at least, to have had in mind that
were involved (the contents of Exhibit A and A-1 are admittedly
under the law relating to the execution of a will it is necessary that the
identical); and appellants were duly notified of the proposed
person who signs the name of the testatrix must afterwards sign his
amendment. It is nowhere proved or claimed that the amendment
own name; and that, in view of the fact that, in the case at bar, the
deprived the appellants of any substantial right, and we see no error in
name signed below that of the testatrix as the person who signed her
admitting the amended petition.
name, being, from its appearance, not the same handwriting as that
constituting the name of the testatrix, the will is accordingly invalid,
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed, such fact indicating that the person who signed the name of the
with costs against appellants. testatrix failed to sign his own. We do not believe that this contention
can be sustained. Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as
follows:
EN BANC
Besides, as may be seen, the said three witnesses who signed the
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No.
attestation clause, did so also on the left margin and beside the
2645, provides, indeed, among the necessary requirements before a
signature of the testator or of Simplicio Sala who signed by order of
will can be probated, that it be attested and signed by three or more
the latter, and if account is taken of the fact that these witnesses are
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other.
"instrumental" witnesses, as above demonstrated, and they have made
And said section, as amended, further provides as follows:
reference to their own signatures, as well as that of the testator and of
the person who signed by the latter's order below the attestation
* * * The testator or the person requested by him to write clause, it is evident that in the instant case, it is merely a matter of
his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall technicality devoid of any importance as to the probate of the will that
also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the said witnesses are called instrumental witnesses, as if they were
left margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively different from those who have to sign the attestation clause, for all of
in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The them are but the same witnesses; and, as this court held in the case of
attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476), "The object of the solemnities
upon which the will is written, and that fact that the testator surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith
signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
other person to write his name, under his express direction, guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this
in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these
and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight
the testator and of each other. of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the
exercise of the right to make a will. So when a interpretation already
Instrumental witness, as defined by Escriche in his Diccionario given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that
Razonado de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, volume 4, page 1115, is one adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
who takes part in the execution of an instrument or writing. useless and frustative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded;"
which doctrine must be applied in this case, in view of the facts herein
mentioned and what has been above demonstrated.
At present and under the laws now in force, particularly Act No. 2645
amendatory to said section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when a
will is to be executed, the testator draws or writes it personally or For all of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and the
through another person and signs it also personally, or if he is document, Exhibit A, presented by the proponent as the last will and
physically incapacitated, as in the instant case, through another person testament of the deceased Tan Diuco is admitted to probate, without
who may or may not be the one who prepared or wrote the will, that special finding as to costs of both instances. So ordered.
is, the document constituting the testator's last will and testament.
The will having thus been prepared and before it is signed by the EN BANC
testator or the person acting in his stead, or the one directed by him to
sign it in his name, in which case the name of the testator is written
G.R. No. L-9150 March 31, 1915
before that of the signer, as above stated, in order that said document
may have the character of a valid will, the testator gathers three or
more credible witnesses and tells them that the contents of said MARIANO LEAÑO, petitioner-appellant,
document is his will, without informing them of its contents, and then vs.
the testator, or the person directed by him to do so, signs it in the ARCADIO LEAÑO, objector-appellee.
presence of the testator and of each other, and the testator or the
person acting in his stead, as well as the three witnesses sign on the
CARSON, J.:
left margin of each page or sheet, which must be numbered
correlatively in letters on the upper part of the page. These witnesses
are the witnesses, referred to in the aforesaid law as instrumental The evidence of record satisfactorily discloses that Cristina Valdes,
witnesses, for the simple reason that they took part in the execution of deceased, placed her costs against her name, attached by some other
an instrument or document known as will, their participation being person to the instrument offered for probate which purports to be her
limited to the acts aforementioned. last will and testament, in the presence of three witnesses whose
names are attached to the attesting clause, and that they attested and
subscribed the instrument in her presence and in the presence of each
In dealing with attestation, said section 618 of the Code of Civil
other.
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, does not say that said
witnesses must be different from those who signed the attestation
clause, for in the first part of said section, after speaking of the We are of the opinion that the placing of the cross opposite her name
signature of the testator or the person signing in his place, it at the construction of the instrument was a sufficient compliance with
adds, "and attested and subscribed by three or more credible the requirements of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other," from prescribes that except where wills are signed by some other person
which it clearly follows that the same witnesses who signed on the left than the testator in the manner and from herein indicated, a valid will
42
Wills and Succession Case Digests
must be signed by the testator. The right of a testator to sign his will the end of the will by Atty. Florentino Javier at the express request of
by mark, executed animo testandihas been uniformly sustained by the the testator in the presence of the testator and each and every one of
courts of last resort of the United States in construing statutory the witnesses; (2) to certify that after the signing of the name of the
provisions prescribing the mode of execution of wills in language testator by Atty. Javier at the former's request said testator has written
identical with, or substantially similar to that found in section 618 of a cross at the end of his name and on the left margin of the three
our code, which was taken from section 2349 of the Code of Vermont. pages of which the will consists and at the end thereof; (3) to certify
(Page on Wills, par. 173, and the cases there cited in support of the that the three witnesses signed the will in all the pages thereon in the
doctrine just announced.) presence of the testator and of each other.
The trial judge was of contrary opinion, and declined to admit the In our opinion, the attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to
instrument to probate as the last will and testament of the decedent. state that Antero Mercado caused Atty. Florentino Javier to write the
We are of opinion, however, that the evidence of record satisfactorily testator's name under his express direction, as required by section 618
establishes the execution of that instrument as and for her last will and of the Code of Civil Procedure. The herein petitioner (who is appealing
testament in the manner and form prescribed by law. by way of certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals) argues,
however, that there is no need for such recital because the cross
written by the testator after his name is a sufficient signature and the
The judgment entered in the court below should therefore be
signature of Atty. Florentino Javier is a surplusage. Petitioner's theory
reversed, without costs in this instance, and the record remanded to
is that the cross is as much a signature as a thumbmark, the latter
the court below, where judgment will be entered admitting the
having been held sufficient by this Court in the cases of De
instrument in question to probate in accordance with the prayer of the
Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104; Dolar vs. Diancin, 55 Phil.,
petitioner. So ordered.
479; Payad vs. Tolentino, 62 Phil., 848; Neyra vs. Neyra, 76 Phil., 296
and Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil., 429.
EN BANC
It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the
G.R. No. L-4067 November 29, 1951 usual signature of Antero Mercado or even one of the ways by which
he signed his name. After mature reflection, we are not prepared to
In the Matter of the will of ANTERO MERCADO, deceased. liken the mere sign of the cross to a thumbmark, and the reason is
ROSARIO GARCIA, petitioner, obvious. The cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a
vs. thumbmark.
JULIANA LACUESTA, ET AL., respondents.
What has been said makes it unnecessary for us to determine there is
PARAS, C.J.: a sufficient recital in the attestation clause as to the signing of the will
by the testator in the presence of the witnesses, and by the latter in
the presence of the testator and of each other.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals disallowing
the will of Antero Mercado dated January 3, 1943. The will is written in
the Ilocano dialect and contains the following attestation clause: Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with against the
petitioner. So ordered.
LABARADOR, J.:
In testimony, whereof, we sign this statement, this the third
day of January, one thousand nine hundred forty three,
(1943) A.D. Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
City admitting to probate the will of one Anacleta Abellana. The case
was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals where the following
Sgd.) NUMERIANO EVANGELISTA (Sgd.) "ROSENDA CORTES assignment of error is made:
Sgd.) BIBIANA ILLEGIBLE The appellants respectfully submit that the Trial Court erred
in holding that the supposed testament, Exh. "A", was
signed in accordance with law; and in admitting the will to
The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who probate.
wrote the name of Antero Mercado, followed below by "A reugo del
testator" and the name of Florentino Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged
In view of the fact that the appeal involves a question of law the said
to have written a cross immediately after his name. The Court of
court has certified the case to us.
Appeals, reversing the judgement of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte, ruled that the attestation clause failed (1) to certify that
the will was signed on all the left margins of the three pages and at The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
43
Wills and Succession Case Digests
It appears on record that the last Will and Testament section 618 above referred to, but it is necessary that the
(Exhibit "A"), which is sought to be probated, is written in testator's name be written by the person signing in his stead
the Spanish language and consists of two (2) typewritten in the place where he could have signed if he knew how or
pages (pages 4 and 5 of the record) double space. The first was able to do so, and this in the testator's presence and by
page is signed by Juan Bello and under his name appears his express direction; so that a will signed in a manner
typewritten "Por la testadora Anacleta Abellana, residence different than that prescribed by law shall not be valid and
Certificate A-1167629, Enero 20, 1951, Ciudad de will not be allowed to be probated.
Zamboanga', and on the second page appears the signature
of three (3) instrumental witnesses Blas Sebastian, Faustino
Where a testator does not know how, or is unable for any
Macaso and Rafael Ignacio, at the bottom of which appears
reason, to sign the will himself, it shall be signed in the
the signature of T. de los Santos and below his signature is
following manner:
his official designation as the notary public who notarized
the said testament. On the first page on the left margin of
the said instrument also appear the signatures of the John Doe by the testator, Richard Doe; or in this form: "By
instrumental witnesses. On the second page, which is the the testator, John Doe, Richard Doe." All this must be
last page of said last Will and Testament, also appears the written by the witness signing at the request of the testator.
signature of the three (3) instrumental witnesses and on
that second page on the left margin appears the signature of Therefore, under the law now in force, the witness Naval A.
Juan Bello under whose name appears handwritten the Vidal should have written at the bottom of the will the full
following phrase, "Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana'. The name of the testator and his own name in one forms given
will is duly acknowledged before Notary Public Attorney above. He did not do so, however, and this is failure to
Timoteo de los Santos. (Emphasis supplied) comply with the law is a substantial defect which affects the
validity of the will and precludes its allowance,
The appeal squarely presents the following issue: Does the signature notwithstanding the fact that no one appeared to oppose it.
of Dr. Juan A. Abello above the typewritten statement "Por la
Testadora Anacleta Abellana . . ., Ciudad de Zamboanga," comply with The same ruling was laid down in the case of Cuison vs. Concepcion, 5
the requirements of law prescribing the manner in which a will shall be Phil., 552. In the case of Barut vs. Cabacungan, 21 Phil., 461, we held
executed? that the important thing is that it clearly appears that the name of the
testatrix was signed at her express direction; it is unimportant whether
The present law, Article 805 of the Civil Code, in part provides as the person who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or not.
follows: Cases of the same import areas follows: (Ex Parte Juan Ondevilla, 13
Phil., 479, Caluya vs.Domingo, 27 Phil., 330; Garcia vs. Lacuesta, 90
Phil., 489).
Every will, other than a holographic will, must
be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself
or by the testator's name written by some other person in In the case at bar the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does
his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and not appear written under the will by said Abellana herself, or by Dr.
subscribed by three or more credible witness in the presence Juan Abello. There is, therefore, a failure to comply with the express
of the testator and of one another. (Emphasis supplied.) requirement in the law that the testator must himself sign the will, or
that his name be affixed thereto by some other person in his presence
and by his express direction.
The clause "must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence and by his express direction," is practically the same as the It appearing that the above provision of the law has not been complied
provisions of Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) with, we are constrained to declare that the said will of the deceased
which reads as follows: Anacleta Abellana may not be admitted to probate.
No will, except as provided in the preceding section shall be WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the
valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or petition for the probate of the will denied. With costs against
affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the petitioner.
testator, or by the testator's name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction, and EN BANC
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses
in the presence of the testator and of each other. . . .
(Emphasis supplied). G.R. No. L-3907 March 12, 1908
Note that the old law as well as the new require that the testator ROMAN ABAYA, petitioner-appellant,
himself sign the will, or if he cannot do so, the testator's name must vs.
be written by some other person in his presence and by his express DONATA ZALAMERO, respondent-appellee.
direction. Applying this provision this Court said in the case of Ex Parte
Pedro Arcenas, et al., Phil., 700: TORRES, J.:
It will be noticed from the above-quoted section 618 of the On the 6th of August, Roman Abaya filed a petition with the Court of
Code of Civil Procedure that where the testator does not First Instance of La Laguna, for the allowance of the will executed by
know how, or is unable, to sign, it will not be sufficient that Juan Zalamero, a resident of Pagsanhan, in said province, on the 29th
one of the attesting witnesses signs the will at the testator's of October, 1905, and produced in court the said will, which was
request, the notary certifying thereto as provided in Article written in Tagalog dialect. Donata Zalamero opposed the petition,
695 of the Civil Code, which, in this respect, was modified by alleging that the will had been executed under pressure and unlawful
44
Wills and Succession Case Digests
and improper influence on the part of those who were to benefit testator, who afterwards placed the cross between them, stating that
thereby, and that it had not been executed and signed in accordance it was his statement, all of which was written immediately after the
with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A day said name and surname of the testator and the cross made by him,
was appointed for the hearing and in the course of the proceedings and the same was subscribed by the three witnesses in the manner
the witnesses offered by both parties were examined; on the 10th of provided by law.
January, 1907, the court refused to admit the will of said Juan
Zalamero, as requested by Roman Abaya; Abaya appealed from the
The essential requisites prescribed by the above-mentioned section
decision and moved for a new trial which motion has not been finally
618 of the law have been complied with, namely, that three witnesses
acted upon by the court; for this reason the petitioner, now before this
were present at the execution of the will of Juan Zalamero at the date
court, still insists thereon for the effects of the appeal which he had
mentioned therein; that they heard his statement that the said
interposed, and has submitted a certified copy of the proceedings to
instrument, written and drawn up under his direction, contained his
which the assignment of errors presented by him refers.
last will; that they saw and witnessed when, at the express request of
the testator, and under his direction, the witness, Mariano Zaguirre,
Two points are presented. The first is, that Juan Zalamero, while in wrote at the foot of the will the name and surname of Juan Zalamero,
life, executed his will on the 29th of October, 1905, under lawful and when the latter put the cross between his written name and
pressure and influence exercised by those who were thereby surname, each of the witnesses subscribing it at the time and in the
benefited; and second, that the said will was not executed and signed presence of each other.
in accordance with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
For the reasons hereinbefore set forth it is our opinion that the
judgment appealed from should be reversed and that it be declared, as
After an examination of the facts alleged and the evidence adduced by we now do, that the will executed by the late Juan Zalamero while in
both parties, and considering the case according to the rules of life, under date of the 29th of October, 1905, was executed in
common sense and sound criticism, it must necessarily be admitted accordance with the law, and that therefore it should be duly admitted
that the weight and preponderance of the evidence prove in a in order that it may produce all consequent legal effects, and it is so
conclusive manner the authenticity and genuineness of the said will as ordered without any special ruling as to costs.
the real and true expression of the will of the testator, Juan Zalamero,
and for this reason the first point should have been decided by the
EN BANC
court below in a negative sense.
On February 25, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of
with the court a petition for the removal of respondent as special said decision, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this
administrator, as he failed to file an inventory within 3 months from his appeal.
appointment and qualification as special administrator, as provided for
in Section 1, Rule 84, of the Rules of Court. To this petition,
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue
respondent filed an opposition, on the ground that said provision of
the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent, the
the Rules of Court does not apply to a special administrator, and an
same not being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
inventory had already been submitted by him, before said petition for
his removal was filed.1äwphï1.ñët
We agree with petitioners. The Court of Appeals, in the decision
appealed from, assumed jurisdiction over the present case on the
On February 27, 1960, the devisees Conchita and Rose Marie Kohlhaas
theory that "the amount in controversy relative to the appointment of
filed with the court a petition for appointment of Conchita as special
Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator to protect the interests of
co-administratrix. Devisee Adelina Sajo, likewise, filed a similar petition
respondents (herein petitioners) is only P90,000.00 more or less, i.e.,
February 29.
one fourth of the conjugal property" (of respondent and the deceased
Digna Maravilla) which, is per inventory submitted by respondent as
On March 5, 1960, the court held a joint hearing the (1) petition to special administrator is valued at P362,424.90. This theory is
appoint Eliezar Lopez as special administrator, (2) approval of untenable. Note that the proceedings had on the appointment of
respondent's record appeal and appeal bond, (3) petition to remove Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator are merely incidental to the
respondent as special administrator, (4) petition to appoint Conchita probate or testate proceedings of the deceased Digna Maravilla
Kohlhaas as special co-administratrix, and (5) petition to appoint presently on appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-
Adelina Sajo as special co-administrator. At said hearing, respondent R) where petitioners' motion to elevate the same to the Supreme
objected to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez was special co- Court, on the ground that the amount herein involved is within the
administratrix, on grounds that (a) the law allows only one special co- latter's exclusive jurisdiction, is still pending, resolution. That the Court
administrator (b) the order of March 16, 1959 estops the court from of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over said testate proceedings
appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator (c) such cannot be doubted, considering that the properties therein involved
appointment is unfair to respondent, because owns at least 3/4 of the are valued at P362,424,90, as per inventory of the special
whole property, conjugal nature, which would be subjected to the administrator.
administrate of a stranger, and (d) a deadlock between two special
administrators would ruin the management of the property, including
Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be
those of respondent. On cross-examination of Eliezar Lopez,
administered and liquidated in testate or intestate proceedings of the
respondent's counsel elicited the facts that (1) Lopez was employed
deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate pertaining
full time in the PCAPE, with office in Manila. and could not discharge
to the deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate. This Court has
the functions of a co-administrator, and (2) there was merely intention
already held that even if the deceased had left no debts, upon the
on Lopez part to resign from office.
dissolution of the marriage by the death of the husband or wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated
After said joint hearing, the court appointed Eliezar Lopez as special in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse (Vda.
co-administrator in an order dictated open court, to protect the de Roxas v. Pecson, et al., L-2211, December 20, 1948; 82 Phil. 407;
interests of Pedro, Asuncion and Regina Maravilla. see also Vda. de Chantengco v. Chantengco, et al., L-10663, October
31, 1958). In a number of cases where appeal was taken from an
order of a probate court disallowing a will, this Court, in effect,
From this order, respondent, on March 7, 1960, filed with the Court of
recognized that the amount or value involved or in controversy therein
Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for
is that of the entire estate (Suntay v. Suntay, L-3087, July 31, 1954,
preliminary injunction) to annul the order appointing Eliezar Lopez as
50 O.G. 5321; Vano v. Vda. de Garces, et al., L-6303, June 30, 1954,
special co-administrator, and to prohibit the probate court from further
50 O.G. 3045). Not having appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings
proceeding with the petition for the removal of respondent as special
in probate (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R), considering that the amount
administrator. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary
involved therein is more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals
injunction on March 9, 1960 which was amended on March 11, 1960 to
cannot also have original jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari and
make it more specific.
prohibition prayed for by respondent in the instant case, which are
merely incidental thereto.
On October 6, 1960, petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition to certify the case to the Supreme Court,
In the United States, the rule is that "proceedings in probate are
on the grounds that the principal amount in controversy in this case
appealable where the amount or value involved is reducible to a
exceeds P200,000.00, and the writs (of certiorari and prohibition)
pecuniary standard, the amount involved being either the appellant's
prayed for are not in aid of appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
interest or the value of the entire estate according as the issues on
Appeals, since the probate case is not on appeal before it. To this
appeal involve only the appellant's rights or the entire administration
petition, respondent filed an opposition. on the grounds that the
of the estate. ... In a contest for administration of an estate the
amount in controversy is less than P200,000.00 and the decision of the
amount or value of the assets of the estate is the amount in
probate court (of February 8, 1960) is now on appeal before the Court
controversy for purposes of appeal." (4 C.J.S. 204). In line with this
of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R); hence, the writ prayed for is in aid
ruling, it is to be observed that respondent's interest as appellant in
of its appellate jurisdiction, and the present case does not involve title
the probate proceedings (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) is, according to his
to or possession of real estate exceeding in value P200,000.00.1
theory, the whole estate amounting to P362,424.90, or, at least more
than 3/4 thereof, or approximately P270,000.00. Such interest,
48
Wills and Succession Case Digests
reduced to a pecuniary standard on the basis of the inventory, is the While it is true that questions of fact have been raised in the probate
amount or value of the matter in controversy, and such amount being proceedings (Spec. Proc. No. 4977, CFI of Negros Occidental) which
more than P200,000.00, it follows that the appeal taken in said was appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals, it becomes
proceedings falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court immaterial, in view of Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
and should, therefore, be certified to it pursuant to Section 17 of the as amended, providing that the Supreme Court shall have exclusive
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended. appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which the value in controversy
exceeds two hundred thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and
costs", and that "all cases which may be erroneously brought to the
Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the
Supreme Court, or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the proper
annulment of the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-
court, which shall hear the same as if it had originally been brought
administrator and to restrain the probate court from removing
before it".
respondent as special administrator. It is therefore, a contest for the
administration of the estate and, consequently, the amount or value of
the assets of the whole estate is the value in controversy (4 C.J.S. On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as
204). It appearing that the value of the estate in dispute is much more special administrator, we agree with respondent that there was no
than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had no original need for it. Note that the Rules of Court contain no provision on
jurisdiction to issue the writs in question. special co-administrator, the reason being, that the appointment of
such special administrator is merely temporary and subsists only until a
regular executor or administrator is duly appointed. Thus, it would not
The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, arrived at the
only be unnecessary but also impractical, if for the temporary duration
amount of "P90,000.00 more or less", as the amount involved in the
of the need for a special administrator, another one is appointed aside
case, upon authority of the case of Vistan v. Archbishop (73 Phil. 20).
from the husband, in this case, upon whom the duty to liquidate the
But this case is inapplicable, as it does not refer to the question of
community property devolves merely to protect the interests of
administration of the estate, nor to an order denying probate of a will,
petitioners who, in the event that the disputed will is allowed to
but only to the recovery of a particular legacy consisting of the rentals
probate, would even have no right to participate in the proceedings at
of a fishpond belonging to the estate. In an analogous case involving
all. (Roxas v. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407.)
the administration of a trust fund, the United States Supreme Court
held:
In view of the conclusion herein reached, in connection with the
amount involved in the controversy, it is suggested that appropriate
Where the trust fund administered and ordered to be
steps be taken on the appeal pending in the Court of Appeals involving
distributed by the circuit court, in a suit to compel the
the probate of the will (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) to comply with the
stockholders of a corporation to pay their subscriptions to
provisions of the Judiciary Act on the matter.
stock to realize the fund, amounts to more than $5,000.00,
this court has jurisdiction of the appeal, which is not affected
by the fact that the amounts decreed to some of the WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of May 16, 1961 is
creditors are less than that sum (Handly et al. vs. Stutz, et set aside and another one entered also setting aside the order of the
al., 34 Law Ed. 706). trial court of March 5, 1960, appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-
administrator. Without costs. So ordered.
Respondent also contends that appeals in special proceedings, as
distinguished from ordinary civil cases, are within the exclusive EN BANC
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since they are not
enumerated in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as amended.
G.R. No. L-26545 December 16, 1927
Granting, arguendo, that a special proceeding is not a civil action, it
has never been decided that a special proceeding is not a "civil case"
(Carpenter v. Jones, 121 Cal. 362; 58 p. 842). On the other hand, it Testate Estate of Florencia R. Mateo. PERFECTO
has been held that the term "civil case" includes special proceedings GABRIEL, petitioner-appellee,
(Herkimer v. Keeler, 100 Iowa 680, N.W. 178). Moreover, Section 2, vs.
Rule 73, of the Rules of Court provides that the rules on ordinary civil RITA R. MATEO, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
actions are applicable in special proceedings where they are not
inconsistent with, or when they may serve to supplement the AVANCEÑA, C. J.:
provisions relating to special proceedings. Consequently, the procedure
of appeal is the same in civil actions as in special proceedings. (See
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, 1957 Ed., p. 326.) The judgment appealed from allowed the will of Florencia Mateo dated
February 6, 1923, composed of two used sheets to probate. The will
appears to be signed by the testatrix and three witnesses on the left
The cases cited by respondent where this Court ruled that the separate margin of each of the sheets, by the testatrix alone at the bottom, and
total claim of the parties and not the combined claims against each by the three witnesses after the attestation clause. The testatrix died
other determine the appellate jurisdictional amount, are not applicable on August 13, 1925. Opposition to such probate was filed by Rita
to, the instant case, because Section 2, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court is Mateo, the testatrix's sister, and by other relatives.
explicit that the amount or value involved or in controversy in probate
proceedings is that of the entire estate. Assuming, arguendo, that the
rule in the cases cited by respondent is here applicable, it should be The three attesting witnesses to this will, testifying in this case,
noted that respondent claims the whole estate of at least more than declared that the signature of the testatrix were written in their
3/4 thereof. Said claim, reduced to a pecuniary standard, on the basis presence and that they signed their names in the presence of the
of the inventory, would amount to more than P200,000.00 and, testatrix and of each other.
consequently, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The testatrix from girlhood knew how to sign her name and did so with
The case of Ledesma v. Natividad (L-6115, May 10, 1954) cited by her right hand; but as the right side of her body later became
respondent in his brief, is also inapplicable, because unlike the instant paralyzed, she learned to sign with her left hand and for many years
case, it did not involve a contest in the administration of the estate.
49
Wills and Succession Case Digests
thereafter, up to the time of her death, she used to sign with that whether or not they signed with the same pen and ink, these are
hand. Opponents allege that Florencia Mateo did not sign this will. details of such trivial importance, considering that this will was signed
two years before the date on which these witnesses gave their
testimony, that it is not proper to set aside the will for this reason
There are three salient arguments among those adduced by the
alone.
opponents in support of their opposition.
At the bottom thereof, under the heading "Pangalan", are written the 3. That sufficient and abundant evidence warrants
signatures of Matilde D. Orobia, Celso D. Gimpaya and Maria R. conclusively the fact that the purported will of the
Gimpaya, and opposite the same, under the heading "Tirahan", are deceased was not executed and attested as
their respective places of residence, 961 Highway 54, Philamlife, for required by law;
Miss Orobia, and 12 Dagala St., Navotas, Rizal, for the two Gimpayas.
Their signatures also appear on the left margin of all the other pages.
The WW is paged by typewritten words as follows: "Unang Dahon" 4. That the evidence is likewise conclusive that the
and underneath "(Page One)", "Ikalawang Dahon" and underneath document presented for probate, Exhibit 'F' is not
"(Page Two)", etc., appearing at the top of each page. the purported win allegedly dictated by the
deceased, executed and signed by her, and
attested by her three attesting witnesses on April
The will itself provides that the testatrix desired to be buried in the 15, 1961.
Catholic Cemetery of Navotas, Rizal in accordance with the rites of the
Roman Catholic Church, all expenses to be paid from her estate; that
all her obligations, if any, be paid; that legacies in specified amounts WHEREFORE, Exhibit "F", the document presented
be given to her sister, Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago, her brother for probate as the last wig and testament of the
Santiago Gabriel, and her nephews and nieces, Benjamin, Salud, deceased Isabel Gabriel is here by DISALLOWED.
Rizalina (herein petitioner), Victoria, Ester, Andres, all surnamed
Gabriel, and Evangeline, Rudyardo Rosa, Andrea, Marcial, Numancia,
51
Wills and Succession Case Digests
From this judgment of disallowance, Lutgarda Santiago appealed to III. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that Atty, Paraiso was not
respondent Court, hence, the only issue decided on appeal was previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the
whether or not the will in question was executed and attested as witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document
required by law. The Court of Appeals, upon consideration of the Exhibit "F".
evidence adduced by both parties, rendered the decision now under
review, holding that the will in question was signed and executed by
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the fact that the three
the deceased Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961 in the presence of the
typewritten lines under the typewritten words "Pangalan" and
three attesting witnesses, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria
"Tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three
Gimpaya, signing and witnessing the document in the presence of the
attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion.
deceased and of each other as required by law, hence allow ed
probate.
V. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's finding that
it was incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the wilt Exhibit
Oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales moved for reconsideration of the
3
"F , without any note or document, to Atty. Paraiso.
aforesaid decision and such motion was opposed 4 by petitioner-
appellant Lutgarda Santiago. Thereafter. parties submitted their
respective Memoranda, 5and on August 28, 1973, respondent Court, VI. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the trial court
Former Special First Division, by Resolution 6 denied the motion for that Matilde Orobia was not physically present when the Will Exhibit
reconsideration stating that: "F" was allegedly signed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel
Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya.
The oppositor-appellee contends that the
preponderance of evidence shows that the VII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court gave
supposed last wig and testament of Isabel Gabriel undue importance to the picture takings as proof that the win was
was not executed in accordance with law because improperly executed.
the same was signed on several occasions, that
the testatrix did not sign the will in the presence VIII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the grave
of all the instrumental witnesses did not sign the contradictions, evasions, and misrepresentations of witnesses
will in the presence of each other. (subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner had been
explained away, and that the trial court erred in rejecting said
The resolution of the factual issue raised in the testimonies.
motion for reconsideration hinges on the
appreciation of the evidence. We have carefully IX. The Court of Appeals acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction or
re-examined the oral and documentary evidence has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
of record, There is no reason to alter the findings proceedings, as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision.
of fact in the decision of this Court sought to be
set aside. 7
X. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial
court and admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the alleged last will and
In her petition before this Court, oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.
contends that respondent Court abused its discretion and/or acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction in reverssing the findings of fact
and conclusions of the trial court. The Court, after deliberating on the It will be noted from the above assignments of errors that the same
petition but without giving due course resolved, in the Resolution are substantially factual in character and content. Hence, at the very
dated Oct. 11, 1973 to require the respondents to comment thereon, outset, We must again state the oft-repeated and well-established rule
which comment was filed on Nov. 14, 1973. Upon consideration of the that in this jurisdiction, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
allegations, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the not reviewable, the same being binding and conclusive on this Court.
petition, as well as the Comment 8 of private respondent thereon, We This rule has been stated and reiterated in a long line of cases
denied the petition by Resolution on November 26, 1973, 9 the enumerated in Chan vs. CA (L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737,
question raised being factual and for insufficient showing that the 743) 12 and Tapas vs. CA (L-22202, February 27; 1976, 69 SCRA
findings of fact by respondent Court were unsupported by substantial 393), 13and in the more recent cases of Baptisia vs. Carillo and
evidence. CA (L32192, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 214, 217) and Vda. de Catindig
vs. Heirs of Catalina Roque (L-25777, November 26, 1976, 74 SCRA
83, 88). In the case of Chan vs. CA, this Court said:
Subsequently, or on December 17, 1973, petitioner Rim Gabriel Goes
fried a Motion for Reconsideration 10 which private respondent
answered by way of her Comment or Opposition 11 filed on January ... from Guico v. Mayuga, a 1936 decision, the opinion being penned
15, 1974. A Reply and Rejoinder to Reply followed. Finally, on March by the then Justice Recto, it has been well-settled that the jurisdiction
27, 1974, We resolved to give due course to the petition. of tills Court in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited
to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of
fact being conclusive. More specifically, in a decision exactly a month
The petitioner in her brief makes the following assignment of errors: later, this Court, speaking through the then Justice Laurel, it was held
that the same principle is applicable, even if the Court of Appeals was
I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the in disagreement with the lower court as to the weight of the evidence
document, Exhibit "F" was executed and attested as required by law with a consequent reversal of its findings of fact ...
when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental
witnesses were credible witness Stated otherwise, findings of facts by the Court of Appeals, when
supported by substantive evidence are not reviewable on appeal by
II. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the lower certiorari. Said findings of the appellate court are final and cannot be
court that the preparation and execution of the win Exhibit "F", was disturbed by Us particularly because its premises are borne out by the
unexpected and coincidental. record or based upon substantial evidence and what is more, when
52
Wills and Succession Case Digests
such findings are correct. Assignments of errors involving factual honesty and uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of the
issues cannot be ventilated in a review of the decision of the Court of witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party.
Appeals because only legal questions may be raised. The Supreme
Court is not at liberty to alter or modify the facts as set forth in the
We also reject as without merit petitioner's contention that the term
decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reversed. Where the
"credible" as used in the Civil Code should be given the same meaning
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court,
it has under the Naturalization Law where the law is mandatory that
a minute scrutiny by the Supreme Court is in order, and resort to duly-
the petition for naturalization must be supported by two character
proven evidence becomes necessary. The general rule We have thus
witnesses who must prove their good standing in the community,
stated above is not without some recognized exceptions.
reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, their honesty and
uprightness. The two witnesses in a petition for naturalization are
Having laid down the above legal precepts as Our foundation, We now character witnesses in that being citizens of the Philippines, they
proceed to consider petitioner's assignments of errors. personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for
the period of time required by the Act and a person of good repute
and morally irreproachable and that said petitioner has in their opinion
Petitioner, in her first assignment, contends that the respondent Court
all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines
of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F", was
and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of the
executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely
Naturalization Law (Section 7, Commonwealth Act No. 473 as
no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were credible
amended).
witnesses. She argues that the require. ment in Article 806, Civil Code,
that the witnesses must be credible is an absolute requirement which
must be complied with before an alleged last will and testament may In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character
be admitted to probate and that to be a credible witness, there must witnesses for they merely attest the execution of a will or testament
be evidence on record that the witness has a good standing in his and affirm the formalities attendant to said execution. And We agree
community, or that he is honest and upright, or reputed to be with the respondent that the rulings laid down in the cases cited by
trustworthy and reliable. According to petitioner, unless the petitioner concerning character witnesses in naturalization proceedings
qualifications of the witness are first established, his testimony may are not applicable to instrumental witnesses to wills executed under
not be favorably considered. Petitioner contends that the term the Civil Code of the Philippines.
"credible" is not synonymous with "competent" for a witness may be
competent under Article 820 and 821 of the Civil Code and still not be
In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three
credible as required by Article 805 of the same Code. It is further
instrumental witnesses, namely, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and
urged that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should receive
Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily supported
the same settled and well- known meaning it has under the
by the evidence as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, which
Naturalization Law, the latter being a kindred legislation with the Civil
findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon.
Code provisions on wigs with respect to the qualifications of witnesses.
Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification of any of
the said witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them
We find no merit to petitioner's first assignment of error. Article 820 of is below 18 years of age, of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot
the Civil Code provides the qualifications of a witness to the execution read or write.
of wills while Article 821 sets forth the disqualification from being a
witness to a win. These Articles state:
It is true that under Article 805 of the New Civil Code, every will, other
than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other
age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
witness to the execution of a will mentioned in testator and of one another, While the petitioner submits that Article
article 806 of this Code. "Art. 821. The following 820 and 821 of the New Civil Code speak of the competency of a
are disqualified from being witnesses to a will: witness due to his qualifications under the first Article and none of the
disqualifications under the second Article, whereas Article 805 requires
the attestation of three or more credible witnesses, petitioner
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,
concludes that the term credible requires something more than just
being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification being competent under Articles 820 and 821 must also be a credible
of a document, perjury or false testimony. witness under Article 805.
Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness Petitioner cites American authorities that competency and credibility of
testify initially or at any time during the trial as to his good standing in a witness are not synonymous terms and one may be a competent
the community, his reputation for trustworthythiness and reliableness, witness and yet not a credible one. She exacerbates that there is no
his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony may be evidence on record to show that the instrumental witnesses are
believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the credible in themselves, that is, that they are of good standing in the
qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied community since one was a family driver by profession and the second
with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced the wife of the driver, a housekeeper. It is true that Celso Gimpaya
from his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 was the driver of the testatrix and his wife Maria Gimpaya, merely a
years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or housekeeper, and that Matilde Orobia was a piano teacher to a
competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, grandchild of the testatrix But the relation of employer and employee
deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction much less the humble or financial position of a person do not
of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article disqualify him to be a competent testamentary witness. (Molo Pekson
821 of the Civil Code. We reject petitioner's contention that it must and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344; Testate Estate of
first be established in the record the good standing of the witness in Raymundo, Off. Gaz., March 18,1941, p. 788).
the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
Private respondent maintains that the qualifications of the three or In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an instrumental
more credible witnesses mentioned in Article 805 of the Civil Code are witness to a will is determined by the statute, that is Art. 820 and 821,
those mentioned in Article 820 of the same Code, this being obvious Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends On the appreciation of his
from that portion of Article 820 which says "may be Q witness to the testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that
execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code," and cites said witness is telling the truth. Thus, in the case of Vda. de Aroyo v.
authorities that the word "credible" insofar as witnesses to a will are El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968,
concerned simply means " competent." Thus, in the case of Suntay vs. the Supreme Court held and ruled that: "Competency as a witness is
Suntay, 95 Phil. 500, the Supreme Court held that "Granting that a will one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that
was duly executed and that it was in existence at the time of, and not the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person
revoked before, the death of the testator, still the provisions of the lost to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent,
wig must be clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his
witnesses. 'Credible witnesses' mean competent witnesses and not testimony." In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses
those who testify to facts from or upon hearsay. " emphasis supplied). in Order to be competent must be shown to have the qualifications
under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications
under Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy
In Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344,
of belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be
the Supreme Court held that "Section 620 of the same Code of Civil
first established on record that the witnesses have a good standing in
Procedure provides that any person of sound mind, and of the age of
the community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be
eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf, or dumb and able to read
trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless
and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will. This same
the contrary is established otherwise. In other words, the instrumental
provision is reproduced in our New Civil Code of 1950, under Art. 820.
witnesses must be competent and their testimonies must be credible
The relation of employer and employee, or being a relative to the
before the court allows the probate of the will they have attested. We,
beneficiary in a win, does not disqualify one to be a witness to a will.
therefore, reject petitioner's position that it was fatal for respondent
The main qualification of a witness in the attestation of wills, if other
not to have introduced prior and independent proof of the fact that the
qualifications as to age, mental capacity and literacy are present, is
witnesses were "credible witnesses that is, that they have a good
that said witness must be credible, that is to say, his testimony may be
standing in the community and reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.
entitled to credence. There is a long line of authorities on this point, a
few of which we may cite:
Under the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth
assignments of errors, petitioner disputes the findings of fact of the
A 'credible witness is one who is not is not to
respondent court in finding that the preparation and execution of the
testify by mental incapacity, crime, or other cause.
will was expected and not coincidental, in finding that Atty. Paraiso
Historical Soc of Dauphin County vs. Kelker 74 A.
was not previously furnished with the names and residence certificates
619, 226 Pix 16, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1010. (Words
of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document
and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 340).
Exhibit "F", in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines
under the typewritten words "pangalan" and "tinitirahan" were left
As construed by the common law, a 'credible blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all
witness' to a will means a 'competent witness.' present in the same occasion, in holding credible that Isabel Gabriel
Appeal of Clark, 95 A. 517, 114 Me. 105, Ann. Cas. could have dictated the will without note or document to Atty. Paraiso,
1917A, 837. (lbid, p. 341). in holding that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was
signed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other
Expression 'credible witness' in relation to witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, in holding that the trial
attestation of wins means 'competent witness that court gave undue importance to the picture takings as proof that the
is, one competent under the law to testify to fact will was improperly executed, and in holding that the grave
of execution of will. Vernon's Ann. Civ St. art. contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of the witnesses
8283. Moos vs. First State Bank of Uvalde, Tex . (subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner had been
Civ. App. 60 S.W. 2nd 888, 889. (Ibid, p. 342) explained away.
The term 'credible', used in the statute of wills Since the above errors are factual We must repeat what We have
requiring that a will shall be attested by two previously laid down that the findings of fact of the appellate court are
credible witnesses means competent; witnesses binding and controlling which We cannot review, subject to certain
who, at the time of attesting the will, are legally exceptions which We win consider and discuss hereinafter. We are
competent to testify, in a court of justice, to the convinced that the appellate court's findings are sufficiently justified
facts attested by subscribing the will, the and supported by the evidence on record. Thus, the alleged
competency being determined as of the date of unnaturalness characterizing the trip of the testatrix to the office of
the execution of the will and not of the timr it is Atty. Paraiso and bringing all the witnesses without previous
offered for probate, Smith vs. Goodell 101 N.E. appointment for the preparation and execution of the win and that it
255, 256, 258 111. 145. (Ibid.) was coincidental that Atty. Paraiso was available at the moment
impugns the finding of the Court of Appeals that although Atty. Paraiso
admitted the visit of Isabel Gabriel and of her companions to his office
Credible witnesses as used in the statute relating on April 15, 1961 was unexpected as there was no prior appointment
to wills, means competent witnesses — that is, with him, but he explained that he was available for any business
such persons as are not legally disqualified from transaction on that day and that Isabel Gabriel had earlier requested
testifying in courts of justice, by reason of mental him to help her prepare her will. The finding of the appellate court is
incapacity, interest, or the commission of crimes, amply based on the testimony of Celso Gimpaya that he was not only
or other cause excluding them from testifying informed on the morning of the day that he witnessed the will but that
generally, or rendering them incompetent in it was the third time when Isabel Gabriel told him that he was going to
respect of the particular subject matter or in the witness the making of her will, as well as the testimony of Maria
particular suit. Hill vs. Chicago Title & Trust co 152 Gimpaya that she was called by her husband Celso Gimpaya to
N.E. 545, 546, 322 111. 42. (Ibid. p, 343)
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proceed to Isabel Gabriel's house which was nearby and from said notary public and as such public document is evidence of the facts in
house, they left in a car to the lawyer's office, which testimonies are clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the
recited in the respondent Court's decision. presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there must be
evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.
(Yturalde vs. Azurin, 28 SCRA 407). We find no such evidence pointed
The respondent Court further found the following facts: that Celso
by petitioner in the case at bar.
Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya obtained residence certificates a
few days before Exhibit "F" was executed. Celso Gimpaya's residence
certificate No. A-5114942 was issued at Navotas, Rizal on April 13, Likewise, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals in holding that the
1961 while Maria Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114974 was fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten words
issued also at Navotas, Rizal on April 14, 1961. The respondent Court "pangalan ' and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that
correctly observed that there was nothing surprising in these facts and the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion
that the securing of these residence certificates two days and one day, merits Our approval because tills conclusion is supported and borne
respectively, before the execution of the will on April 15, 1961, far out by the evidence found by the appellate court, thus: "On page 5 of
from showing an amazing coincidence, reveals that the spouses were Exhibit "F", beneath the typewritten words "names", "Res. Tax Cert.
earlier notified that they would be witnesses to the execution of Isabel date issued" and place issued the only name of Isabel Gabriel with
Gabriel's will. Residence Tax certificate No. A-5113274 issued on February 24, 1961
at Navotas Rizal appears to be in typewritten form while the names,
residence tax certificate numbers, dates and places of issuance of said
We also agree with the respondent Court's conclusion that the
certificates pertaining to the three (3) witnesses were personally
excursion to the office of Atty. Paraiso was planned by the deceased,
handwritten by Atty. Paraiso. Again, this coincides with Atty. Paraiso's
which conclusion was correctly drawn from the testimony of the
even the sale must be made to close relatives; and the seventh was
Gimpaya spouses that they started from the Navotas residence of the
the appointment of the appellant Santiago as executrix of the will
deceased with a photographer and Isabel Gabriel herself, then they
without bond. The technical description of the properties in paragraph
proceeded by car to Matilde Orobia's house in Philamlife, Quezon City
5 of Exhibit F was not given and the numbers of the certificates of title
to fetch her and from there, all the three witnesses (the Gimpayas and
were only supplied by Atty. Paraiso. "
Orobia) passed by a place where Isabel Gabriel stayed for about ten to
fifteen minutes at the clinic of Dr. Chikiamco before they proceeded to
Atty. Cipriano Paraiso's office. It is true that in one disposition, the numbers of the Torrens titles of
the properties disposed and the docket number of a special proceeding
are indicated which Atty. Paraiso candidly admitted were supplied by
It is also evident from the records, as testified to by Atty. Paraiso, that
him, whereupon petitioner contends that it was incredible that Isabel
previous to the day that. the will was executed on April 15, 1961,
Gabriel could have dictated the will Exhibit "F" without any note or
Isabel Gabriel had requested him to help her in the execution of her
document to Atty. Paraiso, considering that Isabel Gabriel was an old
will and that he told her that if she really wanted to execute her will,
and sickly woman more than eighty-one years old and had been
she should bring with her at least the Mayor of Navotas, Rizal and a
suffering from a brain injury caused by two severe blows at her head
Councilor to be her witnesses and that he (Atty. Paraiso) wanted a
and died of terminal cancer a few weeks after the execution of Exhibit
medical certificate from a physician notwithstanding the fact that he
"F". While we can rule that this is a finding of fact which is within the
believed her to be of sound and disposition mind. From this evidence,
competency of the respondent appellate court in determining the
the appellate court rightly concluded, thus: "It is, therefore, clear that
testamentary capacity of the testatrix and is, therefore, beyond Our
the presence of Isabel Gabriel and her witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso
power to revise and review, We nevertheless hold that the conclusion
Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya including the photographer in the law
reached by the Court of Appeals that the testatrix dictated her will
office of Atty. Paraiso was not coincidental as their gathering was pre-
without any note or memorandum appears to be fully supported by the
arranged by Isabel Gabriel herself."
following facts or evidence appearing on record. Thus, Isabel Gabriel,
despite her age, was particularly active in her business affairs as she
As to the appellate court's finding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously actively managed the affairs of the movie business ISABELITA Theater,
furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as paying the aparatistas herself until June 4, 1961, 3 days before her
to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit ' L which death. She was the widow of the late Eligio Naval, former Governor of
the petitioner assails as contradictory and irreconcilable with the Rizal Province and acted as coadministratrix in the Intestate Estate of
statement of the Court that Atty. Paraiso was handed a list (containing her deceased husband Eligio Naval. The text of the win was in
the names of the witnesses and their respective residence certificates) Tagalog, a dialect known and understood by her and in the light of all
immediately upon their arrival in the law office by Isabel Gabriel and the circumstances, We agree with the respondent Court that the
this was corroborated by Atty. Paraiso himself who testified that it was testatrix dictated her will without any note or memorandum, a fact
only on said occasion that he received such list from Isabel Gabriel, unanimously testified to by the three attesting witnesses and the
We cannot agree with petitioner's contention. We find no contradiction notary public himself.
for the, respondent Court held that on the occasion of the will making
on April 15, 1961, the list was given immediately to Atty. Paraiso and
Petitioner's sixth assignment of error is also bereft of merit. The
that no such list was given the lawyer in any previous occasion or date
evidence, both testimonial and documentary is, according to the
prior to April 15, 1961.
respondent court, overwhelming that Matilde Orobia was physically
present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961 by the testatrix
But whether Atty. Paraiso was previously furnished with the names and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. Such
and residence certificates of the witnesses on a prior occasion or on factual finding of the appellate court is very clear, thus: "On the
the very occasion and date in April 15, 1961 when the will was contrary, the record is replete with proof that Matilde Orobia was
executed, is of no moment for such data appear in the notarial physically present when the will was signed by Isabel Gabriel on April
acknowledgment of Notary Public Cipriano Paraiso, subscribed and '15, 1961 along with her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria
sworn to by the witnesses on April 15, 1961 following the attestation Gimpaya. The trial court's conclusion that Orobia's admission that she
clause duly executed and signed on the same occasion, April 15, 1961. gave piano lessons to the child of the appellant on Wednesdays and
And since Exhibit "F" is a notarial will duly acknowledged by the Saturdays and that April 15, 1961 happened to be a Saturday for
testatrix and the witnesses before a notary public, the same is a public which reason Orobia could not have been present to witness the will
document executed and attested through the intervention of the on that — day is purely conjectural. Witness Orobia did not admit
55
Wills and Succession Case Digests
having given piano lessons to the appellant's child every Wednesday the trial court. On the other hand, the respondent Court of Appeals
and Saturday without fail. It is highly probable that even if April 15, held that said contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations had
1961 were a Saturday, she gave no piano lessons on that day for been explained away. Such discrepancies as in the description of the
which reason she could have witnessed the execution of the will. typewriter used by Atty. Paraiso which he described as "elite" which to
Orobia spoke of occasions when she missed giving piano lessons and him meant big letters which are of the type in which the will was
had to make up for the same. Anyway, her presence at the law office typewritten but which was Identified by witness Jolly Bugarin of the
of Atty. Paraiso was in the morning of April 15, 1961 and there was N.B.I. as pica the mistake in mentioning the name of the photographer
nothing to preclude her from giving piano lessons on the afternoon of by Matilde Orobia to be Cesar Mendoza when actually it was Benjamin
the same day in Navotas, Rizal." Cifra, Jr.— these are indeed unimportant details which could have
been affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human
memory such that by themselves would not alter the probative value
In addition to the testimony of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and
of their testimonies on the true execution of the will, (Pascual vs. dela
Maria Gimpaya that Matilde was present on April 15, 1961 and that she
Cruz, 28 SCRA 421, 424) for it cannot be expected that the testimony
signed the attestation clause to the will and on the left-hand margin of
of every person win be Identical and coinciding with each other with
each of the pages of the will, the documentary evidence which is the
regard to details of an incident and that witnesses are not expected to
will itself, the attestation clause and the notarial acknowledgment
remember all details. Human experience teach us "that contradictions
overwhelmingly and convincingly prove such fact that Matilde Orobia
of witnesses generally occur in the details of certain incidents, after a
was present on that day of April 15, 1961 and that she witnessed the
long series of questionings, and far from being an evidence of
will by signing her name thereon and acknowledged the same before
falsehood constitute a demonstration of good faith. In as much as not
the notary public, Atty. Cipriano P. Paraiso. The attestation clause
all those who witness an incident are impressed in like manner, it is
which Matilde Orobia signed is the best evidence as to the date of
but natural that in relating their impressions, they should not agree in
signing because it preserves in permanent form a recital of all the
the minor details; hence the contradictions in their testimony." (Lopez
material facts attending the execution of the will. This is the very
vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429).
purpose of the attestation clause which is made for the purpose of
preserving in permanent form a record of the facts attending the
execution of the will, so that in case of failure in the memory of the It is urged of Us by the petitioner that the findings of the trial court
subscribing witnesses, or other casualty they may still be proved. should not have been disturbed by the respondent appellate court
(Thompson on Wills, 2nd ed., Sec. 132; Leynez vs. Leynez, 68 Phil. because the trial court was in a better position to weigh and evaluate
745). the evidence presented in the course of the trial. As a general rule,
petitioner is correct but it is subject to well-established exceptions. The
right of the Court of Appeals to review, alter and reverse the findings
As to the seventh error assigned by petitioner faulting the Court of
of the trial court where the appellate court, in reviewing the evidence
Appeals in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the
has found that facts and circumstances of weight and influence have
picture-takings as proof that the win was improperly executed, We
been ignored and overlooked and the significance of which have been
agree with the reasoning of the respondent court that: "Matilde
misinterpreted by the trial court, cannot be disputed. Findings of facts
Orobia's Identification of the photographer as "Cesar Mendoza",
made by trial courts particularly when they are based on conflicting
contrary to what the other two witnesses (Celso and Maria Gimpaya)
evidence whose evaluation hinges on questions of credibility of
and Atty. Paraiso said that the photographer was Benjamin Cifra, Jr., is
contending witnesses hes peculiarly within the province of trial courts
at worst a minor mistake attributable to lapse of time. The law does
and generally, the appellate court should not interfere with the same.
not require a photographer for the execution and attestation of the
In the instant case, however, the Court of Appeals found that the trial
will. The fact that Miss Orobia mistakenly Identified the photographer
court had overlooked and misinterpreted the facts and circumstances
as Cesar Mendoza scarcely detracts from her testimony that she was
established in the record. Whereas the appellate court said that
present when the will was signed because what matters here is not the
"Nothing in the record supports the trial court's unbelief that Isabel
photographer but the photograph taken which clearly portrays Matilde
Gabriel dictated her will without any note or document to Atty.
Orobia herself, her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya. " Further, the
Paraiso;" that the trial court's conclusion that Matilde Orobia could not
respondent Court correctly held: "The trial court gave undue
have witnessed anybody signing the alleged will or that she could not
importance to the picture takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion
have witnessed Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sign the same or
that the will was improperly executed. The evidence however, heavily
that she witnessed only the deceased signing it, is a conclusion based
points to only one occasion of the execution of the will on April 15,
not on facts but on inferences; that the trial court gave undue
1961 which was witnessed by Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and
importance to the picture-takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion
Maria Gimpaya. These witnesses were quite emphatic and positive
that the will was improperly executed and that there is nothing in the
when they spoke of this occasion. Hence, their Identification of some
entire record to support the conclusion of the court a quo that the will
photographs wherein they all appeared along with Isabel Gabriel and
signing occasion was a mere coincidence and that Isabel Gabriel made
Atty. Paraiso was superfluous."
an appointment only with Matilde Orobia to witness the signing of her
will, then it becomes the duty of the appellate court to reverse findings
Continuing, the respondent Court declared: "It is true that the second of fact of the trial court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over
picture-taking was disclosed at the cross examination of Celso the lower courts.
Gimpaya. But this was explained by Atty. Paraiso as a reenactment of
the first incident upon the insistence of Isabel Gabriel. Such
Still the petitioner insists that the case at bar is an exception to the
reenactment where Matilde Orobia was admittedly no longer present
rule that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the
was wholly unnecessary if not pointless. What was important was that
facts and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Again We agree
the will was duly executed and witnessed on the first occasion on April
with the petitioner that among the exceptions are: (1) when the
15, 1961 , " and We agree with the Court's rationalization in
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conformity with logic, law and jurisprudence which do not require
conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
picture-taking as one of the legal requisites for the execution or
impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when
probate of a will.
the presence of each other as required by law. " Specifically, We affirm
that on April 15, 1961 the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, together with
Petitioner points to alleged grave contradictions, evasions and Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya, and a
misrepresentations of witnesses in their respective testimonies before photographer proceeded in a car to the office of Atty. Cipriano Paraiso
56
Wills and Succession Case Digests
at the Bank of P.I. Building, Manila in the morning of that day; that on Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
the way, Isabel Gabriel obtained a medical certificate from one Dr. and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
Chikiamko which she gave to Atty. Paraiso upon arriving at the latter's appellee. (Roque vs. Buan, et al., G.R. No. L-22459, Oct. 31, 1967;
office and told the lawyer that she wanted her will to be made; that Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., G.R. No. L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967;
Atty. Paraiso asked Isabel Gabriel to dictate what she wanted to be Hilarion Jr. vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-19570; Sept. 14, 1967).
written in the will and the attorney wrote down the dictation of Isabel
Gabriel in Tagalog, a language known to and spoken by her; that Atty.
Petitioner's insistence is without merit. We hold that the case at bar
Paraiso read back to her what he wrote as dictated and she affirmed
does not fall within any of the exceptions enumerated above. We
their correctness; the lawyer then typed the will and after finishing the
likewise hold that the findings of fact of the respondent appellate court
document, he read it to her and she told him that it was alright; that
are fully supported by the evidence on record. The conclusions are
thereafter, Isabel Gabriel signed her name at the end of the will in the
fully sustained by substantial evidence. We find no abuse of discretion
presence of the three witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and
and We discern no misapprehension of facts. The respondent Court's
Maria Gimpaya and also at the left-hand margin of each and every
findings of fact are not conflicting. Hence, the well-established rule
page of the document in the presence also of the said three witnesses;
that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its findings of fact are
that thereafter Matilde Orobia attested the will by signing her name at
binding and conclusive and should not be disturbed by this Tribunal
the end of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of pages
and it must be applied in the case at bar in its full force and effect,
1, 2, 3 and 5 of the document in the presence of Isabel Gabriel and
without qualification or reservation. The above holding simply
the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya; then,
synthesize the resolutions we have heretofore made in respect ' to
Celso Gimpaya signed also the will at the bottom of the attestation
petitioner's previous assignments of error and to which We have
clause and at the left-hand margin of the other pages of the document
disagreed and, therefore, rejected.
in the presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and Maria Gimpaya;
that Maria Gimpaya followed suit, signing her name at the foot of the
attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of every page in the The last assignments of error of petitioner must necessarily be rejected
presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and Celso Gimpaya; that by Us as We find the respondent Court acted properly and correctly
thereafter, Atty. Paraiso notarized the will as Page No. 94, Book No. and has not departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
IV, Series of 1961, in his Notarial Register. On the occasion of the proceedings as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision by
execution and attestation of the will, a photographer took pictures, one the Supreme Court, and as We find that the Court of Appeals did not
Exhibit "G", depicting Matilde Orobia, the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, Celso err in reversing the decision of the trial court and admitting to probate
Gimpaya, Maria Gimpaya and Atty. Paraiso, taken on said occasion of Exhibit "F", the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.
the signing of the will, and another, Exhibit "H", showing Matilde
Orobia signing testimony that he had earlier advised Isabel Gabriel to We rule that the respondent Court's factual findings upon its
bring with her at least the Mayor and a Councilor of Navotas, Rizal to summation and evaluation of the evidence on record is unassailable
be her witnesses for he did not know beforehand the Identities of the that: "From the welter of evidence presented, we are convinced that
three attesting witnesses until the latter showed up at his law office the will in question was executed on April 15, 1961 in the presence of
with Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961. Atty. Paraiso's claim which was Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya signing and
not controverted that he wrote down in his own hand the date witnessing the same in the the will on a table with Isabel Gabriel,
appearing on page 5 of Exhibit "F" dissipates any lingering doubt that Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sitting around the table. Atty.
he prepared and ratified the will on the date in question." Paraiso, after finishing the notarial act, then delivered the original to
Isabel Gabriel and retained the other copies for his file and notarial
It is also a factual finding of the Court of Appeals in holding that it was register. A few days following the signing of the will, Isabel Gabriel,
credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will, Exhibit "F", Celso Gimpaya and another photographer arrived at the office of Atty.
without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso as against the Paraiso and told the lawyer that she wanted another picture taken
contention of petitioner that it was incredible. This ruling of the because the first picture did not turn out good. The lawyer told her
respondent court is fully supported by the evidence on record as that this cannot be done because the will was already signed but
stated in the decision under review, thus: "Nothing in the record Isabel Gabriel insisted that a picture be taken, so a simulated signing
supports the trial court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will was performed during which incident Matilde Orobia was not present.
without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso. On the contrary, all the
three attesting witnesses uniformly testified that Isabel Gabriel Petitioner's exacerbation centers on the supposed incredibility of the
dictated her will to Atty. Paraiso and that other than the piece of paper testimonies of the witnesses for the proponent of the will, their alleged
that she handed to said lawyer she had no note or document. This fact evasions, inconsistencies and contradictions. But in the case at bar, the
jibes with the evidence — which the trial court itself believed was three instrumental witnesses who constitute the best evidence of the
unshaken — that Isabel Gabriel was of sound disposing memory when will making have testified in favor of the probate of the will. So has the
she executed her will. lawyer who prepared it, one learned in the law and long in the practice
thereof, who thereafter notarized it. All of them are disinterested
Exhibit "F" reveals only seven (7) dispositions which are not witnesses who stand to receive no benefit from the testament. The
complicated but quite simple. The first was Isabel Gabriel's wish to be signatures of the witnesses and the testatrix have been identified on
interred according to Catholic rites the second was a general directive the will and there is no claim whatsoever and by anyone, much less
to pay her debts if any; the third provided for P1,000.00 for her sister the petitioner, that they were not genuine. In the last and final
Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago and P2,000.00 for her brother analysis, the herein conflict is factual and we go back to the rule that
Santiago Gabriel; the fourth was a listing of her 13 nephews and the Supreme Court cannot review and revise the findings of facts of
nieces including oppositor-appellee Rizalina Gabriel and the amount for the respondent Court of Appeals.
each legatee the fifth was the institution of the petitioner-appellant,
Lutgarda Santiago as the principal heir mentioning in general terms WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed
seven (7) types of properties; the sixth disposed of the remainder of from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
her estate which she willed in favor of appellant Lutgarda Santiago but
prohibiting the sale of such properties to anyone except in extreme
situations in which judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; SO ORDERED.
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6) when the Court of
57
Wills and Succession Case Digests
EN BANC Applying that doctrine to the instant case, we hold that, as each and
every page used of the will bears the signatures of the testator and
the witnesses, the fact that said signatures do not all appear on the
G.R. No. L-21755 December 29, 1924
left margin of each page does not detract from the validity of the
will.lawphi1.net
In the matter of the testate estate of Antonio Mojal, deceased.
FILOMENA NAYVE, petitioner-appellee,
Turning to the second defect alleged, that is to say, the fact that the
vs.
sheets of the document are not paged with letters, suffice it to cite the
LEONA MOJAL and LUCIANA AGUILAR, opponents-appellants.
case of Unson vs. Abella (43 Phil., 494), where this court held that
paging with Arabic numerals and not with letters, as in the case before
ROMUALDEZ, J.: us, is within the spirit of the law and is just as valid as paging with
letters.
This is a proceeding for the probate of the will of the deceased Antonio
Mojal instituted by his surviving spouse, Filomena Nayve. The probate As to the proposition that the attestation clause does not state the
is opposed by Leona Mojal and Luciana Aguilar, sister and niece, number of sheets or pages of the will, which is the third defect
respectively, of the deceased. assigned, it must be noted that the last paragraph of the will here in
question and the attestation clause, coming next to it, are of the
The Court of First Instance of Albay, which tried the case, overruled following tenor:
the objections to the will, and ordered the probate thereof, holding
that the document in controversy was the last will and testament of In witness
Antonio Mojal, executed in accordance with law. From this judgment whereof, I set
the opponents appeal, assigning error to the decree of the court my hand unto
allowing the will to probate and overruling their opposition. this will here in
the town of
The will in question, Exhibit A, is composed of four sheets with written Camalig, Albay,
matter on only side of each, that is, four pages written on four sheets. Philippine
The four sides or pages containing written matter are paged "Pag. 1," Islands, this
"Pag. 2," "Pag. 3," "Pag. 4," successively. Each of the first two sides or 26th day of
pages, which was issued, was signed by the testator and the three November,
witnesses on the margin, left side of the reader. On the third page nineteen
actually used, the signatures of the three witnesses appear also on the hundred and
margin, left side of the reader, but the signature of the testator is not eighteen,
on the margin, but about the middle of the page, at the end of the will composed of
and before the attestation clause. On the fourth page, the signatures four sheets,
of the witnesses do not appear on the margin, but at the bottom of including the
the attestation clause, it being the signature of the testator that is on next:
the margin, left side of the reader. ANTONIO MOJAL
59
Wills and Succession Case Digests
This is a defect so radical that there is no way by which what is written From this judgment an appeal was taken in behalf of the persons
on the reverse side of the first folio may be held valid. It is possible contesting the will, and the only errors here assigned have reference
that this document consists of only the two folios numbered 1 and 2, to the two following points, namely, first, whether a will can be
and that on the reverse side of number 2 nothing may have been admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a
written upon the order of the testatrix, the testament ending at the single attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the
foot of the first folio with the legacy "To my nephew Catalino Ignacio, absence of the other two; and, secondly, whether the will in question
pesos 200" (A mi sobrino Catalino Ignacio doscientos pesos) and from is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the signature of the
that part then immediately follows folio No. 2 — "Manila a tres de testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right
Octubre de mil novecientos diez y ocho.--Yo la testadora firmo en margin of each page of the will instead of the left margin.
presencia etc." (Manila, October 3, 1918, — I, the testatrix, sign in the
presence of etc.) There is nothing which guarantees all the contents of
Upon the first point, while it is undoubtedly true that an uncontested
page 2. The margin of this page is absolutely blank. there is nothing
will bay be proved by the testimony of only one of the three attesting
which gives the assurance that the testatrix ordered the insertion of all
witnesses, nevertheless in Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), this
the contents of page 2. It may very well be that it was subsequently
court declared after an elaborate examination of the American and
added thereby substituting the will of the testatrix, a result for the
English authorities that when a contest is instituted, all of the attesting
prevention of which this manner of authenticity by affixing the
witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of the process
signature on each page and not merely on each folio was provided for
of the court.
by law. This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not
enough that the signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear
upon two folios or leaves; three pages having been written, the In the present case no explanation was made at the trial as to why all
authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed with the three of the attesting witnesses were not produced, but the probable
signature of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses. The English text reason is found in the fact that, although the petition for the probate
which requires the signing of pages and not merely leaves or folios of this will had been pending from December 21, 1917, until the date
should prevail. it is so provided in section 15 of the Administrative set for the hearing, which was April 5, 1919, no formal contest was
Code (Act No. 2711). entered until the very day set for the hearing; and it is probable that
the attorney for the proponent, believing in good faith the probate
would not be contested, repaired to the court with only one of the
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs of this instance
three attesting witnesses at hand, and upon finding that the will was
against the appellant.
contested, incautiously permitted the case to go to proof without
asking for a postponement of the trial in order that he might produce
EN BANC all the attesting witnesses.
G.R. No. 15566 September 14, 1921 Although this circumstance may explain why the three witnesses were
not produced, it does not in itself supply any basis for changing the
rule expounded in the case above referred to; and were it not for a
EUTIQUIA AVERA, petitioner-appellee,
fact now to be mentioned, this court would probably be compelled to
vs.
reverse this case on the ground that the execution of the will had not
MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ, as guardian of the
been proved by a sufficient number of attesting witnesses.
minors Cesar Garcia and Jose Garcia,objectors-appellants.
It appears, however, that this point was not raised by the appellant in
STREET, J.:
the lower court either upon the submission of the cause for
determination in that court or upon the occasion of the filing of the
In proceedings in the court below, instituted by Eutiquia Avera for motion for a new trial. Accordingly it is insisted for the appellee that
probate of the will of one Esteban Garcia, contest was made by Marino this question cannot now be raised for the first time in this court. We
Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of guardian for believe this point is well taken, and the first assignment of error must
the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia. Upon the date appointed for be declared not be well taken. This exact question has been decided
the hearing, the proponent of the will introduced one of the three by the Supreme Court of California adversely to the contention of the
attesting witnesses who testified — with details not necessary to be appellant, and we see no reason why the same rule of practice should
here specified — that the will was executed with all necessary external not be observed by us. (Estate of McCarty, 58 Cal., 335, 337.)
formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full possession of
disposing faculties. Upon the latter point the witness was corroborated
There are at least two reason why the appellate tribunals are
by the person who wrote the will at the request of the testator. Two of
disinclined to permit certain questions to be raised for the first time in
the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor was their absence
the second instance. In the first place it eliminates the judicial criterion
accounted for by the proponent of the will.
of the Court of First Instance upon the point there presented and
makes the appellate court in effect a court of first instance with
When the proponent rested the attorney for the opposition introduced reference to that point, unless the case is remanded for a new trial. In
a single witness whose testimony tended to show in a vague and the second place, it permits, if it does not encourage, attorneys to
indecisive manner that at the time the will was made the testator was trifle with the administration of justice by concealing from the trial
so debilitated as to be unable to comprehend what he was about. court and from their opponent the actual point upon which reliance is
placed, while they are engaged in other discussions more simulated
After the cause had been submitted for determination upon the proof than real. These considerations are, we think, decisive.
thus presented, the trial judge found that the testator at the time of
the making of the will was of sound mind and disposing memory and In ruling upon the point above presented we do not wish to be
that the will had been properly executed. He accordingly admitted the understood as laying down any hard and fast rule that would prove an
will to probate. embarrassment to this court in the administration of justice in the
future. In one way or another we are constantly here considering
aspects of cases and applying doctrines which have escaped the
attention of all persons concerned in the litigation below; and this is
60
Wills and Succession Case Digests
necessary if this court is to contribute the part due from it in the The same could not be said of a case like that of Estate of
correct decision of the cases brought before it. What we mean to Saguinsin, supra, where only the leaves, or alternate pages, were
declare is that when we believe that substantial justice has been done signed and not each written page; for as observed in that case by our
in the Court of First Instance, and the point relied on for reversal in late lamented Chief Justice, it was possible that in the will as there
this court appears to be one which ought properly to have been originally executed by the testratrix only the alternative pages had
presented in that court, we will in the exercise of a sound discretion been used, leaving blanks on the reverse sides, which conceivably
ignore such question relates a defect which might have been cured in might have been filled in subsequently.
the Court of First Instance if attention had been called to it there. In
the present case, if the appellant had raised this question in the lower
The controlling considerations on the point now before us were well
court, either at the hearing or upon a motion for a new trial, that court
stated In Re will of Abangan (40 Phil., 476, 479), where the court,
would have had the power, and it would have been is duty,
speaking through Mr. Justice Avanceña, in a case where the signatures
considering the tardy institution of the contest, to have granted a new
were placed at the bottom of the page and not in the margin, said:
trial in order that all the witnesses to the will might be brought into
court. But instead of thus calling the error to the attention of the court
and his adversary, the point is first raised by the appellant in this The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of
court. We hold that this is too late. wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
avoid substitution o will and testaments and to guarantee
their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this
Properly understood, the case of Cabang vs. Delfinado, supra, contains
subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
nothing inconsistent with the ruling we now make, for it appears from
these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must
the opinion in that case that the proponent of the will had obtained an
not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law
order for a republication and new trial for the avowed purpose of
to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a
presenting the two additional attesting witnesses who had not been
will. So when an interpretation already given assures such
previously examined, but nevertheless subsequently failed without any
ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing
apparent reason to take their testimony. Both parties in that case were
but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless
therefore fully apprised that the question of the number of witnesses
and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be
necessary to prove the will was in issue in the lower court.
disregarded.
The second point involved in this case is whether, under section 618 of
In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible
the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, it is
prejudice to any person, as attendant upon the actual deviation from
essential to the validity of a will in this jurisdiction that the names of
the letter of the law, such deviation must be considered too trivial to
the testator and the instrumental witnesses should be written on the
invalidate the instrument.
left margin of each page, as required in said Act, and not upon the
right margin, as in the will now before us; and upon this we are of the
opinion that the will in question is valid. It is true that the statute says It results that the legal errors assigned are not sustainable, and the
that the testator and the instrumental witnesses shall sign their names judgment appealed from will be affirmed. It is so ordered, with costs
on the left margin of each and every page; and it is undeniable that against the appellants.
the general doctrine is to the effect that all statutory requirements as
to the execution of wills must be fully complied with. The same EN BANC
doctrine is also deducible from cases heretofore decided by this court.
61
Wills and Succession Case Digests
Chan, Mauricio de la Peña y Simeon Omboy, y despues de the signature of the three instrumental witnesses, we cannot escape
conformarse con el contendido del testamento, ella rogo a the conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law and
Bonifacio Miñoza, que escribiera su nombre al pie del therefore, cannot be admitted to probate.
testamento, en la pagina segunda, y asi lo hizo Bonifacio
Miñoza, y despues ella estampo su marca digital entra su
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, without
nombre y apelido en presencia de todos y cada uno de los
pronouncement as to costs.
tres testigos instrumentales, Rosario K. Chan, Mauricio de la
Peña y Simeon Omboy y de Bonifacio Miñoza, y despues,
Bonifacio Miñoza firmo tambien al pie del todos y cada uno EN BANC
de lo tres testigos arriba nombrados. La testadora asi como
Bonifacio Miñoza parte de la primera pagina del testamento G.R. No. 17857 June 12, 1922
qeu se halla compuesto de dos paginas. Todos y cada uno
de los tres testigos instrumentales, Rosario K. Chan,
Mauricio de la Peña y Simeon Omboy, firmaron al pie de la In re will of Josefa Zalamea y Abella, deceased.
clausula de atestiguamiento que esta escrita en la pagina PEDRO UNSON, petitioner-appellee,
segunda del testamento y en la margen izquierda de la vs.
misma pagina 2 y de la pagina primera en presencia de la ANTONIO ABELLA, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
testadora, de Bonifacio Miñoza, del abogado Kintanar y de
todos y cada uno de ellos. El testamento fue otorgado por la VILLAMOR, J.:
testadora libre y expontaneament, sin haber sido
amenazada, forzada o intimidada, y sin haberse ejercido
sobre ella influencia indebida, estando la misma en pleno On July 19, 1918, Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella, single, 60 years old,
uso de sus facultades mentales y disfrutando de buena who was residing in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna,
salud. La testadore fallecio en su case en Argao en 22 de executed her last will and testament with an attached inventory of her
febrero de 1957 (Vease certificado de defuncion Exhibito B). properties, Exhibits A and A-1, in the presence of three witnesses, who
La heredera instituida en el testamento, Carmen Alberastine, signed with her all the pages of said documents. The testatrix died on
murio dos semanas despues que la testadora, o sea en 7 de the 6th of January, 1921, and, as the record shows, the executor
Marzo de 1957, dejando a su madre, la solicitante Diosdada appointed in the will, Pedro Unson, filed in the court of First Instance
Alberastine. of Laguna on the 19th of January of the same year an application for
the probate of the will and the issuance of the proper letters of
administration in his favor.
The above facts are not controverted, there being no opposition to the
probate of the will. However, the trial court denied the petition on the
ground that the first page of the will does not bear the thumbmark of To said application an opposition was presently by Antonio Abella,
the testatrix. Petitioner now prays that this ruling be set aside for the Ignacia Abella, Avicencia Abella, and Santiago Vito, alleging that the
reason that, although the first page of the will does not bear the supposed will of the deceased Zalamea was not executed in conformity
thumbmark of the testatrix, the same however expresses her true with the provinces of the law, inasmuch as it was not paged
intention to givethe property to her whose claims remains undisputed. correlatively in letters, nor was there any attestation clause in it, nor
She wishes to emphasize that no one has filed any to the opposition to was it signed by the testatrix and the witnesses in the presence of
the probate of the will and that while the first page does not bear the each other.
thumbmark of the testatrix, the second however bears her thumbmark
and both pages were signed by the three testimonial witnesses. Trial having been held, the judge a quo overruled the opposition of the
Moreover, despite the fact that the petition for probate is unoppossed, contestants, and ordered the probate of the will, Exhibit A, and the
the three testimonial witnesses testified and manifested to the court inventory, Exhibit A-1, holding that both documents contained the true
that the document expresses the true and voluntary will of the and last will of the deceased Josefa Zalamea.
deceased.
From the judgment of the court below, the contestants have appealed,
This contention cannot be sustained as it runs counter to the express and in their brief they assign three errors, which, in their opinion,
provision of the law. Thus, Section 618 of Act 190, as amended, justify the reversal of the judgment appealed from.
requires that the testator sign the will and each and every page
thereof in the presence of the witnesses, and that the latter sign the
will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the testator The first error assigned by the appellants as committed by the court
and of each other, which requirement should be expressed in the below is its finding to the effect that Exhibit A, said to be the will of
attestation clause. This requirement is mandatory, for failure to comply the deceased Josefa Zalamea, was executed with all the solemnities
with it is fatal to the validity of the will (Rodriguez vs. Alcala, 55 Phil., required by the law.
150). Thus, it has been held that "Statutes prescribing the formalities
to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. As The arguments advanced by appellants' counsel in support of the first
stated in 40 Cyc., at page 1097, 'A will must be executed in assignment of error tend to impeach the credibility of the witnesses for
accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely the proponent, specially that of Eugenio Zalamea. We have made a
void.' All these requirements stand as of equal importance and must be careful examination of the evidence, but have not found anything that
observed, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of a will. would justify us in disturbing the finding of the courta quo. The
No power or discretion is vested in them, either to superadd other attesting witnesses, Eugenio Zalamea and Gonzalo Abaya, clearly
conditions or dispence with those enumerated in the statutes" (Uy testify that together with the other witness to the will, Pedro de Jesus,
Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405, 407; See also Saño vs. they did sign each and every page of the will and of the inventory in
Quintana, 48 Phil., 506; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil., 30; Quinto vs. the presence of each other and of the testatrix, as the latter did
Morata, 54 Phil., 481). likewise sign all the pages of the will and of the inventory in their
presence.
Since the will in question suffers from the fatal defect that it does not
bear the thumbmark of the testatrix on its first page even if it bears
62
Wills and Succession Case Digests
In their brief the appellants intimate that one of the pages of the will pending from December 21, 1917, until the date set for the
was not signed by the testatrix, nor by the witnesses on the day of the hearing, which was April 5, 1919, no formal contest was
execution of the will, that is, on the 19th of July, 1918, basing their entered until the very day set for the hearing; and it is
contention on the testimony of Aurelio Palileo, who says that on one probable that the attorney for the • proponent, believing in
occasion Gonzalo Abaya told him that one of the pages of the will had good faith that probate would not be contested, repaired to
not been signed by the witnesses, nor by the testatrix on the day of its the court with only one of the three attesting witnesses at
execution. Palileo's testimony is entirely contradicted by Gonzalo Abaya hand, and upon finding that the will was contested,
not only in the direct, but in the rebuttal, evidence as well. To our incautiously permitted the case to go to proof without asking
mind, Palileo's testimony cannot prevail over that of the attesting for a postponement of the trial in order that he might
witnesses, Gonzalo Avaya and Eugenio Zalamea. The appellants produce all the attesting witnesses.
impeach the credibility of Eugenio Zalamea, for having made a sworn
declaration before the justice of the peace of Santa Cruz, Laguna,
Although this circumstance may explain why the three
before the trial of this case, to the effect that he was really one of the
witnesses were not produced, it does not in itself supply any
witnesses to the will in question, which fact was corroborated by
basis for changing the rule expounded in the case above
himself at the trial. The appellants take Zalamea's testimony in
referred to; and were it not for a fact now to be mentioned,
connection with the dismissal of a criminal case against a nephew of
this court would probably be compelled to reverse this case
his, in whose success he was interested, and infer from this fact the
on the ground that the execution of the will had not been
partiality of his testimony. We deem this allegation of little importance
proved by a sufficient number of attesting witnesses.
to impeach the credibility of the witness Zalamea, especially because
his testimony is corroborated by the other attesting witness. Gonzalo
Abaya, and by attorney Luis Abaya, who had prepared the testament It appears, however, that this point was not raised by the
at the instance of the testatrix. The foregoing is sufficient for us to appellant in the lower court either upon the submission of
conclude that the first assignment of error made by the appellants is the cause for determination in that court or upon the
groundless. occasion of the filing of the motion for a new trial.
Accordingly it is insisted for the appellee that this question
cannot now be raised for t he first time in this court. We
The appellants contend that the court below erred in admitting the will
believe this point is well taken, and the first assignment of
to probate notwithstanding the omission of the proponent to produce
error must be declared not to be well taken. This exact
one of the attesting witnesses.
question has been decided by the Supreme Court of
California adversely to the contention of the appellant, and
At the trial of this case the attorneys for the proponent stated to the we see no reason why the same rule of practice should not
court that they had necessarily to omit the testimony of Pedro de be observed by us. (Estate of McCarty, 58 Cal., 335, 337.)
Jesus, one of the persons who appear to have witnessed the execution
of the will, for there were reasonable grounds to believe that said
There are at least two reasons why the appellate tribunals
witness was openly hostile to the proponent, inasmuch as since the
are disinclined to permit certain questions to be raised for
announcement of the trial of the petition for the probate of the will,
the first time in the second instance. In the first place it
said witness has been in frequent communication with the contestants
eliminates the judicial criterion of the Court of First Instance
and their attorney, and has refused to hold any conference with the
upon the point there presented and makes the appellate
attorneys for the proponent. In reply to this, the attorney for the
court in effect a court of first instance with reference to that
contestants, said to the court, "without discussing for the present
point, unless the case is remanded for a new trial. In the
whether or not in view of those facts (the facts mentioned by the
second place, it permits, if it does not encourage, attorneys
attorneys for the petitioner), in the hypothesis that the same are
to trifle with the administration of justice by concealing from
proven, they are relieved from producing that witness, for while it is a
the trial court and from their opponent the actual point upon
matter not decided, it is a recognized rule that the fact that a witness
which reliance is placed, while they are engaged in other
is hostile does not justify a party to omit his testimony; without
discussions more simulated than real. These considerations
discussing this, I say, I move that said statement be stricken out, and
are, we think, decisive.
if the proponent wants these facts to stand to stand in the record, let
him prove them." The court a quo ruled, saying, "there is no need."
In ruling upon the point above presented we do not wish to
be understood as laying down any hard and fast rule that
To this ruling of the court, the attorney for the appellants did not take
would prove an embarrassment to this court in the
any exception.
administration of justice in the future. In one way or another
we are constantly here considering aspects of cases and
In the case of Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez (42 Phil., 145), recently applying doctrines which have escaped the attention of all
decided by this court, in deciding the question whether a will can be persons concerned in the litigation below; and this is
admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a necessary if this court is to contribute the part due from it in
single attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the the correct decision of the cases brought before it. What we
absence of the other two, it was said; "while it is undoubtedly true that mean to declare is that when we believe that substantial
an uncontested will may be proved by the testimony of only one of the justice has been done in the Court of First Instance, and the
three attesting witnesses, nevertheless in Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 point relied on for reversal in this court appears to be one
Phil., 291), this court declared after an elaborate examination of the which ought properly to have been presented in that court,
American and English authorities that when a contest is instituted, all we will in the exercise of a sound discretion ignore such
of the attesting witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach question upon appeal; and this is the more proper when the
of the process of the court. question relates to a defect which might have been cured in
the Court of First Instance if attention had been called to it
there. In the present case, if the appellant had raised this
In the present case no explanation was made at the trial as
question in the lower court, either at the hearing or upon a
to why all three of the attesting witnesses were not
motion for a new trial, that court would have had the power,
produced, but the probable reason is found in the fact that,
and it would have been its duty, considering the tardy
although the petition for the probate of this will had been
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
institution of the contest, to have granted a new trial in And the attestation clause is as follows:
order that all the witnesses to the will might be brought into
court. But instead of thus calling the error to the attention of
The foregoing will composed of ten folios including this one
the court and his adversary, the point is first raised by the
whereunto we have affixed our signatures, as well as the
appellant in this court. We hold that this is too late.
inventory of the properties of Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella,
was read to Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella, and the latter
Properly understood, the case of Cabang vs. Delfinado, affixed her name to the last, and each and every page of
supra, contains nothing inconsistent with the ruling we now this will and inventory composed of ten folios in our
make, for it appears from the opinion in that case that the presence; and she declared this to be her last will and
proponent of the will had obtained an order for a testament and at her request we have affixed hereunto our
republication and new trial for the avowed purpose of respective signatures in her presence and in the presence of
presenting the two additional attesting witnesses who had each other as witnesses to the will and the inventory this
not been previously examined, but nevertheless 19th of July, 1918, at Pagsanjan, Laguna, P.I.
subsequently failed without any apparent reason to take
their testimony. Both parties in that case were therefore fully
(Sgd.) GONZALO ABAYA,
apprised that the question of the number of witnesses
EUGENIO ZALAMEA,
necessar to prove the will was in issue in the lower court.
PEDRO DE JESUS.
In the case at bar, we do not think this question properly to have been
In view of the fact that the inventory is referred to in the will as an
raised at the trial, but in the memorandum submitted by the attorney
integral part of it, we find that the foregoing attestation clause is in
for the appellants to the trial court, he contended that the will could
compliance with section 1 of Act No. 2645, which requires this
not be admitted to probate because one of the witnesses to the will
solemnity for the validity of a will, and makes unnecessary any other
was not produced, and that the voluntary non-production of this
attestation clause at the end of the inventory.
witness raises a presumption against the pretension of the proponent.
The trial court found that the evidence introduced by the proponent,
consisting of the testimony of the two attesting witnesses and the As to the paging of the will in Arabic numerals, instead of in letters, we
other witness who was present at the execution, and had charge of adhere to the doctrine announced in the case of Aldaba vs. Roque (p.
the preparation of the will and the inventory, Exhibits A and A-1, was 378, ante), recently decided by this court. In that case the validity of
sufficient. As announced in Cabang vs. Delfinado, supra, the general the will was assailed on the ground that its folios were paged with the
rule is that, where opposition is made to the probate of a will, the letters A, B, C, etc., instead of with the letters "one," two," "three,"
attesting witnesses must be produced. But there are exceptions to this etc. It was held that this way of numbering the pages of a will is in
rule, for instance, when a witness is dead, or cannot be served with compliance with the spirit of the law, inasmuch as either one of these
process of the court, or his reputation for truth has been questioned or methods indicates the correlation of the pages and serves to prevent
he appears hostile to the cause of the proponent. In such cases, the the abstraction of any of them. In the course of the decision, we said:
will may be admitted to probate without the testimony of said witness, "It might be said that the object of the law in requiring that the paging
if, upon the other proofs adduced in the case, the court is satisfied be made in letters is to make falsification more difficult, but it should
that the will has been duly executed. Wherefore, we find that the non- be noted that since all the pages of the testament are signed at the
production of the attesting witness, Pedro de Jesus, as accounted for margin by the testatrix and the witnesses, the difficulty of forging the
by the attorney for the proponent at the trial, does not render void the signatures in either case remains the same. In other words the more
decree of the court a quo, allowing the probate. or less degree of facility to imitate the writing of the letters A, B, C,
etc., does not make for the easiness to forge the signatures. And as in
the present case there exists the guaranty of the authenticity of the
But supposing that said witness, when cited, had testified adversely to
testament, consisting in the signatures on the left margins of the
the application, this would not by itself have change the result reached
testament and the paging thereof as declared in the attestation clause,
by the court a quo, for section 632 of the Code of Civil Procedure
the holding of this court in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476), might
provides that a will can be admitted to probate, notwithstanding that
as well be repeated:
one or more witnesses do not remember having attested it, provided
the court is satisfied upon the evidence adduced that the will has been
executed and signed in the manner prescribed by the law. "The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of
wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty
The last error assigned by the appellants is made to consist in the
their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this
probate of the inventory, Exhibit A-1, despite the fact that this exhibit
subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
has no attestation clause in it, and its paging is made in Arabic
these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must
numerals and not in letters.
not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law
to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a
In the third paragraph of the will, reference is made to the inventory, will. So when an interpretation whatsoever, that adds
Exhibit A-1, and at the bottom of said will, the testatrix Josefa Zalamea nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
says: useless, and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be
disregarded."
In witness whereof, I sign this will composed of ten folios
including the page containing the signatures and the In that case the testament was written on one page, and the
attestation of the witnesses; I have likewise signed the attestation clause on another. Neither one of these pages was
inventory attached to this will composed of ten folios in the numbered in any way, and it was held: "In a will consisting of two
presence of Messrs. Gonzalo Abaya, Eugenio Zalamea, Pedro sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and
de Jesus, in this municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna, is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses, and the
Philippine Islands, this 19th of July, 1918. second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the
bottom by the three witnesses it is not necessary that both sheets be
64
Wills and Succession Case Digests
further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or VILLAMOR, J.:
be paged."
It appears from the record of the case that on July 9, 1918, Maria
This means that, according to the particular case, the emission of Roque y Paraiso, the widow of Bruno Valenzuela, resident of the barrio
paging does not necessarily render the testament invalid. of Mambog, municipality of Malolos, Province of Bulacan, executed her
last will and testament in the Tagalog dialect with the help of Vicente
Platon and in the presence of three witnesses who signed the
The law provides that the numbering of the pages should be in letters
attestation clause and each of the four pages of the testament. Maria
placed on the upper part of the sheet, but if the paging should be
Roque died on December 3, 1919, and when her will was filed in court
placed in the lower part, would the testament be void for this sole
for probate, it was contested by Ludovico Roque on the ground that it
reason? We believe not. The law also provides that the testator and
had not been prepared nor executed in conformity with the
the witnesses must sign the left margin of each of the sheets of the
requirements and solemnities prescribed by law.
testament; but if they should sign on the right margin, would this fact
also annul the testament? Evidently not. This court has already held
in Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez (42 Phi., 145): After due proceedings had been had, the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan by its decision rendered on February 27th of the following
year, pronounced the testament in question valid, and ordered its
"It is true that the statute says that the testator and the
probate, appointing Ceferino Aldaba as the administrator of the estate.
instrumental witnesses shall sign their names on the left
margin of each and every page; and it is undeniable that the
general doctrine is to the effect that all statutory The errors assigned by the appellant are two, to wit: "That each and
requirements as to the execution of wills must be fully every folio of the said testament is not paged correlatively in letter,"
complied with. The same execution for wills must be fully and "that the said will lacks the attestation clause required by law."
complied with. The same doctrine is also deducible from
cases heretofore decided by this court."
We have examined document Exhibit 4 which is the will in question
and we find at the end thereof the following in Tagalog which
"Still some details at time creep into legislative enactments translated into English reads:
which are so trivial that it would be absurd to suppose that
the Legislature could have attached any decisive importance
This document expresses my last and spontaneous will, and
to them. The provision to the effect that the signatures of
is my last will and testament, which was drawn by the
the testator and witnesses shall be written on the left margin
lawyer, Don Vicente Platon, at my direction, and everything
of each page — rather than on the margin — seems to be of
contained in this testament has been ordained and directed
this character. So far as concerns the authentication of the
by me to said Vicente Platon in order that it might be
will, and of every part thereof, it can make no possible
embodied in this testament, and after this testament has
difference whether the names appear on the left or on the
been drawn up, I directed him to read it so that I might hear
right margin, provided they are on one or the other. In Craig
all its contents, and I have heard and understood all the
vs. Tatlonghari (G. R. No. 12558, decided March 23, 1918,
contents of this document which is my last will, wherefore,
not reported), this court declared a will void which was
and not knowing how to write, I have requested Don Vicente
totally lacking in the signatures required to be written on its
Platon to write and sign my name in my stead hereon; I
several pages; and in the case of Re Estate of Saguinsin (41
declare that this testament is composed of four sheets,
Phil., 875) a will was likewise declared void which contained
actually used, that the sheets are paged with the letter A, B,
the necessary signatures on the margin of each leaf (folio),
C, and d, and above my name I have placed the thumb
but not in the margin of each page containing written
mark of my right hand in the presence of the subscribing
matter."
witnesses, and that all the witnesses have signed in my
presence and of each other here at Malolos, Bulacan, this
We do not desire to intimate that the numbering in letters is a 9th day of the month of July, 1918; and I also declare that
requisite of no importance. But since its principal object is to give the at my request Don Vicente Platon has written my name on
correlation of the pages, we hold that his object may be attained by the left margin of all pages of this testament, in the
writing one, two, three, etc., as well as by writing A, B, C, etc. presence of the witnesses, and all the witnesses have also
signed all the pages of this testament on the left margin in
my presence and that of each other.
We see no reason why the same rule should not be applied where the
paging is in Arabic numerals, instead of in letters, as in the inventory
in question. So that, adhering to the view taken by this court in the X (Her thumb mark)
case of Abangan vs. Abangan, and followed in Aldava vs. Roque, with MARIA ROQUE Y PARAISO,
regard to the appreciation of the solemnities of a will, we find that the Per VICENTE PLATON.
judgement appealed from should be, as is hereby, affirmed with the (Sgd.) REGINO E. MENDOZA,
costs against the appellants. So ordered. Witness.
This means that, according to the particular case, the omission of The question in this case is as to the validity of the document Exhibit A
paging does not necessarily render the testament invalid. as a will, which was propounded by Ramon J. Fernandez for probate,
and contested by Fernando Vergel de Dios and Francisco, Ricardo and
The law provides that the numbering of the pages should be in letters Virgilio Rustia, the court of First Instance of Manila having denied its
placed on the upper part of the sheet, but if the paging should be probate.
place din the lower part, would the testament be void for his sole
reason? We believe not. The law also provides that the testator and The applicant takes this appeal, assigning error to the action of the
the witnesses must sign the left margin of each of the sheets of the lower court in holding the attestation fatally defective and in not
testament; but if they should sign on the right margin, would this fact finding Act No. 2645 void.
66
Wills and Succession Case Digests
The defects attributed to the will by the contestants are as follows, to As to the numbering of the sheet containing the attestation clause, it is
wit: true that it does not appeal on the upper part of the sheet, but it does
not appear in its text, the pertinent part of which is copied hereinafter,
with the words, having reference to the number of sheets of the will,
(a) It was not sufficiently proven that the testator knew the
underscored, including the page number of the attestation:
contents of the will.
In this instance only one of these objections is reiterated, formulated With reference to the second assignment of error, we do not share the
in these words: "That the court a quo erred in holding that the opinion that the trial court communicated an abuse of discretion in
document Exhibit "A" was executed in all particulars as required by allowing the appellant to offer evidence to prove knowledge of Spanish
law." To this objection is added the alleged error of the court "in by the testator, the language in which the will is drawn, after the
allowing the petitioner to introduce evidence that Exhibit "A" was petitioner had rested his case and after the opponent had moved for
written in a language known to the decedent after petitioner rested his dismissal of the petition on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It
case and over the vigorous objection of the oppositor. is within the discretion of the court whether or not to admit further
evidence after the party offering the evidence has rested, and this
discretion will not be reviewed except where it has clearly been
The will in question comprises two pages, each of which is written on abused. (64 C. J., 160.) More, it is within the sound discretion of the
one side of a separate sheet. The first sheet is not paged either in court whether or not it will allow the case to be reopened for the
letters or in Arabic numerals. This, the appellant believes, is a fatal further introduction of evidence after a motion or request for a
defect. nonsuit, or a demurrer to the evidence, and the case may be reopened
after the court has announced its intention as to its ruling on the
The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is guard request, motion, or demurrer, or has granted it or has denied the
against fraud, and to afford means of preventing the substitution or of same, or after the motion has been granted, if the order has not been
defecting the loss of any of its pages. (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., written, or entered upon the minutes or signed. (64 C. J., 164.)
476.) In the present case, the omission to put a page number on the
first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by other forms of In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed. After the parties have
identification more trustworthy than the conventional numerical words produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer
or characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first rebutting evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good
page by the internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer
contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the first evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in
and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. (Siuliong
the last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, and Co. vs. Ylagan, 43 Phil., 393; U. S. vs. Alviar, 36 Phil., 804.) So,
which starts at the bottom of the preceding page. Furthermore, the generally, additional evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered,
unnumbered page contains the caption "TESTAMENTO," the invocation or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or
69
Wills and Succession Case Digests
where the purpose of the evidence is to the evidence is to correct It is pointed out, however, that the attestation clause states that the
evidence previously offered. (I Moran's Comments on the Rules of testatrix declared in the presence of the three witnesses that the
Court, 2d ed., 545; 64 C. J., 160-163.) The omission to present document in question was her last will or testament, and it is argued
evidence on the testator's knowledge of Spanish had not been that this testament taken together with the preceding clause which
deliberate. It was due to a misapprehension or oversight. reads: "En fe de todo lo cual firmo con mi nombre este mi testamento
o ultima voluntad, escrito en dialecto visayo que es el dialecto que
poseo y hablo, en Inayauan, comprension de Cawayan, Filipinas, hoy a
Although alien to the second assignment of error, the appellant
16 de Agosto de 1943," expresses the idea that the testatrix signed
impugns the will for its silence on the testator's understanding of the
the will in the presence of the witnesses. The argument is not only far-
language used in the testament. There is no statutory requirement
fetched but it also overlooks the fact that it is in the attestation clause
that such knowledge be expressly stated in the will itself. It is a matter
signed the will in the presence of the subscribing witnesses, since that
that may be established by proof aliunde. This Court so impliedly ruled
is one of the statements by law required to be embodied in the
in Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil., 781, in which the probate of a will
attestation clause. The words above quoted, which, in the will in
written in Tagalog was ordered although it did not say that the testator
question, are written above the signature of the testator and come
knew that idiom. In fact, there was not even extraneous proof on the
before the attestation clause, do not form a part of the latter. By the
subject other than the fact that the testator resided in a Tagalog
attestation clause is meant "that clause wherein the witnesses certify
region, from which the court said "a presumption arises that said Maria
that the instrument has been executed before them, and the manner
Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect.
of the execution of the same." (Black, Law Dictionary.) It is signed not
by the testator but by the witnesses, for it is a declaration made by the
The order of the lower court ordering the probate of the last will and witnesses and not by the testator. And the law is clear that it is the
testament of Don Sixto Lopez is affirmed, with costs. attestation clause that must contain a statement, among others, that
the testator signed the will in the presence of the witnesses. Without
EN BANC that statement, the attestation clause is fatally defective.
G.R. No. L-2415 July 31, 1950 This defect is not cured by proof aliunde or even by a judicial finding
based upon such proof that the testator did in fact sign the will in the
presence of the subscribing witnesses. That is a fact required by law to
Testatee estate of the late Paula Toray. EUSTAQUIA be stated in the attestation clause itself, and it is settled that where it
TENEFRANCIA, petitioner-appellant, is not so stated it cannot be established by evidence aliunde, and that
vs. where such evidence has been admitted, even without opposition, it
ROSA ABAJA, oppositor-appellee. should not be given the effect intended. (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca,
43 Phil., 405; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil., 481.) In the case last cited
REYES, J.: this Court had the following to say:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of It is vigorously contended on behalf of the appellant, that
Negros Occidental denying probate of a will. the alleged defect of the attestation clause1 has been cured
by oral evidence, which was admitted without opposition on
the part of the appellee. This contention cannot be
The will in question purports to have been executed in August, 1943, sustained. The doctrine of this court with reference to
by Paula Toray, who died the following month. Presented for probate statute of frauds is not applicable to wills. The statute of
by one of the legatees, the herein appellant Eustaquia Tenefrancia, it frauds relates to contracts and agreements. The subject of
was opposed by Rosa Abaja, daughter of the deceased Eulogia Abaja, wills and testaments and the formalities surrounding their
instituted heir in an earlier will executed by the same testatrix and her execution are governed by separate and specific provisions
deceased husband. The lower court disallowed the will on the ground of Act No. 190.
that it was not executed in accordance with law in that the attestation
clause did not state that the testatrix signed the will in the presence of
the instrumental witnesses. An examination of section 618 of Act No. 190, prior to, and
after its amendment by Act No. 2645, shows clearly that the
legislature intended to exclude evidence aliunde tending to
Among the formalities prescribed by law (section 618 of Act 190, as establish that the will has been executed and attested in
amended by Act No. 2645) to a valid will is the requirement that the conformity with the requirements of the law, where such
attestation clause should state "the fact that the testator signed the compliance does not appear on the face of the will itself.
will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his Prior to its amendments, section 618 contained the following
name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses." saving clause: "But the absence of such form of attestation
This requirement was not complied with in the present case, for the shall not render the will invalid if is as proven that the will
attestation clause fails to state that fact. This is obvious from the was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided."
following agreed translation of the said attestation clause:
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
Section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, should be given a de los demas y de la del mismo testador Valerio Leynez . El
strict interpretation. In the case of Uy Coque vs. Navas L. testamento consta de los (2) paginas solamente.
Sioca (43 Phil., 405) this court, speaking of the construction
to be given to said section, said:
The question presented is, under section 618, as amended, of
the Code of Civil Procedure, is this attestation clause legally sufficient?
Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed The pertinent portion of this section of the Code is as follows:
in the execution of wills are very strictly construed.
As stated in 40 Cyc., at page 1097, "A will must be
. . . the attestation shall state the number of sheets
executed in accordance with the statutory
or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact
requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. All
that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
these requirements stand as of equal importance
caused some other person to write his name, under his
and must be observed, and courts cannot supply
express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, an the
the defective execution of a will. No power or
later witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in
discretion is vested in them, either to superadd
the presence of the testator and of each other.
other conditions or dispense with those
enumerated in the statutes. (Uy Coque vs. Navas
L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405, 407.) The alleged defect in the attestation clause of the controverted
will is that it fails to state that the testator and the three witnesses
signed each and every page of the will in the manner prescribed by
It is also urged that the lower court should not have entertained the
law, because it merely states "firmanos el presente cada uno en
opposition of Rosa Abaja, who had no legal interest in the proceeding.
presencia de los otros, o de los demas y de la del mismo testador
But it does not appear that timely objection to the said opposition was
Valerio Leynez." In deciding this question the Court of Appeals,
made in the court below, and it is settled that the mere fact that a
however, ruled:
stranger has been permitted to oppose the allowance of a will is not a
reversible error and does not invalidate the proceedings where no
objection is interposed by any of the parties in interest. (Paras vs. A la luz de las jurisprudencias arriba citadas en la
Narciso, 35 Phil., 244.) It is true that in the course of Rosa Abaja's clausada de atestiguamiento discutida en el asunto de autos
declaration, counsel for appellant made some manifestation tending to no encontramos un cumplimiento sustantial del requisito
question the admissibility of her testimony. But it is not clear that the exigido por la ley, de que en ella se haga constar que el
remark was meant to be an objection to the opposition itself. And in testador y los testigos han firmado unos en presencia de
any event, even without opposition, the lower court could not have otros, todas y cada una de las paginas usadas del
legally allowed the will in question, for under section 618 of Act No. testamento, requisito que no se puede establecer por medio
190, as amended by Act No. 2645, no will shall be valid to pass any de su prueba aliunde.
estate, real or personal., nor charge or affect the same unless the
attestation clause conforms to the requirements therein provided, and Against this conclusion of the Court of Appeals, petitioner puts
the imperactive language of the Rules of Court (Rule 77, section 9 [a]) forward the contention that it has decided a question of substance in a
directs that the will "shall be disallowed" if not executed and "attested way not probably in accord with the law and the applicable decisions
as required by law." of this court (Rule 47, paragraph e [1] of Supreme Court.) The rule of
liberal construction of the applicable law should, petitioner avers, be
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is affirmed, with held to apply in the case at bar, and in support of her content on she
costs against the appellant. invokes a long array of cases (Abangan vs .Abangan, 40 Phil., 476;
Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez, 42 Phil., 145; Aldaba vs. Roque, 43
Phil., 378; Unson vs .Abella, 43 Phil., 494; Fernandez vs. Vergel de
EN BANC
Dios, 46 Phil., 922; Nayve vs. Mojal, 47 Phil., 152; De Gala vs
.Gonzalez, 53 Phil., 104; Rey vs. Cartagena, 56 Phil., 282; Dichoso de
G.R. No. L-46097 October 18, 1939 Ticson vs. De Gorostiza, 57 Phil., 437; Sebastian vs. Paganiban, 59
Phil., 653; De Guzman vs. Celestino, G.R. No. 35273, April 25, 1932;
Policarpio vs. Baltazar, G.R. No. 36349, November 14, 1932;
TEOFILA ADEVA VIUDA DE LEYNEZ, petitioner,
Malate vs. Olea, G.R. No. 36154, December 16, 1932; In re Estate of
vs.
Jennings, 1933, G.R. No. 38758). To this line of cases those of
IGNACIO LEYNEZ, respondent.
Rodriguez vs. Yap, G.R. No. 45924, May 18, 1939, and Grey vs. Fabie,
G.R. No. 45160, May 23, 1939, may perhaps be added. Respondent,
LAUREL, J.: on the other hand, equally invokes a number of cases wherein, he
contends, the rule of strict construction was made to prevail. (Uy
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; In re Estate of Neuark, 46
the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Court of First Phil., 841; Saño vs.Quintana, 48 Phil., 506; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50
Instance of Mindoro denying probate of the will of the deceased Phil., 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil., 481; Rodriguez vs. Alcala, 55
Valerio Leynez, on the ground that its attestation clause does not Phil., 150.)
conform to the requirements section 618, as amended, of the Code of
Civil Procedure. This Court has already taken notice of these different views
within, in Dichoso de Ticson vs. De Gorostiza(57 Phil., 437, 439-440),
The attestation clause of the will is worded as follows: it frankly made the following observation : "The truth is that there
have been, noticeable in the Philippines two divergent tendencies in
the law of wills — the one being planted on strict construction and the
Suscrito y declarado por el testador Valerio Leynez, other on liberal construction. A late example of the former views may
como su ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de todos be found in the decision in Rodriguez vs. Alcala ([1930], 55 Phil., 150),
y cada uno de nosotros, y a ruego de dicho testador, sanctioning a literal enforcement of the law. The basic case in the
firmamos el presente cada uno en presencia de los otros, o other direction, predicated on reason, is Abangan vs.
Abangan ([1919], 40 Phil., 476), oft-cited approvingly in later
71
Wills and Succession Case Digests
decisions." It is fairness to recognize the existence of opposing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless
currents of legal thought, a situation which perhaps has brought about and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be
a certain degree of confusion in this field. It is also fairness to avow, disregarded.
however, that a more careful examination of the cases will show that,
while the two tendencies mentioned in easily discernible, the conflict in
It follows that the writ of certiorari should be, as it is hereby,
many cases is more apparent than real, and the variance, if at all, in
granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed, with the
the application of the principles involved was due in some instances to
result that the controverted will, Exhibit A, of the deceased Valerio
the marked differentiation of facts and the consequent personal or
Leynez, shall be admitted to probate. So ordered, with costs against
collective criteria in particular cases.lâwphi1.nêt
the respondent-appellee. So ordered.
For the validity of a formal notarial will, does Article 805 of the Civil
It must be noted that the law uses the
Code require that the testatrix and all the three instrumental and
terms attested and subscribed Attestation consists in witnessing the
attesting witnesses sign at the end of the will and in the presence of
testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally
the testatrix and of one another?
that those things are, done which the statute requires for the
execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a
Article 805 of the Civil Code provides: fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses'
names upon the same paper for the purpose of Identification of such
Every will, other than a holographic will, must be paper as the will which was executed by the testator. (Ragsdale v. Hill,
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator 269 SW 2d 911).
himself or by the testator's name written by some
other person in his presence, and by his express Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or considered view that the will in this case was subscribed in a manner
more credible witnesses in the presence of the which fully satisfies the purpose of Identification.
testator and of one another.
The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the
The testator or the person requested by him to first page of the will attested not only to the genuineness of the
write his name and the instrumental witnesses of signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as
the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and embodied in the attestation clause.
every page thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, and all the pages shall be numbered
While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable,
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be ignored,
each page.
especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. (Gonzales
v. Gonzales, 90 Phil. 444, 449).
The attestation shall state the number of pages
used upon which the will is written, and the fact
The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental
that the testator signed the will and every page
objective permeating the provisions on the law on wills in this project
thereof, or caused some other person to write his
consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the
name, under his express direction, in the presence
end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last
of the instrumental witnesses, and that the lacier
wishes but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the
witnesses and signed the will and the pages
commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
and influence upon the testator. This objective is in accord with the
another.
modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a
will" (Report of the Code commission, p. 103).
If the attestation clause is in a language not
known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to
Parenthetically, Judge Ramon C. Pamatian stated in his questioned
the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
order that were not for the defect in the place of signatures of the
witnesses, he would have found the testimony sufficient to establish
The respondent Judge interprets the above-quoted provision of law to the validity of the will.
require that, for a notarial will to be valid, it is not enough that only
the testatrix signs at the "end" but an the three subscribing witnesses
The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and
must also sign at the same place or at the end, in the presence of the
satisfied in the present case when the instrumental witnesses signed at
testatrix and of one another because the attesting witnesses to a will
the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary
attest not merely the will itself but also the signature of the testator. It
dispositions, especially so when the will was properly Identified by
is not sufficient compliance to sign the page, where the end of the will
subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to be the same will executed by
is found, at the left hand margin of that page.
the testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the
questioned order.
On the other hand, the petitioner maintains that Article 805 of the Civil
Code does not make it a condition precedent or a matter of absolute
73
Wills and Succession Case Digests
We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation attests to the fun observance of the statutory
clause failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will. This requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. Vs.
would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision on
case, it is discernible from the entire wig that it is really and actually reconsideration) 'witnesses may sabotage the will
composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her by muddling or bungling it or the attestation
instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains clause.
the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix
at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby granted. The orders of the
the left margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos"
respondent court which denied the probate of tile will, the motion for
comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The
reconsideration of the denial of probate, and the motion for
acknowledgment itself states that "This Last Will and Testament
appointment of a special administrator are set aside. The respondent
consists of two pages including this page".
court is ordered to allow the probate of the wig and to conduct further
proceedings in accordance with this decision. No pronouncement on
In Singson v. Florentino, et al. (92 Phil. 161, 164), this Court made the costs.
following observations with respect to the purpose of the requirement
that the attestation clause must state the number of pages used:
SO ORDERED.
Icasiano v. Icasiano (11 SCRA 422, 429) has the following ruling which As to the contention of the petitioner-appellant, as stated above, the
applies a similar liberal approach: trial court denied probate of the will on the sole ground that the
attestation clause does not state that the testratrix requested Attorney
Almario to write her name.
... Impossibility of substitution of this page is
assured not only (sic) the fact that the testatrix
and two other witnesses did sign the defective The last paragraph of the questioned will reads in part as follows:
page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint
of the seal of the notary public before whom the En prueba de todo lo cual, firmo el presente testamento con
testament was ratified by testatrix and all three mi marcha digital, poque no puedo estampar mi firma a
witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and causa de mi debilidad, rogando al abogado M. Almario que
literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on poga mi nombre en el sitio donde he de estampar mi
account of the inadvertence of a single witness marcha digital . . ..
over whose conduct she had no control where the
purpose of the law to guarantee the Identity of
the testament and its component pages is The evidence of record established the fact that Leoncia Tolentino,
sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate assisted by Attorney Almario, placed her thumb mark on each and
deviation existed, and the evidence on record every age of time questioned will and the said attorney merely wrote
her name to indicate the place where she placed said thumb mark. In
74
Wills and Succession Case Digests
other words Attorney Almario did not sign for the testatrix. She signed will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and
for placing her thumb mark on each and every page thereof "A statute of each other.
requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by the
testator's mark." (Quoted by this court from 28 R.C.L., p, 117; De
The formal deffects of the will in question occur in its attestation
Gala vs.Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104, 108.) It is clear, therefore,
clause which, in translation, read as follows:
that it was not necessary that the attestation clause in question should
state that the testatrix requested Attorney Almario to sign her name
inasmuch as the testratrix signed the will in question in accordance We, the undersigned witnesses of this will, state that it has
with law. been shown to us by the testatrix as her last will and
testament. And as she cannot sign her name, she asked that
Mr. Filomeno Piczon sign her name in the presence of each
The appealed order of the trial court is reversed and the questioned
of us, and each of us, the witnesses, also signed in the
will of Leoncia Tolentino, deceased, is hereby admitted to probate with
presence of the testatrix.
the costs of this appeal against the oppositor-appellant.
It will be noted that the attestation clause does not state the number
Jallores. Vs. Interino – cannot be located in the internet and in the
of pages contained in the will nor does it state that the witnesses
SCRA.
signed in the presence of each other. Neither do these facts appear in
any other part of the will.
EN BANC
Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of
G.R. No. 17430 May 31, 1922 wills are very strictly construed. As stated in 40 Cyc., at page 1097, "A
will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements;
otherwise it is entirely void. All these requirements stand as of equal
In the matter of the estate of Geronima Uy Coque, deceased.
importance and must be observed, and courts cannot supply the
ANDREA UY COQUE, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
defective execution of a will. No power or discretion is vested in them,
vs.
either to superadd other conditions or dispose with those enumerated
JUAN NAVAS L. SIOCA, special administrator of the estate of
in the statutes."
Geronima Uy Coque, deceased, opponent-appellant.
This court has also frequently held that a will should not be probated
OSTRAND, J.:
unless in its execution there has been a strict complaince with all the
requisites prescribed in section 618 of the Code of Civil Produre. It is
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of true that in the case of Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476) the court
Samar, admitting a will to probate. upheld the validity of a will consisting of only two pages, the first
containing all the testamentary dispositions and being signed by the
The validity of the will is attacked on the ground that the testatrix was testator at the bottom and by both the testator and the witnesses in
mentally incapacitated at the time of its execution and on the further the margin, the second page containing only the attestaiton clause
ground that it was not executed on the form prescribed by section 618 with the signatures of the witnesses at the bottom but without
of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645, marginal signatures. The decision was based on the ground that it
could not have been the intention of the legislator to require, as an
essential to the validity of the will, that all the signatures appear twice
The transcript of the testimony taken in the probate proceedings not on the same page as such a requirement would be entirely
appearing in the record, we cannot review the findings of the court purposeless. This decision is no doubt sound; that in statutory
below as to the sanity of the testatrix. This leaves for our consideration construction the evident intent of the legislator controls will probably
only the question as to whether the omission of certain formalities in not be disputed.
the execution of the will are fatal to its validity.
But it must not be forgotten that in construing statutory provisions in
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. regard to the formal requisites of a will, we are seeking to ascertain
2645 reads: the intent, of the legislator and not that the testator; the latter's
intention is frequently defeated through non-observance of the statue.
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be
valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or The purpose of the Legislature in prescribing the rather strict
affect the same, unless it be written in the language or formalities now required in the execution of a will are clearly revealed
dialect known by the testator and signed by him, or by the by comparing section 618, supra, as originally enacted with the
testator's name written by some other person in his amended section quoted above. The original section reads:
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of each other. The testator or No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be
the person requested by him to write his name and the valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, testator, or by the testator's name written by some other
and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses
state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will attestation shall state the fact that the testator signed the
and every page thereof, or caused some other person to will, or caused it to be signed by some other person, at this
write his name, under his express direction, in the presence express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and
of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the that they attested and subscribed it is his presence and in
the presence of each other. But the absence of such form of
75
Wills and Succession Case Digests
attestation shall not render the will in valid if it is proven that presence of the testatrix. Section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended by
the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section Act No. 2645, provides that he attestation clause shall state the fact
provided. that the testator signed the will and all the pages thereof, or caused
another persons to place his name thereon at his expressed direction
in the presence of the three witnesses to the will, and that the latter
The amendments or changes introduced by Act No. 2645 are ( a) that
signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the testator and of
the will must now be executed in a language or dialect known to the
each other. In the case of Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca (43 Phil., 405),
testator; (b) that the testator and witnesses must sign each page on
this court has held that the requirement that the attestation clause
the left margin; (c) that the pages be numbered correclatively; (d) that
must contain the statement that the witnesses signed in the presence
the attestation clause shall state the number sheets or page used in
of each other is imperative and non-comfort in said case in support of
the will and (e) that it must appear from the attestation clause itself
this doctrine may be adduced for holding that the will is also null and
that the testator and witnesses signed in the form and manner
void when in the attestation clause it does not appear that the
required by law and that is this can no longer be proven by evidence
witnesses to the will signed it and every page thereof on the left
aliunde.
margin and in the presence of the testatrix. In order to insure the
authenticity of a will, which is the object of the law, it is just as
The changes mentioned under (d) and (e) are the only ones which important, if not the most important, that the witnesses should sign in
need be considered in the present case. The purpose of requiring the the presence of the testator and of each other.lawphi1.net
number of sheets to be stated in the attestation clause is obvious; the
document might easily be so prepared that the removal of a sheet
The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the probate of the will of
would completely change the testamentary dispositions of the will and
Victoria Quintana is denied, without special pronouncement as to
in the absence of a statement of the total number of sheets such
costs. So ordered.
removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the
numbers at the top of the following sheets or pages. If, on the other
hand, the total number of sheets is stated in the attestation clause the EN BANC
falsification of the document will involve the inserting of new pages
and the forgoing of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the
G.R. No. L-26135 March 3, 1927
margin, a matter attended with much greater difficulty.
77
Wills and Succession Case Digests
As will be noted, the attestation clause contravenes the express TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA,
requirements of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. JUAN CABALLERO, AUREA CABALLERO, OSCAR LAROSA,
2645, in two ways: First, it fails to state that each and every page of HELEN CABALLERO, SANTOS CABALLERO, PABLO CABALLERO,
the will was signed by the testators and the witnesses; and, second, it VICTOR RAGA, MAURICIA RAGA, QUIRICA RAGA, RUPERTO
fails to state that the witnesses signed each and every page of the will ABAPO, represented herein by his Attorney-in-Fact,
in the presence of the testators. ARMSTICIA * ABAPO VELANO, and CONSESO CANEDA,
represented herein by his heirs, JESUS CANEDA, NATIVIDAD
CANEDA and ARTURO CANEDA, petitioners,
In the case of Saño vs. Quintana (48 Phil., 506) this court held that
vs.
"an attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special
the will and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the
Administrator of the Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents.
presence of the testator is defective, and such defect annuls the will."
This doctrine was restated and reaffirmed in the case of
Gumban vs. Gorecho (50 Phil., 30). REGALADO, J.:
It is vigorously contended on behalf of the appellant, that the alleged Presented for resolution by this Court in the present petition for review
defect of the attestation clause has been cured by oral evidence, which on certiorari is the issue of whether or not the attestation clause
was admitted without opposition on the part of the appellee. This contained in the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero
contention cannot be sustained. The doctrine of this court with complies with the requirements of Article 805, in relation to Article
reference to statute of frauds is not applicable to wills. The statue of 809, of the Civil Code.
frauds relates to contracts and agreements. The subject of will and
testaments and the formalities surrounding their execution are
The records show that on December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a
governed by separate and specific provisions of Act No. 190.
widower without any children and already in the twilight years of his
life, executed a last will and testament at his residence in Talisay,
An examination of section 618 of Act No. 190, prior to, and after its Cebu before three attesting witnesses, namely, Cipriano Labuca,
amendment by Act No. 2645, shows clearly that the Legislature Gregorio Cabando and Flaviano Toregosa. The said testator was duly
intended to exclude evidence aliunde, tending to establish that the will assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad, and a notary public,
has been executed and attested in conformity with the requirements of Atty. Filoteo Manigos, in the preparation of that last will. 1 It was
the law, where such compliance does not appear on the face of the, declared therein, among other things, that the testator was leaving by
will itself. Prior to its amendment, section 618 contained the following way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to
saving clause: "But the absence of such form of attestation shall not Presentacion Gaviola, Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito
render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and Abatayo, Benoni G. Cabrera and Marcosa Alcantara, all of whom do not
attested as in this section provided." appear to be related to the testator. 2
The most outstanding feature of the amendment of said section 618 Four months later, or on April 4, 1979, Mateo Caballero himself filed a
by Act No. 2645 is the elimination of said saving clause and the petition docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3899-R before Branch II
greater emphasis laid on the formalities as to signatures and the of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu seeking the probate of his
attestation clause. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the intention last will and testament. The probate court set the petition for hearing
of the Legislature, in eliminating said clause, was admitted without on August 20, 1979 but the same and subsequent scheduled hearings
opposition, it should not be given effect and thus defeat the manifest were postponed for one reason to another. On May 29, 1980, the
intention of the Legislature in amending said section 618. testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard by the
probate court. 3 On February 25, 1981, Benoni Cabrera, on of the
legatees named in the will, sough his appointment as special
Section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, should be given a strict
administrator of the testator's estate, the estimated value of which was
interpretation. In the case of Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca (43 Phil.,
P24,000.00, and he was so appointed by the probate court in its order
405) this court, speaking of the construction to be given to said
of March 6, 1981. 4
section, said:
78
Wills and Succession Case Digests
In the course of the hearing in Special Proceeding No. 3899-R, herein substantialy complied with the requirements of
petitioners appeared as oppositors and objected to the allowance of Art. 805 of the Civil Code. What appears in the
the testator's will on the ground that on the alleged date of its attestation clause which the oppositors claim to be
execution, the testator was already in the poor state of health such defective is "we do certify that the testament was
that he could not have possibly executed the same. Petitioners likewise read by him and the attestator, Mateo Caballero,
reiterated the issue as to the genuineness of the signature of the has published unto us the foregoing will consisting
testator therein. 7 of THREE PAGES, including the acknowledgment,
each page numbered correlatively in letters of the
upper part of each page, as his Last Will and
On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses, Cipriano Labuca,
Testament, and he has signed the same and every
and the notary public Atty. Filoteo Manigos, testified that the testator
page thereof, on the spaces provided for his
executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound
signature and on the left hand margin in the
and disposing mind and that, contrary to the assertions of the
presence of the said testator and in the presence
oppositors, Mateo Caballero was in good health and was not unduly
of each and all of us (emphasis supplied).
influenced in any way in the execution of his will. Labuca also testified
that he and the other witnesses attested and signed the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other. The other two attesting To our thinking, this is sufficient compliance and
witnesses were not presented in the probate hearing as the had died no evidence need be presented to indicate the
by then. 8 meaning that the said will was signed by the
testator and by them (the witnesses) in the
presence of all of them and of one another. Or as
On April 5, 1988, the probate court rendered a decision declaring the
the language of the law would have it that the
will in question as the last will and testament of the late Mateo
testator signed the will "in the presence of the
Caballero, on the ratiocination that:
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages
. . . The self-serving testimony of the two thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
witnesses of the oppositors cannot overcome the another." If not completely or ideally perfect in
positive testimonies of Atty. Filoteo Manigos and accordance with the wordings of Art. 805 but (sic)
Cipriano Labuca who clearly told the Court that the phrase as formulated is in substantial
indeed Mateo Caballero executed the Last Will and compliance with the requirement of the law." 11
Testament now marked Exhibit "C" on December
5, 1978. Moreover, the fact that it was Mateo
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said ruling of
Caballero who initiated the probate of his Will
respondent court, but the same was denied in the latter's resolution of
during his lifetime when he caused the filing of the
January 14, 1992, 12 hence this appeal now before us. Petitioners
original petition now marked Exhibit "D" clearly
assert that respondent court has ruled upon said issue in a manner not
underscores the fact that this was indeed his Last
in accord with the law and settled jurisprudence on the matter and are
Will. At the start, counsel for the oppositors
now questioning once more, on the same ground as that raised before
manifested that he would want the signature of
respondent court, the validity of the attestation clause in the last will
Mateo Caballero in Exhibit "C" examined by a
of Mateo Caballero.
handwriting expert of the NBI but it would seem
that despite their avowal and intention for the
examination of this signature of Mateo Caballero We find the present petition to be meritorious, as we shall shortly
in Exhibit "C", nothing came out of it because they hereafter, after some prefatory observations which we feel should be
abandoned the idea and instead presented Aurea made in aid of the rationale for our resolution of the controversy.
Caballero and Helen Caballero Campo as witnesses
for the oppositors.
1. A will has been defined as a species of conveyance whereby a
person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control
All told, it is the finding of this Court that Exhibit to a certain degree the disposition of his estate after his
"C" is the Last Will and Testament of Mateo death. 13 Under the Civil Code, there are two kinds of wills which a
Caballero and that it was executed in accordance testator may execute. 14 the first kind is the ordinary or attested will,
with all the requisites of the law. 9 the execution of which is governed by Articles 804 to 809 of the Code.
Article 805 requires that:
Undaunted by the said judgment of the probate court, petitioners
elevated the case in the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19669. Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will,
They asserted therein that the will in question is null and void for the must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to testator himself or by the testator's name written
specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed by some other person in his presence, and by his
the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed express direction, and attested and subscribed by
the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of three or more credible witnesses in the presence
one another. of the testator and of one another.
On October 15, 1991, respondent court promulgated its The testator or the person requested by him to
decision 10 affirming that of the trial court, and ruling that the write his name and the instrumental witnesses of
attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero substantially the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and
complies with Article 805 of the Civil Code, thus: every page thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, and all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
The question therefore is whether the attestation
each page.
clause in question may be considered as having
79
Wills and Succession Case Digests
The attestation should state the number of pages that the will is the very same instrument executed by the testator and
used upon which the will is written, and the fact attested to by the witnesses. 24
that the testator signed the will and every page
thereof, or caused some other person to write his
Further, by attesting and subscribing to the will, the witnesses thereby
name, under his express direction, in the presence
declare the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation
of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
clause. 25 The attestation clause, therefore, provide strong legal
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages
guaranties for the due execution of a will and to insure the authenticity
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
thereof. 26 As it appertains only to the witnesses and not to the
another.
testator, it need be signed only by them. 27 Where it is left unsigned, it
would result in the invalidation of the will as it would be possible and
If the attestation clause is in a language not easy to add the clause on a subsequent occasion in the absence of the
known to the witness, it shall be interpreted to testator and its witnesses. 28
them.
In its report, the Code Commission commented on the reasons of the
In addition, the ordinary will must be acknowledged before a notary law for requiring the formalities to be followed in the execution of
public by a testator and the attesting witness.15 hence it is likewise wills, in the following manner:
known as notarial will. Where the attestator is deaf or deaf-mute,
Article 807 requires that he must personally read the will, if able to do
The underlying and fundamental objectives
so. Otherwise, he should designate two persons who would read the
permeating the provisions on the law on wills in
will and communicate its contents to him in a practicable manner. On
this Project consists in the liberalization of the
the other hand, if the testator is blind, the will should be read to him
manner of their execution with the end in view of
twice; once, by anyone of the witnesses thereto, and then again, by
giving the testator more freedom in expressing his
the notary public before whom it is acknowledged. 16
last wishes, but with sufficient safeguards and
restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud
The other kind of will is the holographic will, which Article 810 defines and the exercise of undue and improper pressure
as one that is entirely written, dated, and signed by the testator and influence upon the testator.
himself. This kind of will, unlike the ordinary type, requires no
attestation by witnesses. A common requirement in both kinds of will
This objective is in accord with the modern
is that they should be in writing and must have been executed in a
tendency with respect to the formalities in the
language or dialect known to the testator. 17
execution of wills. . . . 29
83
Wills and Succession Case Digests
The main objection insisted upon by the appellant in that the will is be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
fatally defective, because its attestation clause is not signed by the witnesses. A notarial will executed with indifference to these two codal
attesting witnesses. There is no question that the signatures of the provisions opens itself to nagging questions as to its legitimacy.
three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the
attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by
The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with
the witnesses on the left-hand margin.
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The petition filed by
petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is
correct. The attestation clause is 'a memorandum of the facts the son of the cousin of the decedent.
attending the execution of the will' required by law to be made by the
attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An
The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular
unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the
Pilipino, read in full:
witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof
negatives their participation.
HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three
witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law and SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN:
may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is
untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the legal AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St., Sampaloc,
mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its Manila, pitongput siyam (79) na gulang, nasa hustong pagi-isip, pag-
pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the unawa at memoria ay nag-hahayag na ito na ang aking huling habilin
bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such at testamento, at binabali wala ko lahat ang naunang ginawang habilin
clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the o testamento:
testator and any or all of the witnesses.
84
Wills and Succession Case Digests
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO of the three (3) witnesses to the will, Quirino Agrava, Lamberto Leano,
address: 500 San Diego St. and Juanito Estrada. The RTC also called to fore "the modern tendency
Sampaloc, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-7717-37 in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will x x x with the
Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981. end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last
wishes;"7 and from this perspective, rebutted oppositor’s arguments
that the will was not properly executed and attested to in accordance
QUIRINO AGRAVA
with law.
address: 1228-Int. 3, Kahilum
Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-458365
Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981 After a careful examination of the will and consideration of the
testimonies of the subscribing and attesting witnesses, and having in
mind the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the
LAMBERTO C. LEAÑO
execution of a will, i.e., the liberalization of the interpretation of the
address: Avenue 2, Blcok 7,
law on the formal requirements of a will with the end in view of giving
Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.MA., Cavite Res.
the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, this Court is
Cert. No. A-768277 issued at Carmona, Cavite on Feb. 7, 1981
persuaded to rule that the will in question is authentic and had been
executed by the testatrix in accordance with law.
JUANITO ESTRERA
address: City Court Compound,
On the issue of lack of acknowledgement, this Court has noted that at
City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829
the end of the will after the signature of the testatrix, the following
Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981.
statement is made under the sub-title, "Patunay Ng Mga Saksi":
The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), With regard to the oppositor’s argument that the will was not
who represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate numbered correlatively in letters placed on upper part of each page
heirs" of the decedent.2 Geralda Castillo claimed that the will is a and that the attestation did not state the number of pages thereof, it is
forgery, and that the true purpose of its emergence was so it could be worthy to note that the will is composed of only two pages. The first
utilized as a defense in several court cases filed by oppositor against page contains the entire text of the testamentary dispositions, and the
petitioner, particularly for forcible entry and usurpation of real second page contains the last portion of the attestation clause and
property, all centering on petitioner’s right to occupy the properties of acknowledgement. Such being so, the defects are not of a serious
the decedent.3 It also asserted that contrary to the representations of nature as to invalidate the will. For the same reason, the failure of the
petitioner, the decedent was actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs, testatrix to affix her signature on the left margin of the second page,
namely her grandchildren, who were then residing abroad. Per which contains only the last portion of the attestation clause and
records, it was subsequently alleged that decedent was the widow of acknowledgment is not a fatal defect.
Bonifacio Igsolo, who died in 1965,4 and the mother of a legitimate
child, Asuncion E. Igsolo, who predeceased her mother by three (3) As regards the oppositor’s assertion that the signature of the testatrix
months.5 on the will is a forgery, the testimonies of the three subscribing
witnesses to the will are convincing enough to establish the
Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed genuineness of the signature of the testatrix and the due execution of
and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that the will.8
decedent’s signature did not appear on the second page of the will,
and the will was not properly acknowledged. These twin arguments The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo,
are among the central matters to this petition. who had substituted his since deceased mother-in-law, Geralda
Castillo. In a Decision dated 17 August 1995, the Court of Appeals
After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order dated reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for
10 August 1992.6 The RTC favorably took into account the testimony probate.9 The Court of Appeals noted that the attestation clause failed
85
Wills and Succession Case Digests
to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will the total number of sheets such removal might be effected by
void and undeserving of probate.10 taking out the sheet and changing the numbers at the top of
the following sheets or pages. If, on the other hand, the total
number of sheets is stated in the attestation clause the falsification of
Hence, the present petition.
the document will involve the inserting of new pages and the forging
of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the margin, a matter
Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil attended with much greater difficulty."16
Code that "the number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in the
attestation clause" is merely directory, rather than mandatory, and
The case of In re Will of Andrada concerned a will the attestation
thus susceptible to what he termed as "the substantial compliance
clause of which failed to state the number of sheets or pages used.
rule."11
This consideration alone was sufficient for the Court to declare
"unanim[ity] upon the point that the defect pointed out in the attesting
The solution to this case calls for the application of Articles 805 and clause is fatal."17 It was further observed that "it cannot be denied that
806 of the Civil Code, which we replicate in full. the x x x requirement affords additional security against the danger
that the will may be tampered with; and as the Legislature has seen fit
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed to prescribe this requirement, it must be considered material."18
at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name
written by some other person in his presence, and by his express Against these cited cases, petitioner cites Singson v.
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible Florentino19 and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal,20 wherein the Court allowed
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. probate to the wills concerned therein despite the fact that the
attestation clause did not state the number of pages of the will. Yet
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the the appellate court itself considered the import of these two cases, and
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each made the following distinction which petitioner is unable to rebut, and
and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the which we adopt with approval:
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper
part of each page. Even a cursory examination of the Will (Exhibit "D"), will readily show
that the attestation does not state the number of pages used upon
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the which the will is written. Hence, the Will is void and undeserving of
will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every probate.
page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under
his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, We are not impervious of the Decisions of the Supreme Court in
and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages "Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., 92 Phil. 161 and
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. Apolonio [Taboada] versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al., 118 SCRA 195,"
to the effect that a will may still be valid even if the attestation does
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it not contain the number of pages used upon which the Will is written.
shall be interpreted to them. However, the Decisions of the Supreme Court are not applicable in the
aforementioned appeal at bench. This is so because, in the case of
"Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., supra," although the
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by attestation in the subject Will did not state the number of pages used
the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required in the will, however, the same was found in the last part of the body of
to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk the Will:
of Court.
"x x x
The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect, the
failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages of the
will. But an examination of the will itself reveals several more The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
deficiencies. amended by Act No. 2645, which requires that the attestation clause
shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which the will is
written, which requirement has been held to be mandatory as an
As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails to state effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or omission
the number of pages of the will.12 There was an incomplete attempt to of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom
comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted for the the property is intended to be bequeathed (In re Will of Andrada, 42
insertion of the number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the Phil. 180; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Gumban vs.
blank was never filled in; hence, the requisite was left uncomplied Gorcho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs.
with. Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of these cases seems to
be that the attestation clause must contain a statement of the number
The Court of Appeals pounced on this defect in reversing the trial of sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is
court, citing in the process Uy Coque v. Navas L. Sioca13 and In re: Will omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the deficiency
of Andrada.14 In Uy Coque, the Court noted that among the defects of cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or
the will in question was the failure of the attestation clause to state the examination of the will itself. But here the situation is different. While
number of pages contained in the will.15 In ruling that the will could the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages
not be admitted to probate, the Court made the following upon which the will is written, however, the last part of the body of
consideration which remains highly relevant to this day: "The purpose the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight pages, which
of requiring the number of sheets to be stated in the attestation clause circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of
is obvious; the document might easily be so prepared that the construction and places it within the realm of similar cases where a
removal of a sheet would completely change the testamentary broad and more liberal view has been adopted to prevent the will of
dispositions of the will and in the absence of a statement of the testator from being defeated by purely technical considerations."
(page 165-165, supra) (Underscoring supplied)
86
Wills and Succession Case Digests
In "Apolonio Tabaoda versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al." supra, the x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can
notarial acknowledgement in the Will states the number of pages used be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages
in the: are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each
and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the
will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and
"x x x
defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause
can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and
We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of
clause failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will. This each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause,
would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this being the only check against perjury in the probate
case, it is discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually proceedings.29 (Emphasis supplied.)
composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her
instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains
The Court of Appeals did cite these comments by Justice J.B.L. Reyes
the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix
in its assailed decision, considering that the failure to state the number
at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at
of pages of the will in the attestation clause is one of the defects which
the left margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos"
cannot be simply disregarded. In Caneda itself, the Court refused to
comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The
allow the probate of a will whose attestation clause failed to state that
acknowledgment itself states that "this Last Will and Testament
the witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the
consists of two pages including this page" (pages 200-201, supra)
presence of the testator and of each other,30 the other omission cited
(Underscoring supplied).
by Justice J.B.L. Reyes which to his estimation cannot be lightly
disregarded.
However, in the appeal at bench, the number of pages used in the will
is not stated in any part of the Will. The will does not even contain any
Caneda suggested: "[I]t may thus be stated that the rule, as it now
notarial acknowledgment wherein the number of pages of the will
stands, is that omission which can be supplied by an examination of
should be stated.21
the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will
not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to
Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the enactment of probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which
the Civil Code in 1950, at a time when the statutory provision cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the
governing the formal requirement of wills was Section invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will
itself."31 Thus, a failure by the attestation clause to state that the
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.22 Reliance on these cases remains testator signed every page can be liberally construed, since that fact
apropos, considering that the requirement that the attestation state can be checked by a visual examination; while a failure by the
the number of pages of the will is extant from Section 618.23 However, attestation clause to state that the witnesses signed in one another’s
the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950 did put in force a rule of presence should be considered a fatal flaw since the attestation is the
interpretation of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as the only textual guarantee of compliance.32
attestation clause is concerned, that may vary from the philosophy
that governed these two cases. Article 809 of the Civil Code states: "In The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on
the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper which the will was written remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809.
pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of
attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible
invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent
substantial compliance with all the requirements of article 805." any increase or decrease in the pages.33 The failure to state the
number of pages equates with the absence of an averment on the part
In the same vein, petitioner cites the report of the Civil Code of the instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will,
Commission, which stated that "the underlying and fundamental the execution of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and
objective permeating the provisions on the [law] on [wills] in this subscribed to. Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance with
project consists in the [liberalization] of the manner of their execution this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is
with the end in view of giving the testator more [freedom] in comprised of, as was the situation in Singson andTaboada. However,
[expressing] his last wishes. This objective is in accord with the in this case, there could have been no substantial compliance with the
[modern tendency] in respect to the formalities in the execution of requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement in the
wills."24 However, petitioner conveniently omits the qualification attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of
offered by the Code Commission in the very same paragraph he cites pages which comprise the will.
from their report, that such liberalization be "but with sufficient
safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to
exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the comply with the formal requirements as enumerated under Article 805.
testator."25 Whatever the inclinations of the members of the Code Commission in
incorporating Article 805, the fact remains that they saw fit to
Caneda v. Court of Appeals26 features an extensive discussion made by prescribe substantially the same formal requisites as enumerated in
Justice Regalado, speaking for the Court on the conflicting views on Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, convinced that these
the manner of interpretation of the legal formalities required in the remained effective safeguards against the forgery or intercalation of
execution of the attestation clause in wills.27 Uy notarial wills.34 Compliance with these requirements, however picayune
Coque and Andrada are cited therein, along with several other cases, in impression, affords the public a high degree of comfort that the
as examples of the application of the rule of strict testator himself or herself had decided to convey property post
construction.28 However, the Code Commission opted to recommend a mortem in the manner established in the will.35 The transcendent
more liberal construction through the "substantial compliance rule" legislative intent, even as expressed in the cited comments of
under Article 809. A cautionary note was struck though by Justice the Code Commission, is for the fruition of the testator’s
J.B.L. Reyes as to how Article 809 should be applied:
87
Wills and Succession Case Digests
incontestable desires, and not for the indulgent admission of the instrumental witnesses’ signatures on each and every page, the
wills to probate. fact must be noted that it is the attestation clause which contains the
utterances reduced into writing of the testamentary witnesses
themselves. It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required
The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals.
under Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon which the
However, an examination of the will itself reveals a couple of even
will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and every
more critical defects that should necessarily lead to its rejection.
page thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will and all the
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The
For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these elemental
instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.
witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not
appear at the bottom of the attestation clause which after all consists
Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly
of their averments before the notary public.
attested to by the instrumental witnesses, as they failed to sign the
attestation clause.
Cagro v. Cagro36 is material on this point. As in this case, "the
signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the
Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this
bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the
petition should also hinge. The requirement under Article 806 that
same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin."37 While
"every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
three (3) Justices38 considered the signature requirement had been
testator and the witnesses" has also not been complied with. The
substantially complied with, a majority of six (6), speaking through
importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it had
Chief Justice Paras, ruled that the attestation clause had not been duly
been segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and
signed, rendering the will fatally defective.
entrusted into a separate provision, Article 806. The non-observance of
Article 806 in this case is equally as critical as the other cited flaws in
There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the compliance with Article 805, and should be treated as of equivalent
will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the import.
page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand
margin.
In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista,
wrote "Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic),
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila."40 By no manner of contemplation
correct. The attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts can those words be construed as an acknowledgment. An
attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by the acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going
attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or
unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the deed.41 It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor
witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has
negatives their participation. attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though
witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law and it does not hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an
may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document
untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the legal was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.42 Ordinarily, the
mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its language of the jurat should avow that the document was subscribed
pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the and sworn before the notary public, while in this case, the notary
bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such public averred that he himself "signed and notarized" the document.
clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the Possibly though, the word "ninotario" or "notarized" encompasses the
testator and any or all of the witnesses.39 signing of and swearing in of the executors of the document, which in
this case would involve the decedent and the instrumental witnesses.
The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. Article 805
particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as
witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the will be a jurat, the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express
"attested and subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]." The requirement of Article 806 is that the will be "acknowledged", and not
respective intents behind these two classes of signature are distinct merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any textual
from each other. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the
signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free
are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another
the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made
statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the beyond the free consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is not
attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will. an empty meaningless act.43 The acknowledgment coerces the testator
An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law
instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page that they had executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act
containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury,
demonstrate these witnesses’ undertakings in the clause, since the thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in
signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free
different avowal. consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance
that the testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary
The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in this dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the will.
case signed the attestation clause itself, but not the left-hand margin
of the page containing such clause. Without diminishing the value of
88
Wills and Succession Case Digests
It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self- Camins, Angeles G. Cosca, Federico G. Tubog, Virginia G. Talanay and
evident as it is under Article 806. A notarial will that is not Angeles G. Talanay, appellees herein, opposed the petition on the
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the ground, among others, that the will was procured by fraud; that the
witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and deceased did not intend the instrument signed by him to be as his will;
sworn to before a notary public. and that the deceased was physically and mentally incapable of
making a will at the time of the alleged execution of said will.
There are two other requirements under Article 805 which were not
fully satisfied by the will in question. We need not discuss them at After due trial, the court rendered the appealed decision finding the
length, as they are no longer material to the document Exhibit "C" to be the authentic last will of the deceased but
disallowing it for failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of
Article 806 of the New Civil Code — that the will must be
disposition of this case. The provision requires that the testator and
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
the instrumental witnesses sign each and every page of the will on the
witnesses.
left margin, except the last; and that all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. In this
case, the decedent, unlike the witnesses, failed to sign both pages of An examination of the document (Exhibit "C") shows that the same
the will on the left margin, her only signature appearing at the so- was acknowledged before a notary public by the testator but not by
called "logical end"44 of the will on its first page. Also, the will itself is the instrumental witnesses.
not numbered correlatively in letters on each page, but instead
numbered with Arabic numerals. There is a line of thought that has
Article 806 of the New Civil Code reads as follows:
disabused the notion that these two requirements be construed as
mandatory.45 Taken in isolation, these omissions, by themselves, may
not be sufficient to deny probate to a will. Yet even as these omissions Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by
are not decisive to the adjudication of this case, they need not be the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not
dwelt on, though indicative as they may be of a general lack of due be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with
regard for the requirements under Article 805 by whoever executed the office of the Clerk of Court.
the will.
We have held heretofore that compliance with the requirement
All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers contained in the above legal provision to the effect that a will must be
from makes the probate denial inexorable. acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and also by the
witnesses is indispensable for its validity (In re: Testate Estate of
Alberto, G. R. No. L-11948, April 29, 1959). As the document under
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
consideration does not comply with this requirement, it is obvious that
the same may not be probated.
SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
ARTICLE 806
EN BANC
Azuela vs. CA - see previous case.
G.R. No. L-7179 June 30, 1955
EN BANC
Testate Estate of the Late Apolinaria Ledesma. FELICIDAD
G.R. No. L-20357 November 25, 1967 JAVELLANA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
DOÑA MATEA LEDESMA, oppositor-appellant.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF
THE WILL OF GREGORIO GATCHALIAN, deceased. PEDRO
REYES GARCIA, petitioner-appellant, REYES, J.B.L., J.:
vs.
FELIPE GATCHALIAN, AURORA G. CAMINS, ANGELES G.
By order of July 23, 1953, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo admitted
COSCA, FEDERICO G. TUBOG, VIRGINIA G. TALANAY and
to probate the documents in the Visayan dialect, marked Exhibits D
ANGELES G. TALANAY, oppositors-appellees.
and E, as the testament and codicil duly executed by the deceased Da.
Apolinaria Ledesma Vda. de Javellana, on March 30, 1950, and May
DIZON, J.: 29, 1952, respectively, with Ramon Tabiana, Gloria Montinola de
Tabiana and Vicente Yap as witnesses. The contestant, Da. Matea
Ledesma, sister and nearest surviving relative of said deceased,
This is an appeal taken by Pedro Reyes Garcia from the decision of the
appealed from the decision, insisting that the said exhibits were not
Court of First Instance of Rizal in Special Proceedings No. 2623
executed in conformity with law. The appeal was made directly to this
denying the allowance of the will of the late Gregorio Gatchalian, on
Court because the value of the properties involved exceeded two
the ground that the attesting witnesses did not acknowledge it before
hundred thousand pesos.
a notary public, as required by law.
Originally the opposition to the probate also charged that the testatrix
On March 15, 1967, Gregorio Gatchalian, a widower of 71 years of
lacked testamentary capacity and that the dispositions were procured
age, died in the municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, leaving no
through undue influence. These grounds were abandoned at the
forced heirs. On April 2 of the same year, appellant filed a petition with
hearing in the court below, where the issue was concentrated into
the above named court for the probate of said alleged will (Exhibit "C")
three specific questions: (1) whether the testament of 1950 was
wherein he was instituted as sole heir. Felipe Gatchalian, Aurora G.
executed by the testatrix in the presence of the instrumental
89
Wills and Succession Case Digests
witnesses; (2) whether the acknowledgment clause was signed and The most important variation noted by the contestants concerns that
the notarial seal affixed by the notary without the presence of the signing of the certificate of acknowledgment (in Spanish) appended to
testatrix and the witnesses; and (3) if so, whether the codicil was the Codicil in Visayan, Exhibit E. Unlike the testament, this codicil was
thereby rendered invalid and ineffective. These questions are the same executed after the enactment of the new Civil Code, and, therefore,
ones presented to us for resolution. had to be acknowledged before a notary public (Art. 806). Now, the
instrumental witnesses (who happen to be the same ones who
attested the will of 1950) asserted that after the codicil had been
The contestant argues that the Court below erred in refusing credence
signed by the testatrix and the witnesses at the San Pablo Hospital,
to her witnesses Maria Paderogao and Vidal Allado, cook and driver,
the same was signed and sealed by notary public Gimotea on the same
respectively, of the deceased Apolinaria Ledesma. Both testified that
occasion. On the other hand, Gimotea affirmed that he did not do so,
on March 30, 1950, they saw and heard Vicente Yap (one of the
but brought the codicil to his office, and signed and sealed it there.
witnesses to the will) inform the deceased that he had brought the
The variance does not necessarily imply conscious perversion of truth
"testamento" and urge her to go to attorney Tabiana's office to sign it;
on the part of the witnesses, but appears rather due to a well-
that Da. Apolinaria manifested that she could not go, because she was
established phenomenon, the tendency of the mind, in recalling past
not feeling well; and that upon Yap's insistence that the will had to be
events, to substitute the usual and habitual for what differs slightly
signed in the attorney's office and not elsewhere, the deceased took
from it (II Moore on Facts, p. 878; The Ellen McGovern, 27 Fed. 868,
the paper and signed it in the presence of Yap alone, and returned it
870).
with the statement that no one would question it because the property
involved was exclusively hers.
At any rate, as observed by the Court below, whether or not the
notary signed the certification of acknowledgment in the presence of
Our examination of the testimony on record discloses no grounds for
the testatrix and the witnesses, does not affect the validity of the
reversing the trial Court's rejection of the improbable story of the
codicil. Unlike the Code of 1889 (Art. 699), the new Civil Code does
witnesses. It is squarely contradicted by the concordant testimony of
not require that the signing of the testator, witnesses and notary
the instrumental witnesses, Vicente Yap, Atty. Ramon Tabiana, and his
should be accomplished in one single act. A comparison of Articles 805
wife Gloria Montinola, who asserted under oath that the testament was
and 806 of the new Civil Code reveals that while testator and
executed by testatrix and witnesses in the presence of each other, at
witnesses sign in the presence of each other, all that is thereafter
the house of the decedent on General Hughes St., Iloilo City, on March
required is that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary
30, 1950. And it is highly unlikely, and contrary to usage, that either
public by the testator and the witnesses" (Art. 806); i.e., that the latter
Tabiana or Yap should have insisted that Da. Apolinaria, an infirm lady
should avow to the certifying officer the authenticity of their signatures
then over 80 years old, should leave her own house in order to
and the voluntariness of their actions in executing the testamentary
execute her will, when all three witnesses could have easily repaired
disposition. This was done in the case before us. The subsequent
thither for the purpose. Moreover, the cross-examination has revealed
signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the testament
fatal flaws in the testimony of Contestant's witnesses. Both claim to
was duly acknowledged by the participants therein is no part of the
have heard the word "testamento" for the first time when Yap used it;
acknowledgment itself nor of the testamentary act. Hence their
and they claimed ability to recall that word four years later, despite the
separate execution out of the presence of the testatrix and her
fact that the term meant nothing to either. It is well known that what
witnesses can not be said to violate the rule that testaments should be
is to be remembered must first be rationally conceived and assimilated
completed without interruption (Andalis vs. Pulgueras, 59 Phil. 643),
(II Moore on Facts, p. 884). Likewise, Maria Paderogao was positive
or, as the Roman maxim puts it, "uno codem die ac tempore in eadem
that Yap brought the will, and that the deceased alone signed it,
loco", and no reversible error was committed by the Court in so
precisely on March 30, 1950; but she could remember no other date,
holding. It is noteworthy that Article 806 of the new Civil Code does
nor give satisfactory explanation why that particular day stuck in her
not contain words requiring that the testator and the witnesses should
mind. Worse still, Allado claimed to have heard what allegedly
acknowledge the testament on the same day or occasion that it was
transpired between Yap and Da. Apolinaria from the kitchen of the
executed.
house, that was later proved to have been separated from the
deceased's quarters, and standing at a much lower level, so that
conversations in the main building could not be distinctly heard from The decision admitting the will to probate is affirmed, with costs
the kitchen. Later, on redirect examination, Allado sought to cure his against appellant.
testimony by claiming that he was upstairs in a room where the
servants used to eat when he heard Yap converse with his mistress;
FIRST DIVISION
but this correction is unavailing, since it was plainly induced by two
highly leading questions from contestant's counsel that had been
previously ruled out by the trial Court. Besides, the contradiction is G.R. No. L-32213 November 26, 1973
hardly consonant with this witness' 18 years of service to the
deceased. AGAPITA N. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
Upon the other hand, the discrepancies in the testimony of the HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of
instrumental witnesses urged upon us by the contestant-appellant, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B.
concerning the presence or absence of Aurelio Montinola at the signing LUGAY, respondents.
of the testament or of the codicil, and the identity of the person who
inserted the date therein, are not material and are largely imaginary, ESGUERRA, J.:
since the witness Mrs. Tabiana confessed inability to remember all the
details of the transaction. Neither are we impressed by the argument
that the use of some Spanish terms in the codicil and testament Petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the Court First Instance
(likelegado, partes iguales, plena propiedad) is proof that its contents of Cebu allowing the probate of the last will a testament of the late
were not understood by the testatrix, it appearing in evidence that Valente Z. Cruz. Petitioner-appellant Agapita N. Cruz, the surviving
those terms are of common use even in the vernacular, and that the spouse of the said decease opposed the allowance of the will (Exhibit
deceased was a woman of wide business interests. "E"), alleging the will was executed through fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was
execute without the testator having been fully informed of the content
90
Wills and Succession Case Digests
thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that Admittedly, there are American precedents holding that notary public
the supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance may, in addition, act as a witness to the executive of the document he
with law. Notwithstanding her objection, the Court allowed the probate has notarized. (Mahilum v. Court Appeals, 64 0. G. 4017; 17 SCRA
of the said last will and testament Hence this appeal by certiorari 482; Sawyer v. Cox, 43 Ill. 130). There are others holding that his
which was given due course. signing merely as notary in a will nonetheless makes him a witness
thereon (Ferguson v. Ferguson, 47 S. E. 2d. 346; In Re Douglas Will,
N. Y. S. 2d. 641; Ragsdal v. Hill, 269 S. W. 2d. 911, Tyson Utterback,
The only question presented for determination, on which the decision
122 So. 496; In Re Baybee's Estate 160 N. 900; W. Merill v. Boal, 132
of the case hinges, is whether the supposed last will and testament of
A. 721;See also Trenwith v. Smallwood, 15 So. 1030). But these
Valente Z. Cruz (Exhibit "E") was executed in accordance with law,
authorities do not serve the purpose of the law in this jurisdiction or
particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code, the first
are not decisive of the issue herein because the notaries public and
requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to
witnesses referred to aforecited cases merely acted as instrumental,
the will, and the second requiring the testator and the witnesses to
subscribing attesting witnesses, and not as acknowledging witnesses.
acknowledge the will before a notary public.
He the notary public acted not only as attesting witness but also
acknowledging witness, a situation not envisaged by Article 805 of the
Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely Deogracias T. Civil Code which reads:
Jamaloas Jr., Dr. Francisco Pañares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one
of them, the last named, is at the same time the Notary Public before
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before
whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged. Reduced to
a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.
simpler terms, the question was attested and subscribed by at least
The notary public shall not be required to retain a
three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each
copy of the will or file another with the office of
other, considering that the three attesting witnesses must appear
the Clerk of Court. [Emphasis supplied]
before the notary public to acknowledge the same. As the third
witness is the notary public himself, petitioner argues that the result is
that only two witnesses appeared before the notary public to To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one the attesting
acknowledge the will. On the other hand, private respondent-appellee, and acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of having only
Manuel B. Lugay, who is the supposed executor of the will, following two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of
the reasoning of the trial court, maintains that there is substantial the provisions of Article 80 be requiring at least three credible
compliance with the legal requirement of having at least three witnesses to act as such and of Article 806 which requires that the
attesting witnesses even if the notary public acted as one of them, testator and the required number of witnesses must appear before the
bolstering up his stand with 57 American Jurisprudence, p. 227 which, notary public to acknowledge the will. The result would be, as has
insofar as pertinent, reads as follows: been said, that only two witnesses appeared before the notary public
for or that purpose. In the circumstances, the law would not be duly in
observed.
It is said that there are, practical reasons for
upholding a will as against the purely technical
reason that one of the witnesses required by law FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby
signed as certifying to an acknowledgment of the reversed and the probate of the last will and testament of Valente Z.
testator's signature under oath rather than as Cruz (Exhibit "E") is declared not valid and hereby set aside.
attesting the execution of the instrument.
Cost against the appellee.
After weighing the merits of the conflicting claims of the parties, We
are inclined to sustain that of the appellant that the last will and
Conejos vs. Yves – cannot be located in the internet or in the SCRA.
testament in question was not executed in accordance with law. The
notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be
considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot
acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To Gonzales vs. CA – go to Article 805
acknowledge before means to avow (Javellana v. Ledesma, 97 Phil.
258, 262; Castro v. Castro, 100 Phil. 239, 247); to own as genuine, to SECOND DIVISION
assent, to admit; and "before" means in front or preceding in space or
ahead of. (The New Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English
Language, p. 72; Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the G.R. No. L-51546 January 28, 1980
English Language, p. 252; Webster's New International Dictionary 2d.
p. 245.) Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public JOSE ANTONIO GABUCAN, petitioner-appellant,
himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the vs.
will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his HON. JUDGE LUIS D. MANTA JOSEFA G. VDA. DE YSALINA and
personality into two so that one will appear before the other to NELDA G. ENCLONAR, respondents-appellees.
acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such
a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.
AQUINO, J.:
The probate court assumed that the notarial acknowledgment of the Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated 11 April 1986 1 of the
said will is subject to the thirty-centavo documentary stamp tax fixed First Civil Cases Division of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now
in section 225 of the Tax Code, now section 237 of the 1977 Tax Code. Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Order dated 27 June 1983 2 of
the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, admitting to probate the
last will and testament 3 with codicil 4 of the late Brigido Alvarado.
Respondent Judge refused to reconsider the dismissal in spite of
petitioner's manifestation that he had already attached the
documentary stamp to the original of the will. (See Mahilum vs. Court On 5 November 1977, the 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a
of Appeals, 64 O. G. 4017, 17 SCRA 482, 486.) notarial will entitled "Huling Habilin" wherein he disinherited an
illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly revoked a previously
executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate before Branch 4
The case was brought to this Court by means of a petition for of the Regional Trial Court of sta. Cruz, Laguna.
mandamus to compel the lower court to allow petitioner's appeal from
its decision. In this Court's resolution of January 21, 1980 the petition
for mandamus was treated in the interest of substantial and speedy As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the notary public
justice as an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 as well as a special and by private respondent who were present at the execution, the
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private
respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the eight-paged document,
read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the three
We hold that the lower court manifestly erred in declaring that, instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter four followed
because no documentary stamp was affixed to the will, there was "no the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished
will and testament to probate" and, consequently, the alleged "action them.
must of necessity be dismissed".
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
duress, or influence of fear and threats; that it was procured by undue We agree with petitioner in this respect.
and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary
who stands to get the lion's share of the testator's estate; and lastly,
Regardless of respondent's staunch contention that the testator was
that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.
still capable of reading at the time his will and codicil were prepared,
the fact remains and this was testified to by his witnesses, that Brigido
When the oppositor (petitioner) failed to substantiate the grounds did not do so because of his "poor," 10 "defective," 11 or
relied upon in the Opposition, a Probate Order was issued on 27 June "blurred" 12 vision making it necessary for private respondent to do the
1983 from which an appeal was made to respondent court. The main actual reading for him.
thrust of the appeal was that the deceased was blind within the
meaning of the law at the time his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil
The following pronouncement in Garcia vs. Vasquez 13 provides an
attached thereto was executed; that since the reading required by Art.
insight into the scope of the term "blindness" as used in Art. 808, to
808 of the Civil Code was admittedly not complied with, probate of the
wit:
deceased's last will and codicil should have been denied.
93
Wills and Succession Case Digests
In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and incapacitated testator the contents of the draft of his will, had already
codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental been accomplished. To reiterate, substantial compliance suffices where
witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the the purpose has been served.
testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read
corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of
acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner
respondent Court of Appeals dated 11 April 1986 is AFFIRMED.
does not so allege, that the contents of the will and codicil were not
Considering the length of time that this case has remained pending,
sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the
this decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of the execution
was not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and
authenticity of the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony SO ORDERED.
of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged that the
will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even prior to Garcia vs. Vasquez – cannot be located in the internet. Go to SCRA.
5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator's residence
precisely for the purpose of securing his conformity to the draft. 15
ARTICLE 809
Moreover, it was not only Atty. Rino who read the documents on
5 November and 29 December 1977. The notary public and the three Alvarado vs. Gaviola – go to Article 808
instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil, albeit silently.
Afterwards, Atty. Nonia de la Pena (the notary public) and Dr. Caneda vs. CA – go to Article 805
Crescente O. Evidente (one of the three instrumental witnesses and
the testator's physician) asked the testator whether the contents of the
document were of his own free will. Brigido answered in the EN BANC
affirmative. 16 With four persons following the reading word for word
with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was G.R. No. L-5826 April 29, 1953
reasonably assured that what was read to him (those which he
affirmed were in accordance with his instructions), were the terms
actually appearing on the typewritten documents. This is especially Testate estate of the late VICENTE CAGRO. JESUSA
true when we consider the fact that the three instrumental witnesses CAGRO, petitioner-appellee,
were persons known to the testator, one being his physician (Dr. vs.
Evidente) and another (Potenciano C. Ranieses) being known to him PELAGIO CAGRO, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
since childhood.
PARAS, C.J.:
The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not.
Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial This is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the
requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, Court of First Instance of Samar, admitting to probate the will allegedly
the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Laoangan, Pambujan, Samar,
affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only on February 14, 1949.
defeat the testator's will. 17
The main objection insisted upon by the appellant in that the will is
As a final word to convince petitioner of the propriety of the trial fatally defective, because its attestation clause is not signed by the
court's Probate Order and its affirmance by the Court of Appeals, we attesting witnesses. There is no question that the signatures of the
quote the following pronouncement in Abangan v. Abangan, 18 to wit: three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the
attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by
The object of the solemnities surrounding the the witnesses on the left-hand margin.
execution of wills is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to avoid the substitution of wills We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is
and testaments and to guaranty their truth and correct. The attestation clause is 'a memorandum of the facts
authenticity. Therefore the laws on the subject attending the execution of the will' required by law to be made by the
should be interpreted in such a way as to attain attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An
these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the
also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof
not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the negatives their participation.
exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends,
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three
any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds
witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law and
nothing but demands more requisites entirely
may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is
unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the
untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the legal
testator's will, must be disregarded (emphasis
mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its
supplied).
pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the
bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such
Brigido Alvarado had expressed his last wishes in clear and clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the
unmistakable terms in his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached testator and any or all of the witnesses.
thereto. We are unwilling to cast these aside fro the mere reason that
a legal requirement intended for his protection was not followed
Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed and the probate of the
strictly when such compliance had been rendered unnecessary by the
will in question denied. So ordered with costs against the petitioner
fact that the purpose of the law, i.e., to make known to the
and appellee.
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
FIRST DIVISION administrator was likewise denied because of the petitioner's failure to
comply with the order requiring him to submit the names of' the
intestate heirs and their addresses.
G.R. No. L-36033 November 5, 1982
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE
WILL OF DOROTEA PEREZ, (deceased): APOLONIO The petitioner decided to file the present petition.
TABOADA, petitioner,
vs.
For the validity of a formal notarial will, does Article 805 of the Civil
HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of Court of First Instance
Code require that the testatrix and all the three instrumental and
of Southern Leyte, (Branch III, Maasin),respondent.
attesting witnesses sign at the end of the will and in the presence of
the testatrix and of one another?
GUTIERREZ, JR. J.:
Article 805 of the Civil Code provides:
This is a petition for review of the orders issued by the Court of First
Instance of Southern Leyte, Branch III, in Special Proceedings No. R-
Every will, other than a holographic will, must be
1713, entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for Probate of the Will of
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
Dorotea Perez, Deceased; Apolonio Taboada, Petitioner", which denied
himself or by the testator's name written by some
the probate of the will, the motion for reconsideration and the motion
other person in his presence, and by his express
for appointment of a special administrator.
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the
In the petition for probate filed with the respondent court, the testator and of one another.
petitioner attached the alleged last will and testament of the late
Dorotea Perez. Written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect, the will
The testator or the person requested by him to
consists of two pages. The first page contains the entire testamentary
write his name and the instrumental witnesses of
dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the page by the
the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and
testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the three (3)
every page thereof, except the last, on the left
instrumental witnesses. The second page which contains the
margin, and all the pages shall be numbered
attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed at the end of the
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
attestation clause by the three (3) attesting witnesses and at the left
each page.
hand margin by the testatrix.
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
proceedings in accordance with this decision. No pronouncement on own feet inasmuch as she was then suffering from
costs. rheumatism or partial paralysis of the lower extremities, and
that on July 27, and May 25, 1923, the testatrix Gregoria
Villaflor used to mark with her thumb, if she did not sign, the
SO ORDERED.
document she executed, as it was proven during the trials by
Exhibit 1 and 2 of the opponents, the doubt and suspicion
EN BANC which this court entertains in regard to the authenticity of
the will in question, becomes a certainty that said testament
G.R. No. L-27440 December 24, 1927 is false.
JOSE VILLAFLOR, petitioner-appellant, We are reluctant to set aside the findings of the court below but they
vs. are, in our opinion, so clearly without sufficient support in the record
DEOGRACIAS TOBIAS, ET AL., oppositors-appellees. that we are constrained to reject them. The will in question is dated
July 12, 1923, and was prepared by a lawyer, Eustaquio Gallardo, and
as far as appearances go, was executed in strict compliance with the
OSTRAND, J.: provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the
execution of wills. The testatrix's name was signed by one Claro Lazo,
This is an appeal from the judgment denying a petition for the probate a clerk in the office of municipal treasurer of Santo Domingo, and the
of a will alleged to have been executed by one Gregoria Villaflor who attesting witnesses were Vicente Tacderas, municipal president, Rufino
died in the municipality of Santo Domingo, Province of Ilocos Sur on D. Soliven, chief of police, and Mariano Pizarro, municipal treasurer, all
October 7, 1925. The petition was presented by Jose Villaflor, one of of the town of Santo Domingo. The finding of the court below that the
the testamentary heirs of the deceased. Pilar Villaflor, Deogracias witness Soliven was not present when Claro Lazo signed the name of
Tobias, and several others whose names do not appear in the record, testatrix and when Vicente Tacderas signed as witness, is based on the
contested the will upon the following grounds: (1) That it was not fact that, in testifying in this case, Claro Lazo upon being asked to
signed by the alleged testatrix personally though she was able to do so enumerate the names of the persons present at the time of signing of
at the time of the execution of the document; (2) that said testatrix the document, omitted the name of Soliven. But it appears from the
did not authorize any one to sign the alleged will in her name; (3) that transcript of the testimony that he afterwards corrected his original
both before and after the execution of the document, Gregoria Villaflor statement and testified that Soliven, as well as the other witnesses to
signed various documents by thumb marks; (4) that although it is true the will, was present while all of the signatures were fixed. This is in
that the testatrix requested that the will be prepared, she nevertheless harmony with the testimony of all of the instrumental witnesses and is
refused to sign it because it was contrary to her desires and undoubtfully true; there is, indeed, nothing strange or unusual in a
instructions; (5) that subsequent to the date upon which the alleged mistake such as that made by Lazo. It may be noted that it is not
will was executed, Gregoria Villaflor on several occasions stated that it disputed that the lawyer Gallardo was present during the whole
was not her testament; (6) that the alleged will was not executed or proceeding and as he appears to have possessed full knowledge of the
signed in conformity of the law. formal requirements for the execution of the will, it is highly
improbable that he would have allowed the will in question to be
signed without the presence of a testatrix and of all the witnesses.
The grounds upon which the court below based the rejection of the
document are thus stated in this decision.
That the attestation clause of the will is written on a separate page
and not on the last page of the body of the document is, in our
After a careful examination of all the evidence of record, this opinion, a matter of minor importance and is explained by the fact that
court is of opinion that it has been sufficiently proved that if the clause had been written on the eight page of the will in direction
Claro Lazo, the person who is alleged to have written the continuation of the body thereof, there would have been sufficient
name of the testatrix in her behalf and by her express space on that page for the signatures of the witnesses to the clause. It
direction, subscribed the name and surname of the testatrix is also to be observed that all of the pages, including that upon which
and signed the will in question without Rufino D. Soliven, the attestation clause is written, bear the signatures of all the
one of the attesting witnesses, signed it; and lastly, when witnesses and that there is no question whatever as to the
Rufino D. Soliven signed the will the witness Vicente genuineness of said signatures.
Tacderas was not present.
The fact that the name of the testatrix was written by another person,
Besides the foregoing defect, which the court believes fatal, and that she did not sign by thumb mark, is easily explained and is
it also finds that the will in question, marked Exhibit B of the evidently due to an attempt on the part of the lawyer Gallardo to
applicant, was typewritten on eight catalan sheets, one comply strictly with the following clause in the Spanish text of section
separated from the others; that the attestation clause was 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure: "Excepto en el caso a que se
written on a separate sheet, marked page 9, when said refiere el articulo anterior, no sera valido para la transmision de bienes
clause could not have been written totally or partially on muebles e inmuebles, ni los gravara y afectara, ningun testamento a
page 8, since one-half of this latter page is blank.lawphi1.net menos que este escrito y que haya sido firmado por el testador, o que
lleve el nombre de este, escrito por otra persona en su presencia y
In the opinion of the court, all this circumstances tend to bajo su direccion expresa, . . . ." The making of a finger mark is not
make the authenticity and due execution of the will in "escribir" and it may be noted that Gallardo apparently is a good
question very doubtful and suspicious. And if the testimony Spanish scholar, that it does not appear that he knows the English
of the witnesses for the opposition should be taken into language;. and that he therefore probably used the Spanish text of the
account as well as the circumstance that the testatrix Code.
Gregoria Villaflor has neither signed or subscribed the
alleged will, notwithstanding the fact that it has been proven There is some testimony on the part of the contestants to the effect
in the record, that on July 12, 1923, the day in which it is that the testatrix on various occasions, subsequent to the execution of
alleged that said will was executed, the testatrix was, in the will, had stated that it was not in conformity with her instructions
good and sound health, although she could not walk on her
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
and that it was not her will. Assuming that such statements were handwriting of their mother and positively Identified her signature.
made, we can give them but little importance. The testatrix was an old They further testified that their deceased mother understood English,
woman and might have well made the statements by way of the language in which the holographic Will is written, and that the date
justification in conversation with persons who considered themselves "FEB./61 " was the date when said Will was executed by their mother.
wronged by the provisions of her will, but expressions of that kind
cannot, of course, work the revocation of the document. The testatrix
Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir filed an
lived for over two years after the will was made and had ample
"opposition to probate" assailing the purported holographic Will of
opportunity to make another will if she was dissatisfied with the first.
Bibiana R. de Jesus because a it was not executed in accordance with
law, (b) it was executed through force, intimidation and/or under
For the reasons stated the appealed judgment is hereby reversed and duress, undue influence and improper pressure, and (c) the alleged
it is ordered that the document in question be admitted to probate as testatrix acted by mistake and/or did not intend, nor could have
the last will and testament of the deceased Gregoria Villaflor. No costs intended the said Will to be her last Will and testament at the time of
will be allowed. So ordered. its execution.
Caneda vs. CA – go to Article 805 On August 24, 1973, respondent Judge Jose C. Colayco issued an
order allowing the probate of the holographic Will which he found to
have been duly executed in accordance with law.
ARTICLE 810
The antecedent facts which led to the filing of this petition are The only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the
undisputed. holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid
compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code which reads:
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the
holographic Wills are strictly construed. requisites, although compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if the
objective or purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is
actually attained by the form followed by the testator.
We agree with the petitioner.
This objective is in accord with the modem We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no
tendency with respect to the formalities in the evidence of bad faith and fraud in its execution nor was there any
execution of wills. (Report of the Code substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no question that the
Commission, p. 103) holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely
written, dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and in a language
known to her. There is also no question as to its genuineness and due
In Justice Capistrano's concurring opinion in Heirs of Raymundo Castro
execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of
v. Bustos (27 SCRA 327) he emphasized that:
the holographic Will of their mother and that she had the testamentary
capacity at the time of the execution of said Will. The objection
xxx xxx xxx interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that the
holographic Will is fatally defective because the date "FEB./61 "
... The law has a tender regard for the will of the appearing on the holographic Will is not sufficient compliance with
testator expressed in his last will and testament on Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to be
the ground that any disposition made by the entertained.
testator is better than that which the law can
make. For this reason, intestate succession is As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the
nothing more than a disposition based upon the day, month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case
presumed will of the decedent. at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and
pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only
Thus, the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the
requirements in order to guard against fraud and bad faith but without holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code,
undue or unnecessary curtailment of testamentary privilege Icasiano v. probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle
Icasiano, 11 SCRA 422). If a Will has been executed in substantial of substantial compliance.
compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad
faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said Win should be WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The order appealed
admitted to probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282). Thus, from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the order allowing the probate
of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is
xxx xxx xxx reinstated.
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
the late Senator or against SUBIC for that matter can be ventilated in a
separate proceeding, such that with the denial of the motion for
intervention, they are not left without any remedy or judicial relief
FERNAN, C.J.:
under existing law.
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
and that the same was actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of Francisco, 57 Phil., 742). But it can not be ignored that the
August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the will. requirement can be considered mandatory only in the case of ordinary
testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses
at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the
validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness need be
Civil Code, the proponent must present three witnesses who could
present (Art. 10), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses
declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the
must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.
testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone witness
presented by the proponent "did not prove sufficiently that the body of
the will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix." Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned
by the words "if the Court deem it necessary", which reveal that what
the law deems essential is that the Court should be convinced of the
The proponent appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to
will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is
produce more than one witness because the will's authenticity was not
produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the ill is
questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily require
genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On
the production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and
the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those
signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be denied
produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort
by the adverse party.
to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all
available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the
Article 811 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to the following effect: proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.
ART. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be Commenting on analogous provisions of Article 691 of the Spanish Civil
necessary that at least one witness who knows the Code of 1889, the noted Commentator, Mucuis Scaevola (Vol. 12, 2nd
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare Ed., p.421), sagely remarks:
that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such
La manera como esta concebida la redaccion del ultimo
witnesses shall be required.
apartado de dicho precepto induce la conclusion de que
siempre o por lo menos, en la mayor parte de los casos, el
In the absence of any competent witnesses referred to in Juez debe acudir al criterio pericial para que le ilustre acerca
the preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it de la autenticidad del testamento olografo, aunque ya esten
necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (691a). insertas en los autos del expediente las declaraciones
testificales. La prudencia con que el Juez debe de proceder
We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will was en resoluciones de transcendencia asi lo exige, y la indole
not contested, he was not required to produce more than one witness; delicada y peligrosa del testamento olografo lo hace
but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we necesario para mayor garantia de todos los interes
are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code can not be comprometidos en aquel.
interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three
witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of En efecto, el cotejo pericial de letras puede ser una
having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at confirmacion facultativa del dicho profano de los testigos y
the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. un modo de desvanecer las ultimas dudas que pudieran
810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness ocurrir al Juez acerca de la autenticidad que trata de
possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of averigaur y declarar. Para eso se ha escrito la frase del
the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing citado ultimo apartado, (siempre que el Juez lo estime
any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the conveniente), haya habido o no testigos y dudaran o no
handwriting and signature of the testator" and who can declare estos respecto de los extremos por que son preguntados.
(truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express) "that the
will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator". There
El arbitrio judicial en este caso debe formarse con
may be no available witness of the testator's hand; or even if so
independencia de los sucesos y de su significacion, para
familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion.
responder debidamente de las resoluciones que haya de
Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus
dictar.
become an impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the second
paragraph of Article 811 prescribes that —
And because the law leaves it to the trial court if experts are still
needed, no unfavourable inference can be drawn from a party's failure
in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the
to offer expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses
preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary,
dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay witnesses.
expert testimony may be resorted to.
Our conclusion is that the rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of
As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that no qualified
the Civil Code is merely directory and is not mandatory.
witness may be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no
competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the
will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the Considering, however, that this is the first occasion in which this Court
deficiency. has been called upon to construe the import of said article, the interest
of justice would be better served, in our opinion, by giving the parties
ample opportunity to adduce additional evidence, including expert
It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three
witnesses, should the Court deem them necessary.
witnesses be presented if the will is contested and only one if no
contest is had) was derived from the rule established for ordinary
testaments (cf. Cabang vs. Delfinado, 45 Phil., 291; Tolentino vs.
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is set aside, and The evidence presented for the petitioner is to the effect that Josefa
the records ordered remanded to the Court of origin, with instructions Villacorte died in the City of Manila on September 12, 1958; that on
to hold a new trial in conformity with this opinion. But evidence June 2, 1956, the late Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and
already on record shall not be retaken. No costs. testament in duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs. Felisa
Icasiano at Pedro Guevara Street, Manila, published before and
attested by three instrumental witnesses, namely: attorneys Justo P.
EN BANC
Torres, Jr. and Jose V. Natividad, and Mr. Vinicio B. Diy; that the will
was acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said three instrumental
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964 witnesses on the same date before attorney Jose Oyengco Ong,
Notary Public in and for the City of Manila; and that the will was
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA actually prepared by attorney Fermin Samson, who was also present
VILLACORTE. during the execution and signing of the decedent's last will and
CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee, testament, together with former Governor Emilio Rustia of Bulacan,
vs. Judge Ramon Icasiano and a little girl. Of the said three instrumental
NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors- witnesses to the execution of the decedent's last will and testament,
appellants. attorneys Torres and Natividad were in the Philippines at the time of
the hearing, and both testified as to the due execution and authenticity
of the said will. So did the Notary Public before whom the will was
REYES, J.B.L., J.: acknowledged by the testatrix and attesting witnesses, and also
attorneys Fermin Samson, who actually prepared the document. The
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila admitting latter also testified upon cross examination that he prepared one
to probate the document and its duplicate, marked as Exhibits "A" and original and two copies of Josefa Villacorte last will and testament at
"A-1", as the true last will and testament of Josefa Villacorte, his house in Baliuag, Bulacan, but he brought only one original and
deceased, and appointing as executor Celso Icasiano, the person one signed copy to Manila, retaining one unsigned copy in Bulacan.
named therein as such.
The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered
This special proceeding was begun on October 2, 1958 by a petition simultaneously with the filing of the petition and marked as Exhibit "A"
for the allowance and admission to probate of the original, Exhibit "A" consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page,
as the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and for the it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses,
appointment of petitioner Celso Icasiano as executor thereof. Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three (3) thereof; but the duplicate
copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition and marked
as Exhibit "A-1" is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting
The court set the proving of the alleged will for November 8, 1958, witnesses in each and every page.
and caused notice thereof to be published for three (3) successive
weeks, previous to the time appointed, in the newspaper "Manila
chronicle", and also caused personal service of copies thereof upon the The testimony presented by the proponents of the will tends to show
known heirs. that the original of the will and its duplicate were subscribed at the
end and on the left margin of each and every page thereof by the
testatrix herself and attested and subscribed by the three mentioned
On October 31, 1958, Natividad Icasiano, a daughter of the testatrix, witnesses in the testatrix's presence and in that of one another as
filed her opposition; and on November 10, 1958, she petitioned to witnesses (except for the missing signature of attorney Natividad on
have herself appointed as a special administrator, to which proponent page three (3) of the original); that pages of the original and duplicate
objected. Hence, on November 18, 1958, the court issued an order of said will were duly numbered; that the attestation clause thereof
appointing the Philippine Trust Company as special contains all the facts required by law to be recited therein and is
administrator.1äwphï1.ñët signed by the aforesaid attesting witnesses; that the will is written in
the language known to and spoken by the testatrix that the attestation
On February 18, 1959, Enrique Icasiano, a son of the testatrix, also clause is in a language also known to and spoken by the witnesses;
filed a manifestation adopting as his own Natividad's opposition to the that the will was executed on one single occasion in duplicate copies;
probate of the alleged will. and that both the original and the duplicate copies were duly
acknowledged before Notary Public Jose Oyengco of Manila on the
same date June 2, 1956.
On March 19, 1959, the petitioner proponent commenced the
introduction of his evidence; but on June 1, 1959, he filed a motion for
the admission of an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of
the decedent left a will executed in duplicate with all the legal the original, admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of one
requirements, and that he was, on that date, submitting the signed when he signed the same, but affirmed that page three (3) was signed
duplicate (Exhibit "A-1"), which he allegedly found only on or about in his presence.
May 26, 1959. On June 17, 1959, oppositors Natividad Icasiano de
Gomez and Enrique Icasiano filed their joint opposition to the Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect
admission of the amended and supplemental petition, but by order of that the signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate (Exhibit "A-1") are
July 20, 1959, the court admitted said petition, and on July 30, 1959, not genuine nor were they written or affixed on the same occasion as
oppositor Natividad Icasiano filed her amended opposition. Thereafter, the original, and further aver that granting that the documents were
the parties presented their respective evidence, and after several genuine, they were executed through mistake and with undue
hearings the court issued the order admitting the will and its duplicate influence and pressure because the testatrix was deceived into
to probate. From this order, the oppositors appealed directly to this adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of those who will
Court, the amount involved being over P200,000.00, on the ground stand to benefit from the provisions of the will, as may be inferred
that the same is contrary to law and the evidence. from the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the will
and the provisions and dispositions thereof, whereby proponents-
appellees stand to profit from properties held by them as attorneys-in-
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
fact of the deceased and not enumerated or mentioned therein, while witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the
oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to look for other properties not coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the
mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the probate of it, on penalty testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law
of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal. should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the
testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose
conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to
We have examined the record and are satisfied, as the trial court was,
guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is
that the testatrix signed both original and duplicate copies (Exhibits
sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and
"A" and "A-1", respectively) of the will spontaneously, on the same in
the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory
the presence of the three attesting witnesses, the notary public who
requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. vs. Murciano, 49 Off.
acknowledged the will; and Atty. Samson, who actually prepared the
Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision on reconsideration) "witnesses may
documents; that the will and its duplicate were executed in Tagalog, a
sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause".
language known to and spoken by both the testator and the witnesses,
and read to and by the testatrix and Atty. Fermin Samson, together
before they were actually signed; that the attestation clause is also in That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was
a language known to and spoken by the testatrix and the witnesses. entirely through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony as well
The opinion of expert for oppositors, Mr. Felipe Logan, that the as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of
signatures of the testatrix appearing in the duplicate original were not signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the
written by the same had which wrote the signatures in the original will acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no
leaves us unconvinced, not merely because it is directly contradicted one was aware of the defect at the time.
by expert Martin Ramos for the proponents, but principally because of
the paucity of the standards used by him to support the conclusion
This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict
that the differences between the standard and questioned signatures
and literal application of the statutory requirements, where the
are beyond the writer's range of normal scriptural variation. The expert
purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal
has, in fact, used as standards only three other signatures of the
tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only
testatrix besides those affixed to the original of the testament (Exh.
page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the left
A); and we feel that with so few standards the expert's opinion and
margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41
the signatures in the duplicate could not be those of the testatrix
Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for the correlative
becomes extremely hazardous. This is particularly so since the
lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to make the first page either
comparison charts Nos. 3 and 4 fail to show convincingly that the are
by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil.
radical differences that would justify the charge of forgery, taking into
429). These precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require
account the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her
satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud
signatures, and the effect of writing fatigue, the duplicate being signed
and bid faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the
right the original. These, factors were not discussed by the expert.
testamentary privilege.
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
FEDERICO AZAOLA, petitioner-appellant, presented by the proponent "did not prove sufficiently that the body of
vs. the will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix."
CESARIO SINGSON, oppositor-appellee.
The proponent appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to
REYES, J.B.L., J.: produce more than one witness because the will's authenticity was not
questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily require
the production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and
This appeal, taken on points of law from a decision rendered on 15
signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be denied
January 1958 by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City in its
by the adverse party.
Special Proceedings No. Q-2640, involves the determination of the
quantity of evidence required for the probate of a holographic will.
Article 811 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to the following effect:
The established facts are thus summarized in the decision appealed
from (Rec. App. pp. 22-24): ART. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be
necessary that at least one witness who knows the
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare
"Briefly speaking, the following facts were established by the
that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
petitioner; that on September 9, 1957, Fortunata S. Vda. de
testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such
Yance died at 13 Luskot, Quezon City, known to be the last
witnesses shall be required.
residence of said testatrix; that Francisco Azaola, petitioner
herein for probate of the holographic will, submitted the said
holographic will (Exh. C) whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was In the absence of any competent witnesses referred to in
made the sole heir as against the nephew of deceased the preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it
Cesario Singson; that witness Francisco Azaola testified that necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (691a).
he saw the holographic will (Exh. C) one month, more or
less, before the death of the testatrix, as the same was
We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will was
handed to him and his wife; that the witness testified also
not contested, he was not required to produce more than one witness;
that he recognized all the signatures appearing in the
but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we
holographic will (Exh. C) as the handwriting of the testatrix
are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code can not be
and to reinforce said statement, witness presented the
interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three
mortgage (Exh. E), the special power of the attorney (Exh.
witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of
F), and the general power of attorney (Exh. F-1), besides
having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at
the deeds of sale (Exhs. G and G-1) including an affidavit
the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art.
(Exh. G-2), and that there were further exhibited in court
810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness
two residence certificates (Exhs. H and H-1) to show the
possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of
signatures of the testatrix, for comparison purposes; that
the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing
said witness, Azaola, testified that the penmanship
any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the
appearing in the aforesaid documentary evidence is in the
handwriting and signature of the testator" and who can declare
handwriting of the testatrix as well as the signatures
(truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express) "that the
appearing in the aforesaid documentary evidence is in the
will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator". There
handwriting of the testatrix as well as the signatures
may be no available witness of the testator's hand; or even if so
appearing therein are the signatures of the testatrix; that
familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion.
said witness, in answer to a question of his counsel admitted
Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus
that the holographic will was handed to him by the testatrix.
become an impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the second
"apparently it must have been written by her" (t.s.n., p. 11).
paragraph of Article 811 prescribes that —
However, on page 16 on the same transcript of the
stenographic notes, when the same witness was asked by
counsel if he was familiar with the penmanship and in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the
handwriting of the deceased Fortunata Vda. de Yance, he preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary,
answered positively in the affirmative and when he was expert testimony may be resorted to.
asked again whether the penmanship referred to in the
previous answer as appearing in the holographic will (Exh. As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that no qualified
C) was hers (testatrix'), he answered, "I would definitely say witness may be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no
it is hers"; that it was also established in the proceedings competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the
that the assessed value of the property of the deceased in will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the
Luskot, Quezon City, is in the amount of P7,000.00. deficiency.
The opposition to the probate was on the ground that (1) the It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three
execution of the will was procured by undue and improper pressure witnesses be presented if the will is contested and only one if no
and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that contest is had) was derived from the rule established for ordinary
the testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, testaments (cf. Cabang vs. Delfinado, 45 Phil., 291; Tolentino vs.
and that the same was actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of Francisco, 57 Phil., 742). But it can not be ignored that the
August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the will. requirement can be considered mandatory only in the case of ordinary
testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their
Civil Code, the proponent must present three witnesses who could validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness need be
declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the present (Art. 10), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses
testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone witness must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.
105
Wills and Succession Case Digests
Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL
by the words "if the Court deem it necessary", which reveal that what RAMONAL, petitioners,
the law deems essential is that the Court should be convinced of the vs.
will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and
produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the ill is UEFEMIA PATIGAS, respondents.
genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On
the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those
PARDO, J.:
produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort
to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all
available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect. Court of Appeals1 and its resolution denying reconsideration, ruling:
Commenting on analogous provisions of Article 691 of the Spanish Civil Upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline
Code of 1889, the noted Commentator, Mucuis Scaevola (Vol. 12, 2nd Calugay and witness Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the
Ed., p.421), sagely remarks: authenticity of testators holographic will has been
established and the handwriting and signature therein
(exhibit S) are hers, enough to probate said will. Reversal of
La manera como esta concebida la redaccion del ultimo
the judgment appealed from and the probate of the
apartado de dicho precepto induce la conclusion de que
holographic will in question be called for. The rule is that
siempre o por lo menos, en la mayor parte de los casos, el
after plaintiff has completed presentation of his evidence
Juez debe acudir al criterio pericial para que le ilustre acerca
and the defendant files a motion for judgment on demurrer
de la autenticidad del testamento olografo, aunque ya esten
to evidence on the ground that upon the facts and the law
insertas en los autos del expediente las declaraciones
plaintiff has shown no right to relief, if the motion is granted
testificales. La prudencia con que el Juez debe de proceder
and the order to dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant
en resoluciones de transcendencia asi lo exige, y la indole
loses his right to present evidence in his behalf (Sec, 1 Rule
delicada y peligrosa del testamento olografo lo hace
35 Revised Rules of Court). Judgment may, therefore, be
necesario para mayor garantia de todos los interes
rendered for appellant in the instant case.
comprometidos en aquel.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is set aside, and Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing
the records ordered remanded to the Court of origin, with instructions on will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased
to hold a new trial in conformity with this opinion. But evidence was the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and
already on record shall not be retaken. No costs. the signature should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as
regularly done and not after every disposition. And assuming that the
holographic will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it was procured
FIRST DIVISION
by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiaries, or through fraud and trickery.1âwphi1.nêt
G.R. No. 123486 August 12, 1999
106
Wills and Succession Case Digests
Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary The fifth witness presented was Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee of
evidence. Petitioners instead of presenting their evidence, filed a the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region 10.
demurrer6 to evidence, claiming that respondents failed to establish She testified that she processed the application of the deceased for
sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of the holographic will pasture permit and was familiar with the signature of the deceased,
of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal. since the signed documents in her presence, when the latter was
applying for pasture permit.
On November 26, 1990, the lower Court issued an order, the
dispositive portion of which reads: Finally, Evangeline Calugay, one of the respondents, testified that she
had lived with the deceased since birth, and was in fact adopted by
the latter. That after a long period of time she became familiar with
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the
the signature of the deceased. She testified that the signature
Demurrer to Evidence having being well taken, same is
appearing in the holographic will is the true and genuine signature of
granted, and the petition for probate of the document
Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.
(Exhibit "S") on the purported Holographic Will of the late
Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, is denied for insufficiency of
evidence and lack of merits.7 The holographic will which was written in Visayan, is translated in
English as follows:
On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal,8 and in
support of their appeal, the respondents once again reiterated the Instruction
testimony of the following witnesses, namely: (1) Augusto Neri; (2)
Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde Ramonal Binanay; (4) Teresita Vedad; (5)
August 30, 1978
Fiscal Rodolfo Waga; and (6) Evangeline Calugay.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, testified that the deceased Matilde Seño 1. Eufemia Patigas
Vda. de Ramonal was her aunt, and that after the death of Matilde's
husband, the latter lived with her in her parent's house for eleven (11)
years from 1958 to 1969. During those eleven (11) years of close 2. Josefina Salcedo
association the deceased, she acquired familiarity with her signature
and handwriting as she used to accompany her (deceased Matilde 3. Evangeline Calugay
Seño Vda. de Ramonal) in collecting rentals from her various tenants
of commercial buildings, and deceased always issued receipts. In
addition to this, she (witness Matilde Binanay) assisted the deceased in (Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
posting the records of the accounts, and carried personal letters of the
deceased to her creditors. August 30, 1978
Matilde Ramonal Binanay further testified that at the time of the death 4. I bequeath my one (1) hectare land at Mandumol,
of Matilde Vda. de Ramonal, she left a holographic will dated August Indahag to Evangeline R. Calugay
30, 1978, which was personally and entirely written, dated and signed,
by the deceased and that all the dispositions therein, the dates, and
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
the signatures in said will, were that of the deceased.
107
Wills and Succession Case Digests
August 30, 1978 witness need be present (art. 10), and the rule requiring
production of three witnesses must be deemed merely
permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.
6. Bury me where my husband Justo is ever buried.
in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the Hence, this petition.
preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary,
expert testimony may be resorted to. The petitioners raise the following issues:
As can be see, the law foresees, the possibility that no (1) Whether or not the ruling of the case of Azaola
qualified witness ma be found (or what amounts to the same vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102, relied upon by the respondent
thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to Court of Appeals, was applicable to the case.
the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert
evidence to supply the deficiency.
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that private respondents had been able to present credible
It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that evidence to that the date, text, and signature on the
three witnesses be presented if the will is contested and only holographic will written entirely in the hand of the testatrix.
one if no contest is had) was derived from the rule
established for ordinary testaments (CF Cabang vs.
Delfianado, 45 PHIL 291; Tolentino v. Francisco, 57 PHIL (3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not
742). But it can not be ignored that the requirement can be analyzing the signatures in the holographic will of Matilde
considered mandatory only in case of ordinary testaments, Seño Vda. de Ramonal.
precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at
the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article
their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no 811 of the Civil Code are permissive or mandatory. The article
108
Wills and Succession Case Digests
provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic Q. Showing to you the receipt dated 23 October 1979, is
will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in this the one you are referring to as one of the receipts which
the will is the genuine signature of the testator.1âwphi1.nêt she issued to them?
We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the A. Yes, sir.
Civil Code is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order.
We have ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an
Q. Now there is that signature of Matilde vda. De Ramonal,
imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and
whose signature is that Mrs. Binanay?
that the presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is
mandatory.11
A. Matilde vda. De Ramonal.
Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an
evil or mischief that aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to Q. Why do you say that is the signature of Matilde Vda. De
achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to Ramonal?
be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for
their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator. A. I am familiar with her signature.
So, we believe that the paramount consideration in the present Q. Now, you tell the court Mrs. Binanay, whether you know
petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased. An exhaustive Matilde vda de Ramonal kept records of the accounts of her
and objective consideration of the evidence is imperative to establish tenants?
the true intent of the testator.
A. Yes, sir.
It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the
respondents testified explicitly that they were familiar with the
handwriting of testator. In the case of Augusto Neri, clerk of court, Q. Why do you say so?
Court of First Instance, Misamis Oriental, he merely identified the
record of Special Proceedings No. 427 before said court. He was not A. Because we sometimes post a record of accounts in
presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the behalf of Matilde Vda. De Ramonal.
holographic was that of the deceased.
109
Wills and Succession Case Digests
A. Yes, sir. Q. Advice of what?
Q. Showing to you this exhibit "S", there is that A. About the will.18
handwritten "tugon", whose handwriting is this?
In her testimony it was also evident that Ms. Binanay kept the fact
A. My Aunt. about the will from petitioners, the legally adopted children of the
deceased. Such actions put in issue her motive of keeping the will a
secret to petitioners and revealing it only after the death of Matilde
Q. Why do you say this is the handwriting of your aunt?
Seño Vda. de Ramonal.
What Ms. Binanay saw were pre-prepared receipts and letters of the
Q. Now, in 1978 Matilde Seno Vda de Ramonal was not yet
deceased, which she either mailed or gave to her tenants. She did not
a sickly person is that correct?
declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note.
A. Yes, sir.
Further, during the cross-examination, the counsel for petitioners
elicited the fact that the will was not found in the personal belongings
of the deceased but was in the possession of Ms. Binanay. She Q. She was up and about and was still uprightly and she
testified that: could walk agilely and she could go to her building to collect
rentals, is that correct?
Q. Mrs. Binanay, when you were asked by counsel for the
petitioners if the late Matilde Seno vda de Ramonal left a will A. Yes, sir.19
you said, yes?
xxx xxx xxx
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, let us go to the third signature of Matilde
Q. Who was in possession of that will? Ramonal. Do you know that there are retracings in the word
Vda.?
A. I.
A. Yes, a little. The letter L is continuous.
Q. Since when did you have the possession of the will?
Q. And also in Matilde the letter L is continued to letter D?
A. It was in my mother's possession.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, it was not in your possession?
Q. Again the third signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal the
letter L in Matilde is continued towards letter D.
A. Sorry, yes.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when did you come into possession since as you
said this was originally in the possession of your mother?
Q. And there is a retracing in the word Vda.?
A. 1985.17
A. Yes, sir.20
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now, Mrs. Binanay was there any particular reason why
your mother left that will to you and therefore you have that Q. Now, that was 1979, remember one year after the
in your possession? alleged holographic will. Now, you identified a document
marked as Exhibit R. This is dated January 8, 1978 which is
only about eight months from August 30, 1978. Do you
A. It was not given to me by my mother, I took that in the
notice that the signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal is
aparador when she died.
beautifully written and legible?
Q. How did you know that she was exhausted when you Q. Why do you say that is her signature?
were not present and you just tried to explain yourself out
because of the apparent inconsistencies?
A. I am familiar with her signature.23
111
Wills and Succession Case Digests
A. This one here that is the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda Q. So you are not definite that this is the signature of
de Ramonal.27 Matilde vda de Ramonal. You are merely supposing that it
seems to be her signature because it is similar to the
signature of the project of partition which you have made?
xxx xxx xxx
A. That is true.30
Q. Aside from attending as counsel in that Special
Proceeding Case No. 427 what were the other assistance
wherein you were rendering professional service to the From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed
deceased Matilde Vda de Ramonal? the will to probate and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in
case of contested holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola
vs. Singson,31ruling that the requirement is merely directory and not
A. I can not remember if I have assisted her in other
mandatory.
matters but if there are documents to show that I have
assisted then I can recall.28
In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals,32 we said that "the object of
the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
xxx xxx xxx
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the
Q. Now, I am showing to you exhibit S which is titled laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
"tugon", kindly go over this document, Fiscal Waga and tell these primordial ends. But on the other hand, also one must not lose
the court whether you are familiar with the handwriting sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and
contained in that document marked as exhibit "S"? curtail the exercise of the right to make a will.
A. I am not familiar with the handwriting. However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being
adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will
Q. This one, Matilde Vda de Ramonal, whose signature is is contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will
this? was in the handwriting of the deceased.
A. I think this signature here it seems to be the signature The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but
of Mrs. Matilde vda de Ramonal. with one of the respondents, who kept it even before the death of the
deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will
was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years before the death
Q. Now, in item No. 2 there is that signature here of of the deceased.
Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can you tell the court whose
signature is this?
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and
the handwriting of the deceased with other documents signed and
A. Well, that is similar to that signature appearing in the executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison
project of partition. was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of
petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which
Q. Also in item no. 3 there is that signature Matilde Vda de contained the signature of the deceased with that of the holographic
Ramonal, can you tell the court whose signature is that? will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer of the
deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in
the holographic will.
A. As I said, this signature also seems to be the signature
of Matilde vda de Ramonal.
A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the
strokes are different when compared with other documents written by
Q. Why do you say that? the testator. The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is
not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on
A. Because there is a similarity in the way it is being the will.
written.
Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30,
Q. How about this signature in item no. 4, can you tell the 1978,33 and the signatures in several documents such as the
court whose signature is this? application letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980,34 and a
letter dated June 16, 1978,35 the strokes are different. In the letters,
there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no
A. The same is true with the signature in item no. 4. It hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. We, therefore,
seems that they are similar.29 cannot be certain that ruling holographic will was in the handwriting by
the deceased.
xxx xxx xxx
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The
Q. Mr. Prosecutor, I heard you when you said that the records are ordered remanded to the court of origin with instructions
signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal Appearing in exhibit S to allow petitioners to adduce evidence in support of their opposition
seems to be the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal? to the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño
vda. de Ramonal.1âwphi1.nêt
A. Yes, it is similar to the project of partition.
No costs.
112
Wills and Succession Case Digests
SO ORDERED. improvement of the schools and colleges founded
by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and
FIRST DIVISION
(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be
proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
wills.
On November 13, 1978, following the III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
consolidation of the cases, the appellees moved APPELLANT'S WILL.
again to dismiss the petition for the probate of the
will. They argued that:
The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or
cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy.
(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is
merely an instruction as to the management and the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been
proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at
113
Wills and Succession Case Digests
least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, to Maria Jocson, by whom he had seven children, including Adelaido.
experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying Jose Rivera had no claim to this estate because the decedent was not
witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost his father. The holographic wills were also admitted to probate. 3
or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be
probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the then
testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison
Intermediate Appellate Court. 4 Its decision is now the subject of this
between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the
petition, which urges the reversal of the respondent court.
handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the
holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made
with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, In support of his claim that he was the sole heir of the late Venancio
104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of Rivera, Jose sought to show that the said person was married in 1928
a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare to Maria Vital, who was his mother. He submitted for this purpose
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will Exhibit A, the marriage certificate of the couple, and Exhibit B, his own
itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law baptismal certificate where the couple was indicated as his parents.
regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in The petitioner also presented Domingo Santos, who testified that Jose
Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by was indeed the son of the couple and that he saw Venancio and Jose
a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon together several times. 5 Jose himself stressed that Adelaido
copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of considered him a half-brother and kissed his hand as a sign of respect
the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before whenever they met. He insisted that Adelaido and his brothers and
the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost sisters were illegitimate children, sired by Venancio with Maria
or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the Jocson. 6
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by
the probate court. Adelaido, for his part, maintained that he and his brothers and sisters
were born to Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson, who were legally
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, married and lived as such for many years. He explained that he could
denying appellant's motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, not present his parents' marriage certificate because the record of
of the Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to approve marriages for 1942 in Mabalacat were destroyed when the town was
the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE. burned during the war, as certified by Exhibit 6. 7 He also submitted
his own birth certificate and those of his sisters Zenaida and Yolanda
Rivera, who were each described therein as the legimitate children of
SO ORDERED.
Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson. 8 Atty. Regalado P. Morales, then
71 years of age, affirmed that he knew the deceased and his parents,
FIRST DIVISION Magno Rivera and Gertrudes de los Reyes, and it was during the
Japanese occupation that Venancio introduced to him Maria Jocson as
his wife. 9 To prove that there were in fact two persons by the same
G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February 15, 1990
name of Venancio Rivera, Adelaido offered Venancio Rivera's baptismal
certificate showing that his parents were Magno Rivera and Gertrudes
JOSE RIVERA petitioner, de los Reyes, 10 as contrasted with the marriage certificate submitted
vs. by Jose, which indicated that the Venancio Rivera subject thereof was
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO J. the son of Florencio Rivera and Estrudez Reyes. 11 He also denied
RIVERA, respondents. kissing Jose's hand or recognizing him as a brother. 12
Was there only one Venancio Rivera in Mabalacat, Pampanga, or were It is true that Adelaido could not present his parents' marriage
there two? certificate because, as he explained it, the marriage records for 1942
in the Mabalacat civil registry were burned during the war. Even so, he
On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town could still rely on the presumption of marriage, since it is not denied
named Venancio Rivera died. On July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming that Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson lived together as husband and
to be the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition wife for many years, begetting seven children in all during that time.
for the issuance of letters of administration over Venancio's estate.
Docketed as SP No. 1076, this petition was opposed by Adelaido J. According to Article 220 of the Civil Code:
Rivera, who denied that Jose was the son of the decedent. Adelaido
averred that Venancio was his father and did not die intestate but in
In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the
fact left two holographic wills. 1
solidarity of the family. Thus every intendment of
the law or fact leans toward the validity of
On November 7, 1975, Adelaido J. Rivera filed, also with the Regional marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
Trial Court of Angeles City, a petition for the probate of the bonds, the legitimacy of children, ... .
holographic wills. Docketed as SP No. 1091, this petition was in turn
opposed by Jose Rivera, who reiterated that he was the sole heir of
The Rules of Court, in Rule 131, provides:
Venancio's intestate estate. 2
SO ORDERED.
In the name of God, Amen.
ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only
be given effect and probated so that she could be the sole heir one substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the
thereunder. original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the
requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the
effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple
After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an Order, dated reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain
September 3, 197 3, reading in part: valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is
to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that
The document Exhibit "C" was submitted to the change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to
National Bureau of Investigation for examination. authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full
The NBI reported that the handwriting, the signature,
signature, the insertions and/or additions and the
initial were made by one and the same person. The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions,
Consequently, Exhibit "C" was the handwriting of cancellations, erasures or alterations in a holographic Will, which affect
the decedent, Natividad K. Kalaw. The only only the efficacy of the altered words themselves but not the essence
question is whether the win, Exhibit 'C', should be and validity of the Will itself. As it is, with the erasures, cancellations
admitted to probate although the alterations and alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real intention cannot
and/or insertions or additions above-mentioned be determined with certitude. As Manresa had stated in his
were not authenticated by the full signature of the commentary on Article 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, whence Article
testatrix pursuant to Art. 814 of the Civil Code. 814 of the new Civil Code was derived:
The petitioner contends that the oppositors are
estopped to assert the provision of Art. 814 on the
ground that they themselves agreed thru their ... No infringe lo dispuesto en este articulo del
counsel to submit the Document to the NBI FOR Codigo (el 688) la sentencia que no declara la
EXAMINATIONS. This is untenable. The parties did nulidad de un testamento olografo que contenga
not agree, nor was it impliedly understood, that palabras tachadas, enmendadas o entre renglones
the oppositors would be in estoppel. no salvadas por el testador bajo su firnia segun
previene el parrafo tercero del mismo, porque, en
realidad, tal omision solo puede afectar a la
The Court finds, therefore, that the provision of validez o eficacia de tales palabras, y nunca al
Article 814 of the Civil Code is applicable to Exhibit testamento mismo, ya por estar esa disposicion en
"C". Finding the insertions, alterations and/or parrafo aparte de aquel que determine las
additions in Exhibit "C" not to be authenticated by condiciones necesarias para la validez del
the full signature of the testatrix Natividad K. testamento olografo, ya porque, de admitir lo
Kalaw, the Court will deny the admission to contrario, se Ilegaria al absurdo de que pequefias
probate of Exhibit "C". enmiendas no salvadas, que en nada afectasen a
la parte esencial y respectiva del testamento,
116
Wills and Succession Case Digests
vinieran a anular este, y ya porque el precepto On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for
contenido en dicho parrafo ha de entenderse en allowance of decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time
perfecta armonia y congruencia con el art. 26 de of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting
la ley del Notariado que declara nulas las adiciones under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect
apostillas entrerrenglonados, raspaduras y capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
tachados en las escrituras matrices, siempre que
no se salven en la forma prevenida, paro no el
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither
documento que las contenga, y con mayor
the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's
motivo cuando las palabras enmendadas,
handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not
tachadas, o entrerrenglonadas no tengan
duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners
importancia ni susciten duda alguna acerca del
through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was
pensamiento del testador, o constituyan meros
likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the
accidentes de ortografia o de purez escrituraria,
will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He
sin trascendencia alguna(l).
claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its
entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
Mas para que sea aplicable la doctrina de
excepcion contenida en este ultimo fallo, es
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the
preciso que las tachaduras, enmiendas o
decedent's holographic will to probate. It found, inter alia:
entrerrenglonados sin salvar saan de pala bras
que no afecter4 alteren ni uarien de modo
substancial la express voluntad del testador Considering then that the probate proceedings
manifiesta en el documento. Asi lo advierte la herein must decide only the question of identity of
sentencia de 29 de Noviembre de 1916, que the will, its due execution and the testamentary
declara nulo un testamento olografo por no estar capacity of the testatrix, this probate court finds
salvada por el testador la enmienda del guarismo no reason at all for the disallowance of the will for
ultimo del año en que fue extendido 3 (Emphasis its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed
ours). by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the
testatrix.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and the Decision of
respondent Judge, dated September 3, 1973, is hereby affirmed in For one, no evidence was presented to show that
toto. No costs. the will in question is different from the will
actually executed by the testatrix. The only
objections raised by the oppositors . . . are that
SO ORDERED.
the will was not written in the handwriting of the
testatrix which properly refers to the question of
SECOND DIVISION its due execution, and not to the question of
identity of will. No other will was alleged to have
been executed by the testatrix other than the will
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
herein presented. Hence, in the light of the
evidence adduced, the identity of the will
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners, presented for probate must be accepted, i.e., the
vs. will submitted in Court must be deemed to be the
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents. will actually executed by the testatrix.
This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of While the fact that it was entirely written, dated
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has
dispositive portion of which reads; been disputed, the petitioners, however, have
satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision will in question was indeed written entirely, dated
of November 19, 1988 of the trial court is hereby and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix.
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the petition for Three (3) witnesses who have convincingly shown
probate is hereby DISMISSED. No costs. knowledge of the handwriting of the testatrix have
been presented and have explicitly and
categorically identified the handwriting with which
The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon the holographic will in question was written to be
City, Branch 94, 2 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, and the the genuine handwriting and signature of the
instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of testatrix. Given then the aforesaid evidence, the
the late Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982. requirement of the law that the holographic will be
entirely written, dated and signed in the
In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners handwriting of the testatrix has been complied
Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam with.
S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand,
and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children. xxx xxx xxx
117
Wills and Succession Case Digests
As to the question of the testamentary capacity of that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New
the testratix, (private respondent) Clemente Sand Civil Code, which read, as follows:
himself has testified in Court that the testatrix was
completely in her sound mind when he visited her
Art. 813: When a number of dispositions
during her birthday celebration in 1981, at or
appearing in a holographic will are signed without
around which time the holographic will in question
being dated, and the last disposition has a
was executed by the testatrix. To be of sound
signature and date, such date validates the
mind, it is sufficient that the testatrix, at the time
dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of
of making the will, knew the value of the estate to
prior dispositions.
be disposed of, the proper object of her bounty,
and thecharacter of the testamentary act . . . The
will itself shows that the testatrix even had Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure
detailed knowledge of the nature of her estate. or alteration in a holographic will, the testator
She even identified the lot number and square must authenticate the same by his full signature.
meters of the lots she had conveyed by will. The
objects of her bounty were likewise identified It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned
explicitly. And considering that she had even and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures,
written a nursing book which contained the law alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated
and jurisprudence on will and succession, there is by decedent.
more than sufficient showing that she knows the
character of the testamentary act.
Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.
In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its
due execution and the testamentary capacity of Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be
the testatrix has to be resolved in favor of the disallowed in any of the following cases:
allowance of probate of the will submitted herein.
(a) If not executed and attested as required by
Likewise, no evidence was presented to show law;
sufficient reason for the disallowance of herein
holographic will. While it was alleged that the said (b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise
will was procured by undue and improper pressure mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of
and influence on the part of the beneficiary or of its execution;
some other person, the evidence adduced have
not shown any instance where improper pressure
or influence was exerted on the testatrix. (Private (c) If it was executed under duress, or the
respondent) Clemente Sand has testified that the influence of fear, or threats;
testatrix was still alert at the time of the execution
of the will, i.e., at or around the time of her birth (d) If it was procured by undue and improper
anniversary celebration in 1981. It was also pressure and influence, on the part of the
established that she is a very intelligent person beneficiary, or of some other person for his
and has a mind of her own. Her independence of benefit;
character and to some extent, her sense of
superiority, which has been testified to in Court,
all show the unlikelihood of her being unduly (e) If the signature of the testator was procured
influenced or improperly pressured to make the by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the
aforesaid will. It must be noted that the undue instrument should be his will at the time of fixing
influence or improper pressure in question herein his signature thereto.
only refer to the making of a will and not as to the
specific testamentary provisions therein which is In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:
the proper subject of another proceeding. Hence,
under the circumstances, this Court cannot find
Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the
convincing reason for the disallowance of the will
following cases;
herein.
118
Wills and Succession Case Digests
(4) If it was procured by Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (Emphasis
undue and improper pressure supplied.)
and influence, on the part of
the beneficiary or of some
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in
other person;
the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably
handwritten by the testator.
(5) If the signature of the
testator was procured by
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its
fraud;
requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the
holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and
(6) If the testator acted by date some of the dispositions, the result is that these
mistake or did not intend that dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not
the instrument he signed render the whole testament void.
should be his will at the time
of affixing his signature
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate,
thereto.
notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In
the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a held:
will. 5 Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the
only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures,
is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will
corrections, and interlineations made by the
was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3)
testator in a holographic Will have not been noted
whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the
under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby
time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will
invalidated as a whole, but at most only as
and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. 6
respects the particular words erased, corrected or
interlined. Manresa gave an identical commentary
In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will when he said "la omission de la salvedad no anula
of Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with the formalities el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia
prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de
Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate 1985." 8 (Citations omitted.)
of said will. This is erroneous.
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or
We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on
(1919), that: testator's signature, 9 their presence does not invalidate the will
itself. 10 The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of
such changes.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of
testaments and to guaranty their truth and changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions
authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the
should be interpreted in such a way as to attain necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article
these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, 810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the
also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering
not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the holographic wills are taken. They read as follows:
exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends,
Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the
any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds
testator writes it himself in the form and with the
nothing but demands more requisites entirely
requisites required in Article 688.
unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the
testator's last will, must be disregarded.
Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only
by persons of full age.
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal
solemnities include the subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment
requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code. In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on
stamped paper corresponding to the year of its
execution, written in its entirety by the testator
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures
and signed by him, and must contain a statement
authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or
of the year, month and day of its execution.
handwritten by the testator himself, 7 as provided under Article 810 of
the New Civil Code, thus:
If it should contain any erased, corrected, or
interlined words, the testator must identify them
A person may execute a holographic will which
over his signature.
must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the
hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no
other form, and may be made in or out of the Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their
own language.
119
Wills and Succession Case Digests
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that It appears that on August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a
only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code — and not will (exhibit A), apparently with all the formalities of the law, wherein
those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code — are essential he made the following bequests: To his stepdaughter Candida
to the probate of a holographic will. Guevara, a pair of earrings worth P150 and a gold chain worth P40; to
his son Ernesto M. Guevara, a gold ring worth P180 and all the
furniture, pictures, statues, and other religious objects found in the
The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not
residence of the testator in Poblacion Sur, Bayambang, Pangasinan; "a
validly dispose of the house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del
mi hija Rosario Guevara," a pair of earrings worth P120; to his stepson
Norte, in its entirety. This is correct and must be affirmed.
Piuo Guevara, a ring worth P120; and to his wife by second marriage,
Angustia Posadas, various pieces of jewelry worth P1,020.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass
only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated.
He also made the following devises: "A mis hijos Rosario Guevara y
However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do
Ernesto M. Guevara y a mis hijastros, Vivencio, Eduviges, Dionisia,
what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain
Candida y Pio, apellidados Guevara," a residential lot with its
provisions of the will. 11 In the case at bench, decedent herself
improvements situate in the town of Bayambang, Pangasinan, having
indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property
an area of 960 square meters and assessed at P540; to his wife
is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr.
Angustia Posadas he confirmed the donation propter
Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the same in its entirety).
nuptias theretofore made by him to her of a portion of 25 hectares of
Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot validly dispose
the large parcel of land of 259-odd hectares described in plan Psu-
of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.
66618. He also devised to her a portion of 5 hectares of the same
parcel of land by way of complete settlement of her usufructurary
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of right.1awphil.net
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of
He set aside 100 hectares of the same parcel of land to be disposed of
the disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del
either by him during his lifetime or by his attorney-in-fact Ernesto M.
Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
Guevara in order to pay all his pending debts and to degray his
94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to
expenses and those of his family us to the time of his death.
probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby
REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran
property. No costs. The remainder of said parcel of land his disposed of in the following
manner:
SO ORDERED.
(d). — Toda la porcion restante de mi terreno arriba
descrito, de la extension superficial aproximada de ciento
Ventura vs. Ventura – cannot be located in the internet. Go to
veintinueve (129) hectareas setenta (70) areas, y veiticinco
Philippine Reports because this is an Unreported Case.
(25) centiares, con todas sus mejoras existentes en la
misma, dejo y distribuyo, pro-indiviso, a mis siguientes
EN BANC herederos como sigue:
G.R. No. L-48840 December 29, 1943 A mi hijo legitimo, Ernesto M. Guevara, ciento ocho (108)
hectareas, ocho (8) areas y cincuenta y cuatro (54)
ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, petitioner-appellant, centiareas, hacia la parte que colinda al Oeste de las cien
vs. (100) hectareas referidas en el inciso (a) de este parrafo del
ROSARIO GUEVARA and her husband PEDRO testamento, como su propiedad absoluta y exclusiva, en la
BUISON, respondent-appellees. cual extension superficial estan incluidas cuarenta y tres (43)
hectareas, veintitres (23) areas y cuarenta y dos (42)
centiareas que le doy en concepto de mejora.
Primacias, Abad, Mencias & Castillo for appellant.
Pedro C. Quinto for appellees.
A mi hija natural reconocida, Rosario Guevara, veintiun (21)
hectareas, sesenta y un (61) areas y setenta y un (71)
centiareas, que es la parte restante.
Let us look into the validity of these considerations. Section 1 of Rule In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other
74 provides as follows: than the present litigants had received their respective legacies or that
they had knowledge of the existence and of the provisions of the will.
Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between
be obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of
heirs. — If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and
the will to present it to the court for probate.
legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by
their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing
letters of administration, divide the estate among Even if the decedent left no debts and nobdy raises any question as to
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument the authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may
filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with that will without
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If first securing its allowance or probate by the court, first, because the
there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to law expressly provides that "no will shall pass either real or personal
himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court"; and,
office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem,
decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters cannot be dispensed with the substituted by any other proceeding,
of administration within two years after the death of the judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy
decedent. designed to effectuate the testator's right to dispose of his property by
will in accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and
legatees under the will thru the means provided by law, among which
That is a modification of section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said
which reads as follows:
heirs and legatees. Nor may the court approve and allow the will
presented in evidence in such an action for partition, which is one
Sec. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal in personam, any more than it could decree the registration under the
Proceedings. — Whenever all the heirs of a person who died Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action
intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity and there are for reinvindicacion or partition.
no debts due from the estate, or all the debts have been
paid the heirs may, by agreement duly executed in writing
We therefore believe and so hold that section 1 of Rule 74, relied upon
by all of them, and not otherwise, apportion and divide the
by the Court of Appeals, does not sanction the procedure adopted by
estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without
the respondent.
proceedings in court.
The case of Leaño vs. Leaño (25 Phil., 180), cited by the Court of
The implication is that by the omission of the word "intestate" and the
Appeals, like section 1 of Rule 74, sanctions the extrajudicial partition
use of the word "legatees" in section 1 of Rule 74, a summary
by the heirs of the properties left by a decedent, but not the
extrajudicial settlement of a deceased person's estate, whether he died
nonpresentation of a will for probate. In that case one Paulina Ver
testate or intestate, may be made under the conditions specified. Even
executed a will on October 11, 1902, and died on November 1, 1902.
if we give retroactive effect to section 1 of Rule 74 and apply it here,
Her will was presented for probate on November 10, 1902, and was
as the Court of Appeals did, we do not believe it sanctions the
approved and allowed by the Court on August 16, 1904. In the
nonpresentation of a will for probate and much less the nullification of
meantime, and on November 10, 1902, the heirs went ahead and
such will thru the failure of its custodian to present it to the court for
divided the properties among themselves and some of them
probate; for such a result is precisely what Rule 76 sedulously provides
subsequently sold and disposed of their shares to third persons. It
against. Section 1 of Rule 74 merely authorizes the extrajudicial or
does not affirmatively appear in the decision in that case that the
judicial partition of the estate of a decedent "without securing letter of
partition made by the heirs was not in accordance with the will or that
administration." It does not say that in case the decedent left a will the
they in any way disregarded the will. In closing the case by its order
heirs and legatees may divide the estate among themselves without
dated September 1, 1911, the trial court validated the partition, and
the necessity of presenting the will to the court for probate. The
one of the heirs, Cunegunda Leaño, appealed. In deciding the appeal
petition to probate a will and the petition to issue letters of
this Court said:
administration are two different things, altho both may be made in the
same case. the allowance of a will precedes the issuance of letters
testamentary or of administration (section 4, Rule 78). One can have a The principal assignment of error is that the lower court
will probated without necessarily securing letters testamentary or of committed an error in deciding that the heirs and legatees of
administration. We hold that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to
122
Wills and Succession Case Digests
the estate of Dña. Paulina Ver had voluntarily divided the plaintiff to nullify said will by not presenting it to the court for probate
estate among themselves. should be sanctioned. As to the inconvenience, delay, and expense,
the plaintiff herself is to blame because she was the custodian of the
will and she violated the duty imposed upon her by sections 2, 4, and
In resolving that question this Court said:
5 of Rule 76, which command her to deliver said will to the court on
pain of a fine not exceeding P2,000 and of imprisonment for contempt
In view of the positive finding of the judge of the lower court of court. As for the defendant, he is not complaining of inconvenience,
that there had been a voluntary partition of the estate delay, and expense, but on the contrary he is insisting that the
among the heirs and legatees, and in the absence of positive procedure prescribed by law be followed by the plaintiff.
proof to the contrary, we must conclude that the lower court
had some evidence to support its conclusion.
Our conclusion is that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the
action instituted by the plaintiff to be in accordance with law. It also
Thus it will be seen that as a matter of fact no question of law was erred in awarding relief to the plaintiff in this action on the basis of
raised and decided in that case. That decision cannot be relied upon as intestacy of the decedent notwithstanding the proven existence of a
an authority for the unprecedented and unheard of procedure adopted will left by him and solely because said will has not been probated due
by the respondent whereby she seeks to prove her status as an to the failure of the plaintiff as custodian thereof to comply with the
acknowledged natural child of the decedent by his will and attempts to duty imposed upon her by the law.
nullify and circumvent the testamentary dispositions made by him by
not presenting the will to the court for probate and by claiming her
It is apparent that the defendant Ernesto M. Guevara, who was named
legitime as an acknowledged natural child on the basis of intestacy;
executor in said will, did not take any step to have it presented to the
and that in the face of express mandatory provisions of the law
court for probate and did not signify his acceptance of the trust or
requiring her to present the will to the court for probate.
refusal to accept it as required by section 3 of Rule 76 (formerly
section 627 of the Code of Civil Procedure), because his contention is
In the subsequent case of Riosa vs. Rocha (1926), 48 Phil. 737, this that said will, insofar as the large parcel of land in litigation is
Court departed from the procedure sanctioned by the trial court and concerned, has been superseded by the deed of sale exhibit 2 and by
impliedly approved by this Court in the Leaño case, by holding that an the subsequent issuance of the Torrens certificate of title in his favor.
extrajudicial partition is not proper in testate succession. In the Riosa
case the Court, speaking thru Chief Justice Avanceña, held:
II
RULING: Yes
Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of
wills are very strictly construed
Attorney Almario did not sign for the testatrix. She signed for placing
her thumb mark on each and every page thereof. "A statute requiring
a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by the As stated in 40 Cyc., at page 1097, "A will must be executed in
testator's mark." It is clear, therefore, that it was not necessary that accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely
the attestation clause in question should state that the testatrix void. All these requirements stand as of equal importance and must be
requested Attorney Almario to sign her name inasmuch as the observed, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of a will.
testratrix signed the will in question in accordance with law. No power or discretion is vested in them, either to superadd other
conditions or dispense with those enumerated in the statues."
125
Wills and Succession Case Digests
This court has also frequently held that a will should not be probated The purpose of the new requirement that it must appear in the
unless in its execution there has been a strict compliance with all the attestation clause that the testator and the witnesses signed in the
requisites prescribed in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. presence of each other and that the fact cannot be proved by evidence
aliunde is, perhaps, less obvious, but, in view of the well-known
unreliability of oral evidence, it is clear that a statement in the
in the case of Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476) the court upheld
attestation clause will afford more satisfactory evidence of the fact to
the validity of a will consisting of only two pages, the first containing
be proven.
all the testamentary dispositions and being signed by the testator at
the bottom and by both the testator and the witnesses in the margin,
the second page containing only the attestation clause with the Sano v Quintana
signatures of the witnesses at the bottom but without marginal G.R. No. L-24556 December 18, 1925
signatures.
FACTS:
The decision was based on the ground that it could not have been the The judgment appealed from allowed the probate of the will of the
intention of the legislator to require, as an essential to the validity of deceased Victoria Quintana executed on March 22, 1924. Without
the will, that all the signatures appear twice on the same page as such going into discussion of the points raised by the parties as to the
a requirement would be entirely purposeless. This decision is no doubt formalities of this will we find a sufficient reason for reversing the
sound. judgment appealed from and denying the probate thereof.
in construing statutory provisions in regard to the formal requisites of In the attestation clause there is no statement that the witnesses to
a will, we are seeking to ascertain the intent of the legislator and not the will have signed on the left margin of each page of the will in the
that of the testator; the latter's intention is frequently defeated presence of the testatrix.
through non-observance of the statute.
ISSUE: WON absence of such statement nullifies the will YES
The purpose of the Legislature in prescribing the rather strict
formalities now required in the execution of a will are clearly revealed
HELD:
by comparing section 618, supra, as originally enacted with the
Section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2645, provides
amended section quoted above.
that he attestation clause shall state the fact that the testator signed
the will and all the pages thereof, or caused another persons to place
The amendments or changes introduced by Act No. 2645 are: his name thereon at his expressed direction in the presence of the
three witnesses to the will, and that the latter signed the will and all its
pages in the presence of the testator and of each other.
(a) that the will must now be executed in a language or dialect known
to the testator;
In the case of Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca (43 Phil., 405), this court
has held that the requirement that the attestation clause must contain
(b) that the testator and witnesses must sign each page on the left
the statement that the witnesses signed in the presence of each other
margin;
is imperative and non-comfort in said case in support of this doctrine
may be adduced for holding that the will is also null and void when in
(c) that the pages be numbered correlatively; the attestation clause it does not appear that the witnesses to the will
signed it and every page thereof on the left margin and in the
(d) that the attestation clause shall state the number of sheets or presence of the testatrix. In order to insure the authenticity of a will,
pages used in the will and which is the object of the law, it is just as important, if not the most
important, that the witnesses should sign in the presence of the
testator and of each other.
(e) that it must appear from the attestation clause it self that the
testator and witnesses signed in the form and manner required by law
and that this can no longer be proven by evidence aliunde. The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the probate of the will of
Victoria Quintana is denied
The changes mentioned under (d) and (e) are the only ones which
need be considered in the present case. Gumban v Gorecho
March 3, 1927
In re will of Eustaquio Hagoriles. PETRONILO GUMBAN,
The purpose of requiring the number of sheets to be stated in the v.INOCENCIA GORECHO, ET AL.
attestation clause is obvious; the document might easily be so
prepared that the removal of a sheet would completely change the
testamentary dispositions of the will and in the absence of a statement This is an appeal by the widow, Inocencia Gorecho, from an order of
of the total number of sheets such removal might be effected by the CFI of Iloilo probating the last will and testament of the deceased
taking out the sheet and changing the numbers at the top of the Hagoriles. The widow said that the alleged will was not prepared in
following sheets or pages. conformity with the law as it did not contain an attestation clause
stating that the testator and the witnesses signed all the pages of the
will. She cited the case of Saño vs. Quintana. The defendant cited the
If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets is stated in the case of Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar.
attestation clause the falsification of the document will involve the
inserting of new pages and the forging of the signatures of the testator
and witnesses in the margin, a matter attended with much greater ISSUE: WON an attestation clause which does not recite that the
difficulty. testator and the witnesses signed all the pages of the will is defective.
YES, based on Saño v. Quintana. The SC adopted and reaffirmed the
decision in the case of Saño vs. Quintana and modified Nayve vs. Mojal
and Aguilar.
126
Wills and Succession Case Digests
In the case of Saño vs. Quintana, it was decided that an attestation 2645, in two ways: First, it fails to state that each and every page of
clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed the will and the will was signed by the testators and the witnesses; and, second, it
each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the fails to state that the witnesses signed each and every page of the will
testator is defective, and such a defect annuls the will. In contrast, is in the presence of the testators.
the decision in Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, wherein it was held that
the attestation clause must state the fact that the testator and the
In the case of Saño vs. Quintana (48 Phil., 506) this court held that
witnesses reciprocally saw the signing of the will, for such an act
"an attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed
cannot be proved by the mere exhibition of the will, if it is not stated
the will and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the
therein. It was also held that the fact that the testator and the
presence of the testator is defective, and such defect annuls the will."
witnesses signed each and every page of the will can be proved also
by the mere examination of the signatures appearing on the document
itself, and the omission to state such evident fact does not invalidate The defect was not cured by oral evidence unopposed by the adverse
the will. party. The doctrine with reference to statute of frauds is not applicable
to wills. The statue of frauds relates to contracts and agreements. The
subject of will and testaments and the formalities surrounding their
In this case, the SC reaffirmed the decision in Saño v Quintana for the
execution are governed by separate and specific provisions of Act No.
following reasons:
190.
In the first place, the Mojal decision was concurred in by only four
An examination of section 618 of Act No. 190, prior to, and after its
members of the court, less than a majority, with two strong dissenting
amendment by Act No. 2645, shows clearly that the Legislature
opinions; the Quintana decisions was concurred in by seven members
intended to exclude evidence aliunde, tending to establish that the will
of the court, a clear majority, with one formal dissent. In the second
has been executed and attested in conformity with the requirements of
place, the Mojal decision was promulgated in December, 1924; the
the law, where such compliance does not appear on the face of the,
Quintana decision was thus subsequent in point of time. And in the
will itself. Prior to its amendment, section 618 contained the following
third place, the Quintana decision is believed more nearly to conform
saving clause: "But the absence of such form of attestation shall not
to the applicable provisions of the law.
render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and
attested as in this section provided."
The right to dispose of property by will is governed entirely by statute.
The law of the case is here found in section 618 of the Code of Civil
The most outstanding feature of the amendment of said section 618
procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, and in section 634 of the
by Act No. 2645 is the elimination of said saving clause and the
same Code, as unamended. It is part provided in section 618, as
greater emphasis laid on the formalities as to signatures and the
amended, that "No will . . . shall be valid . . . unless . . . ." It is further
attestation clause. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the intention
provided in the same section that "The attestation shall state the
of the Legislature, in eliminating said clause, was admitted without
number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will and every page
opposition, it should not be given effect and thus defeat the manifest
thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his
intention of the Legislature in amending said section 618.
express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of
the testator and of each other." Codal section 634 provides that " The Section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, should be given a strict
will shall be disallowed in either of the following cases: 1. If not interpretation. In the case of Uy the Court said:
executed and attested as in this Act provided." The law not alone
carefully makes use of the imperative, but cautiously goes further and Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of
makes use of the negative, to enforce legislative intention. It is not wills are very strictly construed. As stated in 40 Cyc., at page 1097, "A
within the province of the courts to disregard the legislative purpose so will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements;
emphatically and clearly expressed. otherwise it is entirely void. All these requirements stand as of equal
importance and must be observed, and courts cannot supply the
Quinto v Morata defective execution of a will. No power or discretion is vested in them,
G.R. No. L-31732, February 19, 1930 either to superadd other conditions or dispense with those enumerated
in the statutes." (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405, 407.)
FACTS:
This proceeding is the probate of the will of Gregorio Pueblo which was CANEDA vs AGRO
opposed by his brother , Mateo Pueblo, on the following grounds:
FACTS:
(1) That the attestation clause of said will does not state the number Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children, executed a last will
of pages of which the will is composed, and (2) that the attestation and testament before three attesting witnesses and he was duly
clause does not state that each and every page of the will was signed assisted by his lawyer and a notary public. It was declare therein that,
by the testators in the presence of the witnesses, and that the latter among other things, that the testator was leaving by way of legacies
signed the same in the presence of the testators and in the presence and devises his real and personal properties to specific persons, all of
of each other. whom do not appear to be related to Mateo. Not long after, he himself
filed a petition before the CFI seeking the probate of his last will and
testament but the scheduled hearings were postponed, until the
Herein appellant contends that the defect was cured by oral evidence,
testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard by the
which was admitted without opposition on the part of the appellee.
probate court. Benoni Cabrera, one of the legatees named in the will,
sought his appointment as special administrator of the testator’s estate
ISSUE: WON the defect was cured by oral evidence. NO but due to his death, he was succeeded by William Cabreara, who was
appointed by RTC which is already the probate court. In the course of
the hearing, herein petitioners claiming to be nephews and nieces of
HELD: The attestation clause of the will contravenes the express
the testator, appeared as oppositors and objected to the allowance of
requirements of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No.
the testator’s will on the ground that on the alleged date of its
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
execution, the testator was already in the poor state of health such the page containing the same was signed by the witnesses on the left
that he could not have possibly executed the same; and that the hand margin.
signature of the testator is not genuine. The probate court rendered a
decision that such will is the Last Will and Testament of Mateo
3. Petitioner contended that the signatures of the 3 witnesses on the
Caballero and that it was executed in accordance with all the requisites
left hand margin conform substantially to law and may be deemed as
of the law. Upon appeal to CA, the petitioners asserted that the will in
their signatures to the attestation clause.
question is null and void for the reason that its attestation clause is
fatally defective since it fails to specifically state the instrumental
witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their ISSUE: w/n the will is valid?
presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in
the presence of the testator and of one another. However, CA affirmed HELD: Will is not valid. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the
the decision of the trial court ruling and ruling that the attestation facts attending the execution of the will. It is required by law to be
clause in the Last Will substantially complies with Article 805 of the made by the attesting witnesses and it must necessarily bear their
Civil Code. Due to denial of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, signatures.
hence this appeal before the Supreme Court. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the
witnesses since the omission of their signatures at the bottom
ISSUES: whether or not the attestation clause contained in the last will negatives their participation.
and testament of the late Mateo Caballero complies with the
requirements of Article 805 Moreover, the signatures affixed on the let hand margin is not
substantial conformance to the law. The said signatures were merely
RULING: in conformance with the requirement that the will must be signed on
An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the the left-hand margin of all its pages. If the attestation clause is
attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed unsigned by the 3 witnesses at the bottom, it would be easier to add
before them and to the manner of the execution of the same. It is a clauses to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the
separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct testator and any or all of the witnesses.
of execution and once signed by the witnesses, it gives affirmation to
the fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law The probate of the will is denied.
has been observed. Under the 3rd paragraph of Article 805, such a
clause, the complete lack of which would result in the invalidity of the
will, should state: AZUELA vs. CA
1. The number of pages used upon which the will is written; A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages
2. That the testator signed, or expressly cause another to sign, the will on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation
and every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective.
3. That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an
the will and all its pages, and that the said witnesses also signed the acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of
will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three
another. defects is just aching for judicial rejection.
It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both Facts: Felix Azuela filed a petition with the trial court for the
attest and subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of probate of a notarial will purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo on
one another. “Attestation” and “subscription” differ in meaning. June 10, 1981 and notarized on the same day. The will consisted of
Attestation is the act of sense, while subscription is the act of the two (2) pages and was written in Filipino. The attestation clause did
hand. The attestation clause herein assailed is that while it recites that not state the number of pages and it was not signed by the attesting
the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of witnesses at the bottom thereof. The said witnesses affixed their
the three attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will though.
that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the Geralda Castillo opposed the petition, claiming that the will was not
circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that
to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. What is the decedent’s signature did not appear on the second page of the
then clearly lacking, is the statement that the witnesses signed the will will, and the will was not properly acknowledged.
and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another. The trial court held the will to be authentic and to have been executed
The absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or in accordance with law and, thus, admitted it to probate, calling to fore
imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the “the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of
will that is here sought to be admitted to probate. a will…with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in
expressing his last wishes.
CAGRO vs CAGRO
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court’s decision and
Facts: ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. It noted that the
1. The case is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will,
of the CFI of Samar which admitted to probate a will allegedly thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate.
executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Pambujan, Samar on Feb. 14,
1949. Azuela argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code
that “the number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in the
2. The appellants insisted that the will is defective because the attestation clause” is merely directory, rather than mandatory, and
attestation was not signed by the witnesses at the bottom although
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
thus susceptible to what he termed as “the substantial compliance Saksi,” comprised the attestation clause and the acknowledgement,and
rule.” was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject will complied with the requirements ISSUE: W/n there was observance of the requirement under Article
of Article 805? 806 with respect to acknowledgment before a notary public?
RULING: As to the issue of number of pages, no substantial RULING: NO. A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary
compliance in this case. The failure of the attestation clause to state public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is
the number of pages on which the will was written remains a fatal subscribed and sworn to before a notary public. The importance of the
flaw, despite Art. 809. This requirement aims at safeguarding the will requirement of acknowledgment is highlighted by the fact that it had
against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages been segregated from the other requirements under Art. 805 and
and thus preventing any increase or decrease in the pages. entrusted into a separate provision, Art. 806. The express requirement
of Art. 806 is that the will be “acknowledged”, and not merely
subscribed and sworn to. The acknowledgment coerces the testator
Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance with this
and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law
requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is
that they had executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act
comprised of, as was the situation in Singson and Taboada. In this
or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury,
case, however, there could have been no substantial compliance with
thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in
the requirements under Art. 805 of the Civil Code since there is no
the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free
statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to
consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance
the number of pages which comprise the will. There was an
that the testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary
incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been
dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the will.
allotted for the insertion of the number of pages in the attestation
In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista,
clause. Yet the blank was never filled in.
wrote "Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic),
1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila."40 By no manner of contemplation
As to the issue of witnesses not signing under the attestation clause, can those words be construed as an acknowledgment.(the statement
the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to is considered a jurat)
by the instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the
instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they
GARCIA vs. GATCHALIAN
do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause. Art. 805
particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental
witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the will be FACTS: On March 15, 1967, Gregorio Gatchalian, a widower of 71
attested and subscribed by them. The signatures on the left-hand years of age, died in the municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal,
corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are leaving no forced heirs. On April 2 of the same year, appellant filed a
aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the petition with the above named court for the probate of said alleged will
other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the (Exhibit "C") wherein he was instituted as sole heir.
witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation
clause itself. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested
After due trial, the court rendered the appealed decision finding the
will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of
document Exhibit "C" to be the authentic last will of the deceased but
the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures
disallowing it for failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of
cannot demonstrate these witnesses’ undertakings in the clause, since
Article 806 of the New Civil Code — that the will must be
the signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
wholly different avowal.
witnesses.
The RTC admitted the will to probate. According to the trial court, the
CRUZ vs. VILLASOR
declaration at the end of the will under the sub-title, “Patunay Ng Mga
129
Wills and Succession Case Digests
G.R. No. L-32213 November 26, 1973 ahead of. (The New Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English
AGAPITA N. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. Language, p. 72; Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the
VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First English Language, p. 252; Webster's New International Dictionary 2d.
Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY, respondents. p. 245.) Consequently, if the third witness were the notary
ESGUERRA, J.: public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his
having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done
because he cannot split his personality into two so that one
Petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the CFI of Cebu
will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation
allowing the probate of the last will a testament of the late Valente Z.
in the making of the will. To permit such a situation to obtain
Cruz.
would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.
GONZALES vs. CA
On the other hand, private respondent-appellee, Manuel B.
G.R. No. L-37453
Lugay, who is the supposed executor of the will, following the
May 25, 1979
reasoning of the trial court, maintains that there is substantial
GUERRERO, J.:
compliance with the legal requirement of having at least three
attesting witnesses even if the notary public acted as one of
them, bolstering up his stand with 57 American Jurisprudence, p. 227 On June 24, 1961, herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago filed a
which, insofar as pertinent, reads as follows: petition for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by the
deceased Isabel Gabriel and designating therein petitioner as the
principal beneficiary and executrix. The will submitted for probate,
It is said that there are, practical reasons for upholding a will as
Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in Tagalog, appears to have been
against the purely technical reason that one of the witnesses required
executed in Manila on the 15th day of April, 1961, or barely two (2)
by law signed as certifying to an acknowledgment of the testator's
months prior to the death of Isabel Gabriel. It consists of five (5)
signature under oath rather than as attesting the execution of the
pages, including the pages whereon the attestation clause and the
instrument.
acknowledgment of the notary public were written. The signatures of
the deceased Isabel Gabriel appear at the end of the will on page four
RULING: The SC inclined to sustain that of the appellant and at the left margin of all the pages.
that the last will and testament in question was not executed
in accordance with law.
Petitioner contends that Exhibit "F" was not executed and attested as
required by law because there was absolutely no proof that the three
The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be instrumental witnesses were credible witnesses. She argues that the
considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot requirement in Article 806, Civil Code, that the witnesses must be
acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To credible is an absolute requirement which must be complied with
acknowledge before means to avow (Javellana v. Ledesma, 97 Phil. before an alleged last will and testament may be admitted to probate
258, 262; Castro v. Castro, 100 Phil. 239, 247); to own as genuine, to and that to be a credible witness, there must be evidence on record
assent, to admit; and "before" means in front or preceding in space or that the witness has a good standing in his community, or that he is
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. SEC. 238. Effect of failure to stamp taxable document. — An
According to petitioner, unless the qualifications of the witness are first instrument, document, or paper which is required by law to be
established, his testimony may not be favorably considered. Petitioner stamped and which has been signed, issued, accepted, or transferred
contends that the term "credible" is not synonymous with "competent" without being duly stamped, shall not be recorded, nor shall it or any
for a witness may be competent under Article 820 and 821 of the Civil copy thereof or any record of transfer of the same be admitted or used
Code and still not be credible as required by Article 805 of the same in evidence in any court until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have
Code. It is further urged that the term "credible" as used in the Civil been affixed thereto and cancelled.
Code should receive the same settled and well- known meaning it has
under the Naturalization Law, the latter being a kindred legislation with
No notary public or other officer authorized to administer oaths shall
the Civil Code provisions on wigs with respect to the qualifications of
add his jurat or acknowledgment to any document subject to
witnesses.
documentary stamp tax unless the proper documentary stamps are
affixed thereto and cancelled.
We find no merit to petitioner's first assignment of error. Article 820 of
the Civil Code provides the qualifications of a witness to the execution
The probate court assumed that the notarial acknowledgment of the
of wills while Article 821 sets forth the disqualification from being a
said will is subject to the thirty-centavo documentary stamp tax fixed
witness to a win.
in section 225 of the Tax Code, now section 237 of the 1977 Tax Code.
We, therefore, reject petitioner's position that it was fatal for That procedure may be implied from the provision of section 238 that
respondent not to have introduced prior and independent proof of the the non-admissibility of the document, which does not bear the
fact that the witnesses were "credible witnesses that is, that they have requisite documentary stamp, subsists only "until the requisite stamp
a good standing in the community and reputed to be trustworthy and or stamps shall have been affixed thereto and cancelled."
reliable.
Thus, it was held that the documentary stamp may be affixed at the
GABUCAN v. JUDGE MANTA time the taxable document is presented in evidence (Del Castillo vs.
Madrilena 49 Phil. 749). If the promissory note does not bear a
documentary stamp, the court should have allowed plaintiff's tender of
G.R. No. L-51546 January 28, 1980 a stamp to supply the deficiency. (Rodriguez vs. Martinez, 5 Phil. 67,
JOSE ANTONIO GABUCAN, vs. HON. JUDGE LUIS D. MANTA 71. Note the holding in Azarraga vs. Rodriguez, 9 Phil. 637, that the
JOSEFA G. VDA. DE YSALINA and NELDA G. ENCLONAR lack of the documentary stamp on a document does not invalidate
such document.
FACTS: This case is about the dismissal of a petition for the probate of
a notarial will on the ground that it does not bear a thirty-centavo
documentary stamp.
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA, as his Last Will and Testament and he has the same and every page
JUAN CABALLERO, AUREA CABALLERO, OSCAR LAROSA, thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand
HELEN CABALLERO, SANTOS CABALLERO, PABLO CABALLERO, margin, in the presence of the said testator and in the presence of
VICTOR RAGA, MAURICIA RAGA, QUIRICA RAGA, RUPERTO each and all of us.
ABAPO, represented herein by his Attorney-in-Fact,
ARMSTICIA * ABAPO VELANO, and CONSESO CANEDA,
It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness
represented herein by his heirs, JESUS CANEDA,
should both attest and subscribe to the will in the presence of the
NATIVIDAD CANEDA and ARTURO CANEDA,petitioners, vs. HON.
testator and of one another. "Attestation" and "subscription" differ in
COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special
meaning. Attestation is the act of senses, while subscription is the act
Administrator of the Estate of Mateo Caballero,respondents.
of the hand. The former is mental, the latter mechanical, and to attest
a will is to know that it was published as such, and to certify the facts
G.R. No. 103554 May 28, 1993 required to constitute an actual and legal publication; but to subscribe
a paper published as a will is only to write on the same paper the
names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of identification.
Facts: On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any
children executed a last will and testament at his residence in Talisay,
Cebu before three attesting witnesses, namely, Cipriano Labuca, In Taboada vs. Rizal, we clarified
Gregorio Cabando and Flaviano Toregosa. The said testator was duly that attestation consists in witnessing the testator's execution of the
assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad, and a notary public, will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are done
Atty. Filoteo Manigos, in the preparation of that last will. 1 It was which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the
declared therein, among other things, that the testator was leaving by signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the other
way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon the
Presentacion Gaviola, Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito same paper for the purpose of identification of such paper as the will
Abatayo, Benoni G. Cabrera and Marcosa Alcantara, all of whom do not which was executed by the testator. As it involves a mental act, there
appear to be related to the testator. would be no means, therefore, of ascertaining by a physical
examination of the will whether the witnesses had indeed signed in the
presence of the testator and of each other unless this is substantially
Four months later, or on April 4, 1979, Mateo Caballero
expressed in the attestation.
himself filed a petition docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3899-R
before Branch II of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu seeking
the probate of his last will and testament. The probate court set the What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the
petition for hearing on August 20, 1979 but the same and subsequent attestation clause herein assailed is the fact that while it recites that
scheduled hearings were postponed for one reason to another. On the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of
May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his petition could the three attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages
finally be heard by the probate court. that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the
circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective
signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of
Probate court declared that the Last Will and Testament of
each other.
Mateo Caballero and that it was executed in accordance with all the
requisites of the law. Petitioners oppositors elevated the case to the
CA asserting that the will in question is null and void for the reason The phrase "and he has signed the same and every page
that its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand
state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator margin," obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental
signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the words "as his Last Will
all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one and Testament." On the other hand, although the words "in the
another. CA affirmed the probate court. presence of the testator and in the presence of each and all of us"
may, at first blush, appear to likewise signify and refer to the
witnesses, it must, however, be interpreted as referring only to the
Issue: whether or not the attestation clause contained in the last will
testator signing in the presence of the witnesses since said phrase
and testament of the late Mateo Caballero complies with the
immediately follows the words "he has signed the same and every
requirements of Article 805, in relation to Article 809, of the Civil Code.
page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left
hand margin." What is then clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis ,
Held: No. An examination of the last will and testament of is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page
Mateo Caballero shows that it is comprised of three sheets all of which thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
have been numbered correlatively, with the left margin of each page
thereof bearing the respective signatures of the testator and the three
It is our considered view that the absence of that
attesting witnesses. The part of the will containing the testamentary
statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must
dispositions is expressed in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect and is signed
necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to
at the foot thereof by the testator. The attestation clause in question,
be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the
on the other hand, is recited in the English language and is likewise
aforestated defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be
signed at the end thereof by the three attesting witnesses hereto. 30
characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the language
Since it is the proverbial bone of contention, we reproduce it again for
used therein which would warrant the application of the substantial
facility of reference:
compliance rule under Article 809 of the New Civil Code.
. . . The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be CAGRO vs CAGRO
supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are
consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VICENTE CAGRO. JESUSA
every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will
CAGRO vs. PELAGO CAGRO, ET AL.
was notarized. All theses are facts that the will itself can reveal, and
defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause
can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether GR NO. L-5826 April 29, 1953
all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must
substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check Art 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed
against perjury in the probate proceedings. (Emphasis ours.) at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator’s name
written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
We stress once more that under Article 809, the defects direction, andattested and subscribed by three or more credible
and imperfections must only be with respect to the form of witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
the attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects
or imperfections would not render a will invalid should it be proved FACTS:
that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with
Article 805. In this regard, however, the manner of proving the
due execution and attestation has been held to be limited to Pelagro Cagro, et al. (respondents) allege that the will is fatally
merely an examination of the will itself without resorting to defective, because its attestation clause is not signed by the three
evidence aliunde, whether oral or written. attesting witnesses.
In the will, the page containing the attestation clause is signed by the
witnesses on the left-hand margin, but said attesting witnesses did not
The foregoing considerations do not apply where
sign at the bottom.
the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting
witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the Vicente Cagro (petitioner) contended that the signatures of the
presence of the testator and of each other. In such a situation, attesting witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to
the defect is not only in the form or language of the attestation clause the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation
but the total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to clause.
be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. That is
precisely the defect complained of in the present case since there is no ISSUE:
plausible way by which we can read into the questioned attestation
clause statement, or an implication thereof, that the attesting witness
did actually bear witness to the signing by the testator of the will and WON the absence of the signatures of the attesting witnesses
all of its pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed the at the bottom of the attestation clause renders it fatally
will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one defective? – YES.
another.
HELD:
Furthermore, the rule on substantial compliance in Article
809 cannot be revoked or relied on by respondents since it Yes. The will becomes fatally defective due to failure to conform with
presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can be cured or the requirements in Art 805.
supplied by the text of the will or a consideration of matters apparent The signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin cannot
therefrom which would provide the data not expressed in the be said to conform substantially to the law, because said signatures
attestation clause or from which it may necessarily be gleaned or are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the
clearly inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted textual left-hand margin of all its pages.
requirements were actually complied within the execution of the will. If an attestation clause is not signed by the three witnesses at the
In other words, defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence bottom, and still be admitted by the courts sufficient, it would be easy
supplied by the will itself. to add such clause to any will on a subsequent occasion, in the
absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.
In the case at bar, contrarily, proof of the acts required to The will was fatally defective and not admitted to probate.
have been performed by the attesting witnesses can be supplied by
only extrinsic evidence thereof, since an overall appreciation of the
Dissenting Opinion
contents of the will yields no basis whatsoever from with such facts
may be plausibly deduced. What private respondent insists on are the
testimonies of his witnesses alleging that they saw the compliance with The will in question substantially complied with the formalities of the
such requirements by the instrumental witnesses, oblivious of the fact law and, therefore, should be admitted to probate.
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
of Identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the
testator. (Ragsdale v. Hill, 269 SW 2d 911).
ISSUE (On 809): WON the will was subscribed in a manner which fully
satisfies the requirements; YES
TABOADA V ROSAL
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that the Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will when it does
testator was in good health and was not unduly influenced in any way not pertain to the form or language of the will. This is because there is
in the execution of his will. not substantial compliance with Article 805.
ISSUE:
ARTICLE 810
W/N the attestation clause in the will of the testator is fatally defective
Roxas vs De Jesus, JR
or can be cured under the art. 809. NO!
The attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal guaranties for Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that after his appointment as
the due execution of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof. administrator, he found a notebook belonging to the deceased Bibiana
R. de Jesus and that on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, a letter-will
addressed to her children and entirely written and signed in the
It is contended by petitioners that the attestation clause in the will
handwriting of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was found. The will is
failed to specifically state the fact that the attesting witnesses
dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my win which I want to be
witnessed the testator sign the will and all its pages in their presence
respected although it is not written by a lawyer. ...
and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and every page
thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. And the
Court agrees. The testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by the
testimonies of Pedro Roxas de Jesus and Manuel Roxas de Jesus who
likewise testified that the letter dated "FEB./61 " is the holographic Will
The attestation clause does not expressly state therein the
of their deceased mother, Bibiana R. de Jesus. Both recognized the
circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures
handwriting of their mother and positively Identified her signature.
to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
They further testified that their deceased mother understood English,
the language in which the holographic Will is written, and that the date
The phrase, “and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on "FEB./61 " was the date when said Will was executed by their mother.
the space provided for his signature and on the left hand margin,”
obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as
Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir filed an
it is immediately preceded by the words” as his last will and
"opposition to probate" assailing the purported holographic Will of
testament.”
Bibiana R. de Jesus because it was not executed in accordance with
law alleging that the alleged holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and R. de Jesus was not dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code.
every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. She contends that the law requires that the Will should contain the
That the absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or day, month and year of its execution and that this should be strictly
imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the complied with.
will that is here sought to be probated.
Issue: whether or not the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the
Also, Art. 809 does not apply to the present case because holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid
the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.
signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator
and of each other. The defect in this case is not only with respect to
Ruling: Yes. Liberal construction was applied by the court. The court
the form or the language of the attestation clause. The defects must
reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith
be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself which is
and fraud in its execution nor was there any substitution of Wins and
clearly lacking in this case.
Testaments. There is no question that the holographic Will of the
deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and
Therefore, the probate of the will is set aside and the case for the signed by the testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There
intestate proceedings shall be revived. is also no question as to its genuineness and due execution. All the
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the holographic HELD: NO. To allow intervention, [a] it must be shown that the
Will of their mother and that she had the testamentary capacity at the movant has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or otherwise
time of the execution of said Will. The objection interposed by the qualified; and [b] consideration must be given as to whether the
oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that the holographic Will is fatally adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or
defective because the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic prejudiced, or whether the intervenor's rights may be protected in a
Will is not sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must concur as the first
objection is too technical to be entertained. is not more important than the second.
As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the The words "an interest in the subject" mean a direct interest in the
day, month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case cause of action as pleaded, and which would put the intervenor in a
at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint, without the
pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only establishment of which plaintiff could not recover.
issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the
holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code,
Here, the interest, if it exists at all, of petitioners-movants is indirect,
probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle
contingent, remote, conjectural, consequential and collateral. At the
of substantial compliance.
very least, their interest is purely inchoate, or in sheer expectancy of a
right in the management of the corporation and to share in the profits
CONCEPCION MAGSAYSAY-LABRADOR thereof and in the properties and assets thereof on dissolution, after
vs. payment of the corporate debts and obligations.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
While a share of stock represents a proportionate or aliquot interest in
FACTS: In 1958, Adelaida Rodriguez-Magsaysay and her husband, late the property of the corporation, it does not vest the owner thereof
Senator Genaro Magsaysay, acquired, thru conjugal funds, a parcel of with any legal right or title to any of the property, his interest in the
land with improvements, known as "Pequena Island".after the death of corporate property being equitable or beneficial in nature.
her husband, she discovered an annotation at the back of TCT No. Shareholders are in no legal sense the owners of corporate property,
3258 that "the land was acquired by her husband from his separate which is owned by the corporation as a distinct legal person.
capital;"the registration of a Deed of Assignment dated June 25, 1976
purportedly executed by the late Senator in favor of SUBIC, as a result
The petitioners cannot claim the right to intervene on the strength of
of which TCT No. 3258 was cancelled and TCT No. 22431 issued in the
the transfer of shares allegedly executed by the late Senator. The
name of SUBIC; and the registration of Deed of Mortgage dated April
corporation did not keep books and records. 11 Perforce, no transfer
28, 1977 in the amount of P 2,700,000.00 executed by SUBIC in favor
was ever recorded, much less effected as to prejudice third parties.
of FILMANBANK; that the foregoing acts were void and done in an
The transfer must be registered in the books of the corporation to
attempt to defraud the conjugal partnership considering that the land
affect third persons. The law on corporations is explicit. Section 63 of
is conjugal, her marital consent to the annotation on TCT No. 3258
the Corporation Code provides, thus: "No transfer, however, shall be
was not obtained, the change made by the Register of Deeds of the
valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in
titleholders was effected without the approval of the Commissioner of
the books of the corporation showing the names of the parties to the
Land Registration and that the late Senator did not execute the
transaction, the date of the transfer, the number of the certificate or
purported Deed of Assignment or his consent thereto, if obtained, was
certificates and the number of shares transferred."
secured by mistake, violence and intimidation. She further alleged that
the assignment in favor of SUBIC was without consideration and
consequently null and void. She prayed that the Deed of Assignment
and the Deed of Mortgage be annulled and that the Register of Deeds
be ordered to cancel TCT No. 22431 and to issue a new title in her ARTICLE 811
favor.
ICASIANO vs. ICASIANO Witness Jose Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three
(3) of the original, admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964 one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page three (3) was
signed in his presence.
we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code cannot
Article 811 be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three
witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of
Azaola vs Singson having the probate denied.
FEDERICO AZAOLA, petitioner-appellant, vs. CESARIO SINGSON, Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a
oppositor-appellee. holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil
Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses possessing
FACTS: On September 9, 1957, Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died at 13 the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the
Luskot, Quezon City, known to be the last residence of said testatrix proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any
three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting
Francisco Azaola, petitioner herein for probate of the holographic will, and signature of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of
submitted the said holographic will (Exh. C) whereby Maria Milagros course, even if the law does not so express) "that the will and the
Azaola was made the sole heir as against the nephew of the deceased signature are in the handwriting of the testator". There may be no
Cesario Singson available witness acquainted with the testator's hand; or even if so
familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion.
witness Francisco Azaola testified that he saw the holographic will Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus
(Exh. C) one month, more or less, before the death of the testatrix, as become an impossibility
the same was handed to him and his wife
That is evidently the reason why the second paragraph of Article 811
He testified also that he recognized all the signatures appearing in the prescribes that "in the absence of any competent witness referred to in
holographic will (Exh. C) as the handwriting of the testatrix and to the preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert
reinforce said statement, witness presented the mortgage (Exh. E), the testimony may be resorted to."
special power of attorney (Exh. F), and the general power of attorney
(Exh. F-1), besides the deeds of sale (Exhs. G and G-1) including an As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that no qualified
affidavit (Exh. G-2), and that there were further exhibited in court two witness may be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no
residence certificates (Exhs. H and H-1) to show the signatures of the competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the
testatrix, for comparison will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the
deficiency.
Azaola, testified that the penmanship appearing in the aforesaid
documentary evidence is in the handwriting of the testatrix as well as It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three
the signatures appearing therein are the signatures of the testatrix witnesses be presented if the will is contested and only one if no
contest is had) was derived from the rule established for ordinary
when the same witness was asked by counsel if he was familiar with testaments (cf. Cabang vs. Delfinado, 45 Phil., 291; Tolentino vs.
the penmanship and handwriting of the deceased Fortunata Vda. de Francisco, 57 Phil. 742). But it can not be ignored that the requirement
Yance, he answered positively in the affirmative and when he was can be considered mandatory only in the case of ordinary testaments,
asked again whether the penmanship referred to in the previous precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at the
answer as appearing in the holographic will (Exh. C) was hers execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity
(testatrix'), he answered, "I would definitely say it is hers" (Art. 805)
The opposition to the probate was on the ground that (1) the Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present (Art. 10),
execution of the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must be deemed
and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.
the testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will,
and that the same was actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned
August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the will. by the words "if the Court deem it necessary", which reveal that what
the law deems essential is that the Court should be convinced of the
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is
Civil Code, the proponent must present three witnesses who could produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is
declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On
testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone witness the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort and objective consideration of the evidence is imperative to establish
to handwriting experts. The duty of the court, in fine, is to exhaust all the true intent of the testator.
available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the
Fiscal Waga, one of the witnesses, expressed doubts as to the
proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.
signature of the deceased. Evangeline, on her part, testified that as to
why she was familiar with the handwriting of the deceased was
And because the law leaves it to the trial court to decide if experts are
because she lived with her since birth. She never declared that she
still needed, no unfavourable inference can be drawn from a party's
saw the deceased write a note or sign a document. In Matilde’s
failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses
testimony, she saw pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased,
dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay witnesses.
which she either mailed or gave to her tenants. She did not declare
that she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note.
Our conclusion is that the rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of
Furthermore, in her testimony it was also evident that Ms. Binanay
the Civil Code is merely directory and is not mandatory.
kept the fact about the will from petitioners, the legally adopted
children of the deceased.
Codoy vs Calugay The will was also not found in the possession of the deceased when
she died. Such actions put in issue her motive of keeping the will a
[G.R. No. 123486. August 12, 1999] secret to petitioners and revealing it only after the death of Matilde
Seño Vda. de Ramonal. Comparing the signature in the holographic
Facts:
will dated August 30, 1978, and the signatures in several documents
The deceased Matilde Seno Vda de Ramonal executed a holographic
such as the application letter for pasture permit dated December
will on August 30, 1978. Herein respondents Eugenia Calugay,
30,1980 and a letter dated June 16, 1978 the strokes are different. In
Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas are devisees and legatees of
the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that
the holographic will of the deceased. They filed with the RTC of
there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. We,
Misamis a petition for probate of the holographic will of Matilde who
therefore, cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the
died on 16 January 1990.
handwriting by the deceased.
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code — are essential
holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." 4 It to the probate of a holographic will.
held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not
New Civil Code, which read, as follows: validly dispose of the house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del
Norte, in its entirety. This is correct and must be affirmed.
Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic
will are signed without being dated, and the last disposition has a
Venura vs Ventura
signature and date, such date validates the dispositions preceding it,
whatever be the time of prior dispositions.
Guevarra vs Guevarra ( NO RELATION accdg to ADAM)
Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a
holographic will, the testator must authenticate the same by his full
signature.
Article 817
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned
and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, Miciano vs Brimo
alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated
by decedent. Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO,
administrator, petitioner-appellee, vs.ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-
Issue: Whether said will was executed in accordance with the appellant.(G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927)
formalities prescribed by law. YES!
FACTS: The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of
partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed
HELD: The CA is wrong. it. The court, however, approved it.
In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will
of Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with the formalities The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil xxx (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this
Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of
of said will. This is erroneous. partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza
Ruling: A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the
requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the Turkish laws.
holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in
date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which
cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for
whole testament void. which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:
notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In
the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court
held: Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights
made by the testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever
most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be
interlined. situated.
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or
insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on
testator's signature, 9 their presence does not invalidate the will itself. ISSUE: W/N the national law of the testator was violated in the
10 The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such testamentary dispositions.
changes.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of
RULING: But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said
changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions
testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws,
(Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the
inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the
necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article
Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on
810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the
such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the
Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering
Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
holographic wills are taken. They read as follows:
Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it himself It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws
in the form and with the requisites required in Article 688. are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be given an
Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of full opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he
age. assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of
In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested
corresponding to the year of its execution, written in its entirety by the regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
testator and signed by him, and must contain a statement of the year,
month and day of its execution.
There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of
If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the
the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary
testator must identify them over his signature.
dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force,
Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language.
must be complied with and executed. lawphil.net
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that
only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code — and not
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was for probate before the CFI of Cebu. By error of the Judge, the will was
not erroneous. admitted to probate although that admission to probate was
erroneous.
Held: No. The fact that the testator in his will mentioned a sale of real
estate, fully consummated before his death, which he had made to
one of the witnesses to his will, does not make such person an HELD:
incompetent witness; nor does the fact that he signed the will as one
of the attesting witnesses render the will invalid under section 622 of No. There was no valid revocation of he will before the death of the
the Code of Civil Procedure. testator.
"If a person attests the execution of a will, to whom or to whose wife The physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does
or husband, or parent, or child, a beneficial devise, legacy, or interest, not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is
of or affecting real or personal estate, is given by such will, such coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator.
devise, legacy, or interest shall, so far only as concerns such person, It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the
or the wife or husband, or parent or child of such person, or anyone testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under
claiming under such person or such wife or husband, or parent or the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it
child, be void, unless there are three other competent witnesses to goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will
such will, and such person so attesting shall be admitted as a witness itself.
as if such devise, legacy, or interest had not been made or given. But In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be
a mere charge on the real or personal estate of the testator, for the conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would
payment of debts, shall not prevent his creditors from being not suffice.
competent witnesses to his will."
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
In Art. 1830, Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements If it can be inferred that the testator deliberately destroyed the 1918
for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause of the 1939 will,
to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, and it is true that he gave a duplicate copy thereof to his wife, the
tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or herein petitioner, the most logical step for the testator to take is to
by another person in his presence and under his express direction. recall said duplicate copy in order that it may likewise be destroyed.
There is insufficient evidence to show compliance with these But this was not done as shown by the fact that said duplicate copy
requirements. remained in the possession of petitioner. It is possible that because of
the long lapse of twenty-one (21) years since the first will was
executed, the original of the will had been misplaced or lost, and
1. The document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, forgetting that there was a copy, the testator deemed it wise to
Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at execute another will containing exactly the same testamentary
all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. dispositions. Whatever may be the conclusion we may draw from this
2. The burning was not proven to have been done under the chain of circumstances, the stubborn fact is that there is no direct
express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not evidence of voluntary or deliberate destruction of the first will by the
in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were testator. This matter cannot be inference or conjectur.
one in stating that they were the only ones present at the
place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was
located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned. Granting for the sake of argument that the earlier will was voluntarily
destroyed by the testator after the execution of the second will, which
revoked the first, could there be any doubt, under this theory, that
said earlier will was destroyed by the testator in the honest belief that
it was no longer necessary because he had expressly revoked it in his
Article 832
will of 1939? In other words, can we not say that the destruction of
the earlier will was but the necessary consequence of the testator's
Molo vs Molo
belief that the revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will was
valid and the latter would be given effect? If such is the case, then it is
FACTS:
our opinion that the earlier will can still be admitted to probate under
Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the Pasay, Rizal, the principle of "dependent relative revocation".
without leaving any forced heir. He was survived, however, by his
This is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. The failure of a
wife, petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces and
new testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation
nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and Cornelio, all
depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive
surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children of Candido Molo y
conditions, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a
Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator. Mariano Molo y Legaspi left
mere intent to make at some time a will in the place of that destroyed
two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918 (first will), and another
will not render the destruction conditional. It must appear that the
executed on June 20, 1939 (second will).
revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new will. (1
On February 7, 1941, Juana Juan Vda de Molo filed a petition seeking Alexander, p. 751; Gardner, p. 253.)
the probate of the second will. There being no opposition, the will was
We hold therefore, that even in the supposition that the destruction of
probated. However, upon petition filed by the herein oppositors, the
the original will by the testator could be presumed from the failure of
order of the court admitting the will to probate was set aside and the
the petitioner to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the
case was reopened. Court rendered decision denying the probate of
effect of defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is
said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the same
founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly
was executed in accordance with law.
executed and would be given due effect. The theory on which this
The widow filed another petition for the probate of the first will. Again, principle is predicated is that the testator did not intend to die
the same oppositors filed an opposition to the petition based on three intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest when he executed two
grounds: (3) that the will has been subsequently revoked. wills on two different occasion and instituted his wife as his universal
Oppositors contend that the revocatory clause contained in 1939 will of heir. There can therefore be no mistake as to his intention of dying
the deceased, notwithstanding the disallowance of said will, is valid testate.
and still has the effect of nullifying the prior of 1918.
Court issued an order admitting the will to probate.
Naval vs Naval
ISSUE: WON the probate court erred in not holding that the alleged
will of 1918 was deliberately revoked by Molo himself
Article 838
HELD:
Spouses Pascual vs CA
There is no evidence which may directly indicate that the testator
deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918 will because of his SPOUSES RICARDO PASCUAL and CONSOLACION
knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will he executed SIOSON, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS
in 1939. The only evidence we have is that when the first will was S. EUGENIO-GINO, respondents.
executed in 1918, Juan Salcedo, who prepared it, gave the original and
copies to the testator himself and apparently they remained in his
possession until he executed his second will in 1939. And when the
1939 will was denied probate on November 29, 1943, and petitioner FACTS: Petitioner Consolacion and respondent Remedios are the niece
was asked by her attorney to look for another will, she found the and granddaughter, respectively, of the late Canuto Sioson. CANUTO
duplicate copy (Exhibit A) among the papers or files of the testator. and 11 other individuals, including his sister Catalina Sioson and his
She did not find the original. brother Victoriano Sioson were co-owners of a parcel of land in Tanza,
Navotas, Metro Manila. CATALINA, CANUTO, and VICTORIANO each
owned an aliquot 10/70 share or 1,335 square meters of Lot 2.
145
Wills and Succession Case Digests
REMEDIOS’ action is based on an implied trust under Article
1456 since she claims that the inclusion of the additional 1,335 square
CANUTO had Lot 2 surveyed and subdivided into eight lots through meters in TCT No. (232252) 1321 was without basis. In effect,
Subdivision Plan Psd 34713 which the Director of Lands approved Lot REMEDIOS asserts that CONSOLACION acquired the additional 1,335
No. 2-A, were placed under CANUTO’s name. Three other individuals square meters through mistake or fraud and thus CONSOLACION
took the remaining lots should be considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
rightful owner of the property. Clearly, the applicable prescriptive
period is ten years under Article 1144 and not four years under Articles
CANUTO and CONSOLACION executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang 1389 and 1391.
Tuluyan. Under the KASULATAN, CANUTO sold his 10/70 share in Lot 2
This ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date the
in favor of CONSOLACION for P2,250.00. CONSOLACION immediately
adverse party repudiates the implied trust, which repudiation takes
took possession of the lots and declared the land for taxation purposes
place when the adverse party registers the land
and paid the corresponding real estate taxes.
REMEDIOS filed her complaint on 4 February 1988 or more than
On 23 October 1968, the surviving children of CANUTO, namely,
19 years after CONSOLACION registered her title over Lot Nos. 2-A
Felicidad and Beatriz, executed a joint affidavit affirming the
and 2-E on 28 October 1968. Unquestionably, REMEDIOS filed the
KASULATAN in favor of CONSOLACION. They also attested that the
complaint late thus warranting its dismissal.
lots their father had sold to CONSOLACION.
On 28 October 1968, CONSOLACION registered the KASULATAN Respondent is Not a Real Party-in-Interest
and the JOINT AFFIDAVIT with the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal. Based on these documents, the Register of Deeds issued to
CONSOLACION Transfer Certificate of Title of the lots. Not only does prescription bar REMEDIOS’
complaint. REMEDIOS is also not a real party-in-interest who can file
On 4 February 1988, REMEDIOS filed a complaint against
the complaint, as the trial court correctly ruled.
CONSOLACION and her spouse Ricardo Pascual in the Regional Trial
Court of Malabon, Branch 165, for “Annulment or Cancellation of REMEDIOS anchored her claim over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E (or
Transfer Certificate [of Title] and Damages.” REMEDIOS claimed that over its one-half portion) on the devise of these lots to her under
she is the owner of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E because CATALINA devised CATALINA’s LAST WILL. However, the trial court found that the
these lots to her in CATALINA’s last will and testament ]dated 29 May probate court did not issue any order admitting the LAST WILL to
1964. REMEDIOS added that CONSOLACION obtained title to these probate. REMEDIOS does not contest this finding. Indeed, during the
lots through fraudulent means since the area covered by TCT (232252) trial, REMEDIOS admitted that Special Proceedings Case No. C-208 is
1321 is twice the size of CANUTO’s share in Lot 2. REMEDIOS prayed still pending.
for the cancellation of CONSOLACION’s title, the issuance of another
title in her name, and the payment to her of damages. Article 838 of the Civil Code states that “[N]o will shall pass
either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
Petitioners sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of accordance with the Rules of Court.” This Court has interpreted this
prescription. provision to mean, “until admitted to probate, [a will] has no effect
whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder.”] REMEDIOS
Issue:
anchors her right in filing this suit on her being a devisee of
WON prescription bars the action filed by REMEDIOS? YES CATALINA’s LAST WILL. However, since the probate court has not
admitted CATALINA’s LAST WILL, REMEDIOS has not acquired any
WON Remedios has a right of action against Petitioners? NO right under the LAST WILL. REMEDIOS is thus without any cause of
action either to seek reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E or to
enforce an implied trust over these lots.
Held:
The proof of all these requisites is involved in the probate; and as to HELD:
each and all of them the probate is conclusive. (Castaneda vs. Petitioner was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower
Alemany, 3 Phil. Rep., 426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil. Rep., 436; court. He had no direct interest in the probate of the will. His only
Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vano, 8 Phil. Rep., 119; Sanchez vs. Pascual, 11 interest in the estate is an indirect interest as former counsel for a
Phil. Rep., 395; Montanano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. Rep., 676.) prospective heir.
Our reported cases do not contain the slightest intimation that a will In Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, We had occassion to rule that one
which has been probated according to law, and without fraud, can be who is only indirectly interested in a will may not interfere in its
148
Wills and Succession Case Digests
probate. Thus: “the reason for the rule excluding strangers from character of res judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all
contesting the will, is not that thereby the court maybe prevented from juridical questions in connection therewith being for once and forever
learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of probate, closed. 5 Such final order makes the will conclusive against the whole
but rather that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by world as to its extrinsic validity and due execution.
the intervention in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the
estate which would entitle them to be heard with relation thereto.”
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the
same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. 12
As to petitioner’s argument that by virtue of his contract of services Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will
with Del Rosario, he is a creditor of the latter, and that under Article and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly
1052 of the Civil Code which provides: executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or
impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance
according to the laws on succession, 13 the unlawful
ART. 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his
provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially
own creditors, the latter may petition the court to authorize them to
so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory
accept it in the name of the heir.
decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having
attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will no
The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an extent sufficient longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically
to cover the amount of their credits. The excess, should there be any, valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had
shall in no case pertain to the renouncer, but shall be adjudicated to the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand
the persons to whom, in accordance with the rules established in this and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies
Code, it may belong. provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of
other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or
he has a right to accept for his client Del Rosario to the extent of 35% court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied
thereof the devise in her favor (which she in effect repudiated) to with the decision or order. As early as 1918, it has been declared that
protect his contigent attorney's fees. public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional
errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time fixed by law 14
become final otherwise there will be no end to litigation. Interes rei
The argument is devoid of merit. Article 1052 of the Civil Code does publicae ut finis sit litium — the very object of which the courts were
not apply to this case. That legal provision protects the creditor of a constituted was to put an end to controversies. 15 To fulfill this
repudiating heir. Petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less
payment of his fees is contingent and dependent upon the successful arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful. 16 The only
probate of the holographic will. Since the petition for probate was instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a
dismissed by the lower court, the contingency did not occur. Attorney final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of
Leviste is not entitled to his fee. circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence
not imputable to negligence, 17 which circumstances do not concur
herein.
A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or HELD: Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the
reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. It has been consistently petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by private
held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of respondent. He argues that, as the nearest next of kin and creditor of
the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct. In ruling
the order allowing the will became final and the question determined that petitioner has no right to intervene in the proceedings before
by the court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in the Branch 65 of RTC-Makati City, the Court of Appeals held:
same proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due
execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings
of the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the
the latter. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent
he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator. As we stated in
decedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes Ozaeta v. Pecson:
of all his properties the private respondent can inherit only if the said
will is annulled. His interest in the decedent’s estate is, therefore, not
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a
direct or immediate. Maniksâ
necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the
manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to
His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his
been raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition to his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this right may
motion to intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported by be considered a curtailment of the right to dispose.
evidence.
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or
. . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct interest in the fails to give bond may the court appoint other persons to administer
estate or the will, and the private respondent has none. Moreover, the the estate. None of these circumstances is present in this case.
ground cited in the private respondent’s opposition, that the petitioner
has deliberately misdeclared the truth worth and value of the estate, is
GR No. L-23445, June 23, 1966
not relevant to the question of her competency to act as executor.
REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant, vs. FELIX
Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court requires only an allegation of
NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and
the probable value and character of the property of the estate. The
appellees.
true value can be determined later on in the course of the settlement
of the estate.
Facts: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.
Surviving her were her legitimate parents – Felix and Paz, and 6
Rule 79, §1 provides:
brothers and sisters.
On December 7, 1970, QUEMADA as special administrator, instituted Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership
against PASTOR, JR. and his wife an action for reconveyance of of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifest therein that
alleged properties of the estate, which included the properties subject ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of
of the legacy and which were in the names of the spouses PASTOR, extrinsic validity of the win, and the need for and propriety of
JR. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de Pastor, who claimed to be the appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the
owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance. holographic will "with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having
been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law." It declared that the intestate estate administration
On February 2, 1971, PASTOR, JR. and his sister SOFIA filed their
aspect must proceed " subject to the outcome of the suit for
opposition to the petition for probate and the order appointing
reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal
QUEMADA as special administrator.
properties in Civil Case 274-T before Branch IX of the CFI of Cebu."
[Parenthetically, although the statement refers only to the "intestate"
On December 5, 1972, the PROBATE COURT issued an order allowing aspect, it defies understanding how ownership by the estate of some
the will to probate. properties could be deemed finally resolved for purposes of testate
administration, but not so for intestate purposes. Can the estate be the
For two years after remand of the case to the PROBATE COURT, owner of a property for testate but not for intestate purposes?] Then
QUEMADA filed pleading after pleading asking for payment of his again, the Probate Order (while indeed it does not direct the
legacy and seizure of the properties subject of said legacy. PASTOR, implementation of the legacy) conditionally stated that the intestate
JR. and SOFIA opposed these pleadings on the ground of pendency of administration aspect must proceed "unless . . . it is proven . . . that
the reconveyance suit with another branch of the Cebu Court of First the legacy to be given and delivered to the petitioner does not exceed
Instance. All pleadings remained unacted upon by the PROBATE the free portion of the estate of the testator," which clearly implies
COURT. that the issue of impairment of legitime (an aspect of intrinsic validity)
was in fact not resolved. Finally, the Probate Order did not rule on the
propriety of allowing QUEMADA to remain as special administrator of
estate properties not covered by the holographic will, "considering that
On March 5, 1980, the PROBATE COURT set the hearing on the this (Probate) Order should have been properly issued solely as a
intrinsic validity of the will for March 25, 1980, but upon objection of resolution on the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the
PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA on the ground of pendency of the aforestated will. "
reconveyance suit, no hearing was held on March 25. Instead, the
PROBATE COURT required the parties to submit their respective
position papers as to how much inheritance QUEMADA was entitled to
It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of exercised judiciously, with due regard and caution to the peculiar
ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised circumstances of each individual case.
on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said Probate Order
directed the special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.
Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under
the Torrens system in the name of private respondents, and as such
RUFINA LUY LIM vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA were to be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title, the
CORPORATION, SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE probate court obviously opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy fact and
DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING CORPORATION, still proceeded to issue the impugned orders.
ACTION COMPANY, INC.
[G.R. No. 124715. January 24, 2000]
By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in effect
acted in utter disregard of the presumption of conclusiveness of title in
Facts: Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of the late Pastor Y. Lim favor of private respondents. Certainly, the probate court through
whose estate is the subject of probate proceedings in Special
Proceedings Q-95-23334, entitled, "In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y.
such brazen act transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed
Lim Rufina Luy Lim, represented by George Luy, Petitioner". Private
settled jurisprudence on this matter.
respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the
inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion for the
lifting of lis pendens and motion for exclusion of certain properties CORONADO vs. CA
from the estate of the decedent which titles are under PR corporations’ 191 SCRA 814
names. The probate court denied the motion. G.R. No. 78778
December 3, 1990
Petitioner, in the SC, argues that the parcels of land covered under the
Torrens system and registered in the name of private respondent The property subject of this case is a parcel of land situated in
corporations should be included in the inventory of the estate of the Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing 277 square meters. Leonida Coronado
decedent Pastor Y. Lim, alleging that after all the determination by the and her co-petitioners claim that the property in question was
probate court of whether these properties should be included or not is bequeathed to Leonida Coronado under a Will executed by Dr.
merely provisional in nature, thus, not conclusive and subject to a final Dalmacio Monterola, who was allegedly in possession thereof even
determination in a separate action brought for the purpose of before the outbreak of World War II.
adjudging once and for all the issue of title.
Parenthetically, said will was probated under Sp. Proc. No. SC-283,
Issue: W/N petitioner’s contention that said properties be included in entitled "Testate Estate of the Deceased Monterola Leonida F.
the estate inventory is meritorious. NO Coronado, petitioner (Ibid., p. 105). JUANA, together with her
husband, opposed the said probate. Despite their opposition, however,
the Will was allowed by the then Court of First Instance of Laguna,
Held: The determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over
Sta. Cruz Branch (Ibid., p. 106). On appeal, said decision was affirmed
matters of probate depends upon the gross value of the estate of the
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 40353, entitled "Leonida F.
decedent.
Coronado, petitioner-appellee v. Heirs of Dr. Dalmacio Monterola,
oppositors-appellants" (Ibid.). It is not apparent, however, from the
As to the power and authority of the probate court, petitioner relies record whether or not said decision has already become final and
heavily on the principle that a probate court may pass upon title to executory.
certain properties, albeit provisionally, for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not be included in the
As a result of the conflicting claims over the property in question,
inventory.
JUANA filed an action for quieting of title, declaratory relief and
damages against CORONADO.
A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling
evidence was ever presented by petitioner to bolster her bare
Now, CORONADO claims that the will under which JUANA inherited the
assertions as to the title of the deceased Pastor Y. Lim over the
property in question from her grandfather, Melecio Artiaga, was never
properties.
probated; hence, said transfer for ownership was ineffectual
considering that under Rule 75, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court (formerly
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate Sec. 125 of Act No. 190, no will shall pass either real or personal
of the late Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registered in property unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court (Ibid., p.
the name of private respondent corporations, which under the law 115).
possess a personality separate and distinct from their stockholders,
and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate
The contention is without merit.
fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of
private respondents should stand undisturbed.
While it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court (Art. 838, Civil
Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private
Code), the questioned will, however, may be sustained on the basis of
respondents’ motion for exclusion. While it may be true that the
Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time
Regional Trial Court, acting in a restricted capacity and exercising
said document was executed by Melecio Artiaga in 1918. The said
limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is competent to issue orders
article read as follows:
involving inclusion or exclusion of certain properties in the inventory of
the estate of the decedent, and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally the
question of title over properties, it is no less true that such authority "Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties
conferred upon by law and reinforced by jurisprudence, should be by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it
152
Wills and Succession Case Digests
does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heir." (Mang-Oy v. Court ISSUE: W/N the probate court can rule on the intrinsic validity of the
of Appeals, 144 SCRA 33 [1986]) will.
In this case, nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida Coronado RULING: As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only
is entitled to legitime from Melecio Artiaga. The truth of the matter is to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the
that the record is bereft of any showing that Leonida Coronado and testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
the late Melecio Artiaga were related to each other. requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the
will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has
been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVIII, Court
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang vs.
of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS
Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
PAGUIA, respondents.(G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984)
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent
FACTS: On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her
judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C.
father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private
Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for
respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C.
him.
Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only
compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule
74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated unto This contention is without merit.
himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion
Campos.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner
and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that
petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a
which was allegedly executed in the United States and for her permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
The law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent.
citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide
Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix
died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not
sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public
testatrix made her last wig and testament on July 10, 1975, according policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine
to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., that after the testatrix death, her Law.
last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and
registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia,
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions
U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was
of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code,
appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment
the national law of the decedent must apply.
as executor in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia,
U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the
appointment of an administratrix to administer and eventually NOTE: The SC finds the contention of the petition as to the issue of
distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines. jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit. (Read Rule 73, Section 1, of the
Rules of Court)
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was
filed by herein petitioner alleging among other things, that he has Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was
every reason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had
intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of
pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania,
could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to United States of America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as
him. alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for
relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel,
court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing
Atty. Franco Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver
to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
of Rights or Interests) stating that he "has been able to verify the
veracity thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to be truly the
probated will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex- SOLIVIO vs. CA
parte presentation of evidence for the reprobate of the questioned will
was made. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit: G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos is hereby
admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Campos FACTS: On Nov. 25, 1982, Annie Sand died. Her holographic will
Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix. named as devisees petitioners (Sps. Ajero) and private respondent
(Clemente Sand).
153
Wills and Succession Case Digests
On Jan. 20, 1983, petitioners instituted a special proceeding for
allowance of decedent’s holographic will claiming that decedent was in
every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner, vs. JUDGE TOMAS R.
LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First Instance of Manila;
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II and LINDA
the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's GRIMM, respondents.G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984
handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which
were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by
Facts: Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in
petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence.
the Makati Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He was survived by
his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named
Trial Court admitted the decedent’s holographic will to probate. CA, Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm
however, reversed said decision. Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first
marriage which ended in divorce.
ISSUE: WON the alterations and corrections on Annie Sand’s
holographic will invalidate the will such that it cannot be admitted for He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California.
probate. NO! One will disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as
conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second win
disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
RULING:
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate
Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a
Grimm and E. LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978 in Probate No. 3720 of the
holographic will are signed without being dated, and the last
Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah.
disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the
dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions.
Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed
in Manila by Ethel (daughter with first wife) in January, 1978. In its
Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or
order dated April 10, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to
alteration in a holographic will, the testator must authenticate the
probate the two wills and the codicil.
same by his full signature.
Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its
Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris
requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained
and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with
in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to
knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a
sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these
compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate.
dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not
render the whole testament void.
On January 9, 1978, his daughter of the first marriage, Ethel, filed with
Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance intestate proceeding
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate,
No. 113024 for the settlement of his estate. This was opposed by the
notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article
second wife, Maxine, on the ground of the pendency of the probate of
814.In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova, this Court held:
Grimm's will in Utah.
154
Wills and Succession Case Digests
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. the control and jurisdiction of the court for its proper disposition
479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 according to the tenor of the partition.
SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs
should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate until after the will has been probated. A project partition is merely a
case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge proposal to distribute the estate which the court may accept or reject.
assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two It is the court that makes that distribute of the estate and determines
cases. the persons who are entitled thereto.
When Vda. de Kilayko, et al. moved for the reopening of the testate
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this estate proceedings of Maria Alunan, the judicial decree of partition and
judgment an opposition and answer to the petition unless she order of closure of such proceedings was already final and executory,
considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the then reglementary period of thirty (30) days having elapsed from the
purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should time of its issuance, with no timely appeal having been filed by them.
be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the All the requisites for the existence of res judicata are present.
testate case.
ARANCILLO vs. PENAFLORIDA (please refer to Sigma tsn, hindi
VDA. DE KILAYKO vs. JUDGE TENGCO mahanap ang case)
GR NO. 45425 MARCH 27, 1992
The Incompetent, CARMEN CAÑIZA, represented by her legal
FACTS: guardian, AMPARO EVANGELISTA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and
his wife, LEONORA ESTRADA, respondents.
In 1962, the late Maria Alunan executed a “Testamento”, leaving it in
the possession of her niece Eustaqia Lizares.
Eustaqia filed a project of partition in the settlement of the estate of FACTS: On November 20, 1989, the ninety-four year old Carmen
Alunan and was appointed executrix. Cañiza was declared incompetent by judgment[1] of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 107,[2] in a guardianship
The heirs of Alunan executed an agreement of partition and
proceeding.[3] She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and
subdivision.
physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile
Thereafter, Eustaqia filed an urgent motion to reopen the testate
dementia. Her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista, was appointed legal
proceedings so that some properties of Alunan which had been
guardian of her person and estate.
omitted in the partition be adjudicated to her. Eustaqia died
subsequently.
Vda. De Kilayko (petitioner) filed a motion to reopen once again the Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court
testate estate proceedings of Alunan. They prayed among others that (MetroTC) of Quezon City (Branch 35) to eject the spouses Pedro and
a substitute administrator be appointed. Leonora Estrada from the premises of a house and lot owned by
Two sets of intestate heirs of Eustaqia opposed the motion, alleging Cañiza on account of the urgent need of the house due to her
that the court had no more jurisdiction to reopen as the order of advanced age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her
closure had long become final and the testamentary provisions sought expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment;"
to be enforced are null and void.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they
ISSUE: had been living in Cañiza's house since the 1960's; that in
consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by
Cañiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a
WON the testate proceedings may be reopened? – NO. holographic will on September 4, 1988 by which she "bequeathed" to
the Estradas the house and lot in question.
CRUZ vs. VILLASOR (the case is not related to art. 838) ISSUES: 1. WON the change in the codicil after it has been admitted
shall be given effect
CAROLINA CAMAYA, FERDINAND CAMAYA, EDGARDO
CAMAYA and ANSELMO MANGULABNAN, petitioners 2.WON probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared null
vs. and void and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs of petitioners and
BERNARDO PATULANDONG, respondent. the deed of sale
156
Wills and Succession Case Digests
HELD: 1. YES. Natcher averred that she was legally married to Graciano on 20 March
Petitioners argue that by allowing the codicil to probate, it in effect 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a
amended the final judgment in the partition case which is not allowed compulsory heir of the latter.
by law and that petitioner Camayas are innocent purchasers for value
and enjoy the legal presumption that the transfer was lawful. This
The RTC declared that the deed of sale executed by the late Graciano
does not persuade.
del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a
complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property
Though the judgment in the partition case had become final and was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has been
executory as it was not appealed, it specifically provided in its decreed a judicial separation of property between them, the spouses
dispositive portion that the decision was "without prejudice [to] ... the are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale,cannot be
probate of the codicil." The rights of the prevailing parties in said case likewise regarded as a valid donation.It may however be regarded as
were thus subject to the outcome of the probate of the codicil. an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a
compulsory heir of the deceased.”
2. YES. It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of
proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision ratiocinating it is
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and
which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that said legal distribution of the estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary
court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they action for reconveyance/annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the
to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well settlement of estate of a deceased person.
and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
ISSUE: May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate
jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with
court cannot do so.
damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of
a deceased person particularly in questions as to advancement of
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?
the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a
transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the
RULING: NO. Matters which involve settlement and distribution
respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent
of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the
administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory
probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third
persons of their possession and ownership of the property. x x x
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its
general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication
NATCHER vs.CA
and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of
herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as the complaint for reconveyance
FACTS: Spouses Gracianodel Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were and annulment of title with damages is not the proper vehicle to
registered owners of a parcel of land. Upon the death of Graciana in thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances,
1951, Graciano, together with his six children entered into an the RTC was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to
extrajudicial settlement of Graciana’s estate adjudicating and dividing validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent
among themselves the real property subject.Under the agreement, Graciano Del Rosario to his wife Natcher.
Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received
1/14 share of the said property.
ART. 847
157
Wills and Succession Case Digests
4) Eufemia Uson, deceased, who is survived by three daughters
called Maria Salud, Maria Amparo, and Maria Asuncion; and Felix Balanay, Jr. filed a petition for the probate of his mother’s
5) Maria Pilar Uson; notarial will, which was written in English. In thatwill, Leodegaria
6) Maria Manaoag Uson, unmarried, issued had by our deceased declared that it was her desire her properties should not be divided
after Don Daniel Uson with one Leonarda Fernandez, alias Andao de among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes
Lingayen, so that they may have and enjoy it in equal parts as good should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties. She devised
sisters and relatives. andpartitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She
disposed of in the will her husband's one-half share of the conjugal
assets. This was contested by the heirs.
The court below found that the children of the deceased sisters should
take only that portion which their respective mothers would have
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the
taken if they been alive at the time the will was made; that the
will. Thereafter, Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument waiving and
property should be divided into six equal parts corresponding to the
renouncing his right in Leodegaria’s estate in favor of their 6 children
number of sisters; that each living sister should take one-sixth, and the
children of each deceased sister should also take one-sixth, each one-
ISSUE: WON the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic
sixth to be divided among said children equally.
validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and
in declaring it void. NO, the TC was correct
The appellants were asserting that under a proper construction of the
paragraphs of the codicil above-quoted the property should be divided
HELD: We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions
equally between the living sisters and the children of the deceased
of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to
sisters, share and share alike, a niece taking the same share that a
withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to
sister receives.
have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court
acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before
Issue: How should the property be divided? its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might
become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically
Held: Equally. We find expressions which seem to indicate with fair void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity
clearness that it was the intention of the testatrix to divide her of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should
property equally between her sisters and nieces. The indications are: meet the issue.
First, that the testatrix, in the first paragraph thereof, declares that But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February
after her husband's death she desires that "my sisters and nieces, as 28, 1974 that the will was void and in converting the testate
hereinafter named, shall succeed him as heirs." proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that
in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the surviving husband's
conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights
Second, that the testatrix, in the second paragraph of the codicil, which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.
names and identifies each one of her heirs then living, in each one of
the persons whom she desires shall succeed her husband in the
property. Among those mentioned specially are the nieces as well as The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained
the sisters. The nieces are referred to in no way different from the in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions,
sisters. Each one stands out in the second paragraph of the codicil as unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made
clearly as the other and under exactly the same conditions. such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been
made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will
are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can
Third, the last clause of the second paragraph of the codicil which, it be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the
seems to us, taken together with the last clause of the first paragraph testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing
of the codicil, is decisive of the intention of the testatrix. In the last injustice to the beneficiaries"
clause she says that she names all of the persons whom she desires to
take under her will be name "so that they must take and enjoy the
property in equal parts as good sisters and relatives." The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of
the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a
coowner thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso But That
We have then in the first paragraph a declaration as to who the illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be
testatrix desires shall become the owners of her property on the death disregarded.
of her husband. Among them we find the names of the nieces as well
as of the sisters. We have also the final declaration of the testatrix that
she desires that the sisters and the nieces shall take and enjoy the When practical considerations demand that intrinsic validity be passed
property in equal parts. That being so, it appears to us that the upon even before the will is probated, the will could do since the
testatrix's intention is fairly clear, so clear in fact that it is unnecessary probate of the will might become an idle ceremony if on its face the
to bring in extraneous arguments to reach a conclusion as to what she will is intrinsically void.
intended.
ARTICLE 850
10th Set FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-23079. February 27, 1970.]
SUX 9th Batch ARTICLE 838 BALANAY Jr. Vs MARTINEZ
RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO
FACTS: Leodegaria Julian died. She was survived by her husband, AUSTRIA MOZO, petitioners, vs. HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge,
Felix Balanay, Sr., and six legitimate children. Court of First Instance of Rizal, PERFECTO CRUZ, BENITA
158
Wills and Succession Case Digests
CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ and LUZ CRUZ-
SALONGA respondents. The petitioners further contend that had the deceased known the
adoption to be spurious, she would not have instituted the
The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the respondents at all — the basis of the institution being solely her belief
will to pass on to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meñez, that they were compulsory heirs. Proof therefore of the falsity of the
Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had adoption would cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and the
been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted opening of the estate wide to intestacy.
children.
Did the lower court then abuse its discretion or act in violation of the
On April 23, 1969, more than two years after her will was allowed to rights of the parties in barring the petitioners nephews and niece from
probate, Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the decedent
executor without bond by the same court in accordance with the in her will?
provisions of the decedent's will, notwithstanding the blocking attempt
pursued by the petitioner Ruben Austria. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the
Civil Code, the following requisites must concur:
Finally, on November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed in the same First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will;
proceedings a petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance Second, the cause must be shown to be false; and
that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the five
Third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would
respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted by the
not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the
decedent in accordance with law, in effect rendering these
cause.
respondents mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to
succeed as heirs.
The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms,
"sapilitang tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana"
Will the alleged adoption, which turned out to be false, cause the
(legitime), that the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the
invalidation of the institutions of the heirs.
respondents was the testatrix's belief that under the law she could not
do otherwise. If this were indeed what prompted the testatrix in
Held: No. instituting the respondents, she did not make it known in her will.
Surely if she was aware that succession to the legitime takes place by
operation of law, independent of her own wishes, she would not have
The petitioners cite, as the controlling rule, article 850 of the Civil Code
found it convenient to name her supposed compulsory heirs to their
which reads:
legitimes. Her express adoption of the rules on legitimes should very
"The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be well indicate her complete agreement with that statutory scheme.
considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the
testator would not have made such institution if he had known the
falsity of such cause." But even this, like the petitioners' own proposition, is highly
speculative of what was in the mind of the testatrix when she
Coming closer to the center of the controversy, the petitioners have
executed her will. One fact prevails, however, and it is that the
called the attention of the lower court and this Court to the following
decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the
pertinent portions of the will of the deceased which recite:
cause for such institution of heirs. We cannot annul the same on the
"III basis of guesswork or uncertain implications.
"Ang aking mga sapilitang tagapagmana (herederos forzosos) ay ang
aking itinuturing na mga anak na tunay (Hijos legalmente adoptados)
And even if we should accept the petitioners' theory that the decedent
na sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may
instituted the respondents perfecto Cruz, et al. solely because she
apelyidong Cruz.
believed that the law commanded her to do so, on the false
xxx xxx xxx assumption that her adoption of these respondents was valid, still such
"V institution must stand.
"Kung ako ay bawian ng Dios ng buhay, ay aking ipinamamana ang
aking mga ari-ariang maiiwan, sa kaparaanang sumusunod: Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive injunction to
"A. — Aking ipinamamana sa aking nabanggit na limang anak na sina ignore whatever false cause the testator may have written in his will
Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidong for the institution of heirs. Such institution may be annulled only when
Cruz, na parepareho ang kaparti ng bawa't isa at walang lamangan (en one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the testator
partes iguales), bilang kanilang sapilitang mana (legiti[ma]), ang clearly would not have made the institution if he had known the cause
kalahati (1/2) ng aking kaparti sa lahat ng aming ari-ariang for it to be false.
gananciales ng aking yumaong asawang Pedro Cruz na napapaloob sa
Actuacion Especial No. 640 ng Hukumang Unang Dulugan ng Rizal at
Now, would the late Basilia have caused the revocation of the
itinutukoy sa No. 1 ng parafo IV ng testamentong ito, ang kalahati
institution of heirs if she had known that she was mistaken in treating
(1/2) ng mga lagay na lupa at palaisdaan na nasa Obando at Polo,
these heirs as her legally adopted children? Or would she have
Bulacan, na namana ko sa aking yumaong ama na si Calixto Austria, at
instituted them nonetheless?
ang kalahati (1/2) ng ilang lagay na lupa na nasa Tinejeros, Malabon,
Rizal, na aking namana sa yumao kong kapatid na si Fausto Austria."
The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute
on this point or at best is vague and uncertain. The phrases, "mga
The tenor of the language used, the petitioners argue, gives rise to the
sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana," were borrowed from
inference that the late Basilia was deceived into believing that she was
the language of the law on succession and were used, respectively, to
legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the
de scribe the class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the
respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. as the latter's legitime.
inheritance. They offer no absolute indication that the decedent would
159
Wills and Succession Case Digests
have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known expressly provided that ASF is the sole legatee and devisee of his
that she was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. estate.
Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for
Her disposition of the free portion of her estate (libre disposicion) issuance of letters testamentary filed by private respondent. He argues
which largely favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latter's that, as the nearest next of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest
children, and the children of the respondent Benita Cruz, shows a in the matter is material and direct. The court ruled that petitioner has
perceptible inclination on her part to give to the respondents more no right to intervene in the proceedings before Branch 65 of RTC-
than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Makati City.
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot
Compare this with the relatively small devise of land which the be considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of
decedent had left for her blood relatives, including the petitioners testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory or forced
Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Mozo and the children of the heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the
petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude the respondents Perfecto Civil Code provides:
Cruz, et al, from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the other One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate
nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the estate by or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
intestacy — a result which would subvert the clear wishes of the Manikanä
decedent.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he
does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the
Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept away by legitimate of said heirs.
these explicit injunctions in the Civil Code: "The words of a will are to
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator’s -
receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some
effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions (1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be legitimate parents and ascendants;
preferred which will prevent intestacy." (2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants,
with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
ARTICLE 854 (3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal
Maloles II v Philips fiction;
[G.R. No. 129505. January 31, 2000] (5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil
FACTS: Code.
In 1995, Dr. Arturo De Los Santos filed a petition for probate of his Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who
will. He declared that he has no compulsory heirs and that he is may have been preterited in the testator’s will.
naming as sole devisee and legatee the Arturo de Santos Foundation,
Inc. (ASF). The named executrix is Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips. The Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings
petition was filed in RTC Makati Branch 61. Judge Fernando Gorospe of based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the
said court determined that Arturo is of sound mind and was not acting testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent
in duress when he signed his last will and testament and so Branch 61 upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator.
allowed the last will and testament on February 16, 1996. As we stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson: The choice of his executor is a
Ten days from the allowance, Arturo died. Thereafter, Pacita, as precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right
executrix, filed a motion for the issuance of letters of testamentary to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that
with Branch 61. She however withdrew the motion but later on refilled the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who
it with RTC Makati Branch 65. can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The
curtailment of this right may be considered a curtailment of the right
Meanwhile, a certain Octavio Maloles II filed a motion for intervention to dispose.
with Branch 61 claiming that as a next of kin (him being the full
blooded nephew of Arturo) he should be appointed as the Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or
administrator of the estate and that he is an heir. fails to give bond may the court appoint other persons to administer
the estate. None of these circumstances is present in this case.
Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order transferring the
motion filed by Pacita to Branch 61. Judge Santos ratiocinated that
since the probate proceeding started in Branch 61, then it should be G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
the same court which should hear Pacita’s motion. Branch 61 however CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner, vs.HON. INTERMEDIATE
refused to consolidate and referred the case back to Branch 65. APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA
Branch 65 subsequently consolidated the case per refusal of Branch A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents.
61. Eventually, Branch 65 allowed the motion for intervention filed by F A C T S : Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the
Octavio. late Nemesio. The will provided that all his shares from properties he
earned with his wife shall be given to his brother Segundo (father of
Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such property shall be given to
ISSUE: WON Maloles is a compulsory heir (him being the sole full- Segundo’s children. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio.
blooded nephew) NO
The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased,
and the latter's widow Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on the following
HELD: grounds:
Anent the issue of Octavio being an heir, such contention has no merit. (1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;
He is not an heir. Arturo died testate. Next of kins may only inherit if a (2) he is merely a universal heir and
person dies intestate. In this case, Arturo left a valid will which (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
WON Rosa, the widow of the deceased, has been preterited.
NO When Antonia died, the conjugal Lot No. 63 was the subject of an
WON Virginia, the legally adopted daughter of the deceased, action for partition and damages among Josefa, Emilio and Don Julian.
has been preterited. YES
A Compromise Agreement was had whereby the Court rendered a
decision declaring , among others , that Don Julian retains
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides: ownership of Lot No. 63
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the Par. 13 of the same compromise agreement also provided that the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves
the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of
insofar as they are not; inofficious. Julian L. Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the Teves, his two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves
institution shall he effectual, without prejudice to the right of and Pedro Reyes Teves and his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn
representation. Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced During his lifetime, Don Julian, Emilio, and Josefa assigned and
heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned transferred to petitioner JLT Agro Inc. Lot No. 63 through a Deed of
therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities and a
are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Supplemental Deed. . Petitioner successfully had the lot registered in
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). its name. (Note: petitioner is actually a family corporation where Don
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may Julian is president and Josefa the treasurer).
not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator,
although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the After Don Julian’s death, Milagros sold Lot No. 63 to herein
surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if respondents. Upon registering the Deed of Absolute Sale with the
she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. ROD, respondents discovered that the title was already in the name of
(Art. 854, Civil code) petitioner.
However, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent
Respondents, as vendees of Lot No. 63, filed a complaint before the
Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not
RTC ,seeking the declaration of nullity and cancellation of TCT No. T-
been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 8-
375 in the name of petitioner and the transfer of the title to Lot No. 63
9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth
in their names, plus damages.
Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights
and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes
the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied The trial court ruled that at the time of Don Julian’s death , Lot No. 63
that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator was no longer a part of his estate since he had earlier assigned it to
and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least petitioner on 31 July 1973. Consequently, the lot could not be a
their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly proper subject of extrajudicial partition by Milagros Donio and her
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally children, and not being the owners they could not have sold it. Had
adopted child. respondents exercised prudence before buying the subject lot by
investigating the registration of the same with the Registry of Deeds,
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open they would have discovered that five (5) years earlier, the title had
to intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions already been cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-375 in the name of
which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in petitioner.
the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as
the legitimes are concerned. On appeal, the CA held that the Compromise Agreement particularly
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and paragraph 13 thereof, determined, adjudicated and reserved to Don
sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally Julian’s two sets of heirs their future legitimes in his estate . The two
abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of sets of heirs acquired full ownership and possession of the properties
universal heirs-without any other testamentary disposition in the will- respectively adjudicated to them in the CFI decision which was based
amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully on the Compromise Agreement and Don Julian himself could no
worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no longer dispose of the same, including Lot No. 63.
leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No
legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the whole ISSUE:
property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner
and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution of 1st :WON Don Julian validly transferred Lot No. 63 to petitioner. YES
heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v.
Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and devises 2nd: WON there is preterition . NO
must, as already stated above, be respected.
HELD:
JLT Agro Inc v Antonio Balansag
[G.R. No. 141882. March 11, 2005] 1st Issue
J.L.T. AGRO, INC., represented by its Manager, JULIAN L.
TEVES, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO BALANSAG and HILARIA The partition inter vivos (Compromise Agreement) of the properties of
CADAYDAY, respondents. Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article 1347. However,
considering that it would become legally operative only upon the death
FACTS: of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the
Don Julian contracted two marriages. The first was with Antonia with properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was
whom he had 2 children , Josefa and Emilio. When Antonia died, Don but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the
Julian married Milagros with whom he had 4 children. property of their father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D.
the interest to which it related was at the time nonexistent and might SEANGIO, Petitioners, vs. HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as
never exist. Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO,
Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D.
covering Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and
owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot would only JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.
pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death. Facts: A petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo
Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute was filed by petitioners before the RTC. On July 1, 1999, private
right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be challenged respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings
by Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that it had already primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the
been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement. holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the
estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will
2nd Issue under Article 783 of the Civil Code.
Emerging as the crucial question in this case is whether Don Julian had RTC ruling: A perusal of the document termed as "will" by
validly transferred ownership of the subject lot during his lifetime. The oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly shows that
lower court ruled that he had done so through the Supplemental there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo
Deed. The appellate court disagreed, holding that the Supplemental and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New
Deed is not valid, containing as it does a prohibited preterition of Don Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng
Julian’s heirs from the second marriage. Petitioner contends that the Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a
ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous. The contention is well- compulsory heir in the direct line. As such, this Court is bound to
founded. dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an abuse of
discretion.
Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or Petitioners argue that the holographic will does not contain any
all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly states,Kasulatan ng
of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory
annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedent’s will and the
insofar as they are not inofficious. Manresa defines preterition as the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void.
omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or,
while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir
without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of ISSUE: Won there is preterition in the decedent’s will? NO.
the properties. It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the HELD: the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line
direct line from inheritance. It consists in the silence of the testator were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s opinion,
with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory
either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not
the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The
he is mentioned in the will in the latter case. But there is no preterition mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the
where the testator allotted to a descendant a share less than the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her
legitime, since there was no total omission of a forced heir. name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between
Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since
what he resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic
properties, as evidenced by the court approved Compromise will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the
Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides
preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus,
properties which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his
Don Julian upon his death. A couple of provisions in the Compromise property may be rendered nugatory.
Agreement are indicative of Don Julian’s desire along this line. Hence,
the total omission from inheritance of Don Julian’s heirs from the
second marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly ARTICLE 857 (Substitution of Heirs)
imaginable as it is unfounded.
PCIB vs ESCOLIN
Despite the debunking of respondents’ argument on preterition, still (Very loooooooong case; 78 assignment of errors TORTURE!!!! Sinali
the petition would ultimately rise or fall on whether there was a valid ko lang yung tungkol sa Article 857. I would suggest you read the
transfer effected by Don Julian to petitioner. Notably, Don Julian was fulltext. )
also the president and director of petitioner, and his daughter from the
first marriage, Josefa, was the treasurer thereof. There is of course no BARREDO, J.
legal prohibition against such a transfer to a family corporation. Yet Facts: On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving
close scrutiny is in order, especially considering that such transfer a will executed on November 22, 1952 pertinently providing as follows:
would remove Lot No. 63 from the estate from which Milagros and her
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
children could inherit. Both the alleged transfer deed and the title
remainder of my estate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or
which necessarily must have emanated from it have to be subjected to
located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and
incisive and detailed examination.
to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I
SEANGIO VS REYES/ Article 854 give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006 estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike,
namely: Held: Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Saddie persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under
Rascoe, Era Roman and Nimroy Higdon. substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case
named in item Fourth, above, prior to the death of my husband, the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or
Charles Newton Hodges, then it is my will and bequest that the heirs be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave
of such deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share which his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be
would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived. transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary
substitution. The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
This will was subsequently probated in aforementioned Special
Proceedings No. 1307 of respondent court on June 28, 1957, with the In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default
widower Charles Newton Hodges being appointed as Executor, of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In
pursuant to the provisions thereof. the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not
provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease,
incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would
Ruling: The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge
the said disposition exclusively in the light of substitutions covered by Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil,
the Civil Code section on that subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the
Book III) when it is obvious that substitution occurs only when another testatrix's near descendants.
heir is appointed in a will "so that he may enter into inheritance in Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point,
default of the heir originally instituted," (Article 857, id.) and, in the petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is
present case, no such possible default is contemplated. The brothers strictly mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the same
and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges because, later to the second heir. In the case under consideration, the instituted
under her will, they are not to inherit what Hodges cannot, would not heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property
or may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of from his provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of
inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary
simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions, substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first
partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and heir the preservation of the property and its transmission to the
correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters- second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by
in-law. It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution." Also,
whole of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as universal and the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite.
sole heir with absolute dominion over them 6 only during his lifetime, The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his
which means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private
any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was respondent.
not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also
upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that missing here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the
contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to
fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be
the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs. beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A
Hodges, would automatically become operative upon the occurrence of
fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not
the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any remainder related by first degree to the second heir. In the case under scrutiny,
of her estate then.
the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla.
ARTICLE 859
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ, ET AL.
MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS G.R. No. L-27952
February 15, 1982
[G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000] ABAD SANTOS, J
Jose Eugenio Ramirez's will was admitted to probate. Testator
Facts: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix provided in respect of the legacies of Roberto and Jorge Ramirez "con
Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su
petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of parcel of defecto, con substitution vulgar reciprocal entre ambos."
land, with the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to herein private
respondent every year during the latter's lifetime. The codicil provides The appellants question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in
that the obligation is imposed not only on the instituted heir but also connection with Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the estate in favor
to his successors-in-interest and that in case of failure to deliver, of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace v. Ramirez. They allege that the
private respondent shall seize the property and turn it over to the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda survived the
testatrix's "near descendants." PR filed an action for the non- testator or stated differently because she did not predecease the
compliance of the said conditions.Petitioner theorizes that the testatrix testator.
intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants"
Whether or not appellants contention is tenable. NO.
should the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private respondent
be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and without
issue, there can be no valid substitution and such testamentary "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another heir so that he may
provision cannot be given any effect. enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted."
(Art. 857, Civil Code. And that there are several kinds of substitutions,
Issue: W/ N there is fudiciarycommissionary substitution. NO namely: simple or common, brief or compendious, reciprocal, and
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil Code.) According to Tolentino, administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an inventory of
"Although the Code enumerates four classes, there are really only two the estate as follows:
principal classes of substitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary. On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition
The others are merely variations of these two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185 as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two
[1973].) parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and
which reads: Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3)
of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should
die before him, or should not wish, or should be incapacitated to Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds:
accept the inheritance. xxx (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also
invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the
refers, shall comprise the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, Civil Code; xxx
unless the testator has otherwise provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as
RULING: It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint-
follows:
judgment of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the default of the heir originally instituted." (Art. 857, Civil Code. And that
fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to there are several kinds of substitutions, namely: simple or common,
preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of brief or compendious, reciprocal, and fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil
inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such Code.) According to Tolentino, "Although the Code enumerates four
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally classes, there are really only two principal classes of substitutions:
instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and the the simple and the fideicommissary. The others are merely variations
second heir are living at time of the death of the testator. of these two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)
It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code.
respect of the legacies of Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants, The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as
thus: con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, follows:
y, en su defecto, con substitution vulgar reciprocal entre ambos. ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the
The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to
provided. The appellants question the sustitucion vulgar y preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of
fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski" in connection with inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such
the one-third usufruct over the estate given to the widow Marcelle substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
However, this question has become moot because as We have ruled instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and the
above, the widow is not entitled to any usufruct. second heir are living at time of the death of the testator.
The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in
connection with Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the estate in favor respect of the legacies of Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants.
of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace v. Ramirez. The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because provided. The appellants question the sustitucion vulgar y
Wanda survived the testator or stated differently because she did not fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski" in connection with
predecease the testator. But dying before the testator is not the only the one-third usufruct over the estate given to the widow Marcelle
case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to However, this question has become moot because as We have ruled
accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. above, the widow is not entitled to any usufruct.
Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid. The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in
connection with Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the estate in favor
of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace v. Ramirez.
ARTICLE 863 They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because
Wanda survived the testator or stated differently because she did not
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA predecease the testator. But dying before the testator is not the only
PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appellee, vs. MARCELLE D. case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to
VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra.
RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants. G.R. No. L-27952 Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.
February 15, 1982
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the
appellants are correct in their claim that it is void for the following
(Manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez reasons:
among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle (a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are
Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge not related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil
Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski. The widow Marcelle Code validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such
is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for instituted."
substitutions.)
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by
Tolentino as follows:
FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation,
December 11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will substitution, or transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has
was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, decidedly adopted this construction. From this point of view, there can
Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed be only one tranmission or substitution, and the substitute need not be
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman, On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos
however, construe the word "degree" as generation, and the present brought a complaint, docketed as before Branch 52 of the Regional
Code has obviously followed this interpretation. by providing that the Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr.
substitution shall not go beyond one degree "from the heir originally Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil.
instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must
be related to and be one generation from the first heir.
RTC dismissed the complaint. CA reversed RTC decision and ordered
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child the heirs of Rabadilla to reconvey the title over the lot, together with
or a parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
generation or degree from the fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-194.)
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the
Petitioner now contends that there Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be
usufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil
substituted by his “near descendants” should there be noncompliance
Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the testator contradicts the
with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.
establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the
And since the testatrix died single and without issue, there can be no
properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of
valid substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be given
the usufructuaries and the naked owners."
effect.
The estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as
follows:
ISSUE: WON there can be no valid substitution by the heirs of Dr.
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;One-half (1/2)
Rabadilla.
thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in
naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a
simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. RULING: There can be a valid substitution.
Ramirez.
165
Wills and Succession Case Digests
related by first degree to the second heir. In the case under scrutiny, in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over
the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. the testatrix's near descendants.
Jorge Rabadilla.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point,
petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is
strictly mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the same
ARTICLE 882
later to the second heir. In the case under consideration, the instituted
heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property
RABADILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the
respondents.||| sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a
Facts: fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing
upon the first heir the preservation of the property and its transmission
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, in a codicil of AlejaBelleza, was to the second heir. Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the
instituted devisee of Lot No. 1392 with an area of 511,855 square testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr.
meters with the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to herein Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver
private respondent every year during the latter's lifetime. The part of the usufruct to private respondent. Another important
codicil provides that the obligation is imposed not only on the element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under
instituted heir but also to his successors-in-interest and that in Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the
case of failure to deliver, private respondent shall seize the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first
property and turn it over to the testatrix's "near descendants." heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if
Dr. Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife and the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir. In the
children, one of whom is herein petitioner. Private respondent, case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the
alleging failure of the heirs to comply with their obligation, filed a instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. The institution of an heir in the
complaint with the RTC praying for the reconveyance of the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the
subject property to the surviving heirs of the testatrix. During the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In
pre-trial, a compromise agreement was concluded between the a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution,
parties wherein the lessee of the property assumed the (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or
delivery of 100 piculs of sugar to private respondent. However, (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A "mode"
only partial delivery was made. imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect
the efficacy of his rights to the succession. On the other hand, in a
Thereafter, the trial court dismissed the complaint for conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be
lack of cause of action. The Court of Appeals, on appeal, reversed fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The
the decision and held that the institution of Dr. Rabadilla is in the condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but
nature of a modal institution and a cause of action in does not suspend. To some extend, it is similar to a resolutory
favor of private respondent arose when petitioner failed to condition
comply with their obligation under the codicil, and in ordering the
reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of testatrix. Aggrieved, ARTICLE 888
petitioner availed of this recourse.
Issue:Whether or not there was substitution? REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA PASCUAL, petitioners, vs.
AIDA FRANCISCO-ALFONSO, respondent.
Ruling: G.R. No. 138774 March 8, 2001
Successional rights are transmitted from the Facts: Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only
moment of death and compulsory heirs succeed the decedent not only daughter of spouses Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are
to all the property but also to his rights and obligations. Hence, the now both deceased.
heirs of Dr. Rabadilla is also obliged under the codicil to deliver 100
Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio
piculs of sugar to private respondent every year.
Francisco with his common law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom he
There is no substitution of heir where no substitute was begot seven (7) children.
provided by the testatrix in case the instituted heir predecease her or Gregorio Francisco owned two parcels of residential land. When
in case of the latter's incapacity or renunciation nor was the instituted Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided to his
heir mandated to preserve the property and to transmit it to the daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his property were in the
second heir.Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual.
or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under
After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990, Aida inquired about the
substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the
certificates of title from her half sisters. They informed her that
designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case
Gregorio had sold the land to them on August 15, 1983. After
the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or
verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale
be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave
in favor of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August 15,
his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be
1983, Gregorio executed a "Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan, whereby
transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary
for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land to Regina Francisco
substitution.
and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance Bulacan issued TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-
in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or 59.586 to Zenaida Pascual.
renunciation. In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a
Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to complaint against petitioners for annulment of sale with damages. She
predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near alleged that the signature of her late father, Gregorio Francisco, on the
descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983, was a forgery.
should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed
166
Wills and Succession Case Digests
Issue: May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the HELD:
estate of her deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the
property of her father to his illegitimate children?
In order that a property may be impressed with a reservable character
the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was
Held: No. acquired by a descendant from an asscendant or from a brother or
sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without an
Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil issue; (3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by
Code19 provisions insofar as the transaction affected respondent's operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third
legitime. The sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was degree belonging to the line from which said property came.
the Civil Code, not the Family Code. All of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the
Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his records, Juanoito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate in
illegitimate daughters20 at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The 1952; he died withour leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share
sale was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre
legitime and rightful share in said property. Before his death, Gregorio died, Juannnito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the
had a change of heart and informed his daughter about the titles to third degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador
the property. Chua and Remidios Chua, the suppose legitimate children of the
deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein
According to Article 888, Civil Code:
According to Manresa, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous
"The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one- title when the recipient does not give anything in return." It matters
half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior
"The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made
rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person making it,
provided." without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that
the person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return.
Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the
“The essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so
parcels of land involved were the only property left by their father, the
gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the
sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in her father's
transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the
estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his
transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the
only legitimate child.21
second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by
The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous.
proper testate or intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from
His compulsory heir can not be deprived of her share in the estate any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the property is
save by disinheritance as prescribed by law. given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous.
ARTICLE 891
GONZALES v CFI
Jose Frias Chua had 2 marriages. First with Patricia, he had 3 children-
Ignacio, Manuel and Lorenzo. FACTS:
When Patricia died, he married Consolacion de la Torre and had one Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason,
child - Juanito Frias Chua. died [Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow,
Jose Frias Chua died intestate. Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named
After the intestate proceeding the court adjudicated half of lot in Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito,
question to Consolacion and the other half to their only son, Juanito. Alejandro and Jose.
The two sons in the first marriage, Lorenzo and Ignacio, received P3k The real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason (father) were
and P1550 respectively. (Manuel already died). partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and
Juanito also died intestate without issue. Consolacion de la Torre Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la
executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro- Paz(son/husband) who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.|
indiviso share of her son Juanito in the lot in question. Filomena Legarda y Races (daughter) died intestate and without issue
When dela Torre died, Ignacio and the heirs of Lorenzo filed a on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races
complaint praying that the one-half portion of the Lot be declared as a Vda. de Legarda (mother/wife).
reservable property for the reason that the lot in question was subject
Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to
to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 NCC.
herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased
daughter.
ISSUE: These are the properties (see full text) in litigation in this case. As a
result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her
WON property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties
from his father Jose Frias Chua gratuitously (as first requisite held proindiviso by her other six children.
of Reserva Troncal)? – YES. Mrs. Legarda executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein
she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter,
167
Wills and Succession Case Digests
in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor
grandchildren in all). (reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from the
Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the properties (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario)
consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y who is within the third degree from theprepositus and who belongs to
Tuason (father) which the children inherited in representation of their the (line o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the
father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz (son/husband). property should be reserved by the reservor.
Mrs. Legarda died (mother/wife). Her will was admitted to probate as The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters.
a holographic will. The decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
Appeals. descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the property
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz, a daughter of the testatrix, filed a came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. He is
motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the called the prepositus.
properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate
on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.
should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death
brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of
surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
Benito F. Legarda. from which the property came.
Mrs. Beatriz Gonzales filed an ordinary civil action against her brothers, The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee
sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of a retro in a pacta de retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional.
securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but
properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic
he can require that the reservable character of the property be
will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and
recognized by the purchaser.
her three sons.
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the
Lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales.
reservable property is illegal for being a contract regarding future
inheritance.
ISSUE: WON the disputed properties are reservable properties under
article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811; YES
APPLICATION TO THE INSTANT CASE:
Whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in his
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably
will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six
reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she
children; NO
was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time
of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of
HELD: the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs.
NOTE: This case involves a length illustrative discussion of Reserva Legarda.
Troncal so prefer to read full text. We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had
now article 891, which reads: 1äwphï1.ñët inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable
properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
the reservor.
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit
of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit
from which said property came. the reservable properties from theprepositus, not from the reservor.
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be
title property from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from
same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda.
by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property
ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share
who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant therein.
(prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition
came. of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second
lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary
or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by disposition cannot be allowed.
operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased
descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the (See Full text for application of Florentino v Florentino case)
reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the
reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in
consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable
(reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the character due to the non-existence of third-degree relatives of
deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs.
brother or sister of the deceased descendant. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree
relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and Races lines.
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or
extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs.
brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death, there were (and still
descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant
168
Wills and Succession Case Digests
are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are
properties did not lose their reservable character. The disposition of reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the one-half pro-
the said properties should be made in accordance with article 891 or indiviso share therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his
the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half
holographic will. The said properties did not form part of Mrs. pro-indiviso share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of
Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4). land, and, therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and
to be collected by defendant Dalisay P. Tongko Camacho from the
tenants of said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate
G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986
taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
plaintiffs-appellees, vs. DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO
TONGKO and GODOFREDO CAMACHO, defendants-appellants.
On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco
Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant
FACTS: Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half of the
Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisco seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions.
Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate
relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles.
ISSUE: whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by
the lower Court, all relatives of the praepositus within the third degree
Plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a common in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable
ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of property upon the death of the reservista, as seems to be implicit in
Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant. Art. 891 of the Civil Code or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant,
They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously the rights of said relatives are subject to, and should be determined
donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate by, the rules on intestate succession.
sister of plaintiffs). Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her
husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino
HELD: That question has already been answered in Padura vs.
Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-
Baldovino, 3 where the reservatario was survived by eleven nephews
Camacho) and leaving the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as
and nieces of the praepositus in the line of origin, four of whole blood
the inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.
and seven of half blood, and the claim was also made that all eleven
were entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares. This Court,
In 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the principles of
children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that the nephews and nieces of
legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the whole blood were each entitled to a share double that of each of the
partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by nephews and nieces of half blood in accordance with Article 1006 of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of the Civil Code.
Deeds of Manila were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia
Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on
three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate children
intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any
Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso shares.
right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino
Dizon (thepraepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his
In 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within
leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of the same degree as the latter.
land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole
intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva
This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made
troncal. In 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights
in Padura, supra, that as to the reservable property,
and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by
thereservatarios do not inherit from the reservista, but from the
her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho,
descendant praepositus:
subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant
Primo Tongko. ... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the
estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long as
there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The
On June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his only latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista, but from the
legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho. The descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis
parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns causa, subject to the condition that they must survive thereservista.
one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries,
her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.Defendant Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) ... .
Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other
half of the said seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of
the reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus,
and under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been
upon legal advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three- excluded by the defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate
fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain
which interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or simply because "the transmission of the property was delayed by the
three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being interregnum of the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a "detour"
also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon. through an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the reservation before its
transmission to the reservatario.
ISSUE: 1. Which of the following articles of the New Civil Code will ARTICLE 912
apply, Article 343 on the one hand, or Articles 341, 978 and 979 on
the other; and
DIZON-RIVERA vs. DIZON
Facts:
2. Whether the material data rule enuciated by Rule 41, Section 6 the On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in
New Rules of Court should be followed, ex cathedra, in the present Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to
case: wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon,
Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina
HELD: Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia
Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-
deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven
WE opine that the governing provision is the hereinafter quoted article compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the
343 of the New Civil Code, in relation to Articles 893 and 1000 of said
oppositors-appellants.
law, which directs that: The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960
and written in the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will
Art. 343. If the adopter is survived by legitimate were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other
parents or ascendants and by an adopted person. legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia,
the latter shall not have more successional rights Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and
than an acknowledged natural child. Laureano Tiambon.
A project partition was filed reducing the share of Marina and Tomas’
share (children) as they are admittedly considered to have received in
Article 343 of the New Civil Code is qualification to
the will more than their respective legitime. The other children
Article 341 which gives an adopted child the same
proposed their own project partition whereby they would reduce the
rights and duties as though he were a legitimate
testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to ½ and
child. The reason for this is that:
limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises or legacies
to ½ of the estate as the disposable free portion.
(I)t is unjuest to exclude the adopter's parents
from the inheritance in facor of an adopted person
(Report of the Code Commission, p. 92).
Held:
Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments
It is most unfair to accord more successional rights to the adopted, in the testatrix' will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be
who is only related artificially by fiction of law to the deceased, than considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole context of
170
Wills and Succession Case Digests
the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate (save ordered to render an accounting of the fruits. The probate court
for some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning granted the petition. On January 31, 1957 the parish priest filed
of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole another petition for the delivery of the ricelands to the church as
estate through her will. The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in trustee.
her testamentary dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition praying
convert the same into devises to be taken solely from the free one-half that the bequest be declared inoperative and that they be adjudged as
disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix' intent that the persons entitled to the said ricelands since, as admitted by the
her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the parish priest of Victoria, "no nearest male relative of" the testator "has
beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said ever studied for the priesthood".
dispositions were therefore on account of the respective legitimes of
However, it was discovered that the testator had a grandnephew
the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of
named Edgardo G. Cunanan (the grandson of his first cousin) who was
her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the
a seminarian in the San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in Quezon
third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in
City. The administrator was directed to deliver the ricelands to the
case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them
parish priest of Victoria as trustee.
shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the
time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said CA's ruling: Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for his
deceased." 17 nearest male relative who would take the holy orders but that such
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary trust could exist only for twenty years because to enforce it beyond
dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory that period would violate "the rule against perpetuities. It ruled that
heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate, since no legatee claimed the ricelands within twenty years after the
as contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code testator's death, the same should pass to his legal heirs, citing articles
precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirsmay dispose 888 and 912(2) of the old Civil Code and article 870 of the new Civil
of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code.
Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by As refutation, the legal heirs argue that the Court of Appeals d the
oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article bequest inoperative because no one among the testator's nearest male
912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who relatives had studied for the priesthood and not because the trust was
admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her a private charitable trust. According to the legal heirs, that factual
estate in providing that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a legitime finding is binding on this Court.
may retain the entire property,provided its value does not exceed that
of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as ISSUE: WON the parish church has the right to the
legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for administration of the ricelands
making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die HELD: NO. In this case, as in cases involving the law of contracts
intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the and statutory construction, where the intention of the contracting
testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article parties or of the lawmaking body is to be ascertained, the primary
1080 of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions issue is the determination of the testator's intention which is the law of
upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to the case.
be respected insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that
compulsory heirs. the testator intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male
relative who would become a priest, who was forbidden to sell the
ARTICLE 960 ricelands, who would lose the devise if he discontinued his studies for
the priesthood, or having been ordained a priest, he was
excommunicated, and who would be obligated to say annually twenty
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of the testator and his
RIGOR. THE PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC parents.
CHURCH OF VICTORIA, TARLAC, petitioner-appellant,
vs. On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would
BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE administer the ricelands only in two situations: one, during the interval
RIGOR and JOVITA ESCOBAR DE FAUSTO, respondents- of time that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for
appellees. the priesthood and two, in case the testator's nephew became a priest
and he was excommunicated.
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no
FACTS: Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on haya legatario acondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he was
August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at the time of his
was probated by the CFI of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. death, who would like to become a priest, was still in grade school or
Named as devisees in the will were the testators nearest relatives, his in high school or was not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish
three sisters. The testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands before the nephew
Gamalinda. entered the seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew entered
In addition to he will contained the following controversial legacy the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy and administer the
purported to be given to the nearest male relative who shall take the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship
priesthood, and in the interim to be administered by the actual would be terminated.
Catholic Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether
Philippines, or his successors. at the time Father Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was
Judge Roman A. Cruz in his order of August 15, 1940, approving the studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his desire to follow
project of partition, directed that after payment of the obligations of the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically answered in
the estate the administratrix should deliver to the devisees their paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and
respective shares. January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "not male
On 1954, the parish priest of Victoria filed a petition praying for the relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the
appointment of a new administrator who should deliver to the church priesthood"
the said ricelands, and further praying that the possessors thereof be
171
Wills and Succession Case Digests
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late
became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree,
question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent.
of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt
was likewise inoperative.
ARTICLE 970
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now
article 960 (2), which provides that legal succession takes place when
G.R. No. 140975, Promulgated December 8, 2000
the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There
being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU, Petitioner. vs. PASTORA
should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as PIEDAD, Respondent.
if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and Facts: This case involves a question of law rather than question of
partly intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. The old rule fact.
as to the indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer valid. Thus, if a
conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate
succession as to the property recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon In this case, there is no doubt nor difference that arise as to the truth
Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267). or falsehood on alleged facts. The question as to whether intervenor-
appellant as a collateral relative within the fifth civil degree, has legal
interest in the intestate proceeding which would justify her
ARTICLE 962
intervention calls for the application and interpretation of the proper
law.
BAGUNU vs. PIEDAD
Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or
ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-
FACTS: Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a
ascendants. Pastora is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third- first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent.
degree relative of the decedent, while Ofelia. Petitioner was asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late
Augusto H. Piedad.
Ofelia asserted entitlement to a share of the estate of the late
Augusto H. Piedad and assailed the finality of the order of the trial
court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad. Issue: Can petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree,
inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil
degree? Elsewise stated does the rule of proximity in intestate
succession find application among collateral relatives?
ISSUE: Can Ofelia, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit
alongside Pastorat, a collateral relative of the third civil degree?
Held: NO.
In this petition for review, the question raised is whether the widow Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs: xxx (3) The widow or
whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, widower; xxx
her mother-in-law.
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial settlement is valid . YES
The fact that Cresenciano predeceased Joaquin Teves does not mean
that he or, more accurately, his heirs, lose the right to share in the
Heirs of Joaquin Teves v CA partition of the property for this is a proper case for representation,
wherein the representative is raised to the place and degree of the
(G.R. No. 109963, Ocotber 13, 1999) person represented and acquires the rights which the latter would
have if he were living.
FACTS:
Marcelina and Joaquin Teves had 9 children named Teotimo, Felicia, However, notwithstanding their non-inclusion in the settlement, the
Pedro, Andres, Asuncion, Gorgonio, Cresenciano, Arcadia and action which Cresenciano might have brought for the reconveyance of
Maria. After the death of spouses Teves (intestate), their 8 children ( their shares in the property has already prescribed. An action for
Andres predeceased the parents) executed extrajudicial settlements reconveyance based upon an implied trust pursuant to article 1456 of
adjudicating unto themselves two parcels of land belonging to their the Civil Code prescribes in ten years from the registration of the deed
parents and alienating the same in favor of their sister Asuncion . The or from the issuance of the title. Asuncion Teves acquired title over Lot
first Extrajudicial Settlement covered Lot 6409 (lot 1) . The second 6409 in 1972, but the present case was only filed by plaintiffs-
covered Lot 769-A (Lot 2) which was adjudicated in equal shares. appellants in 1984, which is more than 10 years from the issuance of
title.
On May 9, 1984, Ricardo ( heir of Cresenciano) and Arcadia Teves filed
the present action for partition seeking the partition of the lands in
question and conveyance of their respective shares. Ricardo claims
that Cresenciano’s signature did not appear in the Settlement of Lot As to Ricardo’s claim over Lot 769-A
769-A. Arcadia’s main contention is that the documents entitled
“Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale “ over each of the two parcels of Ricardo Teves is actually in possession of an undetermined portion of
land is spurious since some of the signatures were forgeries. In sum, Lot 769-A and defendants-appellees It-it do not claim ownership over
they argue that these fraudulent documents which defendants rely in his share in the land. Thus, contrary to the appellate court’s ruling,
claiming ownership to the disputed properties are all nullities and have there is no basis for an action for reconveyance of Ricardo Teves’
no force in law and could not be used as basis for any legal title. share since, in the first place, there has been no conveyance. Ricardo
Teves is entitled to the ownership and possession of one-eighth of Lot
The Trial Court and CA upheld the validity of the extrajudicial 769-A.
settlements.
Neither does Ricardo Teves have a right to demand partition of Lot
769-A because the two extrajudicial settlements have already
effectively partitioned such property. Every act which is intended to
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is
deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. The extrajudicial DIAZ v. IAC (Cuabo)
settlements executed in 1956 and 1959 adjudicated Lot 769-A in equal
shares unto the eight heirs of Marcelina .Such a partition, which was
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and
legally made, confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the
MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA
property adjudicated to him. Although Cresenciano, Ricardo’s
PACURSA guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., vs.INTERMEDIATE
predecessor-in-interest, was not a signatory to the extrajudicial
APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.
settlements, the partition of Lot 769-A among the heirs was made in
G.R. No. L-66574 June 17, 1987
accordance with their intestate shares under the law.
What is the effect of non-registration of the Extrajudicial Settlements Felisa (neice) filed a petition praying among other things, that the
(settlement of Lot 769-A was not registered)? corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her favor and that
she be appointed as special Administratrix of the properties of the
deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
In the case of Vda. de Reyes vs. CA, the Court, interpreting section 1 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, upheld the validity of an oral partition Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only
of the decedent’s estate and declared that the non-registration of an legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila
extrajudicial settlement does not affect its intrinsic validity. It was held Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union
in this case that – were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3)
that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero
[t]he requirement that a partition be put in a public document and and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only
registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda.
same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in
claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time
others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six
executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz
there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is competent for the
heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a
manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law. The lower court declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin (Niece) as the sole
legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law
doctrine that the law does not relieve a party from the effects of a for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate family and the
contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with full illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism
awareness of what he was doing, simply because the contract turned and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down
out to be a foolish or unwise investment. Therefore, although upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the
plaintiffs-appellants may regret having alienated their hereditary illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the
shares in favor of their sister Asuncion, they must now be considered former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former,
bound by their own contractual acts. in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more
than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
ART 992 Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in
the succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista Manuel C. Pascual Jose C. Pascual
provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code. Susana C. Pascual-Bautista Erlinda C. Pascual Wenceslao C. Pascual,
Jr.
In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of (c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the
the Spanish Civil Code is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, deceased, to wit:
We are reproducing herewith the Reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Avelino Pascual Isoceles Pascual Loida Pascual-Martinez Virginia
Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also finds full support from other Pascual-Ner Nona Pascual-Fernando Octavio Pascual Geranaia Pascual-
civilists, to wit: Dubert;
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was blood of the deceased, to wit:
admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 Olivia S. Pascual Hermes S. Pascual
of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can riot inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and (e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the
mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this deceased and represented by the following:
principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Dominga M. Pascual Mamerta P. Fugoso Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay Eleuterio P. Sarmiento Domiga P. San
and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate Diego Nelia P. Marquez Silvestre M. Pascual Eleuterio M. Pascual
child to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or (Rollo, pp. 46-47)
illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a
legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don
the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do
so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future Andres Pascual, filed with the RTC, a Special Proceeding, Case No.
7554, for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband.
revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide
either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of
representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a
contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the
first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis- herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although
a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary paragraph V of such compromise agreement provides, to wit:
Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First
Quater, 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).
This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the
continuation of the above-entitled proceedings until the final
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise
phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual
includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual.
includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. 7 The record shows
that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed
to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the
are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes
children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of
provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court Don Andres Pascual, their uncle.
did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole
legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero. On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate
Hereditary Rights and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to
reiterate Hereditary Rights.
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, vs.
On December 18, 1987, the RTC, presided over by Judge Manuel S.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby
C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE
resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia
ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL,
and Hermes Pascual.
ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA
PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO
PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent CA rendered its decision dismissing
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. the petition.
162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.
PARAS, J.: ISSUE: Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the
FACTS: Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural
are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the children from the inheritance of the deceased. YES!
latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual.
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of
issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to
and was survived by the following:
exclude recognized and of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses; SCRA 645 [1987]) because being acknowledged natural children, their
(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when
the deceased, to wit: such children were under conception.
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children descendants shall inherit by right of representation" and in Article 902
as provided in Article 992 must be strictly construed to refer only to that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their
spurious children. death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate
are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that
an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. (Amicus
petitioners are within the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12).
and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them. Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432;
[1990]).
RULING: Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the Civil Code,
provides: Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are
nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the
from the illegitimate child. issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural children should be
treated differently, in the negative.
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v.
IAC, supra, where this Court ruled that: It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA
LEX SED LEX).
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate
child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother TOMAS CORPUS vs.ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the
of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco, RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA
is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS, RAMON L. CORPUS, ENRIQUE J.
legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD ASPRER and CIPRIANO
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is NAVARRO,
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is
in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the G.R. No. L-22469 October 23, 1978
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child
nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken
in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding Facts: Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and
further grounds of resentment. Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas
illegitimate children. Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not Corpus Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his
err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father nearest relatives were (1) his half-brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half-
Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose
the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father. A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half-brother,
Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half-
brother Jose Corpus.
SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN (Diaz vs
CA)
The Court held: Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of
successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus,
to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. TC dismissed the case.
representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner,
one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented
are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear
on this matter. The right of representation is not available to In the appeal, one of the contentions of Corpus is that the TC erred in
illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a holdind Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child.
legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that
the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent
by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the
grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of Issue: W/N Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother's
representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate. NO.
intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of
his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the
provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case
because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab Held: The children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are
intestatobetween the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and presumed to be legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have taken
relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state Article place between Ramona and Tomas. Semper praesumitur pro
982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception. matrimonio. It is disputably presumption "That a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage"; "that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being
177
Wills and Succession Case Digests
no divorce, absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate", and "that G.R. No. 183053
things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and
the ordinary habits of life" (Sec. 5[z], [bb] and cc Rule 131, Rules of June 16, 2010
Court).
NACHURA, J.:
Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el In 1979, Emilio I died. In June 4, 1990, Cristina also died. Significantly,
legitimado no tienen derecho a suceder abintestato a los hijos y Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, adopted their
parientes legitimos del padre o madre que to haya reconocido, ni ellos illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
al hijo natural ni al legitimado". Article 943 "prohibits all successory
reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" .
The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further
grounds of resentment. NO. Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar
rule,[18] is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for
the actual relationship between Federico and Cristina, on one hand,
and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal relationship of
Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an legitimate relatives;
acknowledged natural or legitimated child should die without issue,
either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who
acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both
acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and As Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s interest in the estate of Cristina
share alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated is as much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of
children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in respondent, considering that the CA even declared that “under the
accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have the right of
sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side, succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership.”
rules of intestacy.
“The [R]eceipt of the [E]arnest [M]oney with [P]romise to [S]ell and to ISSUE: 1. whether the CA erred in modifying the trial court’s Decision
[B]uy is hereunder quoted, to wit: and in obligating petitioners to sell 3/5 of the disputed properties to
respondent, even if the suspensive condition had not been fulfilled
‘Received today from MR. ALEX A. LINA the sum of ONE HUNDRED Collateral issue: the computation of the decedent’s share in the realty
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, per under administration.
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company Chec[k] No. 319913 dated today
for P100,000.00, x xx as additional earnest money for the following: RULING: Petitioners argue that the CA erred in ordering the
conveyance of the disputed 3/5 of the parcels of land, despite the
nonfulfillment of the suspensive condition -- court approval of the sale
xxx ‘3. Considering that Mrs.Remedios Reyes de Sandejas is -- as contained in the “Receipt of Earnest Money with Promise to Sell
already deceased and as there is a pending intestate proceedings for and to Buy” (also referred to as the “Receipt”). Instead, they assert
the settlement of her estate (Spec. Proc. No. 138393, Manila CFI, that because this condition had not been satisfied, their obligation to
Branch XI), wherein SELLER was appointed as administrator of said deliver the disputed parcels of land was converted into a money claim.
Estate, and as SELLER, in his capacity as administrator of said Estate,
has informed BUYER that he (SELLER) already filed a [M]otion with the
Court for authority to sell the above parcels of land to herein BUYER,
We disagree. Petitioners admit that the agreement between the
but which has been delayed due to the burning of the records of said
deceased EliodoroSandejas Sr. and respondent was a contract to
Spec. Pro. No. 138398, which records are presently under
sell. Not exactly. In a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase
reconstitution, the parties shall have at least ninety (90) days from
price is a positive suspensive condition. The vendor’s obligation to
receipt of the Order authorizing SELLER, in his capacity as
convey the title does not become effective in case of failure to pay.[10]
administrator, to sell all THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PARCELS OF LAND
TO HEREIN BUYER (but extendible for another period of ninety (90)
days upon the request of either of the parties upon the other), within
which to execute the deed of absolute sale covering all above parcels On the other hand, the agreement between Eliodoro Sr. and
of land; respondent is subject to a suspensive condition -- the procurement of
a court approval, not full payment. There was no reservation of
ownership in the agreement. In accordance with paragraph 1 of the
‘5. Whether indicated or not, all of above terms and conditions Receipt, petitioners were supposed to deed the disputed lots over to
shall be binding on the heirs, administrators, and assigns of both the respondent. This they could do upon the court’s approval, even before
SELLER and BUYER full payment. Hence, their contract was a conditional sale, rather than
a contract to sell as determined by the CA.
The lower court issued an [O]rder granting the intervention of Alex A.
Lina. When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or
effectivity can take place only if and when the condition happens or is
fulfilled.[11] Thus, the intestate court’s grant of the Motion for Approval
The counsel for [A]dministratorEliodoro P. Sandejas filed a of the sale filed by respondent resulted in petitioners’ obligation to
[M]anifestation alleging among others that the administrator, execute the Deed of Sale of the disputed lots in his favor. The
Mr.Eliodoro P. Sandejas, died sometime in November 1984 in Canada. condition having been satisfied, the contract was
perfected. Henceforth, the parties were bound to fulfill what they had
Intervenor Alex A. Lina filed [a] Motion for his appointment as a new expressly agreed upon.
administrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios R. Sandejas. Lower
Computation of Eliodoro’s Share
179
Wills and Succession Case Digests
Petitioners aver that the CA’s computation of Eliodoro Sr.’s share Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator, without bond, of
in the disputed parcels of land was erroneous because, as the conjugal the estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to
partner of Remedios, he owned one half of these lots plus a further her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.
one tenth of the remaining half, in his capacity as a one of her legal - Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her
heirs. Hence, Eliodoro’s share should be 11/20 of the entire first marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the
property. Respondent poses no objection to this computation.[22] latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more than
eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with
On the other hand, the CA held that, at the very least, the Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she
conditional sale should cover the one half (1/2) pro indiviso conjugal sought priority in the administration of the estate of the decedent.
share of Eliodoro plus his one tenth (1/10) hereditary share as one of
the ten legal heirs of the decedent, or a total of three fifths (3/5) of ISSUE: WON the marriage between the deceased Teodorico and
the lots in administration.[23] respondent Marietta is valid (that, in turn, would be determinative of
her right as a surviving spouse). YES.
Petitioners’ computation is correct. The CA computed Eliodoro’s
RULING: The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and
share as an heir based on one tenth of the entire disputed property. It
respondent Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force
should be based only on the remaining half, after deducting the
at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect
conjugal share.[24]
only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limited its
The proper determination of the seller-heir’s shares requires further retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not
explanation. Succession laws and jurisprudence require that when a prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the Civil Code or other laws. Verily, the applicable specific provision in the
decedent’s entire estate – under the concept of conjugal properties of instant controversy is Article 83 of the New Civil Code.
gains -- must be divided equally, with one half going to the surviving In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's
spouse and the other half to the heirs of the deceased.[25] After the first husband, James William Bounds, had been absent or had
settlement of the debts and obligations, the remaining half of the disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a
estate is then distributed to the legal heirs, legatees and devices. We second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This
assume, however, that this preliminary determination of the second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil
decedent’s estate has already been taken into account by the parties, Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a
since the only issue raised in this case is whether Eliodoro’s share is judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.
11/20 or 3/5 of the disputed lots.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having
been adduced to indicate another property regime between the
spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution with the
death of Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal
portions -- one portion going to the surviving spouse and the other
portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. The successional right in
intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net estate of the deceased,
concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces
(the latter by right of representation), is one-half of the inheritance,
the brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to the
other half. Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed by right of
representation in the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon the
other hand, nephews and nieces can succeed in their own right which
is to say that brothers or sisters exclude nephews and nieces except
only in representation by the latter of their parents who predecease or
are incapacitated to succeed. The appellate court has thus erred in
granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion of its judgment,
successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their own
mother Antonia who herself is invoking successional rights over the
estate of her deceased brother.
ART 995
183
Wills and Succession Case Digests
Held: No, the reprobation of the will is valid. Although on its face,
In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest leagal heirs were his three the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the
sisters or second-degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the
Mrs. Quiambao. Obviously, when the testator specified his nearest private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was,
male relative, he must have had in mind his nephew or a son of his at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident
sister, who would be his third-degree relative, or possibly a of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par.
grandnephew. But since he could not prognosticate the exact date of (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
his death or state with certitude what category of nearest male relative
would be living at the time of his death, he could not specify that his Art. 16 par. (2).
nearest male relative would be his nephew or grandnephews (the son
of his nephew or niece) and so he had to use the term "nearest male
relative". xxx xxx xxx
CAYETANO v. LEONIDAS the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent.
FACTS: On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide
father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix
respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not
Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public
compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication whereby he policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine
adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the Law.
deceased Adoracion Campos.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions
On November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code,
reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was the national law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied
allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:
administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy
Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of or good customs may be involved in our system of
her death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
while temporarily residing with her sister that during her lifetime, the For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
testatrix made her last will and testament on July 10, 1975, according the amount of successional rights, to the
to the laws of Pennsylvania, after the testatrix death, her last will and decedent's national law. Specific provisions must
testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered with the prevail over general ones.
Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A.,
xxx xxx xxx
An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner
alleging among other things, that he has every reason to believe that The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G.
the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic and under the law of Texas, there are no forced
provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
would work injustice and injury to him. validity of the provision of the will and the amount
of successional rights are to be determined under
Issue: Whether or not the reprobation of the will is invalid for it Texas law, the Philippine Law on legitimes cannot
divested the father of his legitime which was reserved by the law for be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
him and the same would work injustice and injury to him.
The order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and
to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under
184
Wills and Succession Case Digests
consideration. It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or
good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the
nationals. memorandum he submitted to support his motion for reconsideration,
Fortunato changed the basis for his claim to a portion of the estate. He
asserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights dated July 31,
1967, supposedly signed by Pilar N. Borromeo, Maria B. Putong, Jose
Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo, Patrocinio
Borromeo-Herrera, Marcial Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V.
Borromeo, Consuelo B. Morales, Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B.
Talam In the waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato
their shares in the disputed estate. The motion was opposed on the
ART 1043
ground that the trial court, acting as a probate court, had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim; that respondent Fortunato
Borromeo is estopped from asserting the waiver agreement; that the
waiver agreement is void as it was executed before the declaration of
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, heirs; that the same is void having been executed before the
PATROCINIO BORROMEO-HERRERA, petitioner, distribution of the estate and before the acceptance of the inheritance;
vs. and that it is void ab initio and inexistent for lack of subject matter.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-41171 July 23, 1987
On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial court concluding
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
that the five declared heirs who signed the waiver agreement
assigning their hereditary rights to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the
same rights, declared the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito
Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died
Borromeo.
on March 13, 1952, in Paranaque, Rizal at the age of 88 years, without
forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance
of Cebu a petition for the probate of a one page document as the last
It is argued by the petitioner that the document entitled " waiver of
will and testament left by the said deceased, devising all his properties
Hereditary Rights" executed on July 31, 1967, aside from having been
to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and
cancelled and revoked on June 29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo,
undivided shares, and designating Junquera as executor thereof.
Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is without force and effect
because there can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before
there has been a valid acceptance of the inheritance the heirs intend
to transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code, to make
After due trial, the probate court held that the document presented as
acceptance or repudiation of inheritance valid, the person must be
the will of the deceased was a forgery.
certain of the death of the one from whom he is to inherit and of his
right to the inheritance. Since the petitioner and her co-heirs were not
certain of their right to the inheritance until they were declared heirs,
The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings. their rights were, therefore, uncertain. This view, according to the
petitioner, is also supported by Article 1057 of the same Code which
directs heirs, devicees, and legatees to signify their acceptance or
After determining the intestate heirs of the decedent, the court repudiation within thirty days after the court has issued an order for
ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo shall the distribution of the estate.
be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal and
equitable shares among the 9 declared intestate heirs.
The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver ISSUE: WON Victor's course of action constitutes a valid renunciation
of his legitime
document did not have the clear and convincing intention to relinquish
their rights, Thus: (1) On October 27, 1967. Fortunato, Tomas, and
Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading entitled "Compliance" wherein they
HELD: NO. No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the
submitted a proposal for the amicable settlement of the case. In that
foregoing acts. It must be remembered that at the time of the
Compliance, they proposed to concede to all the eight (8) intestate
substitution, the judgment approving the compromise agreement has
heirs of Vito Borromeo all properties, personal and real, including all
already been rendered. Victor merely participated in the execution of
cash and sums of money in the hands of the Special Administrator, as
the compromise judgment. He was not a party to the compromise
of October 31, 1967, not contested or claimed by them in any action
agreement.
then pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In turn, the heirs
would waive and concede to them all the 14 contested lots. In this More importantly, our law on succession does not countenance tacit
document, the respondent recognizes and concedes that the repudiation of inheritance. Rather, it requires an express act on the
petitioner, like the other signatories to the waiver document, is an heir part of the heir. (See Article 1051)
of the deceased Vito Borromeo, entitled to share in the estate. This
Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177 upon the
shows that the "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be
latter’s death, his act of moving for execution of the compromise
what the respondent now purports it to be. Had the intent been
judgment cannot be considered an act of renunciation of his legitime.
otherwise, there would not be any reason for Fortunato, Tomas, and
He was, therefore, not precluded or estopped from subsequently
Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer to settle the case
seeking the reduction of the donation.
amicably, and offer to concede to them parts of the estate of the
deceased; (2) On April 21 and 30, 1969, the majority of the declared
heirs executed an Agreement on how the estate they inherited shall be
distributed. This Agreement of Partition was approved by the trial court ART 1053
on August 15, 1969; (3) On June 29, 1968, the petitioner, among
others, signed a document entitled Deed of Assignment" purporting to
transfer and assign in favor of the respondent and Tomas and Amelia
Borromeo all her (Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and IMPERIAL vs. CA
participation as an intestate heir in the estate of the deceased Vito
Borromeo. The stated consideration for said assignment was FACTS: Petitioner Eloy Imperial purchased a parcel of land from his
P100,000.00; (4) On the same date, June 29, 1968, the respondent natural father Leoncio Imperial. Although the transaction was
Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in the aforementioned deed denominated as a sale, both admit that it was a donation.
of assignment) in turn executed a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of
the heirs-assignors named in the same deed of assignment. The stated Subsequently, Leoncio filed a n action for the annulment of
consideration was P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation of Deed of the supp osed deed of saleon the ground that he was deceived by
Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance was signed by Tomas Eloy into signing the said document. However, a compromise
Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968, while Fortunato agreement was then made by both parties. When Leoncio died, his
Borromeo signed this document on March 24, 1969. adopted son, Victor, substituted him in the Compromise agreement
and moved for the execution of the judgment. When Victor also died,
his heirs (priva te r espondents her ein) filed an action for
annulment of the d onation on the ground that the conveyance
ART 1051
186
Wills and Succession Case Digests
of said property in favor of petitioner Eloy impaired the legitime of of Dr. De Santos. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the
Victor, their natural brother and predecessor-in-interest. order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration in
his name.
As argued by Eloy, when Leoncio died, it was only Victor who was Petitioner sought to intervene and to set aside the appointment of
entitled to question the donation. However, instead of filing an action private respondent as special administrator reiterating his relationship
to contest the donation, Victor asked to be substituted in the to the deceased. The RTC denied his motion. CA upheld the denial of
Compromise Agreement and even moved for execution of the petitioner’s motion for intervention.
compromise judgment therein. Petitioner, now before the SC, claims the right to intervene in and
oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by private
respondent. He argues that, as the nearest next of kin and creditor of
the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct.Issue:
ISSUE#1: w/n Victor was deemed to have renounced his legitime? Whether or not petitioner has a right to intervene and oppose the
petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the respondent.
ISSUE #2: w/n the heirs of Victor, upon his death, have the right to
contest the donation? His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having
been raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition to his
HELD: No, their right to do so is expressly recognized under motion to intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported by
Article 772, and also in Article 1053:If the heir should die without evidence.
having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his right shall be
transmitted to his heirs.
. . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct interest in the
estate or the will, and the private respondent has none. Moreover, the
ground cited in the private respondent's opposition, that the petitioner
ART 1058 has deliberately misdeclared the truth worth and value of the estate, is
not relevant to the question of her competency to act as executor.
G.R. No. 129505 January 31, 2000 Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court requires only an allegation of
the probable value and character of the property of the estate. The
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs. PACITA DE LOS REYES
true value can be determined later on in the course of the settlement
PHILLIPS, respondent.
of the estate.
Facts: On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos filed a petition for
Rule 79, §1 provides:
probate of his will. In his will, he alleged that he had no compulsory
heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition
Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his for administration. — Any person interested in a will may state in
properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; writing the grounds why letters testamentary should not issue to the
and that copies of said will were in the custody of the named persons named therein as executors, or any of them, and the court,
executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. The RTC after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of such
issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will. After the grounds. A petition may, at the same time, be filed for letters of
probate of his will, Dr. de Santos died on February 26, 1996. administration with the will annexed.
Petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is
that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) and Octavio one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one
L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin
187
Wills and Succession Case Digests
who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor, and whose "for reason of his improper and immoral conduct amounting to
interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent. concubinage, which is a ground for legal separation under Philippine
Law";
bequeathed her properties in equal shares to her sisters Exaltacion L.
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot
Allarde, Vicenta L. Faustino and Gloria L. Teoxon, and her nieces
be considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of
Rowena F. Corona and Jennifer F. Way; and
testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory or forced
heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the
appointed Rowena F. Corona, herein petitioner, as her
Civil Code provides: Executrix.
On November 21, 1980, Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate Wills before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI and for the
or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. appointment of Nenita P. Alonte as Administrator because she
(Rowena) is presently employed in the United Nations in New York
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he City.
does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the On December 2, 1980, upon Rowena's urgent Motion, the Probate
legitimate of said heirs. Court appointed Nenita P. Alonte as Special Administratrix, upon a
P100,000.00 bond.
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator's —
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their On December 12, 1980, the surviving husband, Romarico Vitug, filed
legitimate parents and ascendants; an "Opposition and Motion" and prayed that the Petition for Probate be
denied and that the two Wills be disallowed, (basis: impairment his
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants,
legitime and will was made under duress) with Romarico further
with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
praying for his appointment as Special Administrator because the
(3) The widow or widower; Special Administratrix appointed is not related to the heirs and has no
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal interest to be protected, besides, the surviving spouse is qualified to
fiction; administer.
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil On December 18, 1980, Nenita P. Alonte posted her bond and took her
Code. oath of office before a Notary Public
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who On February 6, 1981, the Probate Court set aside its Order of
may have been preterited in the testator's will. December 2, 1980 appointing Nenita as Special Administratrix, and
appointed instead the surviving husband, Romarico, as Special
Administrator with a bond of P200,000.00, essentially for the reasons
Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings that under Section 6, Rule 78, of the Rules of Court, the surviving
based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the spouse is first in the order of preference for appointment as
testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent Administrator as he has an interest in the estate; that the
upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator. As we stated disinheritance of the surviving spouse is not among the grounds of
in Ozaeta v. Pecson: disqualification for appointment as Administrator; that the next of kin
is appointed only where the surviving spouse is not competent or is
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a unwilling to serve besides the fact that the Executrix appointed, is not
necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the the next of kin but merely a niece, and that the decedent's estate is
manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to nothing more than half of the unliquidated conjugal partnership
appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his property
wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this right may Petitioner moved for reconsideration with an alternate Motion for the
be considered a curtailment of the right to dispose. appointment of co-Special Administrators to which private respondents
filed their Opposition. MR was denied.
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal stating:
fails to give bond may the court appoint other persons to administer
the estate. None of these circumstances is present in this case. that the Probate Court strictly observed the order of preference
established by the Rules;
that petitioner though named Executrix in the alleged Will, declined the
FIRST DIVISION trust and instead nominated a stranger as Special Administrator;
[G.R. No. L-59821. August 30, 1982.] that the surviving husband has legitimate interests to protect which
are not adverse to the decedent's estate which is merely part of the
ROWENA F. CORONA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, conjugal property; and
ROMARICO G. VITUG, AVELINO L. CASTILLO, NICANOR
CASTILLO, KATHLEEN D. LUCHANGCO GUILLERMO
that disinheritance is not a disqualification to appointment as Special
Administrator besides the fact that the legality of the disinheritance
LUCHANGCO, JR., ANTONIO LUCHANGCO, RODOLFO TORRES,
would involve a determination of the intrinsic validity of the Will which
REYNALDO TORRES and PURISIMA T. POLINTAN, respondents.
is decidedly premature at this stage
On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York,
U.S.A., leaving two Wills:
Hence, this appeal to the SC.
WON Nenita Alonte may be properly appointed as special
one, a holographic Will dated October 3, 1980, which excluded her administratror
husband, respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as one of her heirs, and
the other, a formal Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or about three
weeks thereafter, which expressly disinherited her husband Romarico Held: Yes, she may.
188
Wills and Succession Case Digests
The executrix's choice of Special Administrator, considering her own A person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain
inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the limitations, one of which is that he cannot give by donation more than
testratix in her will, is entitled to the highest consideration. Objection he can give by will (Art. 752, Civil Code). If he does, so much of what
to Nenita Alonte's appointment on grounds of impracticality and lack of is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious
kinship are overshadowed by the fact that justice and equality demand and the donation is reducible to the extent of such excess, though
that the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the surviving without prejudice to its taking effect in the donor's lifetime or the
husband be represented in the management of the decedent's estate. donee's appropriating the fruits of the thing donated (Art. 771, Civil
Special Administrators, while they may have respective interests to Code). Such a donation is, moreover, collationable that is, its value is
protect, are officers of the Court subject to the supervision and control imputable into the hereditary estate of the donor at the tune of his
of the Probate Court and are expected to work for the best interests of death for the purpose of determining the legitime of the forced or
the entire estate, its smooth administration, and its earliest settlement compulsory heirs and the freely disposable portion of the estate. This
is true as well of donations to strangers as of gifts to compulsory heirs,
Wherefore, ... SC ordered ... to appoint Nenita F. Alonte as co-Special although the language of Article 1061 of the Civil Code would seem to
Administrator, properly bonded, who shall act as such jointly with the limit collation to the latter class of donations. And this has been held to
other Special Administrator on all matters affecting the estate. be a long-established rule in Liguez vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, et
al., where this Court said:
ART 1061
Vda de Tupas vs RTC of Negros Occidental ... Hence, the forced heirs are entitled to have the donation set aside
in so far as inofficious: i.e., in excess of the portion of free disposal,
G.R. No. L-65800 October 3, 1986 computed as provided in Articles 818 and 819, and bearing in mind
that collationable gifts' under Article 818 should include gifts made not
only in favor of the forced heirs, but even those made in favor of
stranger. So that in computing the legitimes, the value of the property
FACTS: donated to herein appellant, Conchita Liguez, should be considered
part of the donor's estate. Once again, only the court of origin has the
Epifanio Tupas died on Aug 20, 1978 childless, leaving his widow, requisite data to determine whether the donation is inofficious or not.
Partenza Lucerna, as his only surviving compulsory heir. He also left a
will dated May 18, 1976, which was admitted to probate Sept 30,
1980. Among the assets listed in his will were lots Nos. 837, 838 and
839 of the Sagay Cadastre, admittedly his private capital. However, at The fact, therefore, that the donated property no longer actually
the time of his death, these lots were no longer owned by him, he formed part of the estate of the donor at the time of his death cannot
having donated them the year before (on August 2, 1977) to the be asserted to prevent its being brought to collation. Indeed, it is an
Tupas Foundation, Inc., which had thereafter obtained title to said obvious proposition that collation contemplates and particularly applies
lots. to gifts inter vivos. The further fact that the lots donated were
admittedly capital or separate property of the donor is of no moment,
because a claim of inofficiousness does not assert that the donor gave
what was not his, but that he gave more than what was within his
Claiming that said donation had left her practically destitute of any power to give.
inheritance, Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc.
in the same Court to have the donation declared inofficious insofar as
it prejudiced her legitime, therefore reducible " ... by one-half or such
proportion as ... (might be deemed) justified ... and " ... the resulting Since it is clear that the questioned donation is collationable and that,
deduction ... " restored and conveyed or delivered to her. The having been made to a stranger (to the donor) it is, by law chargeable
complaint also prayed for attorney's fees and such other relief as might to the freely disposable portion of the donor's estate, to be reduced
be proper. insofar as inofficious, i.e., it exceeds said portion and thus impairs the
legitime of the compulsory heirs, in order to find out whether it is
inofficious or not, recourse must be had to the rules established by the
Civil Code for the determination of the legitime and, by extension, of
The trial court however, ruled against her on the following grounds: .. the disposable portion. These rules are set forth in Articles 908, 909
(1) Article 900 relied upon by plaintiff is not applicable because the and 910 of the Code.
properties which were disposed of by way of donation one year before
the death of Epifanio Tupas were no longer part of his hereditary
estate at the time of his death on August 20, 1978; (2) the donation
properties were Epifanio's capital or separate estate; and (3) Tupas Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate
Foundation, Inc. being a stranger and not a compulsory heir, the leaves the freely disposable portion by which the donation in question
donation inter vivos made in its favor was not subject to collation here must be measured. If the value of the donation at the time it was
under Art. 106 1, C.C. made does not exceed that difference, then it must be allowed to
stand. But if it does, the donation is inofficious as to the excess and
must be reduced by the amount of said excess. In this case, if any
excess be shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the petitioner-
ISSUE: WON a donation inter vivos by a donor now deceased is appellant as the sole compulsory heir of the deceased Epifanio R.
inofficious and should be reduced at the instance of the donor’s widow Tupas.
YES
Zaragoza v. CA (Camello)
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full
mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donations made blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.
by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is
the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative
ART 1062
title by the testator during his lifetime.
Buhay De Roma v. CA (Cuabo)
The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory 12th Set
heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after
finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced.
ART 1062
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its G.R. No. L-46903 July 23, 1987
purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded. APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as Guardian of Rosalinda
de Roma,respondents.
190
Wills and Succession Case Digests
Candelaria de Roma (deceased) had two legally adopted daughters, express prohibition to collate, and we see none.
Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on April The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and
30, 1971. Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time filed an unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article
inventory of the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the ground 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the
that certain properties (7 parcels of coconut land) earlier donated by exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.
Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included.
ART 1078
Rosalinda rigorously argues that it is, Buhay should subject 7 parcels
of coconut land to collation in conformity with Article 1061 of the Civil
G.R. No. 119730 September 2, 1999
Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no
obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation
and the donation was not officious. RODOLFO NOCEDA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
AURORA ARBIZO DIRECTO, respondents.
The trial court ruled in favor of Buhay holding that the deed of
donation contained no express prohibition to collate as an exception to GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Article 1062.
FACTS: On June 1, 1981, plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant
The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows: Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo, the daughter, grandson, and
widow, respectively, of the late Celestino Arbizo, who died in 1956,
extrajudicially settled a parcel of land, Lot 1121, located at Bitaog, San
IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at
Isidro, Cabangan, Zambales, which was said to have an area of 66,530
pagsisilbi sa akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay
square meters.
Arabella Castaneda, may karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino
at naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San
Pablo sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusang-loob kong Plaintiff Directo's share was 11,426 square meters, defendant Noceda
ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE got 13,294 square meters, and the remaining 41,810 square meters
ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng went to Maria Arbizo (Exhibit G). On the same date, plaintiff Directo
pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa donated 625 square meters of her share to defendant Noceda, who is
na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na her nephew being the son of her deceased sister, Carolina (Exhibit D).
ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring However, on August 17, 1981, another extrajudicial settlement-
ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang partition of Lot 1121 was executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant
pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of the said land went to Maria
makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and defendant Noceda got only one-fifth
lupa; each. In said extrajudicial settlement-partition as well as in the Tax
Declaration 16-0032 over Lot 1121 in the name of the late Celestino
Arbizo, the said parcel of land was said to have an area of only 29,845
IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari
square meters (Exhibit C).
sa sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi
masisira ang legitimate ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin,
sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking Sometime in 1981, defendant Noceda constructed his house on the
kabuhayan na ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na land donated to him by plaintiff Directo. Plaintiff Directo fenced the
kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion. portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the
donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts. But in 1985,
defendant Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by plaintiff
ISSUE: WON the 7 parcels of coconut land should be subjected to
Directo, occupied the three huts (3) and fenced the entire land of
collation? YES
plaintiff Directo without her consent. Plaintiff Directo demanded from
defendant Noceda to vacate her land, but the latter refused. Hence,
HELD: there is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting plaintiff Directo filed the present suit, a complaint for the recovery of
the collation of the donated properties. As the said court correctly possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation,
observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na against defendant Noceda before the lower court.
mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and
should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation.
During the trial, the lower court ordered that a relocation survey of Lot
The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the
1121 be conducted by Engr. Edilberto Quejada of the Bureau of Lands.
subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.
After the survey of Lot 1121 in the presence of both parties, Engr.
Edilberto Quejada reported that the area of Lot 1121 stated in the
We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free extrajudicial settlement-partition of August 17, 1981 was smaller than
portion" in the deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and the actual area of Lot 1121 which is 127,298 square meters. Engr.
we may also presume he understood the legal consequences of the Quejada subdivided Lot 1121, excluding the portions occupied by third
donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise persons, known as Lot 8, the salvage zone and the road lot, on the
language of the document, that he would have included therein an basis of the actual occupancy of Lot 1121 by the heirs of the late
express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention. Celestino Arbizo and the extrajudicial settlement-partition of August
17, 1981. The portion denominated as Lot A, with an area of 12,957
square meters was the share of defendant Noceda; Lot C, with the
Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the
same area as that of Lot A, was the share of plaintiff Directo, a portion
clear language of Article 1062.1awphil The suggestion that there was
of which was donated to defendant Noceda; and Lot B, with an area of
an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable
38,872 square meters, went to Maria Arbizo (Exhibit E).
to the free portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration.
Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed
donation is officious The sole issue is whether or not there was an
191
Wills and Succession Case Digests
ISSUE: W/N the parties are still considered as co-owners of finding ingratitude against him. It was established that petitioner
the subject property. NO! Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him by private
respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of
Lot C which belongs to private respondent Directo, thus petitioner's act
Petitioner argues that he did not usurp the property of respondent
of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent Directo
Directo since, to date, the metes and bounds of the parcel of land left
without the latter's knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation
by their predecessor in interest, Celestino Arbizo, are still
which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered
undetermined since no final determination as to the exact areas
as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law does
properly pertaining to the parties herein; hence they are still
not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be
considered as co-owners thereof.
proved in the action for revocation.
In this case the source of co-ownership among the heirs was intestate
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN TEVES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al
succession. Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of
[G.R. No. 109963. October 13, 1999]
the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs
subject to the payment of debts of the deceased.
Synopsis: In affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court held that the extrajudicial settlements executed by the
Partition, in general, is the separation, division and
heirs of Joaquin Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca are legally valid and
assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom
binding. The Court upheld, finding no cogent reason to reverse, the
it may belong. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-
trial and appellate courts’ factual finding that the evidence presented
ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual interest of
by petitioners is insufficient to overcome the evidentiary value of the
each co-owner, vesting in each a sole estate in specific
extrajudicial settlements. Moreover, even assuming that petitioners
property and giving to each one a right to enjoy his estate
have a defensible cause of action, they are barred from pursuing the
without supervision or interference from the other. And one
same by reason of their long and inexcusable inaction. In addition, an
way of effecting a partition of the decedent's estate is by the
extrajudicial settlement is a contract. Therefore, although petitioners
heirs themselves extrajudicially.
may regret having alienated their hereditary shares in favor of their
sister Asuncion, they must now be considered bound by their
The heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo namely Maria Arbizo, Aurora A. contractual acts.
Directo (private respondent) and Rodolfo Noceda (petitioner) entered
into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate on August 17, 1981 and
Facts: Spouses Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves died intestate
agreed to adjudicate among themselves the property left by their
and without debts in 1943 and 1953, respectively. During their
predecessor-in-interest in the following manner:
lifetime, the spouses own two parcels of land designated as Lot 769-A
registered in the name of Marcelina and Lot 6409 registered in the
To Rodolfo Noceda goes the northern one-fifth (1/5) portion name of Joaquin and his two sisters. However, Joaquin’s sisters died
containing an area of 5,989 sq. meters; without issue, causing the entire property to pass to him. After
Marcelina and Joaquin died, their children executed extrajudicial
To Maria Arbizo goes the middle three-fifths (3/5) portion; and To settlements purporting to adjudicate unto themselves the ownership
Aurora Arbizo goes the southern one-fifth (1/5) portion. over the two parcels of land and to alienate their shares thereto in
favor of their sister Asuncion Teves for a consideration. The division of
Lot 769-A was embodied in two deeds. The first Deed of Extrajudicial
In the survey plan submitted by Engineer Quejada, the portions Settlement and Sale was entered into on June 13, 1956 while the
indicated by red lines and numbered alphabetically were based on the second deed was executed on April 21, 1959. The Deed of Extrajudicial
percentage proportion in the extrajudicial settlement and the actual Settlement and Sale covering Lot 6409 was executed on December 14,
occupancy of each heir which resulted to these divisions as follows: 1971. After the death of Asuncion Teves, her children, private
respondents It-it herein, extrajudicially settled her property,
Lot A; the area is 2,957 sq.m. — goes to Rodolfo A. Noceda (1/5) adjudicating unto themselves said lots. On July 2, 1984, the It-it sold
Lot 6409 to Lucrecio Baylosis, Sr. and Pacita Nocete-Baylosis. On May
9, 1984, herein petitioners, heirs of Marcelina and Joaquin, filed a
Lot B; 38,872 sq.m. Maria Arbizo (3/5) complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental against
private respondents for the partition and reconveyance of the
Lot C; 12,957 sq.m. Aurora Arbizo (1/5) aforesaid parcels of land, alleging that the extrajudicial settlements
were spurious. Private respondents, on the other hand, maintained
that the assailed documents were executed with the formalities
Thus, the areas allotted to each heir are now specifically delineated in required by law and are therefore binding and legally effective as
the survey plan. There is no co-ownership where portion owned is bases for acquiring ownership over the lots in question. Furthermore, it
concretely determined and identifiable, though not technically is contended that petitioners have slept on their rights and should now
described, or that said portions are still embraced in one and the same be deemed to have abandoned such rights. Thereafter, the trial court
certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable or ruled in favor of private respondents and upheld the validity of the
identifiable, or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion extrajudicial settlements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
over each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners. A partition court’s decision with a slight modification.
legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the
property adjudicated to him.
Issue: W/N the oral extrajudicial partition of the parties is valid. YES
We also find unmeritorious petitioner's argument that since there was
no effective and real partition of the subject lot there exists no basis Held: We affirm that the extrajudicial settlements executed by the
for the charge of usurpation and hence there is also no basis for heirs of Joaquin Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca are legally valid and
binding. The extrajudicial settlement of a decedent’s estate is
192
Wills and Succession Case Digests
authorized by Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Thus, for a heirs, each part corresponding to the share of the heirs in each
partition pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 74 to be valid, the following marriage.
conditions must concur: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent
left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the
In the same year, Patronicio Recasa, representing the heirs of the first
heirs are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by
marriage, sold the share of the heirs in the estate to Dominador
their judicial guardian or legal representatives; (4) the partition was
Recasa, an heir of the second marriage. On June 15, 1950,
made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the
Dominador, representing the heirs of the second marriage, in turn sold
Register of Deeds.
the share of the heirs to Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi whose heirs
are the present petitioners. Included in this sale was the property sold
Neither does Ricardo Teves have a right to demand partition of Lot by Patronicio to Dominador.
769-A because the two extrajudicial settlements have already
effectively partitioned such property. Every act which is intended to
In 1958, the Seraspis obtained a loan making the land as security.
put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is
However, they failed to pay the loan for which reason the mortgage
deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
was foreclosed and the lands were sold to KRBI as the highest bidder.
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. The extrajudicial
Subsequently, the lands were sold by KRBI to Manuel Rata, brother-in-
settlements executed in 1956 and 1959 adjudicated Lot 769-A in equal
law of Quirico Seraspi. It appears that Rara, as owner of the property,
shares unto the eight heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca. Such a partition,
allowed Quirico Seraspi to administer the property.
which was legally made, confers upon each heir the exclusive
ownership of the property adjudicated to him. Although Cresenciano,
Ricardo’s predecessor-in-interest, was not a signatory to the In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa, Marcelino's child by his
extrajudicial settlements, the partition of Lot 769-A among the heirs third wife, taking advantage of the illness of Quirico Seraspi, who had
was made in accordance with their intestate shares under the law. been paralyzed due to a stroke, forcibly entered the lands in question
and took possession thereof.
With regards to the requisite of registration of extrajudicial
settlements, it is noted that the extrajudicial settlements covering Lot In 1983, the Seraspis purchased the lands from Manuel Rata and
769-A were never registered. However, in the case of Vda. de Reyes afterwards filed a complaint against Simeon Recasa for recovery of
vs. CA, the Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of possession of the lands.
Court, upheld the validity of an oral partition of the decedent’s estate
and declared that the non-registration of an extrajudicial settlement In the case at bar, private respondent did not acquire possession of
does not affect its intrinsic validity. It was held in this case that - [t]he the property through any of the modesrecognized by the Civil Code, to
requirement that a partition be put in a public document and wit: (1) occupation, (2) intellectual creation, (3) law, (4) donation, (5)
registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the succession, (6) tradition in consequence of certain contracts, and (7)
same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. prescription. 5
The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It
follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the
prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no Private respondent could not have acquired ownership over the
creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such property through occupation since, under Art. 714 of the Civil Code,
rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter the ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation.
into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan Nor can he base his ownership on succession for the property was not
different from those provided by law. Thus, despite its non- part of those distributed to the heirs of the third marriage, to which
registration, the extrajudicial settlements involving Lot 769-A are private respondent belongs. It must be remembered that in the
legally effective and binding among the heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca partition of the intestate estate of Marcelino Recasa, the properties
since their mother had no creditors at the time of her death. were divided into three parts, each part being reserved for each group
of heirs belonging to one of the three marriages Marcelino entered
into. Since the contested parcels of land were adjudicated to the heirs
An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched of the first and second marriages, it follows that private respondent, as
doctrine that the law does not relieve a party from the effects of a heir of the third marriage, has no right over the parcels of land. While,
contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with full as heir to the intestate estate of his father, private respondent was co-
awareness of what he was doing, simply because the contract turned owner of all of his father's properties, such co-ownership rights were
out to be a foolish or unwise investment. Therefore, although effectively dissolved by the partition agreed upon by the heirs of
plaintiffs-appellants may regret having alienated their hereditary Marcelino Recasa.
shares in favor of their sister Asuncion, they must now be considered
bound by their own contractual acts.
Neither can private respondent claim good faith in his
favor.1âwphi1 Good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the
HEIRS OF SERASPIvs.CA person from whom the possessor received the thing was its owner but
could not transmit the ownership thereof. 6Private respondent entered
G.R. No. 135602 the property without the consent of the previous owner. For all intents
and purposes, he is a mere usurper.
April 28, 2000
Like private respondent, petitioners have not acquired the property
through any of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of
MENDOZA, J.:
ownership. The basis of petitioners' claim of ownership is the contract
of sale they had with Rata, but this by itself is insufficient to make
Marcelino Recasa was the owner of two parcels of land. During his them owners of the property. For while a contract of sale is perfected
lifetime, Marcelino contracted three (3) marriages. At the time of his by the meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the
death in 1943, he had fifteen (15) children from his three marriages. contract and upon the price, 7 the ownership of the thing sold is not
In 1948, his intestate estate was partitioned into three parts by his transferred to the vendee until actual or constructive delivery of the
property. 8 Hence, the maxim non nudis pactis, sed traditione dominia
193
Wills and Succession Case Digests
dominica rerum transferuntur (not mere agreements but tradition letter in 1981 to private respondent's counsel, that their father had
transfers the ownership of things). given them their inheritance.
Consequently, petitioners are not the owners of the property since it ISSUES: 1. W/N THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
has not been delivered to them. At the time they bought the property LOTS TRANSFERRED INTER VIVOS TO THE OTHER HEIRS SHOULD
from Rata in 1983, the property was in the possession of private HAVE BEEN COLLATED TO THE MASS OF THE ESTATE OF THE
respondent. DECEASED FLAVIO ZARAGOZA.
However, this does not give private respondent a right to remain in 2. WHETHER THE PARTITION INTER VIVOS BY FLAVIO OF
possession of the property. Petitioners' title to the property prevails HIS PROPERTIES, WHICH INCLUDE LOTS 871 AND 943, IS VALID.
over private respondents' possession in fact but without basis in law.
RULING: It is the main contention of the petitioner that the
ART 1080 adjudication of Lots 943 and 871 in favor of private respondent, as her
inheritance share, has no legal basis since there is no will nor any
document that will support the transfer.
SPOUSES FLORENTINO ZARAGOZA and ERLINDA ENRIQUEZ-
ZARAGOZA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, ALBERTA ZARAGOZA MORGAN, respondents. Both the trial court and the public respondent found that during
the lifetime of Flavio, he already partitioned and distributed his
properties among his three children, excepting private respondent,
FACTS:
through deeds of sale. A deed of sale was not executed in favor of
private respondent because she had become an American citizen and
Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of the Constitution prohibited a sale in her favor. Petitioner admitted Lots
land. He had four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of the private respondent. These
surnamed Zaragoza. On December 9, 1964, he died without a will and are factual determinations of the Court of Appeals, based on
was survived by his four children. documentary and testimonial evidence. As a rule, we are bound by
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals.[12] Was the partition done
Private respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a complaint with the during the lifetime of Flavio Zaragoza Cano valid? We think so. It is
Court of First Instance of Iloilo against Spouses Florentino and Erlinda, basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done
herein petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code
Lots 943 and 871, and for payment of damages. She alleged that her is clear on this.[13] The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after
father, in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited properties among his collation, as provided for in Article 1061:
four children. The shares of her brothers and sister were given to them
in advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid consideration, Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs,
while her share, which consists of lots no. 871 and 943, was not must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he
conveyed by way of deed of sale then. She averred that because of may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter,
her marriage, she became an American citizen and was prohibited to by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be
acquire lands in the Philippines except by hereditary succession. For computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
this reason, no formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor account of the partition.
covering these lots during her father's lifetime.
Unfortunately, collation can not be done in this case where the original
Petitioners, in their Answer, denied knowledge of an alleged petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the
distribution by way of deeds of sale to them by their father. They said other compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed
that lot 871 is still registered in their father's name, while lot 943 was without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the
sold by him to them for a valuable consideration. They denied indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their
knowledge of the alleged intention of their father to convey the cited respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the
lots to Alberta, much more, the reason for his failure to do so because partitioning inter vivos.
she became an American citizen. They denied that there was
partitioning of the estate of their father during his lifetime.
ART. 1080 - J.L.T. AGRO, INC. vs. BALANSAG ET. AL.
2.) As a general rule, No. Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, 5. Carlomagno A. Crucillo
even future ones, which are not outside the commerce of man may be
the object of a contract. The exception is that no contract may be On February 19, 1971, respondent Rafael A. Crucillo conveyed and
entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to sold to his co-respondents, Sps. Noceda, for and in consideration of
the exception is partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080. the sum of P25,000, his share in subject parcel of land. Subsequently
the Provincial Assessor of Cavite issued a new tax declaration (Tax
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly Declaration No. 5417) in the name of Sps. Noceda.
valid pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would
become legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right On August 13, 1971, petitioners brought a complaint against the
of his heirs from the second marriage to the properties adjudicated to respondents for “Annulment of Extrajudicial Partition, Deed of Sale,
him under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It and Tax Declarations, with Damages”.
was a bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being
the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature was
inchoate. Evidently, at the time of the execution of the supplemental RTC directed the Provincial Assessor of Cavite to cancel the tax
deed in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the declaration issued in the name of Sps. Noceda. CA also rendered the
property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his sale, between Rafael and Sps. Noceda, null and void.
heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death.
ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial partition, i.e., oral partition, of the
estate of Balbino was valid and binding. YES!
ART 1082 HELD: It has been shown that upon the death of Juana Aure, the
petitioners and the respondent Rafael Crucillo partitioned the estate
among themselves, with each one of them possessing their respective
CARLOMAGNO A. CRUCILLO, ADELAIDA C. PERENA, LUCIA shares and exercising acts of ownership.
ROZUL, PRIMITIVA MENDOZA SUMAGUI, YOLANDA ROZUL,
PABLITA ROZUL, PETRITA ROZUL, ROSALINA ROZUL,
MAXIMINO CRUCILLO, NICASIO SARMIENTO, MARCIAL When the Court conducted an ocular inspection of the property in
SARMIENTO, CIPRIANO SARMIENTO, CONRADO CRUCILLO, dispute, it observed that Dr. Carlomagno Crucillo had erected a
LOURDES CRUCILLO, MIGUEL CRUCILLO, FELICIDAD building of strong materials, which he utilizes as his clinic, on the
CRUCILLO, and MIGUELA CRUCILLO, petitioners, vs. THE southern portion of said land fronting Gen. Luna St., that Adelaida
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, LUCIO PERENA, RAFAEL Crucillo had constructed her residence, which is also of strong
A. CRUCILLO, MIGUEL R. PERLADO, FELIX NOCEDA, BENITA materials, on the northern portion of said land fronting Gen. Luna St.;
GATPANDAN NOCEDA, and THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF that between the clinic of Dr. Carlomagno Crucillo and the residential
CAVITE, respondents. house of Adelaida Crucillo is the ancestral house’, which is erected on
that portion of the said land which Rafael Crucillo sold to the
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
defendants-spouses; and that the Heirs of Elena Crucillo had Issue: Whether or not the partition should be rescinded arising from a
constructed a house of strong materials on the northern portion of said preteritionattended by bad faith and fraud.
land fronting Aure St., (of Exhs. ‘X’ and ‘Y’) The Court further observed
that a hollow block party wall separates the respective portion
Ruling: The Supreme Court found the appellate court to have ruled
occupied by the residential house of Adelaida, the ‘ancestral house’,
correctly. The evidence submitted by petitioners were utterly wanting,
and the clinic of Dr. Carlomagno Crucillo, Judging from their
consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While asserting
appearance and condition, the improvements erected by Adelaida
that NiloViado employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in
Crucillo, Dr. Carlomagno Crucillo, and the Heirs of Elena Crucillo are
procuring the signatures of the parties to the deed of donation
not less than then (10) years old.”
and of the extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are vague on how and
in what manner those supposed vices occurred.
From the foregoing facts, it can be gleaned unerringly that the heirs of
Balbino A. Crucillo agreed to orally partition subject estate among
With regard to the issue of preterition, the Court ruled that
themselves, as evinced by their possession of the inherited premises,
the exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from
their construction of improvements thereon, and their having declared
the deed of the extrajudicial settlement verily has had the
in their names for taxation purposes their respective shares. These
effect of preterition.
are indications that the heirs of Balbino A. Crucillo agreed to divide
subject estate among themselves, for why should they construct
improvements thereon, pay the taxes therefor, and exercise other acts The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from
of ownership, if they did not firmly believe that the property was the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the
theirs. It is certainly foolhardy for petitioners to claim that no oral effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the
partition was made when their acts showed otherwise. Moreover, it is absence of proofof fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral
unbelievable that the possession of the heirs was by mere tolerance, attack on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646. The relief, as so
judging from the introduction of improvements thereon and the length correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead rests on Article
of time that such improvements have been in existence. Then too, 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not
after exercising acts of ownership over their respective portions of the attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded
contested estate, petitioners are estopped from denying or contesting but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining
the existence of an oral partition to her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted properly in ordering
the remand of the case for further proceedings to make the proper
valuation of the Isarog property and ascertainment of the amount due
petitioner Delia Viado.||
PADA-KILARIO v. CA
January 19,2000
NON,petitioners, vsCOURT OF APPEALS, ALICIA N. VIADO,
Facts: One Jacinto Pada had six (6) children. His estate included a
CHERRI VIADO and FE FIDES VIADO, respondents.||
parcel of land of residential and coconut land located at Poblacion,
Matalom, Leyte, denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area
Facts: Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977 a common of 1,301.92 square meters. It is the northern portion of Cadastral Lot
residence at the Isarog property. Soon, tension appeared to have No. 5581 which is the subject of the instant controversy.
escalated between petitioner Rebecca Viado and respondent Alicia
During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada,
Viado after the former had asked that the property be equally divided
obtained permission from him to build a house on the northern portion
between the two families to make room for the growing children.
of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor,
continued living in the house together with his eight children.
Respondents claimed absolute ownership over the entire Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's children, has been living
property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied in that house since 1960.
by the latter. On February 1, 1988 petitioners, asserting co-ownership
Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an
over the property in question, filed a case of partition before the
extra-judicial partition of his estate. For this purpose, they executed a
RTC of Quezon City.
private document which they, however, never registered in the Office
of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership
At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was himself
over the subject property on the deed of donation executed by the late
present while his other brothers were represented by their children.
Julian Viado covering his 1/2 share in favor of respondent's husband,
Their sisters, Valentina and Ruperta, both died without any issue.
NiloViado, and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian Viado,
Marciano was represented by his daughter, Maria; Amador was
Leah Viado Jacobs and petitioner Rebecca Viado waived their rights
represented by his daughter, Concordia; and Higino was represented
and interests in favor of NiloViado.
by his son, Silverio who is the private respondent in this case. It was
to both Ananias and Marciano, represented by his daughter, Maria,
The trial court found for respondents and adjudged Alicia that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was allocated during the said partition.
Viado and her children as being the true owners of the disputed When Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as
property. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the co-owner of said property.
trial court, but ordered the remand of the records of the case to
On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the
the court a quo for further proceedings to determine the value of the
right of his father, Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.
property and the amount respondents should pay to petitioner Delia
Viado for having been preterited in the deed of extrajudicial On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the co-
settlement. Dissatisfied therewith, petitioners filed the petition seeking ownership right of his father, Marciano. Private respondent, who is the
the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals. first cousin of Maria, was the buyer.
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANTIBANEZ
vacate the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can
utilize the said area.
Last Set
On June 26, 1995, private respondent filed in a complaint for
ejectment with prayer for damages against petitioner spouses.
On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Esperanza Pada- ARTICLE 1083
Pavo, Concordia Pada-Bartolome, and Angelito Pada, executed a Deed
of Donation[9] transferring to petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, their
PHILIP C. SANTOS and HEIRS OF ELISEO M. SANTOS,
respective shares as co-owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.
petitioners, vs. LADISLAO M. SANTOS represented herein by his
Issue: WHETHER THE EXTRA JUDICIAL PARTITION IS VALID AND Attorney-In-Fact NOE M. SANTOS, respondents. G.R. No. 139524
VOLUNTARY, THUS CAN BE GIVEN EFFECT. October 12, 2000
Held:
The extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs On May 13, 1993, Ladislao Santos filed a complaint against his brother,
made in 1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private Eliseo Santos and the latter’s son, Philip Santos for "Judicial Partition".
document. No law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and The Ladislao averred in his complaint, that, when his and Eliseo
be registered in order to be valid.[15] The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule Santos’ sister, Isidra Santos, died intestate on April 1, 1967, they
74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public inherited her parcel of land; that, on December 16, 1980, Virgilio
document and registered, has for its purpose the protection of Santos executed a "Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Residential
creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims.[16] The object Land" on the basis of which Tax Declaration No. 04-0016 was issued to
of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows the Appellee Philip Santos.
then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the In their Answer to the complaint, the Philip Santos admitted that after
prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are the death of Isidra Santos, on April 1, 1967, to partition Lot 1522,
involved.[17] Without creditors to take into consideration, it is under which a portion of Lot 1522, with an area of 3,387 square
competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for meters, was adjudicated to the Ladislao, and a portion of the same lot,
distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from those with an area of 3,000 square meters, was conveyed to the Appellee
provided by the rules from which, in the first place, nothing can be Eliseo Santos and the parcel of land left by Isidra Santos was conveyed
inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the partition to by Appellee Eliseo Santos to Virgilio Santos, who, from infancy had
be valid.[18] The partition of inherited property need not be embodied been under the care of Isidra Santos, to approximately equalize the
in a public document so as to be effective as regards the heirs that share of the Appellee Eliseo Santos in the estate of Bonifacio Santos.
participated therein.[19] The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil The Appellees further averred that Appellees had acquired the Isidra
Code that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission, property by acquisitive prescription.
modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property, Philip Santos insist that acquisitive prescription has already set in; and
must appear in a public instrument, is only for convenience, non- that estoppel lies to bar the instant action for partition. According to
compliance with which does not affect the validity or enforceability of petitioners, Virgilio Santos was already in possession of the subject
the acts of the parties as among themselves.[20] property since after the death of Isidra Santos on April 1, 1967.
Thereafter, Philip Santos took possession of the subject property on
The 1951 extrajudicial partition of Jacinto Pada's estate being legal and
December 16, 1980 upon its sale on said date. They reason out that
effective as among his heirs, Juanita and Maria Pada validly transferred
more than 13 years had lapsed from April 1, 1967 to December 16,
their ownership rights over Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to Engr. Paderes
and private respondent, respectively. 1980; and that more than 12 years had lapsed from the time Philip
Santos took possession of the property on December 16, 1980 up to
The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed the time Ladislao Santos filed the action for partition on May 13, 1993.
voluntarily and spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status.[23] Petitioners conclude that the instant action is already barred by
When they discussed and agreed on the division of the estate of ordinary acquisitive prescription of ten years. Further, it is argued that
Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did so in furtherance of their the possession of Virgilio Santos could be tacked with the possession
mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive, unless and until of Philip Santos bringing to a total of 26 years the time that elapsed
it is shown that there were debts existing against the estate which had before the filing of the case in 1993. They add that these 26 years of
not been paid.[24] No showing, however, has been made of any inaction call for the application of the principle of estoppel by laches.
unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no
reason why the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary acts.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acquisitive prescription has already
The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the set in.
heirs of Amador Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners
after forty four (44) years of never having disputed the validity of the
Ruling: NO
1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the subject property to
Considering that there was no proof that Ladislao Santos executed any
Marciano and Ananias, produced no legal effect. In the said partition,
"Combined Deed of Partition" in tandem with the Eliseo Santos, we
what was allocated to Amador Pada was not the subject property
rule that a co-ownership still subsists between the brothers over the
which was a parcel of residential land in Sto. Nino, Matalom, Leyte, but
Isidra property. This being the case, we apply Article 494 of the Civil
rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut land in the interior of Sto. Nino
Code which states that, "prescription does not run in favor of a co-
St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel of rice land in
owner or co-heir against his co-owners or his co-heirs so long as he
Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The donation made by his heirs to
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership." In Adile vs. Court
petitioners of the subject property, thus, is void for they were not the
of Appeals,14 it was held:
owners thereof. At any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of
"x x x. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-
Amador Pada to repudiate the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial
ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-
partition as prescription and laches have equally set in.
ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain
conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN TEVES v. CA act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3)
the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in
197
Wills and Succession Case Digests
possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious Petitioners object to the inclusion of the house and lot in Manila,
possession of the property for the period required by law." covered by TCT No. 131044, among those to be transferred to the
There is no showing that Eliseo Santos had complied with these legatees-heirs as it would contravene the testator’s intent that no one
requisites.1âwphi1 We are not convinced that Eliseo had repudiated is to own the same.
the co-ownership, and even if he did, there is no showing that the
same had been clearly made known to Ladislao.
Issue Article 1083: W/N provision (e) on the indivisibility of property is
valid –NO.
IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT OF BASILIO SANTIAGO, MA. PILAR SANTIAGO
Ruling:
and CLEMENTE SANTIAGO, Petitioners, - versus - ZOILO S.
It is clear from Basilio’s will that he intended the house and lot in
SANTIAGO, FELICIDAD SANTIAGO-RIVERA, HEIRS OF
Manila to be transferred in petitioners’ names for administration
RICARDO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF CIPRIANO SANTIAGO, HEIRS
purposes only, and that the property be owned by the heirs in
OF TOMAS SANTIAGO, Respondents. August 9, 2010
common, thus:
Art. 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of the
estate unless the testator should have expressly forbidden its partition,
in which case the period of indivision shall not exceed twenty years as e) Ang lupa’t bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na
provided in article 494. This power of the testator to prohibit division 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi
applies to the legitime. bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan
Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-ownership terminates lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at
when any of the causes for which partnership is dissolved takes place, kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung
or when the court finds for compelling reasons that division should be magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod sa
ordered, upon petition of one of the co-heirs. (1051a) medaling salita, ang bahay at lupang ito’y walang magmamay-ari
bagkus ay gagamitin habang panahon ng sinomang magnanais sa
aking kaapuapuhan na tumuklas ng karunungan sa paaralan sa
Facts:
Maynila at katabing mga lunsod x x x x[33] (emphasis and
Testator: Basilio Santiago contracted 3 marriages.
underscoring supplied)
1st wife: Bibiano Lopez
The condition set by the decedent on the property’s indivisibility is
Children: Irene and Marta
subject to a statutory limitation. On this point, the Court agrees with
the ruling of the appellate court, viz:
2nd wife: Irene Santiago;
6 children Tomas, Cipriano, Ricardo, respondents Zoilo and Felicidad,
For this Court to sustain without qualification, [petitioners]’s
and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all surnamed Santiago.
contention, is to go against the provisions of law, particularly Articles
494, 870, and 1083 of the Civil Code, which provide that the
3rd wife: Cecilia Lomotan prohibition to divide a property in a co-ownership can only last for
3 children: Eugenia herein petitioner Clemente, and Cleotilde, all twenty (20) years
surnamed Santiago xxxxxxxx
After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his daughter by the Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the indivision of a
second marriage petitioner Ma. Pilar filed before the Regional Trial property for more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public
Court (RTC) of Bulacan[2] a petition for the probate of Basilio’s will, policy to sanction co-ownership beyond the period expressly mandated
admitted, and Pilar was appointed executrix. by the Civil Code x x x x[34]
e) Ang lupa’t bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na G.R. No. L-26855 April 17, 1989
2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi FRANCISCO GARCIA, PAZ GARCIA, and MARIA GARCIA,
bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan petitioners,
lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at vs.
kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung JOSE CALALIMAN, PACIENCIA TRABADILLO & HON. COURT OF
magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod x x x. APPEALS, Third Division, respondents.
DOCTRINE:
Written notice is required for the period of one month for the other co-
f) Ang bigasan, mga makina at pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop ay
heirs to redeem begins to run. Both the letter and spirit of the new
ipinamamana ko sa aking asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na
Civil Code argue against any attempt to widen the scope of the notice
Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente, at
specified in Article 1088 by including therein any other kind of notice,
Cleotilde nang pare-pareho. Ngunit, sa loob ng dalawampong (20)
such as verbal or by registration. Written notice is indispensable, actual
taon mula sa araw ng aking kamatayan, hindi nila papartihin ito at
knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manners by the
pamamahalaan ito ni Clemente at ang maghahawak ng salaping
redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written
kikitain ay si Ma. Pilar na siyang magpaparte.
notice, as exacted by the Code, to remove all uncertainty as to the
sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubt that the
g) Ang lahat ng lupa, liban sa lupa’t bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila, ay alienation is not definitive. The law not having provided for any
ipinapamana ko sa aking nasabing asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga alternative, the method of notifications remains exclusive, though the
anak na Tomas, Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any
Clemente at Cleotilde nang pare-pareho. Datapwa’t, gaya din ng mga distinctive method for written notification of redemption
bigasan, makina at gawaan ng pagkain ng hayop, ito ay hindi
papartihin sa loob ng dalawampong (20) taon mula sa aking
Facts:
pagpanaw, at pamamahalaan din nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente.
On February 11, 1946, one Gelacio Garcia died intestate, leaving a
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
parcel of unregistered land about 372 sq. meters, situated in the superfluous, the purpose of the law having been fully served when
Municipality of Tubungan, Province of Iloilo. On his death the property petitioner Garcia went to the Office of the Register of Deeds and was
was inherited by his nephews, nieces, grandnephews who are the for himself, read and understood the contents of the Deeds of Sale.
descendants of his late brothers, Pedro, Simeon, Buenaventura and
Marcos. On December 3, 1954, the heirs, Juanita Bertomo, Joaquin
There is no question that the provision of law applicable in the instant
Garcia, Porfirio Garcia, Dioscoro Garcia, Flora Garcia, Consolacion
case is Art. 1088 of the New Civil Code (Art. 1067, Old Civil Code) as
Garcia, Remedios Garcia, Trinidad Garcia, Baltazar Garcia signed a
the matter concerns heirs and inheritance not yet distributed
document entitled, "Extra-judicial Partition and Deed of Sale".
(Wenceslao v. Calimon, 46 Phil. 906 [1923]). Art. 1088 states:
Article 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
On December 17, 1954 another group of heirs, Rosario Garcia, stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
Margarita Garcia, Dolores Rufino, Resurreccion Tagarao, Serafin subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
Tagarao, Buenaventura Tagarao, Fortunata Garcia and Simeon Garcia, price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month
all residents of Isabela, Negros Occidental, also sold to the spouses from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
Jose Calaliman and Paciencia Trabadillo through their attorney-in-fact,
Juanito Bertomo, their shares, rights, interest and participation in the
The main issue: whether or not petitioners took all the
same parcel of land. The Deed of Sale was registered in the Register
necessary steps to effectuate their exercise of the right of
of Deeds of Iloilo also on December 22, 1954, Inscription No. 20640,
legal redemption within the period fixed by Art. 1088 of the
p. 88, Vol. 64 (Exhibits, p. 2122).
Civil Code
On May 7, 1955 the heirs Francisco Garcia, Paz Garcia, and Maria
Garcia, petitioners herein, filed against the spouses Jose Calaliman and
Paciencia Trabadillo, private respondents herein, Civil Case No. 3489 Ruling: The Court took note of the fact that the registration of the
with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, for legal redemption of the deed of sale as sufficient notice of sale under the provision of Section
3/4 portion of the parcel of land inherited by the heirs from the late 51 of Act No. 496 applies only to registered lands and has no
Gelacio Garcia, which portion was sold by their co-heirs to the application whatsoever to a case where the property involved is
defendants. In the complaint (Record on Appeal, p. 4) plaintiffs unregistered land. If the intention of the law had been to include
alleged, among others: verbal notice or nay other means of information as sufficient to give
5. That, plaintiffs' co-owners had never offered for sale their interest the effect of this notice, then there would have been no necessity or
and shares over the said land to the plaintiffs prior to the sale in favor reasons to specify in Article 1088 that the said notice be made in
of the defendants, nor given notice of such intention on their part; and writing for, under the old law, a verbal notice or information was
that, no notice in writing has been given by said co-owners to the sufficient. In the interpretation of a related provision (Article 1623),
plaintiffs of the said sale, such that, plaintiffs came to learn of it only written notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of the sale acquired
from other source; in some other manners by the redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or
6. That, plaintiffs would have purchased the interest and shares of she is still entitled to written notice, as exacted by the Code, to remove
their co-owners had the latter offered the same to them prior to the all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any
sale thereof to the defendants; and that, within 30 days after learning doubt that the alienation is not definitive. The law not having provided
of the sale made to the defendants under annexes 'A', 'B' and 'B-l', for any alternative method of notifications remains exclusive, thought
plaintiffs made repeated offer to the defendants to allow them to the Code does not prescribed any particular form of written notice nor
redeem said interest and shares acquired by the defendants in any distinctive method for written notification of redemption.
accordance with the right granted to the plaintiffs by law in such a
case, offering a reasonable price thereof of P300 taking into Baylon v Amador
consideration the fact that the defendants had acquired only 3/4 of the
land of 372 square meters more or less, in area with assessed value of
P110 and a fair market value of 372 at Pl per square meter, the price Facts: On August 26, 1987, private respondent filed an ejectment case
actually obtaining in the locality at the time of the sale thereof under against petitioner at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bacon,
Annexes 'A', 'B' and 'B-l'; however, the defendants refused and have Sorsogon, alleging that the latter defaulted in payment of rentals and
until the present refused to grant redemption thereof giving no reason refused to vacate the subject property owned by private respondent
why other than challenging the plaintiffs to bring their case in court: despite repeated demands.
7. That, the circumstances surrounding the transaction between the On December 28, 1990, after the parties submitted their respective
defendants and plaintiffs' co-owners, the vendors, were such that position papers, the MTC decided in favor of private respondent and
defendants could not have actually paid nor the vendors actually ordered petitioner to vacate the subject premises.
received the total price of P800 as stipulated in the deeds Annexes 'A', In retaliation, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 91-5663 before the
'B' and 'B-l' while the said price fixed is grossly excessive and highly Sorsogon RTC for specific performance alleging that their contract of
exaggerated and prohibitive for evidently ulterior motive: lease also contained an option to buy through which private
8. That, the land herein described is an ancestral property and respondent gave petitioner the preferential right to purchase the
plaintiffs have actually a house standing thereon and having lived subject property in the event the same was put on sale.
thereon ever since, such that, the defendants' refusal to allow In the meantime, private respondent's ex parte motion for execution of
redemption thereof has caused the plaintiffs mental torture, worry and judgment in the ejectment case was granted and on April 19, 1992,
anxiety, forcing them to litigate and retain services of counsel, the MTC issued an alias writ of execution.
therefore, plaintiffs demand against the defendants P500 for moral To prevent imminent ejectment, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari,
damage, P500 for exemplary damage, P300 for attorney's fees, aside prohibition and mandamus with prayer for issuance of temporary
from actual expenses incurred; and, furthermore, P5 monthly as restraining order (TRO) at the Sorsogon RTC, docketed as Civil Case
reasonable value of defendants' occupation of a portion of the No. 92-5747.
premises counting from the filing of this complaint. Meanwhile, without notice to private respondent, petitioner acquired a
"3/9 portion" of the subject property from one of the co-owners.
Respondents claim that the 30-day period prescribed in Article 1088
for petitioners to exercise the right to legal redemption had already Held: Regarding private respondent's right of redemption, Article 1088
elapsed and that the requirement of Article 1088 that notice must be of the New Civil Code explicitly states that, should any of the heirs sell
in writing is deemed satisfied because written notice would be his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the
co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within Heirs with Sale were null and void and had no legal and binding effect
the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing by on them.[12]
the vendor.
The requirement of a written notice is mandatory. This Court has long
Issue: Whether the written notice required to be served by an
established the rule that, notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-
heir to his co-heirs in connection with the sale of hereditary
owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-
rights to a stranger before partition under Article 1088 of the
owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms
Civil Code[17] can be dispensed with when such co-heirs have
and conditions as well as its efficacy and status.[6]c
actual knowledge of the sale such that the 30-day period
Private respondent was never given such written notice. He thus still
within which a co-heir can exercise the right to be subrogated
has the right to redeem said one-third portion of the subject property.
to the rights of a purchaser shall commence from the date of
On account of the lack of written notice of the sale by the other co-
actual knowledge of the sale.
heirs, the 30-day period never commenced.
NON vs. CA
Facts: Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves had nine children,
February 15, 2000
namely Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Andres, Asuncion, Gorgonio,
Facts:
Cresenciano, Arcadia and Maria. Andres, however, predeceased both
• During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P.
his parents and died without issue. After Marcelina Cimafranca and
Viado owned several pieces of property, among them a house and lot
Joaquin Teves died, intestate and without debts, in 1943 and 1953,
located at 147 Isarog Street, La Loma, Quezon City, covered by
respectively, their children executed extrajudicial settlements
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682. Virginia P. Viado died on 20
purporting to adjudicate unto themselves the ownership over two
October 1982. Julian C. Viado died three years later on 15 November
parcels of land belonging to their deceased parents and to alienate
1985. Surviving them were their children -- Nilo Viado, Leah Viado
their shares thereto in favor of their sister Asuncion Teves. The validity
Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca Viado, married to Jose Non,
of these settlements executed pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 of the
and Delia Viado. Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both died on 22
Rules of Court is the primary issue in the present case.
April 1987. Nilo Viado left behind as his own sole heirs herein
On May 9, 1984, plaintiffs-appellants Ricardo and Arcadia Teves filed a
respondents --- his wife Alicia Viado and their two children Cherri
complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental for the
Viado and Fe Fides Viado.
partition and reconveyance of two parcels of land located in
• Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence
Dumaguete, designated as Lots 769-A and 6409, against the heirs of
at the Isarog property. Soon, however, tension would appear to have
Asuncion Teves. The complaint was subsequently amended to include
escalated between petitioner Rebecca Viado and respondent Alicia
Maria Teves and the heirs of Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, and Gorgonio
Viado after the former had asked that the property be equally divided
Teves as plaintiffs and the spouses Lucresio Baylosis and Pacita
between the two families to make room for the growing children.
Nocete, and Cecilia Cimafranca-Gamos and Cecilia Flor Cimafranca as
Respondents, forthwith, claimed absolute ownership over the entire
defendants.[3] Plaintiffs-appellants alleged that defendants-appellees,
property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied
without any justifiable reason, refused to partition the said parcels of
by the latter. On 01 February 1988, petitioners, asserting co-ownership
land and to convey to plaintiffs their rightful shares.[4]
over the property in question, filed a case for partition before the
Lot 769, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4682-A,[5] is
Quezon City RTC (Branch 93).
registered in the names of Urbana Cimafranca, one-fourth (1/4) share,
• Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the
Marcelina Cimafranca, the wife of Joaquin Teves, one-fourth (1/4)
subject property on two documents --- a deed of donation executed by
share, Domingo Villahermosa, one-eighth (1/8) share, Antero
the late Julian Viado covering his one-half conjugal share of the Isarog
Villahermosa, one-eighth (1/8) share, Cecilia Cimafranca, one-eighth
property in favor of Nilo Viado and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in
(1/8) share and Julio Cimafranca, one-eighth (1/8) share. The present
which Julian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs (through a power of attorney in
controversy involves only Marcelina Cimafranca’s one-fourth (1/4)
favor of Nilo Viado) and petitioner Rebecca Viado waived in favor of
share in the land, designated as Lot 769-A.
Nilo Viado their rights and interests over their share of the property
On June 13, 1956, Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Asuncion, Gorgonio and
inherited from Virginia Viado. Both instruments were executed on 26
Arcadia Teves executed a document entitled "Settlement of Estate and
August 1983 and registered on 07 January 1988 by virtue of which
Sale,"[6] adjudicating unto themselves, in equal shares, Lot 769-A and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682 was cancelled and new Transfer
conveying their shares, interests and participations over the same in
Certificate of Title No. 373646 was issued to the heirs of Nilo Viado.
favor of Asuncion Teves for the consideration of P425.00. A similar
• Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the
deed denominated "Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale"[7] was signed
foregoing instruments, contending that the late Nilo Viado employed
by Maria Teves on April 21, 1959. Under such deed, Maria conveys her
forgery and undue influence to coerce Julian Viado to execute the
own share over Lot 769-A in favor of Asuncion Teves for the
deed of donation. Petitioner Rebecca Viado, in her particular case,
consideration of P80.00. The two settlements were denounced by the
averred that her brother Nilo Viado employed fraud to procure her
plaintiffs as spurious.
signature to the deed of extrajudicial settlement. She added that the
exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial
ISSUE: Whether the extra-judicial settlement is binding settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant its
among the heirs. annulment. Finally, petitioners asseverated at the assailed instruments,
HELD: Yes. although executed on 23 August 1983, were registered only five years
1. The extra-judicial settlement is valid since the following requisites later, on 07 January 1988, when the three parties thereto, namely,
concurred: Julian Viado, Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs had already died.
a. The decedent left no will • Assessing the evidence before it, the trial court found for
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Wills and Succession Case Digests
respondents and adjudged Alicia Viado and her children as being the Teodoro Abenojar with Florencia Bautista. They disclaimed the
true owners of the disputed property. allegation of the petitioners that their mother Guillerma Abenojar was
a legitimate daughter of Teodoro Abenojar and Florencia Bautista, the
truth being allegedly that Guillerma Abenojar, the mother of the
Landayans, was Teodoro Abenojar's spurious child with Antera Mandap
HELD: The exclusion of Delia, alleged to be a retardate, from the Deed
who was then married to another man.
of Extrajudicial Settlement verily had the effect of preterition. This kind
• As their affirmative and special defense, the private respondents
of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith,
alleged that the action of the petitioners had already prescribed, the
does not justify a collateral attack on the Transfer Certificate of Title.
same having been filed more than 18 years after the execution of the
The relief rests on Article 1104 to the effect that where the preterition
documents that they seek to annul.
is not attended by bad faith and
fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall
be paid the value of the share HELD: The dismissal of the action is erroneous. The question if it is
pertaining to her. The appellate court has acted properly in ordering void requires a legal inquiry into the legal status of Severino. Should
the remand of the case for further proceedings to make the proper the petitioners be able to substantiate their contention that Severino is
valuation of the property and the ascertainment of the amount due to an illegitimate son of Guillerma, he is not a legal heir of Teodoro. The
Delia. right of representation is denied by law to an illegitimate child who is
disqualified to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father. On this supposition, the subject deed of
ARTICLE 1105
extrajudicial partition is one that included a person who is not an heir
of the descendant whose estate is being partitioned. Such a deed is
LANDAYAN vs. BACANI September 30, 1982 governed by Article 1105 of the Civil Code. The Supreme Court
Facts: ordered the respondent judge to try the case on the merits and render
• An extra-judicial partition was entered into by Maxima, wife of the the corresponding judgment thereon.
deceased Teodoro, and Severino. Petitioners contended that they are
the legal heirs of the deceased since they are the children of
MENDOZA vs. IAC July 30, 1987
Guillerma, who was the only child of the deceased and his first wife
FACTS:
Florencia. They averred that Severino is an illegitimate child of
• The extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Evaristo executed
Guillerma. But Severino alleged that he is the acknowledged natural
between Buenaventura and Modesta was sought to be annulled. The
child of Teodoro and Florencia. Private respondents also alleged that
lower court ruled that such settlement is void as to as the shares of
the action of the petitioners had prescribed since it has been more
Modesta are concerned. Nicolasa and Teresa predeceased
than 18 years after the execution of the document they seek to annul.
Buenaventura. Modesta is the illegitimate child of Nicolasa.
The lower court ruled that the action is barred by prescription.
Buenaventura then died. It was prayed that Modesta be declared the
• In his lifetime, Teodoro Abenojar owned several parcels of land
legal heir of Buenaventura.
located in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and a house and lot in Manila. The
• Buenaventura, Nicolasa and Teresa, all surnamed Gabuya, are the
said properties were all covered by Torrens Titles in his name. He died
legitimate children of the spouses Evaristo Gabuya and Susana
intestate in Urdaneta, on March 20, 1948.
Sabandija, who died intestate many years ago, the first in 1926 and
• On February 3, 1949, private respondents Maxima Andrada, the
the second in 1912
surviving spouse of Teodoro Abenojar, and Severino Abenojar,
• Both Nicolasa and Teresa died single, the first in 1943 and the
executed a public document, entitled "Extra-Judicial Agreement of
second in 1964
Partition" whereby they adjudicated between themselves the
• Modesta Gabuya is the illegitimate daughter of Nicolasa [Exhs. G &
properties left by Teodoro Abenojar. Severino Abenojar represented
7-B-Gabuya]
himself in said document as "the only forced heir and descendant" of
• Lot Nos. 3506 and 3597 of the Cebu Cadastre were some of the
the late Teodoro Abenojar.
original properties left by the late Evaristo Gabuya both located at
• On March 6, 1968, petitioners herein filed a complaint in the Court of
Pardo, Cebu City, formerly covered by Original Certificate [sic] of Title
First Instance of Pangasinan presided over by the respondent Judge
Nos. 6353 and 6597 in the name of Evaristo Gabuya and containing
seeking a judicial declaration that they are legal heirs of the deceased
2,799 square meters and 2,992 square meters, respectively
Teodoro Abenojar, and that private respondents be ordered to
• Sometime in February, 1969, Modesta Gabuya accompanied by Atty.
surrender the ownership and possession of some of the properties that
Elias S. Mendoza went to the house of Buenaventura Gabuya who
they acquired under the deed of extra-judicial settlement
wanted to see the titles of these two parcels of land and Buenaventura
corresponding to the shares of the petitioners and that the said deed
was instructed by Modesto to look for them so that they be
of extra- judicial settlement and the subsequent deed of donation
reconstituted; that some days later the two, Modesta Gabuya and Elias
executed in favor of private respondents, spouses Liberata Abenojar
S. Mendoza visited him again at his house and Mode took the titles but
and Jose Serrano, in consequence thereof be declared nun and void.
this time Buenaventura went with them to the Cebu Capitol Building
• In their complaint, petitioners Maria, Segundo, Marcial and Lucio, all
• Buenaventura and Modesto signed a document and acknowledged
surnamed LANDAYAN (the rest of the petitioners being their respective
before Atty. Salvador B. Mendoza but the latter did not read to the
spouses), alleged that they are the legitimate children of Guillerma
signatories the contents of the document; that this document dated
Abenojar, then already deceased, who was the only child of Teodoro
March 12, 1969 turned out to be an Extrajudicial settlement of the
Abenojar with his first wife named Florencia Bautista; and that while
Estate of Evaristo Gabuya [Exhs. A and 1-B-Gabuya] whereby
Teodoro Abenojar contracted a second marriage with Antera Mandap
Buenaventura and Modesto appear to have divided and partitioned
and a third with private respondent Maxima Andrada, he did not have
between themselves pro visio and share and share alike [1/2 each] Lot
any offspring in any of the said second and third marriages. They aver
Nos. 3506 and 3597
that private respondent Severino Abenojar is an illegitimate son of
• This Extrajudicial settlement of the Estate of Evaristo Gabuya was
Guillerma Abenojar. They accordingly pray that they be declared as
duly published [Exh. B] in the Morning Times and registered with the
among the legal heirs of the deceased Teodoro Abenojar entitled to
Register of Deeds [Exhs. B-1 & B-2] and the document itself was also
share in his estate
similarly registered [Exhs. A-1 and A-2]
• Private respondents, on the other hand, have alleged in their
• On December 31, 1968, prior to the execution of the Extra-Judicial
pleadings that Teodoro Abenojar married only once, and that was with
Settlement document, a Deed of Absolute Sale [Exhs. 2-B-Gabuya]
private respondent Maxima Andrada. They claimed that private
was executed by Modesta Gabuya in favor of the spouses Atty. and
respondent Severino Abenojar is an acknowledged natural child of
204
Wills and Succession Case Digests
Mrs. Elias S. Mendoza covering her alleged one-half [1/2] undivided 1105 is applicable. The participation of nonheirs does not render the
share in Lot No. 3597 for a consideration of P10,000.00; that pursuant partition void in its entirety but only to the extent corresponding them.
to the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement [Exhs. A & 1-B-Gabuya], and
the Deed of Absolute Sale [Exh. 2-B-Gabuya], Original Certificates of
FERNANDEZ vs. FERNANDEZ August 28, 2001
Title Nos. 6353 and 6597 in the name of the late Evaristo Gabuya,
father of Buenaventura Gabuya, were cancelled and in liue thereof
were issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 43909 and 43910 [Exh. Rodolfo was adopted by the late spouses Jose and Generosa. When
C] The first in the names of spouses Buenaventura Gabuya married to Jose died, a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition was executed between
Severa Fernandez, and Modesta Gabuya married to Dominador Delima Rodolfo and Generosa. After learning the transaction, the nephews and
and the second, in the names of Buenaventura Gabuya married to nieces of Jose filed an action to declare the Deed of Extra-judicial
Severa Fernandez and Atty. Elias S. Mendoza married to Eustiquia S. Partition void ab initio.
Mendoza; that Atty. Elias S. Mendoza and Modesta Gabuya have
respectively asked from Buenaventura Gabuya the partition of the lots Facts:
which they are co-owners of the undivided one-half [1/2] portion “The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia
• Buenaventura refused to do so claiming that ModestaGabuya is not were the registered owners of a parcel of land located at Dagupan City
entitled to inherit from the estate of his late father Evaristo Gabuya. 7 covered by TCT No. T-9267 (525) consisting of 194 sq. meters, and
the two-storey building constructed thereon covered by Tax
Ruling: The only document presented by Modesta to prove that she Declaration 22-592-1. It is undisputed that Generosa gave birth to a
was recognized by her mother was the certificate of birth and baptism baby boy named Rogelio who died when he was only twelve (12) years
signed by the parish priest. Canonical certificate of baptism is not old as paralytic. In the testimony of Romeo Fernandez (TSN, Aug. 31,
sufficient to prove recognition. Neither could the alleged continuous 1994, pp. 9-14) it was revealed that the late Spouses being childless
possession by Modesta by the death of their son, purchased from a certain Miliang for P20.00
Gabuya of the status of a natural child improve her condition. Modesta a one (1) month baby boy. The boy being referred to was later on
Gabuya, not having been acknowledged in the manner provided by law identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein appellant. Appellant was
by her mother, Nicolasa, was not entitled to succeed the latter. The taken care of by the couple and was sent to school and became a
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Evaristo, therefore, null and dental technician. He lived with the couple until they became old and
void insofar as Modesta Gabuya is concerned per Article 1105 of the disabled.
New Civil Code.
The trial court found that defendant Rodolfo Fernandez was not a
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY vs. CA legitimate nor a legally adopted child of spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez
March 7, 2000 and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not inherit
Culled from the evidence proffered by petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty from the spouses. Rodolfo’s claim as a son of the deceased spouses
Co. (hereafter AZNAR), it appears that Lot No. 4399 containing an area Fernandez was negated by the fact that (1) he only reached high
of 34,325 square meters located at Brgy. Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City, was school and was told to stop studying so that he could help in the clinic
acquired by AZNAR from the heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on by virtue of of Dr. Fernandez, (2) he failed to present any birth certificate, (3) the
an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale book entitled Fercolla clan which was compiled and edited by
dated 3 March 1964. This deed was registered with the Register of respected people such as Ambassador Armando Fernandez, Justice
Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on 6 March 1964 as shown on the face Jorge Coquia and Teresita Coquia-Sison, showed the geneology of the
thereof. After the sale, petitioner AZNAR declared this property under family of Dr. Jose and Generosa Fernandez without a child; a pedigree
its name for taxation purposes and regularly paid the taxes thereon. may be admitted in evidence to prove the facts of genealogy and that
Herein private respondents were allegedly allowed to occupy portions entries in a family bible or other family books or charts, engravings or
of Lot No. 4399 by mere tolerance provided that they leave the land in rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of
the event that the company would use the property for its purposes. pedigree,[5] (4) the certification issued by the Records Management
Later, AZNAR entered into a joint venture with Sta. Lucia Realty and Archives Office that there was no available information about the
Development Corporation for the development of the subject lot into a birth of petitioner Rodolfo to the spouses Fernandez, (5) the
multi-million peso housing subdivision and beach resort. When its application of Dr. Jose Fernandez for backpay certificate naming
demands for the private respondents to vacate the land failed, AZNAR petitioner Rodolfo as his son was doubtful considering that there were
filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTCC) of Lapu-Lapu City a case for blemishes or alteration in the original copy; (6) that Rodolfo’s
unlawful detainer and damages, which was docketed as Civil Case No. baptismal certificate was spurious and falsified since there were no
R-1027. available records of baptism with the parish from June 7, 1930 to
On the other hand, the private respondents alleged that they are the August 8, 1936, while Rodolfo’s baptismal certificate which was issued
successors and descendants of the eight children of the late Crisanta in 1989 showed that he was baptized on November 24, 1934. The
Maloloy-on, whose names appear as the registered owners in the court found that the extra-judicial partition and the deed of absolute
Original Certificate of Title No. RC-2856. Private respondents set up sale were prepared and executed under abnormal, unusual and
the defense of ownership and questioned the title of Aznar to the irregular circumstances which rendered the documents null and void.
subject lot, alleging that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of
Absolute Sale upon which petitioner bases its title is null and void for Issue: The principal issue for resolution in this case concerns
being fraudulently made. Private respondents claim that not all the the rights of the parties to the conjugal property of the
known heirs of Crisanta participated in the extrajudicial partition and deceased spouses Fernandez.
that 2 person who participated and were made parties thereto were
not heirs of Crisanta.
Petitioners allege that the respondent court found the extra-judicial
partition executed by petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa
Ruling in relation to Article 1105: Under Article 1104, partition made Fernandez, widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, null and void because the
with preterition shall not be rescinded unless it be proved that there former allegedly failed to prove legitimate filiation to his putative
was bad faith or fraud. In this case, there was no evidence of bad faith father, the late Dr. Jose Fernandez. Petitioners, contend, however,
or fraud. that the burden of proof lies with the respondents because they were
As to the 2 parties to the deed who were allegedly not heirs, Article the ones contesting the filiation of Rodolfo Fernandez. They insist that
both lower courts had no power to pass upon the matter of filiation
205
Wills and Succession Case Digests
because it could not be collaterally attacked in the present action but
in a separate and independent action directly impugning such filiation.
206