Cole Smith

Ehman, Robert. 2000. “What Really Is Wrong with Pedophilia”. Public Affairs
Quarterly 14 (2). [North American Philosophical Publications, University of Illinois Press]:
129–40. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40441281.
In “What Really Is Wrong with Pedophilia” Robert Ehman expounds upon his somewhat
extreme thesis that the taboo of pedophilia in contemporary North American Society is
unfounded and that many of its perceived damages are caused by the taboo itself. The article is
structured in a series of arguments in support of the taboo, followed by his counter arguments.
Ehman starts by suggesting that a legally mandated “age of consent” is an invalid
measure of consent. He points out how individuals mature in different ways and at different
paces. This means there is no one age before which a person is incapable of consent. He suggests
instead, that consent should be maturity based, on an individual level. He identifies consent as
gradually developing as well, rather than present or not, and continues to outline two dimensions
of consent, knowledge about ones actions, and freedom from coercion in their performance.
He first addresses one common argument against sexual relations between adults and
children. The discrepancy in their status and ensuing dependence children endure at the hands of
adults means they are incapable of consenting. His counterargument first explains that many
children are capable of identifying degrees of control and asymmetry in social status. He
compares a ten year old’s relationship with a teacher to his relationship with his eighteen year
old second cousin, explaining how most ten year olds are capable of distinguishing between the
degrees of control each possesses. Ehman also points out that these asymmetrical relationships
are not considered damaging to the legitimacy of a child’s participation in other activities (sports,
religion) encouraged by adults, and asks why it should impact the legitimacy of a sexual
relationship between a child and adult.
Ehman next discusses a child’s lack of comprehension of a possible sexual relationship
with an adult. He first claims that children have legitimate sexual desires, and do not necessarily
misinterpret an adult’s advances. He also argues that every sexual interaction among adults is
perceived differently by each participant. In a simple example, one participant may think of their
sexual relationship is an expression of love, while their partner only sees it as “erotic play”.
Simply put, there is not universal “meaning” of sex. At which point, Ehman claims, there is
nothing necessarily missing in a child’s perception of their sexual experiences.
Ehman briefly addresses the idea of sex as a physical violation of a child’s bodily
autonomy. His response is again, to compare the treatment of other physical interactions between
adults and children. His specific example demonstrates that the nonsexual comforting of a sick
child may be more physically invasive than masturbating in their presence; only one is being
suggested as unacceptable.
Ehman’s final discussion of the requirement of consent is pertinent to a broader
discussion of taboos. Ehman points out that the taboo on sex between children and adults not
only is responsible for the psychological damage attributed to the sex, but that the silence that
shrouds pedophilia as a taboo means that consent is less likely to be found. His definition of
consent includes understanding the “rules” that govern the interaction. Ehman claims that
because of the taboo on sex between adults and children, neither adults, nor children are able to
access societal “rules” governing the interaction. This lack of knowledge means that both parties
are less likely to be able to offer informed consent.