Bulaong vs Gonzales

FACTS:

This case involves conflicting claims of two sets of parties over two parcels of land. The first parcel of land, with an area
of 237 square meters and covered by TCT No. T-249639 was originally registered in the name of Fortunato E. Limpo,
married to Bertha Limpo. The other parcel of land, with an area of 86 square meters and covered by TCT No. T-249641,7
was originally registered in the names of Pacifica E. Limpo, married to Nicanor C. Sincionco, and Fortunato E. Limpo,
married to Bertha Limpo. These parcels of land were mortgaged by the daughter of Fortunato and Bertha Limpo, Regina
Christi Limpo, upon the authority of her father, to the Bulaongs, to secure a loan in the amount of P4,300,000.00. The
mortgage was evidenced by a Deed of Mortgage dated January 13, 1993. The Bulaongs alleged that before they
executed the mortgage, Regina gave them the owner’s duplicates of title of the two properties. In early January,
Anselmo Bulaong, together with his counsel, Atty. Roberto Dionisio, allegedly went to the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Bulacan to check the titles of the properties to be mortgaged. According to the Bulaongs, the Register of Deeds, Atty.
Elenita Corpus, assured them that TCT Nos. T-249639 and T-249641 were completely clear of any liens or encumbrances
from any party. Relying on this assurance, Anselmo Bulaong agreed to the execution of the mortgage over the two
properties. After the execution of the mortgage, the Bulaongs once again went to the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan to register and annotate the mortgage on the titles. They learned then that the Register of Deed’s copies of the
two titles were among the records that were burned in the fire that destroyed the entire office of the Register of Deeds
of Bulacan on March 7, 1987. Atty. Elenita Corpus convinced them to cause the reconstitution of the originals of the
titles, and further assured them that the mortgage over the properties would be protected since a copy of the Deed of
Mortgage had already been given to her office for annotation. On February 4, 1993, the newly reconstituted titles were
issued, still in the names of Fortunato Limpo, and of Pacifica Limpo and Fortunato Limpo, respectively. Thereafter, on
February 24, 1993, new titles were again issued upon the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Regina’s parents but
the new titles in Regina’s name now contained entries pertaining to Writ of Execution. It appears that a certain Veronica
Gonzales had filed a criminal case for estafa against Regina and on October 28, 1991, it rendered a decision acquitting
Regina, but at the same time ordering her to pay Veronica actual damages in the total amount of P275, 000.00. By virtue
of a writ of execution issued on December 29, 1992, the abovequoted notice of levy was recorded in the Primary Entry
Book of the Registry of Bulacan on January 4, 1993. However, this was not annotated on the titles themselves because at
the time of the levy, the properties had not yet been transferred to Regina, but were still registered in the name of her
parents. To satisfy Regina’s judgment debt, the two lots were sold at public auction on June 8, 1993 to Veronica, the
only bidder, for P640,354.14. The Certificate of Sale was annotated on the titles on June 8, 1993 as Entry No. 2075. Upon
the lapse of the one year redemption period on June 20, 1994, Veronica’s titles over the properties were consolidated. A
final deed of sale was issued in Veronica’s name and annotated on June 24, 1994.21 On the other hand, the Bulaongs
also had the mortgage extrajudicially foreclosed, with the sheriff conducting the auction sale on August 22, 1994. The
Bulaongs were the highest bidders, buying the properties for the sum ofP4,300,000.00. They also paid the corresponding
capital gains tax of P215,000.00, plus P64,500.00 for the documentary stamp tax, which were required before the titles
to the lots could be transferred in their names. The Certificate of Sale in their favor was inscribed on August 23, 1994 on
TCT No. T-30395 and TCT No. T-30396 as Entry No. 46739. The RTC ruled in favor of the Bulaongs. According to the RTC,
allowing Veronica to levy on the properties worth at least P5,000,000.00 for a judgment of P275,000.00 would result in
gross unjust enrichment. The RTC thus ordered the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to issue new titles in the name of the
Bulaongs, but only after the Bulaongs had reimbursed the amount of P275,000.00 to Veronica, with interest. Both
parties appealed to the CA. The CA upheld the validity of the Notice of Levy on Execution, noting that it created a lien in
favor of the judgment creditor over the property. According to the CA, when the Bulaongs received the owners’ copies
of TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396, the Notice of Levy was already annotated on the titles and, thus, should have put
them on guard. As mortgagees of the lots, the Bulaongs had the option to redeem the properties within the redemption
period provided by law. Since they failed to avail of this remedy, the consolidation of titles in Veronica’s name was
proper.

ISSUE: Whether or not Veronica has a superior right over the properties?

Ruling: Petition Granted. Redemption is not the proper remedy The CA faulted the Bulaongs for not redeeming the
properties from Veronica when they had the option of doing so. For failing to exercise this right, the CA concluded that
the consolidation of the titles to the lots in Veronica’s name thus became a matter of course. We disagree. Regina’s
interest in the properties is not established. The levy on execution for judgment is "the act x x x by which an officer sets
apart or appropriate[s,] for the purpose of satisfying the command of the writ, a part or the whole of the judgment
debtor’s property."33 Every interest which the judgment debtor may have in the property may be subjected to levy on
execution.

This statute authorizes the sale under execution of every kind of property, and every interest in property which is, or
may be, the subject of private ownership and transfer. It deals with equitable rights and interests as it deals with legal,
without anywhere expressly recognizing or making any distinction between them. We think the real test, as to whether
or not property can be attached and sold upon execution is — does the judgment debtor hold such a beneficial interest
in such property that he can sell or otherwise dispose of it for value? If he does, then the property is subject to
execution and payment of his debts. Although we recognize the validity of the annotation of the levy on the execution in
the present case, the question of whether the levy itself is valid remains to be determined. To do this, Regina’s interest
in the subject properties at the time of the levy has to be ascertained. To recall, Veronica’s notice of levy on execution is
based on Regina’s interest in the two properties, which she acquired via the Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly executed
by her parents in her favor on November 5, 1991. The subject properties were finally registered in Regina’s name, not by
virtue of the 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale, but by virtue of succession, specifically by the "Adjudication" that Regina filed
with the Register of Deeds on February 24, 1993,40 pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. If she had
already acquired her parents’ interest in these properties in 1991, she would not have needed any authority from her
father to execute the mortgage with the Bulaongs; she would have done so in her own capacity. The spring cannot rise
higher than its source. Since Regina had no established interest in the subject properties at the time of the levy,
Veronica’s levy had nothing to attach to in the subject properties. Unregistered sale of land cannot bind third parties.
Even assuming that the Deed of Absolute Sale in Regina’s favor was valid, we still cannot uphold the validity of the levy
and execution sale in Veronica’s favor. Simply put, if a sale is not registered, it is binding only between the seller and the
buyer, but it does not affect innocent third persons.

Republic v. Bantigue Point Development Corporation

GR No. 162322 | March 14, 2012

Facts: On July 17, 1997, Bantigue Point filed with RTC Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration of title
over Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D, San Juan Cadastre, 10,732 m2 with a total assessed value of P14,920.

On July 18, 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on October 22, 1997. On August 7, 1997, it
issued a second Order setting the initial hearing on November 4, 1997.

In 1998, while the records were still with the RTC, Republic filed its Opposition.

RTC Clerk of Court transferred motu propio the records of the case to MTC San Juan, because the assessed value of the
property was less than P100,000.
The MTC issued an Order of General Default and commenced with the reception of evidence. Bantigue presented Tax
Declarations, a Deed of Absolute Sale in its favor, and a Certification from the DENR CENRO of Batangas City that the lot
is within the alienable and disposable (A&D) zone. MTC awarded the land to Bantigue.

Upon appeal, CA affirmed MTC. Since Republic actively participated in the proceedings, it is estopped from questioning
the issue of jurisdiction on appeal. Bantigue sufficiently established its registrable title over the property after having
proven OCEN possession and occupation.

Issue: Whether the land is alienable and disposable?

Held:

No. CENRO certification not sufficient proof that the property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The applicant for land registration
has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership by establishing through incontrovertible evidence
that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the government.

Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO
Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by
the legal custodian of the official record.

Only CENRO certification presented. No DENR Secretary's approval of the original classification.

Petition for Review is denied. Case remanded to MTC for reception of evidence of evidence to prove that the property
sought to be registered is A&D land of the public domain.

Republic vs. Metro Index Realty

Facts:

1.Respondent filed w/ the RTC of Cavite an application for judicial confirmation of title over 3 parcels of land located at
Brgy. Mataas na Lupa, Indang Cavitea.During the hearing it presented 2 witnesses, Dimayuga Project Documentation
Officer who testified that respondent bought the property from Herminia, Melinda & Hernando Sicap & that it was
declared for taxation in the respondents name in 2006 &&& the property is alienable & disposable land evidenced by
the certification issued by DENR.

Herminia testified that she & her siblings inherited the land from their parents who had been in possession of the land
since 1956 as shown by the tax declaration & at the time they inherited the property, they had been religiously paying
taxes thereon & planted coconut, banana, santol, palay & corn2. RTC granted the application w/ CA affirmed ruling that
the number of trees found in the land is not the determination of ownership of the land (even only few trees are there,
does not mean that they did NOT own the land) & constructive possession

SC reversed the CA decision for failure to comply w/ the requirements of sec 14, PD 1529 (1st & 2nd par)

Issue: W/N respondent had proven that he is entitled to the benefits of PD 1529 on confirmation of imperfect titles?

Ruling: No. Although respondents might be in open & continuous possession of the land, still it is part of the public
dominion. Public lands become only patrimonial not only w/ a declaration that these are alienable & disposable lands
but there must be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained
for public service or the development of the national wealth and only so will prescription run against it
The classification of the land to be public or alienable should have 1st been addressed to but was regrettably neglected.
Public Land Act requires more than constructive possession & casual cultivation ---- a mere casual cultivation of portions
of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under a claim of ownership.

In this case lot 1 = 2k coconuts = 119 hectaresb.Lot 2 = 1k coconuts = 19 hectares c.Reality = 1 hectare = 114 coconuts
w/c means that only 25 hectares out of 138 hectares being applied for was in fact cleared, cultivated & planted w/
coconut w/c need not be tendered or watched. This only showed that casual or occasional cultivation of portions of the
land in question. In short, possession is not exclusive nor notorious, much less continuous, so as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the government.

Valiao vs Republic

GR 170757, Nov 28, 2011

Facts

The petitioners (Pacifico Valiao, Lodovico Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea) filed with the RTC of
Kabankalan an application of a parcel of land with an area of 504, 535 square meters in Barrio Galicia, Ilog, Negros
Occidental under the conditions of PD 1529. They claim that they have acquired the property in 1947 after the death of
their uncle Basilio Milliarez who purchased the land from Fermin Payogao through a Deed of Sale dated May 19, 1916,
entirely handwritten in Spanish. Upon their uncle’s death, they have possessed the land until 1966 when oppositor
Macario Zafra disposed them of their property compelling them to file complaints of Grave Coercion and Qualified Theft
against him. The petitioners submitted a Tax Declaration No. 9562[6] dated September 29, 1976 under the names of the
heirs of Basilio Millarez. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision to grant the petitioner’s application for
registration.

Issue

Whether Lot No. 2372 is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain and if they had been in an open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a claim of ownership.

Ruling

The petitioners’ application under PD 1529 should be denied.

The petitioners failed to prove that the subject property was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the
public domain.

Under the Regalian doctrine, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural
land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen
into ownership and be registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of
the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence
must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
In addition, there must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that
the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the government.

The petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in an open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. There is
nothing in the records that would substantiate petitioners’ claim that Basilio was in possession of the property during
the period of possession required by law.

Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually
exercise over his own property. As regards petitioners’ possession of the land in question from 1947 to 1966, petitioners
could only support the same with a tax declaration dated September 29, 1976. At best, petitioners can only prove
possession since said date. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to
possess land when not supported for other evidence. It does not necessarily prove ownership.

G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012

WILLEM BEUMER,
vs. AVELINA AMORES,

FACTS:

Willem (Beumer), a Dutch national, married Avelina (Amores) on March 29, 1980.

Their marriage was declared null by the RTC on November 10, 2000 by reason of psychological incapacity, thus
Willem filed a petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership and distribution of properties which he claimed were
acquired during their marriage.

He purchased and inherited some lots which are now the subject of this case.

The respondent averred that she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the
truth being that she used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds
and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance.

During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of respondent,
these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit12
since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition.

He also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary
to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.

During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of respondent,
these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit12
since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition.

He also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary
to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.
ISSUE:

Can a foreign national own lands in the Philippines?

HELD:

The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners may not own lands in the Philippines. However, there are no restrictions to
the ownership of buildings or structures on lands of foreigners. As such, the two houses on Lots 1 and 2142 are
considered co-owned by the parties.

While admitting to have previously executed a joint affidavit that respondent’s personal funds were used to purchase
Lot 1, he likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. The Court cannot, even on
the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject
properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase

A contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and
produces no legal effect at all.

Republic of the Philippines v. Sogod Development Corporation

[ G.R. No. 175760; 17 February 2016]

Facts:

Respondent Sogod Development Corporation (Sogod) filed an application for registration and confirmation of land that
it purchased from Catalina Rivera, averring that “by itself and through its predecessors-in-interest[,] [it had] been in
open, continuous, exclusive[,] and notorious possession and occupation of [the land] since June 12, 1945[.]” DENR filed
an Opposition on the ground that the land was previously forest land and was certified and released as alienable and
disposable only on January 17, 1986. Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Catmon-Carmen-Sogod ruled in favour herein
respondent Sogod, which the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issue:

Whether or not the occupation of forest lands prior to its classification as alienable and disposable land may be
considered for purposes of complying with the requirements for judicial confirmation of title.

Ruling:

Yes. Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, 70 otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which
requires possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 for a judicial confirmation of title:

SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.

A similar provision is found in Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, which reads:

SECTION 14. Who May Apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: AIDSTE

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

This court in Heirs of Mario t v. Republic has clarified that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 qualifies possession and
occupation, not land classification, as alienable and disposable. The agricultural land subject of the application needs
only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicant's possession
and occupation of the land dates back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thus:

The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural land
should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such
classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be
minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full
legislative intent be respected.

We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation
was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers.
Except that said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be
associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal
meaning of the law as written by the legislators.

Moreover, an examination of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement
that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As
such, the applicant's imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945,
or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously
and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion
of the period. In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as
the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period
of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act. It is for this reason that the property subject of the application of
Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire
duration of the requisite period of possession.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land
at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.