ART.
198 - SUPPORT Held:
Lim Lua v. Lua (G.R. No. 175279-80, Jun. 5, 2013)
Facts: Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent
Danilo Y. Lua, and for support pendent lite amounting to
P500,000.
Respondent on the other hand, refused and manifested
that he is only willing to give as much as 75,000 as
support.
RTC ruled that the amount of 250,000 support per month
is sufficient, notwithstanding the separate medical
support for susan when the need arises. However this
amount was eventually reduced by the CA, citing the
fact that there was no evidence adduced to show the
alleged millions of income of respondent, and that based
on the evidence presented the proper amount to paid
should be 115,000. This was not assailed by any party
does it became final and executory.
Issues once again arised, when respondent in complying
with its obligation paid only the amount of P162,651.90
to petitioner. Respondent explained that, as decreed in
the CA decision, he deducted from the amount of
support in arrears (September 3, 2003 to March 2005)
ordered by the CA -- P2,185,000.00 -- plus P460,000.00
(April, May, June and July 2005),
totalingP2,645,000.00, the advances given by him to his
children and petitioner in the sum of P2,482,348.16
(with attached photocopies of receipts/billings). On the
other hand petitioner contends that respondent shouldn’t
be allowed the deductions he made arguing that under
Article 194, support comprises everything indispensable
for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family, that in this case the cars
and credit card charges are not part of support. Once
again RTC, ruled in favor of petitioner granting a writ of
execution, however upon appeal such was decision was
reversed and the CA allowed the deductions made by
respondent. Hence the case at bar.
Issue: WON the deductions made by respondent
including the two
automobile and credit card charges are valid deductions
and considered as advances.
The Supreme Court reversed the CA, and stated that CA
should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by
respondent to be credited against the accrued support
pendente lite.
The amount of support which those related by marriage
and family relationship is generally obliged to give each
other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of
the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such support
comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family.
Here, the monthly support pendente lite granted by the
trial court was intended primarily for food, household
expenses such as salaries of drivers and house helpers,
and also petitioner’s scoliosis therapy sessions.
Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by
respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost,
travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli, purchases
through credit card of items other than groceries and dry
goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these
bear no relation to the judgment awarding support
pendente lite. Any amount respondent seeks to be
credited as monthly support should only cover those
incurred for sustenance and household expenses
SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner, vs. DANILO Y. LUA,
Respondent. G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 5, 2013
SUMMARY: Mother of two seeks spousal and child
support from rich husband. FACTS: On September 3,
2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent
Danilo Y. Lua, to the RTC. In her prayer for support
pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner
sought the amount of Php500,000 as monthly support,
citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and
dividends in several companies and businesses here and
abroad. After due hearing, RTC cited Art. 203 of the
Family Code, stating that support is demandable from
the time plaintiff needed the said support but is payable
only from the date of judicial demand, and thus also
granted support pendente lite of P250,000.00 (x 7
corresponding to the 7months that lapsed).
Respondent filed an Motion for Reconsideration
asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal support
considering that she does not maintain for herself a
separate dwelling from their children and respondent has
continued to support the family for their sustenance and
well- being in accordance with family’s social and
financial standing. As to the P250,000.00 granted by the
trial court as monthly support pendente lite, as well as
the P1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found
it unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law
for not having considered the needs of the respondent.
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied. His second
motion also having been denied, respondent filed a
petition for certiorari in the CA. CA nullified RTC’s
ruling and changed the amount to P115,000.00. The
appellate court said that the trial court should not have
completely disregarded the expenses incurred by
respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance
of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses,
and the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry
goods and books, which certainly inured to the benefit
not only of the two children, but their mother (petitioner)
as well, and thus ordered the deduction of the amount of
PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears
of Danilo to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two
children. It also noted the lack of contribution from the
petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to support
their children. Petitioner appealed.
ISSUE: Whether certain expenses already incurred by
the respondent may be deducted from the total support in
arrears owing to petitioner and her children.
DECISION:
The SC declared that the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED.
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those
related by marriage and family relationship is generally
obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the
recipient. Such support comprises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family.
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment of
voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any
time during the proceeding, the court, motu proprio or
upon verified application of any of the parties, guardian
or designated custodian, may temporarily grant support
pendent lite prior to the rendition of the judgment or
final order. Because of its provisional nature, a court
does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case
before it can settle an application for this relief. All that
a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount
of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly
resolve the application. It is enough that affidavits or
other documentary evidence appearing in the record
establish the facts.
In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite
for petitioner and her two children was determined after
due hearing and submission of documentary evidence by
the parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court
was reduced on appeal, it is clear that the monthly
support pendente lite of Php115,000.000 ordered by the
CA was intended primarily for the sustenance of
petitioner and her children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries
of drivers and house helpers, and other household
expenses. Petitioner’s testimony also mentioned the cost
of regular therapy for her scoliosis and medicine.
As to financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond
doubt that he can solely provide for the subsistence,
education, transportation, health/medical needs and
recreational activities of his.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the
provisional support from the salary of the parent. Since
the amount of the monthly support pendent lite as fixed
by the CA was not appealed by either party, there is no
controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness. The
dispute concerns the deductions made by respondent in
settling the support in arrears. The amounts already
extended to the two children; being a commendable act
of petitioner, should be continued by him considering
the vast financial resources at his disposal.
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
ARTS. 209-211
Santos v CA (G.R. 113054)
FACTS:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and
Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo
City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel
Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987. From the time
the boy was released from the hospital until sometime
thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his
maternal grandparents, private respondents herein,
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two
brothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-year
old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend
that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner
abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to
his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care,
Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.,"
before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with
Santos, Sr. as respondent. After an ex-parte hearing on
October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the
same day awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos,
Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals.
In its decision dated April 30, 1992, respondent appellate
court affirmed the trial court's order.
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and
the appellate court to award custody of his minor son to
his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that
under Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental
authority of the grandparents is proper only when both
parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's
unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully
shown by private respondents.
ISSUE:
Who should properly be awarded custody of the
minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
RULING:
The minor should be given to the legitimate father.
When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to
another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a
document, what is given is merely temporary custody
and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or
unsuitability may substitute parental authority be
exercised by the surviving grandparent.
The court held the contentions of the grandparents are
insufficient as to remove petitioner's parental authority
and the concomitant right to have custody over the
minor. Private respondents' demonstrated love and
affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate
father is still preferred over the grandparents.
The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly
because there is no proof that at the present time,
petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While
petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable, it cannot
be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the
unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep
his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious
efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him
custody would help enhance the bond between parent
and son.
The Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise
no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many
men in uniform who are assigned to different parts of the
country in the service of the nation, are still the natural
guardians of their children.
Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting
away his boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is
likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.
SANTOS SR VS CA
242 SCRA 407
Leouel and Julia had placed their child into the care of
the latter’sparents ever since the child was born. The
grandparents were the oneswho provided support for the
child, since Leouel cannot afford to do so.Julia then left
for the States to work but louelle does not know
where.The grandparents claim that Julia has been
sending financial support toher son.
On September 1990, Leouel abducted the child from his
grandparents.The grandparents then filed for custody of
the boy, which the trial courtgranted.
Leouel appealed, stating that the respondents have failed
to show thehe is unfit to be the father and that the
substitute parental authoritygranted to the boy’s
grandparents was inappropriate.
The respondents claim that they are financially well-off
to take care of the son, while Leouel is not. They can
provide the child with an air-conditioned room since he
is asthmatic.
Also, Julia has entrusted the boy to them. Leouel’s use
of trickery toabduct the child also is a sign of his
unfitness. They likewise claim thatthey are in the best
position to take care of the child, and this should bethe
primary consideration of the court.
ISSUE: WON Leouel should be awarded proper custody
HELD: Yes. The father, Leouel was not shown to be an
unfit parent. The factthat he kidnapped his son from the
latter’s maternal grandparents does notrender him unfit.
Also, disqualifying him as custodian because of the
natureof his work (soldier) would mean depriving all
soldiers of their child’scompany. Only in cases of death,
absence or unsuitability of parents maysubstitute
parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparents.
Theright of custody accorded to parents springs from the
exercise of parental authority. Parental authority or
patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution
whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection
of their unemancipated children to the extent required by
the latter' s needs.
It is a mass of rights and obligations which thelaw grants
to parents for the purpose of the children's physical
preservation and development, as well as the cultivation
of their intellect and the education of their heart and
senses.
As regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a
task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no
sovereignty but a sacred trust for thewelfare of the
minor."
ART 213 PARENTAL AUTHORITY IN CASE OF
LEGAL SEPARATION
1) CHUA v CABANGBANG (1969)
CFI dismisses Pacita’s claim for her daughter. She was a
prostitute who had three children by three men whom
she lived with successively (Chua Ben, Sy Sia Lay and
Victor Tan Villareal)
Betty Chua, 11 yo at the time of the trial, was one of her
children and is in the custody of Flora Cabangbang.
Cabangbang and Chua had different stories as to how
Betty’s custody was acquired.
FLORA: she found the child wrapped in a bundle in
their front door
PACITA: Villareal gave Betty to Flora as a payment for
his debts. She now claims custody of her child after five
years allegedly because she did not know where to look
for the child.
ISSUE: WON Pacita may regain her child
HELD: No. There was constructive abandonment and
hence she may be deprived of parental authority. She
only wants the child back so her biological father’s
support would resume (take note that this is still
uncertain) and she was even willing to withdraw her suit
if the Cabangbangs would pay her 150K. She attests no
genuine motherly longing. In the best interest of the
child, Flora Cabangbang should retain custody.
COMPARED WITH CELIS v CAFUIR, Celis did not
lose communication with her child during the time that
Cafuir had custody of her child.
2) PEREZ V CA (G.R.No. 118870, March 29, 1996)
Facts:
Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa,
his wife, (petitioner) is a registered nurse. After six
miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy,
Nerissa finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York
on July 20, 1992. Ray stayed with her in the U.S. twice
and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike
his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not
employed.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived
in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the
U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-
week vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets.
However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his
sick mother and promised to follow her with the baby.
According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently
in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York,
she changed her mind and continued working. She was
supposed to come back immediately after winding up
her affairs there.
When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II’s
first birthday, the couple was no longer on good terms.
They had quarrels. Nerissa did not want to live near her
in-laws and rely solely on her husband’s meager income
of P5,000.00. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay
here, where he could raise his son even as he practiced
his profession. He maintained that it would not be
difficult to live here since they have their own home and
a car. Despite mediation by the priest, the couple failed
to reconcile.
Nerissa filed a petition to surrender the custody of their
son to her.
The trial court issued an Order awarding custody to
Nerissa citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the
Family Code which provides that no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court’s order and held that granting
custody to the boy’s father would be for the child’s best
interest and welfare.
Issue:
Who should have rightful custody of a child?
Held:
Nerissa. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the
Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar provision.
Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors)
provides:
“SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are
separated. Appeal. - When husband and wife are
divorced or living separately and apart from each other,
and the questions as to the care, custody, and control of a
child or children of their marriage is brought before a
Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to
any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the
testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care,
custody, and control of each such child as will be for its
best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent
it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless
the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by
reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness,
incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under seven years
of age shall be separated from its mother, unless the
court finds there are compelling reasons therefor.”
(Italics supplied)
The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that
a child under seven years of age shall not be separated
from his mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word “shall”
in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6
of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory
character.
The general rule that a child under seven years of age
shall not be separated from his mother finds its reason in
the basic need of a child for his mother’s loving care.
Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify the
court’s awarding the custody of such a child to someone
other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise
sole parental authority. In the past the following grounds
have been considered ample justification to deprive a
mother of custody and parental authority: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity and being sick with a communicable disease.
It has long been settled that in custody cases, the
foremost consideration is always the welfare and best
interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international
instrument, the Convention on the Rights of the Child
provides: “In all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be
a primary consideration.
In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative
factor inasmuch as both parties have demonstrated that
they have ample means. Nerissa’s present work schedule
is not so unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time
with her son. Quite a number of working mothers who
are away from home for longer periods of time are still
able to raise a family well, applying time management
principles judiciously. Also, delegating child care
temporarily to qualified persons who run day-care
centers does not detract from being a good mother, as
long as the latter exercises supervision, for even in our
culture, children are often brought up by housemaids
under the eagle eyes of the mother.
Although Ray’s is a general practitioner, the records
show that he maintains a clinic, works for several
companies on retainer basis and teaches part-time. He
cannot possibly give the love and care that a mother
gives to his child.
3) SY VS. CA
4) AGNES GAMBOA-HIRSCH V HON. COURT
OF APPEALS AND FRANKLIN HARVEY
HIRSCH
CRC Provisions:
Article 3: Best interests of the child
Domestic Provisions:
Family Code, Article 213
Child and Youth Welfare Code
Case Summary:
The mother of a three year old child told the father that
she would be taking the child on a brief vacation. The
father later discovered that she and the child would not
be returning to the family home. The father petitioned
the Court of Appeals (CA), which granted joint custody
of the child to both the mother and father. This petition
by the mother asks the Supreme Court to set aside this
decision of the CA.
Issue and resolution:
Custody dispute between the two biological parents of a
child. The Court revoked the joint custody order and
awarded sole custody of the child to the mother.
Court reasoning:
Article 3 of the CRC requires that the best interests of
the child shall be a primary consideration, and national
law, in the same way, provides that the welfare of the
child shall be the primary consideration. A “tender-age
presumption” exists in Article 213 of the Family Code,
under which a mother is to be preferred in awarding
custody of children under the age of seven. This
presumption can be overturned only by compelling
evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother is
declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in
one or more of the following instances: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease.
Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or
grossly incapable of caring for her child, therefore there
was no compelling reason to take the child from the
mother’s custody.
Excerpts citing CRC and other relevant human rights
instruments:
The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that
“in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken
by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of
law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the
best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration (emphasis supplied).” The Child and
Youth Welfare Code, in the same way, unequivocally
provides that in all questions regarding the care and
custody, among others, of the child, his/her welfare shall
be the paramount consideration.
CRIN Comments:
CRIN believes that this decision is not consistent with
the CRC. CRIN notes the right of the child to develop
relationships with both their parents under Article 9 of
the CRC. In this case, the Court failed to consider the
best interests of the child in continuing her relationship
with her father. The best interests of the child should be
evaluated on a case by case basis, rather than through
rigid legislative presumptions such as the “tender-age
presumption”.
ARTICLE 225- EFFECT OF PARENTAL
AUTHORITY UPON PROPERTY OF CHILDREN
1. PINEDA VS CA
Lessons Applicable: Who Exercises Rights of Minor
Insured or Beneficiaries (Insurance)
Laws Applicable: Art. 225 Family Code
FACTS:
 Prime Marine Services, Inc. (PMSI), a
crewing/manning outfit, procured Group PoIicy
from Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. to provide life
insurance coverage to its sea-based employees enrolled
under the plan.
 February 17 1986: 6 employees of the PMSI
perished at sea when M/V Nemos, a Greek cargo
vessel, sunk somewhere in El Jadida, Morocco
 The beneficiaries asked President and General
Manager of PMSI, Capt. Roberto Nuval and
issued him special powers of attorney
authorizing him to "follow up, ask, demand,
collect and receive" for their benefit indemnities.
It only verbally pertained to the sinking of the
fatal vessel
 Unknown to them, however, the PMSI, in its
capacity as employer and policyholder of the life
insurance of its deceased workers, filed with
formal claims with their special power of
attorney
 Capt. Nuval, upon receipt of these checks from
the treasurer, who happened to be his son-in-
law, endorsed and deposited them in his account
with the Commercial Bank of Manila, now
Boston Bank
 Upon learning that they are entitled to the claim,
they sought to recover from Insular Life but it
denied on the ground that they already delivered
to PMSI
 The fact that there was a verbal agreement
between complainants-appellees and Capt.
Nuval limiting the authority of the latter to
claiming specified death benefits cannot
prejudice the insurance company which relied
on the terms of the powers of attorney which on
their face do not disclose such limitation
 Section 180 of the Insurance Code has been
amended by the Family Code 17 which grants
the father and mother joint legal guardianship
over the property of their unemancipated
common child without the necessity of a court
appointment; however, when the market value of
the property or the annual income of the child
exceeds P50,000.00, the parent concerned shall
be required to put up a bond in such amount as
the court may determine.
 Insurance Commission: favored petitioners
 The Insular Life Assurance Company appealed
stating that
 (a) had no jurisdiction over the case
considering that the claims exceeded
P100,000
 (b) erred in holding that the powers of
attorney relied upon by Insular Life
were insufficient to convey absolute
authority to Capt. Nuval to demand,
receive and take delivery of the
insurance proceeds pertaining to the
petitioners
 (c) erred in not giving credit to the
version of Insular Life that the power of
attorney supposed to have been executed
in favor of the Alarcons was missing,
and
 (d) erred in holding that Insular Life was
liable for violating Section 180 of the
Insurance Code for having released to
the surviving mothers the insurance
proceeds pertaining to the beneficiaries
who were still minors despite the failure
of the former to obtain a court
authorization or to post a bond.
 CA: eliminated the award to minor beneficiaries
Dina Ayo and Lucia Lontok
ISSUE: W/N the minor beneficiaries award should be
eliminated
HELD: YES. petition is GRANTED. CA Reversed.
Insurance Commission Reinstated.
 Being special powers of attorney, they must be
strictly construed. Insular Life knew that a
power of attorney in favor of Capt. Nuval for the
collection and receipt of such proceeds was a
deviation from its practice with respect to group
policies.
 Group Insurance
 coverage terms for group insurance are
usually stated in a master agreement or
policy that is issued by the insurer to a
representative of the group or to an
administrator of the insurance program
 employer acts as a functionary in the
collection and payment of premiums and
in performing related duties
 falling within the ambit of
administration of a group policy is the
disbursement of insurance payments by
the employer to the employees
 employee is in the position of a real
party to the master policy
 employees is the true source of the
benefits, which are a form of additional
compensation to them
 enables the employees to carry a larger
amount of insurance than they could
otherwise, and helps to attract and hold
a permanent class of employees
 Even granting for the sake of argument that the
special powers of attorney were in due form,
Insular Life was grossly negligent in delivering
the checks, drawn in favor of the petitioners, to a
party who is not the agent mentioned in the
special power of attorney
 Nor can we agree with the opinion of the public
respondent that since the shares of the minors in
the insurance proceeds are less than P50,000.00,
then under Article 225 of the Family Code their
mothers could receive such shares without need
of either court appointments as guardian or the
posting of a bond
 Art. 225. The father and the mother shall
jointly exercise legal guardianship over the
property of their unemancipated common child
without the necessity of a court appointment. In
case of disagreement, the father's decision shall
prevail, unless there is judicial order to the
contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual
income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent
concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such
amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten
per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual
income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations
prescribed for general guardians.
It is clear from the said Article that regardless of the
value of the unemancipated common child's property,
the father and mother ipso jure become the legal
guardian of the child's property. However, if the market
value of the property or the annual income of the child
exceeds P50,000.00, a bond has to be posted by the
parents concerned to guarantee the performance of the
obligations of a general guardian.
 It must, however, be noted that the second
paragraph of Article 225 of the Family Code
speaks of the "market value of the property or
the annual income of the child," which means,
therefore, the aggregate of the child's property or
annual income; if this exceeds P50,000.00, a
bond is required.
 There is no evidence that the share of each of the
minors in the proceeds of the group policy in
question is the minor's only property. Without
such evidence, it would not be safe to conclude
that, indeed, that is his only property