FILOIL REFINERY CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
FILOIL SUPERVISORY & CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION AND
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Beltran, Lacson & Associates for petitioner.
Lanting, Morabe Law Offices for private respondent.

TEEHANKEE, J.:p
The present appeal questions the right of supervisors and confidential employees to
organize the respondent labor association and to bargain collectively with their
employer, petitioner corporation herein, as upheld by respondent court of industrial
relations in its appealed orders and resolution.
Respondent association is a labor organization duly registered with the Department of
Labor. It is composed exclusively of the supervisory and confidential employees of
petitioner corporation. There exists another entirely distinct labor association
composed of the corporation's rank-and-file employees, the Filoil Employees &
Workers Association (FEWA) with which petitioner executed a collective bargaining
agreement. This collective bargaining agreement expressly excluded from its coverage
petitioner's supervisory and confidential employees, who in turn organized their own
labor association, respondent herein.
Respondent association filed on February 18, 1965 with the industrial court its petition
for certification as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent of all of
petitioner's supervisory and confidential employees working at its refinery in Rosario,
Cavite.
Petitioner corporation filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of
cause of action and of respondent court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter,
under its claim that supervisors are not employees within the meaning of Republic Act
875, the Industrial Peace Act, and that since they are part of management, they do not
have the right to bargain collectively although they may organize an organization of
their own.
Respondent court in its order of May 26, 1965 denied the dismissal motion. It ruled that
under the express provisions of section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act, "(I)ndividuals
employed as supervisors shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of
employees under their supervision but may form separate organizations their own."1
It rejected petitioner's claim against respondent association's right to bargain
collectively, holding that such was expressly granted under section 24 of the Industrial
Peace Act, and asserting that "if Congress deemed it wise for supervisors not to have
the right to strike, then it should have been so expressly stated as in the case of
government employees. Section 11 of the Industrial Peace Act gives government
employees the right to belong to any labor organization provided no obligation to strike
or join a strike is imposed by such labor organization. The denial to government
employees of the right to strike is significant in the controversy before this Court
because it manifests to all that Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 875 was aware
of the implications that when supervisors were given the right to organize themselves
into a labor organization, they have correlative right to declare a strike. In the case of
supervisors, they were enfranchised by Congress to organize themselves into a labor
organization and were denied the right to strike. This means that the right to strike was
not denied them since no special reason obtains among the supervisors as it does
obtain among government employees."2
The industrial court likewise dismissed petitioner's objection against the composition of
respondent association in that it included as members technical men and confidential
employees in this wise: "(A)t this point, it may be stressed that supervisors as a
general rule should form an association of their own and should exclude all other types
of personnel unless a special consideration exists, like example, that they are so few in
number and that there are other technical men or confidential men equally few in
number. In the latter case, the supervisors, technical men and confidential employees
may be constituted into one unit."3
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said order of May 26, 1965 was denied by
respondent court en banc per its resolution dated September 7, 1965 which affirmed
the said order. No appeal having been taken from the resolution, the petition was
accordingly set for hearing and the parties submitted their stipulation of facts,
stipulating inter aliathat respondent association "has forty-seven (47) members among
the supervisory, technical men and confidential employees of the company" and that
"all the forty seven (47) members of the (respondent association) are being checked-
off by the company for union dues pursuant to the individual check-off authorization
submitted to the company."
The parties could not agree, however, on the composition of the appropriate bargaining
unit with petitioner corporation proposing that the 47 members of respondent
association should be broken up into five (5) separate collective bargaining units, viz,
the supervisors should form a distinct unit separate from the rest of the personnel who
in turn would be divided into separate and independent units or confidential
employees, professional personnel, "fringe" employees consisting of five firemen, and
twelve (12) office and clerical employees.
Evidence was received by respondent court and it was satisfied that executive
personnel handling personnel matters for the employer were duly excluded from
respondent association. Thus, per respondent court's order of July 23, 1966, it is noted
that "not one of the employees listed under Groups I and II including (their supervisor)
Leonardo R. Santos under Group III, is a member of (respondent association)", since
"(I)t appears that the personnel listed under Groups I and Group II ... are in the
category of executives who have supervision over the supervisors who are members of
(respondent association) and that Marcelo Bernardo handles personnel matters of the
employer ... All of them should, therefore, be excluded from the appropriate bargaining
unit.4
Respondent court in its said order of July 23, 1966 consequently cast aside petitioner's
sedulous objections against the inclusion of the confidential employees in the
supervisors respondent association, thus: "(F)rom the memorandum and manifestation
of the company, a persistent assault against the inclusion of the confidential emloyees
with supervisors under one bargaining unit would seem to be evident. Although this
inclusion has already been raised in the motion to dismiss filed by the company and
has already been resolved by the Court en banc, with no appeal to the Supreme Court
having been taken by the company, we shall try once more to show why such
inclusion. It is admitted by the company that confidential employees are outside the
coverage of the existing collective bargaining agreement between the respondent
company and the rank and file union (FEWA) by specific agreement. Since the
confidential employees are very few and are, by practice and tradition, identified with
management, the NLRB, because of such "identity of interest" (Wilson & Co., 68 NLRB
84), has allowed their inclusion in the bargaining unit of supervisors who are likewise
identified with management. This Court, a counterpart of the NLRB, for same reason,
should also allow the inclusion of the confedential employees in the bargaining unit of
supervisor except of course Marcelo Bernardo who, pursuant to Order of May 26,
1965, as affirmed by the Court en banc, should be excluded because he handles
personnel matters for the employer."5
Respondent court pointed out that "in fact, out of forty-three (43), excluding the twelve
(12) executive personnel under Groups I and II, the company proposes five (5)
bargaining units or eight (8) employees per unit. This Court will be creating
fragmentary units which would not serve the interest of industrial peace, much less in
an industry indispensable to the national interest like the one at bar, as is now
obtaining in the Philippine National Railways, also an industry indispensable to the
national interest (Union de Maquinistas, Fogoneros y Motormen vs. Philippine National
Railways, Case No. 67-IPA), with thirteen (13) unions, if it breaks up the petitioner
union into five (5) bargaining units. The Court is likewise aware of the ineffectiveness
of a small union with a scanty members as bargaining unit. The breaking up of
bargaining agents into tiny units will greatly impair their organizational value. It has
always been the policy of the United States National Labor Relations Board that, in
deciding upon whether to include or exclude a group of employees from a bargaining
unit, the Board has always allowed itself to be guided by the determination as to
whether its action "will insure to the employees of the Company the full benefit of their
right to self-organization and to collective bargaining and otherwise effectuate the
policies of the Act" (20 NLRB 705). We see no reason why this Tribunal whose basic
functions are the same as that of the NLRB, should do less or otherwise depart from
this sound policy."6
Since respondent association "clearly represents the majority of the employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit," respondent court therefore certified it as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent for all the employees in the unit.
Respondent court per its resolution en banc dated September 15, 1966 dismissed
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, holding that "as to the question of the right of
supervisors and confidential employees to compel their employer to bargain
collectively, this has already been passed upon by the Trial Court in its Order dated
May 26, 1965 which Order was affirmed by the Court en banc in a resolution dated
September 7, 1965. The Company did not appeal this resolution to the Supreme Court.
Hence, this matter, as far as we are concerned, has already been resolved. We find it,
therefore, unnecessary to pass upon the same again," and that it found no sufficient
justification to alter or modify the trial court's order upholding the appropriateness of the
bargaining unit. On this latter point, Judge Salvador, while concurring with the
supervisors' right of self-organization and collective bargaining, cast a dissenting vote
on the ground that the Industrial Peace Act did not contemplate nor provide for
supervisors and confidential employees to be under one bargaining unit and as to
"executive personnel" who have supervision over the supervisors being excluded from
any representation, urged that "another supervisors' unit must be created for these
executive personnel." The second point is not in contention at bar since the "executive
personnel" concerned have not appealed their exclusion.
In this appeal, petitioner pursues anew its contention that supervisors form part of
management and are not considered as employees entitled to bargain collectively,
arguing that "as supervisors form part and parcel of management, it is absurd for
management to bargain collectively with itself." Petitioner further argues that under the
American concept, supervisors are not considered employees and that since our
Congress copied verbatim the Taft-Hartley Act's definition of supervisor,7 its act of
"incorporating the definition in the Taft-Hartley Act" must be deemed an expression of
its intention "to follow the intendment of said Act."
Petitioner's contentions are untenable, prescinding from the fact of its failure to appeal
in due course respondent court's en banc resolution of September 7, 1965 upholding
the right of the supervisors and confidential employees to organize respondent
association and to compel petitioner to negotiate and bargain collectively with it.
Petitioner's argument that since supervisors form part of management, to allow them to
bargain collectively would be tantamount to management bargaining with itself may be
a well-turned phrase but ignores the dual status of a supervisor as a representative of
management and as an employee.
If indeed the supervisor is absolutely undistinguishable from management, then he
would be beyond removal or dismissal, for as respondent association counters, "how
can management remove or dismiss itself?"
As stated for the Court by the now Chief Justice in AG & P Co. of Manila, Inc. vs.
C.I.R.,8 section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act "explicitly provides that "employees" —
and this term includes supervisors — "shall have the right to self-organization, and to
form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of
collective bargaining through representations of their own choosing and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or
protection" and that "individuals employed as supervisors ... may form separate
organizations of their own". Indeed, it is well settled that "in relation to his employer," a
foreman or supervisor "is an employee within the meaning of the Act" ... For this
reason, supervisors are entitled to engage in union activities and any discrimination
against them by reason thereof constitutes an unfair labor practice."
Petitioner's arguments go in reality to the wisdom and policy of the Industrial Peace Act
which expressly grants supervisors the right to organize and bargain collectively, which
are beyond the Court's power of review. Thus, the argument that "it is axiomatic in the
law of self-interest that an employer must give a "better deal" to those who act in his
interest and in whom he has trust and confidence. These are the supervisors and
confidential employees"9 and that "In the United States there was a move to have a
part of the supervisory group to be aligned with labor. But the enactment of the Taft-
Hartley Act put an end to this move." 10
So with petitioner's thesis that "(T)o then give supervisors the right to compel
employers to bargain would in effect align labor and management together against
stockholders and bondholders (capital) and inexorably tilt the balance of power in favor
of these hitherto confliction forces. This is contrary to the nature and philosophy of free
enterprise." 11 This further serves to point up the validity and rationale of the Industrial
Peace Act's provision, since the supervisors and confidential employees, even though
they may exercise the prerogatives of management as regards the rank and file
employees are indeed employees in relation to their employer, the company which is
owned by the "stockholders and bondholders (capital)" in petitioner's own words, and
should therefore be entitled under the law to bargain collectively with the top
management with respect to their terms and conditions of employment.
Petitioner's argument that the express provisions of section 3 of our Industrial Peace
Act must give way to the intendment of the Taft-Hartley Act which exempts employers
from the legal obligation to recognize and negotiate with supervisors is tenuous and
groundless. The language of our own statute is plain and unambiguous and admits of
no other interpretation.
The other principal ground of petitioner's appeal questioning the confidential
employees' inclusion in the supevisors bargaining unit is equally untenable.
Respondent court correctly held that since the confidential employee are very few in
number and are by practice and tradition identified with the supervisors in their role as
representives of management vis-a-vis the rank and file employee such identity of
interest has allowed their inclusion in the bargaining unit of supervisors-managers for
purposes of collective bargaining in turn as employees in relation to the company as
their employer.
No arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion can be attributed against respondent
court's allowing the inclusion of the confidential employees in the supervisors'
association for as admitted by petitioner itself, supra, the supervisors and confidential
emplyees enjoy its trust and confidence. Thisidentity of interest logically calls for their
inclusion in the same bargaining unit and at the same time fulfills the law's objective of
insuring to them the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective
bargaining, which could hardly be accomplished if the respondent association's
membership were to be broken up into five separate ineffective tiny units, as urged by
petitioner.
Respondent court's action not being vulnerable to challenge as being arbitrary or
capricious is therefore sustained, in line with the Court's consistent rulings that the
industrial court "enjoys a wide discretion in determining the procedure necessary to
insure the fair and free choice of bargaining representations by employees," and that
its action "in deciding upon an appropriate unit for collective bargaining purposes is
discretionary ... and (that) its judgment in this respect is entitled to almost complete
finality, unless its action is arbitrary or capricious" 12 and that absent any grave abuse
of discretion as to justify the Court's intervention, "this Court has repeatedly upheld the
exercise of the Court of Industrial Relations in matters concerning the representation of
employee groups." 13
ACCORDINGLY, the orders and resolution appealed from are hereby affirmed and the
petition at bar is dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA and NORTH LUZON MAGNOLIA
SALES LABOR UNION-INDEPENDENT, respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioner.
E.N.A. Cruz & Associates for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:
Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) prays that the Resolution dated March 19,
1991 and the Order dated April 12, 1991 of public respondent Undersecretary
Bienvenido E. Laguesma declaring respondent union as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all the Magnolia sales personnel in northern Luzon be set aside for
having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion.
On June 4, 1990, the North Luzon Magnolia Sales Labor Union (respondent union for
brevity) filed with the Department of Labor a petition for certification election among all
the regular sales personnel of Magnolia Dairy Products in the North Luzon Sales
Area. 1
Petitioner opposed the petition and questioned the appropriateness of the bargaining
unit sought to be represented by respondent union. It claimed that its bargaining
history in its sales offices, plants and warehouses is to have a separate bargaining unit
for each sales office.
The petition was heard on November 9, 1990 with petitioner
being represented by Atty. Alvin C. Batalla of the Siguion Reyna law office. Atty.
Batalla withdrew petitioner's opposition to a certification election and agreed to
consider all the sales offices in northern Luzon as one bargaining unit. At the pre-
election conference, the parties agreed inter alia, on the date, time and place of the
consent election. Respondent union won the election held on November 24, 1990. In
an Order dated December 3, 1990, 2 Mediator-Arbiter Benalfre J. Galang certified
respondent union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all the regular sales
personnel in all the sales offices of Magnolia Dairy Products in the North Luzon Sales
Area.
Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor. It claimed that
Atty. Batalla was only authorized to agree to the holding of certification elections
subject to the following conditions: (1) there would only be one general election; (2) in
this general election, the individual sales offices shall still comprise separate
bargaining units. 3
In a Resolution dated March 19, 1991, 4 public respondent, by authority of the
Secretary of Labor, denied SMC's appeal and affirmed the Order of the Med- Arbiter.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner claims that:
THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY LAGUESMA ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE IGNORED AND TOTALLY
DISREGARDED PETITIONER'S VALID AND JUSTIFIABLE GROUNDS
WHY THE ERROR MADE IN GOOD FAITH BY PETITIONER'S COUNSEL
BE CORRECTED, AND INSTEAD RULED:
A
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS "THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING
AGENT FOR ALL THE REGULAR SALES OFFICES OF MAGNOLIA DAIRY
PRODUCTS, NORTH LUZON SALES AREA", COMPLETELY IGNORING THE
ESTABLISHED BARGAINING HISTORY OF PETITIONER SMC.
B
THAT PETITIONER IS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE "AGREEMENT"
ENTERED INTO AT THE HEARING ON
9 NOVEMBER 1990, IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE ESTABLISHED FACTS OF THE
CASE AND THE APPLICABLE LAW ON THE MATTER.
We find no merit in the petition.
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not respondent union represents an
appropriate bargaining unit, and (2) whether or not petitioner is bound by its lawyer's
act of agreeing to consider the sales personnel in the north Luzon sales area as one
bargaining unit.
Petitioner claims that in issuing the impugned Orders, public respondent disregarded
its collective bargaining history which is to have a separate bargaining unit for each
sales office. It insists that its prior collective bargaining history is the most persuasive
criterion in determining the appropriateness of the collective bargaining unit.
There is no merit in the contention.
A bargaining unit is a "group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less
than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer,
indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties
under the collective bargaining provisions of the law." 5
The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are:
(1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); 6 (2) affinity and unity of the employees'
interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation
and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective
bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. 7
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, this Court has categorically ruled that the existence
of a prior collective bargaining history is neither decisive nor conclusive in the
determination of what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit. 8
Indeed, the test of grouping is mutuality or commonality of interests. The employees
sought to be represented by the collective bargaining agent must have substantial
mutual interests in terms of employment and working conditions as evinced by the type
of work they perform.
In the case at bench, respondent union sought to represent the sales personnel in the
various Magnolia sales offices in northern Luzon. There is similarity of employment
status for only the regular sales personnel in the north Luzon area are covered. They
have the same duties and responsibilities and substantially similar compensation and
working conditions. The commonality of interest among he sales personnel in the north
Luzon sales area cannot be gainsaid. In fact, in the certification election held on
November 24, 1990, the employees concerned accepted respondent union as their
exclusive bargaining agent. Clearly, they have expressed their desire to be one.
Petitioner cannot insist that each of the sales office of Magnolia should constitute only
one bargaining unit. What greatly militates against this position is the meager number
of sales personnel in each of the Magnolia sales office in northern Luzon. Even the
bargaining unit sought to be represented by respondent union in the entire north Luzon
sales area consists only of approximately
9
fifty-five (55) employees. Surely, it would not be for the best interest of these
employees if they would further be fractionalized. The adage "there is strength in
number" is the very rationale underlying the formation of a labor union.
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that Atty. Batalla was merely a substitute
lawyer for Atty. Christine Ona, who got stranded in Legaspi City. Atty. Batalla was
allegedly unfamiliar with the collective bargaining history of its establishment. Petitioner
claims it should not be bound by the mistake committed by its substitute lawyer.
We are not persuaded. As discussed earlier, the collective bargaining history of a
company is not decisive of what should comprise the collective bargaining unit. Insofar
as the alleged "mistake" of the substitute lawyer is concerned, we find that this mistake
was the direct result of the negligence of petitioner's lawyers. It will be noted that Atty.
Ona was under the supervision of two (2) other lawyers, Attys. Jacinto de la Rosa, Jr.
and George C. Nograles. There is nothing in the records to show that these two (2)
counsels were likewise unavailable at that time. Instead of deferring the hearing,
petitioner's counsels chose to proceed therewith. Indeed, prudence dictates that, in
such case, the lawyers allegedly actively involved in SMC's labor case should have
adequately and sufficiently briefed the substitute lawyer with respect to the matters
involved in the case and the specific limits of his authority. Unfortunately, this was not
done in this case. The negligence of its lawyers binds petitioner. As held by this Court
in the case of Villa Rhecar Bus v. De la Cruz: 10
. . . As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. Only
when the application of the general rule would result in serious
injustice should an exception thereto be called for.
In the case at bench, petitioner insists that each of the sales offices in northern Luzon
should be considered as a separate bargaining unit for negotiations would be more
expeditious. Petitioner obviously chooses to follow the path of least resistance. It is not,
however, the convenience of the employer that constitutes the determinative factor in
forming an appropriate bargaining unit. Equally, if not more important, is the interest of
the employees. In choosing and crafting an appropriate bargaining unit, extreme care
should be taken to prevent an employer from having any undue advantage over the
employees' bargaining representative. Our workers are weak enough and it is not our
social policy to further debilitate their bargaining representative.
In sum, we find that no arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to
public respondents certification of respondent union as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all the regular Magnolia sales personnel of the north Luzon sales
area.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the challenged Resolution and Order of public
respondent are hereby AFFIRMED in toto, there being no showing of grave abuse of
discretion or lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
Department of Labor and Employment, and THE ALL U.P. WORKERS' UNION,
represented by its President, Rosario del Rosario, respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:
In this special civil action of certiorari the University of the Philippines seeks the
nullification of the Order dated October 30, 1990 of Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja of the
Bureau of Labor Relations holding that "professors, associate professors and assistant
professors (of the University of the Philippines) are . . rank-and-file employees . . ;"
consequently, they should, together with the so-called non-academic, non-teaching,
and all other employees of the University, be represented by only one labor
organization. 1 The University is joined in this undertaking by the Solicitor General who
"has taken a position not contrary to that of petitioner and, in fact, has manifested . .
that he is not opposing the petition . . ." 2
The case 3 was initiated in the Bureau of Labor Relations by a petition filed on March 2,
1990 by a registered labor union, the "Organization of Non-Academic Personnel of UP"
(ONAPUP). 4 Claiming to have a membership of 3,236 members — comprising more
than 33% of the 9,617 persons constituting the non-academic personnel of UP-
Diliman, Los Baños, Manila, and Visayas, it sought the holding of a certification
election among all said non-academic employees of the University of the Philippines.
At a conference thereafter held on March 22, 1990 in the Bureau, the University stated
that it had no objection to the election.
On April 18, 1990, another registered labor union, the "All UP Workers' Union," 5 filed a
comment, as intervenor in the certification election proceeding. Alleging that its
membership covers both academic and non-academic personnel, and that it aims to
unite all UP rank-and-file employees in one union, it declared its assent to the holding
of the election provided the appropriate organizational unit was first clearly defined. It
observed in this connection that the Research, Extension and Professional Staff
(REPS), who are academic non-teaching personnel, should not be deemed part of the
organizational unit.
For its part, the University, through its General Counsel, 6 made of record its view that
there should be two (2) unions: one for academic, the other for non-academic or
administrative, personnel considering the dichotomy of interests, conditions and rules
governing these employee groups.
Director Calleja ruled on the matter on August 7, 1990. 7 She declared that "the
appropriate organizational unit . . should embrace all the regular rank-and-file
employees, teaching and non-teaching, of the University of the Philippines, including
all its branches" and that there was no sufficient evidence "to justify the grouping of the
non-academic or administrative personnel into an organization unit apart and distinct
from that of the academic or teaching personnel." Director Calleja adverted to Section
9 of Executive Order No. 180, viz.:
Sec. 9. The appropriate organizational unit shall be the employer unit
consisting of rank-and-file employees, unless circumstances otherwise
require.
and Section 1, Rule IV of the Rules Implementing said EO 180 (as amended by
SEC. 2, Resolution of Public Sector Labor Management Council dated May 14,
1989, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
For purposes of registration, an appropriate organizational unit may refer
to:
xxx xxx xxx
d. State universities or colleges, government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
She went on to say that the general intent of EO 180 was "not to fragmentize the
employer unit, as "can be gleaned from the definition of the term "accredited
employees' organization," which refers to:
. . a registered organization of the rank-and-file employees as defined in
these rules recognized to negotiate for the employees in an organizational
unit headed by an officer with sufficient authority to bind the agency, such
as . . . . . . state colleges and universities.
The Director thus commanded that a certification election be "conducted among rank-
and-file employees, teaching and non-teaching" in all four autonomous campuses of
the UP, and that management appear and bring copies of the corresponding payrolls
for January, June, and July, 1990 at the "usual pre-election conference . . ."
At the pre-election conference held on March 22, 1990 at the Labor Organizational
Division of the DOLE, 8 the University sought further clarification of the coverage of the
term, "rank-and-file" personnel, asserting that not every employee could properly be
embraced within both teaching and non-teaching categories since there are those
whose positions are in truth managerial and policy-determining, and hence, excluded
by law.
At a subsequent hearing (on October 4, 1990), the University filed a Manifestation
seeking the exclusion from the organizational unit of those employees holding
supervisory positions among non-academic personnel, and those in teaching staff with
the rank of Assistant Professor or higher, submitting the following as grounds therefor:
1) Certain "high-level employees" with policy-making, managerial, or confidential
functions, are ineligible to join rank-and-file employee organizations under Section 3,
EO 180:
Sec. 3. High-level employees whose functions are normally considered as
policy-making or managerial or whose duties are of a highly confidential
nature shall not be eligible to join the organization of rank-and file
government employees;
2) In the University hierarchy, not all teaching and non-teaching personnel belong the
rank-and file: just as there are those occupying managerial positions within the non-
teaching roster, there is also a dichotomy between various levels of the teaching or
academic staff;
3) Among the non-teaching employees composed of Administrative Staff and
Research personnel, only those holding positions below Grade 18 should be regarded
as rank-and-file, considering that those holding higher grade positions, like Chiefs of
Sections, perform supervisory functions including that of effectively recommending
termination of appointments or initiating appointments and promotions; and
4) Not all teaching personnel may be deemed included in the term, "rank-and-file;" only
those holding appointments at the instructor level may be so considered, because
those holding appointments from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor to full
Professor take part, as members of the University Council, a policy-making body, in the
initiation of policies and rules with respect to faculty tenure and promotion. 9
The ONAPUP quite categorically made of record its position; that it was not opposing
the University's proferred classification of rank-and file employees. On the other hand,
the "All UP Workers' Union" opposed the University's view, in a Position Paper
presented by it under date of October 18, 1990.
Director Calleja subsequently promulgated an Order dated October 30, 1990, resolving
the "sole issue" of "whether or not professors, associate professors and assistant
professors are included in the definition of high-level employee(s)" in light of Rule I,
Section (1) of the Implementing Guidelines of Executive Order No. 180, defining "high
level employee" as follows:
1. High Level Employee — is one whose functions are normally considered
policy determining, managerial or one whose duties are highly confidential
in nature. A managerial function refers to the exercise of powers such as:
1. To effectively recommend such managerial actions;
2. To formulate or execute management policies and decisions;
or
3. To hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, dismiss, assign or
discipline employees.
The Director adjudged that said teachers are rank-and-file employees "qualified to join
unions and vote in certification elections." According to her —
A careful perusal of the University Code . . shows that the policy-making
powers of the Council are limited to academic matters, namely, prescribing
courses of study and rules of discipline, fixing student admission and
graduation requirements, recommending to the Board of Regents the
 conferment of degrees, and disciplinary power over students. The policy-
determining functions contemplated in the definition of a high-level
employee pertain to managerial, executive, or organization policies, such
as hiring, firing, and disciplining of employees, salaries, teaching/working
hours, other monetary and non-monetary benefits, and other terms and
conditions of employment. They are the usual issues in collective
bargaining negotiations so that whoever wields these powers would be
placed in a situation of conflicting interests if he were allowed to join the
union of rank-and-file employees.
The University seasonably moved for reconsideration, seeking to make the following
points, to wit:
1) UP professors do "wield the most potent managerial powers: the power to rule on
tenure, on the creation of new programs and new jobs, and conversely, the abolition of
old programs and the attendant re-assignment of employees.
2) To say that the Council is "limited to (acting on) academic matters" is error, since
academic decisions "are the most important decisions made in a University . . (being,
as it were) the heart, the core of the University as a workplace.
3) Considering that the law regards as a "high level" employee, one who performs
either policy-determining, managerial, or confidential functions, the Director erred in
applying only the "managerial functions" test, ignoring the "policy-determining
functions" test.
4) The Director's interpretation of the law would lead to absurd results, e.g.: "an
administrative officer of the College of Law is a high level employee, while a full
Professor who has published several treatises and who has distinguished himself in
argument before the Supreme Court is a mere rank-and-file employee. A dormitory
manager is classified as a high level employee, while a full Professor or Political
Science with a Ph. D. and several Honorary doctorates is classified as rank-and-file." 10
The motion for reconsideration was denied by Director Calleja, by Order dated
November 20, 1990.
The University would now have this Court declare void the Director's Order of October
30, 1990 as well as that of November 20, 1990. 11 A temporary restraining order was
issued by the Court, by Resolution dated December 5, 1990 conformably to the
University's application therefor.
Two issues arise from these undisputed facts. One is whether or not professors,
associate professors and assistant professors are "high-level employees" "whose
functions are normally considered policy determining, managerial or . . highly
confidential in nature." The other is whether or not, they, and other employees
performing academic functions, 12 should comprise a collective bargaining unit distinct
and different from that consisting of the non-academic employees of the
University, 13 considering the dichotomy of interests, conditions and rules existing
between them.
As regards the first issue, the Court is satisfied that it has been correctly resolved by
the respondent Director of Bureau Relations. In light of Executive Order No. 180 and
its implementing rules, as well as the University's charter and relevant regulations, the
professors, associate professors and assistant professors (hereafter simply referred to
as professors) cannot be considered as exercising such managerial or highly
confidential functions as would justify their being categorized as "high-level employees"
of the institution.
The Academic Personnel Committees, through which the professors supposedly
exercise managerial functions, were constituted "in order to foster greater involvement
of the faculty and other academic personnel in appointments, promotions, and other
personnel matters that directly affect them." 14 Academic Personnel Committees at the
departmental and college levels were organized "consistent with, and demonstrative of
the very idea of consulting the faculty and other academic personnel on matters
directly affecting them" and to allow "flexibility in the determination of guidelines
peculiar to a particular department or college." 15
Personnel actions affecting the faculty and other academic personnel should, however,
"be considered under uniform guidelines and consistent with the Resolution of the
Board (of Regents) adopted during its 789th Meeting (11-26-69) creating the University
Academic Personnel Board." 16 Thus, the Departmental Academic Personnel
Committee is given the function of "assist(ing) in the review of the recommendations
initiated by the Department Chairman with regard to recruitment, selection,
performance evaluation, tenure and staff development, in accordance with the general
guidelines formulated by the University Academic Personnel Board and the
implementing details laid down by the College Academic Personnel
Committee;" 17 while the College Academic Personnel Committee is entrusted with the
following functions: 18
1. Assist the Dean in setting up the details for the implementation of
policies, rules, standards or general guidelines as formulated by the
University Academic Personnel Board;
2. Review the recommendation submitted by the DAPCs with regard to
recruitment, selection, performance evaluation, tenure, staff development,
and promotion of the faculty and other academic personnel of the College;
3. Establish departmental priorities in the allocation of available funds for
promotion;
4. Act on cases of disagreement between the Chairman and the members
of the DAPC particularly on personnel matters covered by this Order;
5. Act on complaints and/or protests against personnel actions made by the
Department Chairman and/or the DAPC.
The University Academic Personnel Board, on the other hand, performs the following
functions: 19
1. Assist the Chancellor in the review of the recommendations of the
CAPC'S.
2. Act on cases of disagreement between the Dean and the CAPC.
3. Formulate policies, rules, and standards with respect to the selection,
compensation, and promotion of members of the academic staff.
4. Assist the Chancellor in the review of recommendations on academic
promotions and on other matters affecting faculty status and welfare.
From the foregoing, it is evident that it is the University Academic Personnel
Committee, composed of deans, the assistant for academic affairs and the chief of
personnel, which formulates the policies, rules and standards respecting selection,
compensation and promotion of members of the academic staff. The departmental and
college academic personnel committees' functions are purely recommendatory in
nature, subject to review and evaluation by the University Academic Personnel Board.
In Franklin Baker Company of the Philippines vs. Trajano, 20 this Court reiterated the
principle laid down in National Merchandising Corp. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, 21 that the power to recommend, in order to qualify an employee as a
supervisor or managerial employee "must not only be effective but the exercise of such
authority should not be merely of a routinary or clerical nature but should require the
use of independent judgment." Where such recommendatory powers, as in the case at
bar, are subject to evaluation, review and final action by the department heads and
other higher executives of the company, the same, although present, are not effective
and not an exercise of independent judgment as required by law.
Significantly, the personnel actions that may be recommended by the departmental
and college academic personnel committees must conform with the general guidelines
drawn up by the university personnel academic committee. This being the case, the
members of the departmental and college academic personnel committees are not
unlike the chiefs of divisions and sections of the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority whom this Court considered as rank-and-file employees in National
Waterworks & Sewerage Authority vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions, 22because "given
ready policies to execute and standard practices to observe for their execution, . . .
they have little freedom of action, as their main function is merely to carry out the
company's orders, plans and policies."
The power or prerogative pertaining to a high-level employee "to effectively
recommend such managerial actions, to formulate or execute management policies or
decisions and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, dismiss, assign or discipline
employees" 23 is exercised to a certain degree by the university academic personnel
board/committees and ultimately by the Board of Regents in accordance with Section 6
of the University
24
Charter, thus:
(e) To appoint, on the recommendation of the President of the University,
professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University; to
fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other duties and
conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them in its discretion leave of
absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provision
of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after
investigation and hearing shall have been had.
Another factor that militates against petitioner's espousal of managerial employment
status for all its professors through membership in the departmental and college
academic personnel committees is that not all professors are members thereof.
Membership and the number of members in the committees are provided as follows: 25
 Sec. 2. Membership in Committees. — Membership in committees may be
made either through appointment, election, or by some other means as
may be determined by the faculty and other academic personnel of a
particular department or college.
Sec. 3. Number of Members. — In addition to the Chairman, in the case of
a department, and the Dean in the case of a college, there shall be such
number of members representing the faculty and academic personnel as
will afford a fairly representative, deliberative and manageable group that
can handle evaluation of personnel actions.
Neither can membership in the University Council elevate the professors to the status
of high-level employees. Section 6 (f) and 9 of the UP Charter respectively provide: 26
Sec. 6. The Board of Regents shall have the following powers and duties . .
.;
xxx xxx xxx
(f) To approve the courses of study and rules of discipline drawn up by the
University Council as hereinafter provided; . . .
Sec. 9. There shall be a University Council consisting of the President of
the University and of all instructors in the university holding the rank of
professor, associate professor, or assistant professor. The Council shall
have the power to prescribe the courses of study and rules of
discipline, subject to the approval of the Board of Regents. It shall fix the
requirements for admission to any college of the university, as well as for
graduation and the receiving of a degree. The Council alone shall have the
power to recommend students or others to be recipients of degrees.
Through its president or committees, it shall have disciplinary power over
the students within the limits prescribed by the rules of discipline approved
by the Board of Regents. The powers and duties of the President of the
University, in addition to those specifically provided in this Act shall be
those usually pertaining to the office of president of a university.
It is readily apparent that the policy-determining functions of the University Council are
subject to review, evaluation and final approval by the Board of Regents. The Council's
power of discipline is likewise circumscribed by the limits imposed by the Board of
Regents. What has been said about the recommendatory powers of the departmental
and college academic personnel committees applies with equal force to the alleged
policy-determining functions of the University Council.
Even assuming arguendo that UP professors discharge policy-determining functions
through the University Council, still such exercise would not qualify them as high-level
employees within the context of E.O. 180. As correctly observed by private respondent,
"Executive Order No. 180 is a law concerning public sector unionism. It must therefore
be construed within that context. Within that context, the University of the Philippines
represents the government as an employer. 'Policy-determining' refers to policy-
determination in university mattes that affect those same matters that may be the
subject of negotiation between public sector management and labor. The reason why
'policy-determining' has been laid down as a test in segregating rank-and-file from
management is to ensure that those who lay down policies in areas that are still
negotiable in public sector collective bargaining do not themselves become part of
those employees who seek to change these policies for their collective welfare." 27
The policy-determining functions of the University Council refer to academic
matters, i.e. those governing the relationship between the University and its students,
and not the University as an employer and the professors as employees. It is thus
evident that no conflict of interest results in the professors being members of the
University Council and being classified as rank-and-file employees.
Be that as it may, does it follow, as public respondent would propose, that all rank-and-
file employees of the university are to be organized into a single collective bargaining
unit?
A "bargaining unit" has been defined as a group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective
interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the
best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective
bargaining provisions of the law. 28
Our labor laws do not however provide the criteria for determining the proper collective
bargaining unit. Section 12 of the old law, Republic Act No. 875 otherwise known as
the Industrial Peace Act, simply reads as follows: 29
Sec. 12. Exclusive Collective Bargaining Representation for Labor
Organizations. — The labor organization designated or selected for the
purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in an
appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative
of all the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment; Provided, That any individual employee or group of
employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their
employer.
Although said Section 12 of the Industrial Peace Act was subsequently incorporated
into the Labor Code with minor changes, no guidelines were included in said Code for
determination of an appropriate bargaining unit in a given case. 30 Thus, apart from the
single descriptive word "appropriate," no specific guide for determining the proper
collective bargaining unit can be found in the statutes.
Even Executive Order No. 180 already adverted to is not much help. All it says, in its
Section 9, is that "(t)he appropriate organizational unit shall be the employer unit
consisting of rank-and-file employees, unless circumstances otherwise require." Case
law fortunately furnishes some guidelines.
When first confronted with the task of determining the proper collective bargaining unit
in a particular controversy, the Court had perforce to rely on American jurisprudence.
In Democratic Labor Association vs. Cebu Stevedoring Company, Inc., decided on
February 28, 1958, 31 the Court observed that "the issue of how to determine the
proper collective bargaining unit and what unit would be appropriate to be the collective
bargaining
agency" . . . "is novel in this jurisdiction; however, American precedents on the matter
abound . . (to which resort may be had) considering that our present Magna Carta has
been patterned after the American law on the subject." Said the Court:
. . . Under these precedents, there are various factors which must be
satisfied and considered in determining the proper constituency of a
bargaining unit. No one particular factor is itself decisive of the
determination. The weight accorded to any particular factor varies in
accordance with the particular question or questions that may arise in a
given case. What are these factors? Rothenberg mentions a good number,
but the most pertinent to our case are: (1) will of the employees (Globe
Doctrine); (2) affinity and unit of employees' interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working
conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) employment
status, such as temporary, seasonal probationary employees. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
An enlightening appraisal of the problem of defining an appropriate
bargaining unit is given in the 10th Annual Report of the National Labor
Relations Board wherein it is emphasized that the factors which said board
may consider and weigh in fixing appropriate units are: the history, extent
and type of organization of employees; the history of their collective
bargaining; the history, extent and type of organization of employees in
other plants of the same employer, or other employers in the same
industry; the skill, wages, work, and working conditions of the employees;
the desires of the employees; the eligibility of the employees for
membership in the union or unions involved; and the relationship between
the unit or units proposed and the employer's organization, management,
and operation. . . .
. . In said report, it is likewise emphasized that the basic test in determining
the appropriate bargaining unit is that a unit, to be appropriate, must affect
a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages,
hours, working conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining (citing
Smith on Labor Laws, 316-317; Francisco, Labor Laws, 162). . . .
The Court further explained that "(t)he test of the grouping is community or mutuality of
interests. And this is so because 'the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best
assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights' (Rothenberg
on Labor Relations, 490)." Hence, in that case, the Court upheld the trial court's
conclusion that two separate bargaining units should be formed, one consisting of
regular and permanent employees and another consisting of casual laborers or
stevedores.
Since then, the "community or mutuality of interests" test has provided the standard in
determining the proper constituency of a collective bargaining unit. In Alhambra Cigar
& Cigarette Manufacturing Company, et al. vs. Alhambra Employees' Association
(PAFLU), 107 Phil. 23, the Court, noting that the employees in the administrative, sales
and dispensary departments of a cigar and cigarette manufacturing firm perform work
which have nothing to do with production and maintenance, unlike those in the raw
lead (malalasi), cigar, cigarette, packing (precintera) and engineering and garage
departments, authorized the formation of the former set of employees into a separate
collective bargaining unit. The ruling in the Democratic Labor Association case, supra,
was reiterated in Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Unit vs. Court of Industrial Relations,
110 Phil. 176, where casual employees were barred from joining the union of the
permanent and regular employees.
Applying the same "community or mutuality of interests" test, but resulting in the
formation of only one collective bargaining units is the case of National Association of
Free Trade Unions vs. Mainit Lumber Development Company Workers Union-United
Lumber and General Workers of the Phils., G.R. No. 79526, December 21, 1990, 192
SCRA 598. In said case, the Court ordered the formation of a single bargaining unit
consisting of the Sawmill Division in Butuan City and the Logging Division in Zapanta
Valley, Kitcharao, Agusan Norte of the Mainit Lumber Development Company. The
Court reasoned:
Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees of the
Sawmill Division and the Logging Division. Their functions mesh with one
another. One group needs the other in the same way that the company
needs them both. There may be difference as to the nature of their
individual assignments but the distinctions are not enough to warrant the
formation of a separate bargaining unit.
In the case at bar, the University employees may, as already suggested, quite easily
be categorized into two general classes: one, the group composed of employees
whose functions are non-academic, i.e., janitors, messengers, typists, clerks,
receptionists, carpenters, electricians, grounds-keepers, chauffeurs, mechanics,
plumbers; 32 and two, the group made up of those performing academic functions, i.e.,
full professors, associate professors, assistant professors, instructors — who may be
judges or government executives — and research, extension and professorial
staff. 33 Not much reflection is needed to perceive that the community or mutuality of
interests which justifies the formation of a single collective bargaining unit is wanting
between the academic and non-academic personnel of the university. It would seem
obvious that teachers would find very little in common with the University clerks and
other non-academic employees as regards responsibilities and functions, working
conditions, compensation rates, social life and interests, skills and intellectual pursuits,
cultural activities, etc. On the contrary, the dichotomy of interests, the dissimilarity in
the nature of the work and duties as well as in the compensation and working
conditions of the academic and non-academic personnel dictate the separation of
these two categories of employees for purposes of collective bargaining. The formation
of two separate bargaining units, the first consisting of the rank-and-file non-academic
personnel, and the second, of the rank-and-file academic employees, is the set-up that
will best assure to all the employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
These special circumstances, i.e., the dichotomy of interests and concerns as well as
the dissimilarity in the nature and conditions of work, wages and compensation
between the academic and non-academic personnel, bring the case at bar within the
exception contemplated in Section 9 of Executive Order No. 180. It was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Labor Relations Director to have ruled otherwise, ignoring
plain and patent realities.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order of October 30, 1990 is hereby AFFIRMED in so far
as it declares the professors, associate professors and assistant professors of the
University of the Philippines as rank-and-file employees. The Order of August 7, 1990
is MODIFIED in the sense that the non-academic rank-and-file employees of the
University of the Philippines shall constitute a bargaining unit to the exclusion of the
academic employees of the institution — i.e., full professors, associate professors,
assistant professors, instructors, and the research, extension and professorial staff,
who may, if so minded, organize themselves into a separate collective bargaining unit;
and that, therefore, only said non-academic rank-and-file personnel of the University of
the Philippines in Diliman, Manila, Los Baños and the Visayas are to participate in the
certification election.
SO ORDERED.
St. James vs. Samahan GR No. 151326
The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 5 September 2001 Decision and
3 January 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 60197. The
Court of Appeals sustained the Decision of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) directing the opening of the challenged ballots cast during the certification
election.

The Antecedent Facts

The Samahang Manggagawa sa St. James School of Quezon City (Samahang

Manggagawa) filed a petition for certification election to determine the collective
bargaining representative of the motor pool, construction and transportation employees
of St. James School of Quezon City (St. James). On 26 June 1999, the certification
election was held at the DOLE office in Intramuros, Manila. There were 149 eligible
voters and 84 voters cast their votes. St. James filed a certification election protest
challenging the 84 votes. St. James alleged that it had 179 rank and file employees,
none of whom voted in the certification election. St. James argued that those who
voted were not its regular employees but construction workers of an independent
contractor, Architect Conrado Bacoy (Architect Bacoy).

In an Order dated 6 January 2000,[3] Med-Arbiter Tomas F. Falconitin (Med-Arbiter

Falconitin) ruled that at the time of the certification election, the 84 voters were no
longer working at St. James. Med-Arbiter Falconitin supported his ruling using the
roster of rank and file employees submitted by St. James, which did not include the
names of the 84 voters. Med-Arbiter Falconitin also ruled that since the construction
projects have ceased, some of the workers were no longer entitled to vote in the
certification election. Finally, Med-Arbiter Falconitin ruled that even if the 84 workers
were to be included in the 179 rank and file employees of St. James, the total number
of voters would be 263. Thus, the 84 votes cast would not be sufficient to constitute a
majority of all eligible voters to have a valid certification election. The dispositive
portion of the Order reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the certification election protest

is hereby given due course.

Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the certification

election for the rank and file employees of respondent/protestant St. James
School of Quezon City conducted on June 26, 1999, a failure; and null and
void ab initio.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Samahang Manggagawa appealed to the Secretary of Labor. In its Decision[5] dated 5

May 2000, the DOLE[6] reversed the ruling of Med-Arbiter Falconitin. The DOLE ruled
that Samahang Manggagawa seeks to represent the non-academic personnel or the
rank and file employees from the motor pool, construction and transportation
departments, and not all the rank and file employees of St. James. According to the
DOLE, Med-Arbiter Falconitin erred in including all the rank and file employees of St.
James, whether teaching or non-teaching personnel, in the computation of the total
number of employees. The DOLE ruled that the list submitted by St. James contained
only the administrative, teaching and office personnel of the school. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the order dated

06 January 2000 of the Med-Arbiter is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu
thereof, an order is hereby issued directing the Election Officer, Lilibeth
Cagara, DOLE-National Capital Region to open and canvass the 84
challenged ballots within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, subject to usual
notice and representation by the parties and thereafter to issue the
corresponding certification of the results.

SO DECIDED.[7]

St. James filed a motion for reconsideration. The DOLE[8] denied the motion in its 19
June 2000 Resolution.[9] St. James filed a special civil action before the Court of
Appeals.
In a Decision[10] dated 5 September 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
and ruled that the DOLE did not commit grave abuse of discretion in reversing the
ruling of Med-Arbiter Falconitin. In its 3 January 2002 Resolution,[11] the Court of
Appeals denied St. James motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

St. James questions the validity of the formation of the labor union and the
validity of the certification election.[12]

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

The Validity of the Formation of the Labor Union

St. James argues that majority of the members of Samahang Manggagawa are not its
employees but employees of Architect Bacoy, an independent contractor.

St. James may no longer question the validity of the formation of the labor union.

The records[13] show that prior to the holding of the certification election, St.
James filed a petition for cancellation of Samahang Manggagawas union registration.
Among the grounds cited in the petition was the lack of employer-employee
relationship between St. James and Samahang Manggagawas members. The Med-
Arbiter recommended the cancellation of the union registration. DOLE Regional
Director IV Romeo Young (Director Young) adopted the Med-Arbiters recommendation
and cancelled Samahang Manggagawas union registration. Samahang Manggagawa
filed an appeal before the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). In its Decision[14] dated 22
January 1998, the BLR[15]reversed Director Youngs Decision. In its Resolution[16] of 12
February 1998, the BLR denied St. James motion for reconsideration. St. James filed a
special civil action before the Court of Appeals. The case was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 50918. In its 9 February 2001 Decision,[17] the Court of Appeals dismissed St.
James petition and affirmed the BLRs Decision. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
construction workers are actually St. James regular employees in its motor pool,
construction and transportation departments. The Court of Appeals also ruled that
Architect Bacoy is a labor-only contractor and thus an agent of St. James, which is the
real employer.

St. James filed a petition for certiorari before this Court. The case was docketed
as G.R. No. 149648. In a Resolution dated 10 October 2001, this Court denied the
petition for St. James error in the choice or mode of appeal.[18] The Courts 10 October
2001 Resolution closed any issue on the validity of the formation of the labor union.

The Validity of the Certification Election

Section 13, Rule XII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
(Omnibus Rules) provides:

Section 13. Proclamation and certification of results by election officer;

when proper. Upon completion of the canvass there being a valid election,
the election officer shall proclaim and certify as winner the union which
obtained a majority of the valid votes cast under any of the following
conditions:

a) No protest had been filed or, even if one was filed, the same
was not perfected within the five-day period for perfection of the
protest;

b) No challenge of eligibility issue was raised or even if one was

raised, the resolution of the same will not materially change the
result.

For this purpose, the election officer shall immediately issue the
corresponding certification, copy furnished all parties, which shall form part
of the records of the case. The winning union shall have the rights,
privileges and obligations of a duly certified collective bargaining
representative from the time the certification is issued. The proclamation
and certification so issued shall not be appealable.

According to St. James, the certification election was conducted without quorum.
St. James alleges that it has 179 rank and file employees in its Quezon City Campus.
When the certification election was held, none of these qualified rank and file
employees cast their votes because they were all on duty in the school premises. The
84 voters who cast their votes are employees of Architect Bacoy. St. James also
alleges that it has 570 rank and file employees in all its campuses. Even if the 84
voters are its employees, the votes do not constitute a majority vote of its rank and file
employees because the quorum should be based on its 570 rank and file employees.

We cannot sustain the argument.

St. James has five campuses the Philamlife and Scout Alcaraz, Quezon City
campuses which are pre-schools; the Paraaque City and Calamba, Laguna campuses
which offer elementary, secondary and college education; and the Tandang Sora,
Quezon City campus which offers elementary and secondary education.[19]

The members of Samahang Manggagawa are employees in the Tandang Sora

campus. Under its constitution and by-laws, Samahang Manggagawa seeks to
represent the motor pool, construction and transportation employees of the Tandang
Sora campus.[20] Thus, the computation of the quorum should be based on the rank
and file motor pool, construction and transportation employees of the Tandang Sora
campus and not on all the employees in St. James five campuses.

Section 2, Rule XII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules provides:

Section 2. Qualification of voters; inclusion-exclusion proceedings. All

employees who are members of the appropriate bargaining unit sought to
be represented by the petitioner at the time of the certification or consent
election shall be qualified to vote. A dismissed employee whose dismissal
is being contested in a pending case shall be allowed to vote in the
election.

In case of disagreement over the voters list or over the eligibility of

voters, all contested voters shall be allowed to vote. However, their votes
shall be segregated and sealed in individual envelopes in accordance with
Section 9 of these Rules.

The motor pool, construction and transportation employees of the Tandang Sora
campus had 149 qualified voters at the time of the certification election. Hence, the 149
qualified voters should be used to determine the existence of a quorum. Since a
majority or 84 out of the 149 qualified voters cast their votes, a quorum existed in the
certification election.

St. James further alleges that the names of the 84 voters are not on the list of its rank
and file employees. On this score, we sustain the factual finding of the DOLE that the
list submitted by St. James consists of its administrative, teaching and office personnel.
These administrative, teaching and office personnel are not members of Samahang
Manggagawa. They do not belong to the bargaining unit that Samahang Manggagawa
seeks to represent. Hence, the list submitted by St. James may not be used as basis to
determine the members of Samahang Manggagawa.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 5 September 2001 Decision

and the 3 January 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60197.
SO ORDERED.
BELYCA CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
DIR. PURA FERRER CALLEJA, LABOR RELATIONS, MANILA, MINISTRY OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; MED-ARBITER, RODOLFO S. MILADO, MINISTRY
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 10 AND ASSOCIATED
LABOR UNION (ALU-TUCP), MINDANAO REGIONAL OFFICE, CAGAYAN DE ORO
CITY, respondents.
Soriano and Arana Law Offices for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Francisco D. Alas for respondent Associated Labor Unions-TUCP.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking to
annul or to set aside the resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated November
24, 1986 and denying the appeal, and the Bureau's resolution dated January 13, 1987
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the questioned resolution dated November 24, 1986 (Rollo,
p. 4) reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Order is
affirmed and the appeal therefrom denied.
Let, therefore, the pertinent records of the case be remanded to the office
of origin for the immediate conduct of the certification election.
The dispositive portion of the resolution dated January 13, 1987 (Rollo, p. 92) reads,
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Belyca
Corporation (Livestock Agro-Division) is hereby dismissed for lack of merit
and the Bureau's Resolution dated 24 November 1986 is affirmed.
Accordingly, let the records of this case be immediately forwarded to the
Office of origin for the holding of the certification elections.
No further motion shall hereafter be entertained.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
On June 3, 1986, private respondent Associated Labor Union (ALU)-TUCP, a
legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Ministry of Labor and Employment
under Registration Certificate No. 783-IP, filed with the Regional Office No. 10, Ministry
of Labor and Employment at Cagayan de Oro City, a petition for direct certification as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees/workers of
Belyca Corporation (Livestock and Agro-Division), a duly organized, registered and
existing corporation engaged in the business of poultry raising, piggery and planting of
agricultural crops such as corn, coffee and various vegetables, employing
approximately 205 rank and file employees/workers, the collective bargaining unit
sought in the petition, or in case of doubt of the union's majority representation, for the
issuance of an order authorizing the immediate holding of a certification election (Rollo,
p. 18). Although the case was scheduled for hearing at least three times, no amicable
settlement was reached by the parties. During the scheduled hearing of July 31, 1986
they, however, agreed to submit simultaneously their respective position papers on or
before August 11, 1986 (rollo. p. 62).
Petitioner ALU-TUCP, private respondent herein, in its petition and position paper
alleged, among others, (1) that there is no existing collective bargaining agreement
between the respondent employer, petitioner herein, and any other existing legitimate
labor unions; (2) that there had neither been a certification election conducted in the
proposed bargaining unit within the last twelve (12) months prior to the filing of the
petition nor a contending union requesting for certification as the. sole and exclusive
bargaining representative in the proposed bargaining unit; (3) that more than a majority
of respondent employer's rank-and-file employees/workers in the proposed bargaining
unit or one hundred thirty-eight (138) as of the date of the filing of the petition, have
signed membership with the ALU-TUCP and have expressed their written consent and
authorization to the filing of the petition; (4) that in response to petitioner union's two
letters to the proprietor/ General Manager of respondent employer, dated April 21,
1986 and May 8, 1 986, requesting for direct recognition as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers, respondent employer has locked out 119
of its rank-and-file employees in the said bargaining unit and had dismissed earlier the
local union president, vice-president and three other active members of the local
unions for which an unfair labor practice case was filed by petitioner union against
respondent employer last July 2, 1986 before the NLRC in Cagayan de Oro City (Rollo,
pp. 18; 263).<äre||anº•1àw>
Respondent employer, on the other hand, alleged in its position paper, among others,
(1) that due to the nature of its business, very few of its employees are permanent, the
overwhelming majority of which are seasonal and casual and regular employees; (2)
that of the total 138 rank-and-file employees who authorized, signed and supported the
filing of the petition (a) 14 were no longer working as of June 3, 1986 (b) 4 resigned
after June, 1986 (c) 6 withdrew their membership from petitioner union (d) 5 were
retrenched on June 23, 1986 (e) 12 were dismissed due to malicious insubordination
and destruction of property and (f) 100 simply abandoned their work or stopped
working; (3) that the 128 incumbent employees or workers of the livestock section were
merely transferred from the agricultural section as replacement for those who have
either been dismissed, retrenched or resigned; and (4) that the statutory requirement
for holding a certification election has not been complied with by the union (Rollo, p.
26).
The Labor Arbiter granted the certification election sought for by petitioner union in his
order dated August 18, 1986 (Rollo, p. 62).
On February 4, 1987, respondent employer Belyca Corporation, appealed the order of
the Labor Arbiter to the Bureau of Labor Relations in Manila (Rollo, p. 67) which denied
the appeal (Rollo, p. 80) and the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 92). Thus, the
instant petition received in this Court by mail on February 20, 1987 (Rollo, p. 3).
In the resolution of March 4, 1987, the Second Division of this Court required
respondent Union to comment on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order
(,Rollo, p. 95).
Respondent union filed its comment on March 30, 1987 (Rollo, p. 190); public
respondents filed its comment on April 8, 1987 (Rollo, p. 218).
On May 4, 1987, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and to require
the parties to submit their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days from notice
(Rollo, p. 225).
The Office of the Solicitor General manifested on June 11, 1987 that it is adopting the
comment for public respondents as its memorandum (Rollo, p. 226); memorandum for
respondent ALU was filed on June 30, 1987 (Rollo, p. 231); and memorandum for
petitioner, on July 30, 1987 (Rollo, p. 435).
The issues raised in this petition are:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROPOSED BARGAINING UNIT IS AN
APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF 30% (NOW
20%) OF THE EMPLOYEES IN THE PROPOSED BARGAINING UNIT,
ASKING FOR A CERTIFICATION ELECTION HAD BEEN STRICTLY
COMPLIED WITH.
In the instant case, respondent ALU seeks direct certification as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file workers of the livestock and agro division of
petitioner BELYCA Corporation (Rollo, p. 232), engaged in piggery, poultry raising and
the planting of agricultural crops such as corn, coffee and various vegetables (Rollo, p.
26). But petitioner contends that the bargaining unit must include all the workers in its
integrated business concerns ranging from piggery, poultry, to supermarts and
cinemas so as not to split an otherwise single bargaining unit into fragmented
bargaining units (Rollo, p. 435).<äre||anº•1àw>
The Labor Code does not specifically define what constitutes an appropriate collective
bargaining unit. Article 256 of the Code provides:
Art. 256. Exclusive bargaining representative.—The labor
organization designated or selected by the majority of the
employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be
exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual
employee or group of employee shall have the right at any time
to present grievances to their employer.
According to Rothenberg, a proper bargaining unit maybe said to be a group of
employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, which the collective interests of all the employees, consistent with equity to
the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the
parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law (Rothenberg in Labor
Relations, p. 482).
This Court has already taken cognizance of the crucial issue of determining the proper
constituency of a collective bargaining unit.
Among the factors considered in Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring
Co. Inc. (103 Phil 1103 [1958]) are: "(1) will of employees (Glove Doctrine); (2) affinity
and unity of employee's interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties or
similarity of compensation and working conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining
history; and (4) employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary
employees".
Under the circumstances of that case, the Court stressed the importance of the fourth
factor and sustained the trial court's conclusion that two separate bargaining units
should be formed in dealing with respondent company, one consisting of regular and
permanent employees and another consisting of casual laborers or stevedores.
Otherwise stated, temporary employees should be treated separately from permanent
employees. But more importantly, this Court laid down the test of proper grouping,
which is community and mutuality of interest.
Thus, in a later case, (Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing Co. et al. v.
Alhambra Employees' Association 107 Phil. 28 [1960]) where the employment status
was not at issue but the nature of work of the employees concerned; the Court
stressed the importance of the second factor otherwise known as the substantial-
mutual-interest test and found no reason to disturb the finding of the lower Court that
the employees in the administrative, sales and dispensary departments perform work
which has nothing to do with production and maintenance, unlike those in the raw leaf,
cigar, cigarette and packing and engineering and garage departments and therefore
community of interest which justifies the format or existence as a separate appropriate
collective bargaining unit.
Still later in PLASLU v. CIR et al. (110 Phil. 180 [1960]) where the employment status
of the employees concerned was again challenged, the Court reiterating the rulings,
both in Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc.
supra and Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Co. et al. v. Alhambra Employees'
Association (supra) held that among the factors to be considered are: employment
status of the employees to be affected, that is the positions and categories of work to
which they belong, and the unity of employees' interest such as substantial similarity of
work and duties.
In any event, whether importance is focused on the employment status or the mutuality
of interest of the employees concerned "the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best
assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights (Democratic
Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc. supra)
Hence, still later following the substantial-mutual interest test, the Court ruled that there
is a substantial difference between the work performed by musicians and that of other
persons who participate in the production of a film which suffice to show that they
constitute a proper bargaining unit. (LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Philippine Musicians Guild, 1
SCRA 132 [1961]).
Coming back to the case at bar, it is beyond question that the employees of the
livestock and agro division of petitioner corporation perform work entirely different from
those performed by employees in the supermarts and cinema. Among others, the
noted difference are: their working conditions, hours of work, rates of pay, including the
categories of their positions and employment status. As stated by petitioner corporation
in its position paper, due to the nature of the business in which its livestock-agro
division is engaged very few of its employees in the division are permanent, the
overwhelming majority of which are seasonal and casual and not regular employees
(Rollo, p. 26). Definitely, they have very little in common with the employees of the
supermarts and cinemas. To lump all the employees of petitioner in its integrated
business concerns cannot result in an efficacious bargaining unit comprised of
constituents enjoying a community or mutuality of interest. Undeniably, the rank and
file employees of the livestock-agro division fully constitute a bargaining unit that
satisfies both requirements of classification according to employment status and of the
substantial similarity of work and duties which will ultimately assure its members the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
II
It is undisputed that petitioner BELYCA Corporation (Livestock and Agro Division)
employs more or less two hundred five (205) rank-and-file employees and workers. It
has no existing duly certified collective bargaining agreement with any legitimate labor
organization. There has not been any certification election conducted in the proposed
bargaining unit within the last twelve (12) months prior to the filing of the petition for
direct certification and/or certification election with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, and there is no contending union requesting for certification as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative in the proposed bargaining unit.
The records show that on the filing of the petition for certification and/or certification
election on June 3, 1986; 124 employees or workers which are more than a majority of
the rank-and-file employees or workers in the proposed bargaining unit had signed
membership with respondent ALU-TUCP and had expressed their written consent and
authorization to the filing of the petition. Thus, the Labor Arbiter ordered the
certification election on August 18, 1986 on a finding that 30% of the statutory
requirement under Art. 258 of the Labor Code has been met.
But, petitioner corporation contends that after June 3, 1986 four (4) employees
resigned; six (6) subsequently withdrew their membership; five (5) were retrenched;
twelve (12) were dismissed for illegally and unlawfully barricading the entrance to
petitioner's farm; and one hundred (100) simply abandoned their work.
Petitioner's claim was however belied by the Memorandum of its personnel officer to
the 119 employees dated July 28, 1986 showing that the employees were on strike,
which was confirmed by the finding of the Bureau of Labor Relations to the effect that
they went on strike on July 24, 1986 (Rollo, p. 419). Earlier the local union president,
Warrencio Maputi; the Vice-president, Gilbert Redoblado and three other active
members of the union Carmen Saguing, Roberto Romolo and Iluminada Bonio were
dismissed and a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal etc. was filed by
the Union in their behalf on July 2, 1986 before the NLRC of Cagayan de Oro City
(Rollo, p. 415).<äre||anº•1àw> The complaint was amended on August 20, 1986 for
respondent Union to represent Warrencio Maputi and 137 others against petitioner
corporation and Bello Casanova President and General Manager for unfair labor
practice, illegal dismissal, illegal lockout, etc. (Rollo, p. 416).
Under Art. 257 of the Labor Code once the statutory requirement is met, the Director of
Labor Relations has no choice but to call a certification election (Atlas Free Workers
Union AFWU PSSLU Local v. Noriel, 104 SCRA 565 [1981]; Vismico Industrial
Workers Association (VIWA) v. Noriel, 131 SCRA 569 [1984]) It becomes in the
language of the New Labor Code "Mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a certification
election for the purpose of determining the representative of the employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit and certify the winner as the exclusive bargaining
representative of all employees in the unit." (Federacion Obrera de la Industria
Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas v. Noriel, 72 SCRA 24 [1976]; Kapisanan
Ng Mga Manggagawa v. Noriel, 77 SCRA 414 [1977]); more so when there is no
existing collective bargaining agreement. (Samahang Manggagawa Ng Pacific Mills,
Inc. v. Noriel, 134 SCRA 152 [1985]); and there has not been a certification election in
the company for the past three years (PLUM Federation of Industrial and Agrarian
Workers v. Noriel, 119 SCRA 299 [1982]) as in the instant case.
It is significant to note that 124 employees out of the 205 employees of the Belyca
Corporation have expressed their written consent to the certification election or more
than a majority of the rank and file employees and workers; much more than the
required 30% and over and above the present requirement of 20% by Executive Order
No. 111 issued on December 24, 1980 and applicable only to unorganized
establishments under Art. 257, of the Labor Code, to which the BELYCA Corporation
belong (Ass. Trade Unions (ATU) v. Trajano, G.R. No. 75321, June 20, 1988).) More
than that, any doubt cast on the authenticity of signatures to the petition for holding a
certification election cannot be a bar to its being granted (Filipino Metals Corp. v. Ople
107 SCRA 211 [1981]). Even doubts as to the required 30% being met warrant holding
of the certification election (PLUM Federation of Industrial and Agrarian Workers v.
Noriel, 119 SCRA 299 [1982]). In fact, once the required percentage requirement has
been reached, the employees' withdrawal from union membership taking place after
the filing of the petition for certification election will not affect said petition. On the
contrary, the presumption arises that the withdrawal was not free but was procured
through duress, coercion or for a valuable consideration (La Suerte Cigar and
Cigarette Factory v. Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, 123 SCRA 679 [1983]).
Hence, the subsequent disaffiliation of the six (6) employees from the union will not be
counted against or deducted from the previous number who had signed up for
certification elections Vismico Industrial Workers Association (VIWA) v. Noriel 131
SCRA 569 [1984]).<äre||anº•1àw> Similarly, until a decision, final in character, has
been issued declaring the strike illegal and the mass dismissal or retrenchment valid,
the strikers cannot be denied participation in the certification election notwithstanding,
the vigorous condemnation of the strike and the fact that the picketing were attended
by violence. Under the foregoing circumstances, it does not necessarily follow that the
strikers in question are no longer entitled to participate in the certification election on
the theory that they have automatically lost their jobs. (Barrera v. CIR, 107 SCRA 596
[1981]). For obvious reasons, the duty of the employer to bargain collectively is nullified
if the purpose of the dismissal of the union members is to defeat the union in the
consent requirement for certification election. (Samahang Manggagawa Ng Via Mare v.
Noriel, 98 SCRA 507 [1980]). As stressed by this Court, the holding of a certification
election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented. (George and Peter Lines
Inc. v. Associated Labor Unions (ALU), 134 SCRA 82 [1986]).
Finally, as a general rule, a certification election is the sole concern of the workers. The
only exception is where the employer has to file a petition for certification election
pursuant to Art. 259 of the Labor Code because the latter was requested to bargain
collectively. But thereafter the role of the employer in the certification process ceases.
The employer becomes merely a bystander (Trade Union of the Phil. and Allied
Services (TUPAS) v. Trajano, 120 SCRA 64 [1983]).
There is no showing that the instant case falls under the above mentioned exception.
However, it will be noted that petitioner corporation from the outset has actively
participated and consistently taken the position of adversary in the petition for direct
certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative and/or certification
election filed by respondent Associated Labor Unions (ALU)-TUCP to the extent of
filing this petition for certiorari in this Court. Considering that a petition for certification
election is not a litigation but a mere investigation of a non-adversary character to
determining the bargaining unit to represent the employees (LVN Pictures, Inc. v.
Philippine Musicians Guild, supra; Bulakena Restaurant & Caterer v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 45 SCRA 88 [1972]; George Peter Lines, Inc. v. Associated Labor Union,
134 SCRA 82 [1986]; Tanduay Distillery Labor Union v. NLRC, 149 SCRA 470 [1987]),
and its only purpose is to give the employees true representation in their collective
bargaining with an employer (Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions CCLU v. Noriel,
116 SCRA 694 [1982]), there appears to be no reason for the employer's objection to
the formation of subject union, much less for the filing of the petition for a certification
election.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit (b)
resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated Nov. 24, 1986 is AFFIRMED; and
the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on March 4, 1987 is LIFTED
permanently.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 77395. November 29, 1988.]

BELYCA CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. DIR. PURA FERRER CALLEJA, LABOR

RELATIONS, MANILA, MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; MED-
ARBITER, RODOLFO S. MILADO, MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 10 AND ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION (ALU-TUCP),
MINDANAO REGIONAL OFFICE, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, Respondents.

Soriano and Araña Law Offices for Petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public Respondent.

Francisco D. Alas for respondent Associated Labor Unions-TUCP.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; LABOR CODE; COLLECTIVE

BARGAINING UNIT; PROPER CONSTITUENCY, CITED. — Among the factors
considered in Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc. (103 Phil
1103 [1958]) are:" (1) will of employees (Glove Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of
employee’s interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties or similarity of
compensation and working conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary employees."

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BASIC TEST OF ACCEPTABILITY. — In any event, whether
importance is focused on the employment status or the mutuality of interest of the
employees concerned "the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is
whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all
employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights (Democratic Labor
Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc. supra)

3. ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATION ELECTION; CALL IS MANDATORY WHERE

STATUTORY REQUIREMENT IS MET. — Under Art. 257 of the Labor Code once the
statutory requirement is met, the Director of Labor Relations has no choice but to call a
certification election (Atlas Free Workers Union (AFWU) PSSLU Local v. Noriel, 104
SCRA 565 [1981]; Vismico Industrial Workers Association (VIWA) v. Noriel, 131 SCRA
569 [1984]) It becomes in the language of the New Labor Code "Mandatory for the
Bureau to conduct a certification election for the purpose of determining the
representative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and certify the
winner as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the unit."
(Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas v.
Noriel, 72 SCRA 24 [1976]; Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa v. Noriel, 77 SCRA 414
[1977]); more so when there is no existing collective bargaining agreement.
(Samahang Manggagawa Ng Pacific Mills, Inc. v. Noriel, 134 SCRA 152 [1985]); and
there has not been a certification election in the company for the past three years
(PLUM Federation of Industrial and Agrarian Workers v. Noriel, 119 SCRA 299 [1982])
as in the instant case.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOUBTS AS TO THE AUTHENTICITY OF SIGNATURE OR TO
THE REQUIRED PERCENTAGE DO NOT BAR HOLDING OF ELECTION. — Any
doubt cast on the authenticity of signatures to the petition for holding a certification
election cannot be a bar to its being granted (Filipino Metals Corp. v. Ople 107 SCRA
211 [1981]). Even doubts as to the required 30% being met warrant holding of the
certification election (PLUM Federation of Industrial and Agrarian Workers v. Noriel,
119 SCRA 299 [1982]). In fact, once the required percentage requirement has been
reached, the employees’ withdrawal from union membership taking place after the
filing of the petition for certification election will not affect said petition. On the contrary,
the presumption arises that the withdrawal was not free but was procured through
duress, coercion or for a valuable consideration (La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory
v. Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, 123 SCRA 679 [1983]).

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; UNTIL A DECISION ON THE STRIKE HAS BECOME FINAL
STRIKES CANNOT BE DENIED IN THE ELECTION. — Until a decision, final in
character, has been issued declaring the strike illegal and the mass dismissal or
retrenchment valid, the strikers cannot be denied participation in the certification
election notwithstanding, the vigorous condemnation of the strike and the fact that the
picketing were attended by violence. Under the foregoing circumstances, it does not
necessarily follow that the strikers in question are no longer entitled to participate in the
certification election on the theory that they have automatically lost their jobs. (Barrera
v. CIR, 107 SCRA 596 [1981]). For obvious reasons, the duty of the employer to
bargain collectively is nullified if the purpose of the dismissal of the union members is
to defeat the union in the consent requirement for certification election. (Samahang
Manggagawa Ng Via Mare v. Noriel, 98 SCRA 507 [1980]).

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATION ELECTION; A SOLE CONCERN OF WORKERS,

EXCEPTION. — As a general rule, a certification election is the sole concern of the
workers. The only exception is where the employer has to file a petition for certification
election pursuant to Art. 259 of the Labor Code because the latter was requested to
bargain collectively. But thereafter the role of the employer in the certification process
ceases. The employer becomes merely a bystander (Trade Union of the Phil. and
Allied Services (TUPAS) v. Trajano, 120 SCRA 64 [1983]).

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A LITIGATION BUT A MERE INVESTIGATION OF A NON-

ADVERSARY CHARACTER. — Considering that a petition for certification election is
not a litigation but a mere investigation of a non-adversary character to determining the
bargaining unit to represent the employees (LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Philippine Musicians
Guild, supra; Bulakeña Restaurant & Caterer v. Court of Industrial Relations, 45 SCRA
88 [1972]; George Peter Lines, Inc. v. Associated Labor Union, 134 SCRA 82 [1986];
Tanduay Distillery Labor Union v. NLRC, 149 SCRA 470 [1987]), and its only purpose
is to give the employees true representation in their collective bargaining with an
employer (Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions (CCLU) v. Noriel, 116 SCRA 694
[1982]), there appears to be no reason for the employer’s objection to the formation of
subject union, much less for the filing of the petition for a certification election.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking to
annul or to set aside the resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated November
24, 1986 and denying the appeal, and the Bureau’s resolution dated January 13, 1987
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The dispositive portion of the questioned resolution dated November 24, 1986 (Rollo,
p. 4) reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Order is affirmed and
the appeal therefrom denied.

Let, therefore, the pertinent records of the case be remanded to the office of origin for
the immediate conduct of the certification election."cralaw virtua1aw library

The dispositive portion of the resolution dated January 13, 1987 (Rollo, p. 92) reads,
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Belyca Corporation

(Livestock Agro-Division) is hereby dismissed for lack of merit and the Bureau’s
Resolution dated 24 November 1986 is affirmed. Accordingly, let the records of this
case be immediately forwarded to the Office of origin for the holding of the certification
elections.

No further motion shall hereafter be entertained."cralaw virtua1aw library

The antecedents of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On June 3, 1986, private respondent Associated Labor Union (ALU)-TUCP, a

legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Ministry of Labor and Employment
under Registration Certificate No. 783-IP, filed with the Regional Office No. 10, Ministry
of Labor and Employment at Cagayan de Oro City, a petition for direct certification as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees/workers of
Belyca Corporation (Livestock and Agro-Division), a duly organized, registered and
existing corporation engaged in the business of poultry raising, piggery and planting of
agricultural crops such as corn, coffee and various vegetables, employing
approximately 205 rank and file employees/workers, the collective bargaining unit
sought in the petition, or in case of doubt of the union’s majority representation, for the
issuance of an order authorizing the immediate holding of a certification election (Rollo,
p. 18). Although the case was scheduled for hearing at least three times, no amicable
settlement was reached by the parties. During the scheduled hearing of July 31, 1986
they, however, agreed to submit simultaneously their respective position papers on or
before August 11, 1986 (rollo. p. 62).

Petitioner ALU-TUCP, private respondent herein, in its petition and position paper
alleged, among others, (1) that there is no existing collective bargaining agreement
between the respondent employer, petitioner herein, and any other existing legitimate
labor unions; (2) that there had neither been a certification election conducted in the
proposed bargaining unit within the last twelve (12) months prior to the filing of the
petition nor a contending union requesting for certification as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative in the proposed bargaining unit; (3) that more than a majority
of respondent employer’s rank-and-file employees/workers in the proposed bargaining
unit or one hundred thirty-eight (138) as of the date of the filing of the petition, have
signed membership with the ALU-TUCP and have expressed their written consent and
authorization to the filing of the petition; (4) that in response to petitioner union’s two
letters to the proprietor/General Manager of respondent employer, dated April 21, 1986
and May 8, 1986, requesting for direct recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file workers, respondent employer has locked out 119 of its rank-
and-file employees in the said bargaining unit and had dismissed earlier the local union
president, vice-president and three other active members of the local unions for which
an unfair labor practice case was filed by petitioner union against respondent employer
last July 2, 1986 before the NLRC in Cagayan de Oro City (Rollo, pp. 18;
263).chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Respondent employer, on the other hand, alleged in its position paper, among others,
(1) that due to the nature of its business, very few of its employees are permanent, the
overwhelming majority of which are seasonal and casual and regular employees; (2)
that of the total 138 rank-and-file employees who authorized, signed and supported the
filing of the petition (a) 14 were no longer working as of June 3, 1986 (b) 4 resigned
after June, 1986 (c) 6 withdrew their membership from petitioner union (d) 5 were
retrenched on June 23, 1986 (e) 12 were dismissed due to malicious insubordination
and destruction of property and (f) 100 simply abandoned their work or stopped
working; (3) that the 128 incumbent employees or workers of the livestock section were
merely transferred from the agricultural section as replacement for those who have
either been dismissed, retrenched or resigned; and (4) that the statutory requirement
for holding a certification election has not been complied with by the union (Rollo, p.
26).

The Labor Arbiter granted the certification election sought for by petitioner union in his
order dated August 18, 1986 (Rollo, p. 62).

On February 4, 1987, respondent employer Belyca Corporation, appealed the order of

the Labor Arbiter to the Bureau of Labor Relations in Manila (Rollo, p. 67) which denied
the appeal (Rollo, p. 80) and the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 92). Thus, the
instant petition received in this Court by mail on February 20, 1987 (Rollo, p. 3).

In the resolution of March 4, 1987, the Second Division of this Court required
respondent Union to comment on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order
(Rollo, p. 95).

Respondent union filed its comment on March 30, 1987 (Rollo, p. 190); public
respondents filed its comment on April 8, 1987 (Rollo, p. 218).

On May 4, 1987, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and to require
the parties to submit their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days from notice
(Rollo, p. 225).

The Office of the Solicitor General manifested on June 11, 1987 that it is adopting the
comment for public respondents as its memorandum (Rollo, p. 226); memorandum for
respondent ALU was filed on June 30, 1987 (Rollo, p. 231); and memorandum for
petitioner, on July 30, 1987 (Rollo, p. 435).

The issues raised in this petition are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHETHER OR NOT THE PROPOSED BARGAINING UNIT IS AN APPROPRIATE

BARGAINING UNIT.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF 30% (NOW 20%) OF

THE EMPLOYEES IN THE PROPOSED BARGAINING UNIT, ASKING FOR A
CERTIFICATION ELECTION HAD BEEN STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH.

In the instant case, respondent ALU seeks direct certification as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file workers of the livestock and agro division of
petitioner BELYCA Corporation (Rollo, p. 232), engaged in piggery, poultry raising and
the planting of agricultural crops such as corn, coffee and various vegetables (Rollo, p.
26). But petitioner contends that the bargaining unit must include all the workers in its
integrated business concerns ranging from piggery, poultry, to supermarts and
cinemas so as not to split an otherwise single bargaining unit into fragmented
bargaining units (Rollo, p. 435).

The Labor Code does not specifically define what constitutes an appropriate collective
bargaining unit. Article 256 of the Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 256. Exclusive bargaining representative. — The labor organization designated or

selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit
shall be exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining. However, an individual employee or group of employees shall
have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer.

According to Rothenberg, a proper bargaining unit maybe said to be a group of

employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, which the collective interests of all the employees, consistent with equity to
the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the
parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law (Rothenberg in Labor
Relations, p. 482).

This Court has already taken cognizance of the crucial issue of determining the proper
constituency of a collective bargaining unit.

Among the factors considered in Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring

Co. Inc. (103 Phil 1103 [1958]) are:" (1) will of employees (Glove Doctrine); (2) affinity
and unity of employee’s interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties or
similarity of compensation and working conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining
history; and (4) employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary
employees."

Under the circumstances of that case, the Court stressed the importance of the fourth
factor and sustained the trial court’s conclusion that two separate bargaining units
should be formed in dealing with respondent company, one consisting of regular and
permanent employees and another consisting of casual laborers or stevedores.
Otherwise stated, temporary employees should be treated separately from permanent
employees. But more importantly, this Court laid down the test of proper grouping,
which is community and mutuality of interest.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Thus, in a later case, (Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing Co. Et. Al. v.
Alhambra Employees’ Association 107 Phil. 28 [1960]) where the employment status
was not at issue but the nature of work of the employees concerned; the Court
stressed the importance of the second factor otherwise known as the substantial-
mutual-interest test and found no reason to disturb the finding of the lower Court that
the employees in the administrative, sales and dispensary departments perform work
which has nothing to do with production and maintenance, unlike those in the raw leaf,
cigar, cigarette, packing and engineering and garage departments and therefore have
a community of interest which justifies the formation or existence as a separate
appropriate collective bargaining unit.

Still later in PLASLU v. CIR Et. Al. (110 Phil. 180 [1960]) where the employment status
of the employees concerned was again challenged, the Court reiterating the rulings,
both in Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc. supra and
Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Co. Et. Al. v. Alhambra Employees’ Association (supra)
held that among the factors to be considered are: employment status of the employees
to be affected, that is the positions and categories of work to which they belong, and
the unity of employees’ interest such as substantial similarity of work and duties.

In any event, whether importance is focused on the employment status or the mutuality
of interest of the employees concerned "the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best
assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights (Democratic
Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc. supra)

Hence, still later following the substantial-mutual interest test, the Court ruled that there
is a substantial difference between the work performed by musicians and that of other
persons who participate in the production of a film which suffice to show that they
constitute a proper bargaining unit. (LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Philippine Musicians Guild, 1
SCRA 132 [1961]).

Coming back to the case at bar, it is beyond question that the employees of the
livestock and agro division of petitioner corporation perform work entirely different from
those performed by employees in the supermarts and cinema. Among others, the
noted difference are: their working conditions, hours of work, rates of pay, including the
categories of their positions and employment status. As stated by petitioner corporation
in its position paper, due to the nature of the business in which its livestock-agro
division is engaged very few of its employees in the division are permanent, the
overwhelming majority of which are seasonal and casual and not regular employees
(Rollo, p. 26). Definitely, they have very little in common with the employees of the
supermarts and cinemas. To lump all the employees of petitioner in its integrated
business concerns cannot result in an efficacious bargaining unit comprised of
constituents enjoying a community or mutuality of interest. Undeniably, the rank and
file employees of the livestock-agro division fully constitute a bargaining unit that
satisfies both requirements of classification according to employment status and of the
substantial similarity of work and duties which will ultimately assure its members the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights.chanrobles law library

II

It is undisputed that petitioner BELYCA Corporation (Livestock and Agro Division)

employs more or less two hundred five (205) rank-and-file employees and workers. It
has no existing duly certified collective bargaining agreement with any legitimate labor
organization. There has not been any certification election conducted in the proposed
bargaining unit within the last twelve (12) months prior to the filing of the petition for
direct certification and/or certification election with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, and there is no contending union requesting for certification as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative in the proposed bargaining unit.

The records show that on the filing of the petition for certification and/or certification
election on June 3, 1986; 124 employees or workers which are more than a majority of
the rank-and-file employees or workers in the proposed bargaining unit had signed
membership with respondent ALU-TUCP and had expressed their written consent and
authorization to the filing of the petition. Thus, the Labor Arbiter ordered the
certification election on August 18, 1986 on a finding that 30% of the statutory
requirement under Art. 258 of the Labor Code has been met.

But, petitioner corporation contends that after June 3, 1986 four (4) employees
resigned; six (6) subsequently withdrew their membership; five (5) were retrenched;
twelve (12) were dismissed for illegally and unlawfully barricading the entrance to
petitioner’s farm; and one hundred (100) simply abandoned their work.

Petitioner’s claim was however belied by the Memorandum of its personnel officer to
the 119 employees dated July 28, 1986 showing that the employees were on strike,
which was confirmed by the finding of the Bureau of Labor Relations to the effect that
they went on strike on July 24, 1986 (Rollo, p. 419). Earlier the local union president,
Warrencio Maputi; the Vice-president, Gilbert Redoblado; and three other active
members of the union Carmen Saguing, Roberto Romolo and Iluminada Bonio were
dismissed and a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal etc. was filed by
the Union in their behalf on July 2, 1986 before the NLRC of Cagayan de Oro City
(Rollo, p. 415). The complaint was amended on August 20, 1986 for respondent Union
to represent Warrencio Maputi and 137 others against petitioner corporation and Bello
Casanova President and General Manager for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal,
illegal lockout, etc. (Rollo, p. 416)

Under Art. 257 of the Labor Code once the statutory requirement is met, the Director of
Labor Relations has no choice but to call a certification election (Atlas Free Workers
Union (AFWU) PSSLU Local v. Noriel, 104 SCRA 565 [1981]; Vismico Industrial
Workers Association (VIWA) v. Noriel, 131 SCRA 569 [1984]) It becomes in the
language of the New Labor Code "Mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a certification
election for the purpose of determining the representative of the employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit and certify the winner as the exclusive bargaining
representative of all employees in the unit." (Federacion Obrera de la Industria
Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas v. Noriel, 72 SCRA 24 [1976]; Kapisanan
Ng Mga Manggagawa v. Noriel, 77 SCRA 414 [1977]); more so when there is no
existing collective bargaining agreement. (Samahang Manggagawa Ng Pacific Mills,
Inc. v. Noriel, 134 SCRA 152 [1985]); and there has not been a certification election in
the company for the past three years (PLUM Federation of Industrial and Agrarian
Workers v. Noriel, 119 SCRA 299 [1982]) as in the instant case.

It is significant to note that 124 employees out of the 205 employees of the Belyca
Corporation have expressed their written consent to the certification election or more
than a majority of the rank and file employees and workers; much more than the
required 30% and over and above the present requirement of 20% by Executive Order
No. 111 issued on December 24, 1980 and applicable only to unorganized
establishments under Art. 257, of the Labor Code, to which the BELYCA Corporation
belong (Ass. Trade Unions (ATU) v. Trajano, G.R. No. 75321, June 20, 1988).) More
than that, any doubt cast on the authenticity of signatures to the petition for holding a
certification election cannot be a bar to its being granted (Filipino Metals Corp. v. Ople
107 SCRA 211 [1981]). Even doubts as to the required 30% being met warrant holding
of the certification election (PLUM Federation of Industrial and Agrarian Workers v.
Noriel, 119 SCRA 299 [1982]). In fact, once the required percentage requirement has
been reached, the employees’ withdrawal from union membership taking place after
the filing of the petition for certification election will not affect said petition. On the
contrary, the presumption arises that the withdrawal was not free but was procured
through duress, coercion or for a valuable consideration (La Suerte Cigar and
Cigarette Factory v. Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, 123 SCRA 679 [1983]).
Hence, the subsequent disaffiliation of the six (6) employees from the union will not be
counted against or deducted from the previous number who had signed up for
certification elections (Vicmico Industrial Workers Association (VIWA) v. Noriel 131
SCRA 569 [1984]). Similarly, until a decision, final in character, has been issued
declaring the strike illegal and the mass dismissal or retrenchment valid, the strikers
cannot be denied participation in the certification election notwithstanding, the vigorous
condemnation of the strike and the fact that the picketing were attended by violence.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it does not necessarily follow that the strikers in
question are no longer entitled to participate in the certification election on the theory
that they have automatically lost their jobs. (Barrera v. CIR, 107 SCRA 596 [1981]). For
obvious reasons, the duty of the employer to bargain collectively is nullified if the
purpose of the dismissal of the union members is to defeat the union in the consent
requirement for certification election. (Samahang Manggagawa Ng Via Mare v. Noriel,
98 SCRA 507 [1980]). As stressed by this Court, the holding of a certification election
is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented. (George and Peter Lines Inc. v.
Associated Labor Unions (ALU), 134 SCRA 82 [1986]).

Finally, as a general rule, a certification election is the sole concern of the workers. The
only exception is where the employer has to file a petition for certification election
pursuant to Art. 259 of the Labor Code because the latter was requested to bargain
collectively. But thereafter the role of the employer in the certification process ceases.
The employer becomes merely a bystander (Trade Union of the Phil. and Allied
Services (TUPAS) v. Trajano, 120 SCRA 64 [1983]).chanrobles law library : red

There is no showing that the instant case falls under the above mentioned exception.
However, it will be noted that petitioner corporation from the outset has actively
participated and consistently taken the position of adversary in the petition for direct
certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative and/or certification
election filed by respondent Associated Labor Unions (ALU)-TUCP to the extent of
filing this petition for certiorari in this Court. Considering that a petition for certification
election is not a litigation but a mere investigation of a non-adversary character to
determining the bargaining unit to represent the employees (LVN Pictures, Inc. v.
Philippine Musicians Guild, supra; Bulakeña Restaurant & Caterer v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 45 SCRA 88 [1972]; George Peter Lines, Inc. v. Associated Labor Union,
134 SCRA 82 [1986]; Tanduay Distillery Labor Union v. NLRC, 149 SCRA 470 [1987]),
and its only purpose is to give the employees true representation in their collective
bargaining with an employer (Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions (CCLU) v. Noriel,
116 SCRA 694 [1982]), there appears to be no reason for the employer’s objection to
the formation of subject union, much less for the filing of the petition for a certification
election.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit (b)
resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated Nov. 24, 1986 is AFFIRMED; and
the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on March 4, 1987 is LIFTED
permanently.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

SO ORDERED.