[ GR No.

L-25024, Mar 30, 1970 ]

TEODORO C. SANTIAGO v. MISS JUANITA BAUTISTA +

DECISION

143 Phil. 209

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato dismissing, on a motion to dismiss,
its Civil Case No. 2012 - for certiorari, injunction and damages - on the ground that the complaint therein
states no cause of action, and from the subsequent order of the court a quo denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the said order of dismissal.

The record shows that at the time Civil Case No. 2012 was commenced in the court below,
appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the public school named Sero Elementary
School in Cotabato City. As the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end, the "Committee On The
Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose
of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. With the school Principal, Mrs. Aurora Lorena,
as chairman, and Juanita Bautista, Rosalinda Alpas, Rebecca Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin,
Aida Camino and Luna Sarmago, as members, the above-named committee deliberated and finally
adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Liñgat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors,
respectively. The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days
before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father
as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students" thus made,
by instituting the above-mentioned civil case in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, against the
above-named committee members along with the District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of
the place.

The corresponding complaint filed alleged, inter alia: that plaintiff-petitioner Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. is
a sixth grader at the SeroElementary School in Cotabato City scheduled to be graduated on May 21st,
1965 with the honor rank of third place, which is disputed; that the teachers of the school had been
made respondents as they compose the "Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor" whose grave
abuse of official discretion is the subject of suit, while the other defendants were included as Principal,
District Supervisor and Academic Supervisor of the school; that Teodoro Santiago, Jr. had been a
consistent honor pupil from Grade I to Grade V of the SeroElementary School, while
Patricia Liñgat (second placer in the disputed ranking in Grade VI) had never been a close rival of
petitioner before, except in Grade V wherein she ranked third; that Santiago, Jr. had been prejudiced,
while his closest rival had been so much benefited, by the circumstance that the latter, Socorro Medina,
was coached and tutored during the summer vacation of 1964 by Mrs. Alpas who became the teacher of
both pupils in English in Grade VI, resulting in the far lead Medina obtained over the other pupil; that
the committee referred to in this case had been illegally constituted as the same was composed of all
the Grade VI teachers only, in violation of the Service Manual for Teachers of the Bureau of Public
Schools which provides that the committee to select the honor students should be composed of all
teachers in Grades V and VI; that there are direct and circumstantial matters, which shall be proven
during the trial, wherein respondents have exercised grave abuse of discretion and irregularities, such as
the changing of the final ratings on the grading sheets of Socorro Medina and Patricia Liñgat from 80%
to 85%, and some teachers giving petitioner a starting grade of 75% in Grade VI, which prove, that there
was already an intention to pull him to a much lower rank at the end of the school year; that several
district examinations outside of teachers' daily units and other than periodical tests were given, ratings
in which were heavily considered in the determination of periodical ratings, whereas according to
the Academic Supervisor and Acting Division Superintendent of schools of the place such district
examinations were not advisable; that there was a unanimous agreement and understanding among the
respondent teachers to insult and prejudice the second and third honors by rating Socorro Medina
with a perfect score, which is very unnatural; that the words "first place" in petitioner's certificate in
Grade I was erased and replaced with the words "second place", which is an instance of the unjust and
discriminating abuses committed by the respondent teachers in the disputed selection of honor pupils
they made; that petitioner personally appealed the matter to the School Principal, to the District
Supervisor, and to the Academic Supervisor, but said officials "passed the buck to each other" to delay
his grievances, and as to appeal to higher authorities will be too late, there is no other speedy and
adequate remedy under the circumstances; and, that petitioner and his parents suffered mental and
moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00. They prayed the court, among others, to set aside the
final list of honor students in Grade VI of the SeroElementary School for that school year 1964-1965,
and, during the pendency of the suit, to enjoin the respondent teachers from officially and formally
publishing and proclaiming the said honor pupils in Grade VI in the graduation exercises the school was
scheduled to hold on the 21st of May of that year 1965. The injunction prayed for was denied by the
lower court in its order of May 20, 1965, the said court reasoning out that the graduation exercises were
then already set on the following day, May 21, 1965, and the restraining of the same would be shocking
to the school authorities, parents, and the community who had eagerly looked forward to the coming of
that yearly happy event. As scheduled, the graduation exercises of the Sero Elementary School for the
school year 1964-1965 was held on May 21, with the same protested list of honor students.

Having been required by the above-mentioned order to answer the petition within ten (10) days,
respondents moved for the dismissal of the case instead. Under date of May 24, 1965, they
filed a motion to dismiss, on the grounds (1) that the action for certiorari was improper, and (2) that
even assuming the propriety of the action, the question brought before the court had already become
academic. This was opposed by petitioner.

In an order dated June 4, 1965, the motion to dismiss of respondents was granted, the court reasoning
thus:

"The respondents now move to dismiss the petition for being improper and for being academic. In
order to resolve the motion to dismiss, the Court has carefully examined the petition to determine the
sufficiency of the alleged cause of action constituting the special civil action of certiorari.

"The pertinent portions of the petition alleging 'grave abuse of discretion' are found in paragraphs 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. These allegations may be substantially summarized as follows: Paragraph 3 alleges
that since grades one to six, the students closely contending for class honors were Socorro
Medina, Teodoro Santiago, Jr., Dolores Dalican and Patricia Liñgat.
"Socorro Medina obtained first honor thrice (grades I, V and VI); once second honor (grade IV), and
twice third place (grades II and III).

"Teodoro Santiago, Jr. obtained first place once (grade IV); four times second place (grades I, II, III and V)
and once third place (grade VI).

"Dolores Dalican obtained twice first place (grades II, III); once third place (grade I).

"Patricia Liñgat once third place (grade V); and once second place (grade VI).

"That as now ranked in the graduation, Patricia Liñgat is given second place while Teodoro Santiago, Jr.,
is given the third place only. This is the ranking now disputed by petitioner, Teodoro Santiago, Jr.

"Paragraph 4 alleges that Socorro Medina was tutored in the summer of 1964 by Mrs.
Rosalinda Alpas who became her English teacher in the sixth grade; that as such, Mrs. Alpas unjustly
favored Socorro against her rivals.

"Paragraph 5 alleges that the teachers who composed the committee on honor students are all grade six
teachers while the Service Manual For Teachers provides that the committee shall be composed of the
teachers from the fifth and sixth grades.

"Paragraph 6 alleges that there are direct and circumstantial evidence showing the change of ratings of
Socorro Medina and Patricia Liñgat from 80% to 85% and the intention to junk petitioner to a lower
rank.

"Paragraph 7 alleges that the giving of district examinations upon which ratings were partly based were
not advisable.

"Paragraph 8 alleges that the teachers rated Socorro Medina a perfect pupil which is unnatural.

"Paragraph 9 alleges that on the first grade certificate of the petitioner the word 'First Place' was erased
and changed to 'Second Place.

"Paragraph 10 alleges that petitioner personally appealed to the school authorities but they only 'passed
the buck to each other'.

"SECOND PARAGRAPH VIOLATED

"Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

'Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions, has
acted without or in excess of, its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal,
board or officer.'

'The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, to-
gether with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.'
"It is striking, indeed, that this petition has not been accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment or order complained of, together with all pleadings and documents which are relevant
thereto, as required by the second paragraph of the aforequoted rule. This violation renders the petition
extremely indefinite and uncertain. There is no written formal judgment or order of respondents that is
submitted for revision or correction of this Court. This violation is fatal to the petition.

"ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES NEGLECTED

"All that the petition alleges is that the petitioner personally appealed to the school authorities who only
'passed the buck to each other'. This allegation does not show that petitioner formally availed of and
exhausted the administrative remedies of the Department of Education. The petition implies that
this is the 'first formal complaint of petitioner against his teachers. The administrative agencies of the
Department of Education could have investigated the grievances of the petitioner with dispatch and give
effective remedies, but petitioner negligently abandoned them. Petitioner cannot now claim that he
lacked any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.

"NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

"Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the part of teachers refer to errors,
mistakes, or irregularities rather than to real grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere commission of errors in the exercise of jurisdiction may not be corrected by means
of certiorari.

"In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the petition states no cause of
action and should be, as it is hereby dismissed."

Upon receipt of a copy of the above-quoted order, the petitioner moved for the reconsideration
thereof, but the same proved to be futile, hence, this appeal.

Appellant here assails the holding of the lower court that his petition states no cause of action on the
grounds - discussed by the court aquo in the appealed order above-quoted - (1) that the petition does
not comply with the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 65 because it has not been accompanied by a
certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto; (2) that administrative remedies were not first exhausted;
and (3) that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the teachers who constituted the
committee referred to. On the other hand, appellees maintain that the court below did not err, in
dismissing the case on said grounds. Further, they, argue in favor of the questioned order of dismissal
upon the additional ground that the "committee on the ratings of students for honor" whose actions are
here condemned by appellant is not the "tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions" against
which an action for certiorari may lie under Section 1 of Rule 65.

The last point raised by appellees deserves first consideration, for if really the said committee of teach-
ers does not fall within the category of the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
functions contemplated by Rule 65, further discussion of the issues raised by appellant may no longer be
necessary. To resolve this problem the following tests may be employed:

"In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action instituted against 'any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial functions.' (Section 1, Rule 67.) A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of
judicial powers; the exercise of a judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of
the court (34 C.J. 1182). In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this
jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist: (1) that there must be a specific controversy in-
volving rights of persons or property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer
for hearing and determination of their respective rights and obligations.

'Judicial action is an adjudication upon the rights of parties who in general appear or are brought before
the tribunal by notice or process, and upon whose claims some decision or judgment is rendered. It
implies impartiality, disinterestedness, a weighing of adverse claims, and is inconsistent with discretion
on the one hand - for the tribunal must decide according to law and the rights of the parties - or with
dictation on the other; for in the first instance it must exercise its own judgment under the law, and not
act under a mandate from another power. x x x The character of its action in a given case must decide
whether that action is judicial, ministerial, or legislative, or whether it be simply that of a public agent of
the county or State, as in its varied jurisdictions it may by turns be each.' (In Re Saline County
Subscription, 100 Am. Dec. 337, 338, cited in Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Public Service
Commission, 181 S. E. 836-837.)

'It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what
the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is
clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.' (State
ex rel. Board of Commissioners of St. Louis County, et al. v. Dunn, 90 N. W. 772-773.)

(2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have the power and
authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the controversy construing and applying the
laws to that end.

'The phrase "judicial power" is not capable of a precise definition which would be applicable to all
cases. The term has been variously defined as the authority to determine the rights of persons or
property by arbitrating between adversaries in specific controversies at the instance of a party thereto;
the authority exercised by that department of government which is charged with the declaration of
what the law is and its construction so far as it is written law; the authority or power vested in the
judges or in the courts; the authority vested in some court, officer, or persons to hear and determine
when the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of
adjudication; the power belonging to or emanating from a judge as such; the power conferred upon a
public officer, involving the exercise of judgment and discretion in the determination of questions of
right in specific cases affecting the interest of persons or property, as distinguished from ministerial
power or authority to carry out the mandates of judicial power or of the law; the power exercised by
courts in hearing and determining cases before them, or some matter incidental thereto, and of which
they have jurisdiction; the power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment; the power which
adjudicates upon and protects the rights and interests of individual citizens, and to that end construes
and applies the law. "Judicial power" implies the construction of laws and the adjudication of legal
rights. It includes the power to hear and determine but not everyone who may hear and determine has
judicial power. The term "judicial power" does not necessarily include the power to hear and determine
a matter that is not in the nature of a suit or action betweenthe parties.' (34 C.J. 1183-1184)

(3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which belongs to
the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive department.
'x x x the distinction between legislative or ministerial functions and judicial functions is difficult to point
out. What is a judicial function does not depend solely upon the mental operation by which it is
performed or the importance of the act. In solving this question, due regard must be had to the organic
law of the state and the division of power of government. In the discharge of executive and legislative
duties, the exercise of discretion and judgment of the highest order is necessary, and matters of the
greatest weight and importance are dealt with. It is not enough to make a function judicial that it re-
quires discretion, deliberation, thought, and judgment. It must be the exercise of discretion and
judgment within that subdivision of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or, at least,
which does not belong to the legislative or executive department. If the matter, in respect to which it is
exercised, belongs to either of the two last-named departments of government, it is not judicial. As to
what is judicial and what is not seems to be better indicated by the nature of athing, than its definition.'
(Whealing & Elm Grove Railroad Co., Appt. v. Town of Triadelphia, et al., 4 L.R.A. (N.S.), pp. 321,
328- 329.) [Underscoring supplied][1]

"'WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult, if not impossible, precisely to define what
are judicial or quasi judicial acts, and there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in
connection with the law as to the right to a writ of certiorari. It is clear, however, that it is the nature of
the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it, that determines
whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that the
proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when
applied to courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act
judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their public character. x x x.'

"In State ex rel. Board of Commrs. vs. Dunn (86 Minn., 301, 304), the following statements were made:

'The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and, what are administrative or ministerial
functions is often difficult to determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance
of legislative or administrative duties, and the performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may,
in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of
judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to
a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to
determine those questions, he acts judicially.'"[2]

It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called committee on the rating of students for
honor whose actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in
the performance of its assigned task. From the above-quoted portions of the decisions cited, it will be
gleaned that before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is neces-
sary, that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which
adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn,
before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is and
thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. As pointed out
by appellees,[3] however, there is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when
teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors,
such function involves the determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically
vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. Worse still, this Court has not even been apprised by
appellant of the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public
Schools appellees allegedly violated in the composition of the committee they constituted thereunder,
and, in the performance of that committee's duties.

At any rate, the situation brought before Us in this case, tho seemingly one of first impression, is not
without substantial parallel. In the case of Felipe vs. Leuterio, etc., et al.,[4] the issue presented for de-
termination was whether or not the courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of
judges of an oratorical contest, and this Court declared that the judiciary has no power to reverse the
award of the board of judges of that contest and, for that matter, it would not interfere in literary
contests, beauty contests and similar competitions. It was reasoned out thus:

"For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been held periodically by schools and colleges in this
islands. Inter-collegiate oratorical competitions are of more recent origin. Members of this court have
taken part in them either as contestants in their school days (In the College of Law, U. P. annual
oratorical contest, first prize was awarded to Justice Montemayor in 1914 and to Justice Labrador in
1916), or as members of the board of judges afterwards. They know some (few) verdicts did not reflect
the audience's preference and that errors have sometimes been ascribed to the award of the
judges. Yet no party ever presumed to invoke judicial intervention; for it is unwritten law in such
contests that the board's decision is final and unappealable.

"Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments of the Word apply the highest tenets of
sportsmanship: finality of the referee's verdict. No alibis, no murmurs of protest. The participants are
supposed to join the competition to contribute to its success by striving their utmost: the prizes are se-
condary.

"No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because their's was merely the privilege to
compete for the prize, and that privilege did not ripen into a demandable right unless and until they
were proclaimed winners of the competition by the appointed arbiters or referees or judges.

"Incidentally, these school activities have been imported from the United States. We found in American
jurisprudence no litigation questioning the determination of the board of judges.

"Now, the fact that a particular action has had no precedent during a long period affords some reason
for doubting the existence of the right sought to be enforced, especially where occasion for its assertion
must have often arisen; and courts are cautious before allowing it, being loath to establish a new legal
principle not in harmony with the generally accepted views thereon. (See C.J.S. Vol. 1, p. 1012.)

"We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the respondent judge reasoned out that
where there is a wrong there is a remedy and that courts of first instance are courts of general juris-
diction.

"The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered some wrong at the hands of the
board of judges. If at all, there was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do
not mean the same thing. 'Wrong' as used in the aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or violation
of a right. As stated before, a contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or she is declared
winner by the board of referees or judges.

"Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of
'damnum absque injuria'. This is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a
different proposition. But then her action should be directed against the individual judge or judges who
fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges."

But even were We to assume for the moment, as the court below apparently did, that judicial
intervention might be sought in cases of this nature, still, We are inclined to sustain the order of
dismissal appealed from for failure on the part of appellant to comply with the requirements of Section
1 of Rule 65. To be sure, the lower court's holding that appellant's failure to accompany his petition
with a copy of the judgment or order subject thereof together with copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto "is fatal to his cause" is supported not only by the provision
of that Rule but by precedents as well. In the case of Alajar et al. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations,[5] where it was claimed by therein petitioners that the respondent court had acted with grave
abuse of discretion in estimating certain rice harvests involved in the case in terms of cavans instead of
cans, allegedly in complete disregard of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in
Expropriation Proceedings No. 84, and of this Court in G.R. No. L-6191,[6] and in ordering thereafter the
division of the said rice harvests on the ratio of 70-30 in favor of the tenants, this Court denied the
petition for certiorari on the ground, among others, of failure on the part of said petitioners to attach to
their petition copies of the decisions allegedly violated. Speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes then, this
Court held:

"The petition is patently without merit. In the first place, it is not even sufficient in form and substance
to justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari prayed for. It charges that the Court of Industrial
Relations abused its discretion in disregarding the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in
Expropriation Proceedings No. 84 and of this Court in G. R. No. L-6191; yet it does not attach to the
petition the decisions allegedly violated by the Court below and point out which particular portion or
portions thereof have been disregarded by the respondent Court."

The same principle was applied in the more recent case of NAWASA vs. Municipality of Libmanan, et
al.,[7] wherein this Court dismissed (by Resolution) the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority against the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, and
the municipality of Libmanan. In the following language, this Court emphasized the importance of
complying with the said requirement of Rule 65:

"While paragraph 3 of the petition speaks of the complaint filed by the respondent municipality with the
respondent court for recovery of property with damages (Civil Case No. L-161), no copy
thereof is attached to the petition.

"Similarly, paragraph 4 of the petition mentions the decision rendered by the respondent court on
December 10, 1965, but no copy thereof is attached to the petition.

"Again, paragraph 5 of the petition speaks of the order of default entered by the respondent court and
of the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the case above-mentioned, but no copy of the
order of default is attached to the petition.

"Bearing in mind that the petition under consideration was filed for the purpose of enjoining the
respondent court from executing the decision rendered in Civil Case No. L-161, the importance of the
missing pleadings is obvious.
"Moreover, the petition is also for the purpose of securing an order commanding the respondent court
to approve either the original or the amended record on appeal filed by petitioner, but no copy of
either is attached to its petition.

"In view of the foregoing, the petition under consideration is dismissed."

It might be true, as pointed out by appellant, that he received a copy of the programmer of the
graduation exercises held by the SeroElementary School in the morning of the very day of that
graduation exercises, implying that he could not have attached then a copy thereof (to show the
decision of the committee of teachers in the ranking of students complained of) to his petition. The
stubborn fact remains, however, that appellant had known of such decision of the said
committee of teachers much earlier, as shown by the circumstance that according to him, even before
the filing of his petition with the lower court on the 19th of May, 1965, he had personally appealed the
said committee's decision with various higher authorities of the above-named school, who merely
passed the buck to each other. Moreover, appellant mentions in his petition various other documents
or papers as the Service Manual for Teachers allegedly violated by appellees in the constitution of their
committee; altered grading sheets; and erasures in his Grade I certificate - which appellant never
bothered to attach to his petition. There could be no doubt then that he miserably failed to comply with
the requirement of Rule 65 above-mentioned. With this conclusion, it is no longer necessary to
pass upon the other two errors assigned by appellant.

FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and Villamor,
JJ., concur.
 131 Phil. 931
[ GR No. L-28790, Apr 29, 1968 ]

ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS v. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE +

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., Acting C.J.:

Petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary of Justice from
investigating the official actuations of the Commissioner of Land Registration, and to declare inoperative
his suspension by the Executive Secretary pending investigation.

The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and
qualified Commissioner of Land Registration, a position created by Republic Act No. 1151. By the terms
of section 2 of said Act, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation,
emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance." The appropriation laws
(Rep. Acts 4642, 4856 and 5170) in the item setting forth the salary of said officer, use the following
expression:

"1. One Land Registration Commissioner, with the rank and privileges of district judge -P19,000.00."

On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner a letter requiring him to
explain in writing not later than March 9, 1968 why no disciplinary action should be taken against
petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidation-
subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles." Noblejas
answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and
compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be suspended and investigated in
the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his
case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 61 of the
Judiciary Act (R.Á. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive Secretary,
"by authority of the President", whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie case exists against you for
gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was "hereby suspended,
upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above charges."

On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to
the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining
writs. In their answer respondents admit the facts but deny that petitioner, as Land Registration
Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be considered a Judge of First
Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of
investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive in nature; that the Legislature
may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to
the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of powers.

Thus, the stark issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be
investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by the Statutes heretofore
mentioned (Rep. Act 1151 and Appropriation Laws) of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of
First Instance.

First to militate against petitioner's stand is the fact that section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for
investigation, suspension or removal of Judges, specifically recites that "No District Judge shall be
separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in
the judgment of the Supreme Court . . ." and it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the
Commissioner of Land Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all.

In the second place, petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes
by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed
upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being possessed by a variety of
executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. These
favoured officers include (a) the Judicial Superintendent of the Department of Justice (Judiciary Act, sec.
42); (b) the Assistant Solicitors General, seven in number (Rep. Act No. 4360); (c) the City Fiscal of
Quezon City (R.A. No. 4495); (d) the City Fiscal of Manila (R.A. No. 4631) and (e) the Securities and
Exchange Commissioner (R.A. No. 5050, s. 2). To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean
placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of investigating and disciplining all these officials whose
functions are plainly executive, and the consequent curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative
grant, of the President's power to discipline and remove administrative officials who are presidential
appointees, and which the Constitution expressly place under the President's supervision and control
(Constitution, Art. VII), sec l0[l]):

Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another
appointee of the President could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon
the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these Justices are
only removable by the Legislature, . through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).

In our opinion, such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it granted
these executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance. This conclusion gains strength
when account is taken of the fact that in the case of the Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations and
those of the Court of Tax Appeals, the organic statutes of said bodies (Republic Act 1206, as amended by
Act 1409; Rep. Act No. 1125) expressly provide that they are to be removed from office for the same
causes and in the same mannerprovided by law for Judges of First Instance", or "members of the
judiciary of appellate rank." The same is true of Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations (Comm. Act
No. 103) and of the Commissioner of Public Service (Public Service Act, Sec. 3). It is thereby shown that
where the legislative design is to make the suspension or removal procedure prescribed for Judges of
First Instance applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal
language.

But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the Legislature had
really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the
Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or
removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be
unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging
this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and
simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.

Justice Cardozo ruled in In re Richardson et al., Connolly vs. Scudder (247 N.Y. 401, 160 N.E. 655), saying:

"There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative
functions except when-reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties."

The United States Supreme Court said in Federal Radio Commission vs. General Electric Co., et al., 281
U.S. 469, 74 Law, Ed., 972, -

"But this court cannot be invested with jurisdiction of that character, whether for purposes of review or
otherwise. It was brought into being by t-he judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with judicial
power only and can have no jurisdiction other than of cases and controversies falling within the classes
enumerated in that article. It cannot give decisions which are merely advisory nor can it exercise or
participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. Keller v.
Potomac Electric Power Co. supra (261 U.S. 444, 67 L. ed. 736, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445) and cases cited;
Postum Cereal Co. vs. California Fig. Nut Co. supra (272 U.S. 700 701, 71 L.ed. 481, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284);
Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 74, 71 L. ed. 541, 544, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; Willing v.
Chicago Auditorium Asso. 277 U.S. 274, 289, 72 L. ed. 880, 884, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; Ex parte Bakelite
Corp. 279 U.S. 438, 449, 73 L. ed. 789, 793, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 411. (Federal Radio Commission v. General
Electric Company, 281 U.S. 469, 74 L. ed. 972) (Italics supplied)

In this spirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and
can not be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining
to or connected with the administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring the Supreme Court to
arbitrate disputes between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay
Transportation Co. (57 Phil. 600).

Petitioner Noblejas seeks to differentiate his case from that of other executive officials by claiming that
under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151, he is endowed with judicial functions. The section invoked
runs as follows:

"Sec. 4. - Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. - When the Register of
Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance
of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where any party in
interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall
be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration either upon the certification of the Register of
Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the party in
interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the records
certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an
order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases shall be
conclusive and binding upon all Registers of deeds: Provided, further, That when a party in interest
disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law,
said decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the
notice thereof."

Serious doubt may well be entertained as to whether the resolution of a consulta by a Register of Deeds
is a judicial function, as contrasted with administrative process. It will be noted that by specific provision
of the section, the decision of the Land Registration Commissioner "shall be conclusive and binding upon
all Registers of Deeds" alone, and not upon other parties. This limitation[1] in effect identifies the
resolutions of the Land Registration Commissioner with those of any other bureau director, whose
resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone. That the Commissioner's resolutions are appealable
does not prove that they are not administrative: any bureau director's ruling is likewise appealable to
the corresponding department head.

But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the Register of Deeds should constitute a judicial
(or more properly quasi judicial) function, analysis of the powers and duties of the Land Registration
Commissioner under Republic Act No. 1151, sections 3 and 4, will show that the resolution
of consultas are but a minimal portion of his administrative or executive functions and merely incidental
to the latter.

Conformably to the well-known principle of statutory construction that statutes should be given,
whenever possible, a meaning that will not bring them in conflict with the Constitution,[2] We are
constrained to rule that the grant by Republic Act 1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration of the
"same privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance" did not include, and was not intended
to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed
only upon that Court's recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of privileges would be violative of
the Constitution and be null and void. Consequently, the investigation and suspension of the
aforenamed Commissioner pursuant to sections 32 and 34 of the Civil Service Law (R.A. 2260) are
neither abuses of discretion nor acts in excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, and the petition is ordered
dismissed. No costs.

Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Petition dismissed
 [ GR No. L-30001, Jun 23, 1970 ]

DIRECTOR OF PRISONS v. ANG CHO KIO +

DECISION

144 Phil. 439

ZALDIVAR, J.:

An appeal by certiorari, by the Solicitor General in behalf of the Director of Prisons and the Executive
Secretary, from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 39018-R of said Court, entitled
"Ang Cho Kio (Ang Ming Huy) Petitioner-Appellee versus The Director of Prisons and the Executive
Secretary, Respondents-Appellees."[1] In his petition the Solicitor General prays this Court "to render
judgment ordering the striking out from said decision of the portions recommending to the Executive
Secretary 'to allow the (petitioner) (respondent Ang Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy) to leave this country in
the first available transportation abroad but otherwise affirming the dismissal of the petition
for habeas corpus, with costs in all instances against respondent Ang Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy."

The pertinent facts for the purposes of this decision, as shown in the record, are as follows:

Respondent Ang Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy had been charged, tried and convicted of various offenses
committed in the Philippines and was sentenced to suffer penalties, to wit: a total of forty-five (45)
years, ten (10) months and twenty one (21) days of imprisonment, P6,000 indemnity, and P5,000 moral
damages, plus life imprisonment and P6,000 indemnity.[2] After serving six and one-half (6) years of his
sentence said respondent was granted conditional pardon on July 4, 1959 by the President of the
Philippines. The conditional pardon partly reads as follows:

"By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution, and upon the recommendation of
the Board of Pardons and Parole, the unexecuted portions of the prison terms of prisoner ANG CHO KI0
@ KIWA @ PHILIPP ANG @ ANG TIU CHIO @ KE WA @ LUCIO LEE @ GO ONG @ MR. ANG @ GO ANG @
MR. ONG is hereby remitted on condition that he will voluntarily leave the Philippines upon his release
and never to return to this country. Should the above-named prisoner refuse to accept said condition,
he shall continue serving his sentence and upon the expiration thereof, he shall be deported from the
Philippines for being an undesirable alien."

Ang Cho Kio duly accepted the conditions of his pardon and actually left the Philippines for Taipeh,
Nationalist China, on July 28, 1959.

In the evening of June 26, 1966 Ang Cho Kio arrived at the Manila International Airport on a Philippine
Air Lines plane from Taipeh, travelling under the name "Ang Ming Huy". He held a round-trip ticket
from Taipeh to Honolulu,to San Francisco, to Los Angeles, to Chicago, to Washington D.C. to New York,
to Vancouver, to Tokyo, to Seoul, to Osaka, to Taipeh to Bangkok, to Saigon, to Hongkong and back
to Taipeh. He was booked on Philippine Air Lines earliest connecting flight to Honolulu on June 29, 1966
at 6:30 p.m., or with a stop-over of about 72 hours in Manila. He surrendered his passport to the
immigration authorities at the Manila International Airport, and was issued a note that his departure
was scheduled for June 29, 1966 at 6:30 p.m. He left his luggage at the airport and was issued claim
tags. He registered for a three-day stay at the El Presidente Hotel at Parañaque, Rizal. He contacted his
two friends in Manila, Lim Pin and Go Bon Kim. These two friends invited him to stay longer in the
Philippines. On June 28, 1966 he and his two friends went to the Bureau of Immigration, where his
friend Lim Pin signed a letter addressed to the Commissioner of Immigration requesting for a fourteen-
day extension of stay in the Philippines for him. Ang Cho Kio was identified by inspector
Mariano Cristi of the Immigration Bureau as the Ang Cho Kio who was deported to Taipeh on July 28,
1959. His identity having been established, Ang Cho Kio was arrested, and the immigration authorities
conducted an investigation regarding his presence in the Philippines. The immigration authorities did
not allow him to proceed with his trip to Honolulu. On July 5, 1966 the Executive Secretary, by authority
of the President, ordered him recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence
that were imposed on him, for having violated the condition of his pardon. The supplemental order of
recommitment reads as follows:[3]

"TO THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL

"WHEREAS, ANG CHO KIO @ KIWA & PHILIPP ANG @ ANG TIU CHIO @ KI WA @ LUCIO DEE @ GO ONG
@ MR. ANG @ GO ANG @ MR. ONG was granted conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines
on July 4, 1959, upon the condition that he will voluntarily leave the Philippines upon his release and
never to return to this country; and

"WHEREAS, said ANG CHO KIO has violated the condition of his pardon in that on June 26, 1966, he
returned to this country from Taipei and gained entry under an assumed name, ANG MING HUY, failed
to leave on the first available connecting flight to Honolulu, his alleged destination; instead requested a
fourteen day extension of his 72-hour transient stop-over; and had in December 1965 applied for a
temporary visitor's visa to Manila also under his assumed name, ANG MING HUY;

"NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority conferred upon the President of the Philippines by Section
64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code, you are hereby ordered to recommit to prison said ANG CHO
KIO @ KIWA @ PHILIPP ANG @ ANG TIU CHIO @ KI WA @ LUCIO DEE @ GO ONG @ MR. ANG @ GO
ANG @ MR. ONG @ ANG MING HUY to serve the unexpired portion of the sentences for which he was
originally committed to prison, and upon expiration thereof, to deliver said person to the custody of the
Commissioner of Immigration for immediate deportation for being an undesirable alien.

"Manila, July 5, 1966.

By Authority of the President:

(Sgd.) RAFAEL M. SALAS

Executive Secretary

RS/ara"

Ang Cho Kio filed with the Executive Secretary a motion, dated August 29, 1966, for the reconsideration
of the supplemental order of recommitment. The Executive Secretary failed to act on the motion for
reconsideration, and so on October 5, 1966 Ang Cho Kio filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with
the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasay Branch), making as respondents in said petition the Director of
Prisons and the Executive Secretary. Under date of October 10, 1966, the officer-in-charge of the
Bureau of Prisons filed his return. Under date of October 17, 1966, the Solicitor General filed a return
for the Director of Prisons and the Executive Secretary.

After due hearing the Court of First Instance of Rizal, on January 31, 1967, rendered a decision dis-
missing the petition for habeas corpus. The Court of First Instance of Rizal held
that Ang Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy was validly recommitted to prison by the President of the Philippines
in the exercise of his prerogatives pursuant to the provisions of Section 64(i) of the Revised
Administrative Code.

Ang Cho Kio appealed to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. In
the decision of a special division of five justices, with three justices concurring, and two justices
concurring and dissenting, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision which in effect affirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing Ang Cho Kio's petition for habeas corpus.

We read the following in the majority opinion:

"It having been settled that Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code is still in force, and that the
respondent Executive Secretary, in the name and by authority of the President, exercised the power of
recommitment herein under the provisions of said Code, and not under Art. 159 of the Revised Penal
Code, it becomes apparent that any discussion regarding failure to file the corresponding indictment and
the presence or absence of criminal intent, will be off-tangent. On the contrary, the issue, in this
connection, is whether the courts of justice may interfere in the exercise by the President, thru his
Executive Secretary, of his administrative power of recommitment. Again, it is settled jurisprudence
that the Chief Executive may determine, alone and by himself, whether the condition attached to a
pardon given by him has been violated; and in the exercise of this prerogative, the courts may not
interfere, however erroneous the findings may be (Espuelas v. The Provincial Warden, supra; Tesoro v.
Director of Prisons, 68 Phil. 154)."

The aforequoted portion of the majority opinion affirms the reasons of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus. However, the majority opinion contains the
recommendation that Ang Cho Kio

".... be sent out at once from this country and that he be allowed to leave Muntinlupa Prisons under
guard only when he has been booked for outward flight at the Manila International Airport so as to
avoid the possibility of any further violation of his conditional pardon. At any rate it would be to the
best interest of the security and peace of this country to have the petitioner expatriated from the
Philippines, instead of being recommitted for a long duration of time to prison where his presence may
constitute a constant menace to our country's welfare and bring about some sinister influence among
the people with whom he will associate or come in contact."

Then the dispositive portion of the majority opinion reads as follows:

"FOR ALL OF THE FOREGOING REASONS, the petition herein filed is hereby dismissed, with costs against
the petitioner, and with a reiteration of the recommendation to allow the petitioner to leave this
country in the first available transportation abroad made in the course of this decision. Let a copy of
this decision be furnished the Executive Secretary."

The concurring and dissenting opinion of the two justices opens with the following statement:

"We concur with the majority opinion insofar as the dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus of
petitioner-appellant AngCho Kio is concerned, for such dismissal, in effect, is equivalent to
an affirmance of the appealed decision. However, we beg to dissent from that portion of the majority
opinion recommending that said petitioner-appellant be allowed to leave this country by the first avail-
able transportation."

In due time the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration, praying
for the deletion from the majority opinion of the recommendation to allow Ang Cho Kio to leave the
country on the first available transportation abroad. The Court of Appeals, by a vote of three to two in
the special division which decided the case, denied the motion. Hence this appeal by certiorari by the
Solicitor General to this Court.

It is now contended by the Solicitor General that the majority of the special division of five justices of
the Court of Appeals erred in making a recommendation to allow respondent Ang Cho Kio to leave this
country on the first available transportation abroad. The Solicitor General maintains that the
recommendation is not a part of the decision binding upon the parties, and is uncalled for; that it gives
the decision a political complexion, because courts are not empowered to make such a
recommendation, nor is it inherent or incidental in the exercise of judicial powers; that there is no law
which gives the court the authority to recommend to the President the voluntary departure of an
undesirable alien who is lawfully committed to jail; that the deportation of aliens sentenced by the
courts for violation of the laws of the land, and even the act of merely allowing such convicted aliens to
voluntarily leave the country, is an act of state exercised solely in the discretion of the Chief Executive. It
is urged by the Solicitor General that the act of sending an undesirable alien out of the country is
political in character, and the courts should not interfere with, nor attempt to influence, the political
acts of the Chief Executive.

In a motion dated April 7, 1969, Ang Cho Kio manifested that he waived his right to file an answer to any
brief filed by the Solicitor General.[4]

We agree with the Solicitor General. The case before the Court of Appeals was for habeas corpus. The
only question to be resolved by the Court of Appeals was whether, or not, the Court of First Instate
of Rizal, had rightly dismissed the petition of Ang Cho Kio for habeascorpus. The Court of Appeals was
not called upon to review any sentence imposed upon Ang Cho Kio. The sentence against him had long
become final, and, in fact, he had served part of the sentence when he was extended pardon on July 4,
1959, upon the condition that he should leave the country, never to return. The opinion of the three
justices of the special division of the Court of Appeals, to which the two other justices have concurred,
found that the recommitment to prison of Ang Cho Kio was done in the exercise by the President of the
Philippines of his power pursuant to the provision of Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code,
and the courts should not interfere with the exercise of that power. The majority opinion should have
been limited to the affirmance of the decision of the lower court, and no more.
The recommendatory power of the courts in this jurisdiction are limited to those expressly provided in
the law - and such law is the provision of Section 5 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:

"Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not
punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through
the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made
the subject of penal legislation.

"In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty,
taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense."

Certainly, the recommendation in the majority opinion of the special division of the Court of Appeals,
now in question, is not authorized under the aforequoted provision of Article 5 of the Revised Penal
Code. The Court of Appeals was not called upon to review any sentence that was imposed
on Ang Cho Kio. It was simply called upon to determine whether Ang Cho Kio was illegally confined, or
not, in the insular penitentiary under the Director of Prisons. We do not consider it proper that the
majority of the justices in the special division make a recommendation that would suggest a
modification or a correction of the act of the Chief Executive, after the same justices have said in their
opinion "that the Chief Executive may determine, alone and by himself, whether the condition attached
to a pardon given by him had been violated; and in the exercise of this prerogative, the courts may not
interfere, however erroneous the findings may be." When the Chief Executive, exercising his powers
pursuant to Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code, ordered Ang Cho Kiorecommitted to
prison, it is assumed that the Chief Executive had decided that Ang Cho Kio should be dealt with that
way under the circumstances. For the court to suggest to the Chief Executive to modify his decision to
recommit Ang Cho Kio to prison by allowing him to leave the country instead is indeed to interfere with
the functions of the Chief Executive. It would be, as urged by the Solicitor General, an interference on,
or an attempt to influence, the exercise by the Chief Executive of the political powers of his office. The
matter of whether an alien who violated the laws in this country may remain or be deported is a political
question that should be left entirely to the Chief Executive to decide. Under the principle of separation
of powers, it is not within the province of the judiciary to express an opinion, or express a suggestion,
that would reflect on the wisdom or propriety of the action of the Chief Executive on matters purely
political in nature.

It may be said that the recommendation embodied in the majority opinion of the special division of the
Court of Appeals simply represents the private opinion of the three justices, and judges should be left
free to express even their private opinions in judicial decisions. We believe, however, that the better
practice should be that the decision of a court should contain only opinion that is relevant to the
question that is before the court for decision. After all, courts are not concerned with the wisdom or
morality of laws, but only in the interpretation and application of the law. We believe that judges
should refrain from expressing irrelevant opinions in their decisions which may only reflect unfavorably
upon their competence and the propriety of their judicial actuations.

However, of the ten members of the Court, as presently constituted, only five are of the opinion that the
recommendation embodied in the decision of the majority of the special division of the Court of
Appeals, now in question, should be deleted from the decision.[5] Two members of the Court are of a
different opinion[6], and three others did not take part in the decision because of their official actuations
relative to the case of respondent Ang Cho Kio before it reached this Court.[7] There is, therefore, one
vote less than the majority of the Court that is necessary to grant the certiorari prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of certiorari is denied, and the decision of the special division of the
Court of Appeals stands. No costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998]

LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, THE
EXECUTIVE JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 104, respondents.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

On June 25, 1996, this Court affirmed[1] the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for
the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon
him of the death penalty for the said crime.
Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising mainly factual issues, and on its
heels, a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the issue of the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659[2] (the death penalty law) and the imposition of the death
penalty for the crime of rape.
On February 7, 1998, this Court denied[3] petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with a finding that Congress duly complied with the
requirements for the reimposition of the death penalty and therefore the death penalty law is not
unconstitutional.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty
from electrocution to lethal injection,[4] and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT
DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7659.[5] Pursuant to the provisions of said law, the Secretary of Justice promulgated the Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 ("implementing rules")[6] and directed the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.[7]
On March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition[8] for Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order to enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of the Bureau of Prisons
from carrying out the execution by lethal injection of petitioner under R.A. No. 8177 and its
implementing rules as these are unconstitutional and void for being: (a) cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment per se as well as by reason of its being (b) arbitrary, unreasonable and a
violation of due process, (c) a violation of the Philippines' obligations under international
covenants, (d) an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, (e) an unlawful exercise by
respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and (f) an unlawful delegation of delegated powers
by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion for Leave of Court[9] to Amend
and Supplement Petition with the Amended and Supplemental Petition[10] attached thereto,
invoking the additional ground of violation of equal protection, and impleading the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 104, in order to enjoin said public respondents from acting under the questioned
rules by setting a date for petitioner's execution.
On March 3, 1998, the Court resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require
the respondents to COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from
notice, and directed the parties "to MAINTAIN the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing
of this petition."
On March 10, 1998, the Court granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Amend and
Supplement Petition, and required respondents to COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from
notice.
On March 16, 1998, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion (1) To clarify Status Quo Order,
and (2) For the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order expressly enjoining public respondents
from taking any action to carry out petitioner's execution until the petition is resolved.
On March 16, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General[11] filed a Comment (On the Petition
and the Amended Supplemental Petition)[12] stating that (1) this Court has already upheld the
constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is
not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; (2) execution by lethal injection, as authorized
under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most
modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas
chamber); (3) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or
impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; (4) R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated
legislative power to respondent Director; and that (5) R.A. No. 8177 confers the power to
promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health and the Bureau
of Corrections.
On March 17, 1998, the Court required the petitioner to file a REPLY thereto within a non-
extendible period of ten days from notice.
On March 25, 1998, the Commission on Human Rights[13] filed a Motion for Leave of Court
to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae[14] with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or
Appear as Amicus Curiae[15] alleging that the death penalty imposed under R.A. No. 7659 which
is to be implemented by R.A. No. 8177 is cruel, degrading and outside the limits of civil society
standards, and further invoking (a) Article II, Section 11 of the Constitution which provides: "The
State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights."; (b)
Article III of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that "Everyone has the right
to life, liberty and security of person," and Article V thereof, which states that "No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."; (c)
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in particular, Article 6 thereof, and
the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming
At The Abolition of the Death Penalty; (d) Amnesty International statistics showing that as of
October 1996, 58 countries have abolished the death penalty for all crimes, 15 countries have
abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes, and 26 countries are abolitionists de facto, which
means that they have retained the death penalty for ordinary crimes but are considered abolitionists
in practice that they have not executed anyone during the past ten (10) years or more, or in that
they have made an international commitment not to carry out executions, for a total of 99 countries
which are total abolitionists in law or practice, and 95 countries as retentionists;[16] and (e) Pope
John Paul II's encyclical, "Evangelium Vitae." In a Resolution dated April 3, 1998, the Court duly
noted the motion.
On March 27, 1998, petitioner filed a Reply[17] stating that (1) this Court is not barred from
exercising judicial review over the death penalty per se, the death penalty for rape and lethal
injection as a mode of carrying out the death penalty; (2) capital punishment is a cruel, degrading
and inhuman punishment; (3) lethal injection is cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment, and
that being the "most modern" does not make it less cruel or more humane, and that the Solicitor
General's "aesthetic" criteria is short-sighted, and that the lethal injection is not risk free nor is it
easier to implement; and (4) the death penalty violates the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights considering that the Philippines participated in the deliberations of and voted for
the Second Optional Protocol.
After deliberating on the pleadings, the Court gave due course to the petition, which it now
resolves on the merits.
In the Amended and Supplemental Petition, petitioner assails the constitutionality of the mode
of carrying out his death sentence by lethal injection on the following grounds:[18]
I.

DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR

BEING A CRUEL, DEGRADING AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT.
II.

THE DEATH PENALTY VIOLATES THE INTERNATIONAL

COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, WHICH IS PART
OF THE LAW OF THE LAND.
III.

LETHAL INJECTION, AS AUTHORIZED UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO.

8177 AND THE QUESTIONED RULES, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BECAUSE IT IS AN UNNECESSARY AND WANTON INFLICTION OF
PAIN ON A PERSON AND IS, THUS, A CRUEL, DEGRADING, AND
INHUMAN PUNISHMENT.
IV.
 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 UNDULY DELEGATES LEGISLATIVE
POWER TO RESPONDENT DIRECTOR.
V.

RESPONDENT SECRETARY UNLAWFULLY DELEGATED THE

LEGISLATIVE POWERS DELEGATED TO HIM UNDER REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 8177 TO RESPONDENT DIRECTOR.
VI.

RESPONDENT SECRETARY EXCEEDED THE AUTHORITY

DELEGATED TO HIM UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 AND
UNLAWFULLY USURPED THE POWER TO LEGISLATE IN
PROMULGATING THE QUESTIONED RULES.
VII.

SECTION 17 OF THE QUESTIONED RULES IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

FOR BEING DISCRIMINATORY AS WELL AS FOR BEING AN
INVALID EXERCISE BY RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF THE POWER
TO LEGISLATE.
VIII.

INJUCTION MUST ISSUE TO PREVENT IRREPARABLE DAMAGE

AND INJURY TO PETITIONER'S RIGHTS BY REASON OF THE
EXISTENCE, OPERATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE AND EQUALLY INVALID AND
IMPLEMENTING RULES.

Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass
constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue
delegation of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.
The Court shall now proceed to discuss these issues in seriatim.
I. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT UNDER
SECTION 19, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
The main challenge to R.A. 8177 and its implementing rules is anchored on Article III, Section
19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution which proscribes the imposition of "cruel, degrading or inhuman"
punishment. "The prohibition in the Philippine Bill against cruel and unusual punishments is an
Anglo-Saxon safeguard against governmental oppression of the subject, which made its first
appearance in the reign of William and Mary of England in 'An Act declaring the rights and
liberties of the subject, and settling the succession of the crown,' passed in the year 1689. It has
been incorporated into the Constitution of the United States (of America) and into most
constitutions of the various States in substantially the same language as that used in the original
statute. The exact language of the Constitution of the United States is used in the Philippine
Bill."[19] "The counterpart of Section 19 (1) in the 1935 Constitution reads: 'Excessive fines shall
not be imposed, nor cruel and inhuman punishment inflicted.' xxx In the 1973 Constitution the
phrase became 'cruel or unusual punishment.' The Bill of Rights Committee of the 1986
Constitutional Commission read the 1973 modification as prohibiting 'unusual' punishment even
if not 'cruel.' It was thus seen as an obstacle to experimentation in penology.Consequently, the
Committee reported out the present text which prohibits 'cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment'
as more consonant with the meaning desired and with jurisprudence on the subject."[20]
Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying
out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering
said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the
date of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which
uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of
"botched executions" or mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently
cruel.
Before the Court proceeds any further, a brief explanation of the process of administering
lethal injection is in order.
In lethal injection, the condemned inmate is strapped on a hospital gurney and wheeled into
the execution room. A trained technician inserts a needle into a vein in the inmate's arm and begins
an intravenous flow of saline solution. At the warden's signal, a lethal combination of drugs is
injected into the intravenous line. The deadly concoction typically includes three drugs: (1) a
nonlethal dose of sodium thiopenthotal, a sleep inducing barbiturate; (2) lethal doses of
pancuronium bromide, a drug that paralyzes the muscles; and (3) potassium chloride, which stops
the heart within seconds. The first two drugs are commonly used during surgery to put the patient
to sleep and relax muscles; the third is used in heart bypass surgery.[21]
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment.[22] In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director of Prisons,[23] this Court held
that "[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment
of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution.It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Would
the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection render
said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons hereafter discussed,
the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence
and expertise of administrative officials.[24]
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16[25] of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix
the time and date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death
convict. As petitioner already knows, the "court" which designates the date of execution is the trial
court which convicted the accused, that is, after this Court has reviewed the entire records of the
case[26] and has affirmed the judgment of the lower court. Thereupon, the procedure is that the
"judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records
are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the judgment for
execution.[27] Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of
notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in
conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death
sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from
the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice
to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death
convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death
penalty became final and executory[28] wherein he can seek executive clemency[29] and attend to all
his temporal and spiritual affairs.[30]
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible
complications in the intravenous injection, considering and as petitioner claims, that respondent
Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal
injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.Such
supposition is highly speculative and unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the
expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are
unsafe or ineffective.[31] Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States wherein execution
by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict,[32] without
any other evidence whatsoever.
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires
that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance
of such task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the
death penalty (by lethal injection) will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.[33]
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the
execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to
give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said
that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this
reason, is to go unpunished."[34] The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted
man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any
method employed to extinguish life humanely.[35] Numerous federal and state courts of the United
States have been asked to review whether lethal injections constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. No court has found lethal injections to implicate prisoner's Eighth Amendment
rights. In fact, most courts that have addressed the issue state in one or two sentences that lethal
injection clearly is a constitutional form of execution.[36] A few jurisdictions, however, have
addressed the merits of the Eighth Amendment claims. Without exception, these courts have found
that lethal injection does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.After reviewing the medical
evidence that indicates that improper doses or improper administration of the drugs causes severe
pain and that prison officials tend to have little training in the administration of the drugs, the
courts have found that the few minutes of pain does not rise to a constitutional violation.[37]
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."[38] Indeed, "[o]ther (U.S.) courts
have focused on 'standards of decency' finding that the widespread use of lethal injections indicates
that it comports with contemporary norms."[39] the primary indicator of society's standard of
decency with regard to capital punishment is the response of the country's legislatures to the
sanction.[40] Hence, for as long as the death penalty remains in our statute books and meets the most
stringent requirements provided by the Constitution, we must confine our inquiry to the legality of
R.A. No. 8177, whose constitutionality we duly sustain in the face of petitioner's challenge. We
find that the legislature's substitution of the mode of carrying out the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection infringes no constitutional rights of petitioner herein.
II. REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL
TREATY OBLIGATIONS
Petitioner assiduously argues that the reimposition of the death penalty law violates our
international obligations, in particular, the International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights,
which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 16, 1996, signed
and ratified by the Philippines on December 19, 1966 and October 23, 1986,[41]respectively.
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:

"1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by
law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.

2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the
time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present
Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered
by a competent court." (emphasis supplied)

3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that

nothing in this article shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to
derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of
the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be
granted in all-cases.

5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below
eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.

6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of

capital punishment by any State. Party to the present Covenant."

Indisputably, Article 6 of the Covenant enshrines the individual's right to life. Nevertheless,
Article 6 (2) of the Covenant explicitly recognizes that capital punishment is an allowable
limitation on the right to life, subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious
crimes". Pursuant to Article 28 of the Covenant, a Human Rights Committee was established and
under Article 40 of the Covenant, State parties to the Covenant are required to submit an initial
report to the Committee on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights
recognized within the Covenant and on the progress made on the enjoyment of those rights one
year of its entry into force for the State Party concerned and thereafter, after five years.On July 27,
1982, the Human Rights Committee issued General Comment No. 6 interpreting Article 6 of
the Covenant stating that "(while) it follows from Article 6 (2) to (6) that State parties are not
obliged to abolish the death penalty totally, they are obliged to limit its use and, in particular, to
abolish it for other than the 'most serious crimes.' Accordingly, they ought to consider reviewing
their criminal laws in this light and, in any event, are obliged to restrict the application of the death
penalty to the most serious crimes.' The article strongly suggests (pars. 2 (2) and (6) that abolition
is desirable. xxx The Committee is of the opinion that the expression 'most serious crimes' must
be read restrictively to mean that the death penalty should be a quite exceptional measure." Further,
the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of Those Facing the Death Penalty[42] adopted by the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations declare that the ambit of the term 'most serious
crimes' should not go beyond intentional crimes, with lethal or other extremely grave
consequences.
The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 16, 1966, and signed and
ratified by the Philippines on December 19, 1966 and August 22,
1989,[43] respectively. The Optional Protocol provides that the Human Rights Committee shall
receive and consider communications from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of any
of the rights set forth in the Covenant.
On the other hand, the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General
Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said
document.[44] Evidently, petitioner's assertion of our obligation under the Second Optional
Protocol is misplaced.
III. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS,
BUT SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177
IS INVALID.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains
not through express provision but by actual division in the framing of our Constitution.Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere.[45] Corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the
principle of non-delegation of powers. "The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be
delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest."[46] The
recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
 (3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.[47]
Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections, to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal
injection is a form of delegation of legislative authority to administrative bodies.
The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity
of the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot
be expected to attend to by itself. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. On
many problems involving day-to-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the needed
competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These
solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the
particular fields assigned to them.[48]
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself - it must
set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate[49]- and (b)
fix a standard - the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable - to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.[50]
Considering the scope and the definiteness of R.A. No. 8177, which changed the mode of
carrying out the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be
done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.[51]
R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its
limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. it indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out.[52] R.A. No. 8177
specifically requires that "[t]he death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director
of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the
person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior
to the execution."[53] Further, "[t]he Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps
to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous
death of the convict."[54] The legislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in the
administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such
task."[55] The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater
detail.[56] The question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a criminal offense,[57] but the
mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is
sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the administrative officials concerned is, to
use the words of Justice Benjamin Cardozo, canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.
Thus, the Court finds that the existence of an area for exercise of discretion by the Secretary
of Justice and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections under delegated legislative power is proper
where standards are formulated for the guidance and the exercise of limited discretion, which
though general, are capable of reasonable application.[58]
 It is also noteworthy that Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code which originally provided for
the death penalty by electrocution was not subjected to attack on the ground that it failed to provide
for details such as the kind of chair to be used, the amount of voltage, volume of amperage or place
of attachment of electrodes on the death convict. Hence, petitioner's analogous argument with
respect to lethal injection must fail.
A careful reading of R.A. No. 8177 would show that there is no undue delegation of legislative
power from the Secretary of Justice to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for the simple
reason that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere constituent
unit of the Department of Justice.[59] Further, the Department of Justice is tasked, among others, to
take charge of the "administration of the correctional system."[60] Hence, the import of the
phraseology of the law is that the Secretary of Justice should supervise the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections in promulgating the Lethal Injection Manual, in consultation with the Department
of Health.[61]
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws
that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of the
implementing rules which provides:

"SEC. 19. EXECUTION PROCEDURE. - Details of the procedure prior to,

during and after administering the lethal injection shall be set forth in a manual to
be prepared by the Director. The manual shall contain details of, among others,
the sequence of events before and after execution; procedures in setting up the
intravenous line; the administration of the lethal drugs; the pronouncement of
death; and the removal of the intravenous system.

Said manual shall be confidential and its distribution shall be limited to

authorized prison personnel."

Thus, the Courts finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a veritable
vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on
the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode
of review and approval thereof. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the
Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the
administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No.
8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.
As to the second paragraph of section 19, the Court finds the requirement of confidentiality
of the contents of the manual even with respect to the convict unduly suppressive. It sees no legal
impediment for the convict, should he so desire, to obtain a copy of the manual. The contents of
the manual are matters of public concern "which the public may want to know, either because
these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen."[62] Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

"SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern

shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
 pertaining to official acts, transaction, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as a basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitation as may be provided by law."

The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern

is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy. [63] In
the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their
time,[64] access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-
making[65] by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.[66]
D. SECTION 17 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS
INVALID FOR BEING DISCRIMINATORY AND CONTRARY TO LAW.
Even more seriously flawed than Section 19 is Section of the implementing rules which
provides:

"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH

SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman
within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is
pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case,
the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."

Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for
being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that
Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express
amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
Article 83 f the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659 now reads
as follows:

"ART. 83, Suspension of the execution of the death sentence.- The death
sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one
(1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age. In this last
case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua
with the accessory penalty provided in Article 40. x x x".

On this point, the Courts finds petitioner's contention impressed with merit. While Article 83
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the
implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after
delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following delivery as
an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence
no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year
reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-
based discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is an impermissible contravention of
the applicable law.
 Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead
remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative
rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law."[67] An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.[68] In case of discrepancy between a
provision of statute and a rule or regulation issued to implement said statute, the statutory provision
prevails. Since the cited clause in Section 17 which suspends the execution of a woman within the
three (3) years next following the date of sentence finds no supports in Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended, perforce Section 17 must be declared invalid.
One member of the Court voted to declare Republic Act. No. 8177 as unconstitutional insofar
as it delegates the power to make rules over the same subject matter to two persons (the Secretary
of Justice and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections) and constitutes a violation of the
international norm towards the abolition of the death penalty. One member of the Court, consistent
with his view in People v. Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682, 734-758 (1997) that the death penalty law
(Republic Act. No. 7659) is itself unconstitutional, believes that Republic Act No. 8177 which
provides for the means of carrying out the death sentence, is likewise unconstitutional. Two other
members of the court concurred in the aforesaid Separate Opinions in that the death penalty law
(Republic Act No. 7659) together with the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) are
unconstitutional. In sum, four members of the Court voted to declare Republic Act. No. 8177 as
unconstitutional. These Separate Opinions are hereto annexed, infra.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the assailed
statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and
19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are
hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 25 of the Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to provide
for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and
unjustifiably makes the manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties including the
accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing
Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in
accordance with this Decision.
NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[ GR No. L-39380, Apr 14, 1978 ]

LUALHATI L. LINA v. AMANTE P. PURISIMA +

DECISION

172 Phil. 328

BARREDO, J.:

Petition for certiorari and mandamus to annul the two successive orders of dismissal, for supposed lack
of jurisdiction, of petitioner's complaint in Special Civil Action No. 94986 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila issued by respondent judge and to command said respondent to try and decide the said case on
the merits.

The first order of dismissal in question dated August 14, 1974 is as follows:

"Petition in this case is for the writ of mandamus to compel respondents 'to restore petitioner to the
position she was excluded from' in the Philippine Veterans Bank.

"While the petition avers that respondent Esteban Cabanos, as President of the Bank, 'in grave abuse of
discretion and authority forcibly excluded petitioner from the position without valid cause, nor basis in
law, it also states that the removal of petitioner was 'upon recommendation of Branch Manager, Julio
Tamondong,' x x x 'which recommendation and action of respondent Esteban Cabanos was later
approved by the Board of Directors of the said Bank.'

"The petition likewise avers that petitioner has appealed to the Office of the President, but the latter
denied the same.

"The allegation in the petition that respondent Cabanos committed 'grave abuse of discretion and
authority' in dismissing petitioner from her office is a legal conclusion, not a statement of the ultimate
facts giving rise to the cause of action being asserted. Why petitioner's removal from office by Cabanos
was in grave abuse of discretion is not averred.

"Neither is it shown in the petition why petitioner is entitled to the office from which she was removed -
to reinstatement, in other words.
"It is equally noticeable that while annexed to the petition is the letter of Assistant Executive Secretary
Ronaldo B. Zamora to Atty. Pantaleon Z. Salcedo informing him of the denial of petitioner's request for
reconsideration as contained in the therewith enclosed copy of the 2nd indorsement of said office, the
petition before the Court does not include said enclosure as an annex, nor copied therein, which should
show why the said request for reconsideration was denied, one of the ultimate facts which must
necessarily be looked into should the petition be given due course. For that matter, neither is the letter
or notice of petitioner's removal from office included in the petition.

"Considering all the foregoing observations, the Court does not find the petition to be sufficient in form
and substance to justify the process of requiring respondents to answer the petition pursuant to Section
6 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

"Wherefore, the petition is hereby dismissed."

In an attempt to cure the supposed defects pointed out in the foregoing order, petitioner filed an
amended petition, which, however, met the same fate as the original one. The second order of dismissal
dated September 3, 1974 runs thus:

"Before the Court is petitioner's motion to admit amended petition, with the amended petition already
attached, filed obviously for the purpose of correcting defects in the original petition which was earlier
dismissed by the Court upon the ground that it found the same not to be sufficient in form and
substance.

"Documents not annexed to the original petition which were pointed out in the order dismissing the
original petition are now annexed to the amended petition. And the nature of their contents explain
why they were conveniently suppressed in the original petition.

"It now appears from the annexes of the amended petition that petitioner was dismissed by respondent
president of the Philippine Veterans Bank pursuant to Letters of Instruction No. 14 and No. 19-A, for
being notoriously undesirable. (Annex 'H'). This being the case, petitioner had a right to appeal from her
dismissal, and the venue of the appeal is the Office of the President, She did appeal. (Annex 'G'). But the
appeal was denied. (Annex 'H' - letter from the Office of the President).

"The aforesaid letter from the Office of the President in effect affirmed the position taken by
respondent Cabanos in dismissing petitioner pursuant to Letter of Instruction No. 14-A.
"Since the removal of petitioner is pursuant to a Letter of Instruction issued by the President pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1081, the validity or legality of said act is beyond the power of the courts to review,
much less modify or reverse, whether by means of the writ of certiorari and/or mandamus, or any other
court process. This is one of the express limitations upon the power of Courts imposed by General Order
No. 3 issued by the President on September 22, 1972. Said general order provides:

xxx xxx xxx

'I do hereby further order that the Judiciary shall continue to function in accordance with its present
organization and personnel, and shall try and decide in accordance with existing laws all criminal and
civil cases, except the following cases:

1. Those involving the validity, legality, or constitutionality of any decree, order or act issued,
promulgated or performed by me or by my duly designated representative pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1081, dated Sept. 21, 1972.

2.

3. Those involving the validity, legality or constitutionality of any rules, orders or acts issued,
promulgated or performed by public servants pursuant to decrees, orders, rules and regulations
issued and promulgated by me or by my duly designated representative pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1081, dated Sept. 21, 1972.'

"Foregoing considered, the amended petition is hereby dismissed upon the grounds already stated in
the order dated August 14, 1974, and upon the more important ground that the relief prayed for therein
is for the present beyond the power of the Court to extend."

Considering that petitioner filed an amended complaint purporting to comply with the tenor of the first
order of dismissal in question, it is unnecessary for Us to make any ruling as to the propriety of His
Honor's action of dismissing the original complaint.

Anent the second order, it is at once obvious that petitioner's right to redress against the same is
beyond dispute. Respondent court's invocation of General Order No. 3 of September 21, 1972 is nothing
short of an unwarranted abdication of judicial authority, which no judge duly imbued with the
implications of the paramount principle of independence of the judiciary should ever think of doing. It is
unfortunate indeed that respondent judge is apparently unaware that it is a matter of highly significant
historical fact that this Court has always deemed General Order No. 3 including its amendment by
General Orders No. 3-a,[1] as practically inoperative even in the light of Proclamation 1081 of September
21, 1972 and Proclamation 1104 of January 17, 1973 placing the whole Philippines under martial law.
While the members of the Court are not agreed on whether or not particular instances of attack against
the validity of certain Presidential Decrees raise political questions which the judiciary would not
interfere with, there is unanimity among Us in the view that it is for the Court rather than the Executive
to determine whether or not We may take cognizance of any given case involving the validity of acts of
the Executive Department purportedly under the authority of the martial law proclamations.

In this regard, to the credit of President Marcos, it has been noted by the Court that the President has
publicly acknowledged as one of the distinctive cardinal features of the prevailing martial law regime
that the constitutional authority, prerogatives and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as they have ever
existed in normal times, remain integrally unimpaired despite the proclamation of martial law. In plainer
terms, it has been repeatedly announced by the President, even to international or foreign audiences,
that our martial law government is subject, as by constitutional mandate it should always be, to the
authority and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. And undoubtedly, in appropriate cases, such
pronouncements can apply to the judiciary as a whole. Accordingly, We do not hesitate to reject the
reasoning advanced by respondent court as a constitutionally-uncalled-for submissiveness to the
Executive, certainly unworthy of the judicial office. We hold that the legal premise of the impugned
order is absolutely erroneous from the point of view of sacred constitutional principles. Such an order
does not deserve to be given sanction by this Court as being in keeping with the role of the courts in this
momentous era of our national existence as a democratic republic committed to hold inviolate the
independence of the judiciary at all times, so long as the constitution continues to be in force.

Now, strictly speaking and observing the usual procedural rules, what has just been said should suffice
to dispose of this case. In other words, in the light of Our view that respondent court committed a grave
error in declaring itself jurisdictionally impotent in the premises, ordinarily, what remains for Us to do is
only to direct that petitioner's case be tried and decided by respondent judge on the merits. But this is
the Supreme Court whose power and duty to do substantial justice in every case before it are inherent,
plenary and imperative, hence extensive to all instances where it appears that final resolution of the
controversy before it is feasible without denying any of the parties involved full opportunity to be heard.
Stated differently, if in any case elevated to this Court for the correction of any supposed procedural
error of any lower court, it should be found that indeed there has been a mistake, and it further appears
that all the facts needed for a complete determination of the whole controversy are already before the
Court undisputed or uncontroverted by the parties, the Supreme Court may at its option, whenever it
feels the best interests of justice would be thereby subserved, dispense with the usual procedure of
remanding the case to the court of origin for its own judgment, and instead, the Supreme Court may
already resolve the pertinent determinative issues and render the final judgment on the merits. The
obvious reason for such an extension in the exercise of the Court's pervasive power is that any other
procedure would amount to an unnecessary rigmarole which can only augment the expenses, efforts
and anxieties of the parties and uselessly delay the administration of justice, no other result for all
concerned being anyway perceptible.

Such is the situation in the case at bar. Although no trial was held in the court below, the pleadings
before Us portray all the vital issues between the parties. The facts alleged by both of them are mutually
uncontroverted and, on the other hand, the legal issues are properly joined. Respondents have from all
appearances unquestioningly submitted all matters in controversy for resolution of this Court. In fact, in
their "Manifestation and Comment" dated November 12, 1975 respondents state their position in this
respect unequivocally thus:
"That they join with the petitioner in her Motion With Leave for Early Resolution dated September 20,
1976, consistent with herein respondents submittal that the instant case be resolved by this Honorable
Tribunal 'without further remanding the case to the court of origin' as manifested in their Reply dated
July 14, 1975."

Accordingly, We shall now proceed to determine petitioner's prayer for mandamus on its merits.

In this connection, it may be stated that on May 22, 1975, subsequent to the hearing of this case,
respondents filed a manifestation to the effect that on May 12, 1975, the following Administrative Order
No. 6, Series of 1975, had been issued:

"ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 6

SERIES OF 1975

SUBJECT: Reinstatement to the Service

of LUALHATI L. LINA

In line with the policy of management to promote industrial peace, Administrative Order No. 75 dated
October 16, 1972, is set aside, and Miss LUALHATI L. LINA is hereby reinstated to her former position as
Bookkeeper in the Bank, effective upon assumption to duty, with entitlement to the pay and allowances
appurtenant thereto.

This order of reinstatement is without prejudice to the outcome of the proceedings pending before the
Supreme Court.

(SGD.) ESTEBAN B. CABANOS"

That manifestation reads in full as follows:

"COME NOW the respondents PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK and ESTEBAN B. CABANOS in his capacity as
President of the Bank, thru the undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court most respectfully
manifest: -

"1. That the principal issue in this case is the questioned ruling and/or order of the lower court presided
by the respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima to the effect that the relief prayed for by the petitioner
for mandamus and damages is beyond the power of the court to extend;
"2. That respondents, without necessarily admitting the correctness of the position taken by the
petitioner, have issued Administrative Order No. 6 dated May 12, 1975, reinstating petitioner to her
former position as bookkeeper, effective upon assumption of office, without prejudice to the result of
the proceedings pending before the Honorable Supreme Court, a certified xerox copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex 'A';

"3. That respondents in addition to reinstatement, will pay all back salaries and other emoluments due
her from October 17, 1972;

"4. That the respondents in addition to reinstatement and payment of back wages and other
emoluments are willing to reimburse the petitioner the actual expenses incurred by her in connection
with this case;

"5. That the reinstatement of the petitioner is in line with the policy of Management to eliminate all
possible irritants between labor and management, to reassure labor of the fairness of management, in
order to promote industrial peace.

"WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the Manifestation be duly considered in whatever
resolution this Honorable Court may deem just and proper in the premises."

Notwithstanding her receipt of the above communications, petitioner has not returned to her work.
Instead, she filed the following "Comments and Manifestation" on June 19, 1975:

"PETITIONER, by counsel, pursuant to and in compliance with the Court's resolution dated May 29, 1975,
and received by counsel on June 9, 1975, now comes before this Honorable Tribunal to submit these
comments and manifestations and respectfully avers that

"1. Petitioner concurs with the manifestation of respondents to the effect that she be restored to the
position she was excluded from 'effective upon assumption of office without prejudice to the result of
the proceedings pending before the Honorable Supreme Court'; the payment of her back salaries and
other emoluments she is entitled to and the reimbursement of her expenses actually incurred in
connection with the case at bar; provided that her claim for damages, actual, moral and exemplary shall
stand unaffected by her concurrence to respondents' manifestation and shall remain subject to the
resolution of this most Honorable Tribunal.
"2. The above entitled case arose out of the dismissal by the lower court of the petition
for mandamus with damages filed by your petitioner, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 94986 upon
the only ground that the relief prayed for in the said petition is 'beyond the power of the court to
extend.'

"3. The petition in the Lower Court sought two specific purposes. These purposes are: (1) the restoration
of petitioner to the position she was excluded from including the payment of her back salaries, actual
expenses incurred in connection with the case and other emoluments due her by virtue of the office,
and (2) the payment of damages, actual, moral and exemplary as a result of her dismissal.

"4. The manifestation of respondents speaks only of the restoration of petitioner to the position she was
excluded from and the payment of her back salaries, other emoluments due her and the actual expenses
incurred in connection with the case at bar, but leaving out, or perhaps purposely omitting the question
of damages prayed for in the petition of origin out of the manifestation and excluding also the award of
attorney's fees to petitioner.

"5. The concurrence therefore, of your petitioner to the manifestation of respondents is only limited to
the matters therein mentioned but without prejudice to her claim of actual, moral and exemplary
damages." (Pp. 111-112, Record.)

with prayer that:

"WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Most Honorable Tribunal that an order be issued to
respondents to

"a. restore your petitioner to her former position;

"b. pay your petitioner's back salaries, and other emoluments due her by virtue of the office;

"c. reimburse your petitioner the expenses she actually incurred in connection with the case;

"d. pay attorney's fees as prayed for in the petition of origin which includes actual, moral and exemplary
or in the alternative, to remand the question of damages to the court of origin.
"FURTHER, petitioner prays for such other relief deemed just, proper and equitable under the
premises." (Pp. 112-113, Record.)

which prayer she reiterated in her subsequent motions of September 24, 1976, November 8, 1976 and
September 13, 1977.

With this denouement in the circumstances of this case after the same was submitted for Our decision,
it has become unnecessary for Us to pass on the claims of petitioner to (1) reinstatement, (2) back
salaries and other emoluments due her by virtue of her office and (3) reimbursement of all expenses
actually incurred by her in connection with this case. Respondents have already committed themselves
to accede to her prayer in these respects, thus:

"Your respondents hereby respectfully submit that it is no longer necessary for the petitioner to pray to
this Honorable Tribunal that judgment be rendered ordering respondents to:

'1. Restore your petitioner movant to her former position;

'2. Pay your petitioner movant her back salaries and other emoluments due her by virtue of the position;

'3. Reimburse your petitioner movant the expenses actually incurred in connection with the case,
including attorney's fees;'

because the respondents, though without admitting the validity of the cause of action of the petitioner,
have already voluntarily and freely expressed their absolute and unqualified willingness and ability to
comply with those demands of petitioner, as respondents have expressed in the Administrative Order
No. 6 dated May 12, 1975 and in their Manifestation dated May 22, 1975 wherein they further
unconditionally committed themselves that petitioner can return to work any time without waiting for
any resolution of this Honorable Tribunal. That which is already being voluntarily complied with need
not be ordered anymore." (Manifestation and Comment of respondents dated November 12, 1976.)

In the same Manifestation and Comment just partially quoted, however, respondents pleaded as
follows:

"However, because of the unexplained failure of petitioner to report back to work pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 6, the herein respondent bank's commitment to pay back salaries and
allowances, we beg leave, should be confined and limited to the period from October 16, 1972 (date of
her dismissal) up to only some reasonable time from May 12, 1975 when Administrative Order No. 6
was issued.

"Thus, the only issue left for determination and resolution of this Honorable Tribunal is whether or not
the respondent is still liable for moral or exemplary damages despite respondents' voluntary action to
reinstate petitioner and pay her back salaries, allowances and actual damages. As regards this issue,
both petitioner and respondents are in unison in moving that this Honorable Tribunal resolve the said
issue without remanding the case to the court of origin. The willingness and voluntary action of
respondent Bank to reinstate petitioner, to pay all back salaries and allowances and actual expenses
incurred by petitioner, we beg leave of this Honorable Tribunal to be considered in the determination
and passing judgment upon the petitioner's claim for moral and/or exemplary damages.

"In this connection the respondents Bank and Esteban B. Cabanos profess good faith as they were
impelled not by ill-will nor personal malice, but only by their ultimate purpose to serve the best interest
of the Bank and the Goals of the New Dispensation and the Program of Reform in and out of the
Government service.

"WHEREFORE, the herein represented respondents move for the early resolution of the instant case
without further remanding the same to the court of origin and in the consideration of the facts and law
applicable to the instant case, herein respondents further respectfully pray that this Honorable Tribunal
take into account the honest and sincere gesture of the respondents in issuing Administrative Order No.
6 dated May 12, 1975 in clear manifestation of their desire to promote industrial peace, to reassure
labor of the fairness of management in the respondent Philippine Veterans Bank.

"Herein respondents also pray that no award of moral and exemplary damages be imposed against
them."

In the factual premises just stated, We do not believe petitioner is entitled to more than what
respondents are willing to concede. For a moment some members of the Court entertained the thought
of awarding her moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees. On further reflection, however, the
Court has come to the unanimous conclusion that petitioner's reaction to the well taken decision of
respondents to rectify whatever legal injury had been caused her by her dismissal, that indeed appears
to be rather precipitate, does not conform with law and justice. It is Our considered view that upon
receipt of the above-quoted memorandum of May 12, 1975 and, particularly, the manifestation of
respondents of May 22, 1975, which were duly served on her counsel, it became the inescapable duty of
petitioner to immediately report for work without having to wait for Our final action. Indeed, by her
posture of obstinacy in refusing to report for duty after respondent insistently reiterated their
conformity, in their Manifestation and Comment of November 12, 1976 above referred to and partly
quoted, to her demand for reinstatement, payment of back salaries and all incidental expenses, she lost
every ground of fairness and equity she might have initially had as a result of her abrupt separation from
the service. As may be observed, respondents' order of reinstatement and formal tender of her back
salaries and expenses was expressly subject to the ultimate outcome of this case. There was, therefore,
nothing anymore that petitioner could risk by immediately reporting for work, insofar as her right to
relief in law is concerned. All she could be entitled to could not have been more securely safeguarded.
Under these circumstances, We have no alternative than to hold that she has deprived herself of legal
and equitable basis for the additional relief of moral and exemplary damages.

The unbending rule of jurisprudence in this jurisdiction regarding the right of an employee or worker to
reinstatement after an unlawful dismissal does not permit him or her to stand idly by for a long time
while awaiting the settlement of the issue. Concomitant with the right to be taken back is the obligation
of the dismissed employee or worker to endeavor to secure gainful employment elsewhere. The
foundation of such a rule is the principle of no work, no pay. In this particular case, petitioner's failure to
report for duty as directed might have impaired the public service being performed by her employer,
considering that her expected return must have derailed any plans for her replacement.

Besides, the law on damages imposes upon the claimant, regardless of the unquestionability of his or
her entitlement thereto, to minimize the same as much as possible. Such indeed is the demand of
equity, for the juridical concept of damages is nothing more than to repair what has been lost materially
and morally. It may not be taken advantage of to allow unjust enrichment. Any relevant act of unfairness
on the part of the claimant correspondingly writes off the moral wrong involved in the juridical injury
inflicted upon him or her.

WHEREFORE, the respondent court's order of September 3, 1974 is hereby declared null and void and
set aside, and Civil Case No. 94986 is deemed terminated in accordance with the terms of this decision.
The Court further rules that petitioner should report for work within thirty (30) days from service of this
decision upon her counsel of record, on pain of her losing her job, if she fails to do so. Respondents'
tender of her back salaries and expenses in accordance with their manifestations before the Court of
May 22, 1975 and November 12, 1976 is declared well taken, and whether or not petitioner returns for
work as herein indicated, she should be paid what she has been promised which, for clarity, We hold
includes (a) payment of petitioner's back salaries from October 16, 1972, the date of her dismissal, up to
one month or thirty (30) days after her counsel's receipt of the respondents' Manifestation and
Comment of November 12, 1976 above referred to and (b) reimbursement of her expenses actually
incurred in connection with this case, including attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10) per centum of the
amount of total recovery as herein allowed.[2]

No costs.

Castro, C.J., Fernando, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero,
JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., concurs separate opinion.

Makasiar, J., dissents separate opinion.

[ GR No. L-34161, Feb 29, 1972 ]

EUGENE A. TAN v. DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL +

RESOLUTION

150 Phil. 778

FERNANDO, J.:

A five-page petition filed on October 6, 1971 by Eugene A. Tan, Silvestre J. Acejas and Rogelio V.
Fernandez, respectively, of Roxas City, Romblon and Davao City, for declaratory relief as taxpayers, but
purportedly suing on behalf of themselves and the Filipino people, in assailing the validity of the Laurel-
Leido Resolution.[1] dealing with the range of the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
would have this Court declare that it is "without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution
and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present
Constitution through the adoption of a form of government other than the form now outlined in the
present Constitution [the Convention being] merely empowered to propose improvements to the
present Constitution without altering the general plan laid down therein."[2] Such a plea of the utmost
seriousness was sought to be compressed in a five-page pleading. It is understandable, therefore, why
the petition could hardly be characterized as possessed of merit. Accordingly, on October 8, 1971, this
Court issued a resolution dismissing it. Then came on the last day of that month a printed thirty-two
page motion for reconsideration. It is evident that petitioners took some pains this time, although the
main reliance seems to be on a secondary authority, American Jurisprudence.[3] The show of diligence is
impressive but the persuasive quality is something else. A perusal thereof yields the conclusion that
petitioners are oblivious of the authoritative precedents in this jurisdiction. The approach is not
distinguished by its conformity with the law as it stands. In this sphere as elsewhere, new cults may be
eroding ancient faiths. Considering, however, the compulsion of the fundamental principle of
separation of powers, this Court cannot exercise the competence petitioners would erroneously assume
it possesses, even assuming that they have the requisite standing, which is the first question to be
faced.

1. What calls for prior determination is whether or not petitioners had the requisite standing to seek a
declaration of the alleged nullity of a resolution of the Constitutional Convention.[4] In the categorical
and succinct language of Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement."[5] There has been a relaxation of this rule. So
it was announced by the present Chief Justice in Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public Works.[6] Thus:
"Again, it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a
direct injury, in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the
instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that the
'expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering
an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,' which may be enjoined at the
request of a taxpayer."[7] Moreover, where a constitutional question is raised, a Senator has usually
been considered as possessed of the requisite personality to bring a suit. Thus in Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito,[8] it was a member of the Senate who was heard by this Court in a suit for prohibition to prevent
the enforcement of the congressional resolution proposing the parity rights amendment.[9] Likewise, in
the latest case in point, Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, it was a Senator who brought the action
challenging the validity of Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. He was quite
successful too. Petitioners in the present case cannot be heard to assert that they do qualify under such
a category.

Moreover, as far as a taxpayer's suit is concerned, this Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether or
not it should be entertained. It is our view that a negative answer is indicated. Nor should petitioners
feel discriminated against just because in Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections,[10] a member of the
Philippine Bar, now Delegate Ramon Gonzales, was allowed to prosecute his action for prohibition
instituted by him as a taxpayer. Petitioners have no cause for legitimate resentment as such suit could
be distinguished from the present.

2. Petitioner Gonzales in accordance with the controlling doctrine had the good sense to wait before
filing his suit until after the enactment of the statute[11] for the submission to the electorate of certain
proposed amendments to the Constitution.[12] It was only then that the matter was ripe for
adjudication. Prior to that stage, the judiciary had to keep its hands off. The doctrine of separation of
powers calls for the other departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. The
judiciary as Justice Laurel emphatically asserted "will neither direct nor restrain executive [or legislative]
action* * *."[13] The legislative and executive branches are not bound to seek its advice as to what to do
or not to do. Judicial inquiry has to be postponed in the meanwhile. It is a prerequisite that something
had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture. At such a time, it may pass on the validity of what was done but only "when * * * properly
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding."[14]

Such a principle applies as well when the inquiry concerns the scope of the competence lodged in the
Constitutional Convention. The judiciary must leave it free to fulfill its responsibility according to its
lights. There is to be no interference. Its autonomy is to be respected. It cannot be otherwise if it is to
perform its function well. Such should be the case not only because it is a coordinate agency but also
because its powers are transcendent, amounting as it does to submitting for popular ratification
proposals which may radically alter the organization and functions of all three departments, including
the courts. It is therefore much more imperative that the rule of noninterference be strictly adhered to
until the appropriate time comes.

More specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the
interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for
ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction. That
is the command of the Constitution as interpreted by this Court. Unless and until such a doctrine loses
force by being overruled or a new precedent being announced it is controlling. That is implicit in the
rule of law. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration cannot therefore be sustained.

WHEREFORE , the motion for reconsideration is denied. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar,
JJ., concur.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 132922. April 21, 1998]

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE

PHILIPPINES, INC. and GMA NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

In Osmea v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 132231, decided March 31, 1998,[1] we upheld the
validity of 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 which prohibits the sale or donation of print space or air
time for political ads, except to the Commission on Elections under 90, of B.P. No. 881,
the Omnibus Election Code, with respect to print media, and 92, with respect to broadcast
media. In the present case, we consider the validity of 92 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 against
claims that the requirement that radio and television time be given free takes property
without due process of law; that it violates the eminent domain clause of the Constitution
which provides for the payment of just compensation; that it denies broadcast media the
equal protection of the laws; and that, in any event, it violates the terms of the franchise
of petitioner GMA Network, Inc.
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an
organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing
as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc.,
operates radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a
franchise granted by Congress.
Petitioners challenge the validity of 92 on the ground (1) that it takes property without
due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television
broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the
power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of
communication or information during the period of election.

The Question of Standing

At the threshold of this suit is the question of standing of petitioner

Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP). As
already noted, its members assert an interest as lawyers of radio and television
broadcasting companies and as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters.
 In those cases[2] in which citizens were authorized to sue, this Court upheld their
standing in view of the transcendental importance of the constitutional question raised
which justified the granting of relief. In contrast, in the case at bar, as will presently be
shown, petitioners substantive claim is without merit. To the extent, therefore, that a
partys standing is determined by the substantive merit of his case or a preliminary
estimate thereof, petitioner TELEBAP must be held to be without standing. Indeed, a
citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he
has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. [3] Members of petitioner have not
shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the operation of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881.
Nor do members of petitioner TELEBAP have an interest as registered voters since
this case does not concern their right of suffrage. Their interest in 92 of B.P. Blg. 881
should be precisely in upholding its validity.
Much less do they have an interest as taxpayers since this case does not involve the
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.[4] A party suing as a taxpayer must
specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute.
Nor indeed as a corporate entity does TELEBAP have standing to assert the rights of
radio and television broadcasting companies. Standing jus tertii will be recognized only if
it can be shown that the party suing has some substantial relation to the third party, or
that the third party cannot assert his constitutional right, or that the right of the third party
will be diluted unless the party in court is allowed to espouse the third partys constitutional
claim. None of these circumstances is here present. The mere fact that TELEBAP is
composed of lawyers in the broadcast industry does not entitle them to bring this suit in
their name as representatives of the affected companies.
Nevertheless, we have decided to take this case since the other petitioner, GMA
Network, Inc., appears to have the requisite standing to bring this constitutional
challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines
affected by the enforcement of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast
companies to provide free air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for
campaign and other political purposes.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing
COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial
election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this
year. Petitioners allegation that it will suffer losses again because it is required to provide
free air time is sufficient to give it standing to question the validity of 92. [5]

Airing of COMELEC Time, a

Reasonable Condition for
Grant of Petitioners
Franchise
 As pointed out in our decision in Osmea v. COMELEC, 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 and
90 and 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 are part and parcel of a regulatory scheme designed to
equalize the opportunity of candidates in an election in regard to the use of mass media
for political campaigns. These statutory provisions state in relevant parts:

R.A. No. 6646

SEC. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. - In addition to the forms

of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, it shall be unlawful:

....

(b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, or other mass
media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of
charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except
to the Commission as provided under Section 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality
who is a candidate for any elective public office shall take a leave of absence
from his work as such during the campaign period.

B.P. Blg. 881, (Omnibus Election Code)

SEC. 90. Comelec space. - The Commission shall procure space in at least
one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city: Provided,
however, That in the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in
any other magazine or periodical in said province or city, which shall be
known as Comelec Space wherein candidates can announce their
candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge, equally and
impartially by the Commission among all candidates within the area in which
the newspaper is circulated. (Sec. 45, 1978 EC).

SEC. 92. Comelec time. - The Commission shall procure radio and television
time to be known as Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and
impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and
television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting
and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or
television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign. (Sec. 46,
1978 EC)

Thus, the law prohibits mass media from selling or donating print space and air time
to the candidates and requires the COMELEC instead to procure print space and air time
for allocation to the candidates. It will be noted that while 90 of B.P. Blg. 881 requires the
COMELEC to procure print space which, as we have held, should be paid for, 92 states
that air time shall be procured by the COMELEC free of charge.
Petitioners contend that 92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process clause [6] and the
eminent domain provision[7] of the Constitution by taking air time from radio and television
broadcasting stations without payment of just compensation. Petitioners claim that the
primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to
advertisers and that to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize a
taking which is not a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private
property. According to petitioners, in 1992, the GMA Network, Inc. lost P22,498,560.00 in
providing free air time of one (1) hour every morning from Mondays to Fridays and one
(1) hour on Tuesdays and Thursdays from 7:00 to 8:00 p.m. (prime time) and, in this years
elections, it stands to lose P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that radio
and television stations provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for the COMELEC
Time.[8]
Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by
television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies
to assign.[9] A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by
Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that any such franchise or right
granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when
the common good so requires.[10]
The idea that broadcast stations may be required to provide COMELEC Time free of
charge is not new. It goes back to the Election Code of 1971 (R.A. No. 6388), which
provided:

SEC. 49. Regulation of election propaganda through mass media. - (a) The
franchises of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to require each such station to furnish free of charge, upon
request of the Commission [on Elections], during the period of sixty days
before the election not more than fifteen minutes of prime time once a week
which shall be known as Comelec Time and which shall be used exclusively
by the Commission to disseminate vital election information. Said Comelec
Time shall be considered as part of the public service time said stations are
required to furnish the Government for the dissemination of public information
and education under their respective franchises or permits.

This provision was carried over with slight modification by the 1978 Election Code
(P.D. No. 1296), which provided:

SEC. 46. COMELEC Time. - The Commission [on Elections] shall procure
radio and television time to be known as COMELEC Time which shall be
allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of
coverage of said radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchises
of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to
require such stations to furnish the Commission radio or television time, free
of charge, during the period of the campaign, at least once but not oftener
than every other day.

Substantially the same provision is now embodied in 92 of B.P. Blg. 881.

Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of the
franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and, until the present case was
brought, such provisions had not been thought of as taking property without just
compensation. Art. XII, 11 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for
the common good. What better measure can be conceived for the common good than
one for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but even more of the public,
particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in an election? [I]t
is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount.[11]
Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement that broadcast
stations give free air time. Even in the United States, there are responsible scholars who
believe that government controls on broadcast media can constitutionally be instituted to
ensure diversity of views and attention to public affairs to further the system of free
expression. For this purpose, broadcast stations may be required to give free air time to
candidates in an election.[12] Thus, Professor Cass R. Sunstein of the University of
Chicago Law School, in urging reforms in regulations affecting the broadcast industry,
writes:

Elections. We could do a lot to improve coverage of electoral

campaigns. Most important, government should ensure free media time for
candidates. Almost all European nations make such provision; the United
States does not. Perhaps government should pay for such time on its
own. Perhaps broadcasters should have to offer it as a condition for receiving
a license. Perhaps a commitment to provide free time would count in favor of
the grant of a license in the first instance. Steps of this sort would
simultaneously promote attention to public affairs and greater diversity of
view. They would also help overcome the distorting effects of soundbites and
the corrosive financial pressures faced by candidates in seeking time on the
media.[13]

In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do
not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and
images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise
is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service. Thus, in De Villata v.
Stanley,[14] a regulation requiring interisland vessels licensed to engage in the interisland
trade to carry mail and, for this purpose, to give advance notice to postal authorities of
date and hour of sailings of vessels and of changes of sailing hours to enable them to
tender mail for transportation at the last practicable hour prior to the vessels departure,
was held to be a reasonable condition for the state grant of license. Although the question
of compensation for the carriage of mail was not in issue, the Court strongly implied that
such service could be without compensation, as in fact under Spanish sovereignty the
mail was carried free. [15]
In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. NTC,[16] the Court ordered the
PLDT to allow the interconnection of its domestic telephone system with the international
gateway facility of Eastern Telecom. The Court cited (1) the provisions of the legislative
franchise allowing such interconnection; (2) the absence of any physical, technical, or
economic basis for restricting the linking up of two separate telephone systems; and (3)
the possibility of increase in the volume of international traffic and more efficient service,
at more moderate cost, as a result of interconnection.
Similarly, in the earlier case of PLDT v. NTC,[17] it was held:

Such regulation of the use and ownership of telecommunications systems is in

the exercise of the plenary police power of the State for the promotion of the
general welfare. The 1987 Constitution recognizes the existence of that power
when it provides:

Sec. 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents
shall contribute to the common good. Individuals and private groups, including
corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall have the
right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty
of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common
good so demands (Article XII).

The interconnection which has been required of PLDT is a form of intervention

with property rights dictated by the objective of government to promote the
rapid expansion of telecommunications services in all areas of the Philippines,
. . . to maximize the use of telecommunications facilities available, . . . in
recognition of the vital role of communications in nation building . . . and to
ensure that all users of the public telecommunications service have access to
all other users of the service wherever they may be within the Philippines at
an acceptable standard of service and at reasonable cost (DOTC Circular No.
90-248). Undoubtedly, the encompassing objective is the common good. The
NTC, as the regulatory agency of the State, merely exercised its delegated
authority to regulate the use of telecommunications networks when it decreed
interconnection.

In the granting of the privilege to operate broadcast stations and thereafter

supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in
licensing and supervising such stations.[18] It would be strange if it cannot even require the
licensees to render public service by giving free air time.
Considerable effort is made in the dissent of Mr. Justice Panganiban to show that the
production of television programs involves large expenditure and requires the use of
equipment for which huge investments have to be made. The dissent cites the claim of
GMA Network that the grant of free air time to the COMELEC for the duration of the 1998
campaign period would cost the company P52,380,000, representing revenue it would
otherwise earn if the air time were sold to advertisers, and the amount of P6,600,850,
representing the cost of producing a program for the COMELEC Time, or the total amount
of P58,980,850.
The claim that petitioner would be losing P52,380,000 in unrealized revenue from
advertising is based on the assumption that air time is finished product which, it is said,
become the property of the company, like oil produced from refining or similar natural
resources after undergoing a process for their production. But air time is not owned by
broadcast companies. As held in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C.,[19] which upheld
the right of a party personally attacked to reply, licenses to broadcast do not confer
ownership of designated frequencies, but only the temporary privilege of using
them. Consequently, a license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no
constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency
to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which
prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others
and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and
voices which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by
necessity, be barred from the airwaves.[20] As radio and television broadcast stations do
not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide
air time to the COMELEC.
Justice Panganibans dissent quotes from Tolentino on the Civil Code which says that
the air lanes themselves are not property because they cannot be appropriated for the
benefit of any individual. (p.5) That means neither the State nor the stations own the air
lanes. Yet the dissent also says that The franchise holders can recover their huge
investments only by selling air time to advertisers. (p. 13) If air lanes cannot be
appropriated, how can they be used to produce air time which the franchise holders can
sell to recover their investment? There is a contradiction here.
As to the additional amount of P6,600,850, it is claimed that this is the cost of
producing a program and it is for such items as sets and props, video tapes,
miscellaneous (other rental, supplies, transportation, etc.), and technical facilities
(technical crew such as director and cameraman as well as on air plugs). There is no
basis for this claim. Expenses for these items will be for the account of the candidates.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2983, 6(d) specifically provides in this connection:

(d) Additional services such as tape-recording or video-taping of programs,

the preparation of visual aids, terms and condition thereof, and the
consideration to be paid therefor may be arranged by the candidates with the
radio/television station concerned. However, no radio/television station shall
make any discrimination among candidates relative to charges, terms,
practices or facilities for in connection with the services rendered.

It is unfortunate that in the effort to show that there is taking of private property worth
millions of pesos, the unsubstantiated charge is made that by its decision the Court
permits the grand larceny of precious time, and allows itself to become the peoples
unwitting oppressor. The charge is really unfortunate. In Jackman v. Rosenbaum
Co.,[21] Justice Holmes was so incensed by the resistance of property owners to the
erection of party walls that he was led to say in his original draft, a statute, which
embodies the communitys understanding of the reciprocal rights and duties of
neighboring landowners, does not need to invoke the petty larceny of the police power in
its justification. Holmess brethren corrected his taste, and Holmes had to amend the
passage so that in the end it spoke only of invoking the police power. [22] Justice Holmes
spoke of the petty larceny of the police power. Now we are being told of the grand larceny
[by means of the police power] of precious air time.

Giving Free Air Time a Duty

Assumed by Petitioner

Petitioners claim that 92 is an invalid amendment of R.A. No. 7252 which granted
GMA Network, Inc. a franchise for the operation of radio and television broadcasting
stations. They argue that although 5 of R.A. No. 7252 gives the government the power to
temporarily use and operate the stations of petitioner GMA Network or to authorize such
use and operation, the exercise of this right must be compensated.
The cited provision of R.A. No. 7252 states:

SEC. 5. Right of Government. - A special right is hereby reserved to the

President of the Philippines, in times of rebellion, public peril, calamity,
emergency, disaster or disturbance of peace and order, to temporarily take
over and operate the stations of the grantee, to temporarily suspend the
operation of any station in the interest of public safety, security and public
welfare, or to authorize the temporary use and operation thereof by any
agency of the Government, upon due compensation to the grantee, for the
use of said stations during the period when they shall be so operated.

The basic flaw in petitioners argument is that it assumes that the provision for
COMELEC Time constitutes the use and operation of the stations of the GMA Network,
Inc. This is not so. Under 92 of B.P. Blg. 881, the COMELEC does not take over the
operation of radio and television stations but only the allocation of air time to the
candidates for the purpose of ensuring, among other things, equal opportunity, time, and
the right to reply as mandated by the Constitution.[23]
 Indeed, it is wrong to claim an amendment of petitioners franchise for the reason that
B.P. Blg. 881, which is said to have amended R.A. No. 7252, actually antedated it. [24] The
provision of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 must be deemed instead to be incorporated in R.A. No.
7252. And, indeed, 4 of the latter statute does.
For the fact is that the duty imposed on the GMA Network, Inc. by its franchise to
render adequate public service time implements 92 of B.P. Blg. 881. Undoubtedly, its
purpose is to enable the government to communicate with the people on matters of public
interest. Thus, R.A. No. 7252 provides:

SEC. 4. Responsibility to the Public. - The grantee shall provide adequate

public service time to enable the Government, through the said broadcasting
stations, to reach the population on important public issues; provide at all
times sound and balanced programming; promote public participation such as
in community programming; assist in the functions of public information and
education; conform to the ethics of honest enterprise; and not use its station
for the broadcasting of obscene and indecent language, speech, act or scene,
or for the dissemination of deliberately false information or willful
misrepresentation, or to the detriment of the public interest, or to incite,
encourage, or assist in subversive or treasonable acts. (Emphasis added)

It is noteworthy that 49 of R.A. No. 6388, from which 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 was taken,
expressly provided that the COMELEC Time should be considered as part of the public
service time said stations are required to furnish the Government for the dissemination of
public information and education under their respective franchises or permits. There is no
reason to suppose that 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 considers the COMELEC Time therein
provided to be otherwise than as a public service which petitioner is required to render
under 4 of its charter (R.A. No. 7252). In sum, B.P. Blg. 881, 92 is not an invalid
amendment of petitioners franchise but the enforcement of a duty voluntarily assumed by
petitioner in accepting a public grant of privilege.
Thus far, we have confined the discussion to the provision of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 for
free air time without taking into account COMELEC Resolution No. 2983-A, 2 of which
states:

SEC. 2. Grant of Comelec Time. - Every radio broadcasting and television

station operating under franchise shall grant the Commission, upon payment
of just compensation, at least thirty (30) minutes of prime time daily, to be
known as Comelec Time, effective February 10, 1998 for candidates for
President, Vice-President and Senators, and effective March 27, 1998, for
candidates for local elective offices, until May 9, 1998. (Emphasis added)

This is because the amendment providing for the payment of just compensation is invalid,
being in contravention of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 that radio and television time given during
the period of the campaign shall be free of charge. Indeed, Resolution No. 2983 originally
provided that the time allocated shall be free of charge, just as 92 requires such time to
be given free of charge. The amendment appears to be a reaction to petitioners claim in
this case that the original provision was unconstitutional because it allegedly authorized
the taking of property without just compensation.
The Solicitor General, relying on the amendment, claims that there should be no more
dispute because the payment of compensation is now provided for. It is basic, however,
that an administrative agency cannot, in the exercise of lawmaking, amend a statute of
Congress. Since 2 of Resolution No. 2983-A is invalid, it cannot be invoked by the parties.

Law Allows Flextime for Programming

by Stations, Not Confiscation of
Air Time by COMELEC

It is claimed that there is no standard in the law to guide the COMELEC in procuring
free air time and that theoretically the COMELEC can demand all of the air time of such
stations.[25] Petitioners do not claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2983-A arbitrarily
sequesters radio and television time. What they claim is that because of the breadth of
the statutory language, the provision in question is susceptible of unbridled, arbitrary and
oppressive exercise.[26]
The contention has no basis. For one, the COMELEC is required to procure free air
time for candidates within the area of coverage of a particular radio or television
broadcaster so that it cannot, for example, procure such time for candidates outside that
area. At what time of the day and how much time the COMELEC may procure will have
to be determined by it in relation to the overall objective of informing the public about the
candidates, their qualifications and their programs of government. As stated in Osmea v.
COMELEC, the COMELEC Time provided for in 92, as well as the COMELEC Space
provided for in 90, is in lieu of paid ads which candidates are prohibited to have under
11(b) of R.A. No. 6646. Accordingly, this objective must be kept in mind in determining
the details of the COMELEC Time as well as those of the COMELEC Space.
There would indeed be objection to the grant of power to the COMELEC if 92 were
so detailed as to leave no room for accommodation of the demands of radio and television
programming. For were that the case, there could be an intrusion into the editorial
prerogatives of radio and television stations.

Differential Treatment of
Broadcast Media Justified

Petitioners complain that B.P. Blg. 881, 92 singles out radio and television stations to
provide free air time. They contend that newspapers and magazines are not similarly
required as, in fact, in Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC[27] we upheld their right to
the payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide under 90.
 The argument will not bear analysis. It rests on the fallacy that broadcast media are
entitled to the same treatment under the free speech guarantee of the Constitution as the
print media. There are important differences in the characteristics of the two media,
however, which justify their differential treatment for free speech purposes.Because of
the physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the government must, of necessity,
allocate broadcast frequencies to those wishing to use them. There is no similar
justification for government allocation and regulation of the print media. [28]
In the allocation of limited resources, relevant conditions may validly be imposed on
the grantees or licensees. The reason for this is that, as already noted, the government
spends public funds for the allocation and regulation of the broadcast industry, which it
does not do in the case of the print media. To require the radio and television broadcast
industry to provide free air time for the COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for what the
industry gets.
From another point of view, this Court has also held that because of the unique and
pervasive influence of the broadcast media, [n]ecessarily . . . the freedom of television
and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to
newspaper and print media.[29]

The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in

the lives of all Filipinos. Newspapers and current books are found only in
metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast
and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses who find
the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble
means. Basic needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities.

On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set
is also becoming universal. Their message may be simultaneously received
by a national or regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or
unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television
set. The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach every person of every
age, persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different
I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or
offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or predict. The impact of the
vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work,
the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject the
utterance.[30]

Petitioners assertion therefore that 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 denies them the equal
protection of the law has no basis. In addition, their plea that 92 (free air time) and 11(b)
of R.A. No. 6646 (ban on paid political ads) should be invalidated would pave the way for
a return to the old regime where moneyed candidates could monopolize media
advertising to the disadvantage of candidates with less resources. That is what Congress
tried to reform in 1987 with the enactment of R.A. No. 6646. We are not free to set aside
the judgment of Congress, especially in light of the recent failure of interested parties to
have the law repealed or at least modified.

Requirement of COMELEC Time, a

Reasonable Exercise of the
States Power to Regulate
Use of Franchises

Finally, it is argued that the power to supervise or regulate given to the COMELEC
under Art. IX-C, 4 of the Constitution does not include the power to prohibit. In the first
place, what the COMELEC is authorized to supervise or regulate by Art. IX-C, 4 of the
Constitution,[31] among other things, is the use by media of information of their franchises
or permits, while what Congress (not the COMELEC) prohibits is the sale or donation of
print space or air time for political ads. In other words, the object of supervision or
regulation is different from the object of the prohibition. It is another fallacy for petitioners
to contend that the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. This may
have force if the object of the power were the same.
In the second place, the prohibition in 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is only half of the
regulatory provision in the statute. The other half is the mandate to the COMELEC to
procure print space and air time for allocation to candidates. As we said in Osmea v.
COMELEC:

The term political ad ban, when used to describe 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, is
misleading, for even as 11(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and
air time to political candidates, it mandates the COMELEC to procure and
itself allocate to the candidates space and time in the media. There is no
suppression of political ads but only a regulation of the time and manner of
advertising.

....

. . . What is involved here is simply regulation of this nature. Instead of leaving

candidates to advertise freely in the mass media, the law provides for
allocation, by the COMELEC of print space and air time to give all candidates
equal time and space for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.

With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC

Time and COMELEC Space are about the only means through which candidates can
advertise their qualifications and programs of government. More than merely depriving
candidates of time for their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless
paid by the government would clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Art. III, 7
of the Constitution provides that the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized, while Art. XII, 6 states that the use of property bears a social
function [and] the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises [is] subject
to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common
good so demands.
To affirm the validity of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their
obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an election
is maintained. For while broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities with
free speech rights, they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the
people have access to the diversity of views on political issues. This right of the people is
paramount to the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of 92, therefore, is
likewise to uphold the peoples right to information on matters of public concern. The use
of property bears a social function and is subject to the states duty to intervene for the
common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that
whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of elections is
for that common good.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan,
Martinez and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Romero, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., dissent.
Vitug, J., has separate opinion.
 EN BANC

[A.M. NO. 11-7-10-SC - July 31, 2012]

Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the

Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

The present administrative matter stems from the two Memoranda, dated
July 14, 2011 and August 10, 2010, submitted by Atty. Eden T. Candelaria,
Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of
Administrative Services, to the Office of the Chief Justice. These

Memoranda essentially ask the Court to determine the proper formula to be

used in computing the appraisal value that a retired Chief Justice and
several Associate Justices of the Supreme Court have to pay to acquire the
government properties they used during their tenure.

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

This issue has its roots in the June 8, 2010 Opinion1 issued by the Legal
Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit
(COA), which found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50
resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the
Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their
incumbency in the Court, to
wit:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Valuation
Valuation under
Name of Items under COA Difference
Justice Purchased CFAG Memorandum (in pesos)
(in pesos) No. 98-569A
(in pesos)
Artemio Toyota 341,241.10 365,000.00 23,758.90
Panganiban Camry,
(Chief Justice) 2003 model
 Toyota 136,500.00 151,000.00 14,500.00
Grandia,
2002 model
Toyota 115,800.00 156,000.00 40,200.00
Camry,
2001 model
Ruben T. Toyota 579,532.50 580,600.00 1,067.50
Reyes Camry,
(Associate 2005 model
Justice)
Toyota 117,300.00 181,200.00 63,900.00
Grandia,
2003 model
Angelina S. Toyota 115,800.00 150,600.00 34,800.00
Gutierrez Grandia,
(Associate 2002 model
Justice)
Adolfo S. Toyota 536,105.00 543,300.00 9,195.00
Azcuna Camry,
(Associate 2005 model
Justice)
Toyota 117,300.00 145,000.00 27,700.00
Grandia,
2002 model
Sony TV Set 2,399.90 2,500.00 100.10
Ma. Alicia 5,800.002

The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of
the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of
the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division
erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional
Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997
and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc
dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01,3 when it should have applied
the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A4 dated August 5,
1998.
Recommendations of the Office of Administrative Services In her
Memorandum dated August 10, 2010, Atty. Candelaria recommended that
the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the
CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned
the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its
guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property since these
were issued in 1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous instances involving
two (2) retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices,5 the COA upheld the in-
house appraisal of government property using the formula found in the
CFAG guidelines. More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the
Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources. Full
autonomy, among others,6 contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility in
the allocation and utilization of the Judiciary s resources, based on its own
determination of what it needs. The Court thus has the recognized authority
to allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided or required by law in
the course of the discharge of its functions.7 To allow the COA to substitute
the Court s policy in the disposal of its property would be tantamount to an
encroachment into this judicial prerogative.

OUR RULING

We find Atty. Candelaria s recommendation to be well-taken.

The COA s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional

bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D
of the 1987 Constitution, which states:ςrαlαω

Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and
duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held
in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a)
constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal
autonomy under this Constitution. emphasis ours

This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court s fiscal
autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial
independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these
matters.

Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence

In Angara v. Electoral Commission,8 we explained the principle of separation
of powers, as follows:ςrαlαω

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of

government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division
in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.
x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution.9ςrνll

The concept of the independence of the three branches of government, on

the other hand, extends from the notion that the powers of government
must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch;
the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its
power over the other branches or the citizenry.10 To achieve this purpose,
the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that
are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective
mandates; lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of
government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or
others.11ςrνll

Under the Judiciary s unique circumstances, independence encompasses the

idea that individual judges can freely exercise their mandate to resolve
justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the
discharge of its constitutional functions free of restraints and influence from
the other branches, save only for those imposed by the Constitution
itself.12 Thus, judicial independence can be "broken down into two distinct
concepts: decisional independence and institutional
independence."13Decisional independence "refers to a judge s ability to
render decisions free from political or popular influence based solely on the
individual facts and applicable law."14 On the other hand, institutional
independence "describes the separation of the judicial branch from the
executive and legislative branches of government."15 Simply put,
institutional independence refers to the "collective independence of the
judiciary as a body."16ςrνll
In the case In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr.
Amado P. Macasaet Published in Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20 and
21, 2007,17 the Court delineated the distinctions between the two concepts
of judicial independence in the following manner:ςrαlαω

One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each

particular judge and seeks to insure his or her ability to decide cases with
autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge has this kind of
independence when he can do his job without having to hear or at least
without having to take it seriously if he does hear criticisms of his personal
morality and fitness for judicial office. The second concept is institutional
judicial independence. It focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a
branch of government and protects judges as a class.

A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of

independence are preserved - wherein public confidence in the competence
and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the
legitimacy of judicial authority. An erosion of this confidence threatens the
maintenance of an independent Third Estate. italics and emphases ours
Recognizing the vital role that the Judiciary plays in our system of
government as the sole repository of judicial power, with the power to
determine whether any act of any branch or instrumentality of the
government is attended with grave abuse of discretion,18no less than the
Constitution provides a number of safeguards to ensure that judicial
independence is protected and maintained.

The Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from depriving the Supreme

Court of its jurisdiction, as enumerated in Section 5, Article VII of the
Constitution, or from passing a law that undermines the security of tenure of
the members of the judiciary.19 The Constitution also mandates that the
judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy,20 and grants the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel.
Jurisprudence21 has characterized administrative supervision as exclusive,
noting that only the Supreme Court can oversee the judges and court
personnel's compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch
of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.22ςrνll

The Constitution protects as well the salaries of the Justices and judges by
prohibiting any decrease in their salary during their continuance in
office,23 and ensures their security of tenure by providing that "Members of
the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good
behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated
to discharge the duties of their office."24With these guarantees, justices and
judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisals brought on
by their judicial action. They can act inspired solely by their knowledge of
the law and by the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting
influence of base or unworthy motives.25ςrνll

All of these constitutional provisions were put in place to strengthen judicial

independence, not only by clearly stating the Court s powers, but also by
providing express limits on the power of the two other branches of
government to interfere with the Court s affairs.

Fiscal Autonomy

One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the

constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. Just as the Executive may not
prevent a judge from discharging his or her judicial duty (for example, by
physically preventing a court from holding its hearings) and just as the
Legislature may not enact laws removing all jurisdiction from courts,26 the
courts may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of their
funds for purposes germane to judicial functions. While, as a general
proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first
instance is unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the
Executive on the Judiciary s fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check
on a co-equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is to perform its
primary function of adjudication, it must be able to command adequate
resources for that purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel the
exercise of) legislative power over the national purse (which at first blush
appears to be a violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion of
legislative autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial independence27 and is
expressly provided for by the Constitution through the grant of fiscal
autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII. This provision states:ςrαlαω

Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the
Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically
and regularly released.

In Bengzon v. Drilon,28 we had the opportunity to define the scope and

extent of fiscal autonomy in the following manner:ςrαlαω

As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the

Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the
Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a
guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the
wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and
authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not
exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay
plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be
provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their
functions.

Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court
says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters
and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the
autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory
platitude.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must

have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their
constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the
manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and
violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially
as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of
powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In
the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to
constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of
autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision.29 (emphases ours)

In this cited case, the Court set aside President Corazon Aquino s veto of
particular provisions of the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year
1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired justices of
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, on the basis of the Judiciary s
constitutionally guaranteed independence and fiscal autonomy. The Court
ruled:ςrαlαω

In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General
Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds
should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The
freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the
funds appropriated from the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use
of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in
other items of the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional
mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds
allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is
aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on
how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.30ςrνll
The Court s declarations in Bengzon make it clear that the grant of fiscal
autonomy to the Judiciary is more extensive than the mere automatic and
regular release of its approved annual appropriations;31real fiscal autonomy
covers the grant to the Judiciary of the authority to use and dispose of its
funds and properties at will, free from any outside control or interference.

Application to the Present Case

The Judiciary s fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief
Justice, as its head, and of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of
administrative control and supervision of the courts and its personnel. As the
Court En Banc s Resolution (dated March 23, 2004) in A.M. No. 03-12-01
reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary serves as the basis in allowing
the sale of the Judiciary s properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme
Court and the appellate courts:ςrαlαω

WHEREAS, by the constitutional mandate of fiscal autonomy as defined in

Bengzon v. Drilon (G.R. No. 103524, 15 April 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150) the
Judiciary has "full flexibility to allocate and utilize (its) resources with the
wisdom and dispatch that (its) needs require";

WHEREAS, the long-established tradition and practice of Justices or Members

of appellate courts of purchasing for sentimental reasons at retirement
government properties they used during their tenure has been recognized as
a privilege enjoyed only by such government officials; andcralawlibrary

WHEREAS, the exercise of such privilege needs regulation to the end that
respect for sentiments that a retiring Justice attaches to properties he or she
officially used during his or her tenure should be in consonance with the
need for restraint in the utilization and disposition of government resources.

By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward

long and faithful service, the sale to the retired Justices of specifically
designated properties that they used during their incumbency has been
recognized both as a privilege and a benefit. This has become an established
practice within the Judiciary that even the COA has previously
recognized.32 The En Banc Resolution also deems the grant of the privilege
as a form of additional retirement benefit that the Court can grant its
officials and employees in the exercise of its power of administrative
supervision. Under this administrative authority, the Court has the power to
administer the Judiciary s internal affairs, and this includes the authority to
handle and manage the retirement applications and entitlements of its
personnel as provided by law and by its own grants.33ςrνll
Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciary s fiscal autonomy and its
independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide
the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they
extend to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the
parameters of the Court s granted power; they determine the terms,
conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.

In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in
CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Court s exercise of its
discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement
privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how
these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not
only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also
encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice
and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary s own affairs.

As a final point, we add that this view finds full support in the Government
Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM), Volume 1, particularly, Section 501
of Title 7, Chapter 3, which states:ςrαlαω

Section 501. Authority or responsibility for property disposal/divestment.

The full and sole authority and responsibility for the divestment and disposal
of property and other assets owned by the national government agencies or
instrumentalities, local government units and government-owned and/or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries shall be lodged in the heads of
the departments, bureaus, and offices of the national government, the local
government units and the governing bodies or managing heads of
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries
conformably to their respective corporate charters or articles of
incorporation, who shall constitute the appropriate committee or body to
undertake the same. italics supplied; emphases ours

This provision clearly recognizes that the Chief Justice, as the head of the
Judiciary, possesses the full and sole authority and responsibility to divest
and dispose of the properties and assets of the Judiciary; as Head of Office,
he determines the manner and the conditions of disposition, which in this
case relate to a benefit. As the usual practice of the Court, this authority is
exercised by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Court En Banc.
However, whether exercised by the Chief Justice or by the Supreme Court
En Banc, the grant of such authority and discretion is unequivocal and leaves
no room for interpretations and insertions.

ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the in-house computation of the

appraisal value made by the Property Division, Office of `Administrative
Services, of the properties purchased by the retired Chief Justice and
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, based on CFAG Joint Resolution No.
35 dated April 23, 1997, as directed under the Court Resolution dated March
23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, is CONFIRMED to be legal and valid. Let the
Commission on Audit be accordingly advised of this Resolution for its
guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998]

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON,

HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO,
BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA,
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondents.

DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:

The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike staged by some alleged farmer-
beneficiaries in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City on
October 9, 1997 commanded nationwide attention that even church leaders and some
presidential candidates tried to intervene for the strikers cause.
The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision[1] of the Office of the President
(OP), issued through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres in OP Case No. 96-C-
6424, which approved the conversion of a one hundred forty-four (144)-hectare land from
agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. This led the Office of the President,
through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called Win-
Win Resolution[2] on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its earlier Decision after
it had already become final and executory. The said Resolution modified the approval
of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of forty-four (44) hectares,
and ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified
farmer-beneficiaries.
But, did the Win-Win Resolution culminate in victory for all the contending parties?
The above-named petitioners cried foul. They have come to this Court urging us to
annul and set aside the Win-Win Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary Ernesto
D. Garilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform from implementing the said Resolution.
Thus, the crucial issue to be resolved in this case is: What is the legal effect of the
Win-Win Resolution issued by the Office of the President on its earlier Decision involving
the same subject matter, which had already become final and executory?
The antecedent facts of this controversy, as culled from the pleadings, may be stated
as follows:
 1. This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon,
owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation
(NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 14371[3] of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
2. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing
Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a
period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and Growers Agreement duly annotated
in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994.
3. In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and
assessed the land value at P2.38 million.[4]
4. NQSRMDC resisted the DARs action. In February, 1992, it sought and was granted
by the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case No. X-576, a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction which ordered the DAR Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Sumilao,
Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), and their authorized
representatives to desist from pursuing any activity or activities concerning the subject
land until further orders.[5]
5. Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR Regional Director issued a
memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, directing the Land Bank to open a trust account
for P2.38 million in the name of NQSRMDC and to conduct summary proceedings to
determine the just compensation of the subject property. NQSRMDC objected to these
moves and filed on June 9, 1992 an Omnibus Motion to enforce the DARAB order of
March 31, 1992 and to nullify the summary proceedings undertaken by the DAR Regional
Director and Land Bank on the valuation of the subject property.
6. The DARAB, on October 22, 1992, acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by (a)
ordering the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank to seriously comply with the terms of
the order dated March 31, 1992; (b) nullifying the DAR Regional Directors memorandum,
dated May 21, 1992, and the summary proceedings conducted pursuant thereto; and (c)
directing the Land Bank to return the claim folder of Petitioner NQSRMDCs subject
property to the DAR until further orders.[6]
7. The Land Bank complied with the DARAB order and cancelled the trust account it
opened in the name of petitioner NQSRMDC.[7]
8. In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed
by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6,[8] dated January 7, 1993,
designating certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-
Industrial Zones where the subject property is situated.
9. What happened thereafter is well-narrated in the OP (TORRES) Decision of March
29, 1996, pertinent portions of which we quote:
Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March
4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-classifying 144 hectares
of land in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from agricultural to
industrial/institutional with a view of providing an opportunity to attract
investors who can inject new economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise
the income of its people.

Parenthetically, under said section, 4th to 5th class municipalities may

authorize the classification of five percent (5%) of their agricultural land area
and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition.

On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use Committee approved

the said Ordinance. Accordingly, on 11 December 1993, the instant
application for conversion was filed by Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of
NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development Association).

Expressing support for the proposed project, the Bukidnon Provincial Board,
on the basis of a Joint Committee Report submitted by its Committee on
Laws, Committee on Agrarian Reform and Socio-Economic Committee
approved, on 1 February 1994, the said Ordinance now docketed as
Resolution No. 94-95. The said industrial area, as conceived by NQSRMDC
(project proponent) is supposed to have the following components:

1. The Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes the following:

Institute for Continuing Higher Education; Institute for Livelihood Science
(Vocational and Technical School); Institute for Agribusiness Research;
Museum, Library, Cultural Center, and Mindanao Sports Development
Complex which covers an area of 24 hectares;

2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn processing for corn

oil, corn starch, various corn products; rice processing for wine, rice-based
snacks, exportable rice; cassava processing for starch, alcohol and food
delicacies; processing plants, fruits and fruit products such as juices;
processing plants for vegetables processed and prepared for market; cold
storage and ice plant; cannery system; commercial stores; public market; and
abattoir needing about 67 hectares;

3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks for recreation,
horse-back riding, memorial and mini-zoo estimated to cover 33 hectares; and
4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-room hotel,
restaurants, dormitories and a housing project covering an area of 20
hectares.

The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated January 4, 1995,
adopted by the Department of Trade and Industry, Bukidnon Provincial Office,
as one of its flagship projects. The same was likewise favorably
recommended by the Provincial Development Council of Bukidnon; the
municipal, provincial and regional office of the DAR; the Regional Office
(Region X) of the DENR (which issued an Environmental Compliance
Certificate on June 5, 1995); the Executive Director, signing By Authority of
PAUL G. DOMINGUEZ, Office of the President Mindanao; the Secretary of
DILG; and Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo D. Clemente.

In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration, Provincial Irrigation

Office, Bagontaas Valencia, Bukidnon, thru Mr. Julius S. Maquiling, Chief,
Provincial Irrigation Office, interposed NO OBJECTION to the proposed
conversion as long as the development cost of the irrigation systems thereat
which is P2,377.00 per hectare be replenished by the developer x x x. Also,
the Kisolon-San Vicente Irrigators Multi Purpose Cooperative, San Vicente,
Sumilao, Bukidnon, interposed no objection to the proposed conversion of the
land in question as it will provide more economic benefits to the community in
terms of outside investments that will come and employment opportunities
that will be generated by the projects to be put up x x x.

On the same score, it is represented that during the public consultation held at
the Kisolan Elementary School on 18 March 1995 with Director Jose
Macalindong of DAR Central Office and DECS Undersecretary Clemente, the
people of the affected barangay rallied behind their respective officials in
endorsing the project.

Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation, however, on

November 14, 1994, the DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to
approve conversion of lands under Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an
Order denying the instant application for the conversion of the subject land
from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same under the
compulsory coverage of CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all
qualified beneficiaries on the following grounds:

1. The area is considered as a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility;

2. The land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition
(NCA);

3. The existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not

applicable;

4. There is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for the

beneficiaries;

5. The procedures on how the area was identified and reclassified for agro-
industrial project has no reference to Memo Circular No. 54, Series of 1993,
E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and E.O. No. 124, Series of 1993.

A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was filed on January 9,

1995 by applicant but the same was denied (in an Order dated June 7,
1995). [9]

10. Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director to proceed with the
compulsory acquisition and distribution of the property.[10]
11. Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed[11] the order of denial to the
Office of the President and prayed for the conversion/reclassification of the subject land
as the same would be more beneficial to the people of Bukidnon.
12. To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretarys order, NQSRMDC, on June
29, 1995, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition with
preliminary injunction,[12] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37614.
13. Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable Paul G. Dominguez, then
Presidential Assistant for Mindanao, after conducting an evaluation of the proposed
project, sent a memorandum[13] to the President favorably endorsing the project with a
recommendation that the DAR Secretary reconsider his decision in denying the
application of the province for the conversion of the land.
14. Also, in a memorandum[14] to the President dated August 23, 1995, the Honorable
Rafael Alunan III, then Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG), recommended the conversion of the subject land to industrial/institutional use
with a request that the President hold the implementation of the DAR order to distribute
the land in question.
15. On October 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37614, issued a
Resolution[15] ordering the parties to observe status quo pending resolution of the
petition. At the hearing held in said case on October 5, 1995, the DAR, through the
Solicitor General, manifested before the said court that the DAR was merely in the
processing stage of the applications of farmers-claimants and has agreed to respect
status quo pending the resolution of the petition.[16]
 16. In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President, through then Executive
Secretary Ruben D. Torres, issued a Decision in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March
29, 1996, reversing the DAR Secretarys decision, the pertinent portions of which read:

After a careful evaluation of the petition vis--vis the grounds upon which the
denial thereof by Secretary Garilao was based, we find that the instant
application for conversion by the Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is
impressed with merit. To be sure, converting the land in question from
agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities for employment
and bring about real development in the area towards a sustained economic
growth of the municipality. On the other hand, distributing the land to would-be
beneficiaries (who are not even tenants, as there are none) does not
guarantee such benefits.

Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural

land with irrigation facility it maybe appropriate to mention that, as claimed by
petitioner, while it is true that there is, indeed, an irrigation facility in the area,
the same merely passes thru the property (as a right of way) to provide water
to the ricelands located on the lower portion thereof. The land itself, subject of
the instant petition, is not irrigated as the same was, for several years, planted
with pineapple by the Philippine Packing Corporation.

On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory
Acquisition (NCA) and that the existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas
covered by NCA is not applicable, suffice it to state that the said NCA was
declared null and void by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) as early as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC,
the DARAB correctly pointed out that under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657, the
subject property could not validly be the subject of compulsory acquisition until
after the expiration of the lease contract with Del Monte Philippines, a Multi-
National Company, or until April 1994, and ordered the DAR Regional Office
and the Land Bank of the Philippines, both in Butuan City, to `desist from
pursuing any activity or activities covering petitioners land.

On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing family
has already contributed substantially to the land reform program of the
government, as follows: 300 hectares of rice land in Nueva Ecija in the 70s
and another 400 hectares in the nearby Municipality of Impasugong,
Bukidnon, ten (10) years ago, for which they have not received just
compensation up to this time.
Neither can the assertion that there is no clear and tangible compensation
package arrangements for the beneficiaries hold water as, in the first place,
there are no beneficiaries to speak about, for the land is not tenanted as
already stated.

Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the

subject property for agro-industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the very
purpose of the law granting autonomy to local government units in the
management of their local affairs. Stated more simply, the language of
Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no room for any other
interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local government units
autonomy in their local affairs including the power to convert portions of their
agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization and disposition
to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities.

WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said legal mandate
and in view of the favorable recommendations of the various government
agencies abovementioned, the subject Order, dated November 14, 1994 of
the Hon. Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform, is hereby SET ASIDE
and the instant application of NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby APPROVED. [17]

17.On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP decision.
18 On September 11, 1996, in compliance with the OP decision of March 29, 1996,
NQSRMDC and the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) executed a
Memorandum of Agreement whereby the former donated four (4) hectares from the
subject land to DECS for the establishment of the NQSR High School.[18]
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS,
it discovered that the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon
found out that during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with
Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the
President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation,
caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title on August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. T-50264[19] of the Registry of
Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance of
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in the
name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536[20] of the Registry of Deeds of
Bukidnon.
19. Thus, on April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a complaint[21] with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon (Branch 9), docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97,
for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141
others. The RTC then issued a Temporary Restraining Order on April 30, 1997 [22]and a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 19, 1997,[23] restraining the DAR and 141 others from
entering, occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.
 20. Meanwhile, on June 23, 1997, an Order[24] was issued by then Executive Secretary
Ruben D. Torres denying DARs motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond
the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared that the
March 29, 1996 OP decision had already become final and executory.
21. The DAR filed on July 11, 1997 a second motion for reconsideration of the June
23, 1997 Order of the President.
22. On August 12, 1997, the said writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC was
challenged by some alleged farmers before the Court of Appeals through a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44905, praying for the lifting of the
injunction and for the issuance of a writ of prohibition from further trying the RTC case.
23. On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike
in front of the DAR Compound in Quezon City to protest the OP Decision of March 29,
1996. On October 10, 1997, some persons claiming to be farmer-beneficiaries of the
NQSRMDC property filed a motion for intervention (styled as Memorandum In
Intervention) in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424, asking that the OP Decision allowing the
conversion of the entire 144-hectare property be set aside.[25]
24. President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with the strikers and promised to
resolve their grievance within the framework of the law. He created an eight (8)-man Fact
Finding Task Force (FFTF) chaired by Agriculture Secretary Salvador Escudero to look
into the controversy and recommend possible solutions to the problem. [26]
25. On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the strikers protest by
issuing the so-called Win/Win Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary
Renato C. Corona, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of the

President, through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, dated March 29, 1996,
is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1. NQSRMDCs application for conversion is APPROVED only with

respect to the approximately forty-four (44) hectare portion of the
land adjacent to the highway, as recommended by the
Department of Agriculture.

2. The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares

traversed by an irrigation canal and found to be suitable for
agriculture shall be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries in
accordance with RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law with a right of way to said portion from the highway
provided in the portion fronting the highway. For this purpose,
the DAR and other concerned government agencies are directed
to immediately conduct the segregation survey of the area,
 valuation of the property and generation of titles in the name of
the identified farmer-beneficiaries.

3. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to

carefully and meticulously determine who among the claimants
are qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

4. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby further directed to

expedite payment of just compensation to NQSRMDC for the
portion of the land to be covered by the CARP, including other
lands previously surrendered by NQSRMDC for CARP
coverage.

5. The Philippine National Police is hereby directed to render full

assistance to the Department of Agrarian Reform in the
implementation of this Order.

We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113 farmers on

October 10, 1997 without ruling on the propriety or merits thereof since it is
unnecessary to pass upon it at this time.

SO ORDERED. [27]

A copy of the Win-Win Resolution was received by Governor Carlos O. Fortich of

Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B. Baula of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November 24,
1997[28] and, on December 4, 1997, they filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition
(under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court) and injunction with urgent prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction (under Rule 58, ibid.),
against then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona and DAR Secretary Ernesto
D. Garilao.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene[29] was filed by alleged
farmer-beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as
they were previously identified by respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on
the 144-hectare property subject of this case. The motion was vehemently opposed[30] by
the petitioners.
In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners claim that the
Office of the President was prompted to issue the said resolution after a very well-
managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in
pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with this
purely political decision to appease the farmers, by reviving and modifying the Decision
of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final and executory in an Order of 23
June 1997.[31] Thus, petitioners further allege, respondent then Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his
jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997. [32] They
availed of this extraordinary writ of certiorari because there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[33] They never filed a motion for
reconsideration of the subject Resolution because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to law
and it would be a futile exercise to seek a reconsideration .[34]
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition and prayed that
it be dismissed outright on the following grounds:
(1) The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review
directly with the Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Court;
(2) The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Win-Win
Resolution before filing the present petition; and
(3) Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.
These are the preliminary issues which must first be resolved, including the incident
on the motion for intervention filed by the alleged farmer-beneficiaries.
Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is
proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of
jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of
its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal.[35] On the other hand,
an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court,
officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.[36] This error is
correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.[37]
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions,[38] including
the Office of the President,[39] may be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified
petition for review[40] within fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, final order
or resolution,[41] whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions
of fact and law.[42]
However, we hold that, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is
inapplicable considering that the present petition contains an allegation that the
challenged resolution is patently illegal[43] and was issued with grave abuse of discretion
and beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C. Coronas) jurisdiction [44] when said
resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which had
long become final and executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here involves
an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under
Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is
an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have
correctly done. The pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings
of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.

x x x x x x x x x.
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases cases in which the
act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.[45]
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the
assailed illegal act may file a verified petition (for certiorari) in the proper court. The
proper court where the petition must be filed is stated in Section 4 of the same Rule 65
which reads:

SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in
the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or
of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and
unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in
and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (4a)

Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and
Regional Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari,[46]prohibition[47] and mandamus.[48] But the jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are
also delineated in that, if the challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court
or of a corporation, board, officer or person, the petition must be filed with the Regional
Trial Court which exercises jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall
be filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or the Rules of
Court. We have clearly discussed this matter of concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs.
Cuaresma, et. al.,[49] through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:

x x x. This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as

prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts
of First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their
respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial
Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court),
although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14,
1981, the latters competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to
those in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application
therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy
is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior)
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals. (Citations omitted)

But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the
petition filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues
raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been
reiterated in subsequent cases, namely:[50] Uy vs. Contreras, et. al.,[51] Torres vs.
Arranz,[52] Bercero vs. De Guzman,[53] and Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al.[54] As we have
further stated in Cuaresma:

x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue

these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-
crowding of the Courts docket.

Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the
present petition in the interest of speedy justice[55] and to avoid future litigations so as to
promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by
petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem
created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later,
we find the assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their petition
first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice
is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of
Appeals:[56]

Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to

facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has
suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation
whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we
forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been
taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case."

As to the second issue of whether the petitioners committed a fatal procedural lapse
when they failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed resolution before
seeking judicial recourse, suffice it to state that the said motion is not necessary when the
questioned resolution is a patent nullity,[57] as will be taken up later.
With respect to the third issue, the respondents claim that the filing by the petitioners
of: (a) a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No.
37614) with the Court of Appeals; (b) a complaint for annulment and cancellation of title,
damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others (Civil Case No. 2687-97) with the
Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon; and (c) the present petition, constitute
forum shopping.
We disagree.
The rule is that:

There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one

forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts
but also in connection with litigation commenced in the courts while an
administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat
administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative
ruling and a favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in this case, where the
court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction (citations
omitted).

The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum
shopping has been laid down in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA
34), x x x and that is, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in the other, as follows:

There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-
36563 identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions, as well as identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the identity on the
two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other
action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the requisites, in fine,
of auter action pendant.' [58]

It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum
shopping. The test for determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum
shopping is where a final judgment in one case will amount to res adjudicata in the action
under consideration. A cursory examination of the cases filed by the petitioners does not
show that the said cases are similar with each other. The petition for certiorari in the Court
of Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR Secretarys order to proceed with the
compulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject property. On the other hand, the
civil case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of title
issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the
following grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDCs title,
used documents which were earlier declared null and void by the DARAB; (2) the
cancellation of NQSRMDCs title was made without payment of just compensation; and
(3) without notice to NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present petition is entirely
different from the said two cases as it seeks the nullification of the assailed Win-Win
Resolution of the Office of the President dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was
issued long after the previous two cases were instituted.
The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for intervention filed
by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, which we have to deny for lack of merit. In their motion,
movants contend that they are the farmer-beneficiaries of the land in question, hence, are
real parties in interest. To prove this, they attached as Annex I in their motion a Master
List of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged master list was made pursuant to
the directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed Win-Win Resolution which directs
the DAR to carefully and meticulously determine who among the claimants are qualified
farmer-beneficiaries. However, a perusal of the said document reveals that movants are
those purportedly Found Qualified and Recommended for Approval. In other words,
movants are merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit.Real
interest means a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy
or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. [59] Undoubtedly, movants
interest over the land in question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in
interest.
Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants based their motion is,
as intimated earlier, null and void. Hence, their motion for intervention has no leg to stand
on.
Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory Decision dated March
29,1996 can still be substantially modified by the Win-Win Resolution.
We rule in the negative.
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the
Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall,
except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the
lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the
parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such
period.

Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be

allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases. (Emphasis
ours)

It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory
character whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the
Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion
for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case,
more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no
more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent
DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed Win-Win
Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed
to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for
reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided
in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been
entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed,
thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the
Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March
29,1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard
of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.[60] we held:

Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the
President had long become final and executory, the same can no longer be
reviewed by the courts. It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the
decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their
quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of
a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata [Brillantes v.
Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956), Ipekdijna Merchandizing Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax
Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72.] The rule of res
judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by
competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of
public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their
jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers
[Brillantes v. Castro, supra at 503].
 The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court
or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and
regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all. [61] This is a
fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to
litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by
those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must
immediately be struck down.
Therefore, the assailed Win-Win Resolution which substantially modified the Decision
of March 29, 1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void. Such void resolution, as
aptly stressed by Justice Thomas A. Street[62] in a 1918 case,[63] is a lawless thing, which
can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it
exhibits its head.[64]
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Resolution
dated November 7, 1997, issued by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 96-C-
6424, is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Motion For Leave To Intervene filed by
alleged farmer-beneficiaries is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Melo, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003]

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, NAGMAMALASAKIT NA

MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO,
INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-
intervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO,
respondent-in-Intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL,
respondent-in-intervention.

[G.R. No. 160262. November 10, 2003]

SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA

RAZON-ABAD, petitioners, ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL
AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-
intervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT,
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents, JAIME
N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO
Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

[G.R. No. 160263. November 10, 2003]

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M.
CAGAMPANG, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS
LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-
intervention, vs. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, JAIME N.
SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

[G.R. No. 160277. November 10, 2003]

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, WORLD WAR II VETERANS

LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention, vs.JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR.,
FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY
LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN,
EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN
GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ,
ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL
DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-
JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR.,
GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON,
MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR,
WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE
GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO,
FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO
BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO
PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES,
AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR.,
FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS
BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC,
GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT,
JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO,
 GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE,
CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN,
ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-
CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA,
GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO,
CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING
MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO,
MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO
MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA
NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND
RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents, JAIME N.
SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

[G.R. No. 160292. November 10, 2003]

HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA

PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO
C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S.
MALLARI, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. HON.
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P.
NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, JAIME N.
SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

[G.R. No. 160295. November 10, 2003]

SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M.

GONZALES, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS
LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH
THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,
 SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-
intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.

[G.R. No. 160310. November 10, 2003]

LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN

MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO
MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE,
LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA,
MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA,
WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL,
ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME
BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE
ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR.
BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE
RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO
BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA,
SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH
LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO,
MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND
NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND
EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS
LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR.,
THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET
AL., respondents.

[G.R. No. 160318. November 10, 2003]

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs. HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE
SENATE, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160342. November 10, 2003]

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF

THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND
ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A
TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING
PROFESSION, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE
WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160343. November 10, 2003]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE

OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT,
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160360. November 10, 2003]

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE
 SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160365. November 10, 2003]

U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C.

PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS,
LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON,
ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R.
DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G.
AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF
OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND
GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE
IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.

[G.R. No. 160370. November 10, 2003]

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160376. November 10, 2003]

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner, vs. HON. FELIX WILLIAM

FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION
 OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT
AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160392. November 10, 2003]

VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners, vs. THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160397. November 10, 2003]

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF

JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U.
VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.

[G.R. No. 160403. November 10, 2003]

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM
B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH
SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

[G.R. No. 160405. November 10, 2003]

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY
CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU
PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD
MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW,
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF
CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL
LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY
RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION,
[MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ,
FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA],
REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO,
PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY
AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.],
MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST
PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU
CHAPTER, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE
SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR
FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how

passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the
determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope
and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself
provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nations history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at
times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal
branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature
and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses
and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the
present controversy subject of the instant petitions whether the filing of the
second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with
the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question has
resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was
brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient
to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court
unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-
constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally
permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in
adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court
is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of
powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by
no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that
part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has
been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each
of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their
indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government,
intended as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the
good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and
coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting,
interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of
governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the
people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XI

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House
of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within
ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least

one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the
President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from
office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines,
but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial,
and punishment according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the
12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules)
on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment
Rules approved by the 11thCongress. The relevant distinctions between these
[1]

two Congresses House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following

tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II RULE V

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION

OF IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
THE SAME OFFICIAL

Section 2. Mode of Initiating Section 16. Impeachment

Impeachment. Impeachment
shall be initiated only by a
verified complaint for
impeachment filed by any
Member of the House of
Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member
thereof or by a verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment filed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House.
Proceedings Deemed
Initiated. In cases where a
Member of the House files
a verified complaint of
impeachment or a citizen
files a verified complaint
that is endorsed by a
Member of the House
through a resolution of
endorsement against an
impeachable
officer, impeachment
proceedings against such
official are deemed
initiated on the day the
Committee on Justice finds
that the verified complaint
and/or resolution against
such official, as the case
may be, is sufficient in
substance, or on the date
the House votes to
overturn or affirm the
finding of the said
Committee that the
verified complaint and/or
 resolution, as the case may
be, is not sufficient in
substance.
In cases where a verified
complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may
be, by at least one-third
(1/3) of the Members of the
House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the
filing of such verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment with the
Secretary General.

RULE V

BAR AGAINST
IMPEACHMENT

Section 17. Bar Against

Section 14. Scope of Bar. No
Initiation Of Impeachment
impeachment proceedings shall
Proceedings. Within a period of
be initiated against the same
one (1) year from the date
official more than once within
impeachment proceedings are
the period of one (1) year.
deemed initiated as provided in
Section 16 hereof, no
impeachment proceedings, as
such, can be initiated against the
same official.(Italics in the
original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which
[2]

directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of

legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). [3]

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment

complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
[4]

Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for culpable violation of
[5]
the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes. The [6]

complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B.

Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House
[7]

Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of

[8]

Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of
the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same
[9]

on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the [10]

Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary
in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice
voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the
[11]

Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.

[12]

(First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District,

Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third (1/3) of
all the Members of the House of Representatives. [13]

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et.
al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article
XI of the Constitution that [n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that
he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all
available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the
issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of
transcendental importance, and that he himself was a victim of the capricious
and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
introduced by the 12th Congress, posits that his right to bring an impeachment
[14]

complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to
the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted
and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and
prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and
9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus
directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article
IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second
impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of
Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the
Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of
Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens
and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental
importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ
perpetually prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any
Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the
issuance of a writ perpetually prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate
President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against
the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from
proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad
Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public
interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the
impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance
of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings
on said second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court
has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the
cases of Chavez v. PCGG and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay
[15]

Development Corporation, prays in his petition for Injunction that the second
[16]

impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers
and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an
order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting,
approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint,
and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and
Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of
Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional
impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act
proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they
have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of
taxpayers money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme
Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as a class suit and pray that (1)
the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as
all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court
enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing,
trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of
prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from
conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members
are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen,
taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which
does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17
of the House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment
complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and
a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in
their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent
Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the
second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging
that it is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the
Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16
and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment
Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be
permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
 In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be
declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et.
al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit
filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran which was filed in behalf
[17]

of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting

respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further
proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare
as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of
respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the
Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino,
alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and
transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial
Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation
of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance
with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate
and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint
due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in
his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time
they filed the second impeachment complaint, were absolutely without any legal
power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of
Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to
disburse the (JDF).
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L.
Hofilea, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the
subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a
constitutional issue which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their
students, pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing
and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second
impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging
his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is
founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF)
was spent in accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does
not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his
petition To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and
Jurisdiction that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the
issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters
of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that
(1) the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom
be declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be
prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3)
respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment
and from conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens
and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second
impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and
impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and
void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be
prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice
or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from
proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263,
the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court, prayed for the
[18]

issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to

prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the
Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for
the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null
and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295,
which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition
bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No.
260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice
of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and
is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of
Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachment
complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because
the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum, and as reflected
[19]

above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the

Senate.
 Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28,
2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court
rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed
him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its
Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b)
require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the
Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of
November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5,
2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici
curiae. In addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to
[20]

maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in
their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives
through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of
special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no
jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives,
which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the
Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to
initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in
his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela) and [21]

Comment, praying that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings
and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the
impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one
where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant
to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution.[22]

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court
resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b)
require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November
3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate
President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is
concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in
fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue
was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an
impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of
Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the
petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of
Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a Petition for Leave to
Intervene in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295,
questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003
on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a
constitutional deadlock and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the
matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and
to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention.
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No.
160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc. also filed a Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene in
G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentels
Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadras Petition in Intervention were
admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and
the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney
Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues
outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:

Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can
invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this
Court at this time.

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:

a) locus standi of petitioners;

b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);

c) political question/justiciability;

d) Houses exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

e) Senates sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;

 f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section
3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and

g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues

arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions
presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted
and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of
whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for
the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the
substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed
in seriatim.

Judicial Review

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of
judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Courts power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of
the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasis supplied)

Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon

by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions,
[23]

unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article
VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel
discoursed:

x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the

Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and

perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through
their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their
sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to
operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances,
and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said
instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions
and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage,
the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions
embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In
the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of
its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2
of article VIII of our Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine

the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided
for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the
judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act
of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it
by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of
judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as
its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of
the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government. (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
[24]

supplied)

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this moderating power to determine the

proper allocation of powers of the different branches of government and to
direct the course of government along constitutional channels is inherent in all
courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is the
[25]

power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable. [26]

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not
explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has been
set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries. To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v.
Madison that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice
[27]

Marshall, to wit:

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be

the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws
of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the
constitution, have that rank.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms
and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions,
that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument. (Italics in the original; emphasis
[28]

supplied)

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant
in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our
courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts. And as pointed out by noted
[29]

political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V.

Mendoza, the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact
[30]

effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil

Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed

[31]

an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which,

together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock
of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are
utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of

government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow
from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
[32]

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino

Feliciano, x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement
of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, [j]udicial review is
[33]

the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation or instrument of intervention

of the judiciary in that balancing operation. [34]

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse
of discretion by any branch or instrumentalities of government, the afore-
quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into
its history, into block letter law the so-called expanded certiorari jurisdiction of
this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following
excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice
Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience

during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the
role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the
circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had
no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning
particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the
release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of
martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political
question. And the Supreme Court said: Well, since it is political, we have no authority
to pass upon it. The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper
solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment
upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations
thereof during the martial law regime.x x x

xxx

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that
such matters constitute a political question. (Italics in the original; emphasis and
[35]

underscoring supplied)

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this
Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-
settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration, this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando,
[36]

declared:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We
do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that
the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the peoples
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense
they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based
on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are
the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum. (Emphasis and
[37]

underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary in this wise:
[38]

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the

provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason
which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision
and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the
whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that
purpose. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied supplied)
[39]

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue where, speaking

[40]

through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental

principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task
in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided
mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. (Emphasis and underscoring
[41]

supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted

as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon, this Court, through Chief Justice
[42]

Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated

a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without
considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they
permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of
its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other
provisions of that great document. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
[43]

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court

[44]

affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of

the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but
that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into
view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and
one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor
of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may
make the words idle and nugatory. (Emphasis supplied)
[45]
 If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to
other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, this Court expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of

the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as
said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing
the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but
they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less
of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the
force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on
how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's
understanding thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
[46]

It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and

jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents
Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel
argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from
the coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et.
al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial
character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the
impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review. [47]

For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senates sole
power to try impeachment cases (1) entirely excludes the application of
[48]

judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senates power to
determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings. [49]

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment

proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De
Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American
authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United
States. Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over
[50]

impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers

decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try
crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which
impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create
a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief. Respondents likewise point
[51]
to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial
power of review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents and intervenors reliance upon American jurisprudence, the
American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support
the proposition that the Senates sole power to try and decide impeachment
cases, as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to
impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial
review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor
can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the
Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions
incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American
Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within
our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine
constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs.
COMELEC, [i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be
[52]

beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because

they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs. Indeed,
[53]

although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United
States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful
words of Father Bernas, [w]e have cut the umbilical cord.
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme
Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial
review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary
in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts,
as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty,
and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the
Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution
bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without
limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives
[54]

the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several

[55]

limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4)
and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing,
required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and
the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments
undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and
the judiciary.Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship
on the principle that whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment
of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial
willfulness and pride. [56]

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-
mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did
not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language
of Baker v. Carr, judicially discoverable standards for determining the validity
[57]

of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.

The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez and Alejandrino v. Quezon, cited by
[58] [59]

respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond

the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of
petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-
ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power
of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona,
Jr., this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court
[60]

to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the

Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara, in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
[61]

Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the
petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc
v. Pineda, this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of
[62]

Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a

congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative
of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that
[63]

the resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on

Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties
as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial
review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of Representatives
[64]

in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to

judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco, it held that although under the
[65]
Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does
not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of
acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it ruled that [66]

confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member,

irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such
member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member
of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the
system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as
a whole and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another. Both are [67]

integral components of the calibrated system of independence and

interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the
powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts power of

judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject
to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have
standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case.

x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner,
the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government. (Italics in the original)
[68]
Standing

Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and

substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The
gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. [69]

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends

that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained
and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister
and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have
standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public
interest and transcendental importance, and that procedural matters are
[70] [71]

subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the
laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them. Amicus [72]

curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same
opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule
exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by
seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical
reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant
petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest
and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure while [73]

the latter has constitutional underpinnings. In view of the arguments set forth
[74]

regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan,

Inc. v. Morato to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from
[75]

real party-in-interest.

The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted
by authorities thus: It is important to note . . . that standing because of its
constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions
relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to
sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain
parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of
the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the
judiciary in certain areas.

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are
brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or
by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually
sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

xxx

On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is the party
who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails
of the suit. (Citations omitted)
[76]

While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the
petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief
Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own
rights as taxpayers; members of Congress;citizens, individually or in a class
suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession which were supposedly
violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when specific requirements have been met have been given
standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to
show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result
of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about
to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
[77]

right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
[78]

interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the
[79]

power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has

sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement
of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a
general interest common to all members of the public. [80]

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a

taxpayer's suit should be entertained. This Court opts to grant standing to
[81]

most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to
the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief
Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official
action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a [82]

member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the

prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. [83]

While an association has legal personality to represent its

members, especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the
[84]

outcome will affect their vital interests, the mere invocation by the Integrated
[85]

Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to
preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not
suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other
groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that
it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court
in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. It, therefore,
[86]

behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues
presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens,
persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests
of all concerned to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved
[87]

in the suit, for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to

[88]

the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the
class whether or not they were before the court. Where it clearly appears that
[89]

not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent

issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as
a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionally allege standing as
citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
 The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole
ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R.
No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the
following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other
assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a
more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. Applying
[90]

these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are
indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on
the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public. Such liberality does not, however, mean
[91]

that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally
eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such
interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner
Vallejos case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have
standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules
of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both,
or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition
of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention
is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant
shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention. [92]

In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadras case,

they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save
for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and
no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed,
this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,
Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their
right as citizens to intervene, alleging that they will suffer if this insidious scheme
of the minority members of the House of Representatives is successful, this
Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied with.
 Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental
importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a
Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene to raise the additional issue of
whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is
valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of
the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the
respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the
limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with
Senate President Drilons. He alleges that submitting to this Courts jurisdiction
as the Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate
which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are
transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator
Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a
member of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this
reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand,
his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to
argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Sorianos motion to intervene, the same must be
denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the
standing requirement for bringing taxpayers suits as set forth in Dumlao v.
Comelec, to wit:
[93]

x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public

moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is
being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against
abuses of legislative power, or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Citations omitted)
[94]

In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that
the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public
money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest
as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity

In Tan v. Macapagal, this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that
[95]

for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that

something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture. Only then may the courts pass on
[96]

the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an
appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of
the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance
with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the
constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been
carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the
House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act
should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds,
has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant
petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R.
Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a
decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality
anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate
should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law
who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to
encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their
signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an
opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the
Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to
the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are
transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their
constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The deans position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the
Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House
Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a
withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint
since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI
of the Constitution and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their
[97]

injuries.
 Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or
both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that,
as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate
is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of
constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise,
as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section
I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which
is bereft of power to grant it.

Justiciability

In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco, Chief Justice Roberto

[98]

Concepcion defined the term political question, viz:

[T]he term political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum, it refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure. (Italics in the original)
[99]

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without

any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of
cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind
the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of
judicial review. In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature
[100]

of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies. Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive
[101]

Secretary which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was
[102]

ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and
took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political
question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine
to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime
motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional
Commissioner, to clarify this Courts power of judicial review and its application
on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual
comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the
service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the
judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the
power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and
is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the
bodys indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on
the Judiciary.

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience

during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but
the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by
the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then
had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning
particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the
release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and
effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political
question. And the Supreme Court said: Well, since it is political, we have no
authority to pass upon it. The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a
proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an
encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further
violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar
are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission
who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme
Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not
mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22, although the proclamation
was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that
the administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September
21.So that when martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly
published anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only
because our main writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who
succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of
the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and
by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the
fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial
law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were
picked up. One of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the
unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of
Malacaang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973
Constitution was presented to the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the
President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some
provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less public
discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to
allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be
held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague,
Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution
was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that Malacaang felt the danger of
its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and
announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held from January
10 to January 15.But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not
announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision
not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as citizens
assemblies or barangays. Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be
propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was
unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should
be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the
Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When the
motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to
the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was
already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the
referendum favored the Constitution.Immediately after the departure of the Minister
of Justice, I proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then
informed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the
1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null
and void. The main defense put up by the government was that the issue was a
political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.

xxx

The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the
vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the
Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any
referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in
the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.

In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the
members of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.

Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference

between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the
defense that the issue was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the
case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of political question was
set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.

x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was
clearly justiciable.

xxx

x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced
the following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political question?

The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual
controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and
enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a
judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling
to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: We can tell your wife what her duties
as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her
physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights
guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion
would be highly derogatory to human dignity.

This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable or enforceable . . .

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a
presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has, also another
important function.The powers of government are generally considered divided
into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is
supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that
supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in
courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that
such matters constitute a political question.

I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an
initial food for thought on the subject of the judiciary. (Italics in the original;
[103]

emphasis supplied)

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice

Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:

MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term judicial power but judicial
power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as
may be created by law.

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify
political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.

MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression judicial power?

MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but
where there is a question as to whether the government had authority or had
abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction,
that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.

xxx

FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the

Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for votes.

On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political

question doctrine?

MR. CONCEPCION. No.

FR. BERNAS. It is not.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion,

amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .

FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do
away with the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.

When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial
power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, judicial power includes and the
reason being that the definition that we might make may not cover all possible
areas.

FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the
political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political
questions are beyond the pale of judicial power. (Emphasis supplied)
[104]

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty,
a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called
the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify,
however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with truly
political questions. From this clarification it is gathered that there are two
species of political questions: (1) truly political questions and (2) those which
are not truly political questions.
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for
respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other
hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review
questions which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP
College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction
over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present
Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus, [105]
this Court, speaking through Madame Justice
Irene Cortes, held:

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens
the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions,
would have normally left to the political departments to decide. x x x [106]

In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, [107]

through Justice Teodoro
Padilla, this Court declared:

The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform
under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, (t)he political question
doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival
claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to
this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the
principle in appropriate cases. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
[108]

And in Daza v. Singson, [109]

speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court
ruled:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before
us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even
the political question. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
[110]

Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable
political questions and non-justiciable political questions,
however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be
problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v.
Carr attempts to provide some:
[111]

x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question. (Underscoring supplied)
[112]

Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are
not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the
presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American
concept of judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less
discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-
justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there
are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether
the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section
3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial
Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally
mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
 IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI
of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article
XI of the Constitution.

The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint
over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of
this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes
an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question
which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such
an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. [113]

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds

for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public
trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the
1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better
way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high
crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without
arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor. Clearly, the [114]

issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is
beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.

Lis Mota

It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the

constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever
possible. Thus, in the case ofSotto v. Commission on Elections, this Court [115]

held:

x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional

question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is
raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some
other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case
arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable. [Emphasis [116]

and underscoring supplied]

The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian

Reform, where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No.
[117]

6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial
inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination,
the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party,
and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the
case itself. [Emphasis supplied]
[118]

Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is
truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the
invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several
constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly
be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining
substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related
cannon of adjudication that the court should not form a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied. [119]

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among
other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly
resulted from a Resolution calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which
[120]

Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be

unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on
investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the
judiciary.
[121]

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.s claims, it is the
studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said
Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of
the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of
said issue would, in the Courts opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional
law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in
general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these
consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said
petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition which would
not be adversely affected by the Courts ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative
inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate
Blue Ribbon Commttee, viz:[122]
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not,
therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted
provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure and that the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. It
follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected,
including the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against
ones self.
[123]

In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino

Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al.,
introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was
verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3
(4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at

least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles
of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives

signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the
requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment was not filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House. With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and
Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the
same merely as a Resolution of Endorsement. Intervenors point to the
Verification of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:

We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the

abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B.
Fuentebella x x x[124]
 Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution
requires in order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically
become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin
forthwith, is that the verified complaint be filed, not merely endorsed, by at least
one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having complied
with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint
should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice
under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of
the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

Intervenors foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined

that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76
or more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment
complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution
of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the
House of Representatives as endorsersis not the resolution of impeachment
contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being
necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified
impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra,
does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on
impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as
the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact
that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262,
have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment
complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the
instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the
original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other
petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary
for the determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said
intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et.
al., adopting the latters arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they
are not unduly prejudiced by this Courts decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as
they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether
Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second
impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

Judicial Restraint

Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground
that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and
decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of
judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that
[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the
impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to
impeachment. But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has
[125]

a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of
the House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option
before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not
legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other
tribunal to which the controversy may be referred. Otherwise, this Court would
[126]

be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the
Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-
bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions. In the august words
[127]

of amicus curiae Father Bernas, jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn

duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would
be a dereliction of duty.
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of
government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no
other office has the authority to do so. On the occasion that this Court had
[128]

been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the
matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and,
as always, with detachment and fairness. After all, by [his] appointment to the
[129]

office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that
[he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied
contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to
render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to
be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking
in [his] office.
[130]

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had

already been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal. In that[131]

case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a
Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from
the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of
them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would
have reduced the Tribunals membership to only its three Justices-Members
whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This
Court held:

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator
sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the
same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty
that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if
shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not prevented
from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of
which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by
no less than the fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the
Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that
would involve all Senatorselect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment
thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections
when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet
the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or
for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may
be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of
vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal.
Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before
said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain
from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.
What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and
that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the
power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto, [132]

it was held that:

Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of

them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as
established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his
judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise
the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the
deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial
power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The
proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no
alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of Justices. (Italics in the original)
[133]

Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when
it exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba, this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the
[134]

seven pillars of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US

Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA as follows: [135]

1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-
adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions is legitimate only in
the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly
suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.

2. The Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it. . . . It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.
3. The Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is to be applied.

4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be
decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.
Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under
the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be
sustained on an independent state ground.

5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who
fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this
rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a
personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in
the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes,
the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the
Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the
challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the
Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one
who has availed himself of its benefits.

7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will
first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided (citations omitted).

The foregoing pillars of limitation of judicial review, summarized

in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the
case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the
statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
 6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.

As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in

the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[136]

Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial
restraint the possibility that judicial review of impeachments might also lead to
embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary. They stress
the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial
hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk
serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded
the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official. Intervenor Soriano [137]

echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its
Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial
authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly
stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a
constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the
Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their
constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a
crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to
act.

x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not

regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of
the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also political
consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to
grant the petitioners prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of
votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a
decision for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows. [138]

Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary where this Court was split and
[139]

in the end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain
respondents claims, the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which
[140]

paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the
coordinate branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner and
not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of
the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of
government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval,
violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law
of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by
the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit: [141]

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public
officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam
unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the
duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of
men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its
authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and
ought to protect and enforce it without fear or favor, resist encroachments by
governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.
[142]

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure

for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress

Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia,

argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do
not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that
the term initiate does not mean to file; that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the
House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean to file
because filing can, asSection 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only
be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment
by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the
members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that
the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against
the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been
initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet
to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term
initiate. Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution,
Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice
of this Court, agreed on the meaning of initiate as to file, as proffered and
explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional
Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus
curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on
November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of initiating included the act
of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the
word initiate as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution
means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
Initiate of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do,
to begin, to commence, or set going. As Websters Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means to perform
or facilitate the first action, which jibes with Justice Regalados position, and that
of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant
petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:

Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts

consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the
articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative
moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or
the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.

Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives
Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is deemed initiated when the
Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a
contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say impeachment
proceedings are initiated but rather are deemed initiated.The language is recognition
that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to
a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking

into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the
substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals
and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action.

However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution
on impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of
this body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last
impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the
information of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the
impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker
committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal
referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of

the approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just
make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that
the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on
the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment
is the one approved by the body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it
appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite
examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon
wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the
resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who
approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or
disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could
help in rearranging these words because we have to be very technical about this. I
have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S.
Congress.The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard
Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already
decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of
Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in
keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the
United States regarding impeachment.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that
on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: to
initiate impeachment proceedings and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the
word resolution the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter i in
impeachment and replace the word by with OF, so that the whole section will now
read: A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the
Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of
Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the
verified complaintand every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles
of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words Articles of Impeachment are
mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-
third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that
my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the
uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States
Congress. Thank you, Madam President. (Italics in the original; emphasis and
[143]

udnerscoring supplied)

This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and

accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers. [144]

It is thus clear that the framers intended initiation to start with the filing of
the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained
that the obvious reason in deleting the phrase to initiate impeachment
proceedings as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was
to settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the
vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not
initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the
filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of
the Constitution. [145]

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view

as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, that the word initiate as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to
file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to
set the complaint moving.
 During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the
word initiate, appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:

Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate
all cases of impeachment.

xxx

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)

refers to two objects, impeachment case and impeachment proceeding.

Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is to
initiate. The object in the first sentence is impeachment case. The object in the
second sentence is impeachment proceeding. Following the principle
of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term cases must be distinguished from the
term proceedings. An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be
decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House,
by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in
that sense that the House has exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to
initiate a case in the Senate, a proceeding must be followed to arrive at a
conclusion. A proceeding must be initiated. To initiate, which comes from the
Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a
progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not
in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the
filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives
or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the
Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper
Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the
resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution
must be forwarded to the House for further processing;and (4) there is the
processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either
affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary
resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all
the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and
transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House initiates an
impeachment case. It is at this point that an impeachable public official is
successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment case before the Senate as impeachment court.
 Father Bernas further explains: The impeachment proceeding is not initiated
when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end
of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the
trial. Neither is the impeachment proceeding initiated when the House
deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or
beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified
complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is
the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary
meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that A vote of at
least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate
impeachment proceedings, this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the
ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding
but rather the filing of a complaint does. Thus the line was deleted and is not
[146]

found in the present Constitution.

Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, No impeachment
proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year, it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this
interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of to
initiate which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the
people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary
people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning,
they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse
it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can
initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment, This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the
principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating impeachment cases with
impeachment proceeding.
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus
curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt
that the term to initiate refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled
with Congress taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and
referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee
on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules,
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the
House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the
finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution
is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These
rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term
initiate a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court
could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of
Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino wherein this Court stated that
[147]

their personal opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the

Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Courts
our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded
utterances of debates and proceedings. Further citing said case, he states that
this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to
actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators
may know more about the real meaning because of the latters balanced
perspectives and disinterestedness. [148]

Justice Gutierrezs statements have no application in the present

petitions. There are at present only two members of this Court who participated
in the 1986 Constitutional Commission Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf
Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for
obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal
opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has
examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of
Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power
to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is
premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate
its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.
 Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that The Congress shall promulgate its
rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section. Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by
the phrase to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. Hence, these
rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules
were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly
provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:

Section 3. (1) x x x

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House
of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within
ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to
either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least

one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then
it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning
of the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmea v. Pendatun, this Court held that it is within the province of
[149]

either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of
what constituted disorderly behavior of its members. However, in Paceta v.
Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, Justice (later Chief Justice)
[150]

Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis
in United States v. Smith, declared that where the construction to be given to
[151]
a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question
becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia, quoting United States v.
[152]

Ballin, Joseph & Co., Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held
[153]

that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the
result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all
matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same
case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the
Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity
of the Rules of Congress, viz:

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-
justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of
power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the
principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the
interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to
view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first
defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It
held:

xxx

The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the
rules of its proceedings. It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had,
prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of
members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall
be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the
names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the
presence of a quorum to do business.(House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is
as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own
motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the
Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the
advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters
for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not
by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there
should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within
these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and
it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different
one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is
not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to
be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond
the challenge of any other body or tribunal.

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of
congressional rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined
by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any
constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method
had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining
Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere
invocation of the principle of separation of powers. [154]

xxx

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to

categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover
up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution
was intentionally cobbled to empower courts x x x to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. This
power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions.It
was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state
constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view
of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were
shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question
doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the
CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis--vis the
Executive and the Legislative departments of government. [155]

xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere
power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the
Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or
instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the
Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other
branches of government despite their more democratic character, the President and
the legislators being elected by the people.[156]

xxx

The provision defining judicial power as including the duty of the courts of justice. . .
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission
to upgrade the powers of this court vis--vis the other branches of government. This
provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a
stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x
x

xxx

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government
committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this
Court from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct
experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935
and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by
initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift
in stress this Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding
out what it should not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn
duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new
constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters
of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to
our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise
this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding
timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other
branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our
courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel
provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its
interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should
provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners. (Italics in the original
[157]

emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant

petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and the
Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives rely on Nixon v. US as [158]

basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of
Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed,
the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that the House of
Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment. It adds nothing
more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this sole power is to be
exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court
concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning does
not hold with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of
Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes
several provisions articulating how that exclusive power is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if
there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms
or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement
before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the
House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term
initiate a meaning different from filing.

Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
 In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Conclusion

If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a

phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and collective
consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict
or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy
over the Davide impeachment.For many of us, the past two weeks have proven
to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both
sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they
respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues
involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the
impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar
slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society -
from the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith
offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of
the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting
instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment
had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued
to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the
House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject
respondent public official.When the present petitions were knocking so to speak
at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made
through what are now the arguments of lack of jurisdiction, non-justiciability,
and judicial self-restraint aimed at halting the Court from any move that may
have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the
question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already
explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for
its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over
an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation
of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue
of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and
competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation
of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or
problem that squarely falls under the Courts jurisdiction, no other course of
action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the
process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy,
is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved
on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings
initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed
one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction
where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly
political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert
judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the
government. Rather, the raison detre of the judiciary is to complement the
discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring about
ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society
upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality
of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this
Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members
interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief
Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has
long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal
rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court
has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood
to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations
could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and
the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions
just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an
incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a
government branchs official act as tested by the limits set by the
Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the
judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this
entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as
likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case,
which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any
legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential
to the laws moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and
obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or
instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality
other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and
ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-
profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the
law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the
Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody
else. The law is solicitous of every individuals rights irrespective of his station
in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put
to test once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario
Davide.Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in
search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in
government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have
found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it
went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can
resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently,
the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC., petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS, respondents.
Manuel C. Briones, Vicente G. Sinco, Manuel V. Gallego and Enrique M. Fernando for
petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Assistant Solicitor General Francisco
Carreon for respondents.

DECISION
BENGZON, J.:
The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No.
3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional, because: A. They deprive
owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without
due process of law; B. They deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their
children for civic efficiency; and C. Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education
unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful
delegation of legislative power.
A printed memorandum explaining their position in extenso is attached to the record.
The Government’s legal representative submitted a mimeographed memorandum contending
that, (1) the matter constitutes no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of
deciding the constitutional questions; (2) petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity
of the said acts; and (3) the Acts are constitutionally valid.
Petitioners submitted a lengthy reply to the above arguments.
Act No. 2706 approved in 1917 is entitled, “An Act making the inspection and recognition of
private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction.” Under its
provisions, the Department of Education has, for the past 37 years, supervised and regulated
all private schools in this country apparently without audible protest, nay, with the general
acquiescence of the general public and the parties concerned.
It should be understandable, then, that this Court should be doubly reluctant to consider
petitioner’s demand for avoidance of the law aforesaid, specially where, as respondents
assert, petitioners suffered no wrong—nor allege any—from the enforcement of the criticized
statute.
It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one
which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising
in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline
the responsibility. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p. 332.)
When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important rights have become
dependent thereon, the Court may refuse to consider an attack on its validity. (C. J. S., 16, p.
204.)
As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent
that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the
protection of the rights of the parties concerned. (16 C. J. S., p. 207.)
In support of their first proposition petitioners contend that the right of a citizen to own and
operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous
governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to
censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government.
Petitioners obviously refer to section 3 of Act No. 2706 as amended which provides that
before a private school may be opened to the public it must first obtain a permit from the
Secretary of Education. The Solicitor General on the other hand points out that none of the
petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and
are actually operating by virtue of their permits.1 And they do not assert that the respondent
Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong
under the terms of law—and, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain.
It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of
sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely
a general to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action
he must show that he has sustained or is interest common to all members of the public. (Ex
parte Levitt, 302 U. S. 633 82 L. Ed. 493.)
Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to
show that he is injured by its operation. (Tyler vs. Judges, 179 U. S.
405; Hendrick vs. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610; Coffman vs. Breeze Corp., 323 U. S. 316-325.)
The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigant
require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a
hypothetical threat being insufficient. (United Public Works vs. Mitchell, 330 U .S. 75; 91 L.
Ed. 754.)
Bona fide suit.—Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies.
The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of such cases
where conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as
contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as necessity
in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants. (Tañada and
Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, p. 1138.)
Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit
of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy. (Cf. Com. ex
rel Watkins vs. Winchester Waterworks (Ky.), 197 S. W. 2d. 771.)
And action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and positive relief.
(Salonga vs. Warner Barnes, L-2245, January, 1951.) Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid the
problem may be. This is specially true where the issues “reach constitutional dimensions, for
then there comes into play regard for the court’s duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues
unless avoidance becomes evasion.” (Rice vs. Sioux City, U. S. Sup. Ct. Adv. Rep., May 23,
1995, Law Ed., Vol. 99, p. 511.)
The above notwithstanding, in view of the several decisions of the United States Supreme
Court quoted by petitioners, apparently outlawing censorship of the kind objected to by them,
we have decided to look into the matter, lest they may allege we refuse to act even in the
face of clear violation of fundamental personal rights of liberty and property.
Petitioners complain that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the
Secretary of Education. Such requirement was not originally included in Act No. 2706. It was
introduced by Commonwealth Act No. 180 approved in 1936. Why?
In March 1924 the Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 3162 creating a Board of
Educational Survey to make a study and survey of education in the Philippines and of all
educational institutions, facilities and agencies thereof. A Board chairmaned by Dr. Paul
Munroe, Columbia University, assisted by a staff of carefully selected technical members
performed the task, made a five-month thorough and impartial examination of the local
educational system, and submitted a report with recommendations, printed as a book of 671
pages. The following paragraphs are taken from such report:
PRIVATE-ADVENTURE SCHOOLS
There is no law or regulation in the Philippine Islands today to prevent a person, however
disqualified by ignorance, greed, or even immoral character, from opening a school to teach
the young. Itis true that in order to post over the door “Recognized by the Government,” a
private adventure school must first be inspected by the proper Government official, but a
refusal to grant such recognition does not by any means result in such a school ceasing to
exist. As a matter of fact, there are more such unrecognized private schools than of the
recognized variety. How many, no one knows, as the Division of Private Schools keeps
records only of the recognized type.
Conclusion.—An unprejudiced consideration of the fact presented under the caption Private
Adventure Schools leads but to one conclusion, viz.: the great majority of them from primary
grade to university are money-making devices for the profit of those who organize and
administer them. The people whose children and youth attend them are not getting what they
pay for. It is obvious that the system constitutes a great evil. That it should be permitted to
exist with almost no supervision is indefensible. The suggestion has been made with the
reference to the private institutions of university grade that some board of control be
organized under legislative control to supervise their administration. The Commission
believes that the recommendations it offers at the end of this chapter are more likely to bring
about the needed reforms.
Recommendations.—The Commission recommends that legislation be enacted to prohibit
the opening of any school by an individual or organization without the permission of the
Secretary of Public Instruction. That before granting such permission the Secretary assure
himself that such school measures up to proper standards in the following respects, and that
the continued existence of the school be dependent upon its continuing to conform to these
conditions:
(1) The location and construction of the buildings, the lighting and ventilation of the rooms,
the nature of the lavatories, closets, water supply, school furniture and apparatus, and
methods of cleaning shall be such as to insure hygienic conditions for both pupils and
teachers.
(2) The library and laboratory facilities shall be adequate to the needs of instruction in the
subjects taught.
(3) The classes shall not show an excessive number of pupils per teacher. The Commission
recommends 40 as a maximum.
(4) The teachers shall meet qualifications equal to those of teachers in the public schools of
the same grade.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of these findings and recommendations, can there be any doubt that the Government
in the exercise of its police power to correct “a great evil” could validly establish the “previous
permit” system objected to by petitioners? This is what differentiates our law from the other
statutes declared invalid in other jurisdictions. And if any doubt still exists, recourse may now
be had to the provision of our Constitution that “All educational institutions shall be under the
supervision and subject to regulation by the State.” (Art. XIV, sec. 5.) The power to regulate
establishments or business occupations implies the power to require a permit or license. (53
C. J. S. 4.)
What goes for the “previous permit” naturally goes for the power to revoke such permit on
account of violation of rules or regulations of the Department.
II. This brings us to the petitioners’ third proposition that the questioned statutes “conferring
on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards
constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.”
This attack is specifically aimed at section 1 of Act No. 2706 which, as amended, provides:
It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of
efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish
adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction given
in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have
authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the
efficiency of instruction given in the same,
“Nowhere in this Act” petitioners argue “can one find any description, either general or
specific, of what constitutes a ‘general standard of efficiency.’ Nowhere in this Act is there
any indication of any basis or condition to ascertain what is ‘adequate instruction to the public.’
Nowhere in this Act is there any statement of conditions, acts, or factors, which the Secretary
of Education must take into account to determine the ‘efficiency of instruction.'”
The attack on this score is also extended to section 6 which provides:
The Department of Education shall from time to time prepare and publish in pamphlet form
the minimum standards required of primary, intermediate, and high schools, and colleges
granting the degrees of Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Science, or any other academic degree.
It shall also from time to time prepare and publish in pamphlet form the minimum standards
required of law, medical, dental, pharmaceutical, engineering, agricultural and other medical
or vocational schools or colleges giving instruction of a technical, vocational or professional
character.
Petitioners reason out, “this section leaves everything to the uncontrolled discretion of the
Secretary of Education or his department. The Secretary of Education is given the power to
fix the standard. In plain language, the statute turns over to the Secretary of Education the
exclusive authority of the legislature to formulate standard. . . ..”
It is quite clear the two sections empower and require the Secretary of Education to prescribe
rules fixing minimum standards of adequate and efficient instruction to be observed by all
such private schools and colleges as may be permitted to operate. The petitioners contend
that as the legislature has not fixed the standards, “the provision is extremely vague, indefinite
and uncertain”—and for that reason constitutionality objectionable. The best answer is that
despite such alleged vagueness the Secretary of Education has fixed standards to ensure
adequate and efficient instruction, as shown by the memoranda fixing or revising curricula,
the school calendars, entrance and final examinations, admission and accreditation of
students etc.; and the system of private education has, in general, been satisfactorily in
operation for 37 years. Which only shows that the Legislature did and could, validly rely upon
the educational experience and training of those in charge of the Department of Education to
ascertain and formulate minimum requirements of adequate instruction as the basis of
government recognition of any private school.
At any rate, petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or
interfered with their operation. Wherefore, no reason exists for them to assail the validity of
the power nor the exercise of the power by the Secretary of Education.
True, the petitioners assert that, the Secretary has issued rules and regulations “whimsical
and capricious” and that such discretionary power has produced arrogant inspectors who
“bully heads and teachers of private schools.” Nevertheless, their remedy is to challenge
those regulations specifically, and/or to ring those inspectors to book, in proper administrative
or judicial proceedings—not to invalidate the law. For it needs no argument, to show that
abuse by the officials entrusted with the execution of a statute does not per se demonstrate
the unconstitutionality of such statute.
Anyway, we find the defendants’ position to be sufficiently sustained by the decision in Alegra
vs. Collector of Customs, 53 Phil., 394 upon holding the statute that authorized the Director
of Agriculture to “designate standards for the commercial grades of abaca, maguey and sisal”
against vigorous attacks on the ground of invalid delegation of legislative power.
Indeed “adequate and efficient instruction” should be considered sufficient, in the same way
as “public welfare” “necessary in the interest of law and order” “public interest” and “justice
and equity and substantial merits of the case” have been held sufficient as legislative
standards justifying delegation of authority to regulate. (See Tañada and
Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, p. 793, citing Philippine cases.)
On this phase of the litigation we conclude that there has been no undue delegation of
legislative power.
In this connection, and to support their position that the law and the Secretary of Education
have transcended the governmental power of supervision and regulation, the petitioners
appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the said Department. However they
failed to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for being
“capricious,” or pain “nuisance”; and it is one of our decisional practices that unless a
constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately argued, the court will
not consider it. (Santiago vs. Far Eastern, 73 Phil., 408.)
We are told that such list will give an idea of how the statute has placed in the hands of the
Secretary of Education complete control of the various activities of private schools, and why
the statute should be struck down as unconstitutional. It is clear in our opinion that the statute
does not in express terms give the Secretary complete control. It gives him powers to inspect
private schools, to regulate their activities, to give them official permits to operate under
certain conditions, and to revoke such permits for cause. This does not amount
to complete control. If any of such Department circulars or memoranda issued by the
Secretary go beyond the bounds of regulation and seeks to establish complete control, it
would surely be invalid. Conceivably some of them are of this nature, but besides not having
before us the text of such circulars, the petitioners have omitted to specify. In any event with
the recent approval of Republic Act No. 1124 creating the National Board of Education,
opportunity for administrative correction of the supposed anomalies or encroachments is
amply afforded herein petitioners. A more expeditious and perhaps more technically
competent forum exists, wherein to discuss the necessity, convenience or relevancy of the
measures criticized by them. (See also Republic Act No. 176.)
If however the statutes in question actually give the Secretary control over private schools,
the question arises whether the power of supervision and regulation granted to the State by
section 5 Article XIV was meant to include control of private educational institutions. It is
enough to point out that local educators and writers think the Constitution provides for control
of Education by the State. (See Tolentino, Government of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. II,
p. 615; Benitez, Philippine Social Life and Progress, p. 335.)
The Constitution (it) “provides for state control of all educational institutions” even as it
enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral
character, personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in
the duties of citizenship. (Malcolm & Laurel, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1936.)
The Solicitor General cites many authorities to show that the power to regulate means power
to control, and quotes from the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to prove that
State control of private education was intended by the organic law. It is significant to note that
the Constitution grants power to supervise and to regulate. Which may mean greater power
than mere regulation.
III. Another grievance of petitioners—probably the most significant—is the assessment of 1
per cent levied on gross receipts of all private schools for additional Government expenses
in connection with their supervision and regulation. The statute is section 11-A of Act No.
2706 as amended by Republic Act No. 74 which reads as follows:
SEC. 11-A. The total annual expense of the Office of Private Education shall be met by the
regular amount appropriated in the annual Appropriation Act: Provided, however, That for
additional expenses in the supervision and regulation of private schools, colleges and
universities and in the purchase of textbook to be sold to student of said schools, colleges
and universities and President of the Philippines may authorize the Secretary of Instruction
to levy an equitable assessment from each private educational institution equivalent to one
percent of the total amount accruing from tuition and other fees: . . . and non-payment of the
assessment herein provided by any private school, college or university shall be sufficient
cause for the cancellation by the Secretary of Instruction of the permit for recognition granted
to it.
Petitioners maintain that this is a tax on the exercise of a constitutional right—the right to
open a school, the liberty to teach etc. They claim this is unconstitutional, in the same way
that taxes on the privilege of selling religious literature or of publishing a newspaper—both
constitutional privileges—have been held, in the United States, to be invalid as taxes on the
exercise of a constitutional right.
The Solicitor General on the other hand argues that insofar as petitioners’ action attempts to
restrain the further collection of the assessment, courts have no jurisdiction to restrain the
collection of taxes by injunction, and in so far as they seek to recover fees already paid the
suit, it is one against the State without its consent. Anyway he concludes, the action involving
“the legality of any tax impost or assessment” falls within the original jurisdiction of Courts of
First Instance.
There are good grounds in support of Government’s position. If this levy of 1 per cent is truly
a mere fee—and not a tax—to finance the cost of the Department’s duty and power to regulate
and supervise private schools, the exaction may be upheld; but such point involves
investigation and examination of relevant data, which should best be carried out in the lower
courts. If on the other hand it is a tax, petitioners’ issue would still be within the original
jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance.
The last grievance of petitioners relates to the validity of Republic Act No. 139 which in its
section 1 provides:
The textbooks to be used in the private schools recognized or authorized by the government
shall be submitted to the Board (Board of Textbooks) which shall have the power to prohibit
the use of any of said textbooks which it may find to be against the law or to offend the dignity
and honor of the government and people of the Philippines, or which it may find to be against
the general policies of the government, or which it may deem pedagogically unsuitable.
This power of the Board, petitioners aver, is censorship in “its baldest form”. They cite two U.
S. cases (Miss. and Minnesota) outlawing statutes that impose previous restraints upon
publication of newspapers, or curtail the right of individuals to disseminate teachings critical
of government institutions or policies.
Herein lies another important issue submitted in the cause. The question is really whether the
law may be enacted in the exercise of the State’s constitutional power (Art. XIV, sec. 5) to
supervise and regulate private schools. If that power amounts to control of private schools,
as some think it is, maybe the law is valid. In this connection we do not share the belief that
section 5 has added new power to what the State inherently possesses by virtue of the police
power. An express power is necessarily more extensive than a mere implied power. For
instance, if there is conflict between an express individual right and the express power to
control private education it cannot off-hand be said that the latter must yield to the former—
conflict of two express powers. But if the power to control education is merely implied from
the police power, it is feasible to uphold the express individual right, as was probably the
situation in the two decisions brought to our attention, of Mississippi and Minnesota, states
where constitutional control of private schools is not expressly produced.
However, as herein previously noted, no justiciable controversy has been presented to us.
We are not informed that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that the
petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing
substantial privileges or rights for so refusing.
The average lawyer who reads the above quoted section of Republic Act 139 will fail to
perceive anything objectionable. Why should not the State prohibit the use of textbooks that
are illegal, or offensive to the Filipinos or adverse to governmental policies or educationally
improper? What’s the power of regulation and supervision for? But those trained to the
investigation of constitutional issues are likely to apprehend the danger to civil liberties, of
possible educational dictatorship or thought control, as petitioners’ counsel foresee with
obvious alarm. Much depends, however, upon the execution and implementation of the
statute. Not that constitutionality depends necessarily upon the law’s effects. But if the Board
on Textbooks in its actuations strictly adheres to the letter of the section and wisely steers a
middle course between the Scylla of “dictatorship” and the Charybdis of “thought control”, no
cause for complaint will arise and no occasion for judicial review will develop. Anyway, and
again, petitioners now have a more expeditious remedy thru an administrative appeal to the
National Board of Education created by Republic Act 1124.
Of course it is necessary to assure herein petitioners, that when and if, the dangers they
apprehend materialize and judicial intervention is suitably invoked, after all administrative
remedies are exhausted, the courts will not shrink from their duty to delimit constitutional
boundaries and protect individual liberties.
IV. FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, reserving to the petitioners the right
to institute in the proper court, and at the proper time, such actions as may call for decision
of the issue herein presented by them, this petition for prohibition will be DENIED. SO
ORDERED.
Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., and Jugo, JJ., concur.
EN BANC

JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., G.R. No. 178624

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
*
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:

Respondent.
June 30, 2009

x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the petition for certiorari[1] filed by Jose Concepcion, Jr.

(petitioner) seeking to set aside the En Banc Resolution dated 02 April
2007 and Order dated 8 May 2007 of respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC).[2]
The petition cites and quotes the assailed rulings, then recites that on January
5, 2007, the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) filed a
Petition for Accreditation to Conduct the Operation Quick Count with the
COMELEC, docketed as SSP No. 07-001.[3] The present petitioner then the
incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay Forbes Park, Makati City was one of the
signatories of the NAMFREL petition in his capacity as the National Chairman of
NAMFREL.

On the same date, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No.

[4]
7798 (Resolution 7798) that reads in full

WHEREAS, Section 3 of Executive Order [EO] No. 94

dated March 2, 1987, provides as follows:

Sec. 3. Prohibition on barangay officials.

No barangay official shall be appointed as member of the
Board of Election Inspectors or as official watcher of each
duly registered major political party or any socio-civic,
religious, professional or any similar organization of which
they may be members.

WHEREAS, the barangay is the smallest political unit of

government and it is a widely accepted fact that barangay officials wield
tremendous influence on their constituents or the residents in
the barangay;

WHEREAS, the Boards of Election Inspectors [BEIs] are charged

with the duty of maintaining the regularity and orderliness of the election
proceedings in each precinct to the end that elections will be honest,
orderly, peaceful and credible:

WHEREAS, records of past political exercises show that on

election day, the Commission on Elections usually receive numerous
complaints against barangay officials entering polling places and
interfering in proceedings of the BEIs thereby causing not only delay in
the proceedings, but also political tension among the BEIs, the voters and
the watchers in the polling place;

NOW THEREFORE, to insure that elections are peaceful, orderly,

regular and credible, the Commission on Elections, by virtue of the powers
vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code [OEC], EO
No. 94, and other election laws RESOLVED to prohibit, as it hereby
RESOLVES to prohibit:
 1. The appointment of barangay officials which includes
the Punong Barangay, Barangay
Kagawad, Barangay Secretary, Barangay Treasurer,
and BarangayTanod, as Chairman/person and/or Member of the BEIs or
as official watcher of any candidate, duly registered major political party,
or any similar organization, or any socio-civic, religious, professional
[sic], in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. The prohibition
extends to barangay officials, employees and tanods, who are
members of accredited citizens arms.

2. The barangay officials, employees and tanods from

staying inside any polling place, except to cast their vote. Accordingly,
they should leave the polling place immediately after casting their
vote.

This Resolution shall take effect on the seventh day after the
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in
the Philippines.

The Education and Information Department shall cause the

publication of this Resolution in two (2) daily newspapers of general
circulation and shall furnish copies thereof to all field officers of the
Commission and the Department of Interior and Local Government, other
deputies and heads of accredited political parties.

SO ORDERED. [Emphasis supplied.]

The COMELEC ruled on NAMFRELs petition for accreditation on April 2,

2007 in the assailed Resolution (April 2, 2007 Resolution), conditionallygranting
NAMFRELs petition in the following tenor: [5]

Having already discussed above the reasons, both factual and legal, for
the dismissal of the Verified Opposition, we find the instant petition for
accreditation as the citizens arm of the petitioner NAMFREL
meritorious. Pursuant to Section 2(5), Article IX (C) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution and Section 52(k) of the Omnibus Election Code, as
amended, this Commission en banc hereby resolves to accredit
petitioner NAMFREL as its citizens arm in the 14 May 2007 national and
local elections, subject to its direct and immediate control and
supervision.

There is, however, one important condition that must be fulfilled by the
petitioner before its accreditation as citizens arm could legally take
effect. Accordingly, Mr. Jose S. Concepcion, Jr., the National Chairman of
NAMFREL, must first be removed both as a member and overall Chairman
of said organization. As correctly pointed out by the oppositor, Mr.
Concepcion, being the Barangay Chairman
of Barangay Forbes Park, Makati City, cannot be a member much more
the overall chairman of the citizens arm such as NAMFREL. This is
explicitly provided for in COMELEC Resolution No. 7798 promulgated on 5
January 2007, pertinent of which we quote:

WHEREAS, Section 3 of Executive Order No. 94 dated March 2, 1987 provides as

follows:

Sec. 3. Prohibition on Barangay officials No barangay official shall be appointed

as member of the Board of Election Inspectors or as watcher of each duly
registered major political party or any socio-civic, religious, professional or any
similar organization of which they may be members.

xxx xxx xxx

NOW THEREFORE, to insure that the elections are peaceful,

orderly, regular and credible, the Commission on Elections, by virtue of
the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the OEC, EO No. 94, and other
election laws, RESOLVED to prohibit, as it is hereby RESOLVES to prohibit:

1. The appointment of barangay officials which include the

Punong Barangay, Kagawad, Barangay Secretary, Barangay Treasurer,
and Barangay Tanod, as Chairman / person and/or Members of the BEIs
or as official watcher of any candidate, duly registered major political
 party, or any similar organization, or any socio-civic, religious,
professional, in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. The
prohibition extends to the barangay officials, employees and tanods,
who are members of the accredited citizens arms.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission en banc

RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES, to grant the instant petition for
accreditation finding it imbued with merit.

xxxx

The ACCREDITATION herein GRANTED is further SUBJECT

TO THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

1. The petitioner is hereby enjoined and encouraged by the

Commission to re-organize in accordance with its own internal rules and
procedures as an independent organization, and to submit before election
day a list of its responsible officers and members, deleting therefrom the
names of any previous officer or member similarly situated with Mr. Jose
S. Concepcion, Jr. who are disqualified to be part of the citizens arm in
view of the passage of COMELEC Resolution No. 7798 on 5 January
2007;

xxxx

9. This accreditation shall be deemed automatically revoked in case

petitioner violates any of the provisions and conditions set forth herein.
[Italics supplied.]

Soon thereafter, NAMFREL filed a Manifestation and Request for Re-

Examination that: (1) contains information regarding NAMFRELs reorganization
and its new set of officers showing that the petitioner had stepped down as National
Chair and had been replaced by a new Chair; (2) manifests NAMFRELs acceptance
of the conditional grant of its petition for accreditation; and (3) includes
NAMFRELs request for a re-examination without further arguments of the April 2,
2007 Resolution as it specifically affected the petitioners membership with
NAMFREL. In this Manifestation and Request for Re-examination, NAMFREL
outlined its various objections and concerns on the legality or validity of Resolution
7798.

The COMELEC, in its Order of May 8, 2007, noted the information relating
to NAMFRELs current officers, and denied the request to examine its (COMELECs)
interpretation of the April 2, 2007 Resolution prohibiting petitioners direct
participation as member and National Chairman of NAMFREL. The COMELEC
reasoned out that the April 2, 2007 Resolution is clear, and NAMFREL had not
presented any convincing argument to warrant the requested examination.

NAMFREL did not question the COMELECs ruling.

THE PETITION

Instead of a direct reaction from NAMFREL, the petitioner filed the

present petition, ostensibly questioning the COMELECs April 2, 2007
Resolution, but actually raising issues with respect to Resolution 7798. To
illustrate this point, the headings of the petitioners cited grounds were as follows:

COMELEC HAS ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR IN

EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED COMELEC
RESOLUTION NO. 7798 WHICH HAS NO STATUTORY BASIS.[6]

COMELEC SERIOUSLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED

ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR
IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT RETROACTIVELY
APPLIED COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 7798 TO NAMFRELS
PETITION.[7]

NAMFREL CHAIRMAN JOSE CONCEPCION WAS NOT

ACCORDED DUE PROCESS WHEN HE WAS NEITHER GIVEN
THE OPPORTUNITY TO QUESTION COMELEC RESOLUTION NO.
7798 NOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HIS SIDE
REGARDING THE PROHIBITION.[8]
 The petitioner expounded on the invalidity of Resolution 7798 with the
following arguments which, for brevity and ease of presentation, we summarize
below:

1. EO No. 94 issued by then President Corazon Aquino on December 17,

1986 prohibits the appointment of barangay officials as members of the BEI or as
official watchers of each duly registered major political party or any socio-civic,
religious, professional or any similar organization of which they may be
members. This law, according to the petitioner, could not however be the statutory
basis of Resolution 7798 because:
a. the prohibition under EO No. 94 applies only to the February 2,
1987 plebiscite. The restrictive application is evident from a reading of
the EOs title[9] and of one of its whereas clauses.[10]

b. nothing in EO No. 94 prohibits the petitioners membership with

NAMFREL or the petitioners appointment as Chair or member of a
duly accredited COMELECs citizen arm. The petitioner, who then
chaired NAMFREL, was never appointed as BEI member or as poll
watcher.

c. the underlying purpose of Resolution 7798 is to

prevent barangay officials from wielding their influence during the
voting and canvassing stages by entering polling places under the
pretext of acting as poll watchers. The petitioner was not a poll watcher;
the COMELEC could have therefore simply prohibited the appointment
of barangay chairmen as BEI members or poll watchers, and would
have already achieved its purpose.

d. the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of regulation, go beyond or expand

the mandate of a law because the COMELEC has no law-making
powers.

e. Resolution 7798 cannot be applied retroactively. Its effectivity clause

provides that it shall be effective on the 7th day after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation, that is, only on January 14,
 2007. Since NAMRELs petition was filed on January 5, 2007 (or
before Resolution 7798s effectivity), it could not have applied to
NAMFRELs petition.

2. Resolution 7798 is an invalid implementing regulation, as it failed to

comply with the following requisites for the validity of implementing rules and
regulations:

a. the rules and regulations must have been issued on the authority of law;

b. the rules and regulations must be within the scope and purview of the
law;

c. the rules and regulations must be reasonable;

d. the rules and regulations must not be contrary to laws or to the

Constitution.
3. On constitutional grounds, the petitioner objected to Resolution 7798
because:

a. the Resolution is unreasonable, as it bears no relation to the very

purpose of the law; its prohibition is harsh, oppressive, and serves no
purpose at all.

b. Resolution 7798 violates the petitioners right to association through its

enforced removal of the petitioner as member and Chair of NAMFEL.

c. the COMELEC denied him of his right to procedural due process; he

was not afforded the cardinal administrative due process right to a
hearing,[11]as he was not given the opportunity to be heard or at least
to comment on Resolution 7798 upon which his removal as National
Chair and member of NAMFREL was based. He should have been
heard since he was not a party to the petition for accreditation in his
personal capacity. Thus, the April 2, 2007 Resolution conditionally
granting NAMFRELs petition for accreditation should be nullified
 insofar as it required the petitioners resignation from NAMFREL as a
pre-condition for the effectivity of its accreditation.

THE OSG RESPONSE

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) defends the validity of Resolution
7798 with the following arguments:

1. Resolution 7798 was issued by the COMELEC as a valid exercise of

its quasi-legislative power to implement elections laws. Hence, notice and hearing
are not required for its validity. The OSG cites Section 52 (c) of the OEC
empowering the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations implementing the
provisions of this Code (the OEC) or other laws which the Commission is required
to enforce and administer in relation with the settled principle [citing Central Bank
v. Cloribel (44 SCRA 307 [1972])] that notice and hearing are not required when an
administrative agency exercises its quasi-legislative power,[12]as opposed to quasi-
judicial power which requires notice and hearing;[13] and

2. EO No. 94 applies to the May 14, 2007 national and local

elections. While EO No. 94 may have been issued primarily for the February 2,
1987plebsicite, its spirit and intent find applicability and relevance to future
elections. Thus, the COMELECs reliance on EO No. 94 when it issued Resolution
7798 is certainly valid and proper;

3. While the petitioner is not appointed as member of the BEI or as

watcher, he nonetheless labors under a conflict of interest, given that a COMELEC-
accredited citizens arm is also entitled, under Section 180 of the OEC to appoint a
watcher in every polling place. Additionally, the fact that the petitioner is
a barangay chairman and at the same time the NAMFREL Chair clearly raises
questions on his neutrality and non-partisanship; COMELEC non-partisanship may
at the same time be compromised, as it is the COMELEC which accredits its citizens
arm.

The OSG in arguing that Resolution 7798 was issued pursuant to the
COMELECs mandate and is not, therefore, tainted with grave abuse of discretion
also harks back at the extent of the power of the COMELEC under Section 2(1) of
Article IX(C) of the Constitution that gives COMELEC the broad power to
administer the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall[14];
there can hardly be any doubt that the text and intent of the constitutional provision
is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

THE COURTS RULING

We resolve to DISMISS the petition for blatant misuse of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.

A primary consideration for us in looking at the petition is its thrust or focus. The
petition mentions three legal instruments related with the case, namely: (1) EO No.
94 issued by then President Aquino; (2) COMELECs April 2,
2007 Resolution conditionally granting NAMFRELs accreditation, subject to the
conditions that the petitioner and similarly situated barangay officials shall not be
included as members or officials of NAMFREL; and (3) COMELEC Resolution
7798, issued pursuant to EO No. 94 and which in turn is the basis for the April 2,
2007 Resolution.

We reiterate that the present petition, by its express terms, seeks to set aside
the En Banc Resolution dated 02 April 2007 and the Order dated 8 May 2007 of
Respondent Comelec who, in grave abuse of discretion and in gross violation of
Petitioners right to due process of law, denied Petitioners right to associate when the
Respondent Comelec, as a condition of NAMFRELs accreditation as citizen arm,
directed the removal of Petitioner as overall Chairman and member. In arguing for
this objective, the petitioner directs his attention at Resolution 7798, not at the April
2, 2007 Resolution, as can be seen from the grounds summarized above. In the
process, he likewise raises issues that call for the interpretation of Resolution 7798s
underlying basis EO No. 94.

Expressed in procedural terms, the petitioner now seeks to assail, in his individual
capacity, a COMELEC adjudicatory resolution (i.e., the April 2, 2007Resolution)
for its adverse effects on him when he was not a party to that case. NAMFREL (the
direct party to the case and who had accepted the COMELEC accreditation ruling),
on the other hand, is not a party to the present petition. Its non-participation is
apparently explained by the position it took with respect to the April 2,
2007 Resolution; in its Manifestation and Request for Examination, it asked for a re-
examination of the April 2, 2007 Resolution, but interestingly stated that

21. NAMFREL accepts the terms of the accreditation and further

manifests that it has commenced full efforts into preparing for the
performance of its duties and obligations as the Commissions citizen
arm. [Emphasis supplied.]

Thus, the present petition is clearly the petitioners own initiative, and
NAMFREL, the direct party in the COMELECs April 2, 2007 Resolution, has
absolutely no participation.

Another unusual feature of this case is the focus of the petition. While its
expressed intent is to assail the COMELECs April 2, 2007 Resolution (an exercise
of the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions), its focus is on the alleged defects of
Resolution 7798, a regulation issued by the COMELEC in the exercise of its
rulemaking power.

The above features of the petition render it fatally defective. The first
defect lies in the petitioners personality to file a petition for certiorari to address an
adjudicatory resolution of the COMELEC in which he was not a party to, and where
the direct party, NAMFREL, does not even question the assailed resolution.It would
have been another matter if NAMFREL had filed the present petition with the
petitioner as intervenor because of his personal interest in the COMELEC ruling. He
could have intervened, too, before the COMELEC as an affected party in
NAMFRELs Manifestation and Request for Examination. As a last recourse, the
petitioner could have expressly stated before this Court the procedural problems he
faced and asked that we suspend the rules based on the unusual circumstances he
could have pointed out. None of these actions, however, took place. Instead, the
petitioner simply questioned the COMELECs April 2, 2007 Resolution without
explaining to this Court his reason for using Rule 65 as his medium, and from there,
proceeded to attack the validity of COMELEC Resolution 7798. Under these
questionable circumstances, we cannot now recognize the petitioner as a party-in-
interest who can directly assail the COMELECs April 2, 2007 Resolution in an
original Rule 65 petition before this Court.
 The requirement of personality or interest is sanctioned no less by Section 7,
Article IX of the Constitution which provides that a decision, order, or ruling of a
constitutional commission may be brought to this Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.[15] This
requirement is repeated in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which applies
to petitions for certiorari under Rule 64 of decisions, orders or rulings of the
constitutional commissions pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64.[16] Section 1, Rule 65
essentially provides that a person aggrieved by any act of a tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions rendered without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction may file a petition for certiorari.

An aggrieved party under Section 1, Rule 65 is one who was a party to the
original proceedings that gave rise to the original action for certiorari under Rule
65. We had occasion to clarify and explain the aggrieved party requirement in Tang
v. Court of Appeals[17] where we said:

Although Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that the special civil action

of certiorari may be availed of by a "person aggrieved" by the orders or
decisions of a tribunal, the term "person aggrieved" is not to be
construed to mean that any person who feels injured by the lower courts
order or decision can question the said courts disposition via certiorari.
To sanction a contrary interpretation would open the floodgates to
numerous and endless litigations which would undeniably lead to the
clogging of court dockets and, more importantly, the harassment of the
party who prevailed in the lower court.

In a situation wherein the order or decision being

questioned underwent adversarial proceedings before a trial court, the
"person aggrieved" referred to under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail
of the special civil action of certiorari pertains to one who was a party
in the proceedings before the lower court. The correctness of this
interpretation can be gleaned from the fact that a special civil action
 for certiorari may be dismissed motu proprio if the party elevating the
case failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order
or decision before the lower court. Obviously, only one who was a party
in the case before the lower court can file a motion for reconsideration
since a stranger to the litigation would not have the legal standing to
interfere in the orders or decisions of the said court. In relation to this, if
a non-party in the proceedings before the lower court has no standing to
file a motion for reconsideration, logic would lead us to the conclusion
that he would likewise have no standing to question the said order or
decision before the appellate court via certiorari. (emphasis supplied)

More importantly, we had this to say in Development Bank of the Philippines

v. Commission on Audit[18] - a case that involves a certiorari petition, under Rule 64
in relation with Rule 65, of a ruling of the Commission on Audit (a constitutional
commission like COMELEC):

The novel theory advanced by the OSG would necessarily require

persons not parties to the present case the DBP employees who are
members of the Plan or the trustees of the Fund to avail
of certiorari under Rule 65. The petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
however, is not available to any person who feels injured by the
decision of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. The person aggrieved under Section 1 of Rule 65 who
can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains only to one who
was a party in the proceedings before the court a quo, or in this case,
before the COA. To hold otherwise would open the courts to numerous
and endless litigations. Since DBP was the sole party in the proceedings
before the COA, DBP is the proper party to avail of the remedy
of certiorari.

The real party in interest who stands to benefit or suffer from the
judgment in the suit must prosecute or defend an action. We have held
that interest means material interest, an interest in issue that the
decision will affect, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest.
 The second fatal defect lies in the petitions thrust; it opened with and professed
to be an express challenge to the COMELECs adjudicatory April 2, 2007 Resolution,
but in its arguments solely attacks and prays for the partial nullity of COMELEC
Resolution 7798 issued in the exercise of the COMELECs rule making power. This
approach is fatally defective because the petition thereby converts an express
challenge of an adjudicatory resolution made without the requisite standing into a
challenge for the nullity of a regulation through an original Rule 65 petition
for certiorari.

To be sure, a COMELEC adjudicatory action can be challenged on the basis

of the invalidity of the law or regulation that underlies the action. But to do this, a
valid challenge to the adjudicatory action must exist; at the very least, the petitioner
must have the requisite personality to mount the legal challenge to the COMELEC
adjudicatory action.[19] Where this basic condition is absent, the challenge is
unmasked for what it really is a direct challenge to the underlying law or regulation
masquerading as a challenge to a COMELEC adjudicatory action.

What is significant in appreciating this defect in the petition is the legal reality
that the petitioner was not without any viable remedy to directly challenge
Resolution 7798. A stand-alone challenge to the regulation could have been made
through appropriate mediums, particularly through a petition for declaratory relief
with the appropriate Regional Trial Court under the terms of Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court, or through a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 to prevent the
implementation of the regulation, as the petitioner might have found appropriate to
his situation. As already mentioned, a challenge can likewise be made in the course
of validly contesting an adjudicatory order of the COMELEC. Such challenge,
however, cannot be made in an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65
dissociated from any COMELEC action made in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions.

The petitioners unusual approaches and use of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
do not appear to us to be the result of any error in reading Rule 65, given the way
the petition was crafted. Rather, it was a backdoor approach to achieve what the
petitioner could not directly do in his individual capacity under Rule 65. It was, at
the very least, an attempted bypass of other available, albeit lengthier, modes of
review that the Rules of Court provide. While we stop short of concluding that the
petitioners approaches constitute an abuse of process through a manipulative reading
and application of the Rules of Court, we nevertheless resolve that the petition
should be dismissed for its blatant violation of the Rules. The transgressions alleged
in a petition, however weighty they may sound, cannot be justifications for blatantly
disregarding the rules of procedure, particularly when remedial measures were
available under these same rules to achieve the petitioners objectives. For our part,
we cannot and should not in the name of liberality and the transcendental importance
doctrine entertain these types of petitions. As we held in the very recent case
of Lozano, et al. vs. Nograles,[20] albeit from a different perspective, our liberal
approach has its limits and should not be abused.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED.

Cost against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10405 December 29, 1960
WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity as Provincial Governor of
Rizal, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL., respondents-
appellees.
Asst. Fiscal Noli M. Cortes and Jose P. Santos for appellant.
Office of the Asst. Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Solicitor A. A. Torres for appellee.

DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal, by petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, dismissing the above entitled case and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction
therein issued, without costs.
On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted
this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 920,
entitled “An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works”, approved on June 20, 1953,
contained, in section 1-C (a) thereof, an item (43[h]) of P85,000.00 “for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement” of Pasig feeder road terminals (Gen.
Roxas — Gen. Araneta — Gen. Lucban — Gen. Capinpin — Gen. Segundo — Gen. Delgado
— Gen. Malvar — Gen. Lim)”; that, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, the
aforementioned feeder roads were “nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not
yet constructed, . . . within the Antonio Subdivision . . . situated at . . . Pasig, Rizal” (according
to the tracings attached to the petition as Annexes A and B, near Shaw Boulevard, not far
away from the intersection between the latter and Highway 54), which projected feeder roads
“do not connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway”;
that the aforementioned Antonio Subdivision (as well as the lands on which said feeder roads
were to be construed) were private properties of respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the time
of the passage and approval of said Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines; that
on May, 1953, respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal,
offering to donate said projected feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig, Rizal; that, on June
13, 1953, the offer was accepted by the council, subject to the condition “that the donor would
submit a plan of the said roads and agree to change the names of two of them”; that no deed
of donation in favor of the municipality of Pasig was, however, executed; that on July 10,
1953, respondent Zulueta wrote another letter to said council, calling attention to the approval
of Republic Act. No. 920, and the sum of P85,000.00 appropriated therein for the construction
of the projected feeder roads in question; that the municipal council of Pasig endorsed said
letter of respondent Zulueta to the District Engineer of Rizal, who, up to the present “has not
made any endorsement thereon” that inasmuch as the projected feeder roads in question
were private property at the time of the passage and approval of Republic Act No. 920, the
appropriation of P85,000.00 therein made, for the construction, reconstruction, repair,
extension and improvement of said projected feeder roads, was illegal and, therefore, void ab
initio“; that said appropriation of P85,000.00 was made by Congress because its members
were made to believe that the projected feeder roads in question were “public roads and not
private streets of a private subdivision”‘; that, “in order to give a semblance of legality, when
there is absolutely none, to the aforementioned appropriation”, respondents Zulueta executed
on December 12, 1953, while he was a member of the Senate of the Philippines, an alleged
deed of donation — copy of which is annexed to the petition — of the four (4) parcels of land
constituting said projected feeder roads, in favor of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines; that said alleged deed of donation was, on the same date, accepted by the then
Executive Secretary; that being subject to an onerous condition, said donation partook of the
nature of a contract; that, such, said donation violated the provision of our fundamental law
prohibiting members of Congress from being directly or indirectly financially interested in any
contract with the Government, and, hence, is unconstitutional, as well as null and void ab
initio, for the construction of the projected feeder roads in question with public funds would
greatly enhance or increase the value of the aforementioned subdivision of respondent
Zulueta, “aside from relieving him from the burden of constructing his subdivision streets or
roads at his own expense”; that the construction of said projected feeder roads was then
being undertaken by the Bureau of Public Highways; and that, unless restrained by the court,
the respondents would continue to execute, comply with, follow and implement the
aforementioned illegal provision of law, “to the irreparable damage, detriment and prejudice
not only to the petitioner but to the Filipino nation.”
Petitioner prayed, therefore, that the contested item of Republic Act No. 920 be declared null
and void; that the alleged deed of donation of the feeder roads in question be “declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, illegal”; that a writ of injunction be issued enjoining the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the Director of the Bureau of Public Works
and Highways and Jose C. Zulueta from ordering or allowing the continuance of the above-
mentioned feeder roads project, and from making and securing any new and further releases
on the aforementioned item of Republic Act No. 920, and the disbursing officers of the
Department of Public Works and Highways from making any further payments out of said
funds provided for in Republic Act No. 920; and that pending final hearing on the merits, a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the aforementioned parties respondent from
making and securing any new and further releases on the aforesaid item of Republic Act No.
920 and from making any further payments out of said illegally appropriated funds.
Respondents moved to dismiss the petition upon the ground that petitioner had “no legal
capacity to sue”, and that the petition did “not state a cause of action”. In support to this
motion, respondent Zulueta alleged that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, not its provincial
governor, should represent the Province of Rizal, pursuant to section 1683 of the Revised
Administrative Code; that said respondent is ” not aware of any law which makes illegal the
appropriation of public funds for the improvements of . . . private property”; and that, the
constitutional provision invoked by petitioner is inapplicable to the donation in question, the
same being a pure act of liberality, not a contract. The other respondents, in turn, maintained
that petitioner could not assail the appropriation in question because “there is no actual bona
fide case . . . in which the validity of Republic Act No. 920 is necessarily involved” and
petitioner “has not shown that he has a personal and substantial interest” in said Act “and that
its enforcement has caused or will cause him a direct injury.”
Acting upon said motions to dismiss, the lower court rendered the aforementioned decision,
dated October 29, 1953, holding that, since public interest is involved in this case, the
Provincial Governor of Rizal and the provincial fiscal thereof who represents him therein,
“have the requisite personalities” to question the constitutionality of the disputed item of
Republic Act No. 920; that “the legislature is without power appropriate public revenues for
anything but a public purpose”, that the instructions and improvement of the feeder roads in
question, if such roads where private property, would not be a public purpose; that, being
subject to the following condition:
The within donation is hereby made upon the condition that the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines will use the parcels of land hereby donated for street purposes only and for
no other purposes whatsoever; it being expressly understood that should the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines violate the condition hereby imposed upon it, the title to the
land hereby donated shall, upon such violation, ipso facto revert to the DONOR, JOSE C.
ZULUETA. (Emphasis supplied.)
which is onerous, the donation in question is a contract; that said donation or contract is
“absolutely forbidden by the Constitution” and consequently “illegal”, for Article 1409 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, declares in existence and void from the very beginning contracts
“whose cause, objector purpose is contrary to law, morals . . . or public policy”; that the legality
of said donation may not be contested, however, by petitioner herein, because his “interest
are not directly affected” thereby; and that, accordingly, the appropriation in question “should
be upheld” and the case dismissed.
At the outset, it should be noted that we are concerned with a decision granting the
aforementioned motions to dismiss, which as much, are deemed to have admitted
hypothetically the allegations of fact made in the petition of appellant herein. According to
said petition, respondent Zulueta is the owner of several parcels of residential land situated
in Pasig, Rizal, and known as the Antonio Subdivision, certain portions of which had been
reserved for the projected feeder roads aforementioned, which, admittedly, were private
property of said respondent when Republic Act No. 920, appropriating P85,000.00 for the
“construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement” of said roads, was passed
by Congress, as well as when it was approved by the President on June 20, 1953. The petition
further alleges that the construction of said roads, to be undertaken with the aforementioned
appropriation of P85,000.00, would have the effect of relieving respondent Zulueta of the
burden of constructing his subdivision streets or roads at his own expenses, 1 and would
“greatly enhance or increase the value of the subdivision” of said respondent. The lower court
held that under these circumstances, the appropriation in question was “clearly for a private,
not a public purpose.”
Respondents do not deny the accuracy of this conclusion, which is self-evident. 2 However,
respondent Zulueta contended, in his motion to dismiss that:
A law passed by Congress and approved by the President can never be illegal because
Congress is the source of all laws . . . Aside from the fact that movant is not aware of any law
which makes illegal the appropriation of public funds for the improvement of what we, in the
meantime, may assume as private property . . . (Record on Appeal, p. 33.)
The first proposition must be rejected most emphatically, it being inconsistent with the nature
of the Government established under the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and
the system of checks and balances underlying our political structure. Moreover, it is refuted
by the decisions of this Court invalidating legislative enactments deemed violative of the
Constitution or organic laws. 3
As regards the legal feasibility of appropriating public funds for a public purpose, the principle
according to Ruling Case Law, is this:
It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for
anything but a public purpose. . . . It is the essential character of the direct object of the
expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the
interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and
thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public
or to the state, which results from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private
enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use public money. (25 R.L.C. pp.
398-400; Emphasis supplied.)
The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in the following language:
In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only,
discussed supra sec. 14, money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes
and not for the advantage of private individuals. (85 C.J.S. pp. 645-646; emphasis supplied.)
Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris Secundum states:
Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the constitution, public funds may be
used only for public purpose. The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative
with its right to tax, and, under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public
purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof to
another purpose, no appropriation of state funds can be made for other than for a public
purpose.
xxx xxx xxx
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the
statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the
advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the
public. (81 C.J.S. pp. 1147; emphasis supplied.)
Needless to say, this Court is fully in accord with the foregoing views which, apart from being
patently sound, are a necessary corollary to our democratic system of government, which, as
such, exists primarily for the promotion of the general welfare. Besides, reflecting as they do,
the established jurisprudence in the United States, after whose constitutional system ours
has been patterned, said views and jurisprudence are, likewise, part and parcel of our own
constitutional law.
This notwithstanding, the lower court felt constrained to uphold the appropriation in question,
upon the ground that petitioner may not contest the legality of the donation above referred to
because the same does not affect him directly. This conclusion is, presumably, based upon
the following premises, namely: (1) that, if valid, said donation cured the constitutional infirmity
of the aforementioned appropriation; (2) that the latter may not be annulled without a previous
declaration of unconstitutionality of the said donation; and (3) that the rule set forth in Article
1421 of the Civil Code is absolute, and admits of no exception. We do not agree with these
premises.
The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its passage or
approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed, subsequently thereto, unless the
latter consists of an amendment of the organic law, removing, with retrospective operation,
the constitutional limitation infringed by said statute. Referring to the P85,000.00
appropriation for the projected feeder roads in question, the legality thereof depended upon
whether said roads were public or private property when the bill, which, latter on, became
Republic Act 920, was passed by Congress, or, when said bill was approved by the President
and the disbursement of said sum became effective, or on June 20, 1953 (see section 13 of
said Act). Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed
belonged then to respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private
purpose, and hence, was null and void. 4 The donation to the Government, over five (5)
months after the approval and effectivity of said Act, made, according to the petition, for the
purpose of giving a “semblance of legality”, or legalizing, the appropriation in question, did
not cure its aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation
need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation.
Again, Article 1421 of our Civil Code, like many other statutory enactments, is subject to
exceptions. For instance, the creditors of a party to an illegal contract may, under the
conditions set forth in Article 1177 of said Code, exercise the rights and actions of the latter,
except only those which are inherent in his person, including therefore, his right to the
annulment of said contract, even though such creditors are not affected by the same, except
indirectly, in the manner indicated in said legal provision.
Again, it is well-stated that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will
sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions
nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public
funds, 5 upon the theory that “the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,”
which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. 6 Although there are some decisions to
the contrary, 7 the prevailing view in the United States is stated in the American Jurisprudence
as follows:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack
the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected,
but also taxpayers, have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys
raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring
expenditure of public moneys. (11 Am. Jur. 761; emphasis supplied.)
However, this view was not favored by the Supreme Court of the U.S. in Frothingham vs.
Mellon (262 U.S. 447), insofar as federal laws are concerned, upon the ground that the
relationship of a taxpayer of the U.S. to its Federal Government is different from that of a
taxpayer of a municipal corporation to its government. Indeed, under the composite system
of government existing in the U.S., the states of the Union are integral part of the Federation
from an international viewpoint, but, each state enjoys internally a substantial measure of
sovereignty, subject to the limitations imposed by the Federal Constitution. In fact, the same
was made by representatives of each state of the Union, not of the people of the U.S., except
insofar as the former represented the people of the respective States, and the people of each
State has, independently of that of the others, ratified said Constitution. In other words, the
Federal Constitution and the Federal statutes have become binding upon the people of the
U.S. in consequence of an act of, and, in this sense, through the respective states of the
Union of which they are citizens. The peculiar nature of the relation between said people and
the Federal Government of the U.S. is reflected in the election of its President, who is chosen
directly, not by the people of the U.S., but by electors chosen by each State, in such manner
as the legislature thereof may direct (Article II, section 2, of the Federal Constitution).
The relation between the people of the Philippines and its taxpayers, on the other hand, and
the Republic of the Philippines, on the other, is not identical to that obtaining between the
people and taxpayers of the U.S. and its Federal Government. It is closer, from a domestic
viewpoint, to that existing between the people and taxpayers of each state and the
government thereof, except that the authority of the Republic of the Philippines over the
people of the Philippines is more fully direct than that of the states of the Union, insofar as
the simple and unitary type of our national government is not subject to limitations analogous
to those imposed by the Federal Constitution upon the states of the Union, and those imposed
upon the Federal Government in the interest of the Union. For this reason, the rule
recognizing the right of taxpayers to assail the constitutionality of a legislation appropriating
local or state public funds — which has been upheld by the Federal Supreme Court
(Crampton vs. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601) — has greater application in the Philippines than that
adopted with respect to acts of Congress of the United States appropriating federal funds.
Indeed, in the Province of Tayabas vs. Perez (56 Phil., 257), involving the expropriation of a
land by the Province of Tayabas, two (2) taxpayers thereof were allowed to intervene for the
purpose of contesting the price being paid to the owner thereof, as unduly exorbitant. It is true
that in Custodio vs. President of the Senate (42 Off. Gaz., 1243), a taxpayer and employee
of the Government was not permitted to question the constitutionality of an appropriation for
backpay of members of Congress. However, in Rodriguez vs. Treasurer of the
Philippines and Barredo vs. Commission on Elections (84 Phil., 368; 45 Off. Gaz., 4411), we
entertained the action of taxpayers impugning the validity of certain appropriations of public
funds, and invalidated the same. Moreover, the reason that impelled this Court to take such
position in said two (2) cases — the importance of the issues therein raised — is present in
the case at bar. Again, like the petitioners in the Rodriguez and Barredo cases, petitioner
herein is not merely a taxpayer. The Province of Rizal, which he represents officially as its
Provincial Governor, is our most populated political subdivision, 8 and, the taxpayers therein
bear a substantial portion of the burden of taxation, in the Philippines.
Hence, it is our considered opinion that the circumstances surrounding this case sufficiently
justify petitioners action in contesting the appropriation and donation in question; that this
action should not have been dismissed by the lower court; and that the writ of preliminary
injunction should have been maintained.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and the records are
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision, with
the costs of this instance against respondent Jose C. Zulueta. It is SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 122241. July 30, 1996]

BOARD OF OPTOMETRY, represented by its Chairman, DR. PRIMITIVA

Y. PEREZ-SISON, PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION,
represented by its Commissioner, HERMOGENES P. POBRE,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, represented by its Secretary, DR.
HILARION M. RAMIRO, BUREAU OF FOODS AND DRUGS,
represented by its Director, DR. QUINTIN L. KINTANAR,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, represented by
its Secretary, SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ, JR., and BUREAU OF
HIGHER EDUCATION, represented by its Director, MONA D.
VALISNO, petitioners, vs. HON. ANGEL B. COLET, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 29, ACEBEDO
OPTICAL COMPANY, INC., represented by its President and
Chairman of the Board, MIGUEL P. ACEBEDO, OPTOMETRY
PRACTITIONERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (OPAP),
represented by its President, DR. MIRIAM F. LLAVE, CENEVIS
OPTOMETRIST ASSOCIATION (COA), represented by its
President, DR. ROBERTO RODIS, JR., ASSOCIATION OF
CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM OPTOMETRIST (ACMO), represented by its
President, DR. CYRIL CORALES, SOUTHERN MINDANAO
OPTOMETRIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILS., INC. (SMOAP),
represented by its President, DR. ELMER VILLAROSA, and
REPUBLICA A. PANOL, No. 9 Gen. Malvar St., Araneta Center,
Cubao, Quezon City, respondents.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Petitioners seek to annul and set aside for having been rendered with grave
abuse of discretion the order of 25 August 1995 issued by public respondent
Judge Angel V. Colet in Civil Case No. 95-74770 which granted a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining, enjoining, and prohibiting the petitioners
herein from undertaking in any form or manner, the enforcement or
implementation of the Revised Optometry Law [R.A. No. 8050] or any
regulations or Code of Ethics issued thereunder.
 The background facts are not disputed.
R.A. No. 8050,[1] entitled An Act Regulating the Practice of Optometry
Education, Integrating Optometrists, and for Other Purposes, otherwise known
as the Revised Optometry Law of 1995, was a consolidation of House Bill (HB)
No. 14100[2] and Senate Bill (SB) No. 1998,[3] which were respectively approved
by both Houses and, thereafter, reconciled by the Bicameral Conference
Committee.[4] The Reconciled Bill[5] was then separately ratified by both the
Senate and the House of Representatives[6] and approved into law by the
President on 7 June 1995.
On 31 July 1995, the private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila a petition for declaratory relief and for prohibition and
injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order.[7] As grounds for their
petition, the private respondents alleged that:
1. There were surreptitious and unauthorized insertion and addition of provisions in the
Reconciled Bill which were made without the knowledge and conformity of the Senate
panel, thereby derogating the orderly procedure essential to the legislative process
and vitiating legislative consent;
2. R.A. No. 8050 derogates and violates the fundamental right of every Filipino to
reasonable safeguards against deprivation of life, liberty and property without due
process of law in that it authorizes optometrists to engage in acts of practice within
the zone of medical practice through permitted use in certain kinds of diagnostic
pharmaceutical agents thereby exposing and subjecting those who avail of the
services of optometrists to definite hazards which would inflict upon them impairment
of vision, resultant blindness, or possible loss of life;
3. R.A. No. 8050 derogates and violates the principle against undue delegation of
legislative power when it provides for a penalty of imprisonment for a maximum of
eight years and a fine not exceeding P40,000.00 upon any person found violating any
rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to said law;
4. R.A. No. 8050 suppresses truthful advertising concerning optical goods and services
in violation of the guaranty of freedom of speech and press; and
5. R.A. No. 8050 employs vague ambiguous terms in defining prohibitions and
restrictions, hence, it falls within the ambit of void-for-vagueness doctrine which
safeguards the guaranty of due process of law.

They then prayed that after due notice and hearing, an order be issued granting
a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining, restraining, restricting, and forbidding
the respondents therein (herein petitioners), their agents, officers, and
employees from performing or undertaking any act in implementation or
enforcement of R.A. No. 8050, or any of its provisions, or its Code of Ethics,
during the pendency of the case, until further orders of the court; and that after
trial on the merits, judgment be rendered: (a) declaring R.A. No. 8050 and its
Code of Ethics null and void due to constitutional violations and transgressions;
(b) granting a writ of prohibition against all the respondents therein enjoining
and restraining them from enforcing or implementing R.A. No. 8050 or its Code
of Ethics in whole or in part; and (c) making permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction.
An examination of the petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74770 in
Branch 29 of the RTC of Manila, disclosed that among the petitioners included
in the caption of the petition were Acebedo Optical Co., Inc.; Optometry
Practitioner Association of the Philippines (OPAP); Cenevis Optometrist
Association (COA); Association of Christian-Muslim Optometrist (ACMO); and
Southern Mindanao Optometrist Association of the Philippines (SMOAP) each
allegedly represented by its president. The body of the petition, however, gave
no details as to the juridical personality and addresses of these alleged
associations, save for Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. It merely listed the names of
the alleged presidents as well as their profession and home addresses.
As likewise disclosed in the petitioners Compliance[8] filed with the trial court
on 18 August 1995, the names of Miguel Acebedo, representing Acebedo
Optical Co., Inc.; Miriam F. Llave, representing the OPAP; and Republica A.
Panol, another petitioner in Civil Case No. 95-74770, did not appear in the
registration books of the Board of Optometry to be authorized optometry
practitioners in the Philippines, as evidenced by certifications issued by the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC). Private respondents COA and
ACMO were neither registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), as evidenced by the certifications issued by the latter.
On 1 August 1995, the trial court, per respondent Judge Angel V. Colet,
issued a Temporary Restraining Order[9] enjoining the respondents from
enforcing or implementing R.A. No. 8050 or its Code of Ethics, until further
orders of the court; directing that summons, with a copy of the petition and of
the temporary restraining order, be served immediately; and setting the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction for hearing on 15 August 1995.
On 11 August 1995, the petitioners herein, as respondents below, filed an
Opposition[10] to the application for preliminary injunction and alleged that:
(1) No proper ground exists to warrant the issuance of a writ as
(a) petitioners therein do not possess the requisite right as would entitle them to the
relief demanded;
(b) petitioners have unquestionably not shown their legal existence or capacity to file
the case, much less their authority to file it in a representative capacity; and
(c) petitioners have misled the court into believing that an act is being done in the
implementation of R.A. No. 8050 tending to make the judgment ineffectual;
(2) The implementation of R.A. No. 8050 carries no injurious effect; and
 (3) Petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of R.A. No.
8050.

At the hearing of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the

parties indicated their intention to present witnesses in support of their
respective positions.Nevertheless, the trial court, finding such procedure not [to
be] conducive to the summary procedure appropriate to the auxiliary remedy of
preliminary injunction, merely directed the parties to submit their other
arguments in writing with supporting evidence, after which the application for a
writ of preliminary injunction would be deemed submitted for resolution.[11] The
parties complied therewith.
On 25 August 1995, the trial court issued the challenged order,[12] the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court grants the writ of preliminary injunction

prayed for until further orders of the Court, respondents and their officials, agents and
employees, are restrained, enjoined, and prohibited from undertaking in any form or
manner, the enforcement or implementation of the Revised Optometry Law [R.A.
8050] or any regulation or Code of Ethics issued thereunder.

Let the writ issue upon filing with this Court a bond in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND [P100,000.00] PESOS in favor of respondents, conditioned
upon payment of damages sustained by respondents in case the writ is later adjudged
to have been improvidently or improperly issued.

We quote its ratiocinations to support the above disposition:

Viewing the petition as a whole, which is duly verified, particularly the constitutional
infirmities alleged by the petitioners, and the supporting exhibits, the court is inclined
to find prima facie, that petitioners have legal rights affected by the Revised
Optometry Law, and that in its operation, said Law is likely to inflict serious and
irreparable injury to such legal rights.

There is clear public right that laws enacted for the governance of citizens should be
the product of the untrammeled will of the peoples representatives in
Congress. Petitioners contend and have adduced at least sufficient evidence to support
this order that, in the Revised Optometry Law, approved by the two Houses of
Congress, there is a showing that at least one major paragraph imposing penalties on
corporate officers, was surreptitiously smuggled into the measure, because the clear
tenor and the content of the provision (Sec. 33) as agreed upon in the Bicameral
Conference Committee, duly reflected in its Minutes (Exhs. S and T) did not include
such paragraph. The fraud upon the legislative process thus practiced through
surreptitious and insidious tampering, manifestly contravenes and violates said public
right, which violation petitioners as members of the Philippine body politic, have the
status and standing to vindicate by the present petition for extraordinary legal
remedies. (See the rulings in Tanada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, particularly pp. 36-37,
citing Severino v. Governor-General, Phil. 366, 378).

Similarly, there is likewise a public right that the laws enacted for the public good
should in truth and in fact promote the public good. Such public right would be
negated and violated if, as petitioners allege, the Revised Optometry Law which is
intended to provide our people with better opportunities and better facilities for better
vision, institutes a practice which in its actual operation, exposes persons availing of
optometric services to serious risk of impairment of vision, possible loss of sight and
even possible loss of life, through administration by optometrists of DPAs. If this be
true, the law under question violates that public right, because it permits inflicting of
serious injury upon our people using services of optometrists. After examining the
different exhibits submitted by petitioners, in which trained experts in our government
agencies themselves attest to the dire consequences that persons on whom DPAs are
used may suffer, the Court finds prima facie basis for danger of irreparable injury to
public health, which the Court should forestall in the exercise of prudence by a
preliminary writ of injunction, pending full inquiry and thorough determination after
trial. Apart from the public rights, which petitioners are entitled to assert in this
action, there are also private individual rights of petitioners which the Revised
Optometry Law tends to injure, and which would be injured irreparably with the
actual operation of said law.

Hardest hit in this regard are the optometrists, whose vested right to continue in the
practice is virtually bludgeoned by the Revised Optometrist Law, as virtually admitted
by respondents in their Opposition. On the one hand, the revised concept of the
practice of optometry [Sec. 4] mandates as standard, the use of DPAs in optometric
examination. For this reason, said Law authorizes virtual suspension of the licenses of
the present crop of optometrists, until after they shall have re-trained and qualified to
use DPAs [Sec. 31]. In case such optometrists insist on practicing without the
mandatory training, their practice could be viewed as substandard if they would avoid
use of DPAs [Sec. 4]. Alternatively, if they use DPAs before they are qualified
through mandatory training, they could incur criminal liability [Secs. 32 and 33]. In
either case, their use of DPAs without or after qualifying training, would expose them
to malpractice suits from persons who might have sustained injury through the use of
DPAs. Again, they might not have the option of refraining from the use of DPAs,
since they could face an ethics charge for substandard practice in not using DPAs in
their practice.
Finally, even petitioner Acebedo Co. would suffer injury in its operations because its
activities, based on the affidavits submitted as exhibits, would surely touch the
boundaries of conduct prohibited and penalized in the Revised Optometry Law. For
one thing, its right to continue in employment, the optometrists working in its optical
shop clinics [including affiant petitioners] might be injured through a criminal charge
that such employment constitutes a prohibited indirect practice of optometry within
the strictures of Section 5 in relation to Sec. 32. Or its advertising of optical goods and
wares, which is its right under the general law and the Constitution, could be charged
as an offense under Section 32 and subjected to penalty under Section 33. These
restraints, which could seriously prejudice existing legal rights, entitle the petitioner
corporation to the extraordinary remedy of declaratory relief, and to preliminary
injunction pending the holding of a trial on the merits. The Court understands that
petitioner could have adduced more evidence than what appears especially on the
matter of the jeopardy to public health as a result of changes of optometric practice
introduced by the Revised Optometry Law. But as the Court understands it,
preponderance is not required for evidentiary support for the grant of preliminary
injunction. As the rule stands, a sampling of relevant evidence is enough, so as to give
the Court a justification for the issuance of the writ [See Olalio v. Hizon, 196 SCRA
665; Syndicated Media Access vs. CA, 219 SCRA 794].

Jurisprudence likewise supports the grant of preliminary writs of injunction, to

maintain the status quo, in suits questioning the constitutionality of laws with
demonstrable prejudice of legal rights [J.M. & Co. v. CA, 3 SCRA 696].

On the basis of the main petition, which is for declaratory relief directed at the
nullification of R.A. 8050 on constitutional grounds, and for a writ of prohibition,
likewise premised on the nullity of said law due to constitutional infirmities, the Court
finds that the whole or part of the relief which petitioners are seeking and to
which prima facie they are entitled, consists in restraining the enforcement or
implementation of the law.

The Court likewise concludes, on its finding that both public rights would be
prejudiced by the operation of R.A. 8050, that its enforcement pendente would inflict
substantial injustice to petitioners.[13]

On 1 September 1995, respondent Judge Colet issued a Writ of Preliminary

Injunction,[14] the dispositive portion of which reads:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned that, until further orders, you, the said
defendants, and all your attorneys, representatives, agents, and any other person
assisting you refrain from enforcing and/or implementing R.A. No. 8050 or its Code
of Ethics.
 The petitioners then filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order and alleged that:
I

RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND/OR

ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE LOCUS STANDI TO FILE THE PETITION A
QUO.
II

RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND/OR

ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DECREEING THAT PRIMA
FACIE EVIDENCE OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY/INVALIDITY OF R.A. 8050
EXISTS WHICH WARRANT THE ENJOINMENT OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION.
III

RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND/OR

ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PRELIMINARILY ENJOINING R.A.
8050 ON MERE ALLEGATIONS BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THAT THE
SAME WOULD BRING INJURIOUS EFFECTS TO THE HEALTH AND SAFETY
OF THE PUBLIC.
IV

RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND/OR

ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.

As we see it, the assigned errors quoted above may be reduced to two key
issues, viz.:
(1) The locus standi of the private respondents to question the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 8050; and
(2) The absence of a valid cause of action for either declaratory relief or prohibition.

The petitioners maintain that for a party to have locus standi to question the
validity of a statute, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.[15] In this light, the private respondents do not have the requisite
personal and substantial interest to assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050
for, per the certifications of the SEC, private respondents COA and ACMO are
not registered associations; and two of the alleged presidents of the respondent
associations are not duly registered optometrists as certified to by the
PRC. Finally, the petitioners aver, the private respondents did not allege in their
petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770, and in their Rejoinder to the Opposition
therein, their capacity to bring suit as required by Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules
of Court.
Refuting this charge, the private respondents claim in their Comment on the
petition that they have, as held by the trial court, locus standi under the rule of
Public Right pursuant to Tanada vs. Tuvera,[16] citing Severino vs. Governor
General;[17] moreover, as also found by the trial court, their rights as
optometrists or optical companies would be adversely affected by the assailed
law. They further claim that they seek to protect their Constitutional rights to
property and freedom of expression from enforcement of the provisions of the
challenged law, which bar truthful advertisements and impose vague and
unreasonable conditions for the continued practice of their profession. Insofar
as private respondents Acebedo Optical Co., Inc., and Panol are concerned,
the said law would likewise adversely affect the conduct of their business of
maintaining optical shops and expose them to threats of criminal
prosecution. Finally, they contend that they also seek, as taxpayers and
citizens, under the concept of Public Right, to bar the enforcement of the law
because it endangers the publics health, a danger clearly seen from the
oppositions to the law filed before both houses of Congress.
I

Only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be

parties in a civil action, and every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest.[18] Under Article 44 of the Civil Code, an
association is considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personality
separate and distinct from that of its members.
There is serious doubt as to the existence of private respondents OPAP,
COA, ACMO, and SMOAP. For one, the body of the petition in Civil Case No.
95-74770 makes no mention of these associations nor states their
addresses. Further, nowhere is it claimed therein that they are juridical
entities. These run counter to Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or the legal existence
of an organized association of persons that is made a party must be
averred. Second, not even in the sworn statements[19] of the alleged presidents
representing the associations, which were offered in evidence in support of the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction, were such associations
mentioned or named. Finally, in their Comment on the instant petition, the
private respondents chose to remain silent on the issue of the juridical
personality of their associations.
For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, private respondents
OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP must then be deemed to be devoid of legal
personality to bring an action, such as Civil Case No. 95-74770.
A real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court is a
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit.[20]
In the case at bench, since OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP were not
shown to be juridical entities, they cannot, for obvious reasons, be deemed real
parties in interest. Moreover, since the names of private respondents Miguel
Acebedo, Miriam F. Llave, and Republica A. Panol do not appear in the
registration books of the Board of Optometry as authorized optometry
practitioners in the Philippines,[21] they do not have the requisite personal and
substantial interest in the case. Even further, although private respondents
Roberto Rodis, Jr., Cyril Corales, and Elmer Villarosa claim to be practicing
optometrists, the petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770 is bereft of any allegation
to make them real parties in interest to challenge the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 8050.
As an attempt in extremis, the private respondents now assert in their
comment that the petition for declaratory relief, prohibition, and injunction was
filed in their capacity as taxpayers and citizens, under the concept of Public
Right, to bar the enforcement of the law because it endangers public
health.[22] They thus suggest that their petition is in the nature of a taxpayers
class suit.
As a class suit, Civil Case No. 95-74770 must fail. Not only did the private
respondents fail to allege this in their petition, they likewise failed to allege the
existence and prove the requisites of a class suit, viz., the subject matter of the
controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons, and the
parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the
court.[23]
Courts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is
the exception to the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For while
no difficulty may arise if the decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs, a
quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as those who were
deemed impleaded by their self-appointed representatives would certainly
claim denial of due process.[24]
 Neither may the private respondents be allowed at this late stage to seek
refuge under the doctrine allowing taxpayers suits. While they claimed their
petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770 was a taxpayers suit, and although this
Court, in a catena of cases, has shown liberality in granting locus standi to
taxpayers in taxpayers suits,[25] the private respondents have not adequately
shown that this liberality must be extended to them. Their plea of injury or
damage is nothing but a sweeping generalization.
II

Civil Case No. 95-74770 must fail for yet another reason. As a special civil
action for declaratory relief,[26] its requisites are: (1) the existence of a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue invoked is ripe for judicial
determination.[27] On this score, we find no difficulty holding that at least the first
and fourth requisites are wanting.
Then there is the unbending rule in constitutional law that courts will not
assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question unless the following
requisites are first satisfied: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination; (2) the
constitutional question must be raised by a proper party; (3) the constitutional
question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the
constitutional question must be necessary to the resolution of the case.[28]
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that
is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory. [29] It
cannot be disputed that there is yet no actual case or controversy involving all
or any of the private respondents on one hand, and all or any of the petitioners
on the other, with respect to rights or obligations under R.A. No. 8050. This is
plain because Civil Case No. 95-74770 is for declaratory relief. Then, too, as
adverted to earlier, the private respondents have not sufficiently established
their locus standi to question the validity of R.A. No. 8050.
The conclusion then is inevitable that the respondent Judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion when he issued a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the implementation of R.A. No. 8050, as well as of the Code of Ethics
promulgated thereunder, if one has been issued. Even if there was before him
a case involving the law, prudence dictated that the respondent Judge should
not have issued the writ with undue haste, bearing in mind our decision, penned
by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, in Drilon vs. Lim,[30] where we stated:
We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general
definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by
the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in
the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the accused in a criminal action
has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charge with
violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they contravene the
Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts
in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.

In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the
utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of
separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the
legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such
courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this
Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a
thorough deliberation of a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the
majority of those who participated in its discussion.
It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with
the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on
the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and
legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The
presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing
that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a
conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the
discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act be struck down.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged order of
25 August 1995 of respondent Judge Angel V. Colet in Civil Case No. 95-74770
granting the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and
the writ of preliminary injunction issued on 1 September 1995 are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The respondent Judge is further DIRECTED to DISMISS Civil Case No. 95-
74770.
 Costs against private respondents Acebedo Optical Co., Inc., Republica A.
Panol, and the alleged presidents of Optometry Practitioner Association of the
Philippines, Cenevis Optometrist Association, Association of Christian-Muslim
Optometrists, Southern Mindanao Optometrist Association of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC

TONDO MEDICAL CENTER G.R. No. 167324

EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR
TROPICAL MEDICINE Present:
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
NATIONAL ORTHOPEDIC PUNO, C.J.,
WORKERS UNION, DR. JOSE R. QUISUMBING,
REYES MEMORIAL HOSPITAL YNARES-SANTIAGO,
EMPLOYEES UNION, SAN SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
LAZARO HOSPITAL CARPIO,
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CORONA,
WORKERS, INC., HEALTH CARPIO MORALES,
ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY, AZCUNA,
COUNCIL FOR HEALTH TINGA,
DEVELOPMENT, NETWORK CHICO-NAZARIO,
OPPOSED TO PRIVATIZATION, GARCIA,
COMMUNITY MEDICINE VELASCO, JR., and
DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION NACHURA, JJ.
INC., PHILIPPINE SOCIETY
OF SANITARY ENGINEERS INC.,
KILUSANG MAYO UNO,
GABRIELA, KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS,
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYAN NG
MGA MARALITA, ELSA O.
GUEVARRA, ARCADIO B.
GONZALES, JOSE G. GALANG,
DOMINGO P. MANAY, TITO P.
ESTEVES, EDUARDO P.
GALOPE, REMEDIOS M.
YSMAEL, ALFREDO BACUATA,
EDGARDO J. DAMICOG,
REMEDIOS M. MALTU AND
REMEGIO S. MERCADO,
Petitioners,
 - versus -

THE COURT OF APPEALS,

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ALBERTO G. ROMULO,
SECRETARY OF HEALTH
MANUEL M. DAYRIT,
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND Promulgated:
MANAGEMENT EMILIA T.
BONCODIN,
Respondents. July 17, 2007
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision,[1] promulgated by the Court of Appeals on 26 November
2004, denying a petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda
(HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive
Order No. 102, Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of
Health, which was issued by then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada on 24 May 1999.
Prior hereto, petitioners originally filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before the
Supreme Court on 15 August 2001. However, the Supreme Court, in a Resolution
dated 29 August 2001, referred the petition to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action.

HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA (HSRA)

In 1999, the DOH launched the HSRA, a reform agenda developed by the HSRA
Technical Working Group after a series of workshops and analyses with inputs from
several consultants, program managers and technical staff possessing the adequate
expertise and experience in the health sector. It provided for five general areas of
reform: (1) to provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; (2) secure funding
for priority public health programs; (3) promote the development of local health
systems and ensure its effective performance; (4) strengthen the capacities of health
regulatory agencies; and (5) expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance
Program (NHIP).[2]

Petitioners questioned the first reform agenda involving the fiscal autonomy of
government hospitals, particularly the collection of socialized user fees and the
corporate restructuring of government hospitals. The said provision under the HSRA
reads:

Provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals. Government hospitals must

be allowed to collect socialized user fees so they can reduce the dependence on
direct subsidies from the government. Their critical capacities like diagnostic
equipment, laboratory facilities and medical staff capability must be upgraded to
effectively exercise fiscal autonomy. Such investment must be cognizant of
complimentary capacity provided by public-private networks. Moreover such
capacities will allow government hospitals to supplement priority public health
programs. Appropriate institutional arrangement must be introduced such as
allowing them autonomy towards converting them into government corporations
without compromising their social responsibilities. As a result, government
hospitals are expected to be more competitive and responsive to health needs.

Petitioners also assailed the issuance of a draft administrative order issued by the
DOH, dated 5 January 2001, entitled Guidelines and Procedure in the
Implementation of the Corporate Restructuring of Selected DOH Hospitals to
Achieve Fiscal Autonomy, and Managerial Flexibility to Start by January
2001;[3]and Administrative Order No. 172 of the DOH, entitled Policies and
Guidelines on the Private Practice of Medical and Paramedical Professionals in
Government Health Facilities,[4] dated 9 January 2001, for imposing an added
burden to indigent Filipinos, who cannot afford to pay for medicine and medical
services.[5]

Petitioners alleged that the implementation of the aforementioned reforms had

resulted in making free medicine and free medical services inaccessible to
economically disadvantaged Filipinos. Thus, they alleged that the HSRA is void for
being in violation of the following constitutional provisions:[6]

ART. III, SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.
ART II, SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty,
and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the
enjoyment of all the people of the blessings of democracy.

ART II, SEC. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will
ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from
poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full
employment, a rising standard of living and an improved quality of life for all.

ART II, SEC. 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.

ART II, SEC. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.

ART II, SEC. 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building
and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social
well-being x x x.

ART II, SEC. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It
shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.

ART XV, SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.

ART XV, SEC. 3. The State shall defend:

xxxx
(2) the right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development.

xxxx

ART XIII, SEC. 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and
healthful working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such
facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to
realize their full potential in the service of the nation.

ART II, SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.

ART XIII, SEC. 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive
approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods,
health and other social services available to all people at affordable cost. There shall
 be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 102

On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No.
102, entitled Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,
which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes
of the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate
from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health
services and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to
local government units. The provisions for the streamlining of the DOH and the
deployment of DOH personnel to regional offices and hospitals read:

Sec. 4. Preparation of a Rationalization and Streamlining Plan. In view of the

functional and operational redirection in the DOH, and to effect efficiency and
effectiveness in its activities, the Department shall prepare a Rationalization and
Streamlining Plan (RSP) which shall be the basis of the intended changes. The RSP
shall contain the following:

a) the specific shift in policy directions, functions, programs and

activities/strategies;
b) the structural and organizational shift, stating the specific functions and
activities by organizational unit and the relationship of each units;
c) the staffing shift, highlighting and itemizing the existing filled and unfilled
positions; and
d) the resource allocation shift, specifying the effects of the streamline set-up
on the agency budgetary allocation and indicating where possible, savings
have been generated.

The RSP shall [be] submitted to the Department of Budget and Management for
approval before the corresponding shifts shall be affected (sic) by the DOH
Secretary.

Sec. 5. Redeployment of Personnel. The redeployment of officials and other

personnel on the basis of the approved RSP shall not result in diminution in rank
and compensation of existing personnel. It shall take into account all pertinent Civil
Service laws and rules.

Section 6. Funding. The financial resources needed to implement the

Rationalization and Streamlining Plan shall be taken from funds available in the
 DOH, provided that the total requirements for the implementation of the revised
staffing pattern shall not exceed available funds for Personnel Services.

Section 7. Separation Benefits. Personnel who opt to be separated from the service
as a consequence of the implementation of this Executive Order shall be entitled to
the benefits under existing laws. In the case of those who are not covered by
existing laws, they shall be entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one month
basic salary for every year of service or proportionate share thereof in addition to
the terminal fee benefits to which he/she is entitled under existing laws.

Executive Order No. 102 was enacted pursuant to Section 17 of the Local
Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160), which provided for the devolution to
the local government units of basic services and facilities, as well as specific health-
related functions and responsibilities.[7]

Petitioners contended that a law, such as Executive Order No. 102, which
effects the reorganization of the DOH, should be enacted by Congress in the exercise
of its legislative function. They argued that Executive Order No. 102 is void, having
been issued in excess of the Presidents authority.[8]
Moreover, petitioners averred that the implementation of the Rationalization
and Streamlining Plan (RSP) was not in accordance with law. The RSP was
allegedly implemented even before the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) approved it. They also maintained that the Office of the President should
have issued an administrative order to carry out the streamlining, but that it failed to
do so.[9]

Furthermore, petitioners Elsa O. Guevarra, Arcadio B. Gonzales, Jose

G. Galang, Domingo P. Manay, Eduardo P. Galope, Remedios M. Ysmael, Alfredo
U. Bacuata and Edgardo J. Damicog, all DOH employees, assailed the validity of
Executive Order No. 102 on the ground that they were likely to lose their jobs, and
that some of them were suffering from the inconvenience of having to travel a longer
distance to get to their new place of work, while other DOH employees had to
relocate to far-flung areas.[10]

Petitioners also pointed out several errors in the implementation of the RSP.
Certain employees allegedly suffered diminution of compensation,[11] while others
were supposedly assigned to positions for which they were neither qualified nor
suited.[12] In addition, new employees were purportedly hired by the DOH and
appointed to positions for which they were not qualified, despite the fact that the
objective of the ongoing streamlining was to cut back on costs.[13] It was also averred
that DOH employees were deployed or transferred even during the three-month
period before the national and local elections in May 2001,[14]in violation of Section
2 of the Republic Act No. 7305, also known as Magna Carta for Public Health
Workers.[15] Petitioners, however, failed to identify the DOH employees referred to
above, much less include them as parties to the petition.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition due to a number of procedural defects,
which proved fatal: 1) Petitioners failed to show capacity or authority to sign the
certification of non-forum shopping and the verification; 2) Petitioners failed to
show any particularized interest for bringing the suit, nor any direct or personal
injury sustained or were in the immediate danger of sustaining; 3) the Petition,
brought before the Supreme Court on 15 August 1999, was filed out of time, or
beyond 60 days from the time the reorganization methods were implemented in
2000; and 4) certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus will not lie where thePresident,
in issuing the assailed Executive Order, was not acting as a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

In resolving the substantial issues of the case, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
HSRA cannot be declared void for violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of
Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections
1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly
pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the peoples right to health and
well-being. It reasoned that the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution are
not self-executing; they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights and can
only provide guidelines for legislation.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that the petitioners assertion that
Executive Order No. 102 is detrimental to the health of the people cannot be made
a justiciable issue. The question of whether the HSRA will bring about the
development or disintegration of the health sector is within the realm of the political
department.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals decreed that the President was empowered to
issue Executive Order No. 102, in accordance with Section 17 Article VII of the
1987 Constitution. It also declared that the DOH did not implement Executive Order
No. 102 in bad faith or with grave abuse of discretion, as alleged by the petitioners,
as the DOH issued Department Circular No. 275-C, Series of 2000, which created
the different committees tasked with the implementation of the RSP, only after both
the DBM and Presidential Committee on Effective Governance (PCEG) approved
the RSP on 8 July 2000 and 17 July 2000, respectively.
Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision rendered on 26 November 2004, but the same was denied in a Resolution
dated 7 March 2005.

Hence, the present petition, where the following issues are raised:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR

IN RULING THAT ANY QUESTION ON THE WISDOM AND EFFICACY OF
THE HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE
CONTROVERSY AND THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE ARE NOT
JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE;

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR

IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS COMPLAINT THAT EXECUTIVE ORDER
NO. 102 IS DETRIMENTAL TO THE FILIPINO IS LIKEWISE NOT A
JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY AND THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS THE
AUTHORITY TO ISSUE SAID ORDER; AND

III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR
IN UPHOLDING TECHNICALITIES OVER AND ABOVE THE ISSUES OF
TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE RAISED IN THE PETITION
BELOW. [16]

The Court finds the present petition to be without merit.

Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared void, since it runs counter
to the aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the
Constitution.[17] They claim that the HSRAs policies of fiscal autonomy, income
generation, and revenue enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of
Article II, Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections
1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted in
making inaccessible free medicine and free medical services. This contention is
unfounded.
 As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-
executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are
not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily
nullified by the inaction of Congress.[18] However, some provisions have already
been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.

In Tanada v. Angara,[19] the Court specifically set apart the sections found
under Article II of the 1987 Constitution as non self-executing and ruled that such
broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be implemented:

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles

and state policies. x x x. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by
the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and
by the legislature in its enactment of laws.

In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,[20] this Court

declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and
Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing
provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[21] the Court referred to Section 1
of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral incentives
to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. These provisions, which merely
lay down a general principle, are distinguished from other constitutional provisions
as non self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in the
courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights.[22]

Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken
from Article II of the Constitution -- specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and
18 -- the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing
in the aforecited case of Taada v. Angara.[23]

Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly
violated the equal protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1
of Article III of the Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of
the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to
substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached, petitioners are
unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition, and
consequently, in annulling the HSRA.
 In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII and Sections
1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords recognition to the protection of working
women and the provision for safe and healthful working conditions; to the adoption
of an integrated and comprehensive approach to health; to the Filipino family; and
to the right of children to assistance and special protection, including proper care
and nutrition. Like the provisions that were declared as non self-executory in the
cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
[24] [25]
Corporation and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, they are mere statements
of principles and policies. As such, they are mere directives addressed to the
executive and the legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie with
the courts; but rather, the electorates displeasure may be manifested in their votes.

The rationale for this is given by Justice Dante Tinga in his Separate Opinion
in the case of Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission[26]:

x x x However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee

the full exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of the ideals
therein expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such
view presents the dangerous tendency of being overbroad and
exaggerated. x x x Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the parameters of
these guaranteed rights. x x x Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial
bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least
the aims of the Constitution.

The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely on petitioners bare allegations that
it violates the general principles expressed in the non self-executing provisions they
cite herein. There are two reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged
infringement of broad constitutional principles: basic considerations of due process
and the limitations of judicial power.[27]

Petitioners also claim that Executive Order No. 102 is void on the ground that
it was issued by the President in excess of his authority. They maintain that the
structural and functional reorganization of the DOH is an exercise of legislative
functions, which the President usurped when he issued Executive Order No.
102.[28] This line of argument is without basis.

This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President may, by
executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of government entities
under the Executive Department.[29] This is also sanctioned under the Constitution,
as well as other statutes.
 Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: [T]he
president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices. Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known
as the Administrative Code of 1987 reads:

SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office - The
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize
the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may
take any of the following actions:

(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper,
including the immediate offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers
System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing consolidating or
merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;

(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President
from other Departments or Agencies; and

(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President
from other Departments or agencies.

In Domingo v. Zamora,[30] this Court explained the rationale behind the

Presidents continuing authority under the Administrative Code to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President. The law grants the President
the power to reorganize the Office of the President in recognition of the recurring
need of every President to reorganize his or her office to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency. To remain effective and efficient, it must be capable of
being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner the Chief Executive deems
fit to carry out presidential directives and policies.

The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the President consists of
the Office of the President Proper and the agencies under it.[31] The agencies under
the Office of the President are identified in Section 23, Chapter 8, Title II of the
Administrative Code:

Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President.The agencies under the
Office of the President refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship of the
President, those under the supervision and control of the President, those under
 the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, those attached to it for
policy and program coordination, and those that are not placed by law or order
creating them under any specific department. (Emphasis provided.)

Section 2(4) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code defines the
term agency of the government as follows:

Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government,
including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or
controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.

Furthermore, the DOH is among the cabinet-level departments enumerated under

Book IV of the Administrative Code, mainly tasked with the functional distribution
of the work of the President.[32] Indubitably, the DOH is an agency which is under
the supervision and control of the President and, thus, part of the Office of the
President. Consequently, Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of the Administrative
Code, granting the President the continued authority to reorganize the Office of the
President, extends to the DOH.

The power of the President to reorganize the executive department is likewise

recognized in general appropriations laws. As early as 1993, Sections 48 and 62 of
Republic Act No. 7645, the General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1993,
already contained a provision stating that:

Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities Within the Executive
Branch.The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby
directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer essential in the
delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased out, or
abolished, subject to civil service rules and regulations. x x x. Actual scaling
down, phasing out, or abolition of activities shall be effected pursuant to
Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President.
(Emphasis provided.)

Sec. 62. Unauthorized Organizational Changes. Unless otherwise created by law or

directed by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in
key positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective
organizational structures and be funded form appropriations by this Act.

Again, in the year when Executive Order No. 102 was issued, The General
Appropriations Act of Fiscal Year 1999 (Republic Act No. 8745) conceded to the
President the power to make any changes in any of the key positions and
organizational units in the executive department thus:

Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the
President of the Philippines, no changes in key positions or organizational units in
any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational
structures and funded from appropriations provided by this Act.

Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional power of
the President to issue. The President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in
issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an exercise of the Presidents constitutional
power of control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of the
Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this
Court.

Petitioners also pointed out several flaws in the implementation of Executive

Order No. 102, particularly the RSP. However, these contentions are without merit
and are insufficient to invalidate the executive order.

The RSP was allegedly implemented even before the DBM approved it. The
facts show otherwise. It was only after the DBM approved the Notice of
Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action on 8 July 2000,[33] and after the
Presidential Committee on Effective Governance (PCEG) issued on 17 July 2000
Memorandum Circular No. 62,[34] approving the RSP, that then DOH Secretary
Alberto G. Romualdez issued on 28 July 2000 Department Circular No. 275-C,
Series of 2000,[35] creating the different committees to implement the RSP.

Petitioners also maintain that the Office of the President should have issued
an administrative order to carry out the streamlining, but that it failed to do so. Such
objection cannot be given any weight considering that the acts of the DOH Secretary,
as an alter ego of the President, are presumed to be the acts of the President. The
members of the Cabinet are subject at all times to the disposition of the President
since they are merely his alter egos.[36] Thus, their acts, performed and promulgated
in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved by the President,
presumptively acts of the President.[37] Significantly, the acts of the DOH Secretary
were clearly authorized by the President, who, thru the PCEG, issued the
aforementioned Memorandum Circular No. 62, sanctioning the implementation of
the RSP.
 Petitioners Elsa Odonzo Guevarra, Arcadio B. Gonzales, Jose G. Galang,
Domingo P. Manay, Eduardo P. Galope, Remedios M. Ysmael, Alfredo U. Bacuata,
and Edgardo Damicog, all DOH employees, assailed the validity of Executive Order
No. 102 on the ground that they were likely to lose their jobs, and that some of them
were suffering from the inconvenience of having to travel a longer distance to get to
their new place of work, while other DOH employees had to relocate to far-flung
areas.

In several cases, this Court regarded reorganizations of government units or

departments as valid, for so long as they are pursued in good faiththat is, for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.[38] On the other hand, if
the reorganization is done for the purpose of defeating security of tenure or for ill-
motivated political purposes, any abolition of position would be invalid. None of
these circumstances are applicable since none of the petitioners were removed from
public service, nor did they identify any action taken by the DOH that would
unquestionably result in their dismissal. The reorganization that was pursued in the
present case was made in good faith. The RSP was clearly designed to improve the
efficiency of the department and to implement the provisions of the Local
Government Code on the devolution of health services to local governments. While
this Court recognizes the inconvenience suffered by public servants in their
deployment to distant areas, the executive departments finding of a need to make
health services available to these areas and to make delivery of health services more
efficient and more compelling is far from being unreasonable or arbitrary, a
determination which is well within its authority. In all, this Court finds petitioners
contentions to be insufficient to invalidate Executive Order No. 102.

Without identifying the DOH employees concerned, much less including

them as parties to the petition, petitioners went on identifying several errors in the
implementation of Executive Order No. 102. First, they alleged that unidentified
DOH employees suffered from a diminution of compensation by virtue of the
provision on Salaries and Benefits found in Department Circular No. 312, Series of
2000, issued on 23 October 2000, which reads:

2. Any employee who was matched to a position with lower salary grade (SG) shall
not suffer a reduction in salary except where his/her current salary is higher than
the maximum step of the SG of the new position, in which case he/she shall be paid
the salary corresponding to the maximum step of the SG of the new position. RATA
shall no longer be received, if employee was matched to a Non-Division Chief
Position.
Incidentally, the petition shows that none of the petitioners, who are working in the
DOH, were entitled to receive RATA at the time the petition was filed. Nor was it
alleged that they suffered any diminution of compensation. Secondly, it was claimed
that certain unnamed DOH employees were matched with unidentified positions for
which they were supposedly neither qualified nor suited. New employees, again
unnamed and not included as parties, were hired by the DOH and appointed to
unidentified positions for which they were purportedly not qualified, despite the fact
that the objective of the ongoing streamlining was to cut back on costs. Lastly,
unspecified DOH employees were deployed or transferred during the three-month
period before the national and local elections in May 2001, in violation of Section 2
of the Republic Act No. 7305, also known as Magna Carta for Public Health
Workers.

Petitioners allegations are too general and unsubstantiated by the records for the
Court to pass upon. The persons involved are not identified, details of their
appointments and transfers such as position, salary grade, and the date they were
appointed - are not given; and the circumstances which attended the alleged
violations are not specified.

Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the
petitioners, they would still not invalidate Executive Order No. 102. Any serious
legal errors in laying down the compensation of the DOH employees concerned can
only invalidate the pertinent provisions of Department Circular No. 312, Series of
2000. Likewise, any questionable appointments or transfers are properly addressed
by an appeal process provided under Administrative Order No. 94, series of
2000;[39] and if the appeal is meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be
invalidated. The validity of Executive Order No. 102 would, nevertheless, remain
unaffected. Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid,
although they may be abused or misabused, and may afford an opportunity for abuse
in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be
determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired,
not from its effects in a particular case.[40]

In a number of cases,[41] the Court upheld the standing of citizens who filed
suits, wherein the transcendental importance of the constitutional question justified
the granting of relief. In spite of these rulings, the Court, in Domingo
v. Carague,[42] dismissed the petition when petitioners therein failed to show any
present substantial interest. It demonstrated how even in the cases in which the Court
declared that the matter of the case was of transcendental importance, the petitioners
must be able to assert substantial interest. Present substantial interest, which will
enable a party to question the validity of the law, requires that a party sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.[43] It is distinguished from a
mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest.[44]

In the same way, the Court, in Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of

the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,[45] ruled that a citizen is allowed to raise a
constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action. This case likewise stressed that the rule
on constitutional questions which are of transcendental importance cannot be
invoked where a partys substantive claim is without merit. Thus, a partys standing
is determined by the substantive merit of his case or a preliminary estimate
thereof. After a careful scrutiny of the petitioners substantive claims, this Court finds
that the petitioners miserably failed to show any merit to their claims.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This

Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 26
November 2004, declaring both the HSRA and Executive Order No. 102 as valid. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU
UNJIENG, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government.
De Witt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.
Vicente J. Francisco, Feria and La O, Orense and Belmonte, and Gibbs and McDonough for
respondent Cu Unjieng.
No appearance for respondent Judge.

DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the
writ of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court
may review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649
entitled “The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.”, more particularly
the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions
of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further
action or entertaining further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the
final judgment of conviction rendered by this court in said case (G. R. No. 41200). 1
Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein
Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled “The People of the
Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.”, criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O.
Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid
criminal case.
The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila on October 15, 1931, petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals
of Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the
volume in the testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the Court of First Instance of
Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant
Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months
of prision correccional to eight years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation
of civil action to the offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon
appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of
from five years and six months of prision correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-
seven days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Mariano Cu
Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which
were denied on December 17, 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on
December 18, 1935. The defendant thereupon sought to have the case elevated
on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition
for certiorari in November, 1936. This court, on November 24, 1936, denied the petition
subsequently filed by the defendant for leave to file a second alternative motion for
reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for
execution of the judgment.
The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the
provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano
Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was
convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the
future. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the
application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the
same June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge
Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.
On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation
to the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition
on April 5, 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not
been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of
section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because
section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law
effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private
prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the
alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to
the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal
concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions
raised concerning the constitutionality of Act No. 4221.
On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution with a
finding that “las pruebas no han establecido de unamanera concluyente la culpabilidad del
peticionario y que todos los hechos probados no son inconsistentes o incongrentes con su
inocencia” and concludes that the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng “es inocente por
duda racional” of the crime of which he stands convicted by this court in G.R. No. 41200, but
denying the latter’s petition for probation for the reason that:
. . . Si este Juzgado concediera la poblacion solicitada por las circunstancias y la historia
social que se han expuesto en el cuerpo de esta resolucion, que hacen al peticionario
acreedor de la misma, una parte de la opinion publica, atizada por los recelos y las
suspicacias, podria levantarse indignada contra un sistema de probacion que permite atisbar
en los procedimientos ordinarios de una causa criminal perturbando la quietud y la eficacia
de las decisiones ya recaidas al traer a la superficie conclusiones enteramente differentes,
en menoscabo del interes publico que demanda el respeto de las leyes y del veredicto
judicial.
On July 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng filed an exception to
the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration.
An alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on July 13, 1937.
This was supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on July 14,
1937. The aforesaid motions were set for hearing on July 31, 1937, but said hearing was
postponed at the petition of counsel for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng because a motion
for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by thirty-three (thirty-four) attorneys
had just been filed with the trial court. Attorney Eulalio Chaves whose signature appears in
the aforesaid motion subsequently filed a petition for leave to withdraw his appearance
as amicus curiae on the ground that the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was
circulated at a banquet given by counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng on the evening of July 30,
1937, and that he signed the same “without mature deliberation and purely as a matter of
courtesy to the person who invited me (him).”
On August 6, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the
issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to
commit the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment.
On August 7, 1937, the private prosecution filed its opposition to the motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae aforementioned, asking that a date be set for a hearing of the same
and that, at all events, said motion should be denied with respect to certain attorneys signing
the same who were members of the legal staff of the several counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng.
On August 10, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera issued an order requiring all
parties including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on
August 14, 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the
hearing of his motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng, he moved
for the postponement of the hearing of both motions. The respondent judge thereupon set
the hearing of the motion for execution on August 21, 1937, but proceeded to consider the
motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances
under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to
court was to have been heard on August 19, 1937. But at this juncture, herein petitioners
came to this court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an
interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila which fostered “the campaign
of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by
this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the
apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court
imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng.”
The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance
of a temporary restraining order by this court on August 21, 1937.
To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition,
herein petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or in excess
of his jurisdiction:
I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng
under probation for the following reason:
(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said purpose of the Philippine Legislature is made
to apply only to the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be made
applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila.
(2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the effect that in the
absence of a special provision, the term “province” may be construed to include the City of
Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws of general application, it is also true that Act
No. 4221 is not a law of general application because it is made to apply only to those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards shall have provided for the salary of a
probation officer.
(3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a province, still, Act No. 4221 would not
be applicable to it because it has provided for the salary of a probation officer as required by
section 11 thereof; it being immaterial that there is an Insular Probation Officer willing to act
for the City of Manila, said Probation Officer provided for in section 10 of Act No. 4221 being
different and distinct from the Probation Officer provided for in section 11 of the same Act.
II. Because even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application
for probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted without
jurisdiction or in excess thereof in continuing to entertain the motion for reconsideration and
by failing to commit Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison after he had promulgated his resolution of
June 28, 1937, denying Mariano Cu Unjieng’s application for probation, for the reason that:
(1) His jurisdiction and power in probation proceedings is limited by Act No. 4221 to the
granting or denying of applications for probation.
(2) After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu Unjieng’s petition for probation on June
28, 1937, it became final and executory at the moment of its rendition.
(3) No right on appeal exists in such cases.
(4) The respondent judge lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to modify or
change the same.
III. Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano Cu Unjieng is innocent of the
crime for which he was convicted by final judgment of this court, which finding is not only
presumptuous but without foundation in fact and in law, and is furthermore in contempt of this
court and a violation of the respondent’s oath of office as ad interim judge of first instance.
IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to violate his duty, which
became imperative when he issued his order of June 28, 1937, denying the application for
probation, to commit his co-respondent to jail.
Petitioners also avers that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation further contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine
Legislature providing for a system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who
are convicted of crime, is unconstitutional because it is violative of section 1, subsection (1),
Article III, of the Constitution of the Philippines guaranteeing equal protection of the laws
because it confers upon the provincial board of its province the absolute discretion to make
said law operative or otherwise in their respective provinces, because it constitutes an
unlawful and improper delegation to the provincial boards of the several provinces of the
legislative power lodged by the Jones Law (section 8) in the Philippine Legislature and by the
Constitution (section 1, Art. VI) in the National Assembly; and for the further reason that it
gives the provincial boards, in contravention of the Constitution (section 2, Art. VIII) and the
Jones Law (section 28), the authority to enlarge the powers of the Court of First Instance of
different provinces without uniformity. In another supplementary petition dated September 14,
1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila, in behalf of one of the petitioners, the People of the
Philippine Islands, concurs for the first time with the issues raised by other petitioner regarding
the constitutionality of Act No. 4221, and on the oral argument held on October 6, 1937,
further elaborated on the theory that probation is a form of reprieve and therefore Act. No.
4221 is an encroachment on the exclusive power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and
reprieves. On October 7, 1937, the City Fiscal filed two memorandums in which he contended
that Act No. 4221 not only encroaches upon the pardoning power to the executive, but also
constitute an unwarranted delegation of legislative power and a denial of the equal protection
of the laws. On October 9, 1937, two memorandums, signed jointly by the City Fiscal and the
Solicitor-General, acting in behalf of the People of the Philippine Islands, and by counsel for
the petitioner, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, one sustaining the power
of the state to impugn the validity of its own laws and the other contending that Act No. 4221
constitutes an unwarranted delegation of legislative power, were presented. Another joint
memorandum was filed by the same persons on the same day, October 9, 1937, alleging that
Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional because it denies the equal protection of the laws and
constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power and, further, that the whole Act is void:
that the Commonwealth is not estopped from questioning the validity of its laws; that the
private prosecution may intervene in probation proceedings and may attack the probation law
as unconstitutional; and that this court may pass upon the constitutional question in
prohibition proceedings.
Respondents in their answer dated August 31, 1937, as well as in their oral argument and
memorandums, challenge each and every one of the foregoing proposition raised by the
petitioners.
As special defenses, respondents allege:
(1) That the present petition does not state facts sufficient in law to warrant the issuance of
the writ of certiorari or of prohibition.
(2) That the aforesaid petition is premature because the remedy sought by the petitioners is
the very same remedy prayed for by them before the trial court and was still pending
resolution before the trial court when the present petition was filed with this court.
(3) That the petitioners having themselves raised the question as to the execution of judgment
before the trial court, said trial court has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the same
under the theory that its resolution denying probation is unappealable.
(4) That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First
Instance to decide the question as to whether or not the execution will lie, this court
nevertheless cannot exercise said jurisdiction while the Court of First Instance has assumed
jurisdiction over the same upon motion of herein petitioners themselves.
(5) That upon the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in seeking to deprive the trial
court of its jurisdiction over the case and elevate the proceedings to this court, should not be
tolerated because it impairs the authority and dignity of the trial court which court while sitting
in the probation cases is “a court of limited jurisdiction but of great dignity.”
(6) That under the supposition that this court has jurisdiction to resolve the question submitted
to and pending resolution by the trial court, the present action would not lie because the
resolution of the trial court denying probation is appealable; for although the Probation Law
does not specifically provide that an applicant for probation may appeal from a resolution of
the Court of First Instance denying probation, still it is a general rule in this jurisdiction that a
final order, resolution or decision of an inferior court is appealable to the superior court.
(7) That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of herein respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng being appealable, the same had not become final and executory for the reason that
the said respondent had filed an alternative motion for reconsideration and new trial within
the requisite period of fifteen days, which motion the trial court was able to resolve in view of
the restraining order improvidently and erroneously issued by this court.lawphi1.net
(8) That the Fiscal of the City of Manila had by implication admitted that the resolution of the
trial court denying probation is not final and unappealable when he presented his answer to
the motion for reconsideration and agreed to the postponement of the hearing of the said
motion.
(9) That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying probation is not
appealable, it is incumbent upon the accused to file an action for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari with mandamus, it appearing that the trial court, although it believed that the
accused was entitled to probation, nevertheless denied probation for fear of criticism because
the accused is a rich man; and that, before a petition for certiorari grounded on an irregular
exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court could lie, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to file a
motion for reconsideration specifying the error committed so that the trial court could have an
opportunity to correct or cure the same.
(10) That on hypothesis that the resolution of this court is not appealable, the trial court retains
its jurisdiction within a reasonable time to correct or modify it in accordance with law and
justice; that this power to alter or modify an order or resolution is inherent in the courts and
may be exercise either motu proprio or upon petition of the proper party, the petition in the
latter case taking the form of a motion for reconsideration.
(11) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is appealable as respondent
allege, said court cannot order execution of the same while it is on appeal, for then the appeal
would not be availing because the doors of probation will be closed from the moment the
accused commences to serve his sentence (Act No. 4221, sec. 1; U.S. vs. Cook, 19 Fed.
[2d], 827).
In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain that
Act No. 4221 is constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does
not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, does not infringe the equal protection
clause of the Constitution, and does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive.
In an additional memorandum filed on the same date, counsel for the respondents reiterate
the view that section 11 of Act No. 4221 is free from constitutional objections and contend, in
addition, that the private prosecution may not intervene in probation proceedings, much less
question the validity of Act No. 4221; that both the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General are
estopped from questioning the validity of the Act; that the validity of Act cannot be attacked
for the first time before this court; that probation in unavailable; and that, in any event, section
11 of the Act No. 4221 is separable from the rest of the Act. The last memorandum for the
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng was denied for having been filed out of time but was admitted
by resolution of this court and filed anew on November 5, 1937. This memorandum elaborates
on some of the points raised by the respondents and refutes those brought up by the
petitioners.
In the scrutiny of the pleadings and examination of the various aspects of the present case,
we noted that the court below, in passing upon the merits of the application of the respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng and in denying said application assumed the task not only of considering
the merits of the application, but of passing upon the culpability of the applicant,
notwithstanding the final pronouncement of guilt by this court. (G.R. No. 41200.) Probation
implies guilt be final judgment. While a probation case may look into the circumstances
attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings and
conclusive of this court, either directly or indirectly, especially wherefrom its own admission
reliance was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. As
already observed by this court in Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated
in subsequent cases, “if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of
overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial
chaos would result.” A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of
the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system
of the nation.
After threshing carefully the multifarious issues raised by both counsel for the petitioners and
the respondents, this court prefers to cut the Gordian knot and take up at once the two
fundamental questions presented, namely, (1) whether or not the constitutionality of Act No.
4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings; and (2) in the affirmative, whether or
not said Act is constitutional. Considerations of these issues will involve a discussion of
certain incidental questions raised by the parties.
To arrive at a correct conclusion on the first question, resort to certain guiding principles is
necessary. It is a well-settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not
be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented
inappropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu [1915],
30 Phil., 563, 568; 6 R. C. L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-782, 783.)
The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary
actions. Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where
the remedies in the ordinary course of law even if available, are not plain, speedy and
adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone ([1922]), 42 Phil., 818), this court held that the
question of the constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the petitioner
in mandamus proceedings (see, also, 12 C. J., p. 783); and in Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259 [affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands (1928), 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845]), this court declared an act of the
legislature unconstitutional in an action of quo warranto brought in the name of the
Government of the Philippines. It has also been held that the constitutionality of a statute may
be questioned in habeas corpus proceedings (12 C. J., p. 783; Bailey on Habeas Corpus,
Vol. I, pp. 97, 117), although there are authorities to the contrary; on an application for
injunction to restrain action under the challenged statute (mandatory, see Cruz vs.
Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234); and even on an application for preliminary injunction where
the determination of the constitutional question is necessary to a decision of the case. (12 C.
J., p. 783.) The same may be said as regards prohibition and certiorari. (Yu Cong Eng vs.
Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059; Bell vs. First Judicial
District Court [1905], 28 Nev., 280; 81 Pac., 875; 113 A. S. R., 854; 6 Ann. Cas., 982; 1 L. R.
A. [N. S], 843, and cases cited). The case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, decided by
this court twelve years ago was, like the present one, an original action for certiorari and
prohibition. The constitutionality of Act No. 2972, popularly known as the Chinese
Bookkeeping Law, was there challenged by the petitioners, and the constitutional issue was
not met squarely by the respondent in a demurrer. A point was raised “relating to the propriety
of the constitutional question being decided in original proceedings in prohibition.” This court
decided to take up the constitutional question and, with two justices dissenting, held that Act
No. 2972 was constitutional. The case was elevated on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court
of the United States which reversed the judgment of this court and held that the Act was
invalid. (271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059.) On the question of jurisdiction, however, the
Federal Supreme Court, though its Chief Justice, said:
By the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516, the Philippine Supreme
Court is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance over inferior
tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such courts
are exercising functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction. It has been held by that court
that the question of the validity of the criminal statute must usually be raised by a defendant
in the trial court and be carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court. (Cadwallader-Gibson
Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192). But in this case where a new act seriously affected
numerous persons and extensive property rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of
actions, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue to the act’s validity
promptly before it and decide in the interest of the orderly administration of justice. The court
relied by analogy upon the cases of Ex parte Young (209 U. S., 123;52 Law ed., 714; 13 L.
R. A. [N. S.] 932; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 441; 14 Ann. Ca., 764; Traux vs. Raich, 239 U. S., 33; 60
Law. ed., 131; L. R. A. 1916D, 545; 36 Sup. Ct. Rep., 7; Ann. Cas., 1917B, 283; and Wilson
vs. New, 243 U. S., 332; 61 Law. ed., 755; L. R. A. 1917E, 938; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 298; Ann.
Cas. 1918A, 1024). Although objection to the jurisdiction was raise by demurrer to the petition,
this is now disclaimed on behalf of the respondents, and both parties ask a decision on the
merits. In view of the broad powers in prohibition granted to that court under the Island Code,
we acquiesce in the desire of the parties.
The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior
jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal
from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (High, Extraordinary Legal
Remedies, p. 705.) The general rule, although there is a conflict in the cases, is that the merit
of prohibition will not lie whether the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute
the constitutionality of which is questioned, because in such cases the interior court having
jurisdiction may itself determine the constitutionality of the statute, and its decision may be
subject to review, and consequently the complainant in such cases ordinarily has adequate
remedy by appeal without resort to the writ of prohibition. But where the inferior court or
tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be
prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that statute. (50 C. J., 670; Ex parte Round
tree [1874, 51 Ala., 42; In re Macfarland, 30 App. [D. C.], 365; Curtis vs. Cornish [1912], 109
Me., 384; 84 A., 799; Pennington vs. Woolfolk[1880], 79 Ky., 13; State vs. Godfrey [1903], 54
W. Va., 54; 46 S. E., 185; Arnold vs. Shields [1837], 5 Dana, 19; 30 Am. Dec., 669.)
Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derived their jurisdiction solely from
Act No. 4221 which prescribes in detailed manner the procedure for granting probation to
accused persons after their conviction has become final and before they have served their
sentence. It is true that at common law the authority of the courts to suspend temporarily the
execution of the sentence is recognized and, according to a number of state courts, including
those of Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Ohio, the power is inherent in the courts
(Commonwealth vs. Dowdican’s Bail [1874], 115 Mass., 133; People vs. Stickel [1909], 156
Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y.,
288; Weber vs. State [1898], 58 Ohio St., 616). But, in the leading case of Ex parte United
States ([1916], 242 U. S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L. R. A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72;
Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court of the United States expressed the opinion that
under the common law the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension, and
brushed aside the contention as to inherent judicial power saying, through Chief Justice
White:
Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses against the criminal laws
and upon conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is judicial, and it is equally to
be conceded that, in exerting the powers vested in them on such subject, courts inherently
possess ample right to exercise reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable them to
wisely exert their authority. But these concessions afford no ground for the contention as to
power here made, since it must rest upon the proposition that the power to enforce begets
inherently a discretion to permanently refuse to do so. And the effect of the proposition urged
upon the distribution of powers made by the Constitution will become apparent when it is
observed that indisputable also is it that the authority to define and fix the punishment for
crime is legislative and includes the right in advance to bring within judicial discretion, for the
purpose of executing the statute, elements of consideration which would be otherwise beyond
the scope of judicial authority, and that the right to relieve from the punishment, fixed by law
and ascertained according to the methods by it provided belongs to the executive department.
Justice Carson, in his illuminating concurring opinion in the case of Director of Prisons vs.
Judge of First Instance of Cavite (29 Phil., 265), decided by this court in 1915, also reached
the conclusion that the power to suspend the execution of sentences pronounced in criminal
cases is not inherent in the judicial function. “All are agreed”, he said, “that in the absence of
statutory authority, it does not lie within the power of the courts to grant such suspensions.”
(at p. 278.) Both petitioner and respondents are correct, therefore, when they argue that a
Court of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its
jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine
Legislature.
It is, of course, true that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered on application
for prohibition where the question has not been properly brought to the attention of the court
by objection of some kind (Hill vs. Tarver [1901], 130 Ala., 592; 30 S., 499; State ex rel. Kelly
vs. Kirby [1914], 260 Mo., 120; 168 S. W., 746). In the case at bar, it is unquestionable that
the constitutional issue has been squarely presented not only before this court by the
petitioners but also before the trial court by the private prosecution. The respondent, Hon.
Jose O Vera, however, acting as judge of the court below, declined to pass upon the question
on the ground that the private prosecutor, not being a party whose rights are affected by the
statute, may not raise said question. The respondent judge cited Cooley on Constitutional
Limitations (Vol. I, p. 339; 12 C. J., sec. 177, pp. 760 and 762), and McGlue vs. Essex
County ([1916], 225 Mass., 59; 113 N. E., 742, 743), as authority for the proposition that a
court will not consider any attack made on the constitutionality of a statute by one who has
no interest in defeating it because his rights are not affected by its operation. The respondent
judge further stated that it may not motu proprio take up the constitutional question and,
agreeing with Cooley that “the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the
judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any
case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the
responsibility” (Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 332), proceeded on the
assumption that Act No. 4221 is constitutional. While therefore, the court a quo admits that
the constitutional question was raised before it, it refused to consider the question solely
because it was not raised by a proper party. Respondents herein reiterates this view. The
argument is advanced that the private prosecution has no personality to appear in the hearing
of the application for probation of defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng in criminal case No. 42648
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and hence the issue of constitutionality was not
properly raised in the lower court. Although, as a general rule, only those who are parties to
a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been
held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where the
jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of the
constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons
interested in the effect to be given the statute.(12 C. J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we
were to concede that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party,
it does not follow that the issue may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and
prohibitions. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised
at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not considered on appeal. (12 C. J., p.
786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But
we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sounds
discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute
should be presented. (In re Woolsey [1884], 95 N. Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases,
although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised
for the first time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C.
J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the
constitutional question, though raised for the first time on appeal, if it appears that a
determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe’s Adm’x vs.
Maysville & B. S. R. Co., [1910], 136 ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis
Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo., 685; 113 S. W. 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co., [1905],
188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional question will be
considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court
below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to
consider the constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these
proceedings, we turn again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad,
supra. And on the hypotheses that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation,
represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional
question here — a point we do not now have to decide — we are of the opinion that the
People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of
Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the constitution, the
People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial
interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal
expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the
validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil.,
259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72
Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action
instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney General vs.
Perkins ([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N. W. 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan,
through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the
respondents to renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the
respondents base their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of
contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to question the constitutionality of
the statute was though, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question
the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the
decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction in void, where the jurisdiction of the court
depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of constitutionality will be
considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect
to begin the statute. (12 C.J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede that the
issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that
the issue may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibition. It is true
that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial,
and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786. See,
also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must
state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion,
may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be
presented. (In re Woolsey [19884], 95 N.Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there
is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first
time at any state of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786.)
Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional
question, though raised for first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the
question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe’s Adm’x vs. Maysville & B. S. R.
Co. [1910], 136 Ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis, Cordage Co. [1908], 214
Mo. 685; 113 S. W., 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co. [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W.,
913.) And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate
court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke [1911],
175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the constitutional question
raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings, we turn again and point with
emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng. vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the hypothesis that the
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not
the proper party to raise the constitutional question here — a point we do not now have to
decide — we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-
General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings.
The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates
the Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought,
has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by
the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law
by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can
challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands[1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature
unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines.
In Attorney General vs. Perkins ([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N.W., 426, 428, 429),
the State of Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to
test the right of the respondents to renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under
which the respondents base their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation
of contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to question the constitutionality
of the statute was itself questioned. Said the Supreme Court of Michigan, through Champlin,
J.:
. . . The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity of a law
enacted by their representatives; that to an accusation by the people of Michigan of
usurpation their government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is an adequate
answer. The last proposition is true, but, if the statute relied on in justification is
unconstitutional, it is statute only in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more saving
effect to justify action under it than if it had never been enacted. The constitution is the
supreme law, and to its behests the courts, the legislature, and the people must bow . . . The
legislature and the respondents are not the only parties in interest upon such constitutional
questions. As was remarked by Mr. Justice Story, in speaking of an acquiescence by a party
affected by an unconstitutional act of the legislature: “The people have a deep and vested
interest in maintaining all the constitutional limitations upon the exercise of legislative
powers.” (Allen vs. Mckeen, 1 Sum., 314.)
In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435; 158 Pac., 38, 40), an original action (mandamus)
was brought by the Attorney-General of Kansas to test the constitutionality of a statute of the
state. In disposing of the question whether or not the state may bring the action, the Supreme
Court of Kansas said:
. . . the state is a proper party — indeed, the proper party — to bring this action. The state is
always interested where the integrity of its Constitution or statutes is involved.
“It has an interest in seeing that the will of the Legislature is not disregarded, and need not,
as an individual plaintiff must, show grounds of fearing more specific injury. (State vs. Kansas
City 60 Kan., 518 [57 Pac., 118]).” (State vs. Lawrence, 80 Kan., 707; 103 Pac., 839.)
Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state’s law officer, its Attorney-General,
or county attorney, may exercise his best judgment as to what sort of action he will bring to
have the matter determined, either by quo warranto to challenge its validity (State vs.
Johnson, 61 Kan., 803; 60 Pac., 1068; 49 L.R.A., 662), by mandamus to compel obedience
to its terms (State vs. Dolley, 82 Kan., 533; 108 Pac., 846), or by injunction to restrain
proceedings under its questionable provisions (State ex rel. vs. City of Neodesha, 3 Kan.
App., 319; 45 Pac., 122).
Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State vs. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. [1917],
197 S. W., 1006; State vs. S.H. Kress & Co. [1934], 155 S., 823; State vs. Walmsley [1935],
181 La., 597; 160 S., 91; State vs. Board of County Comr’s [1934], 39 Pac. [2d], 286; First
Const. Co. of Brooklyn vs. State [1917], 211 N.Y., 295; 116 N.E., 1020; Bush vs. State {1918],
187 Ind., 339; 119 N.E., 417; State vs. Watkins [1933], 176 La., 837; 147 S., 8, 10, 11). In the
case last cited, the Supreme Court of Luisiana said:
It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district attorney, being charged with the
duty of enforcing the laws, has no right to plead that a law is unconstitutional. In support of
the argument three decisions are cited, viz.: State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge of
Tenth Judicial District (33 La. Ann., 1222); State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor vs. Shakespeare,
Mayor of New Orleans (41 Ann., 156; 6 So., 592); and State ex rel., Banking Co., etc. vs.
Heard, Auditor (47 La. Ann., 1679; 18 So., 746; 47 L. R. A., 512). These decisions do not
forbid a district attorney to plead that a statute is unconstitutional if he finds if in conflict with
one which it is his duty to enforce. In State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge, etc., the
ruling was the judge should not, merely because he believed a certain statute to be
unconstitutional forbid the district attorney to file a bill of information charging a person with a
violation of the statute. In other words, a judge should not judicially declare a statute
unconstitutional until the question of constitutionality is tendered for decision, and unless it
must be decided in order to determine the right of a party litigant. State ex rel. Nicholls,
Governor, etc., is authority for the proposition merely that an officer on whom a statute
imposes the duty of enforcing its provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the ground that he
considers the statute unconstitutional, and hence in enforcing the statute he is immune from
responsibility if the statute be unconstitutional. State ex rel. Banking Co., etc., is authority for
the proposition merely that executive officers, e.g., the state auditor and state treasurer,
should not decline to perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a statute, on the
ground that they believe the statute is unconstitutional.
It is the duty of a district attorney to enforce the criminal laws of the state, and, above all, to
support the Constitution of the state. If, in the performance of his duty he finds two statutes
in conflict with each other, or one which repeals another, and if, in his judgment, one of the
two statutes is unconstitutional, it is his duty to enforce the other; and, in order to do so, he is
compelled to submit to the court, by way of a plea, that one of the statutes is unconstitutional.
If it were not so, the power of the Legislature would be free from constitutional limitations in
the enactment of criminal laws.
The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of the general proposition
that the state may impugn the validity of its laws. They have not cited any authority running
clearly in the opposite direction. In fact, they appear to have proceeded on the assumption
that the rule as stated is sound but that it has no application in the present case, nor may it
be invoked by the City Fiscal in behalf of the People of the Philippines, one of the petitioners
herein, the principal reasons being that the validity before this court, that the City Fiscal is
estopped from attacking the validity of the Act and, not authorized challenge the validity of
the Act in its application outside said city. (Additional memorandum of respondents, October
23, 1937, pp. 8,. 10, 17 and 23.)
The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that
time has not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary,
has been impliedly regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People
of the Philippines estopped from nor assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a
constitutional questions only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination,
and the fact that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to
allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are justified in relying upon the statute and
treating it as valid until it is held void by the courts in proper cases.
It remains to consider whether the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is
necessary to the resolution of the instant case. For, “. . . while the court will meet the question
with firmness, where its decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and just respect
for the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided
on other points.” (Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No. 11, 558; 2 Brock., 447. Vide,
also Hoover vs. Wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has been held that the determination of a
constitutional question is necessary whenever it is essential to the decision of the case (12
C. J., p. 782, citing Long Sault Dev. Co. vs. Kennedy [1913], 158 App. Div., 398; 143 N. Y.
Supp., 454 [aff. 212 N.Y., 1: 105 N. E., 849; Ann. Cas. 1915D, 56; and app dism 242 U.S.,
272]; Hesse vs. Ledesma, 7 Porto Rico Fed., 520; Cowan vs. Doddridge, 22 Gratt [63 Va.],
458; Union Line Co., vs. Wisconsin R. Commn., 146 Wis., 523; 129 N. W., 605), as where
the right of a party is founded solely on a statute the validity of which is attacked. (12 C.J., p.
782, citing Central Glass Co. vs. Niagrara F. Ins. Co., 131 La., 513; 59 S., 972; Cheney vs.
Beverly, 188 Mass., 81; 74 N.E., 306). There is no doubt that the respondent Cu Unjieng
draws his privilege to probation solely from Act No. 4221 now being assailed.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, that court will also take cognizance of the fact that
the Probation Act is a new addition to our statute books and its validity has never before been
passed upon by the courts; that may persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of
Manila have applied for probation; that some of them are already on probation; that more
people will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and that the respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng has been at large for a period of about four years since his first conviction.
All wait the decision of this court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the
importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong
reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved.
(Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U.S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059.
See 6 R.C.L., pp. 77, 78; People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N.Y., 533; 101 N.E., 442, 444; Ann.
Cas. 1914C, 616; Borginis vs. Falk Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327; 133 N.W., 209, 211; 37 L.R.A.
[N.S.] 489; Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304.) In Yu Cong Eng vs.
Trinidad, supra, an analogous situation confronted us. We said: “Inasmuch as the property
and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand merchants are affected by these proceedings,
and inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new law not yet interpreted by the courts, in the interest
of the public welfare and for the advancement of public policy, we have determined to overrule
the defense of want of jurisdiction in order that we may decide the main issue. We have here
an extraordinary situation which calls for a relaxation of the general rule.” Our ruling on this
point was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States. A more binding authority in
support of the view we have taken can not be found.
We have reached the conclusion that the question of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has
been properly raised. Now for the main inquiry: Is the Act unconstitutional?
Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the
Constitution. This court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1,
and section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of the national legislature
invalid because in conflict with the fundamental lay. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to
enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme
law by setting aside a statute in conflict therewith. This is of the essence of judicial duty.
This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of
the legislature approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations.
The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the
legislature as well. “The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the
legislative department of the government itself.” (U.S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case
vs. Board of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U.S. vs. Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.)
And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained by the sanction of the executive. The
members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the
Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to this oath and that in enacting
and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the Constitution. The courts
cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn declarations of two of the
three grand departments of the governments. (6 R.C.L., p. 101.) Then, there is that peculiar
political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed
through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. It follows, therefore, that the
courts will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear case. This is a
proposition too plain to require a citation of authorities.
One of the counsel for respondents, in the course of his impassioned argument, called
attention to the fact that the President of the Philippines had already expressed his opinion
against the constitutionality of the Probation Act, adverting that as to the Executive the
resolution of this question was a foregone conclusion. Counsel, however, reiterated his
confidence in the integrity and independence of this court. We take notice of the fact that the
President in his message dated September 1, 1937, recommended to the National Assembly
the immediate repeal of the Probation Act (No. 4221); that this message resulted in the
approval of Bill No. 2417 of the Nationality Assembly repealing the probation Act, subject to
certain conditions therein mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by the President on
September 13, 1937, much against his wish, “to have stricken out from the statute books of
the Commonwealth a law . . . unfair and very likely unconstitutional.” It is sufficient to observe
in this connection that, in vetoing the bill referred to, the President exercised his constitutional
prerogative. He may express the reasons which he may deem proper for taking such a step,
but his reasons are not binding upon us in the determination of actual controversies submitted
for our determination. Whether or not the Executive should express or in any manner
insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed within his broad constitutional power of veto
but which happens to be at the same time pending determination in this court is a question of
propriety for him exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever opinion is expressed by him
under these circumstances, however, cannot sway our judgment on way or another and
prevent us from taking what in our opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given
case. It if is ever necessary for us to make any vehement affirmance during this formative
period of our political history, it is that we are independent of the Executive no less than of
the Legislative department of our government — independent in the performance of our
functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to popularity, and
unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see it and as we
understand it.
The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said
Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that its constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power and (3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws.
1. Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law,
in force at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act,
vests in the Governor-General of the Philippines “the exclusive power to grant pardons and
reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures”. This power is now vested in the President of the
Philippines. (Art. VII, sec. 11, subsec. 6.) The provisions of the Jones Law and the
Constitution differ in some respects. The adjective “exclusive” found in the Jones Law has
been omitted from the Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as at common law, pardon could
be granted any time after the commission of the offense, either before or after conviction
(VideConstitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 2; In reLontok [1922], 43 Phil., 293). The
Governor-General of the Philippines was thus empowered, like the President of the United
States, to pardon a person before the facts of the case were fully brought to light. The framers
of our Constitution thought this undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions,
provided that the pardoning power can only be exercised “after conviction”. So, too, under
the new Constitution, the pardoning power does not extend to “cases of impeachment”. This
is also the rule generally followed in the United States (Vide Constitution of the United States,
Art. II, sec. 2). The rule in England is different. There, a royal pardon can not be pleaded in
bar of an impeachment; “but,” says Blackstone, “after the impeachment has been solemnly
heard and determined, it is not understood that the king’s royal grace is further restrained or
abridged.” (Vide, Ex parte Wells [1856], 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421; Com. vs.
Lockwood [1872], 109 Mass., 323; 12 Am. Rep., 699; Sterling vs. Drake[1876], 29 Ohio St.,
457; 23 am. Rep., 762.) The reason for the distinction is obvious. In England, Judgment on
impeachment is not confined to mere “removal from office and disqualification to hold and
enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Government” (Art. IX, sec. 4, Constitution
of the Philippines) but extends to the whole punishment attached by law to the offense
committed. The House of Lords, on a conviction may, by its sentence, inflict capital
punishment, perpetual banishment, perpetual banishment, fine or imprisonment, depending
upon the gravity of the offense committed, together with removal from office and incapacity
to hold office. (Com. vs. Lockwood, supra.) Our Constitution also makes specific mention of
“commutation” and of the power of the executive to impose, in the pardons he may grant,
such conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper. Amnesty may be granted
by the President under the Constitution but only with the concurrence of the National
Assembly. We need not dwell at length on the significance of these fundamental changes. It
is sufficient for our purposes to state that the pardoning power has remained essentially the
same. The question is: Has the pardoning power of the Chief Executive under the Jones Law
been impaired by the Probation Act?
As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief
Executive. The exercise of the power may not, therefore, be vested in anyone else. “. . . The
benign prerogative of mercy reposed in the executive cannot be taken away nor fettered by
any legislative restrictions, nor can like power be given by the legislature to any other officer
or authority. The coordinate departments of government have nothing to do with the
pardoning power, since no person properly belonging to one of the departments can exercise
any powers appertaining to either of the others except in cases expressly provided for by the
constitution.” (20 R.C.L., pp., , and cases cited.) ” . . . where the pardoning power is conferred
on the executive without express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the
legislature can neither exercise such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with
or control the proper exercise thereof, . . .” (12 C.J., pp. 838, 839, and cases cited.) If Act No.
4221, then, confers any pardoning power upon the courts it is for that reason unconstitutional
and void. But does it?
In the famous Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case, the Supreme Court of the
United States ruled in 1916 that an order indefinitely suspending sentenced was void. (Ex
parte United States [1916], 242 U.S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L.R.A. 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355.) Chief Justice White, after an exhaustive review of the
authorities, expressed the opinion of the court that under the common law the power of the
court was limited to temporary suspension and that the right to suspend sentenced absolutely
and permanently was vested in the executive branch of the government and not in the
judiciary. But, the right of Congress to establish probation by statute was conceded. Said the
court through its Chief Justice: “. . . and so far as the future is concerned, that is, the causing
of the imposition of penalties as fixed to be subject, by probation legislation or such other
means as the legislative mind may devise, to such judicial discretion as may be adequate to
enable courts to meet by the exercise of an enlarged but wise discretion the infinite variations
which may be presented to them for judgment, recourse must be had Congress whose
legislative power on the subject is in the very nature of things adequately complete.” (Quoted
in Riggs vs. United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 6.) This decision led the National Probation
Association and others to agitate for the enactment by Congress of a federal probation law.
Such action was finally taken on March 4, 1925 (chap. 521, 43 Stat. L. 159, U.S.C. title 18,
sec. 724). This was followed by an appropriation to defray the salaries and expenses of a
certain number of probation officers chosen by civil service. (Johnson, Probation for Juveniles
and Adults, p. 14.)
In United States vs. Murray ([1925], 275 U.S., 347; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; 72 Law. ed., 309),
the Supreme Court of the United States, through Chief Justice Taft, held that when a person
sentenced to imprisonment by a district court has begun to serve his sentence, that court has
no power under the Probation Act of March 4, 1925 to grant him probation even though the
term at which sentence was imposed had not yet expired. In this case of Murray, the
constitutionality of the Probation Act was not considered but was assumed. The court traced
the history of the Act and quoted from the report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the
United States House of Representatives (Report No. 1377, 68th Congress, 2 Session) the
following statement:
Prior to the so-called Killitts case, rendered in December, 1916, the district courts exercised
a form of probation either, by suspending sentence or by placing the defendants under state
probation officers or volunteers. In this case, however (Ex parte United States, 242 U.S., 27;
61 L. Ed., 129; L.R.A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72 Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the
Supreme Court denied the right of the district courts to suspend sentenced. In the same
opinion the court pointed out the necessity for action by Congress if the courts were to
exercise probation powers in the future . . .
Since this decision was rendered, two attempts have been made to enact probation
legislation. In 1917, a bill was favorably reported by the Judiciary Committee and passed the
House. In 1920, the judiciary Committee again favorably reported a probation bill to the
House, but it was never reached for definite action.
If this bill is enacted into law, it will bring the policy of the Federal government with reference
to its treatment of those convicted of violations of its criminal laws in harmony with that of the
states of the Union. At the present time every state has a probation law, and in all but twelve
states the law applies both to adult and juvenile offenders. (see, also, Johnson, Probation for
Juveniles and Adults [1928], Chap. I.)
The constitutionality of the federal probation law has been sustained by inferior federal courts.
In Riggs vs. United States, supra, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit said:
Since the passage of the Probation Act of March 4, 1925, the questions under consideration
have been reviewed by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and
the constitutionality of the act fully sustained, and the same held in no manner to encroach
upon the pardoning power of the President. This case will be found to contain an able and
comprehensive review of the law applicable here. It arose under the act we have to consider,
and to it and the authorities cited therein special reference is made (Nix vs. James, 7 F. [2d],
590, 594), as is also to a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit
(Kriebel vs. U.S., 10 F. [2d], 762), likewise construing the Probation Act.
We have seen that in 1916 the Supreme Court of the United States; in plain and unequivocal
language, pointed to Congress as possessing the requisite power to enact probation laws,
that a federal probation law as actually enacted in 1925, and that the constitutionality of the
Act has been assumed by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1928 and consistently
sustained by the inferior federal courts in a number of earlier cases.
We are fully convinced that the Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the United States,
may legally enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all
penal offenses. This conclusion is supported by other authorities. In Ex parte Bates ([1915],
20 N. M., 542; L.R.A. 1916A, 1285; 151 Pac., 698, the court said: “It is clearly within the
province of the Legislature to denominate and define all classes of crime, and to prescribe for
each a minimum and maximum punishment.” And in State vs. Abbott ([1910], 87 S.C., 466;
33 L.R.A. [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1189), the court said: “The legislative
power to set punishment for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the general
assembly may confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the largest discretion as to the sentence to
be imposed, as to the beginning and end of the punishment and whether it should be certain
or indeterminate or conditional.” (Quoted in State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E.,
69.) Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their
violation. Invariably, the legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts —
particularly the trial courts — large discretion in imposing the penalties which the law
prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that justice can best be served by vesting this
power in the courts, they being in a position to best determine the penalties which an
individual convict, peculiarly circumstanced, should suffer. Thus, while courts are not allowed
to refrain from imposing a sentence merely because, taking into consideration the degree of
malice and the injury caused by the offense, the penalty provided by law is clearly excessive,
the courts being allowed in such case to submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as it may deem proper (see art. 5, Revised Penal
Code), in cases where both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are attendant in the
commission of a crime and the law provides for a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the courts may allow such circumstances to offset one another in consideration of
their number and importance, and to apply the penalty according to the result of such
compensation. (Art. 63, rule 4, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Reguera and Asuategui [1921],
41 Phil., 506.) Again, article 64, paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code empowers the courts
to determine, within the limits of each periods, in case the penalty prescribed by law contains
three periods, the extent of the evil produced by the crime. In the imposition of fines, the
courts are allowed to fix any amount within the limits established by law, considering not only
the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more particularly the wealth or means of
the culprit. (Art. 66, Revised Penal Code.) Article 68, paragraph 1, of the same Code provides
that “a discretionary penalty shall be imposed” upon a person under fifteen but over nine
years of age, who has not acted without discernment, but always lower by two degrees at
least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he has committed. Article 69 of the same
Code provides that in case of “incomplete self-defense”, i.e., when the crime committed is not
wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same
or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in article 11 and 12 of the
Code, “the courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in
view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.” And, in
case the commission of what are known as “impossible” crimes, “the court, having in mind
the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender,” shall impose upon
him either arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos. (Art. 59, Revised Penal
Code.)
Under our Revised Penal Code, also, one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment is
deducted from the entire term of imprisonment, except in certain cases expressly mentioned
(art. 29); the death penalty is not imposed when the guilty person is more than seventy years
of age, or where upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme Court, all the members
thereof are not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the death
penalty (art. 47, see also, sec. 133, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 3); the death sentence is not to be inflicted upon a woman within the
three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, or upon any
person over seventy years of age (art. 83); and when a convict shall become insane or an
imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced, or while he is serving his sentenced, the
execution of said sentence shall be suspended with regard to the personal penalty during the
period of such insanity or imbecility (art. 79).
But the desire of the legislature to relax what might result in the undue harshness of the penal
laws is more clearly demonstrated in various other enactments, including the probation Act.
There is the Indeterminate Sentence Law enacted in 1933 as Act No. 4103 and subsequently
amended by Act No. 4225, establishing a system of parole (secs. 5 to 100 and granting the
courts large discretion in imposing the penalties of the law. Section 1 of the law as amended
provides; “hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offenses punished by the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and to a minimum
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for
the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same.” Certain classes of convicts are, by section 2 of the law, excluded
from the operation thereof. The Legislature has also enacted the Juvenile Delinquency Law
(Act No. 3203) which was subsequently amended by Act No. 3559. Section 7 of the original
Act and section 1 of the amendatory Act have become article 80 of the Revised Penal Code,
amended by Act No. 4117 of the Philippine Legislature and recently reamended by
Commonwealth Act No. 99 of the National Assembly. In this Act is again manifested the
intention of the legislature to “humanize” the penal laws. It allows, in effect, the modification
in particular cases of the penalties prescribed by law by permitting the suspension of the
execution of the judgment in the discretion of the trial court, after due hearing and after
investigation of the particular circumstances of the offenses, the criminal record, if any, of the
convict, and his social history. The Legislature has in reality decreed that in certain cases no
punishment at all shall be suffered by the convict as long as the conditions of probation are
faithfully observed. It this be so, then, it cannot be said that the Probation Act comes in conflict
with the power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves, because, to use the
language of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, “the element of punishment or the penalty
for the commission of a wrong, while to be declared by the courts as a judicial function under
and within the limits of law as announced by legislative acts, concerns solely the procedure
and conduct of criminal causes, with which the executive can have nothing to do.” (Ex
parte Bates, supra.) In Williams vs. State ([1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S.E., 843), the court
upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia probation statute against the contention that it
attempted to delegate to the courts the pardoning power lodged by the constitution in the
governor alone is vested with the power to pardon after final sentence has been imposed by
the courts, the power of the courts to imposed any penalty which may be from time to time
prescribed by law and in such manner as may be defined cannot be questioned.”
We realize, of course, the conflict which the American cases disclose. Some cases hold it
unlawful for the legislature to vest in the courts the power to suspend the operation of a
sentenced, by probation or otherwise, as to do so would encroach upon the pardoning power
of the executive. (In re Webb [1895], 89 Wis., 354; 27 L.R.A., 356; 46 Am. St. Rep., 846; 62
N.W., 177; 9 Am. Crim., Rep., 702; State ex rel. Summerfield vs. Moran [1919], 43 Nev., 150;
182 Pac., 927; Ex parte Clendenning [1908], 22 Okla., 108; 1 Okla. Crim. Rep., 227; 19
L.R.A. [N.S.], 1041; 132 Am. St. Rep., 628; 97 Pac., 650; People vs. Barrett [1903], 202 Ill,
287; 67 N.E., 23; 63 L.R.A., 82; 95 Am. St. Rep., 230; Snodgrass vs. State [1912], 67 Tex.
Crim. Rep., 615; 41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162;Ex parte Shelor [1910], 33 Nev.,
361;111 Pac., 291; Neal vs. State [1898], 104 Ga., 509; 42 L. R. A., 190; 69 Am. St. Rep.,
175; 30 S. E. 858; State ex rel. Payne vs. Anderson [1921], 43 S. D., 630; 181 N. W.,
839; People vs. Brown, 54 Mich., 15; 19 N. W., 571; States vs. Dalton [1903], 109 Tenn., 544;
72 S. W., 456.)
Other cases, however, hold contra. (Nix vs. James [1925; C. C. A., 9th], 7 F. [2d], 590; Archer
vs. Snook [1926; D. C.], 10 F. [2d], 567; Riggs. vs. United States [1926; C. C. A. 4th], 14])
[2d], 5; Murphy vs. States [1926], 171 Ark., 620; 286 S. W., 871; 48 A. L. R., 1189; Re
Giannini [1912], 18 Cal. App., 166; 122 Pac., 831; Re Nachnaber [1928], 89 Cal. App., 530;
265 Pac., 392; Ex parte De Voe [1931], 114 Cal. App., 730; 300 Pac., 874; People vs.
Patrick [1897], 118 Cal., 332; 50 Pac., 425; Martin vs. People [1917], 69 Colo., 60; 168 Pac.,
1171; Belden vs. Hugo [1914], 88 Conn., 50; 91 A., 369, 370, 371; Williams vs. State [1926],
162 Ga., 327; 133 S. E., 843; People vs. Heise [1913], 257 Ill., 443; 100 N. E., 1000; Parker
vs. State [1893], 135 Ind., 534; 35 N. E., 179; 23 L. R. A., 859; St. Hillarie, Petitioner [1906],
101 Me., 522; 64 Atl., 882; People vs. Stickle [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; State
vs. Fjolander [1914], 125 Minn., 529; State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court [1925], 73
Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525; State vs. Everitt [1913], 164 N. C., 399; 79 S. E., 274; 47 L. R. A.
[N. S.], 848; State ex rel. Buckley vs. Drew [1909], 75 N. H., 402; 74 Atl., 875; State vs.
Osborne [1911], 79 N. J. Eq., 430; 82 Atl. 424; Ex parte Bates [1915], 20 N. M., 542; L. R. A.,
1916 A. 1285; 151 Pac., 698; People vs. ex rel,. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N.
Y., 288; 23 L. R. A., 856; 36 N. E., 386; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675; People ex rel. Sullivan vs.
Flynn [1907], 55 Misc., 639; 106 N. Y. Supp., 928; People vs. Goodrich [1914], 149 N. Y.
Supp., 406; Moore vs. Thorn [1935], 245 App. Div., 180; 281 N. Y. Supp., 49; Re Hart [1914],
29 N. D., 38; L. R. A., 1915C, 1169; 149 N. W., 568; Ex parte Eaton [1925], 29 Okla., Crim.
Rep., 275; 233 P., 781; State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69; State vs.
Abbot [1910], 87 S. C., 466; 33 L.R.A., [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas., 1912B, 1189; Fults
vs. States [1854],34 Tenn., 232; Woods vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W.,
558; Baker vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1913],70 Tex.,
Crim. Rep., 618; 158 S. W., 998; Cook vs. State [1914], 73 Tex. Crim. Rep., 548; 165 S. W.,
573; King vs. State [1914], 72 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932],
122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 211;
54 S. W. [2d], 127; Re Hall [1927], 100 Vt., 197; 136 A., 24; Richardson vs. Com. [1921], 131
Va., 802; 109 S.E., 460; State vs. Mallahan [1911], 65 Wash., 287; 118 Pac., 42; State ex rel.
Tingstand vs. Starwich[1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393; 396.) We elect
to follow this long catena of authorities holding that the courts may be legally authorized by
the legislature to suspend sentence by the establishment of a system of probation however
characterized. State ex rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich ([1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26
A. L. R., 393), deserved particular mention. In that case, a statute enacted in 1921 which
provided for the suspension of the execution of a sentence until otherwise ordered by the
court, and required that the convicted person be placed under the charge of a parole or peace
officer during the term of such suspension, on such terms as the court may determine, was
held constitutional and as not giving the court a power in violation of the constitutional
provision vesting the pardoning power in the chief executive of the state. (Vide,
also, Re Giannini[1912], 18 Cal App., 166; 122 Pac., 831.)
Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually district
and different from each other, both in origin and in nature. In People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court
of Sessions ([1894], 141 N. Y., 288, 294; 36 N. E., 386, 388; 23 L. R. A., 856; 15 Am. Crim.
Rep., 675), the Court of Appeals of New York said:
. . . The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and pardons, as
understood when the constitution was adopted, are totally distinct and different in their nature.
The former was always a part of the judicial power; the latter was always a part of the
executive power. The suspension of the sentence simply postpones the judgment of the court
temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction and liability following it, and the civil disabilities,
remain and become operative when judgment is rendered. A pardon reaches both the
punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender. It releases the
punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the offender is
as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It removes the penalties and
disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights. It makes him, as it were, a new man, and
gives him a new credit and capacity. (Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S., 4 Wall., 333; 18 Law. ed.,
366; U. S. vs. Klein, 80 U. S., 13 Wall., 128; 20 Law. ed., 519; Knote vs. U. S., 95 U. S., 149;
24 Law. ed., 442.)
The framers of the federal and the state constitutions were perfectly familiar with the principles
governing the power to grant pardons, and it was conferred by these instruments upon the
executive with full knowledge of the law upon the subject, and the words of the constitution
were used to express the authority formerly exercised by the English crown, or by its
representatives in the colonies. (Ex parte Wells, 59 U. S., 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421.)
As this power was understood, it did not comprehend any part of the judicial functions to
suspend sentence, and it was never intended that the authority to grant reprieves and
pardons should abrogate, or in any degree restrict, the exercise of that power in regard to its
own judgments, that criminal courts has so long maintained. The two powers, so distinct and
different in their nature and character, were still left separate and distinct, the one to be
exercised by the executive, and the other by the judicial department. We therefore conclude
that a statute which, in terms, authorizes courts of criminal jurisdiction to suspend sentence
in certain cases after conviction, — a power inherent in such courts at common law, which
was understood when the constitution was adopted to be an ordinary judicial function, and
which, ever since its adoption, has been exercised of legislative power under the constitution.
It does not encroach, in any just sense, upon the powers of the executive, as they have been
understood and practiced from the earliest times. (Quoted with approval in Directors of
Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite [1915], 29 Phil., 265, Carson, J., concurring, at
pp. 294, 295.)
In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally
and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law
inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationer’s case is not terminated by the mere fact
that he is placed on probation. Section 4 of the Act provides that the probation may be
definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged from supervision only after the
period of probation shall have been terminated and the probation officer shall have submitted
a report, and the court shall have found that the probationer has complied with the conditions
of probation. The probationer, then, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody
— subject to the control of the probation officer and of the court; and, he may be rearrested
upon the non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be
committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. (Secs. 2, 3, 5 and 6,
Act No. 4221.)
The probation described in the act is not pardon. It is not complete liberty, and may be far
from it. It is really a new mode of punishment, to be applied by the judge in a proper case, in
substitution of the imprisonment and find prescribed by the criminal laws. For this reason its
application is as purely a judicial act as any other sentence carrying out the law deemed
applicable to the offense. The executive act of pardon, on the contrary, is against the criminal
law, which binds and directs the judges, or rather is outside of and above it. There is thus no
conflict with the pardoning power, and no possible unconstitutionality of the Probation Act for
this cause. (Archer vs. Snook [1926], 10 F. [2d], 567, 569.)
Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the
sentence. Snodgrass vs. State ([1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615;41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150
S. W., 162), is relied upon most strongly by the petitioners as authority in support of their
contention that the power to grant pardons and reprieves, having been vested exclusively
upon the Chief Executive by the Jones Law, may not be conferred by the legislature upon the
courts by means of probation law authorizing the indefinite judicial suspension of sentence.
We have examined that case and found that although the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
held that the probation statute of the state in terms conferred on the district courts the power
to grant pardons to persons convicted of crime, it also distinguished between suspensions
sentence on the one hand, and reprieve and commutation of sentence on the other. Said the
court, through Harper, J.:
That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the Governor to
grant reprieves is settled by the decisions of the various courts; it being held that the
distinction between a “reprieve” and a suspension of sentence is that a reprieve postpones
the execution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an indefinite time.
(Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R., 262; In re Buchanan, 146 N. Y., 264; 40 N. E., 883), and
cases cited in 7 Words & Phrases, pp. 6115, 6116. This law cannot be hold in conflict with
the power confiding in the Governor to grant commutations of punishment, for a
commutations is not but to change the punishment assessed to a less punishment.
In State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court ([1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525), the
Supreme Court of Montana had under consideration the validity of the adult probation law of
the state enacted in 1913, now found in sections 12078-12086, Revised Codes of 1921. The
court held the law valid as not impinging upon the pardoning power of the executive. In a
unanimous decision penned by Justice Holloway, the court said:
. . . . the term “pardon”, “commutation”, and “respite” each had a well understood meaning at
the time our Constitution was adopted, and no one of them was intended to comprehend the
suspension of the execution of the judgment as that phrase is employed in sections 12078-
12086. A “pardon” is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution
of the laws which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law
inflicts for a crime he has committed (United States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150; 8 Law. ed., 640);
 It is a remission of guilt (State vs. Lewis, 111 La., 693; 35 So., 816), a forgiveness of the
offense (Cook vs. Middlesex County, 26 N. J. Law, 326; Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala., 517; 49
Am. Rep., 71). “Commutation” is a remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a
less penalty for the one originally imposed (Lee vs. Murphy, 22 Grat. [Va.] 789; 12 Am. Rep.,
563; Rich vs. Chamberlain, 107 Mich., 381; 65 N. W., 235). A “reprieve” or “respite” is the
withholding of the sentence for an interval of time (4 Blackstone’s Commentaries, 394), a
postponement of execution (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R. [N. Y.], 272), a temporary
suspension of execution (Butler vs. State, 97 Ind., 373).
Few adjudicated cases are to be found in which the validity of a statute similar to our section
12078 has been determined; but the same objections have been urged against parole
statutes which vest the power to parole in persons other than those to whom the power of
pardon is granted, and these statutes have been upheld quite uniformly, as a reference to the
numerous cases cited in the notes to Woods vs. State (130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W.,558,
reported in L. R. A., 1915F, 531), will disclose. (See, also, 20 R. C. L., 524.)
We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the
Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences,
remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President
may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his
rearrest and imprisonment. (Riggs vs. United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 7.)

2. But while the Probation Law does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive
and is not for that reason void, does section 11 thereof constitute, as contended, an undue
delegation of legislative power?

Under the constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three
coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the
judicial. Each of these departments of the government derives its authority from the
Constitution which, in turn, is the highest expression of popular will. Each has exclusive
cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
The power to make laws — the legislative power — is vested in a bicameral Legislature by
the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI,
sec. 1, Constitution of the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly
may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or
authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle
that potestas delegata non delegare potest. This principle is said to have originated with the
glossators, was introduced into English law through a misreading of Bracton, there developed
as a principle of agency, was established by Lord Coke in the English public law in decisions
forbidding the delegation of judicial power, and found its way into America as an enlightened
principle of free government. It has since become an accepted corollary of the principle of
separation of powers. (5 Encyc. of the Social Sciences, p. 66.) The classic statement of the
rule is that of Locke, namely: “The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of
making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have.” (Locke
on Civil Government, sec. 142.) Judge Cooley enunciates the doctrine in the following oft-
quoted language: “One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred
upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body
or authority. Where the sovereign power of the state has located the authority, there it must
remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the Constitution
itself is charged. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative
has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibilities by choosing other agencies
upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and
patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this
sovereign trust.” (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 224. Quoted with
approval in U.S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327.) This court posits the doctrine “on the ethical
principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed
by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter
of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. (U.S. vs. Barrias, supra, at p.
330.)
The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and
inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits
the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. (Rubi vs.
Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660; U. S. vs. Salaveria [1918], 39 Phil.,
102; Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick [1889], 129 U. S., 141; 32 Law. ed., 637; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
256; State vs. Noyes [1855], 30 N. H., 279.) “It is a cardinal principle of our system of
government, that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs by
the central authorities; and hence while the rule is also fundamental that the power to make
laws cannot be delegated, the creation of the municipalities exercising local self government
has never been held to trench upon that rule. Such legislation is not regarded as a transfer of
general legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribed local
regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject of course to the interposition of the
superior in cases of necessity.” (Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick, supra.) On quite the same
principle, Congress is powered to delegate legislative power to such agencies in the territories
of the United States as it may select. A territory stands in the same relation to Congress as a
municipality or city to the state government. (United States vs. Heinszen [1907], 206 U. S.,
370; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 742; 51 L. ed., 1098; 11 Ann. Cas., 688; Dorr vs. United States[1904],
195 U.S., 138; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 808; 49 Law. ed., 128; 1 Ann. Cas., 697.) Courts have also
sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large. Some authorities maintain
that this may not be done (12 C. J., pp. 841, 842; 6 R. C. L., p. 164, citing People vs.
Kennedy [1913], 207 N. Y., 533; 101 N. E., 442; Ann. Cas., 1914C, 616). However, the
question of whether or not a state has ceased to be republican in form because of its adoption
of the initiative and referendum has been held not to be a judicial but a political question
(Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon [1912], 223 U. S., 118; 56 Law. ed., 377; 32 Sup.
Cet. Rep., 224), and as the constitutionality of such laws has been looked upon with favor by
certain progressive courts, the sting of the decisions of the more conservative courts has
been pretty well drawn. (Opinions of the Justices [1894], 160 Mass., 586; 36 N. E., 488; 23
L. R. A., 113; Kiernan vs. Portland [1910], 57 Ore., 454; 111 Pac., 379; 1132 Pac., 402; 37 L.
R. A. [N. S.], 332; Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon, supra.) Doubtless, also,
legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of
article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that “The National Assembly may by
law authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to
fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage
dues.” And section 16 of the same article of the Constitution provides that “In times of war or
other national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribed, to promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out a declared national policy.” It is beyond the scope of this decision to
determine whether or not, in the absence of the foregoing constitutional provisions, the
President could be authorized to exercise the powers thereby vested in him. Upon the other
hand, whatever doubt may have existed has been removed by the Constitution itself.
The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and
shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. (Emphasis ours.)
In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is
usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left
the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or
delegate of the legislature. (6 R. C. L., p. 165.) In The United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ([1922],
43 Phil., 1), this court adhered to the foregoing rule when it held an act of the legislature void
in so far as it undertook to authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a
proclamation fixing the price of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation
a crime. (See and cf. Compañia General de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility
Commissioners [1916], 34 Phil., 136.) The general rule, however, is limited by another rule
that to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to
be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. (6 R. C. L., pp.
177-179.)
For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative
bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective
provinces. They are the agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules
governing delegation of legislative power to administrative and executive officers are
applicable or are at least indicative of the rule which should be here adopted. An examination
of a variety of cases on delegation of power to administrative bodies will show that the ratio
decidendi is at variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the
presence or absence of a standard or rule of action — or the sufficiency thereof — in the
statute, to aid the delegate in exercising the granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that
the standard is sufficient; in others that is insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely
lacking. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay
down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided
in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. (See Schecter vs. United
States [1925], 295 U. S., 495; 79 L. ed., 1570; 55 Sup. Ct. Rep., 837; 97 A.L.R.,
947; People ex rel. Rice vs. Wilson Oil Co. [1936], 364 Ill., 406; 4 N. E. [2d], 847; 107 A.L.R.,
1500 and cases cited. See also R. C. L., title “Constitutional Law“, sec 174.) In the case at
bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of their discretionary power
to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective provinces? What
standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the
respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose
upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power.
What is granted, if we may use the language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case
of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise
arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own
authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the
entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial
boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law
shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation
Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not
wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the
needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not
susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative
power to the provincial boards.
“The true distinction”, says Judge Ranney, “is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority
or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.” (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs.
Clinton County Comrs. [1852]; 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See also, Sutherland on Statutory
Construction, sec 68.) To the same effect are the decision of this court in Municipality of
Cardona vs. Municipality of Binangonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547); Rubi vs. Provincial Board of
Mindoro ([1919],39 Phil., 660) and Cruz vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234). In the first of
these cases, this court sustained the validity of the law conferring upon the Governor-General
authority to adjust provincial and municipal boundaries. In the second case, this court held it
lawful for the legislature to direct non-Christian inhabitants to take up their habitation on
unoccupied lands to be selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial
board. In the third case, it was held proper for the legislature to vest in the Governor-General
authority to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition of the importation of the foreign
cattle, such prohibition to be raised “if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if
deceased among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock
of the lands.”
It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with the simple
transference of details of execution or the promulgation by executive or administrative officials
of rules and regulations to carry into effect the provisions of a law. If we were, recurrence to
our own decisions would be sufficient. (U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327; U.S. vs.
Molina [1914], 29 Phil., 119; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs [1929], 53 Phil., 394; Cebu
Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus [1931], 56 Phil., 446; U. S. vs. Gomez [1915], 31 Phil., 218; Rubi
vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660.)
It is connected, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves
the hands of the legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on certain
contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a
particular community (6 R. C. L., 116, 170-172; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed.,
Vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs. Southard([1825], 10 Wheat. 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme
Court of the United State ruled that the legislature may delegate a power not legislative which
it may itself rightfully exercise.(Vide, also, Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co. [1896], 92 Wis.,
63; 65 N. W., 738; 31 L. R. A., 112.) The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may
be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or
conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to
all branches of the government. (Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co., supra; In re Village of North
Milwaukee [1896], 93 Wis., 616; 97 N.W., 1033; 33 L.R.A., 938; Nash vs. Fries [1906], 129
Wis., 120; 108 N.W., 210; Field vs. Clark [1892], 143 U.S., 649; 12 Sup. Ct., 495; 36 Law.
ed., 294.) Notwithstanding the apparent tendency, however, to relax the rule prohibiting
delegation of legislative authority on account of the complexity arising from social and
economic forces at work in this modern industrial age (Pfiffner, Public Administration [1936]
ch. XX; Laski, “The Mother of Parliaments“, foreign Affairs, July, 1931, Vol. IX, No. 4, pp. 569-
579; Beard, “Squirt-Gun Politics”, in Harper’s Monthly Magazine, July, 1930, Vol. CLXI, pp.
147, 152), the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional
Limitations finds restatement in Prof. Willoughby’s treatise on the Constitution of the United
States in the following language — speaking of declaration of legislative power to
administrative agencies: “The principle which permits the legislature to provide that the
administrative agent may determine when the circumstances are such as require the
application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the time this authority is granted, the
rule of public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the
legislature. In other words, the legislature, as it its duty to do, determines that, under given
circumstances, certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other
circumstances, different of no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the administrative
official is not the legislative determination of what public policy demands, but simply the
ascertainment of what the facts of the case require to be done according to the terms of the
law by which he is governed.” (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, 2nd ed.,
Vol. II, p. 1637.) In Miller vs. Mayer, etc., of New York [1883], 109 U.S., 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 228;
27 Law. ed., 971, 974), it was said: “The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will
must, of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which
the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may designate.” (See, also, 12
C.J., p. 864; State vs. Parker [1854], 26 Vt., 357; Blanding vs. Burr [1859], 13 Cal., 343, 258.)
The legislature, then may provide that a contingencies leaving to some other person or body
the power to determine when the specified contingencies has arisen. But, in the case at bar,
the legislature has not made the operation of the Prohibition Act contingent upon specified
facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves, as we have already
said, the entire operation or non-operation of the law upon the provincial board. the discretion
vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited. A provincial board need not
investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the happening of any specified contingency.
It is bound by no rule, — limited by no principle of expediency announced by the legislature.
It may take into consideration certain facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have
any purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing
to appropriate any funds for the salary of a probation officer. This is a matter which rest
entirely at its pleasure. The fact that at some future time — we cannot say when — the
provincial boards may appropriate funds for the salaries of probation officers and thus put the
law into operation in the various provinces will not save the statute. The time of its taking into
effect, we reiterate, would yet be based solely upon the will of the provincial boards and not
upon the happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain
facts or conditions by a person or body other than legislature itself.
The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending
the operation of the Probation Law in their respective provinces. In some jurisdiction,
constitutions provided that laws may be suspended only by the legislature or by its authority.
Thus, section 28, article I of the Constitution of Texas provides that “No power of suspending
laws in this state shall be exercised except by the legislature”; and section 26, article I of the
Constitution of Indiana provides “That the operation of the laws shall never be suspended,
except by authority of the General Assembly.” Yet, even provisions of this sort do not confer
absolute power of suspension upon the legislature. While it may be undoubted that the
legislature may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a law, a law may not be
suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The
suspension must be general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular
localities. In Holden vs. James ([1814], 11 Mass., 396; 6 Am. Dec., 174, 177, 178), it was
said:
By the twentieth article of the declaration of rights in the constitution of this commonwealth, it
is declared that the power of suspending the laws, or the execution of the laws, ought never
to be exercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such
particular cases only as the legislature shall expressly provide for. Many of the articles in that
declaration of rights were adopted from the Magna Charta of England, and from the bill of
rights passed in the reign of William and Mary. The bill of rights contains an enumeration of
the oppressive acts of James II, tending to subvert and extirpate the protestant religion, and
the laws and liberties of the kingdom; and the first of them is the assuming and exercising a
power of dispensing with and suspending the laws, and the execution of the laws without
consent of parliament. The first article in the claim or declaration of rights contained in the
statute is, that the exercise of such power, by legal authority without consent of parliament,
is illegal. In the tenth section of the same statute it is further declared and enacted, that “No
dispensation by non obstante of or to any statute, or part thereof, should be allowed; but the
same should be held void and of no effect, except a dispensation be allowed of in such
statute.” There is an implied reservation of authority in the parliament to exercise the power
here mentioned; because, according to the theory of the English Constitution, “that absolute
despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere,” is intrusted to the
parliament: 1 Bl. Com., 160.
The principles of our government are widely different in this particular. Here the sovereign
and absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can only exercise what is
delegated to them according to the constitution. It is obvious that the exercise of the power in
question would be equally oppressive to the subject, and subversive of his right to protection,
“according to standing laws,” whether exercised by one man or by a number of men. It cannot
be supposed that the people when adopting this general principle from the English bill of
rights and inserting it in our constitution, intended to bestow by implication on the general
court one of the most odious and oppressive prerogatives of the ancient kings of England. It
is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit
of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages
which are denied to all others under like circumstances; or that ant one should be subject to
losses, damages, suits, or actions from which all others under like circumstances are
exempted.
To illustrate the principle: A section of a statute relative to dogs made the owner of any dog
liable to the owner of domestic animals wounded by it for the damages without proving a
knowledge of it vicious disposition. By a provision of the act, power was given to the board of
supervisors to determine whether or not during the current year their county should be
governed by the provisions of the act of which that section constituted a part. It was held that
the legislature could not confer that power. The court observed that it could no more confer
such a power than to authorize the board of supervisors of a county to abolish in such county
the days of grace on commercial paper, or to suspend the statute of limitations. (Slinger vs.
Henneman [1875], 38 Wis., 504.) A similar statute in Missouri was held void for the same
reason in State vs. Field ([1853, 17 Mo., 529;59 Am. Dec., 275.) In that case a general statute
formulating a road system contained a provision that “if the county court of any county should
be of opinion that the provisions of the act should not be enforced, they might, in their
discretion, suspend the operation of the same for any specified length of time, and thereupon
the act should become inoperative in such county for the period specified in such order; and
thereupon order the roads to be opened and kept in good repair, under the laws theretofore
in force.” Said the court: “. . . this act, by its own provisions, repeals the inconsistent provisions
of a former act, and yet it is left to the county court to say which act shall be enforce in their
county. The act does not submit the question to the county court as an original question, to
be decided by that tribunal, whether the act shall commence its operation within the county;
but it became by its own terms a law in every county not excepted by name in the act. It did
not, then, require the county court to do any act in order to give it effect. But being the law in
the county, and having by its provisions superseded and abrogated the inconsistent
provisions of previous laws, the county court is . . . empowered, to suspend this act and revive
the repealed provisions of the former act. When the question is before the county court for
that tribunal to determine which law shall be in force, it is urge before us that the power then
to be exercised by the court is strictly legislative power, which under our constitution, cannot
be delegated to that tribunal or to any other body of men in the state. In the present case, the
question is not presented in the abstract; for the county court of Saline county, after the act
had been for several months in force in that county, did by order suspend its operation; and
during that suspension the offense was committed which is the subject of the present
indictment . . . .” (See Mitchell vs. State [1901], 134 Ala., 392; 32 S., 687.)
True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to
other localities and, while recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove expressed, courts
in may jurisdiction have sustained the constitutionality of the submission of option laws to the
vote of the people. (6 R.C.L., p. 171.) But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely
local in character which should receive different treatment in different localities placed under
different circumstances. “They relate to subjects which, like the retailing of intoxicating drinks,
or the running at large of cattle in the highways, may be differently regarded in different
localities, and they are sustained on what seems to us the impregnable ground, that the
subject, though not embraced within the ordinary powers of municipalities to make by-laws
and ordinances, is nevertheless within the class of public regulations, in respect to which it is
proper that the local judgment should control.” (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed.,
p. 148.) So that, while we do not deny the right of local self-government and the propriety of
leaving matters of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of
small communities to pass upon, we believe that in matters of general of general legislation
like that which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of probation,
discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No.
4221. True, the statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the
operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested
with the authority to appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation
officers, they thereby are given absolute discretion to determine whether or not the law should
take effect or operate in their respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality
empowered by the legislature to suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular
provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the provincial boards should decide otherwise
by appropriating the necessary funds. The validity of a law is not tested by what has been
done but by what may be done under its provisions. (Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and
Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. J., p. 786.)
It in conceded that a great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the
expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution
thereof. “Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile.” (People
vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been said that popular government lives because of the
inexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It is unquestionable that the mass of powers of
government is vested in the representatives of the people and that these representatives are
no further restrained under our system than by the express language of the instrument
imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment, have that effect.
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission [1936], 35 Off. Ga., 23; Schneckenburger vs.
Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 1317.) But, it should be borne in mind that a constitution is both
a grant and a limitation of power and one of these time-honored limitations is that, subject to
certain exceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated.
We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation
of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and
void.
3. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which
prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws(Act. III, sec. 1 subsec.
1. Constitution of the Philippines.)
This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand
departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivision
thereof, and on many constitutional power, like the police power, taxation and eminent
domain. The equal protection of laws, sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the
United States, “is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.” (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118
U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 10464; Perley vs. North Carolina, 249 U. S.,
510; 39 Sup. Ct. Rep., 357; 63 Law. ed., 735.) Of course, what may be regarded as a denial
of the equal protection of the laws in a question not always easily determined. No rule that
will cover every case can be formulated. (Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co. [1902], 184, U.
S., 540; 22 Sup. Ct., Rep., 431; 46 Law. ed., 679.) Class legislation discriminating against
some and favoring others in prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and nor
made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. (Finely vs. California [1911], 222 U. S., 28; 56
Law. ed., 75; 32 Sup. Ct. Rep., 13; Gulf. C. & S. F. Ry Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150; 41
Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255; Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.)
The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited
to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. (Borgnis vs.
Falk. Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327, 353; 133 N. W., 209; 3 N. C. C. A., 649; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.],
489; State vs. Cooley, 56 Minn., 540; 530-552; 58 N. W., 150; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co. [1911], 220 U. S., 61, 79, 55 Law. ed., 369, 377; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 337; Ann. Cas.,
1912C, 160; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. vs. Clough [1917], 242 U.S., 375; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
144; 61 Law. ed., 374; Southern Ry. Co. vs. Greene[1910], 216 U. S., 400; 30 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
287; 54 Law. ed., 536; 17 Ann. Cas., 1247; Truax vs. Corrigan [1921], 257 U. S., 312; 12 C.
J., pp. 1148, 1149.)
In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted
delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every
case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of
his oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a
probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the
Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means
that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the
benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another
province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination.
Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds
for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no
inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each
and every province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards. On
that hypothesis, every person coming within the purview of the Probation Act would be entitled
to avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will there be any resulting inequality if no province,
through its provincial board, should appropriate any amount for the salary of the probation
officer — which is the situation now — and, also, if we accept the contention that, for the
purpose of the Probation Act, the City of Manila should be considered as a province and that
the municipal board of said city has not made any appropriation for the salary of the probation
officer. These different situations suggested show, indeed, that while inequality may result in
the application of the law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is
not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may be the case, it is clear that in section
11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted
or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal
protection of the law before court should assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable
on that score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section
11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that
account bad. We see no difference between a law which permits of such denial. A law may
appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal
discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions. (By analogy, Chy Lung vs.
Freeman [1876], 292 U. S., 275; 23 Law. ed., 550; Henderson vs. Mayor [1876], 92 U. S.,
259; 23 Law. ed., 543; Ex parte Virginia [1880], 100 U. S., 339; 25 Law. ed., 676; Neal vs.
Delaware [1881], 103 U. S., 370; 26 Law. ed., 567; Soon Hing vs. Crowley [1885], 113 U. S.,
703; 28 Law. ed., 1145, Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886],118 U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed.,
220; Williams vs. Mississippi [1897], 170 U. S., 218; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 583; 42 Law. ed.,
1012; Bailey vs. Alabama [1911], 219 U. S., 219; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145; 55 Law. ed., Sunday
Lake Iron Co. vs. Wakefield [1918], 247 U. S., 450; 38 Sup. Ct. Rep., 495; 62 Law. ed., 1154.)
In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation
(General Oil Co. vs. Clain [1907], 209 U. S., 211; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 475; 52 Law. ed.,
754; State vs. Clement Nat. Bank [1911], 84 Vt., 167; 78 Atl., 944; Ann. Cas., 1912D, 22). If
the law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. (6 R. C.
L. p. 372; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S., 3; 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 18; 27 Law. ed., 835; Yick Wo vs.
Hopkins, supra; State vs. Montgomery, 94 Me., 192; 47 Atl., 165; 80 A. S. R., 386; State vs.
Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N. W., 1104; 36 A. S. R., 948; 19 L. R. A., 858.) Under section 11 of
the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be in
force in other provinces, but one province may appropriate for the salary of the probation
officer of a given year — and have probation during that year — and thereafter decline to
make further appropriation, and have no probation is subsequent years. While this situation
goes rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here indicated to show
that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a government of laws, and
to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality clause but “a rope
of sand”. (Brewer, J. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150 154; 41 Law. ed.,
666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255.)
Great reliance is placed by counsel for the respondents on the case of Ocampo vs. United
States ([1914], 234 U. S., 91; 58 Law. ed., 1231). In that case, the Supreme Court of the
United States affirmed the decision of this court (18 Phil., 1) by declining to uphold the
contention that there was a denial of the equal protection of the laws because, as held
in Missouri vs. Lewis (Bowman vs. Lewis) decided in 1880 (101 U. S., 220; 25 Law. ed., 991),
the guaranty of the equality clause does not require territorial uniformity. It should be
observed, however, that this case concerns the right to preliminary investigations in criminal
cases originally granted by General Orders No. 58. No question of legislative authority was
involved and the alleged denial of the equal protection of the laws was the result of the
subsequent enactment of Act No. 612, amending the charter of the City of Manila (Act No.
813) and providing in section 2 thereof that “in cases triable only in the court of first instance
of the City of Manila, the defendant . . . shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary
examination in any case where the prosecuting attorney, after a due investigation of the facts
. . . shall have presented an information against him in proper form . . . .” Upon the other hand,
an analysis of the arguments and the decision indicates that the investigation by the
prosecuting attorney — although not in the form had in the provinces — was considered a
reasonable substitute for the City of Manila, considering the peculiar conditions of the city as
found and taken into account by the legislature itself.
Reliance is also placed on the case of Missouri vs. Lewis, supra. That case has reference to
a situation where the constitution of Missouri permits appeals to the Supreme Court of the
state from final judgments of any circuit court, except those in certain counties for which
counties the constitution establishes a separate court of appeals called St. Louis Court of
Appeals. The provision complained of, then, is found in the constitution itself and it is the
constitution that makes the apportionment of territorial jurisdiction.
We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void because
it is also repugnant to equal-protection clause of our Constitution.
Section 11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already stated,
the next inquiry is whether or not the entire Act should be avoided.
In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and
the courts will resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into
a statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its removal will leave the
constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process.
(Riccio vs. Hoboken, 69 N. J. Law., 649, 662; 63 L. R. A., 485; 55 Atl., 1109, quoted
in Williams vs. Standard Oil Co. [1929], 278 U.S., 235, 240; 73 Law. ed., 287, 309; 49 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 115; 60 A. L. R., 596.) In Barrameda vs. Moir ([1913], 25 Phil., 44, 47), this court
stated the well-established rule concerning partial invalidity of statutes in the following
language:
. . . where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is
valid, the valid portion, if separable from the valid, may stand and be enforced. But in order
to do this, the valid portion must be in so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to
presume that the Legislative would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they
could not constitutionally enact the other. (Mutual Loan Co. vs. Martell, 200 Mass., 482; 86
N. E., 916; 128 A. S. R., 446; Supervisors of Holmes Co. vs. Black Creek Drainage District,
99 Miss., 739; 55 Sou., 963.) Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid
statute, which carries out the legislative intent. (Pearson vs. Bass. 132 Ga., 117; 63 S. E.,
798.) The void provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main
purpose of the Act, in a manner contrary to the intention of the Legislature. (State vs. A. C. L.
R., Co., 56 Fla., 617, 642; 47 Sou., 969; Harper vs. Galloway, 58 Fla., 255; 51 Sou., 226; 26
L. R. A., N. S., 794; Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540, 565; People vs.
Strassheim, 240 Ill., 279, 300; 88 N. E., 821; 22 L. R. A., N. S., 1135; State vs. Cognevich,
124 La., 414; 50 Sou., 439.) The language used in the invalid part of a statute can have no
legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the
legislative will, independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate. (State
vs. Junkin, 85 Neb., 1; 122 N. W., 473; 23 L. R. A., N. S., 839; Vide, also,. U. S., vs.
Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759; Pollock vs. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co. [1895], 158 U. S.,
601, 635; 39 Law. ed., 1108, 1125; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep., 912; 6 R.C.L., 121.)
It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation Act applicable only in those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards provided for the salaries of probation
officers were inoperative on constitutional grounds, the remainder of the Act would still be
valid and may be enforced. We should be inclined to accept the suggestions but for the fact
that said section is, in our opinion, is inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act that
with the elimination of the section what would be left is the bare idealism of the system, devoid
of any practical benefit to a large number of people who may be deserving of the intended
beneficial result of that system. The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful
examination of the whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely
upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the
salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals.
Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or
subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces
— and this is the actual situation now — appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a
probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation
without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation
system.
Section 2 of the Acts provides that the probation officer shall supervise and visit the
probationer. Every probation officer is given, as to the person placed in probation under his
care, the powers of the police officer. It is the duty of the probation officer to see that the
conditions which are imposed by the court upon the probationer under his care are complied
with. Among those conditions, the following are enumerated in section 3 of the Act:
That the probationer (a) shall indulge in no injurious or vicious habits;
(b) Shall avoid places or persons of disreputable or harmful character;
(c) Shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation officers;
(d) Shall permit the probation officer to visit him at reasonable times at his place of abode or
elsewhere;
(e) Shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of the probation officer
concerning his conduct or condition; “(f) Shall endeavor to be employed regularly; “(g) Shall
remain or reside within a specified place or locality;
(f) Shall make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved parties for actual damages or losses
caused by his offense;
(g) Shall comply with such orders as the court may from time to time make; and
(h) Shall refrain from violating any law, statute, ordinance, or any by-law or regulation,
promulgated in accordance with law.
The court is required to notify the probation officer in writing of the period and terms of
probation. Under section 4, it is only after the period of probation, the submission of a report
of the probation officer and appropriate finding of the court that the probationer has complied
with the conditions of probation that probation may be definitely terminated and the
probationer finally discharged from supervision. Under section 5, if the court finds that there
is non-compliance with said conditions, as reported by the probation officer, it may issue a
warrant for the arrest of the probationer and said probationer may be committed with or
without bail. Upon arraignment and after an opportunity to be heard, the court may revoke,
continue or modify the probation, and if revoked, the court shall order the execution of the
sentence originally imposed. Section 6 prescribes the duties of probation officers: “It shall be
the duty of every probation officer to furnish to all persons placed on probation under his
supervision a statement of the period and conditions of their probation, and to instruct them
concerning the same; to keep informed concerning their conduct and condition; to aid and
encourage them by friendly advice and admonition, and by such other measures, not
inconsistent with the conditions imposed by court as may seem most suitable, to bring about
improvement in their conduct and condition; to report in writing to the court having jurisdiction
over said probationers at least once every two months concerning their conduct and
condition; to keep records of their work; make such report as are necessary for the information
of the Secretary of Justice and as the latter may require; and to perform such other duties as
are consistent with the functions of the probation officer and as the court or judge may direct.
The probation officers provided for in this Act may act as parole officers for any penal or
reformatory institution for adults when so requested by the authorities thereof, and, when
designated by the Secretary of Justice shall act as parole officer of persons released on
parole under Act Number Forty-one Hundred and Three, without additional compensation.”
It is argued, however, that even without section 11 probation officers maybe appointed in the
provinces under section 10 of Act which provides as follows:
There is hereby created in the Department of Justice and subject to its supervision and
control, a Probation Office under the direction of a Chief Probation Officer to be appointed by
the Governor-General with the advise and consent of the Senate who shall receive a salary
of four eight hundred pesos per annum. To carry out this Act there is hereby appropriated out
of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of fifty thousand
pesos to be disbursed by the Secretary of Justice, who is hereby authorized to appoint
probation officers and the administrative personnel of the probation officer under civil service
regulations from among those who possess the qualifications, training and experience
prescribed by the Bureau of Civil Service, and shall fix the compensation of such probation
officers and administrative personnel until such positions shall have been included in the
Appropriation Act.
But the probation officers and the administrative personnel referred to in the foregoing section
are clearly not those probation officers required to be appointed for the provinces under
section 11. It may be said, reddendo singula singulis, that the probation officers referred to in
section 10 above-quoted are to act as such, not in the various provinces, but in the central
office known as the Probation Office established in the Department of Justice, under the
supervision of the Chief Probation Officer. When the law provides that “the probation officer”
shall investigate and make reports to the court (secs. 1 and 4); that “the probation officer”
shall supervise and visit the probationer (sec. 2; sec. 6, par. d); that the probationer shall
report to the “probationer officer” (sec. 3, par. c.), shall allow “the probationer officer” to visit
him (sec. 3, par. d), shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of “the
probation officer” concerning his conduct or condition (sec. 3, par. 4); that the court shall notify
“the probation officer” in writing of the period and terms of probation (sec. 3, last par.), it
means the probation officer who is in charge of a particular probationer in a particular
province. It never could have been intention of the legislature, for instance, to require the
probationer in Batanes, to report to a probationer officer in the City of Manila, or to require a
probation officer in Manila to visit the probationer in the said province of Batanes, to place
him under his care, to supervise his conduct, to instruct him concerning the conditions of his
probation or to perform such other functions as are assigned to him by law.
That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as many probation officers as
there are provinces or groups of provinces is, of course possible. But this would be arguing
on what the law may be or should be and not on what the law is. Between is and ought there
is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. We may think
a law better otherwise than it is. But much as has been said regarding progressive
interpretation and judicial legislation we decline to amend the law. We are not permitted to
read into the law matters and provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose — not even
to save a statute from the doom of invalidity.
Upon the other hand, the clear intention and policy of the law is not to make the Insular
Government defray the salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to make the
provinces defray them should they desire to have the Probation Act apply thereto. The sum
of P50,000, appropriated “to carry out the purposes of this Act”, is to be applied, among other
things, for the salaries of probation officers in the central office at Manila. These probation
officers are to receive such compensations as the Secretary of Justice may fix “until such
positions shall have been included in the Appropriation Act”. It was the intention of the
legislature to empower the Secretary of Justice to fix the salaries of the probation officers in
the provinces or later on to include said salaries in an appropriation act. Considering, further,
that the sum of P50,000 appropriated in section 10 is to cover, among other things, the
salaries of the administrative personnel of the Probation Office, what would be left of the
amount can hardly be said to be sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to probation officers
in the provinces. We take judicial notice of the fact that there are 48 provinces in the
Philippines and we do not think it is seriously contended that, with the fifty thousand pesos
appropriated for the central office, there can be in each province, as intended, a probation
officer with a salary not lower than that of a provincial fiscal. If this a correct, the contention
that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said act is complete is an impracticable thing under
the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that in our case there can be a system of
probation in the provinces without probation officers.
Probation as a development of a modern penology is a commendable system. Probation laws
have been enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what modern criminologist call the
“individualization of the punishment”, the adjustment of the penalty to the character of the
criminal and the circumstances of his particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to
aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It is believed that, in any cases, convicts may
be reformed and their development into hardened criminals aborted. It, therefore, takes
advantage of an opportunity for reformation and avoids imprisonment so long as the convicts
gives promise of reform. (United States vs. Murray [1925], 275 U. S., 347 357, 358; 72 Law.
ed., 309; 312, 313; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; Kaplan vs. Hecht, 24 F. [2d], 664, 665.) The
Welfare of society is its chief end and aim. The benefit to the individual convict is merely
incidental. But while we believe that probation is commendable as a system and its
implantation into the Philippines should be welcomed, we are forced by our inescapable duty
to set the law aside because of the repugnancy to our fundamental law.
In arriving at this conclusion, we have endeavored to consider the different aspects presented
by able counsel for both parties, as well in their memorandums as in their oral argument. We
have examined the cases brought to our attention, and others we have been able to reach in
the short time at our command for the study and deliberation of this case. In the examination
of the cases and in then analysis of the legal principles involved we have inclined to adopt
the line of action which in our opinion, is supported better reasoned authorities and is more
conducive to the general welfare. (Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.)
Realizing the conflict of authorities, we have declined to be bound by certain adjudicated
cases brought to our attention, except where the point or principle is settled directly or by
clear implication by the more authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the
United States. This line of approach is justified because:
(a) The constitutional relations between the Federal and the State governments of the United
States and the dual character of the American Government is a situation which does not
obtain in the Philippines;
(b) The situation of s state of the American Union of the District of Columbia with reference
to the Federal Government of the United States is not the situation of the province with respect
to the Insular Government (Art. I, sec. 8 cl. 17 and 10th Amendment, Constitution of the
United States; Sims vs. Rives, 84 Fed. [2d], 871),
(c) The distinct federal and the state judicial organizations of the United States do not
embrace the integrated judicial system of the Philippines (Schneckenburger vs.
Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., p. 1317);
(d) “General propositions do not decide concrete cases” (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New
York [1904], 198 U. S., 45, 76; 49 Law. ed., 937, 949) and, “to keep pace with . . . new
developments of times and circumstances” (Chief Justice Waite in Pensacola Tel. Co. vs.
Western Union Tel. Co. [1899], 96 U. S., 1, 9; 24 Law. ed., 708; Yale Law Journal, Vol. XXIX,
No. 2, Dec. 1919, 141, 142), fundamental principles should be interpreted having in view
existing local conditions and environment.
ACT NO. 4221 IS HEREBY DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID and the writ of
prohibition is, accordingly, GRANTED. Without any pronouncement regarding costs. SO
ORDERED.
Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Villa-real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur in the result.
 SECOND DIVISION

BARANGAY G.R. No. 188296

CAPTAIN BEDA

TORRECAMPO,
Petitioner, Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - NACHURA,

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.
METROPOLITAN
WATERWORKS

AND SEWERAGE
SYSTEM,

Diosdado Jose Allado,

Administrator, Promulgated:
DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS
May 30, 2011
AND HIGHWAYS,
Secretary

Hermogenes Ebdane,

Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

G.R. No. 188296 is a petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of a Temporary
1

Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Barangay Captain

Beda Torrecampo (Torrecampo) of Barangay Matandang Balara, Quezon City, in his
capacity as taxpayer and on behalf of his barangay constituents and eight million Metro
Manila residents, filed the present petition against respondents Manila Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS) and Diosdado Jose M. Allado (Allado) in his official
capacity as Administrator, and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
and Hermogenes Ebdane (Ebdane) in his official capacity as
Secretary. Torrecampo sought to enjoin respondents from implementing the
Circumferential Road 5 (C-5) Extension Project over Lot Nos. 42-B-2-A, 42-A-6 and
42-A-4 (subject lots), all of which are owned by the MWSS. The C-5 Road Extension
2

Project will connect the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) to the North Luzon
Expressway (NLEX).

The Facts

In his petition, Torrecampo narrated that his constituents approached him on 30 June
3

2009 to report that personnel and heavy equipment from the DPWH entered a portion
of Barangay Matandang Balara to implement the C-5 Road Extension Project over Lot
Nos. 42-A-4, 42-A-6 and 42-A-4. Torrecampo alleged that if the MWSS and the
4

DPWH are allowed to continue and complete the C-5 Road Extension Project
within Barangay Matandang Balara, three aqueducts of the MWSS which supply
water to eight million Metro Manila residents will be put at great
risk. Torrecampo insisted that the RIPADA area, consisting
of Pook Ricarte, PookPolaris and Pook Dagohoy, located in Barangay University of
the Philippines (UP), Diliman, Quezon City, is a better alternative to subject lots.

Torrecampo filed the present petition on 1 July 2009, the very next day after the
DPWHs entry. We considered the allegations and the issues in the petition and required
respondents to comment thereon. We also issued a status quo order, effective from 1
July 2009 and continuing until further orders. We set the urgent application for ex-parte
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction for hearing on 6 July
2009. 5

Pertinent portions of the resolution which summarized the hearing read:

Atty. Alfredo L. Villamor, Jr. avers that the instant petition for injunction seeks to enjoin the
implementation of the DPWH C-5 Road Extension Project to connect the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX)
to the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX), alleging that the project would result to grave injustice and
irreparable injury to petitioner and the eight million residents of Metro Manila considering that the
impending DPWH road project includes the portion known as Tandang Sora Section located within
petitioners barangay, underneath which are the aqueducts supplying water to eight million residents of
Metro Manila, which aqueducts might be damaged and thus imperil and disrupt water supply to all Metro
Manila residents; that the petition raises the fundamental right to health under Sec. 15, Art. II of the 1987
Constitution; and that this petition for injunction has to be filed directly with the Supreme Court rather
than with the lower court, pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. 8975 An Act to Ensure the Expeditious
Implementation and Completion of Government Infrastructure Projects by Prohibiting Lower Courts from
Issuing Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions or Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions,
Providing Penalties for Violations.
Assistant Solicitor General Eric Remegio Panga, lead counsel for respondent DPWH, asserts among others,
that petitioners case does not fall within the exception cited in R.A. 8975 and that under the principle of
hierarchy of courts, the petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court. Said counsel likewise
clarified that the proposed C-5 Road Expansion Project shall not be undertaken pending completion by
the DPWH of studies and tests on the safety concerns, including the determination of the existence and
actual location of the aqueducts in the area.

Atty. Alberto C. Agra for respondent MWSS finds as premature the filing of the petition for injunction as
there is yet no road expansion project to be implemented; that the project as conceived has yet to pass
prior review by the MWSS after submission by the DPWH of a detailed study as to actual engineering
design and actual tests for the conduct of any construction work; that the entry of DPWH in the area is to
conduct study on the soil and on the location of the aqueducts; and that under the premises, there is yet
no justiciable controversy as alleged by petitioner.6

After the respective counsels presented their arguments and answered queries from the
members of the Court, we resolved to require all parties to submit their memoranda
within ten days from the hearing. We also deliberated on the prayer for a temporary
restraining order, and resolved to lift the status quo order of 1 July 2009 considering
that no grave injustice or irreparable injury would arise.

In their memorandum, the MWSS and Allado, through the OGCC, explained the
7

purpose of the MWSS and its participation in the C-5 Road Extension Project. Under
Republic Act No. 6234 (the MWSS Charter), the MWSS owns and has jurisdiction,
supervision and control over all waterworks and sewerage systems within the
development path of the expanding Metro Manila area, Rizal province, and a portion of
Cavite province. The MWSS installed three sub-terrain aqueducts that connect raw
8

water from the La Mesa Dam to the Balara Filtration Plant located
in Barangay Matandang Balara, Diliman, Quezon City. Portions of these aqueducts
are located underneath Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City, and are buried in
varying depths because of the uneven surface of Quezon Citys landscape.
Presidential Proclamation No. 1395 (PP 1395), issued by then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 25 September 2007, declared and reserved certain parcels
of land of the RIPADA area for two purposes:

1. As an access highway for the new road alignment of the C-5 [Road] Extension Project that will connect
the NLEX and SLEX with an area of THIRTY SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY (37,820) SQUARE
METERS, more or less.

2. As housing facilities for deserving and bonafide occupants, to include those active and retired UP
employees presently residing in the said communities with an area of FORTY SIX THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED SIXTY THREE (46,563) SQUARE METERS, more or less.9

The land reserved by PP 1395 has a total area of 84,383 square meters, and is bounded
by University Valley Subdivision on the North, Katipunan Avenue on the
South, Tandang Sora Avenue on the East, and Dagohoy Street on the West. Lot 42-C-
8-B has an area of 37,820 square meters, while Lot 42-C-8-C has an area of 46,563
square meters. PP 1395 directed the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA), under the direct supervision of the Office of the President, to coordinate with
DPWH for detailed engineering plans and designs for the access highway as well as
with the Land Registration Authority and Land Management Bureau of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources for a comprehensive development plan for
housing facilities for the affected families in the areas. At the time of issuance of PP
10

1395, MWSS did not have any participation in the C-5 Extension Project.

On 3 December 2007, then MMDA Chairperson Bayani F. Fernando (Chairperson

Fernando) wrote to then MWSS Administrator Lorenzo H. Jamora and proposed the
utilization of certain MWSS properties for constructing Medium Rise Buildings
(MRBs) for the affected families who will be displaced by the C-5 Road Extension
Project. 11
The Board of Trustees of the MWSS, in a meeting held on 19 June 2008, resolved to
uphold the position of the MWSS management that the MWSS could not accede to
Chairperson Fernandos request. Portions of Resolution No. 2008-120 read:

WHEREAS, Lot 42-B-2-A consisting of 9,018.20 square meters, more or less, is one of the operational
facilities turned over to [Manila Water Company, Inc.] MWCI. Three (3) main aqueducts [two-1575 mm.
diameter Reinforced Concrete Pipes AQ1 and AQ2 (constructed in 1928 and 1955, respectively), and one
2010 mm. Reinforced Concrete Pipe, Hexagonal] conveying raw water from La Mesa Dam
to Balara Treatment Plants are located underneath the subject area. The 60-meter wide ROW was
designed to provide enough space for the rehabilitation, upgrading, and maintenance of the aqueducts
which have been in existence for more than 50 years, and maintenance thereof has to be undertaken to
ensure sustainability of water supply. The area should also be insulated from disruptions and disturbances
such as increased traffic, construction activities, and heavy loadings, as the subject areas were not
technically designed to withstand such dynamic activities. Technically, the integrity of the pipes
underneath is compromised in cases of heavy loadings;

WHEREAS, Lot 42-A-6 consisting of an area of 2,026.50 square meters, more or less, is an extension of the
above-mentioned property and for the same reasons, the same should remain free from disruptions and
disturbances;

WHEREAS, Lot 42-A-3 with an area of 15,647.60 square meters, more or less, located in front of MWSS
complex is now developed as part of the C-5 road extension project;

WHEREAS, Lot 42-A-4 with an area of 47,655.70 square meters, more or less, is an extension of the C-5
road extension project;

WHEREAS, that parcel of land from the aggregate Lot 2 as shown in subdivision Plan PCS-8245 covered by
TCT No. 80123 consisting of 8,414.71 square meters, more or less, is located within the
MWSS Balara Complex and serves as a buffer zone of the chlorine house and other water facilities
comprising the Balara Treatment Plant No. 1.

xxx

WHEREFORE, on motion made by Trustee Reyes and duly seconded by Trustee Dumlao, BE IT RESOLVED,
as it is hereby resolved, to UPHOLD the position of Management that it cannot accede to the segregation
of the aforementioned parcels of land of the MWSS in Barangay Balara, Quezon City for the housing
program of families affected by the C-5 Road Extension Project (NLEX-SLEX Connection). The aqueduct
[Right-of-Way] ROW must be retained/exclusively used for the proposed rehabilitation/upgrading works
of the three (3) aqueducts by MWCI programmed from 2008 and beyond given the fact that the ages or
economic life of the same are nearly reached and/or future improvements considering the increase of
population of Metro Manila.12

Between 3 December 2007 and 20 June 2008, there were correspondences between
Atty. Rowena Turingan-Sanchez (Atty. Turingan-Sanchez), Director IV of the Office
of the President and Administrator Allado of the MWSS; between MMDA 13

Chairperson Fernando and Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita (Exec.

Sec. Ermita); between Leonor C. Cleofas, Deputy Administrator of the MWSS
14

Operations Department, and Vicente Elefante, Manager of the Property Management

Department of the MWSS; and between the Board of Directors of the MWSS and the
15

Chairperson of the MMDA on one hand, and Exec. Sec. Ermita on the other. All these 16

correspondences referred to the segregation of MWSS-owned lots for the construction

of MRBs for those affected by the C-5 Road Extension Project.

On 12 March 2009, MWSS issued Board Resolution No. 2009-052 and allowed DPWH
to use the 60 Meter Right-of-Way for preliminary studies in the implementation of the
C-5 Road Extension Project. The Resolution reads:

Subject to the prior review by Management of the road construction design and the opinion of the OGCC
approving the use of the right-of-way (ROW), as recommended by Management and the joint Board
Committees on Concession, Monitoring and Construction Management, RESOLVED, as it is hereby
resolved, to allow the use by the Department of Public Works and Highways of the MWSS Balara-La Mesa
aqueduct ROW, including the area of the Capitol Golf Course consisting of 93,941 square meters, for the
implementation of the Katipunan/Tandang Sora Segment Circumferential Road 5 Project.17
DPWH entered the said properties of the MWSS on 30 June 2009 to conduct the
necessary complete study and detailed design of the C-5 Road Extension Project,
including test pitting and geothermal profiling.

In their memorandum, DPWH, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
18

stated that to execute the Magsaysay Avenue Congressional Avenue segment of the C-
5 Road Extension Project, the DPWH will follow the direction of the
existing Katipunan Avenue Tandang Sora Avenue road connection. A portion
of Tandang Soraroad, from Magsaysay Avenue to Damayan Road, will be widened to
attain a 30-meter road width, allowing three lanes per direction. The road-widening
aspect of the above-mentioned portion of the project affects Lots 42-A-4 and 42-B-2-A
of the MWSS. A portion of Lot 42-B-2-A was occupied by the Capitol Hills Golf &
Country Club until the early part of July 2009, when the MWSS allowed DPWHs entry
pursuant to Board Resolution No. 2009-052.

The Issues

Torrecampo raises only one issue: Whether respondents should be enjoined from
commencing with and implementing the C-5 Road Extension Project
along TandangSora Road, affecting MWSS properties. Torrecampo argues that (1) he
has the legal standing to file the present suit; (2) only the Supreme Court may issue a
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against government projects,
according to the exception in Section 3 of R.A. 8975; (3) the present suit is not
premature; and (4) the implementation of the C-5 Road Extension Project violates and
defeats the purpose of R.A. 8975 unless it is enjoined.

The MWSS seeks the dismissal of Torrecampos petition on the following grounds: (1)
the petition does not present a justiciable matter that requires the Court to exercise its
power of judicial review; (2) the petition failed to allege Torrecampos right that
warrants the issuance of an injunction under R.A. 8975; and (3) Torrecampo failed to
exhaust administrative remedies.

The DPWH also limits the issue to Torrecampos entitlement to an injunctive writ. The
DPWH argues that: (1) Torrecampo violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts; (2)
MWSS did not object to DPWHs proposed project on the alleged ground that the project
would destroy the aqueducts; (3) there is no credible proof that the project is
implemented in the RIPADA area; (4) the alignment in the RIPADA area is more
difficult to undertake compared to the DPWH alignment; (5) the petition cannot be a
valid class suit because Torrecampo failed to show proof that he represents the interest
of eight million residents of Metro Manila; (6) the petition is not a valid taxpayers suit
as there is yet no project to speak of; (7) the DPWHs determination of the location of
the project in accordance with its specialized skills and technical expertise should be
accorded with finality and respect; (8) Torrecampo is not entitled to the issuance of an
injunctive writ; and (9) Torrecampo has no cause of action.

The Courts Ruling

The petition must fail. Torrecampo is not entitled to an injunction. Torrecampo seeks
judicial review of a question of Executive policy, a matter outside this Courts
jurisdiction. Torrecampo failed to show that respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion that would warrant the exercise of this Courts extraordinary certioraripower.

Judicial Review of a Question of Executive Policy

At the outset, we declare that Torrecampo seeks judicial review of a question of
Executive policy, and quotes the Constitution as a thin veil for his weak arguments.

Torrecampo asserts that [t]he right of the eight million residents of Metro Manila to
clean and potable water is greatly put at risk x x x and alleges that the MWSS and the
19

DPWH violate Section 16, Article II and Section 6, Article XII of the Constitution
20 21

should they choose to proceed with the C-5 Road Extension Project using MWSS
properties instead of the RIPADA area. These issues, however, are dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. Under the guise of the relative
22

importance of the rights of a lesser number of motorists to a wider road vis-a-vis the
rights of some eight million residents of Metro Manila to clean and potable
water, Torrecampo wants this Court to determine whether the Tandang Sora area
is a better alternative to the RIPADA area for the C-5 Road Extension Project.

Despite the definition of judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, an inquiry on issues raised by Torrecampo would delve into matters that
23

are exclusively within the wisdom of the Executive branch. The possibility of judicial
interference, as well as the speculative nature of the present petition, was clearly shown
during the oral arguments:

JUSTICE CARPIO:

Ok, so, is it the province of this Court to tell the DPWH that [it] should construct the road not in
the Ripada area but here in the Tandang Sora area. Do we have that jurisdiction?

Atty. Villamor24:

No, Your Honor. Maybe what your jurisdiction is to stop or enjoin the DPWH from constructing the DPWH
and the Honorable Court need not direct it, or not direct the DPWH to instead construct the Ripada area
because it is already an ongoing concern Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Is that our duty or thats the duty of the President to tell the DPWH Secretary, dont waste our money, we
have already the road on this Ripada side...

Atty. Villamor:

It can be the duty of the President Your Honor, but the petitioner here Your Honor...

JUSTICE CARPIO:

Did you go to the President and ask the President to tell the DPWH Secretary not to waste the taxpayers
money?

Atty. Villamor:

No, the point Your Honor, the petitioner here is a lowly Barangay Captain...

JUSTICE CARPIO:

Yes, but you can also go to the President if you think that there is a waste of funds by the DPWH Secretary?

Atty. Villamor:

We did not contemplate of [sic] that possibility Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:

You should go to the superior first of the Department Secretary, ask the President. We are not the
overseer of the President in terms of Executive functions here.

Atty. Villamor:

Yes, but that is wanting. Maybe the Court is trying to say that we should have exhausted...

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Ok, do you know if the plan of DPWH includes fortifications of the aqueducts [so] that x x x the integrity
will not suffer if there is a road over it?

Atty. Villamor:

We do not know, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:

You do not know?

Atty. Villamor:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:

So, it could be possible that they included that in their plans?

Atty. Villamor:

Well, Your Honors, as I have said Your Honor, apart from the fact that aqueducts will be put in danger,
there is an ongoing Government project, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:

So, do you agree with me that it is possible x x x the DPWH did x x x make plans for remedial measures, so
its possible that they in fact made remedial measures?

Atty. Villamor:

Yes, thats possible, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:

Ok. You are coming here and you are alleging so many factual issues that hundreds of millions of pesos
have already been disbursed?

Atty. Villamor:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO

What are your supporting papers on this?

Atty. Villamor:

The SARO that I have just shown, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CARPIO:

Yes, the SARO doesnt mean actual expenditure, there has to be a contract and the payments must have
been made. There are so many SAROs floating around and not a single centavo has been spent.

Atty. Villamor:

Im not saying by virtue of the SARO, Your Honor, moneys have been spent, what Im saying is that by virtue
of that SARO the project is being implemented and being pushed through by the MMDA, Your Honor.25

The OGCC, in its presentation of the case for MWSS during the oral arguments, further
explained the nature of DPWHs entry into MWSS premises:

Atty. Agra:

xxx

MWSS Board of Trustees, mindful of its mandate under its Charter, issued Resolution No. 2009-052 on
March 12, 2009. The MWSS Board resolved to allow the use by the Department of Public Works and
Highways of the MWSS Balara, La Mesa aqueducts Right of Way for the implementation of the Katipunan-
Tandang Sora segment circumferential road [extension] project. However, as pointed out by counsel, the
implementation of the Resolution, is subject to two conditions precedent: (1) prior review by
management of MWSS of the road construction design, and (2) opinion from the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel approving the use of the Right of Way. To date, the conditions have not been complied
with, simply because no road construction design has been prepared and submitted to the MWSS
management for consideration. The objective, therefore, of the entry into the MWSS property last week
is two (2) fold. First, the purpose of the entry is to fence off, clear, segregate and secure the property in
order that DPWH can conduct the necessary complete study and detailed design of the proposed road
extension project. The study includes test pitting and geo-technical profiling. The results of the study will
show the condition and location of the aqueducts, the condition and classification of the soil, the
requirements to protect the aqueducts, assuming that the detailed design is approved by the MWSS.
Second reason, the entry is simply an act of the ownership of the MWSS over its property
along Tandang Sora. The lease contract with Capitol Golf expired in 2005. And therefore, with or without
the road extension project, the property should be fenced off. In sum, no approval of the road extension
project has been made by the MWSS since no study has been submitted to it.

MWSS recognizes the existence of two plans concerning the extension of the C-5. The other plan referred
to in the petition as the better alternative is being pursued by the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority. The proposed road shall traverse Pook Ricarte, Pook Polaris and Dagohoy, which is referred to
as the Ripada, within the University of the Philippines. An integral part of the project per
Proclamation 1395, is the proposed construction of medium-rise buildings within the University of the
Philippines. Therefore, Your Honors, under Proclamation 1395, MWSS has no role, there is no aqueduct
that would be affected by this proposed project under Proclamation No. 1395. However, in a proposed
proclamation which would effectively amend Proclamation No. 1395, the proposed relocation site of
the bonafide residents of the University of the Philippines shall be within MWSS property
along Tandang Sora. This is the subject of the petition. The letter of Administrator Diosdado Allado dated
June 20, 2008, which is attached to the petition as Annex B, was written in connection with the proposed
proclamation not in connection with Proclamation No. 1395. The proposed proclamation again pertains
to the proposed relocation of UP residents within the MWSS property, in connection with the proposed
C-5 project being carried out by MMDA. The first paragraph of the letter was conveniently omitted by
petitioner in his discussion. Because the first paragraph of the letter puts into context the objections of
the MWSS. What petitioner projects is that the objections of the MWSS pertains to the road extension
project while in truth and in fact the letter referred, signed by Mr. Allado, the Administrator of the MWSS,
refers to the objections not on the the proposed road widening project, but on the proposed housing
project. The objections of the MWSS of any disruption or any disturbance on the aqueducts are confined
to the proposed construction of medium-rise buildings that will be constructed on top of the aqueducts.
Thus, MWSS is not objecting to any proposed extension road project on top of the aqueducts. At this point
MWSS cannot object or concur with any road project since no comprehensive study has been made and
has been submitted to the MWSS for its approval.

Further, it would be erroneous to automatically assume that any road above the aqueducts would
necessarily impair or compromise the integrity of the aqueducts. At present, as pointed out by the Office
of the Solicitor General, there are portions of the aqueducts which are under Commonwealth Avenue,
Luzon Avenue and Tandang Sora. The aqueducts to this day are intact and serve the water needs of the 8
million residents of Metro Manila.26
The determination of where, as between two possible routes, to construct a road
extension is obviously not within the province of this Court. Such determination
belongs to the Executive branch. Moreover, in this case the DPWH still has to conduct
the proper study to determine whether a road can be safely constructed on land beneath
which runs the aqueducts. Without such study, the MWSS, which owns the land, cannot
decide whether to allow the DPWH to construct the road. Absent such DPWH study
and MWSS decision, no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction can
be alleged against or attributed to respondents warranting the exercise of this Courts
extraordinary certiorari power.
27

Indeed, for the above reason alone, Torrecampos petition must fail. There is no need to
further discuss the other issues raised by the parties.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition filed by Barangay Captain Beda Torrecampo.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 170139, August 05, 2014 ]

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. JOY C. CABILES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

This case involves an overseas Filipino worker with shattered dreams. It is our duty, given the facts and
the law, to approximate justice for her.

We are asked to decide a petition for review[1] on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals'
decision[2] dated June 27, 2005. This decision partially affirmed the National Labor Relations
Commission's resolution dated March 31, 2004,[3] declaring respondent's dismissal illegal, directing
petitioner to pay respondent's three-month salary equivalent to New Taiwan Dollar (NT$) 46,080.00,
and ordering it to reimburse the NT$3,000.00 withheld from respondent, and pay her NT$300.00
attorney's fees.[4]

Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement

agency.[5] Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her application for a
quality control job in Taiwan.[6]

Joy's application was accepted.[7] Joy was later asked to sign a one-year employment contract for a
monthly salary of NT$15,360.00.[8]She alleged that Sameer Overseas Agency required her to pay a
placement fee of P70,000.00 when she signed the employment contract.[9]

Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997.[10] She alleged that in
her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year.[11] In Taiwan, she was
asked to work as a cutter.[12]

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal
informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that "she should immediately report to
their office to get her salary and passport."[13] She was asked to "prepare for immediate repatriation."[14]

Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of
NT$9,000.[15] According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.[16]

On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint[17] with the National Labor Relations Commission against
petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally dismissed.[18] She asked for the return of her
placement fee, the withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment of her salary for 23 months as well
as moral and exemplary damages.[19] She identified Wacoal as Sameer Overseas Placement Agency's
foreign principal.[20]

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that respondent's termination was due to her inefficiency,
negligence in her duties, and her "failure to comply with the work requirements [of] her foreign
[employer]."[21] The agency also claimed that it did not ask for a placement fee of ?70,000.00.[22] As
evidence, it showed Official Receipt No. 14860 dated June 10, 1997, bearing the amount of
?20,360.00.[23]Petitioner added that Wacoal's accreditation with petitioner had already been transferred
to the Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc. (Pacific) as of August 6, 1997.[24] Thus, petitioner
asserts that it was already substituted by Pacific Manpower.[25]

Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of petitioner's claims against it.[26] It alleged that there was no
employer-employee relationship between them.[27] Therefore, the claims against it were outside the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.[28] Pacific Manpower argued that the employment contract should first
be presented so that the employer's contractual obligations might be identified.[29] It further denied that
it assumed liability for petitioner's illegal acts.[30]

On July 29, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Joy's complaint.[31] Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro C.
Ramos ruled that her complaint was based on mere allegations.[32] The Labor Arbiter found that there
was no excess payment of placement fees, based on the official receipt presented by petitioner.[33] The
Labor Arbiter found unnecessary a discussion on petitioner's transfer of obligations to Pacific[34] and
considered the matter immaterial in view of the dismissal of respondent's complaint.[35]

Joy appealed[36] to the National Labor Relations Commission.

In a resolution[37] dated March 31, 2004, the National Labor Relations Commission declared that Joy was
illegally dismissed.[38] It reiterated the doctrine that the burden of proof to show that the dismissal was
based on a just or valid cause belongs to the employer.[39]It found that Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency failed to prove that there were just causes for termination.[40] There was no sufficient proof to
show that respondent was inefficient in her work and that she failed to comply with company
requirements.[41] Furthermore, procedural due process was not observed in terminating respondent.[42]

The National Labor Relations Commission did not rule on the issue of reimbursement of placement fees
for lack of jurisdiction.[43] It refused to entertain the issue of the alleged transfer of obligations to
Pacific.[44] It did not acquire jurisdiction over that issue because Sameer Overseas Placement Agency
failed to appeal the Labor Arbiter's decision not to rule on the matter.[45]

The National Labor Relations Commission awarded respondent only three (3) months worth of salary in
the amount of NT$46,080, the reimbursement of the NT$3,000 withheld from her, and attorney's fees
of NT$300.[46]

The Commission denied the agency's motion for reconsideration[47] dated May 12, 2004 through a
resolution[48] dated July 2, 2004.

Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency caused the filing of a petition[49] for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the National Labor Relations Commission's resolutions
dated March 31, 2004 and July 2, 2004.
The Court of Appeals[50] affirmed the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission with respect
to the finding of illegal dismissal, Joy's entitlement to the equivalent of three months worth of salary,
reimbursement of withheld repatriation expense, and attorney's fees.[51] The Court of Appeals
remanded the case to the National Labor Relations Commission to address the validity of petitioner's
allegations against Pacific.[52] The Court of Appeals held, thus:

Although the public respondent found the dismissal of the complainant-respondent illegal, we should
point out that the NLRC merely awarded her three (3) months backwages or the amount of
NT$46,080.00, which was based upon its finding that she was dismissed without due process, a finding
that we uphold, given petitioner's lack of worthwhile discussion upon the same in the proceedings
below or before us. Likewise we sustain NLRC's finding in regard to the reimbursement of her fare,
which is squarely based on the law; as well as the award of attorney's fees.

But we do find it necessary to remand the instant case to the public respondent for further proceedings,
for the purpose of addressing the validity or propriety of petitioner's third-party complaint against the
transferee agent or the Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc. and Lea G. Manabat. We should
emphasize that as far as the decision of the NLRC on the claims of Joy Cabiles, is concerned, the same is
hereby affirmed with finality, and we hold petitioner liable thereon, but without prejudice to further
hearings on its third party complaint against Pacific for reimbursement.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions are hereby partly AFFIRMED in accordance
with the foregoing discussion, but subject to the caveat embodied in the last sentence. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[53]

Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency filed this petition.[54]

We are asked to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the ruling of the
National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three
months' worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorney's fees despite
the alleged existence of just causes of termination.

Petitioner reiterates that there was just cause for termination because there was a finding of Wacoal
that respondent was inefficient in her work.[55] Therefore, it claims that respondent's dismissal was
valid.[56]

Petitioner also reiterates that since Wacoal's accreditation was validly transferred to Pacific at the time
respondent filed her complaint, it should be Pacific that should now assume responsibility for Wacoal's
contractual obligations to the workers originally recruited by petitioner.[57]

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency's petition is without merit. We find for respondent.
I

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing Joy's dismissal.
The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law.

Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at work.[58] They
may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with these standards.[59] Failure
to comply may be a just cause for their dismissal.[60] Certainly, employers cannot be compelled to retain
the services of an employee who is guilty of acts that are inimical to the interest of the
employer.[61] While the law acknowledges the plight and vulnerability of workers, it does not "authorize
the oppression or self-destruction of the employer."[62] Management prerogative is recognized in law
and in our jurisprudence.

This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is "tempered with the employee's right to security
of tenure."[63] Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due process before termination. They
may not be removed from employment without a valid or just cause as determined by law and without
going through the proper procedure.

Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our Constitution.[64]

Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure when they move to work in a different
jurisdiction. With respect to the rights of overseas Filipino workers, we follow the principle of lex loci
contractus.

Thus, in Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC,[65] this court noted:

Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical certificate requirement by contending that since
Osdana was working in Saudi Arabia, her employment was subject to the laws of the host country.
Apparently, petitioner hopes to make it appear that the labor laws of Saudi Arabia do not require any
certification by a competent public health authority in the dismissal of employees due to illness.

Again, petitioner's argument is without merit.

First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made)
governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of employment in this case was
perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations,
and other laws affecting labor apply in this case. Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of the
forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public policy. Here in the Philippines,
employment agreements are more than contractual in nature. The Constitution itself, in Article XIII,
Section 3, guarantees the special protection of workers, to wit:
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be
entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate
in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

....

This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because to allow foreign employers to determine
for and by themselves whether an overseas contract worker may be dismissed on the ground of illness
would encourage illegal or arbitrary pre-termination of employment contracts.[66] (Emphasis supplied,
citation omitted)

Even with respect to fundamental procedural rights, this court emphasized in PCL Shipping Philippines,
Inc. v. NLRC,[67] to wit:

Petitioners admit that they did not inform private respondent in writing of the charges against him and
that they failed to conduct a formal investigation to give him opportunity to air his side. However,
petitioners contend that the twin requirements of notice and hearing applies strictly only when the
employment is within the Philippines and that these need not be strictly observed in cases of
international maritime or overseas employment.

The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code which afford
protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether working within the Philippines or abroad.
Moreover, the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made)
governs in this jurisdiction. In the present case, it is not disputed that the Contract of Employment
entered into by and between petitioners and private respondent was executed here in the Philippines
with the approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Hence, the Labor Code
together with its implementing rules and regulations and other laws affecting labor apply in this
case.[68] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may only be terminated for a just or authorized cause and
after compliance with procedural due process requirements.

Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes of termination by the employer. Thus:
Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following
causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

Petitioner's allegation that respondent was inefficient in her work and negligent in her duties[69] may,
therefore, constitute a just cause for termination under Article 282(b), but only if petitioner was able to
prove it.

The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer. "The employer must
affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause."[70] Failure
to show that there was valid or just cause for termination would necessarily mean that the dismissal was
illegal.[71]

To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the
employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be judged; 2)
the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated to the employee; and 3) the
communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employee's performance assessment.

This is similar to the law and jurisprudence on probationary employees, which allow termination of the
employee only when there is "just cause or when [the probationary employee] fails to qualify as a
regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the
employee at the time of his [or her] engagement."[72]

However, we do not see why the application of that ruling should be limited to probationary
employment. That rule is basic to the idea of security of tenure and due process, which are guaranteed
to all employees, whether their employment is probationary or regular.

The pre-determined standards that the employer sets are the bases for determining the probationary
employee's fitness, propriety, efficiency, and qualifications as a regular employee. Due process requires
that the probationary employee be informed of such standards at the time of his or her engagement so
he or she can adjust his or her character or workmanship accordingly. Proper adjustment to fit the
standards upon which the employee's qualifications will be evaluated will increase one's chances of
being positively assessed for regularization by his or her employer.

Assessing an employee's work performance does not stop after regularization. The employer, on a
regular basis, determines if an employee is still qualified and efficient, based on work standards. Based
on that determination, and after complying with the due process requirements of notice and hearing,
the employer may exercise its management prerogative of terminating the employee found unqualified.

The regular employee must constantly attempt to prove to his or her employer that he or she meets all
the standards for employment. This time, however, the standards to be met are set for the purpose of
retaining employment or promotion. The employee cannot be expected to meet any standard of
character or workmanship if such standards were not communicated to him or her. Courts should
remain vigilant on allegations of the employer's failure to communicate work standards that would
govern one's employment "if [these are] to discharge in good faith [their] duty to adjudicate."[73]

In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign employer's
work requirements and was inefficient in her work.[74] No evidence was shown to support such
allegations. Petitioner did not even bother to specify what requirements were not met, what efficiency
standards were violated, or what particular acts of respondent constituted inefficiency.

There was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently informed of the standards against which her
work efficiency and performance were judged. The parties' conflict as to the position held by
respondent showed that even the matter as basic as the job title was not clear.

The bare allegations of petitioner are not sufficient to support a claim that there is just cause for
termination. There is no proof that respondent was legally terminated.

Petitioner failed to comply with

the due process requirements

Respondent's dismissal less than one year from hiring and her repatriation on the same day show not
only failure on the part of petitioner to comply with the requirement of the existence of just cause for
termination. They patently show that the employers did not comply with the due process requirement.

A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal.[75] The
employer is required to give the charged employee at least two written notices before
termination.[76] One of the written notices must inform the employee of the particular acts that may
cause his or her dismissal.[77] The other notice must "[inform] the employee of the employer's
decision."[78]Aside from the notice requirement, the employee must also be given "an opportunity to be
heard."[79]

Petitioner failed to comply with the twin notices and hearing requirements. Respondent started working
on June 26, 1997. She was told that she was terminated on July 14, 1997 effective on the same day and
barely a month from her first workday. She was also repatriated on the same day that she was informed
of her termination. The abruptness of the termination negated any finding that she was properly
notified and given the opportunity to be heard. Her constitutional right to due process of law was
violated.

II

Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the unexpired
portion of the employment contract that was violated together with attorney's fees and reimbursement
of amounts withheld from her salary.

Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995, states that overseas workers who were terminated without just, valid, or authorized cause
"shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per
annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less."

Sec. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims
under this section shall be joint and several. This provisions [sic] shall be incorporated in the contract for
overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be
filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims
or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical
being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly
and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.

Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall
not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of
the said contract.

Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims inclusive of damages

under this section shall be paid within four (4) months from the approval of the settlement by the
appropriate authority.

In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law
or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of
twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
....

(Emphasis supplied)

Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 states that "repatriation of the worker and the transport of his [or
her] personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which recruited or deployed
the worker overseas." The exception is when "termination of employment is due solely to the fault of
the worker,"[80] which as we have established, is not the case. It reads:

SEC. 15. REPATRIATION OF WORKERS; EMERGENCY REPATRIATION FUND. The repatriation of the worker
and the transport of his personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which
recruited or deployed the worker overseas. All costs attendant to repatriation shall be borne by or
charged to the agency concerned and/or its principal. Likewise, the repatriation of remains and
transport of the personal belongings of a deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne
by the principal and/or local agency. However, in cases where the termination of employment is due
solely to the fault of the worker, the principal/employer or agency shall not in any manner be
responsible for the repatriation of the former and/or his belongings.

....

The Labor Code[81] also entitles the employee to 10% of the amount of withheld wages as attorney's fees
when the withholding is unlawful.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission's decision to award respondent
NT$46,080.00 or the three-month equivalent of her salary, attorney's fees of NT$300.00, and the
reimbursement of the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary, which answered for her repatriation.

We uphold the finding that respondent is entitled to all of these awards. The award of the three-month
equivalent of respondent's salary should, however, be increased to the amount equivalent to the
unexpired term of the employment contract.

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc.,[82] this court ruled that the
clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less"[83] is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.[84]

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It "confers no rights; it imposes
no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at
all."[85]

We are aware that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less" was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 provides:
Section 7. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

SEC. 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damage.
Consistent with this mandate, the NLRC shall endeavor to update and keep abreast with the
developments in the global services industry.

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims
under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for
overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to de
[sic] filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money
claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a
juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be
jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.

Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall
not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of
the said contract.

Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims inclusive of damages

under this section shall be paid within thirty (30) days from approval of the settlement by the
appropriate authority.

In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law
or contract, or any unauthorized deductions from the migrant worker's salary, the worker shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement if [sic] his placement fee and the deductions made with interest at
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

In case of a final and executory judgement against a foreign employer/principal, it shall be automatically
disqualified, without further proceedings, from participating in the Philippine Overseas Employment
Program and from recruiting and hiring Filipino workers until and unless it fully satisfies the judgement
award.

Noncompliance with the mandatory periods for resolutions of case provided under this section shall
subject the responsible officials to any or all of the following penalties:
(a) The salary of any such official who fails to render his decision or resolution within the prescribed
period shall be, or caused to be, withheld until the said official complies therewith;

(b) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or

(c) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to hold any appointive public office for five (5) years.

Provided, however, That the penalties herein provided shall be without prejudice to any liability which
any such official may have incured [sic] under other existing laws or rules and regulations as a
consequence of violating the provisions of this paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)

Republic Act No. 10022 was promulgated on March 8, 2010. This means that the reinstatement of the
clause in Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of respondent's termination from work
in 1997.[86] Republic Act No. 8042 before it was amended by Republic Act No. 10022 governs this case.

When a law is passed, this court awaits an actual case that clearly raises adversarial positions in their
proper context before considering a prayer to declare it as unconstitutional.

However, we are confronted with a unique situation. The law passed incorporates the exact clause
already declared as unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial change in the circumstances.

This may cause confusion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of
Appeals. At minimum, the existence of Republic Act No. 10022 may delay the execution of the judgment
in this case, further frustrating remedies to assuage the wrong done to petitioner. Hence, there is a
necessity to decide this constitutional issue.

Moreover, this court is possessed with the constitutional duty to "[p]romulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights."[87] When cases become moot and academic, we do
not hesitate to provide for guidance to bench and bar in situations where the same violations are
capable of repetition but will evade review. This is analogous to cases where there are millions of
Filipinos working abroad who are bound to suffer from the lack of protection because of the restoration
of an identical clause in a provision previously declared as unconstitutional.

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government may
exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any
law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be
read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.

Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity
cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or
provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have
so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

We are not convinced by the pleadings submitted by the parties that the situation has so changed so as
to cause us to reverse binding precedent.

Likewise, there are special reasons of judicial efficiency and economy that attend to these cases.

The new law puts our overseas workers in the same vulnerable position as they were prior to Serrano.
Failure to reiterate the very ratio decidendi of that case will result in the same untold economic
hardships that our reading of the Constitution intended to avoid. Obviously, we cannot countenance
added expenses for further litigation that will reduce their hard-earned wages as well as add to the
indignity of having been deprived of the protection of our laws simply because our precedents have not
been followed. There is no constitutional doctrine that causes injustice in the face of empty procedural
niceties. Constitutional interpretation is complex, but it is never unreasonable.

Thus, in a resolution[88] dated October 22, 2013, we ordered the parties and the Office of the Solicitor
General to comment on the constitutionality of the reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 10022.

In its comment,[89] petitioner argued that the clause was constitutional.[90] The legislators intended a
balance between the employers' and the employees' rights by not unduly burdening the local
recruitment agency.[91] Petitioner is also of the view that the clause was already declared as
constitutional in Serrano.[92]

The Office of the Solicitor General also argued that the clause was valid and constitutional.[93] However,
since the parties never raised the issue of the constitutionality of the clause as reinstated in Republic Act
No. 10022, its contention is that it is beyond judicial review.[94]

On the other hand, respondent argued that the clause was unconstitutional because it infringed on
workers' right to contract.[95]

We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.[96] Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General
have failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the
precedent.

We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting wages that should be recovered
by an illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a violation of due process and the
equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances and falling within the
same class are treated alike, in terms of "privileges conferred and liabilities enforced."[97] It is a
guarantee against "undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality."[98]

In creating laws, the legislature has the power "to make distinctions and classifications."[99] In exercising
such power, it has a wide discretion.[100]
The equal protection clause does not infringe on this legislative power.[101] A law is void on this basis,
only if classifications are made arbitrarily.[102] There is no violation of the equal protection clause if the
law applies equally to persons within the same class and if there are reasonable grounds for
distinguishing between those falling within the class and those who do not fall within the class.[103] A law
that does not violate the equal protection clause prescribes a reasonable classification.[104]

A reasonable classification "(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class."[105]

The reinstated clause does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable classification.

In Serrano, we identified the classifications made by the reinstated clause. It distinguished between
fixed-period overseas workers and fixed-period local workers.[106] It also distinguished between overseas
workers with employment contracts of less than one year and overseas workers with employment
contracts of at least one year.[107] Within the class of overseas workers with at least one-year
employment contracts, there was a distinction between those with at least a year left in their contracts
and those with less than a year left in their contracts when they were illegally dismissed.[108]

The Congress' classification may be subjected to judicial review. In Serrano, there is a "legislative
classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class."[109]

Under the Constitution, labor is afforded special protection.[110] Thus, this court in Serrano, "[i]mbued
with the same sense of 'obligation to afford protection to labor,' . . . employ[ed] the standard of strict
judicial scrutiny, for it perceive[d] in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs."[111]

We also noted in Serrano that before the passage of Republic Act No. 8042, the money claims of illegally
terminated overseas and local workers with fixed-term employment were computed in the same
manner.[112] Their money claims were computed based on the "unexpired portions of their
contracts."[113] The adoption of the reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 8042 subjected the money
claims of illegally dismissed overseas workers with an unexpired term of at least a year to a cap of three
months worth of their salary.[114] There was no such limitation on the money claims of illegally
terminated local workers with fixed-term employment.[115]

We observed that illegally dismissed overseas workers whose employment contracts had a term of less
than one year were granted the amount equivalent to the unexpired portion of their employment
contracts.[116] Meanwhile, illegally dismissed overseas workers with employment terms of at least a year
were granted a cap equivalent to three months of their salary for the unexpired portions of their
contracts.[117]

Observing the terminologies used in the clause, we also found that "the subject clause creates a sub-
layer of discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one year: those who are
illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the
entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more
remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the reinstated clause, and their monetary benefits
limited to their salaries for three months only."[118]

We do not need strict scrutiny to conclude that these classifications do not rest on any real or
substantial distinctions that would justify different treatments in terms of the computation of money
claims resulting from illegal termination.

Overseas workers regardless of their classifications are entitled to security of tenure, at least for the
period agreed upon in their contracts. This means that they cannot be dismissed before the end of their
contract terms without due process. If they were illegally dismissed, the workers' right to security of
tenure is violated.

The rights violated when, say, a fixed-period local worker is illegally terminated are neither greater than
nor less than the rights violated when a fixed-period overseas worker is illegally terminated. It is state
policy to protect the rights of workers without qualification as to the place of employment.[119] In both
cases, the workers are deprived of their expected salary, which they could have earned had they not
been illegally dismissed. For both workers, this deprivation translates to economic insecurity and
disparity.[120] The same is true for the distinctions between overseas workers with an employment
contract of less than one year and overseas workers with at least one year of employment contract, and
between overseas workers with at least a year left in their contracts and overseas workers with less than
a year left in their contracts when they were illegally dismissed.

For this reason, we cannot subscribe to the argument that "[overseas workers] are contractual
employees who can never acquire regular employment status, unlike local workers"[121] because it
already justifies differentiated treatment in terms of the computation of money claims.[122]

Likewise, the jurisdictional and enforcement issues on overseas workers' money claims do not justify a
differentiated treatment in the computation of their money claims.[123] If anything, these issues justify an
equal, if not greater protection and assistance to overseas workers who generally are more prone to
exploitation given their physical distance from our government.

We also find that the classifications are not relevant to the purpose of the law, which is to "establish a
higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families and
overseas Filipinos in distress, and for other purposes."[124] Further, we find specious the argument that
reducing the liability of placement agencies "redounds to the benefit of the [overseas] workers."[125]

Putting a cap on the money claims of certain overseas workers does not increase the standard of
protection afforded to them. On the other hand, foreign employers are more incentivized by the
reinstated clause to enter into contracts of at least a year because it gives them more flexibility to
violate our overseas workers' rights. Their liability for arbitrarily terminating overseas workers is
decreased at the expense of the workers whose rights they violated. Meanwhile, these overseas
workers who are impressed with an expectation of a stable job overseas for the longer contract period
disregard other opportunities only to be terminated earlier. They are left with claims that are less than
what others in the same situation would receive. The reinstated clause, therefore, creates a situation
where the law meant to protect them makes violation of rights easier and simply benign to the violator.

As Justice Brion said in his concurring opinion in Serrano:

Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 affects these well-laid rules and measures, and in fact provides a hidden
twist affecting the principal/employer's liability. While intended as an incentive accruing to
recruitment/manning agencies, the law, as worded, simply limits the OFWs' recovery in wrongful
dismissal situations. Thus, it redounds to the benefit of whoever may be liable, including the
principal/employer the direct employer primarily liable for the wrongful dismissal. In this sense, Section
10 read as a grant of incentives to recruitment/manning agencies oversteps what it aims to do by
effectively limiting what is otherwise the full liability of the foreign principals/employers. Section 10, in
short, really operates to benefit the wrong party and allows that party, without justifiable reason, to
mitigate its liability for wrongful dismissals. Because of this hidden twist, the limitation of liability under
Section 10 cannot be an "appropriate" incentive, to borrow the term that R.A. No. 8042 itself uses to
describe the incentive it envisions under its purpose clause.

What worsens the situation is the chosen mode of granting the incentive: instead of a grant that, to
encourage greater efforts at recruitment, is directly related to extra efforts undertaken, the law simply
limits their liability for the wrongful dismissals of already deployed OFWs. This is effectively a legally-
imposed partial condonation of their liability to OFWs, justified solely by the law's intent to encourage
greater deployment efforts. Thus, the incentive, from a more practical and realistic view, is really part of
a scheme to sell Filipino overseas labor at a bargain for purposes solely of attracting the market. . . .

The so-called incentive is rendered particularly odious by its effect on the OFWs the benefits accruing to
the recruitment/manning agencies and their principals are taken from the pockets of the OFWs to whom
the full salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract rightfully belong. Thus, the
principals/employers and the recruitment/manning agencies even profit from their violation of the
security of tenure that an employment contract embodies. Conversely, lesser protection is afforded the
OFW, not only because of the lessened recovery afforded him or her by operation of law, but also
because this same lessened recovery renders a wrongful dismissal easier and less onerous to undertake;
the lesser cost of dismissing a Filipino will always be a consideration a foreign employer will take into
account in termination of employment decisions. . . .[126]

Further, "[t]here can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates the
burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored
sector is composed of private businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is
composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that private
business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious."[127]

Along the same line, we held that the reinstated clause violates due process rights. It is arbitrary as it
deprives overseas workers of their monetary claims without any discernable valid purpose.[128]
Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract, in accordance
with Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month equivalence of respondent's
salary must be modified accordingly. Since she started working on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on
July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to her salary from July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. "To rule
otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal
that principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW's security of tenure
which an employment contract embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an
unconstitutional provision of law."[129]

III

On the interest rate, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799 of June 21, 2013, which revised the
interest rate for loan or forbearance from 12% to 6% in the absence of stipulation, applies in this case.
The pertinent portions of Circular No. 799, Series of 2013, read:

The Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 796 dated 16 May 2013, approved the following revisions
governing the rate of interest in the absence of stipulation in loan contracts, thereby amending Section
2 of Circular No. 905, Series of 1982:

Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate
allowed in judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be six
percent (6%) per annum.

Section 2. In view of the above, Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and Sections
4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions are
hereby amended accordingly.

This Circular shall take effect on 1 July 2013.

Through the able ponencia of Justice Diosdado Peralta, we laid down the guidelines in computing legal
interest in Nacar v. Gallery Frames:[130]

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages,
the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
 1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan
or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on

the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of
6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages,
except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly,
where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from
the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall
begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual
base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the
rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be
6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by
then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1, 2013,
shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest fixed
therein.[131]

Circular No. 799 is applicable only in loans and forbearance of money, goods, or credits, and in
judgments when there is no stipulation on the applicable interest rate. Further, it is only applicable if the
judgment did not become final and executory before July 1, 2013.[132]

We add that Circular No. 799 is not applicable when there is a law that states otherwise. While the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas has the power to set or limit interest rates,[133] these interest rates do not
apply when the law provides that a different interest rate shall be applied. "[A] Central Bank Circular
cannot repeal a law. Only a law can repeal another law."[134]

For example, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 provides that unlawfully terminated overseas workers
are entitled to the reimbursement of his or her placement fee with an interest of 12% per annum. Since
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas circulars cannot repeal Republic Act No. 8042, the issuance of Circular No.
799 does not have the effect of changing the interest on awards for reimbursement of placement fees
from 12% to 6%. This is despite Section 1 of Circular No. 799, which provides that the 6% interest rate
applies even to judgments.
Moreover, laws are deemed incorporated in contracts. "The contracting parties need not repeat them.
They do not even have to be referred to. Every contract, thus, contains not only what has been explicitly
stipulated, but the statutory provisions that have any bearing on the matter."[135] There is, therefore, an
implied stipulation in contracts between the placement agency and the overseas worker that in case the
overseas worker is adjudged as entitled to reimbursement of his or her placement fees, the amount
shall be subject to a 12% interest per annum. This implied stipulation has the effect of removing awards
for reimbursement of placement fees from Circular No. 799's coverage.

The same cannot be said for awards of salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract
under Republic Act No. 8042. These awards are covered by Circular No. 799 because the law does not
provide for a specific interest rate that should apply.

In sum, if judgment did not become final and executory before July 1, 2013 and there was no stipulation
in the contract providing for a different interest rate, other money claims under Section 10 of Republic
Act No. 8042 shall be subject to the 6% interest per annum in accordance with Circular No. 799.

This means that respondent is also entitled to an interest of 6% per annum on her money claims from
the finality of this judgment.

IV

Finally, we clarify the liabilities of Wacoal as principal and petitioner as the employment agency that
facilitated respondent's overseas employment.

Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 provides that the foreign
employer and the local employment agency are jointly and severally liable for money claims including
claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship and/or damages. This section also provides that
the performance bond filed by the local agency shall be answerable for such money claims or damages if
they were awarded to the employee.

This provision is in line with the state's policy of affording protection to labor and alleviating workers'
plight.[136]

In overseas employment, the filing of money claims against the foreign employer is attended by
practical and legal complications. The distance of the foreign employer alone makes it difficult for an
overseas worker to reach it and make it liable for violations of the Labor Code. There are also possible
conflict of laws, jurisdictional issues, and procedural rules that may be raised to frustrate an overseas
worker's attempt to advance his or her claims.

It may be argued, for instance, that the foreign employer must be impleaded in the complaint as an
indispensable party without which no final determination can be had of an action.[137]
The provision on joint and several liability in the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995
assures overseas workers that their rights will not be frustrated with these complications.

The fundamental effect of joint and several liability is that "each of the debtors is liable for the entire
obligation."[138] A final determination may, therefore, be achieved even if only one of the joint and
several debtors are impleaded in an action. Hence, in the case of overseas employment, either the local
agency or the foreign employer may be sued for all claims arising from the foreign employer's labor law
violations. This way, the overseas workers are assured that someone the foreign employer's local agent
may be made to answer for violations that the foreign employer may have committed.

The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 ensures that overseas workers have recourse in
law despite the circumstances of their employment. By providing that the liability of the foreign
employer may be "enforced to the full extent"[139] against the local agent, the overseas worker is assured
of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them.[140]

Corollary to the assurance of immediate recourse in law, the provision on joint and several liability in the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 shifts the burden of going after the foreign
employer from the overseas worker to the local employment agency. However, it must be emphasized
that the local agency that is held to answer for the overseas worker's money claims is not left without
remedy. The law does not preclude it from going after the foreign employer for reimbursement of
whatever payment it has made to the employee to answer for the money claims against the foreign
employer.

A further implication of making local agencies jointly and severally liable with the foreign employer is
that an additional layer of protection is afforded to overseas workers. Local agencies, which are
businesses by nature, are inoculated with interest in being always on the lookout against foreign
employers that tend to violate labor law. Lest they risk their reputation or finances, local agencies must
already have mechanisms for guarding against unscrupulous foreign employers even at the level prior to
overseas employment applications.

With the present state of the pleadings, it is not possible to determine whether there was indeed a
transfer of obligations from petitioner to Pacific. This should not be an obstacle for the respondent
overseas worker to proceed with the enforcement of this judgment. Petitioner is possessed with the
resources to determine the proper legal remedies to enforce its rights against Pacific, if any.

Many times, this court has spoken on what Filipinos may encounter as they travel into the farthest and
most difficult reaches of our planet to provide for their families. In Prieto v. NLRC:[141]
The Court is not unaware of the many abuses suffered by our overseas workers in the foreign land
where they have ventured, usually with heavy hearts, in pursuit of a more fulfilling future. Breach of
contract, maltreatment, rape, insufficient nourishment, sub-human lodgings, insults and other forms of
debasement, are only a few of the inhumane acts to which they are subjected by their foreign
employers, who probably feel they can do as they please in their own country. While these workers may
indeed have relatively little defense against exploitation while they are abroad, that disadvantage must
not continue to burden them when they return to their own territory to voice their muted complaint.
There is no reason why, in their very own land, the protection of our own laws cannot be extended to
them in full measure for the redress of their grievances.[142]

But it seems that we have not said enough.

We face a diaspora of Filipinos. Their travails and their heroism can be told a million times over; each of
their stories as real as any other. Overseas Filipino workers brave alien cultures and the heartbreak of
families left behind daily. They would count the minutes, hours, days, months, and years yearning to see
their sons and daughters. We all know of the joy and sadness when they come home to see them all
grown up and, being so, they remember what their work has cost them. Twitter accounts, Facetime, and
many other gadgets and online applications will never substitute for their lost physical presence.

Unknown to them, they keep our economy afloat through the ebb and flow of political and economic
crises. They are our true diplomats, they who show the world the resilience, patience, and creativity of
our people. Indeed, we are a people who contribute much to the provision of material creations of this
world.

This government loses its soul if we fail to ensure decent treatment for all Filipinos. We default by
limiting the contractual wages that should be paid to our workers when their contracts are breached by
the foreign employers. While we sit, this court will ensure that our laws will reward our overseas
workers with what they deserve: their dignity.

Inevitably, their dignity is ours as well.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
modification. Petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency is ORDERED to pay respondent Joy C.
Cabiles the amount equivalent to her salary for the unexpired portion of her employment contract at an
interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment. Petitioner is also ORDERED to reimburse
respondent the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary and pay respondent attorney's fees of NT$300.00 at an
interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment.

The clause, "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in Section 7
of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional
and, therefore, null and void.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[ GR No. 147678-87, Jul 07, 2004 ]

PEOPLE v. EFREN MATEO Y GARCIA +

DECISION

477 Phil. 752

VITUG, J.:

On 30 October 1996, ten (10) informations, one for each count of rape, allegedly committed on ten
different dates - 07 October 1995, 14 December 1995, 05 January 1996, 12 January 1996, 29 February
1996, 08 May 1996, 02 July 1996, 18 July 1996, 16 August 1996 and 28 August 1996 - were filed against
appellant EFREN MATEO. Except for the variance in dates, the ten informations, later docketed Criminal
Cases No. 9351 to No. 9360, inclusive, in the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, uniformly read -

"The undersigned OIC Provincial Prosecutor upon preliminary investigation conducted by the MTC,
Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1, accuses Efren Mateo of Brgy. Buenavista, Tarlac, Tarlac of the crime of Rape,
committed as follows:

"That on or about January 12, 1996, in the Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Efren Mateo y Garcia, who is the
guardian of the complaining witness, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by
means of force and intimidation have carnal knowledge with said Imelda C. Mateo in their house against
her consent."[1]

The trial ensued following a plea of "not guilty" entered by appellant to all the charges.

According to Imelda Mateo, she was born on 11 September 1980 to the spouses Dan Icban and
Rosemarie Capulong. Rosemarie Capulong and appellant started to live together without the benefit of
marriage when private complainant was only two years old. Imelda stayed with her mother and
appellant in a house in Buenavista, Tarlac, and adopted the surname of appellant when she started
schooling.

Imelda recalled that each time the ten rape incidents occurred her mother, Rosemarie, was not at
home. On 07 October 1995, the date of the first rape, Rosemarie went to Bamban and returned home
only the next day. The second rape was said to have occurred on 14 December 1995, while her mother
was attending a seminar for day-care workers. Imelda recalled the third rape to have been committed
on 05 January 1996, the same day her mother resigned from her job and left for Manila. The fourth
rape, she said, happened a week later, on 12 January 1996, when Rosemarie Capulong was attending
yet another seminar for day-care workers. The fifth incident was on 29 February 1996, when Rosemarie
left for Manila to follow-up her application for an overseas job. The sixth rape took place on 08 May
1996 when Rosemarie was once again in Manila to attend to her application papers. On 01 July 1996,
Rosemarie and appellant left for Manila as Rosemarie was scheduled to depart for Jeddah. Appellant
returned home in the evening of the next day, 02 July 1996, the same day the job recruiter relayed the
news that Rosemarie Capulong could not yet leave for Jeddah. During the night, appellant again
molested Imelda. With Rosemarie finally away, appellant frequented his nocturnal visits. On the night
of 18 July 1996, appellant went into her room and abused her while her siblings were sleeping in
the sala. The same incident was repeated on the night of 16 August 1996 when appellant, already
naked, entered the room and sexually assaulted Imelda. The last rape was committed on 28 August
1996. According to private complainant, she never reported any of the ten incidents to anybody
because the accused had threatened to kill her and her mother if she were to disclose the matter to
anyone.

Imelda stated that each of the ten rape incidents were committed in invariably the same fashion. All
were perpetrated inside the house in Buenavista, Tarlac, during the night and, each time, she would try
to ward off his advances by kicking him but that he proved to be too strong for her. These incidents
occurred in the presence of her three sleeping siblings who failed to wake up despite the struggles she
exerted to fend off the advances. She recalled that in all ten instances, appellant had covered her
mouth with a handkerchief to prevent her from shouting. Subsequently, however, she changed her
statement to say that on two occasions, particularly the alleged sexual assaults on 02 July 1996 and 18
July 1996, appellant had only covered her mouth with his hands. Still much later, Imelda testified that
he had not covered her mouth at all.

The predictable pattern of the rape incidents testified to by Imelda prompted the defense to ask her
whether she had, at any one time, taken any protective measure in anticipation of the rape
incidents. She replied that once she had requested her brothers and sister to keep her company in the
bedroom at night but appellant had scolded them. On the night of the fourth rape, she narrated that
she armed herself with a knife but, when appellant entered her room that night, she was not able to
retrieve the bladed weapon from under the bed as appellant was sitting right on top of it.

Dr. Rosario Fider, the second witness for the prosecution, stated that she had physically examined
private complainant on 14 October 1996 and found superficially healed lacerations at 3:00, 6:00 and
9:00 positions on her private organ that could have been caused by an insertion of an instrument or by
sexual intercourse. According to Dr. Fider, the lacerations pointed to possibly one or two, and at most
three, incidents of rape, which had happened not earlier than two weeks before the date of the physical
examination.

Appellant denied each of the charges. On 07 October 1995, the date of the first rape, he claimed that he
was in Barangay Talaga, Capas, to pick up newly hatched ducklings, numbering about a thousand, which
had to be properly fed, kept warm and constantly cared for that required him to be around the entire
day and night for two weeks. The fowls had then to be brought into an open field located one and a half
kilometers away which could be traversed by foot. He continued to tend to the animals from 20
October 1995 until sometime in February 1996. During the period, he was able to go home only once
a week or three times a month.

On 14 December 1995, the supposed date of the second rape, appellant admitted that he had
temporarily left the care of his ducks to go caroling with his wife, their daughter Imelda and some
friends. He immediately returned to care for his ducks, located some 500 meters from their residence,
that kept him busy and away from home when the third, fourth and fifth rape incidents were said to
have taken place on the 5th and 12th of January and 29th of February of 1996. While he admitted to
leaving occasionally the animals in order to go home, these visits, however, were said to be brief and
mainly for getting some food and fresh clothes. Appellant could not recall when exactly he sold the
ducks but it was definitely prior to 08 May 1996, the day he was accepted and reported for work at the
LA Construction of Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac, located some three kilometers away. On 08 May 1996, the
date of the sixth rape, he was at work from seven o'clock in the morning until the following day to finish
a rush job.

On 01 July 1996, he accompanied his wife, Rosemarie, to Manila who was scheduled to leave for Jeddah
the following day. Upon being advised that her flight was postponed, the couple stayed in the house of
one Luding Sevilla in Caloocan. On 03 July, he returned to Tarlac. From 15 July to September, 1996, he
was given the nightshift at the LA Construction. Appellant asserted that it was impossible for him to
have raped private complainant on 28 August 1996 because at six o'clock that evening, his friends Boy
Botio, Boy Pineda, Marvin Dalangin and Nelson Castro had picked him up at his house to attend
the fiesta at Barangay Murcia, Concepcion, Tarlac, where they spent the night.

Appellant dismissed the charges against him as being the malicious "retribution" of a vengeful
stepdaughter. Allegedly, on 11 October 1996, he took private complainant to task after his son, Marlon
Mateo, who had reported seeing her engaged in sexual intercourse with one Pikong Navarro inside the
room of their house. Earlier, on 05 August 1996, he also learned that Sharon Flores, a neighbor and a
friend of private complainant, had caught his stepdaughter and Navarro in a very compromising
position. In anger, he hit Imelda twice with a piece of bamboo. He then forbade her from going out at
night and leaving her siblings alone in the house.

Rosemarie Capulong, the mother of private complainant, rose to testify in defense of her common-law
husband. Capulong asserted that she had not at any time, prior to her departure for Jeddah, spent any
night outside their house. Rosemarie said that she was a day-care teacher from June 1990 until June
1996. On 07 October 1995, the date of the supposed first rape, she was at home and did not go to
Bamban as so claimed by private complainant. Capulong disputed the claim of private complainant that
she attended a seminar for day-care workers on 12 January 1996 since her job did not require her to
attend seminars except for regular meetings held on the last Friday of every month, with each meeting
lasting for only half a day. The last seminar she had attended was in June of 1990 in Tarlac. On 29
February 1996, Rosemarie was also certain that she spent the night at home as she had to report for
work the following day. She started obtaining documents for her planned employment abroad only on
12 February 1996, when she secured her birth certificate in Bamban as so attested by the date
appearing on the certification from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Bamban. On 08 May 1996, she
admitted being away from home while attending a general assembly of day-care workers in
Zambales. On that day, appellant was likewise not at home due to his overtime work up until about
three or four o'clock in the early morning. Imelda herself, Capulong testified, had attended on that
day the San Miguel fiesta. Contrary to the allegation of private complainant, the witness was not in
Manila on the 5th and 12th of January 1996 because, at that time, she had yet no plans of working
overseas. She denied the assertions of private complainant that Capulong had resigned from her day-
care work on 05 January 1996, saying it was actually months later, or in June of 1996, when she quit her
job. It was on 13 February 1996 when she went to Manila for the first time to attend to her application
for a possible overseas work. She made subsequent trips to the city, that is, on the 3rd, 5th, 8th and
24th of the month of June, to follow-up her employment papers and to submit herself to a medical
check-up. All these visits only took a day, and she would always be home in Buenavista at nightfall. On
01 July 1996, appellant accompanied her to Manila but, upon learning that her flight was postponed,
they spent the night in Caloocan. The couple stayed together in Manila until 03 July 1996, when
appellant decided to return to Tarlac. Rosemarie worked in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, until 11 November
1996 when she decided to return home.

Rosemarie Capulong corroborated the testimony of appellant regarding his whereabouts from October
1995, when the ducks were first brought to the field, until 15 December 1995, when appellant had
joined her and their friends caroling. Capulong believed that the charges may have been fabricated by
her relatives who were "jealous" of appellant because it was he, not they, who had been receiving the
remittances of her earnings from Saudi Arabia.

Sharon Flores, a neighbor, testified that, about noontime on 05 August 1996, she repaired to the house
of private complainant to investigate rumors regarding a man seen entering the Capulong
residence. When she went in, she saw private complainant and Pikong Navarro lying on the bed,
embracing each other under a blanket.

Anselmo Botio, a friend of appellant, and Marlon Mateo, a brother of private complainant, corroborated
appellant's alibi. Botio said that on 28 August 1996, at six o'clock in the evening, he, together with
appellant and some friends, went to attend the fiesta in BarangayMurcia upon the invitation of one
Ruben Santos. The group arrived in Murcia at seven o'clock that evening and promptly had dinner and a
drinking spree which lasted until the morning of the next day.

Marlon Mateo testified that one day in October 1996, while his mother was working overseas, he
arrived home from school, and saw Pikong Navarro and private complainant, both naked, on the
bed. Navarro was on top of private complainant and was making thrusting motions. Marlon Mateo
hurriedly left to report the incident to his father.

At the conclusion of the trial, the court a quo issued its decision, dated 23 January 2001, finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape -

"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape and to
indemnify the complainant the sum of P50,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages
for each count of rape."[2]

More often than not, the Court has deemed it sufficient to convict an accused for rape solely on the
basis of the testimony of the victim.[3]The heavy reliance normally given by the Court on the narration of
the victim finds justification on the fact that, generally, she would be the sole witness to the incident
and the shy and demure character of the typical Filipina would preclude her from fabricating that
crime. It is imperative, nonetheless, that the testimony must be convincing and straightforward in order
to avoid any serious doubt from being cast on the veracity of the account given.

Relative to the first supposed rape incident, private complainant categorically stated that she had slept
in the lone bedroom of the house while her siblings and her stepfather slept in the sala

"Q. How did (sic) he able to remove your t-shirt and shorts?

"A. He brought me to the sala and in that place when he undressed me, sir.

"x x x xxx xxx

"Q. How did (sic) he able to take you out from the room? In what way?

"A. She (sic) lifted me and still my mouth was covered, my hands were stocked and I

cannot move, sir.

"Q. She (sic) lifted you by his two hands, is that right?

"A. Yes, sir."[4]

"Q. You testified on direct examination that there is only one room in your house, is that

right?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. And you were then sleeping inside your house in that one room, is that right?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. While your brothers as well as your stepfather were then sleeping outside your

room, you [were] also sleeping, is that right?

"A. Yes, sir."[5]

In the next breath, however, she testified that all her three siblings were sleeping with her on the night
of 07 October 1995 -

"Q. How did (sic) he able to remove your t-shirt and shorts?

"A. He brought me to the sala and in that place when he undressed me, sir.
"Q. Do you want to tell this Honorable Court that he brought you to the sala where your

brothers Ryan and Marlon and your sister Iris were then sleeping?

"A. My brothers and sister were sleeping in the room, sir.

"Q. Is it not a fact that there was only one room in your house?

"A. But they slept there on that night, sir.

"Q. In other words, Madam Witness, you were sleeping together with Ryan, Marlon,

and Iris by that time in one room together in one bed?

"A. Yes, sir."[6]

Still, later, Imelda changed her testimony and said that her brothers were in the sala and that it was only
her sister Iris who was with her in the bedroom when the rape incidents were committed -

"Q. How about your brother Ryan where did he sleep on October 7, 1995?

"A. At the sala, sir.

"Q. Who was with him in the sala?

"A. He [was] sleeping with my stepfather and my brother Marlon, sir.

"Q. How about Iris, where was she sleeping?

"A. She was with me, sir.

"Q. You mean to imply to the Court that according to you the accused abused you on

October 7, 1995, Iris [was] with you in the room?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Are you sure of that?

"A. Yes, sir.

"x x x xxx xxx

"Q. You stated in your direct testimony that on October 7, 1995 your father entered

your room where you were sleeping, covering your mouth and forced you to go to the sala, do you recall
that statement?

"A. No, sir.

"Q. Do you not remember that you have testified that he was able to take you to the

sala?

"A. No, sir.

"Q. And then when you reached the sala, you stated that the accused criminally abused

you?

"A. No, sir.

"Q. Do you not remember having been asked by the prosecutor examining you, and

now I cite to you your statement; `Q - Public Prosecutor Llobrera, `Now, let us make it clear. You said
you were brought to the sala and your answer, `Yes, sir.''' Do you not remember having made that
statement?

"A. No, sir.

"Q. And another question, `When you reached the sala what were the first things he did

to you and your answer, `He kissed me, sir.'' Do you remember that?

"A. No, sir. The first time he abused me was in the room, sir."[7]

The Solicitor General would posit that the claim of private complainant that she had the sole privilege of
sleeping in the lone bedroom of their house while the rest of the family, namely both her parents and
her three siblings, had to squeeze themselves in the sala strained credulity, and that the testimony of
her mother, Rosemarie Capulong, to the effect that the couple were the occupants of the single
bedroom while their children stayed in the sala where the television was located, made more sense.

Imelda testified that her three siblings - Marlon, Ryan and Iris - were sleeping inside the house every
time the rape incidents were committed. The identical testimony of everyone else in the Mateo
household, including her mother Rosemarie Capulong and brother Marlon Mateo, exposed such
assertions to be a blatant lie and categorically stated that Ryan himself had never stayed in the Mateo
residence because he was living with his grandparents since childhood.

Private complainant testified that during the rape incidents she was gagged with a handkerchief which
rendered her unable to shout for help. Later on, however, she gave different versions on whether
appellant covered her mouth with his hand or with a handkerchief during the rape incidents occurring
on 07 October 1995, 05 January 1996, 12 January 1996, 18 July 1996, 16 August 1996 and 28 August
1996. Eventually, she repudiated her earlier testimony by stating that appellant had never covered her
mouth, either with a handkerchief or with his hand -

"Q. Both the incidents of July 2 and July 18, according to you, he only covered your

mouth on both occasions?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. He did not tie your mouth with anything?

"A. No, sir.

"Q. Miss Witness, in your statement also on August 20, 1997, you stated that the

accused covered your mouth and tied your mouth with a handkerchief on both occasions. Do you
remember having given that statement?

"A. No, sir.

"Q. So, you do not remember having made that statement?

"A. No, sir.

"Q. Recalling your testimony you gave on August 20, 1997, for the July 2 occasion and

the testimony that you gave as appearing on page 18 of the transcript of stenographic notes. These
questions and answers were given and answered by you. `Q. While he was doing all these things to
you, did you call for help? A. I cannot shout because my mouth was covered with a handkerchief,
sir. Q. Was he holding that handkerchief? A. It was tied, sir.' On July 17, 1997, you said that the
accused tied your mouth on July 2, 1996, and you said that you cannot shout because your mouth was
tied with a handkerchief. Do you remember having stated that?

"A. No, sir.

"x x x xxx xxx

"Q. On the July 18 occasion, you also stated in your direct testimony on August 29,

1997, when asked these following questions appearing on page 21 of the transcript of stenographic
notes. `Q. Tell the Court how did he rape you on that night? A. On that night while I was sleeping in my
room, he tied a handkerchief in my mouth so I could not shout, sir.' Do you remember having stated
that?

"A. No, sir.

"Q. And also you were asked this question: `Q. After tying this handkerchief to your

mouth, what did he do to you?' You said that he raped you. Do you remember having given this
statement?

"A. No, sir."[8]

Also quite telling were some discrepancies in the testimony of private complainant regarding the
whereabouts of her mother Rosemarie Capulong on the dates of the incidents. According to private
complainant, it was when her mother Rosemarie was not at home when appellant would commit the
dastardly crimes. Not only did the account of Imelda contradict that of Rosemarie but that Imelda
herself would appear to have made irreconcilable statements. According to her, on 07 October 1995,
the date of the first rape, Rosemarie had gone to Bamban to visit her mother. Subsequently, however,
she said that Rosemarie went to Bamban because she worked there, only to later say that, at that time,
Rosemarie had already resigned from work. Imelda would further change her story by stating that
Rosemarie Capulong did not report for work that day; then, in a quick turnaround, she remarked that
her mother did go to Bamban not to work but to get her birth certificate. Interestingly, Imelda said that
07 October 1995 was a working day, and that she had gone to school the following day. Judicial notice
could be taken of the fact, however, that 07 October 1995 was a Saturday and that the following day, a
Sunday, could not have been a school day. With respect to the rape committed on 12 January 1996,
Imelda testified that Rosemarie was attending a seminar; yet, when cross-examined, she told the trial
court that on that day Rosemarie went to Manila to borrow money from her cousin.

The subsequent conduct of a victim could also either confirm or negate her claim of rape.[9] The human
nature, characterized by an instinct for self-preservation and an aversion to humiliation, would dictate
that a typical victim of rape could display changes in behavior, erratic mood swings and an alteration in
her daily routine. No such changes were observed in the case of private complainant. She testified that
on the day after the first incident on 07 October 1995, she woke up at six o'clock in the morning, washed
her face, and went to school. There was no apparent attempt on her part to run away from home
despite every chance to escape from her tormentor or to exercise every means available to ensure that
the incidents would not be repeated. At fifteen years old, already old enough to think of her safety and
well-being, Imelda Mateo went about her usual business as if nothing unusual had occurred. She
continued to sleep in the same bedroom with nary any precaution against the bestiality she was sure
would come everytime her mother was away.
While it may be argued that appellant's moral ascendancy over Imelda was enough to intimidate her to
suffer in silence; still, it could well be improbable for a victim who had been raped no less than ten times
not to make a simple outcry against her unarmed rapist when she had every opportunity to do so.

The Solicitor General assails the factual findings of the trial court and recommends an acquittal of
appellant.

The records would disclose that the first half of the trial, from 17 July 1997 until 15 October 1997, was
conducted by Judge Lino L. Diamsay. Judge Edgardo F. Sundiam conducted the trial from 14 January
1999 until 24 February 1999. From 11 May 1999 until the day of the last hearing, it was Judge Arsenio P.
Adriano who heard the case. While this change of the presiding judges would not invalidate the
proceedings, it did deny to the deciding magistrate the opportunity to observe in entirety the demeanor
of the witnesses which could well be vital to the decision-making process, particularly where credibility
would, by and large, constitute the singular issue.

The law demands that only proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt can justify a verdict of guilt.

Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in
which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving
offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the
more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is
imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution

Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

"(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

"x x x xxx xxx

"(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher."

The same constitutional article has evidently been a thesis for Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659,[10] as well as procedural rules contained in Section 3 of
Rule 122,[11] Section 10 of Rule 122,[12] Section 13 of Rule 124[13]and Section 3 of Rule 125[14] of the Rules
of Court. It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character,
and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an
intermediate appeal or review in favor of the accused.

In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence
of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the
evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal
from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed,
the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and appreciation of
primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet,
it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual issues.

While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed
an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in
these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where
life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded
an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by
the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of
judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances
so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme
Court for its final disposition.[15]

Statistics would disclose that within the eleven-year period since the re-imposition of the death penalty
law in 1993 until June 2004, the trial courts have imposed capital punishment in approximately
1,493,[16] out of which 907 cases[17] have been passed upon in review by the Court. In the Supreme
Court, where these staggering numbers find their way on automatic review, the penalty has been
affirmed in only 230 cases comprising but 25.36% of the total number. Significantly, in more than half or
64.61% of the cases, the judgment has been modified through an order of remand for further
proceedings, by the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or by a reduction of the
sentence. Indeed, the reduction by the Court of the death penalty to reclusion perpetua has been made
in no less than 483 cases or 53.25% of the total number. The Court has also rendered a judgment of
acquittal in sixty-five (65) cases. In sum, the cases where the judgment of death has either been
modified or vacated consist of an astounding 71.77% of the total of death penalty cases directly
elevated before the Court on automatic review that translates to a total of six hundred fifty-one (651)
out of nine hundred seven (907) appellants saved from lethal injection.

Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally vested in the
Supreme Court -

Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

"(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts."

Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making prerogative of the
Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress. The rule here announced additionally allowing
an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case is
elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review, is such a procedural matter.

Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and Section
10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar as they provide
for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the Supreme
Court en banc, dated 19 September 1995, in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court" in cases similarly
involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified accordingly.

WHEREFORE, the instant case is REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be
FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition, consistent with the
discussions hereinabove set forth. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 DIVISION

[ GR No. 81381, Sep 30, 1988 ]

EFIGENIO S. DAMASCO v. JUDGE HILARIO L. LAQUI +

RESOLUTION

248 Phil. 455

PADILLA, J.:

In an Information dated 11 September 1987, but filed only on 17 September 1987 with the Municipal
Trial Court of Mandaluyong, Branch 59, presided over by respondent Judge Hilario L. Laqui, petitioner
Atty. Efigenio S. Damasco was charged with the crime of grave threats committed as follows:

"That on or about the 8th day of July 1987, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously threaten one Rafael K. Sumadohat, with the infliction
upon his person of a wrong amounting to a crime, that is, by then and there uttering the following
remarks, to wit:

'BAKIT MO AKO GINAGANITO? MAGBABAYAD KA. . . . PAPATAYIN KITA. . . MAYROON AKONG BARIL,
BABARILIN KITA, TAGADIYAN LANG AKO.'" (Rollo, p. 13)

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. After trial, respondent Judge found that the evidence
presented did not establish the crime of grave threats but only of light threats. As a result, petitioner
was convicted of the latter crime and was sentenced to pay a fine of P100.00 and the costs.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Rectify and Set Aside the dispositive part of respondent
Judge's decision, contending that he cannot be convicted of light threats, necessarily included in grave
threats charged in the information, as the lighter offense had already prescribed when the information
was filed. Petitioner states that the crime was committed on 8 July 1987 and the information was filed
only on 17 September 1987 or after the lapse of 71 days. (Incidentally, the affidavit/complaint was filed
with the Fiscal's Office only on 7 September 1987, or after the lapse of 61 days from 8 July 1987.[1]) Upon
the other hand, the crime of light threats, which is a light offense, prescribes in two (2) months[2] which
means sixty (60) days.[3]

In denying petitioner's motion, the lower court held that:

"Just to disabuse the mind of the movant, let it be said that the Court is fully aware of the respective
date of the commission of the offense and of the filing of the information. The Court holds on to the
principle that the allegation in the information confers jurisdiction and that jurisdiction once acquired
cannot be lost.
"Thus, since the Court acquired jurisdiction to try the case because the information was filed within the
prescriptive period for the crime charged, which is Grave Threats, the same cannot be lost by
prescription, if after trial what has been proven is merely light threats."[4]

The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, recommends that the petition be given due course,
stating that:

"Respondent Judge denied the 'Motion to Rectify and Set Aside the Dispositive Portion of the Decision'
apparently with the misimpression that what was being questioned was the court's jurisdiction over the
offense charged, ratiocinating that jurisdiction, once acquired, cannot be lost. But such is not the case.
True, the allegations in the Information confer jurisdiction upon the courts, and once acquired, such
jurisdiction cannot be lost. However, this principle is not applicable in the case at bar. The jurisdiction of
the lower court over the crime was never questioned. Rather, the legal dispute lies in whether or not it
was proper for respondent Judge to still convict petitioner after finding him quilty of the lesser offense
of light threats but which has already prescribed. Verily, the query should be answered in the negative
for reasons heretofore discussed."[5]

In the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals,[6] the Court held that where an accused has been found to
have committed a lesser offense includible within the graver offense charged, he cannot be convicted of
the lesser offense if it has already prescribed. To hold otherwise, according to the Court, would be to
sanction a circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accussing the defendant
of the graver offense.

Incidentally, in the case of Felino Reyes vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court and People of the
Philippines,[7] a Memorandum prepared by this ponente for the Court, entitled "An Examination of the
Rule Which Holds That One Cannot Be Convicted Of A Lesser Offense Includible Within a Greater
Offense, Where Prosecution For The Latter Was Commenced After Expiration Of Limitations Applicable
To The Lesser Offense", discusses a possible attempt to depart from the rule laid down in Francisco vs.
CA,[8] by invoking the principle of presumption of regularity in the performance of official acts and
duties, and by interpreting the phrase "prescription of a crime or offense" as merely "a bar to the
commencement of a criminal action."[9]

However, Philippine jurisprudence considers prescription of a crime or offense as a loss or waiver by the
State of its right to prosecute an act prohibited and punished by law.[10] Hence, while it is the rule that
an accused who fails to move to quash before pleading, is deemed to waive all objections which are
grounds of a motion to quash, yet, this rule cannot apply to the defense of prescription, which under
Art. 69 of the Revised Penal Code extinguishes criminal liability. To apply the suggestion in the aforecited
memorandum could contravene said Article 89, which is a part of substantive law.[11] This position is
further strengthened by Sec. 8, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which added extinction of
offense as one of the exceptions to the general rule regarding the effects of a failure to assert a ground
of a motion to quash.

Thus, as suggested by the cited memorandum, a departure from the ruling in Francisco vs. CA,[12] can be
done only "through an overhaul of some existing rules on criminal procedure to give prescription a
limited meaning, i.e., a mere bar to the commencement of a criminal action and therefore,
waivable."[13] But this will have to contend with the Constitutional provision that while the Supreme
Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and the legal assistance to the underprivileged, such rules shall not however diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights.[14]

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision is SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
 ECOND DIVISION

BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS G.R. No. 165922

MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE
(BAMARVEMPCO), represented by Present:
RECTO INSO, Operations Manager,
Petitioner, CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
- versus - ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.

HON. ILUMINADA CABATO-CORTES,

Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Promulgated:
Baguio City,
Respondent. ____________________
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

For review[1] are the Orders[2] of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City finding petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose
Cooperative liable for payment of foreclosure fees.

The Facts

Petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (petitioner) is a

credit cooperative organized under Republic Act No. 6938 (RA 6938), or the
Cooperative Code of the Philippines.[3] Article 62(6) of RA 6938 exempts
cooperatives:

from the payment of all court and sheriff's fees payable to the Philippine
Government for and in connection with all actions brought under this
Code, or where such action is brought by the Cooperative Development
Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of obligations
contracted in favor of the cooperative.[4]

In 2004, petitioner, as mortgagee, filed with the Clerk of Court of the

Regional Trial Court of Baguio City (trial court) a petition to extrajudicially foreclose
a mortgage under Act 3135, as amended.[5] Under Section 7(c) of Rule 141, as
amended,[6] petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure are subject to legal fees based on
the value of the mortgagees claim. Invoking Article 62 (6) of RA 6938, petitioner
sought exemption from payment of the fees.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 30 August 2004, Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes

(respondent), Executive Judge of the trial court, denied the request for exemption,
citing Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended, exempting from
the Rules coverage only the Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and certain suits of local government units.[7]
Petitioner sought reconsideration but respondent denied its motion in the
Order dated 6 October 2004. This time, respondent reasoned that petitioners
reliance on Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is misplaced because the fees collected under
Rule 141 are not fees payable to the Philippine Government as they do not accrue
to the National Treasury but to a special fund[8] under the Courts control.[9]
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner maintains that the case calls for nothing more than a simple
application of Article 62(6) of RA 6938.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Manifestation (in lieu of Comment),
joins causes with petitioner. The OSG submits that as the substantive rule, Article
62(6) of RA 6938 prevails over Section 22 of Rule 141, a judicial rule of procedure.
The OSG also takes issue with respondents finding that the legal fees collected
under Rule 141 are not fees payable to the Philippine Government as the judiciary
forms part of the Philippine government, as defined under the Revised
Administrative Code.[10]
Although not a party to this suit, we required the Courts Office of the Chief Attorney
(OCAT) to comment on the petition, involving as it does, issues relating to the
Courts power to promulgate judicial rules. In its compliance, the OCAT
recommends the denial of the petition, opining that Section 22, Rule 141, as
amended, prevails over Article 62(6) of RA 6938 because (1) the power to impose
judicial fees is eminently judicial and (2) the 1987 Constitution insulated the Courts
rule-making powers from Congress interference by omitting in the 1987
Constitution the provision in the 1973 Constitution allowing Congress to alter
judicial rules. The OCAT called attention to the Courts previous denial of a request
by a cooperative group for the issuance of guidelines to implement cooperatives
fees exemption under Article 62(6) of RA 6938.[11] Lastly, the OCAT recommends
the amendment of Section 22, Rule 141 to make explicit the non-exemption of
cooperatives from the payment of legal fees.
The Issue

The question is whether petitioners application for extrajudicial foreclosure is

exempt from legal fees under Article 62(6) of RA 6938.

The Ruling of the Court

We hold that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 does not apply to petitioners foreclosure
proceeding.
Petitions for Extrajudicial Foreclosure
Outside of the Ambit of Article 62(6) of RA 6938

The scope of the legal fees exemption Article 62(6) of RA 6938 grants to
cooperatives is limited to two types of actions, namely: (1) actions brought under
RA 6938; and (2) actions brought by the Cooperative Development Authority to
enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of cooperatives. By simple
deduction, it is immediately apparent that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority
for petitioner to claim exemption from the payment of legal fees in thisproceeding
because first, the fees imposable on petitioner do not pertain to an action brought
under RA 6938 but to a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act
3135. Second, petitioner is not the Cooperative Development Authority which can
claim exemption only in actions to enforce payments of obligations on behalf of
cooperatives.

The Power of the Legislature

vis a vis the Power of the Supreme Court
to Enact Judicial Rules

Our holding above suffices to dispose of this petition. However, the Court En
Banc has recently ruled in Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the
Government Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees[12] on the issue
of legislative exemptions from court fees. We take the opportunity to reiterate our
En Banc ruling in GSIS.

Until the 1987 Constitution took effect, our two previous

constitutions textualized a power sharing scheme between the legislature and this
Court in the enactment of judicial rules. Thus, both the 1935[13] and the
1973[14] Constitutions vested on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law. However, these constitutions also granted to the legislature the
concurrent power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules.[15]

The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the
previous charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress subsidiary and
corrective power.[16] This glaring and fundamental omission led the Court to
observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice[17] that this Courts power to promulgate
judicial rules is no longer shared by this Court with Congress:
 The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more
independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making
power of this Court [under] Section 5(5), Article VIII[18] x x x .

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for
the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine,
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no
longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x
x x x (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)

Any lingering doubt on the import of the textual evolution of Section 5(5)
should be put to rest with our recent En Banc ruling denying a request by the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for exemption from payment of legal
fees based on Section 39 of its Charter, Republic Act No. 8291, exempting GSIS from
all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or dues of all kinds.[19] Reaffirming Echegarays
construction of Section 5(5), the Court described its exclusive power to promulgate
rules on pleading, practice and procedure as one of the safeguards of this Courts
institutional independence:

[T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules

promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure,
it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of
the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence, the power
to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts
exclusive domain.[20] x x x (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Orders dated 30 August 2004
and 6 October 2004 of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 149453. April 1, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,

DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUO, STATE
PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND
ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and
CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO
ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.

RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the[1]

Resolution dated May 28, 2002, remanding this case to the Regional Trial
[2]

Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81, for the determination of several factual
issues relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689 filed against the respondent and his co-accused with the said
court. In the aforesaid criminal cases, the respondent and his co-accused were
charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male persons
identified as Manuel Montero, a former Corporal of the Philippine Army,
Rolando Siplon, Sherwin Abalora, who was 16 years old, Ray Abalora, who was
19 years old, Joel Amora, Jevy Redillas, Meleubren Sorronda, who was 14
years old, Pacifico Montero, Jr., of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the Philippine
[3]

Army, Welbor Elcamel, SPO1 Carlito Alap-ap of the Zamboanga PNP, and Alex
Neri, former Corporal of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army,
bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The respondent opposed
petitioners motion for reconsideration.[4]

The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the

provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were
with the express consent of the respondent as he himself moved for said
provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial determination of
probable cause and for examination of witnesses. The Court also held therein
that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the
requirements for its application are attendant. The trial court was thus directed
to resolve the following:

... (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the
accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party; (3)
whether the 2-year period to revive it has already lapsed; (4) whether there is any
justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period; (5) whether notices to
the offended parties were given before the cases of respondent Lacson were dismissed
by then Judge Agnir; (6) whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by the
relatives of the three (3) other victims; (7) whether the multiple murder cases against
respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar.

The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-year bar had to be
first determined whether it shall be from the date of the order of then Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases, or from the dates of receipt thereof by the
various offended parties, or from the date of effectivity of the new
rule. According to the Court, if the cases were revived only after the two-year
bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with
the said time-bar. It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize
the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in
court. However, the State is not precluded from presenting compelling reasons
to justify the revival of cases beyond the two-year bar.
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that
(a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not
applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-
bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively.
The Court shall resolve the issues seriatim.

I. SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-99-81679
TO Q-99-81689.
The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-
99-81689 because the essential requirements for its application were not
present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of March 29,
1999. Disagreeing with the ruling of the Court, the petitioners maintain that the
respondent did not give his express consent to the dismissal by Judge Agnir,
Jr., of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The respondent
allegedly admitted in his pleadings filed with the Court of Appeals and during
the hearing thereat that he did not file any motion to dismiss said cases, or even
agree to a provisional dismissal thereof. Moreover, the heirs of the victims were
allegedly not given prior notices of the dismissal of the said cases by Judge
Agnir, Jr.According to the petitioners, the respondents express consent to the
provisional dismissal of the cases and the notice to all the heirs of the victims
of the respondents motion and the hearing thereon are conditions sine qua
non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule.
The petitioners further submit that it is not necessary that the case be
remanded to the RTC to determine whether private complainants were notified
of the March 22, 1999 hearing on the respondents motion for judicial
determination of the existence of probable cause. The records allegedly
indicate clearly that only the handling city prosecutor was furnished a copy of
the notice of hearing on said motion. There is allegedly no evidence that private
prosecutor Atty. Godwin Valdez was properly retained and authorized by all the
private complainants to represent them at said hearing. It is their contention that
Atty. Valdez merely identified the purported affidavits of desistance and that he
did not confirm the truth of the allegations therein.
The respondent, on the other hand, insists that, as found by the Court in its
Resolution and Judge Agnir, Jr. in his resolution, the respondent himself moved
for the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases. He cites the resolution of
Judge Agnir, Jr. stating that the respondent and the other accused filed
separate but identical motions for the dismissal of the criminal cases should the
trial court find no probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against
them.
The respondent further asserts that the heirs of the victims, through the
public and private prosecutors, were duly notified of said motion and the hearing
thereof. He contends that it was sufficient that the public prosecutor was
present during the March 22, 1999 hearing on the motion for judicial
determination of the existence of probable cause because criminal actions are
always prosecuted in the name of the People, and the private complainants
merely prosecute the civil aspect thereof.
The Court has reviewed the records and has found the contention of the
petitioners meritorious.
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with
the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six

(6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal
shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived.

Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and

before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the
essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely:

1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves
for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the
accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case;

2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;

3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;

4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of
the case.

The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application
of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for
the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional
dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the
revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same
offense or for an offense necessarily included therein. [5]

Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of
dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without
the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that
the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the
order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the
prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public
[6]

prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served

with a copy of the order of dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in
writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or
implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on the motion of
[7]

a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my

conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a
provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or silence of the accused
[8]
to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to object to a
[9]

provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent.

[10]

A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express

consent to such provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally
[11]

dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived
only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal
case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or
over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or
refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused
to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or
[12]

refiling is barred by the statute of limitations. [13]

The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the
refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same
offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need of
a new preliminary investigation. However, in a case wherein after the
[14]

provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the

prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have
died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have
emerged, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted before an
[15]

Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary

investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons
are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily
included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has
been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the
accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The
accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and
evidence. After all, the fiscal is not called by the Rules of Court to wait in
ambush; the role of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute but essentially to do
justice to every man and to assist the court in dispensing that justice.[16]

In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second
requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir,
Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the
prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said
criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses
alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the decision of
this Court in Allado v. Diokno, among other cases, there was a need for the
[17]

trial court to conduct a personal determination of probable cause for the

issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent and to have the prosecutions
witnesses summoned before the court for its examination. The respondent
contended therein that until after the trial court shall have personally determined
the presence of probable cause, no warrant of arrest should be issued against
the respondent and if one had already been issued, the warrant should be
recalled by the trial court. He then prayed therein that:

1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the

Constitution be conducted by this Honorable Court, and for this purpose, an order be
issued directing the prosecution to present the private complainants and their
witnesses at a hearing scheduled therefor; and

2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in
the meantime until the resolution of this incident.

Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for. [18]

The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever agree,
impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases. In fact, in
his reply filed with the Court of Appeals, respondent emphasized that:

... An examination of the Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and for
Examination of Prosecution Witnesses filed by the petitioner and his other co-accused
in the said criminal cases would show that the petitioner did not pray for the dismissal
of the case. On the contrary, the reliefs prayed for therein by the petitioner are: (1) a
judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution; and (2) that warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or if
issued, recalled in the meantime until the resolution of the motion. It cannot be said,
therefore, that the dismissal of the case was made with the consent of the petitioner. A
copy of the aforesaid motion is hereto attached and made integral part hereof as
Annex A. [19]

During the hearing in the Court of Appeals on July 31, 2001, the respondent,
through counsel, categorically, unequivocally, and definitely declared that he
did not file any motion to dismiss the criminal cases nor did he agree to a
provisional dismissal thereof, thus:
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was provisional in nature?
ATTY. FORTUN:
It was in (sic) that the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted at the onset
was simply a judicial determination of probable cause for warrants of arrest
issued.Then Judge Agnir, upon the presentation by the parties of their witnesses,
 particularly those who had withdrawn their affidavits, made one further conclusion
that not only was this case lacking in probable cause for purposes of the issuance
of an arrest warrant but also it did not justify proceeding to trial.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be provisionally
dismissed except when it is with the express conformity of the accused.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And with notice to the offended party.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any order, or any
statement, which would normally be required by the Court on pre-trial or on
other matters, including other provisional dismissal. My very limited practice
in criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught me that a judge must be very careful on
this matter of provisional dismissal. In fact they ask the accused to come forward,
and the judge himself or herself explains the implications of a provisional
dismissal. Pumapayag ka ba dito. Puwede bang pumirma ka?
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You were present during the proceedings?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You represented the petitioner in this case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort which the good
Judge Agnir, who is most knowledgeable in criminal law, had done in respect
of provisional dismissal or the matter of Mr. Lacson agreeing to the
provisional dismissal of the case.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion for a judicial
determination of probable cause?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there is no probable cause
what should the Court do?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only prayer that we
asked. In fact, I have a copy of that particular motion, and if I may read my prayer
before the Court, it said: Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial
determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution
be conducted, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to
present the private complainants and their witnesses at the scheduled hearing for
that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or, if
issued, recalled in the meantime until resolution of this incident.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
There is no general prayer for any further relief?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Dont you surmise Judge Agnir, now a member of this Court, precisely addressed your
prayer for just and equitable relief to dismiss the case because what would be the
net effect of a situation where there is no warrant of arrest being issued without
dismissing the case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice, but what is
plain is we did not agree to the provisional dismissal, neither were we asked
to sign any assent to the provisional dismissal.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal did you not file any motion for
reconsideration of the order of Judge Agnir that the case should be dismissed?
ATTY. FORTUN:
I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that my client had
already been arraigned, and the arraignment was valid as far as I was
concerned. So, the dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir operated to
benefit me, and therefore I did not take any further step in addition to rocking
the boat or clarifying the matter further because it probably could prejudice
the interest of my client.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Continue.[20]
 In his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of
Appeals, the respondent declared in no uncertain terms that:

Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the

Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the cases. The records were remanded to the
QC RTC: Upon raffle, the case was assigned to Branch 81. Petitioner and the others
promptly filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause (Annex B). He
asked that warrants for his arrest not be issued. He did not move for the dismissal of
the Informations, contrary to respondent OSGs claim. [21]

The respondents admissions made in the course of the proceedings in the

Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive on him. The respondent is barred
from repudiating his admissions absent evidence of palpable mistake in making
such admissions. [22]

To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689

would be to add to or make exceptions from the new rule which are not
expressly or impliedly included therein. This the Court cannot and should not
do.[23]

The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any
motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-
99-81689 or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at
least three days before said hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private
interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties or the heirs of
the victims must be given adequate a priorinotice of any motion for the
provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the
offended party or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there
is one, or through the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the
offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him before
the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The proof of such service
must be shown during the hearing on the motion, otherwise, the requirement of
the new rule will become illusory. Such notice will enable the offended party or
the heirs of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment
on or object to the motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between
the prosecution and the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case
thereby depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to make
witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with the
consequent release of the accused from detention would enable him to threaten
and kill the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or flee from
Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction or loss of the
prosecutions physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of the
offended party to recover on the civil liability of the accused by his concealment
or furtive disposition of his property or the consequent lifting of the writ of
preliminary attachment against his property.
In the case at bar, even if the respondents motion for a determination of
probable cause and examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce
as his motion for a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689, however, the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior to
the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. It must be stressed that the
respondent filed his motion only on March 17, 1999 and set it for hearing on
March 22, 1999 or barely five days from the filing thereof. Although the public
prosecutor was served with a copy of the motion, the records do not show that
notices thereof were separately given to the heirs of the victims or that
subpoenae were issued to and received by them, including those who executed
their affidavits of desistance who were residents of Dipolog City or Pian,
Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon, Leyte. There is as well no proof in the
[24]

records that the public prosecutor notified the heirs of the victims of said motion
or of the hearing thereof on March 22, 1999. Although Atty. Valdez entered his
appearance as private prosecutor, he did so only for some but not all the close
[25]

kins of the victims, namely, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda Montero, Margarita Redillas,
Rufino Siplon, Carmelita Elcamel, Myrna Abalora, and Leonora Amora who
(except for Rufino Siplon) executed their respective affidavits of
[26]

desistance. There was no appearance for the heirs of Alex Neri, Pacifico
[27]

Montero, Jr., and Meleubren Sorronda. There is no proof on record that all the
heirs of the victims were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the said cases. In fine, there never was any attempt on the part of
the trial court, the public prosecutor and/or the private prosecutor to notify all
the heirs of the victims of the respondents motion and the hearing thereon and
of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing said cases. The said heirs were
thus deprived of their right to be heard on the respondents motion and to protect
their interests either in the trial court or in the appellate court.
Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were
not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred
by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new Informations for
multiple murder against the respondent.
II. THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY.
 The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent
expressly consented to a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 and all the heirs of the victims were notified of the
respondents motion before the hearing thereon and were served with copies of
the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year bar
in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be
applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply the time
limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-
accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair,
reduce, and diminish the States substantive right to prosecute the accused for
multiple murder. They posit that under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code,
the State had twenty years within which to file the criminal complaints against
the accused. However, under the new rule, the State only had two years from
notice of the public prosecutor of the order of dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 within which to revive the said cases. When the new
rule took effect on December 1, 2000, the State only had one year and three
months within which to revive the cases or refile the Informations. The period
for the State to charge respondent for multiple murder under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code was considerably and arbitrarily reduced. They submit that
in case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code and the new rule, the former
should prevail. They also insist that the State had consistently relied on the
prescriptive periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. It was not
accorded a fair warning that it would forever be barred beyond the two-year
period by a retroactive application of the new rule. Petitioners thus pray to the
[28]

Court to set aside its Resolution of May 28, 2002.

For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be applied
retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State that may be impaired
by its application to the criminal cases in question since [t]he States witnesses
were ready, willing and able to provide their testimony but the prosecution failed
to act on these cases until it became politically expedient in April 2001 for them
to do so. According to the respondent, penal laws, either procedural or
[29]

substantive, may be retroactively applied so long as they favor the

accused. He asserts that the two-year period commenced to run on March 29,
[30]

1999 and lapsed two years thereafter was more than reasonable opportunity
for the State to fairly indict him. In any event, the State is given the right under
[31]

the Courts assailed Resolution to justify the filing of the Information in Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the time-bar under the new rule.
The respondent insists that Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure does not broaden the substantive right of double jeopardy
to the prejudice of the State because the prohibition against the revival of the
cases within the one-year or two-year periods provided therein is a legal
concept distinct from the prohibition against the revival of a provisionally
dismissed case within the periods stated in Section 8 of Rule 117. Moreover,
he claims that the effects of a provisional dismissal under said rule do not modify
or negate the operation of the prescriptive period under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code. Prescription under the Revised Penal Code simply becomes
irrelevant upon the application of Section 8, Rule 117 because a complaint or
information has already been filed against the accused, which filing tolls the
running of the prescriptive period under Article 90. [32]

The Court agrees with the respondent that the new rule is not a statute of
limitations. Statutes of limitations are construed as acts of grace, and a
surrender by the sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at
its discretion. Such statutes are considered as equivalent to acts of amnesty
founded on the liberal theory that prosecutions should not be allowed to ferment
endlessly in the files of the government to explode only after witnesses and
proofs necessary for the protection of the accused have by sheer lapse of time
passed beyond availability. The periods fixed under such statutes are
[33]

jurisdictional and are essential elements of the offenses covered. [34]

On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a
special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making
the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that
the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to
prosecute the accused. [35]

The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article
90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law. It is but a limitation of the
[36]

right of the State to revive a criminal case against the accused after the
Information had been filed but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the
express consent of the accused.Upon the lapse of the timeline under the new
rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its
right to revive the case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal
becomes ipso facto permanent. He can no longer be charged anew for the
same crime or another crime necessarily included therein. He is spared from
[37]

the anguish and anxiety as well as the expenses in any new indictments. The [38]

State may revive a criminal case beyond the one-year or two-year periods
provided that there is a justifiable necessity for the delay. By the same token,
[39]

if a criminal case is dismissed on motion of the accused because the trial is not
concluded within the period therefor, the prescriptive periods under the Revised
Penal Code are not thereby diminished. But whether or not the prosecution of
[40]

the accused is barred by the statute of limitations or by the lapse of the time-
line under the new rule, the effect is basically the same. As the State Supreme
Court of Illinois held:

This, in effect, enacts that when the specified period shall have arrived, the right of the
state to prosecute shall be gone, and the liability of the offender to be punishedto be
deprived of his libertyshall cease. Its terms not only strike down the right of action
which the state had acquired by the offense, but also remove the flaw which the crime
had created in the offenders title to liberty. In this respect, its language goes deeper
than statutes barring civil remedies usually do. They expressly take away only the
remedy by suit, and that inferentially is held to abate the right which such remedy
would enforce, and perfect the title which such remedy would invade; but this statute
is aimed directly at the very right which the state has against the offenderthe right to
punish, as the only liability which the offender has incurred, and declares that this
right and this liability are at an end. [41]

The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied
retroactively. As applied to criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates
the steps by which one who has committed a crime is to be punished. In Tan,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that:
[42]

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to

actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive
application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable.The reason is that as a
general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been
held that a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot
insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other
than the existing rules of procedure.

It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively
if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due
process or impair the independence of the Court. In a per curiam decision
in Cipriano v. City of Houma, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
[43]

where a decision of the court would produce substantial inequitable results if

applied retroactively, there is ample basis for avoiding the injustice of hardship
by a holding of nonretroactivity. A construction of which a statute is fairly
[44]

susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,

indefensible, wrongful, and injurious consequences. This Court should not
[45]

adopt an interpretation of a statute which produces absurd, unreasonable,

unjust, or oppressive results if such interpretation could be avoided. Time and
[46]

again, this Court has decreed that statutes are to be construed in light of the
purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. In construing a
statute, the reason for the enactment should be kept in mind and the statute
should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. [47]

Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed

to enhance and implement the constitutional rights of parties in criminal
proceedings may be applied retroactively or prospectively depending upon
several factors, such as the history of the new rule, its purpose and effect, and
whether the retrospective application will further its operation, the particular
conduct sought to be remedied and the effect thereon in the administration of
justice and of criminal laws in particular. In a per curiam decision in Stefano v.
[48]

Woods, the United States Supreme Court catalogued the factors in

[49]

determining whether a new rule or doctrine enunciated by the High Court should
be given retrospective or prospective effect:

(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law
enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration
of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.

In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two
years under the new rule should not be applied retroactively against the State.
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a
time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to
the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable
compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However,
in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the
accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum
prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights
of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that
the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally
dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended
parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown
that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial
of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency
[50]

of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the
Rules and approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the
administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to due process of the
State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts of
provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or
the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a
specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were
times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes
beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy
or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State
and the accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to
expedite criminal proceedings. [51]

It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it

usually operates in his favor, especially if he greatly fears the consequences
[52]

of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which
dominant cases have been known to expire. [53]

The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or
reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or
nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may have been
lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have faded. Passage of
time makes proof of any fact more difficult. The accused may become a
[54]

fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time from
the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove
the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal
case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be
revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the
accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy
and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life
because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer
those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of
innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with
[55]

the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend
himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system. [56]

The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise
that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of
the State and the accused; not for the accused only.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively
so that the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the
public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new
rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed
cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March
29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied
the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three
months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The
period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new rule. On the other
hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two years
from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the
cases.This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the
time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd,
unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration
of justice.
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in
the computation of the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not
yet in effect at the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the
time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the State waived its right to revive the
criminal cases against respondent or that it was negligent for not reviving them
within the two-year period under the new rule. As the United States Supreme
Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People: [57]

We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the
law and, therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights .

The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State
and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate
retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the
accused. For to do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the State and
adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of criminal laws in
particular.
To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua
non to the revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of
the accused before the effective date of the new rule is to assume that the State
is obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new rule before it took
effect. This would be a rank denial of justice. The State must be given a period
of one year or two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive
the criminal case without requiring the State to make a valid justification for not
reviving the case before the effective date of the new rule. Although in criminal
cases, the accused is entitled to justice and fairness, so is the State. As the
United States Supreme Court said, per Mr. Justice Benjamin Cardozo,
in Snyder v. State of Massachussetts, the concept of fairness must not be
[58]

strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance

true. In Dimatulac v. Villon, this Court emphasized that the judges action must
[59]

not impair the substantial rights of the accused nor the right of the State and
offended party to due process of law. This Court further said:

Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for
the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been
wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily
a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the
society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then
must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and
offended party, on the other.

In this case, the eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to

01-101112 were filed with the Regional Trial Court on June 6, 2001 well within
the two-year period.
In sum, this Court finds the motion for reconsideration of petitioners
meritorious.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Resolution of this Court, dated May 28,
2002, is SET ASIDE.The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 24,
2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034 is REVERSED. The Petition of the Respondent
with the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 01-100933 is DISMISSED for
being moot and academic. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81,
is DIRECTED to forthwith proceed with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-
101112 with deliberate dispatch.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC

SARAH P. AMPONG, G.R. No. 167916

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,*
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Promulgated:

CSC-Regional Office No. 11,
Respondent. August 26, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

CAN the Civil Service Commission (CSC) properly assume jurisdiction over
administrative proceedings against a judicial employee involving acts of dishonesty
as a teacher, committed prior to her appointment to the judiciary?

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirming the CSCs exercise of administrative jurisdiction over
petitioner.

The Facts

The following facts are uncontroverted:

On November 10, 1991, a Professional Board Examination for Teachers

(PBET)[2] was held in Davao City. A certain Evelyn Junio-Decir[3] applied for and
took the examination at Room 16, Kapitan Tomas Monteverde Elementary
School. She passed with a rating of 74.27%.[4]

At the time of the PBET examinations, petitioner Sarah P. Ampong (nee

Navarra) and Decir were public school teachers under the supervision of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).[5] Later, on August 3, 1993,
Ampong transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Alabel, SaranganiProvince, where she was appointed as Court Interpreter III.

On July 5, 1994, a woman representing herself as Evelyn Decir went to the

Civil Service Regional Office (CSRO) No. XI, Davao City, to claim a copy of her
PBET Certificate of Eligibility. During the course of the transaction, the CSRO
personnel noticed that the woman did not resemble the picture of the examinee in
the Picture Seat Plan (PSP). Upon further probing, it was confirmed that the person
claiming the eligibility was different from the one who took the examinations. It was
petitioner Ampong who took and passed the examinations under the name Evelyn
Decir.

The CSRO conducted a preliminary investigation and determined the

existence of a prima facie case against Decir and Ampong for Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. On August
23, 1994, they were formally charged and required to file answers under oath. The
formal charge reads:

That sometime before the conduct of the November 10,

1991 Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET), a certain Ms.
Evelyn B. Junio (now Decir) took the said examination at Rm. 16 Kapitan
Tomas Monteverde Elementary School, Davao City, with a passing rate
of 74.27%; That on July 5, 1994 she appeared before the CSCRegion XI
Office to get her Guro Certificate; That upon verification, it was found out
that the picture attached in the Picture Seat Plan, marked as Annex A and
A-1, respectively, were not the same compared to the picture attached in
the CSC Form 212 of Evelyn Junio-Decir marked herein as annex B, B-1,
respectively. There was also a marked difference in the signatures affixed
in the said annexes; That further investigations revealed that it was the
pictures of Ms. Sarah Navarra, wife of her husbands first cousin, who took
the said examination in behalf of Ms. Evelyn Junio-Decir, a provisional
teacher; That the said act of Mesdames Decir and Navarra are acts of
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; that
in (sic) taking the CS examination for and in behalf of another undermines
the sanctity of the CS examinations; All these contrary to existing civil
service laws and regulations. (Emphasis supplied)

In her sworn statement dated November 3, 1994, Decir denied the charges
against her. She reasoned out that it must have been the examination proctor who
pasted the wrong picture on the PSP and that her signatures were different because
she was still signing her maiden name at the time of the examination. In her Answer,
Decir contended that:

2. The same accusation is denied, the truth being:

a. When I took the Professional Board Examination for Teachers

(PBET) in the year 1991, I handed my 1x1 I.D. picture to the
proctor assigned in the examination room who might have
inadvertently pasted in the Seat Plan [the] wrong picture instead
[of] my own picture;

b. With respect to the marked difference in my signature both

appearing in the aforesaid Seat Plan and also with the Form 212,
the disparity lies in that in the year 1991, when I took the afroresaid
examination, I was still sporting my maiden name Evelyn B. Junio
 in order to coincide with all my pertinent supporting papers, like
the special order (s.o.), appointment and among others, purposely
to take said communications. However, immediately after taking
the PBET Examination in 1991, I started using the full name of
Evelyn Junio-Decir.[6]

Even before filing an Answer, petitioner Ampong voluntarily appeared at the

CSRO on February 2, 1995 and admitted to the wrongdoing. When reminded that
she may avail herself of the services of counsel, petitioner voluntarily waived said
right.

On March 13, 1995, petitioner gave another admission in the following tenor:

Q: Now, what is then your intention in coming to this Region inasmuch

as you are still intending to file an answer to the formal charge?
A: I came here because I want to admit personally. So that I will not be
coming here anymore. I will submit my case for Resolution.

Q: So, you intend to waive your right for the formal hearing and you also
admit orally on the guilt of the charge on the Formal Charge
dated August 24, 1994?
A: Yes, Maam.

Q: What else do you want to tell the Commission?

A: x x x Inasmuch as I am already remorseful, I am repenting of the wrong
that I have done. I am hoping that the Commission can help x x x so
that I will be given or granted another chance to serve the government.

xxxx

Q: Now inasmuch as you have declared that you have admitted the guilt
that you took the examination for and in behalf of Evelyn Junio Decir,
are you telling this to the Commission without the assistance of the
counsel or waiver of your right to be assisted by counsel.
A: Yes, Maam. I am waiving my right.[7] (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner reiterated her admission in her sworn Answer dated March 16,
1995:
 3. That, during the commission of the act, I was still under the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports, as Teacher in-charge of San Miguel
Primary School, Malungon North District, way back in 1991,
when the husband of Evelyn Junio-Decir, my husbands cousin came
to me and persuaded me to take the examination in behalf of his wife
to which I disagreed but he earnestly begged so that I was convinced
to agree because I pity his wife considering that she is an immediate
relative, and there was no monetary consideration involved in this
neither a compensatory reward for me, as I was overcome by their
persuasion;

4. That, despite the fact that I was a teacher, I was not aware that the acts
I was charged, is a ground for disciplinary action and punishable by
dismissal;

5. That I should not have conformed to this anomalous transaction

considering that I was born in a Christian family, and was brought up
in the fear of Lord, and had been a consistent officer of the Church
Board, had been a religious leader for so many years, and had been
the organizer of the Music Festival of the Association of Evangelical
Churches of Malungon, Sarangani Province, thus I was devoted to
church work and was known to be of good conduct; and that my
friends and acquaintances can vouch to that, but I was just forced by
circumstances to agree to the spouses Godfre and Evelyn
Decir.[8] (Emphasis added)

CSC Finding and Penalty

On March 21, 1996, the CSC found petitioner Ampong and Decir guilty of
dishonesty, dismissing them from the service. The dispositive part of
the CSCresolution states:

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby finds Evelyn J. Decir and

Sarah P. Navarra guilty of Dishonesty. Accordingly, they are meted the
penalty of dismissal with all its accessory penalties. The PBET rating of
Decir is revoked.[9]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the issue of
jurisdiction.[10] She argued that the exclusive authority to discipline employees of the
judiciary lies with the Supreme Court; that the CSC acted with abuse of discretion
when it continued to exercise jurisdiction despite her assumption of duty as a judicial
employee. She contended that at the time the case was instituted on August 23, 1994,
the CSC already lost jurisdiction over her. She was appointed as Interpreter III of
the RTC, Branch 38, Alabel, Sarangani Province on August 3, 1993.

The CSC denied the motion for reconsideration.[11] According to the Commission,
to allow petitioner to evade administrative liability would be a mockery of the
countrys administrative disciplinary system. It will open the floodgates for others to
escape prosecution by the mere expedient of joining another branch of
government. In upholding its jurisdiction over petitioner, the CSC differentiated
between administrative supervision exercised by the Supreme Court and
administrative jurisdiction granted to the Commission over all civil service
employees:

Moreover, it must be pointed out that administrative supervision is

distinct from administrative jurisdiction. While it is true that this
Commission does not have administrative supervision over employees in
the judiciary, it definitely has concurrent jurisdiction over them. Such
jurisdiction was conferred upon the Civil Service Commission pursuant to
existing law specifically Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) which provides
as follows:

(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted

by or through it directly or on appeal, including contested
appointment, and review decisions and actions of its offices
and of the agencies attached to it x x x.

The fact that court personnel are under the administrative

supervision of the Supreme Court does not totally isolate them from the
operations of the Civil Service Law.Appointments of all officials and
employees in the judiciary is governed by the Civil Service Law (Section
5(6), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution). (Emphasis supplied)

CA Disposition
Via petition for review under Rule 43, petitioner elevated the matter to the
CA.[12] She insisted that as a judicial employee, it is the Supreme Court and not
the CSC that has disciplinary jurisdiction over her.

In a Decision dated November 30, 2004,[13] the CA denied the petition for lack
of merit.

The CA noted that petitioner never raised the issue of jurisdiction until after
the CSC ruled against her. Rather, she willingly appeared before the commission,
freely admitted her wrongdoing, and even requested for clemency. Thus, she was
estopped from questioning the Commissions jurisdiction. The appellate court opined
that while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a partys active
participation in the proceedings before a court, tribunal or body will estop such party
from assailing its jurisdiction.

The CA further ruled that a member of the judiciary may be under the jurisdiction
of two different bodies. As a public school teacher or a court interpreter, petitioner
was part of the civil service, subject to its rules and regulations. When she committed
acts in violation of the Civil Service Law, the CSC was clothed with administrative
jurisdiction over her.

Issue
Petitioner, through this petition, assigns the lone error that:

The Honorable Court of Appeals-First Division decided a question

of substance in a way not in accord with law and jurisprudence, gravely
erred in facts and in law, and has sanctioned such departure and grave
error because it ignored or was not aware of Garcia v. De la Pea, 229
SCRA 766 (1994) and Adm. Matter No. OCA I.P.I. 97-329-P (CSC v.
Ampong) dated January 31, 2001, which reiterate the rule that exclusive
authority to discipline employees of the judiciary lies with the
Supreme Court, in issuing the questioned decision and resolution; which
grave error warrant reversal of the questioned decision and resolution.[14]

Put simply, the issue boils down to whether the CSC has administrative jurisdiction
over an employee of the Judiciary for acts committed while said employee was still
with the Executive or Education Department.
 Our Ruling

The answer to the question at the outset is in the negative but We rule against the
petition on the ground of estoppel.

It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. As
defined under the Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service
embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government,
and government-owned or controlled corporations.[15] Pursuant to its administrative
authority, the CSC is granted the power to control, supervise, and coordinate the
Civil Service examinations.[16] This authority grants to the CSC the right to take
cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations.[17]

However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given

exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and judicial
personnel.[18] By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee
the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It
may take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.[19] Thus, this Court ruled that
the Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of a judge on the powers granted to
it by the Constitution. It violates the specific mandate of the Constitution granting to
the Supreme Court supervisory powers over all courts and their personnel; it
undermines the independence of the judiciary.[20]

In Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana,[21] this Court held that impersonating
an examinee of a civil service examination is an act of dishonesty. But because the
offender involved a judicial employee under the administrative supervision of the
Supreme Court, the CSC filed the necessary charges before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), a procedure which this Court validated.

A similar fate befell judicial personnel in Bartolata v. Julaton,[22] involving

judicial employees who also impersonated civil service examinees. As in Sta.
Ana, the CSC likewise filed the necessary charges before the OCA because
respondents were judicial employees. Finding respondents guilty of dishonesty and
meting the penalty of dismissal, this Court held that respondents machinations reflect
their dishonesty and lack of integrity, rendering them unfit to maintain their positions
as public servants and employees of the judiciary.[23]

Compared to Sta. Ana and Bartolata, the present case involves a similar
violation of the Civil Service Law by a judicial employee. But this case is slightly
different in that petitioner committed the offense before her appointment to the
judicial branch. At the time of commission, petitioner was a public school teacher
under the administrative supervision of the DECS and, in taking the civil service
examinations, under the CSC. Petitioner surreptitiously took the CSC-supervised
PBET exam in place of another person. When she did that, she became a party to
cheating or dishonesty in a civil service-supervised examination.

That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC does not take her
case out of the administrative reach of the Supreme Court.

The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court employee

belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed
before or after employment in the judiciary.

Indeed, the standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial
employee before the OCA. Records show that the CSC did not adhere to this
procedure in the present case.

However, We are constrained to uphold the ruling of the CSC based on the
principle of estoppel. The previous actions of petitioner have estopped her from
attacking the jurisdiction of the CSC. A party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court or tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions to secure an
affirmative relief may not afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a
penalty.[24] As this Court declared in Aquino v. Court of Appeals:[25]

In the interest of sound administration of justice, such practice

cannot be tolerated. If we are to sanction this argument, then all the
 proceedings had before the lower court and the Court of Appeals while
valid in all other respects would simply become useless.[26]

Under the principle of estoppel, a party may not be permitted to adopt a

different theory on appeal to impugn the courts jurisdiction. [27] In Emin v. De
Leon,[28] this Court sustained the exercise of jurisdiction by the CSC, while
recognizing at the same time that original disciplinary jurisdiction over public school
teachers belongs to the appropriate committee created for the purpose as provided
for under the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers.[29] It was there held that a party who fully participated in the proceedings
before the CSC and was accorded due process is estopped from subsequently
attacking its jurisdiction.

Petitioner was given ample opportunity to present her side and adduce evidence in
her defense before the CSC. She filed with it her answer to the charges leveled
against her. When the CSC found her guilty, she moved for a reconsideration of the
ruling. These circumstances all too clearly show that due process was accorded to
petitioner.

Petitioners admission of guilt stands. Apart from her full participation in the
proceedings before the CSC, petitioner admitted to the offense charged that she
impersonated Decir and took the PBET exam in the latters place. We note that even
before petitioner filed a written answer, she voluntarily went to the CSCRegional
Office and admitted to the charges against her. In the same breath, she waived her
right to the assistance of counsel. Her admission, among others, led the CSC to find
her guilty of dishonesty, meting out to her the penalty of dismissal.

Now, she assails said confession, arguing that it was given without aid of
counsel. In police custodial investigations, the assistance of counsel is necessary in
order for an extra-judicial confession to be made admissible in evidence against the
accused in a criminal complaint. If assistance was waived, the waiver should have
been made with the assistance of counsel.[30]

But while a partys right to the assistance of counsel is sacred in proceedings

criminal in nature, there is no such requirement in administrative
proceedings. In Lumiqued v. Exevea,[31] this Court ruled that a party in an
administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel. Moreover, the
administrative body is under no duty to provide the person with counsel because
assistance of counsel is not an absolute requirement.[32]

Petitioners admission was given freely. There was no compulsion, threat or

intimidation. As found by the CSC, petitioners admission was substantial enough to
support a finding of guilt.

The CSC found petitioner guilty of dishonesty. It is categorized as an act

which includes the procurement and/or use of fake/spurious civil service eligibility,
the giving of assistance to ensure the commission or procurement of the
same, cheating, collusion, impersonation, or any other anomalous act which
amounts to any violation of the Civil Service examination.[33] Petitioner
impersonated Decir in the PBET exam, to ensure that the latter would obtain a
passing mark. By intentionally practicing a deception to secure a passing mark, their
acts undeniably involve dishonesty.[34]

This Court has defined dishonesty as the (d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive,
or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity
in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive
or betray.[35] Petitioners dishonest act as a civil servant renders her unfit to be a
judicial employee. Indeed, We take note that petitioner should not have been
appointed as a judicial employee
had this Court been made aware of the cheating that she committed in the civil
service examinations. Be that as it may, petitioners present status as a judicial
employee is not a hindrance to her getting the penalty she deserves.

The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with
the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden or
responsibility. The image of a court, as a true temple of justice, is mirrored in the
conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the
judge to the least and lowest of its personnel.[36] As the Court held in another
administrative case for dishonesty:
 x x x Any act which diminishes or tends to diminish the faith of the
people in the judiciary shall not be countenanced. We have not hesitated
to impose the utmost penalty of dismissal for even the slightest breach of
duty by, and the slightest irregularity in the conduct of, said officers and
employees, if so warranted. Such breach and irregularity detract from the
dignity of the highest court of the land and erode the faith of the people in
the judiciary.

xxxx

As a final point, we take this opportunity to emphasize that no

quibbling, much less hesitation or circumvention, on the part of
any employee to follow and conform to the rules and regulations
enunciated by this Court and the Commission on Civil Service, should be
tolerated. The Court, therefore, will not hesitate to rid its ranks of
undesirables who undermine its efforts toward an effective and efficient
system of justice.[37] (Emphasis added)

We will not tolerate dishonesty for the Judiciary expects the best from all its
employees.[38] Hindi namin papayagan ang pandaraya sapagkat inaasahan ng
Hudikatura ang pinakamabuti sa lahat nitong kawani.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987
DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER, SUPREME
COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in
Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries.
In a nutshell, they submit that “any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as
judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision
of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that “(d)uring their continuance
in office, their salary shall not be decreased,” even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an
independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution.”
It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in
response to representations that the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the
withholding of taxes from salaries of members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, the
Court en banc had reaffirmed the Chief Justice’s directive as follows:
RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. — The Court REAFFIRMED the Chief
Justice’s previous and standing directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this
Court to continue with the deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices
of the Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all other members of the judiciary.
That should have resolved the question. However, with the filing of this petition, the Court has
deemed it best to settle the legal issue raised through this judicial pronouncement. As will be
shown hereinafter, the clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the
proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the
Judiciary, so as to “give substance to equality among the three branches of Government” in
the words of Commissioner Rigos. In the course of the deliberations, it was further expressly
made clear, specially with regard to Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas’ accepted amendment
to the amendment of Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of members of the Judiciary
would be subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers.
This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the
Constitution as approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent
may have been obscured by the failure to include in the General Provisions a proscription
against exemption of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, from
payment of income tax, the Court since then has authorized the continuation of the deduction
of the withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the Supreme Court, as well as from
the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of record that it
had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David, infra, that
declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax
and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during their continuance in
office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly
subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment of
such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection
against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.
A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is called for. The 1935 Constitution
provided:
… (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts) shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance
in office … 1 (Emphasis supplied).
Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme court, and of
judges of inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during their
continuance in office. … 2 (Emphasis ours).
And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same 1973 Constitution
specifically stipulated:
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional
officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax. 3
The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on, reads:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of
judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased. 4(Emphasis supplied).
The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973
Constitution, for which reason, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to revert to
the original concept of “non-diminution “of salaries of judicial officers.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII,
negate such contention.
The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution read:
Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
and of judges of the lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be diminished nor subjected to income tax. Until the National Assembly
shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice shall receive an annual salary of _____________
and each Associate Justice ______________ pesos. 5 (Emphasis ours)
During the debates on the draft Article (Committee Report No. 18), two Commissioners
presented their objections to the provision on tax exemption, thus:
MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of exemption from tax of the salary of justices, does this
not violate the principle of the uniformity of taxation and the principle of equal protection of
the law? After all, tax is levied not on the salary but on the combined income, such that when
the judge receives a salary and it is comingled with the other income, we tax the income, not
the salary. Why do we have to give special privileges to the salary of justices?
MR. CONCEPCION. It is the independence of the judiciary. We prohibit the increase or
decrease of their salary during their term. This is an indirect way of decreasing their salary
and affecting the independence of the judges.
MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be in the nature of a clause to respect tenure, but the
special privilege on taxation might, in effect, be a violation of the principle of uniformity in
taxation and the equal protection clause. 6
xxx xxx xxx
MR. OPLE. x x x
Of course, we share deeply the concern expressed by the sponsor, Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion, for whom we have the highest respect, to surround the Supreme Court and the
judicial system as a whole with the whole armor of defense against the executive and
legislative invasion of their independence. But in so doing, some of the citizens outside,
especially the humble government employees, might say that in trying to erect a bastion of
justice, we might end up with the fortress of privileges, an island of extra territoriality under
the Republic of the Philippines, because a good number of powers and rights accorded to the
Judiciary here may not be enjoyed in the remotest degree by other employees of the
government.
An example is the exception from income tax, which is a kind of economic immunity, which
is, of course, denied to the entire executive department and the legislative. 7
And during the period of amendments on the draft Article, on July 14, 1986, Commissioner
Cirilo A. Rigos proposed that the term “diminished” be changed to “decreased” and that the
words “nor subjected to income tax” be deleted so as to “give substance to equality among
the three branches in the government.
Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, defended
the original draft and referred to the ruling of this Court in Perfecto vs. Meer 8 that “the
independence of the judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come
from taxing their salaries.” Commissioner Rigos then moved that the matter be put to a vote.
Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas stood up “in support of an amendment to the amendment
with the request for a modification of the amendment,” as follows:
FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose an amendment to the amendment saying that it is
not enough to drop the phrase “shall not be subjected to income tax,” because if that is all
that the Gentleman will do, then he will just fall back on the decision in Perfecto vs. Meer and
in Dencia vs. David [should be Endencia and Jugo vs. David, etc., 93 Phil. 696] which
excludes them from income tax, but rather I would propose that the statement will read:
“During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be diminished BUT MAY BE
SUBJECT TO GENERAL INCOME TAX.”IN support of this position, I would say that the
argument seems to be that the justice and judges should not be subjected to income tax
because they already gave up the income from their practice. That is true also of Cabinet
members and all other employees. And I know right now, for instance, there are many people
who have accepted employment in the government involving a reduction of income and yet
are still subject to income tax. So, they are not the only citizens whose income is reduced by
accepting service in government.
Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed amendment to the amendment. Commissioner
Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. then moved for a suspension of the session. Upon resumption,
Commissioner Bernas announced:
During the suspension, we came to an understanding with the original proponent,
Commissioner Rigos, that his amendment on page 6,. line 4 would read: “During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be DECREASED.”But this is on the understanding
that there will be a provision in the Constitution similar to Section 6 of Article XV, the General
Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which says:
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional
officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax.
So, we put a period (.) after “DECREASED” on the understanding that the salary of justices
is subject to tax.
When queried about the specific Article in the General Provisions on non-exemption from tax
of salaries of public officers, Commissioner Bernas replied:
FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be found in the General Provisions.
But at any rate, when we put a period (.) after “DECREASED,” it is on the understanding that
the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David will not apply anymore.
The amendment to the original draft, as discussed and understood, was finally approved
without objection.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The understanding, therefore, is that there will
be a provision under the Article on General Provisions. Could Commissioner Rosario Braid
kindly take note that the salaries of officials of the government including constitutional officers
shall not be exempt from income tax? The amendment proposed herein and accepted by the
Committee now reads as follows: “During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
DECREASED”; and the phrase “nor subjected to income tax” is deleted.9
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in
question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of
the people adopting it should be given effect.10 The primary task in constitutional construction
is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution.11 it may also be safely assumed that the people in
ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. 12
Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is
again reproduced hereunder:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of
judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased. (Emphasis supplied).
it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of
compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are
receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed
after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption
from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that “the imposition of
income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and so violates the Constitution”
in Perfecto vs. Meer,13 as affirmed in Endencia vs. David 14 must be declared discarded. The
framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and
unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987
Constitution that they have adopted
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions
and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot
part of the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income
taxation equitably.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby DISMISSED.
 [ GR No. L-1612, Feb 26, 1948 ]

JORGE B. VARGAS v. EMILIO RILLORAZA +

80 Phil. 297

HILADO, J.:

Counsel for the defense, in a motion dated August 28, 1947, assails the constitutionality of section 14 of
the People's Court Act (Commonwealth Act No. 682) upon the following grounds:

"(a) It provides for qualifications of members of the Supreme Court, other than those provided in
section 6, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution.

"(b) It authorizes the appointment of members of the Supreme Court who do not possess the
qualifications set forth in section 6, Article VIII, of the Philippine Constitution.

"(c) It removes from office the members of the Supreme Court by means of a procedure other than
impeachment, contrary to Article IX, of the Philippine Constitution.

"(d) It deprives the Commission on Appointments of Congress of its constitutional prerogative to

confirm or reject appointments to the Supreme Court.

"(e) It creates two Supreme Courts.

"(f) It impairs the rule making power of the Supreme Court, contrary to section 13, Article VIII, of the
Philippine Constitution.

"(g) It is a Bill of Attainder, for it punishes by disqualification members of the Supreme Court who
rendered said public service during the Japanese occupation.

"(h) It denies the equal protection of the laws.

"(i) It is an ex post pacto legislation.

"(j) It amends the Constitution by a procedure not sanctioned by Article XV, of the Philippine
Constitution.

"(k) It destroys the independence of the Judiciary, and it permits the 'packing' of the Supreme Court in
certain cases, either by Congress or by the President."

The Solicitor General, in behalf of the prosecution, opposes the motion and in support of his opposition
submits these propositions:

"1. Power of Congress to enact section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682.

"2. Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 does not and is not intended to provide an additional
qualification for members of the Supreme Court, much less does it amend section 6, Article VIII, of the
Constitution of the Philippines.
"3. Qualifications of members of the Supreme Court prescribed in section 6, Article VIII of the
Constitution apply to permanent "appointees" not to temporary 'designees.'

"4. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution is not applicable to temporary designations under section
14, Commonwealth Act No. 682.

"5. It does not remove but merely disqualifies the members of the Supreme Court affected to sit and
vote in the particular class of cases therein mentioned.

"6. It does not create an additional 'Special Supreme Court.'

"7. It does not impair the rule-making power of the Supreme Court but merely supplements the Rules of
Court.

"8. It is not a bill of attainder.

"9. It is not an ex post pacto law.

"10. It does not deny equal protection of the laws either to the Justices of the Supreme Court affected or
to the treason indictees concerned.

"11. It does not amend any constitutional provision.

"12. It does not destroy the independence of the judiciary or curtail the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court."

This opposition is a reproduction by reference in the instant case of a similar pleading filed by the
Solicitor General in G. R. No. L-398, People vs. Sison, pursuant to the resolution of this Court in the
instant case dated October 30, 1947, granting the prayer of the Assistant Solicitor General that in the
consideration of petitioner's motion of August 28, 1947, herein, the said opposition in G. R. No. L-398 be
deemed incorporated in the instant case as the government's answer to the petitioner's memorandum
herein of September 27, 1947.

It will not be necessary for the purposes of this resolution to consider and decide all the legal questions
thus raised by these conflicting contentions of the parties.

For the purposes of the present resolution, the considerations presently to be set forth are deemed
sufficient. Article VIII, section 4, of the Constitution ordains that the Supreme Court shall be composed
of a Chief Justice and ten Associate Justices and may sit either in banc or in two divisions unless
otherwise provided by law. Section 5 of the same Article provides, inter alia, that the members of the
Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Section 6 of the same Article stipulates that no person may be appointed member of the
Supreme Court unless he has been five years a citizen of the Philippines, is at least 40 years of age, and
has for 10 years or more been a judge of a court of record or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines. By virtue of section 9 of said Article, the members of the Supreme Court, among other
judicial officials, shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of 70 years, or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. Section 13 of the same Article VIII, inter alia,
enunciates that the then existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are thereby repealed as
statutes, and are declared rules of court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify
the same, and to the power of the Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement them. Art. XVI, section 2,
provides that "all laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the
Commonwealth, and thereafter they shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution,
until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines * * *"

Before the adoption of the Constitution, the law on disqualification of judges was contained in the Code
of Civil Procedure, sections 8 and 698. If said sections should be considered as parts of the then existing
adjective legislation, Article VIII, section 18, of the constitution repealed them along with others dealing
with pleading, practice and procedure, as statutes, and declared them rules of court, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same, without prejudice to the power of the
Congress to repeal, alter or supplement them. In such case, when the Constitution so provided in said
section 13, it sanctioned as rules of court, among other provisions, those in said sections 8 and 608 of
the former Code of Civil Procedure concerning the disqualification of judges. If said sections should be
deemed as pertaining to the then existing substantive legislation, then they were continued as laws or
statutes by the aforecited provision of Article XVI, section 2.

By virtue either of Article VIII, section 13, or Article XVI, section 2, of the constitution, therefore, the
grounds for disqualifying judges, which had been held to include justices of the Supreme Court (Jurado
& Co. vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, 1 Phil., 395) were those established in sections 8
and 608 of the former Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court later promulgated the present Rules
of Court wherein Rule 126 treats of the matter of disqualification of judicial officers. The provisions of
said rule have obviously been taken from the abovecited sections 8 and 608 of the same former Code of
Civil Procedure (see also II Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 2d ed., pp. 779-782). By reason of
the fact that the aforementioned provisions of the former Code of Civil Procedure were continued by
the constitution itself, either as rules of court or as laws or statutes a point we need not now decide
there can be no question of unconstitutionality or repugnancy of said provisions to the constitution as
regards the disqualification of judicial officers. In other words, the framers deemed it fit, right, and
proper that said provisions shall continue to govern the disqualification of judicial officers.

Such question of unconstitutionality or repugnancy to the constitution, however, arises in relation to the
disqualification of certain members of the Supreme Court provided for in section 14 of the People's
Court Act which says:

"SEC. 14. Any Justice of the Supreme Court who held any office or position under the Philippine
Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic may not sit and vote in any
case brought to that Court under section thirteen hereof in which the accused is a person who held any
office or position under either or both the Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine Republic
or any branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof.

"If, on account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds of disqualification of judges, in
Rule 126, section 1 of the Rules of Court, or on account of illness, absence or temporary disability the
requisite number of Justices necessary to constitute a quorum or to render judgment in any case is not
present, the President may designate such number of Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First
Instance, or Cadastral Judges, having none of the disqualifications set forth in said section one hereof, as
may be necessary to sit temporarily as Justices of said Court, in order to form a quorum or until a
judgment in said case is reached."
We propose to approach this question from the following angles: (a) whether or not the Congress had
power to add to the pre-existing grounds of disqualification of a Justice of the Supreme Court, that
provided for in said section 14; (b) whether or not a person may act as a Justice of the Supreme Court
who has not been duly appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments
pursuant to the constitution, even only as a "designee"; and (c) whether or not by the method of
"designation" created by the aforecited section 14 a Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-large of First
Instance, or Cadastral Judge, designated by the President under the same section can constitutionally
"sit temporarily as Justice" of the Supreme Court by virtue thereof.

(a) We start with the principle, well known to the legal profession, that no act of the legislature
repugnant to the constitution can become a law (In re Guariña, 24 Phil., 37, 45; Marbury vs. Madison, 1
Cranch, 175). To discover whether the above quoted section 14 of the People's Court Act is repugnant to
the constitution, one of the best tests would be to compare the operation of the pertinent
constitutional provisions without said section, with their operation with the same section if the latter
were to be allowed to produce its effects. It is self-evident that before the enactment of the oft-quoted
section of the People's Court Act, it was not only the power but the bounden duty of all the members of
the Supreme Court to sit in judgment in all treason cases duly brought or appealed to the Court. That
power and that duty arise from the above cited sections of Article VIII of the Constitution, namely,
section 4, providing how the court shall be composed and how it may sit, section 9, ordaining that they
shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, and the pertinent constitutional and statutory
provisions bearing on the jurisdiction, powers and responsibilities of the Supreme Court. Concretely
referring to the instant case, if section 14 of the People's Court Act had not been inserted therein, there
can be no question that each and every member of this Court would have to sit in judgment in said case.

But if said section 14 were to be effective, such members of the Court "who held any office or position
under the Philippine Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic" would
be disqualified from sitting and voting in the instant case, because the accused herein is a person who
likewise held an office or position at least under the Philippine Executive Commission. In other words,
what the constitution in this respect ordained as a power and a duty to be exercised and fulfilled by said
members of the Court, the quoted section of the People's Court Act would prohibit them from
exercising and fulfilling. What the constitution directs the section prohibits. A clearer case of repugnancy
to the fundamental law can hardly be imagined.

For repugnancy to result it is not necessary that there should be an actual removal of the disqualified
Justice from his office for, as above demonstrated, were it not for the challenged section 14 there would
have been an uninterrupted continuity in the tenure of the displaced Justice and in his exercise of the
powers and fulfillment of the duties appertaining to his office, saving only proper cases or
disqualification under Rule 126. What matters here is not only that the Justice affected continue to be a
member of the Court and to enjoy the emoluments as well as to exercise the other powers and fulfill the
other duties of his office, but that he be left unhampered to exercise all the powers and fulfill all the
responsibilities of said office in all cases properly coming before his Court under the constitution, again
without prejudice to proper cases of disqualification under Rule 126. Any statute enacted by the
legislature which would impede him in this regard, in the words of this Court in In re Guariña, supra,
citing Marbury vs. Madison, supra, simply "can not become law."
It goes without saying that, whether the matter of disqualification of judicial officers belongs to the
realm of adjective, or to that of substantive law, whatever modification, change or innovation the
legislature may propose to introduce therein, must not in any way contravene the provisions of the
constitution, nor be repugnant to the genius of the governmental system established thereby. The
tripartite system, the mutual independence of the three departments in particular, the independence of
the judiciary , the scheme of checks and balances, are commonplaces in democratic governments like
this Republic. No legislation may be allowed which would destroy or tend to destroy any of them.

Under Article VIII, section 2(4) of the Constitution the Supreme Court may not be deprived of its
appellate jurisdiction, among others, over those criminal cases where the penalty may be death or life
imprisonment. Treason may be punished with death or life imprisonment. Pursuant to Article VIII,
sections 4, 5, 6, and 9 of the Constitution the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may only be exercised by
the Chief Justice and Associate Justices appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, sitting in banc or in division, and in cases like those involving treason they must sit in
banc. If, according to section 4 of said Article VIII, "the Supreme Court shall be composed" of the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices therein referred to, its jurisdiction can only be exercised by it as thus
composed. To disqualify any of these constitutional component members of the Court particularly, as in
the instant case, a majority of them in a treason case, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court
itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation
of his judicial power. (Diehl vs. Crumb, 72 Okl., 108; 179 Pac, 44). And if that judge is the one designated
by the constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court,
the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the
court itself. It would seem evident that if the Congress could disqualify members of this Court to take
part in the hearing and determination of certain collaboration cases it could extend the disqualification
to other cases. The question is not one of degree or reasonableness. It affects the very heart of judicial
independence.

Willoughby's United States Constitutional Law, under the topic of separation of powers, Volume 3,
pages 1622-1624, says:

"Upon the other hand, as we shall see, the courts have not hesitated to protect their own independence
from legislative control, not simply by refusing to give effect to retroactive declaratory statutes, or to
acts attempting the revision or reversal of judicial determination, but by refusing themselves to
entertain jurisdiction in cases in which they have not been given the power to enforce their decrees by
their own writs of execution. Thus, as already mentioned, they have refused to act where their decisions
have been subject to legislative or administrative revisions. Finally, even where the extent of their
jurisdiction, as to both parties litigant and subject-matter, has been subject to legislative control, the
courts have not permitted themselves to be deprived of the power necessary for maintaining the
dignity, the orderly course of their procedure, and the effectiveness of their writs.

"In order that the court may perform its judicial functions with dignity and effectiveness, it is necessary
that it should possess certain powers. Among these is the right to issue certain writs, called
extraordinary writs, such as mandamus, injunction, certiorari, prohibition, etc., and especially, to punish
for contempt any disobedience to its orders. The possession of these powers the courts have jealously
guarded, and in accordance with the constitutional doctrine of the separation and independence of the
three departments of government, have held, and undoubtedly will continue to hold, invalid any
attempt on the part of the legislature to deprive them by statute of any power the exercise of which
they deem essential to the proper performance of their judicial functions. The extent of their
jurisdiction, they argue, may be more or less within legislative control, but the possession of powers for
the efficient exercise of that jurisdiction, whether statutory or constitutional, which they do possess,
they cannot be deprived of.

"It has been already pointed out that the jurisdictions of the inferior Federal courts and the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court are wholly within the control of Congress, depending as they do upon
statutory grant. It has, however, been argued that while the extent of this jurisdiction is thus within the
control of the legislature, that body may not control the manner in which the jurisdiction which is
granted shall be exercised, at least to the extent of denying to the courts the authority to issue writs and
take other judicial action necessary for the proper and effective execution of their functions. In other
words, the argument is, that while jurisdiction is obtained by congressional grant, judicial power, when
once a court is established and given a jurisdiction, at once attaches by the direct force of the
Constitution.

"This position was especially argued by Senator Knox, Spooner and Culberson and contested by Senator
Bailey during the debate upon the Repburn Railway Rate Bill of 1906. The point at issue was the
constitutionality of the amendment offered by' Senator Bailey providing that no rate or charge,
regulation or practice, prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, should be set aside or
suspended by any preliminary or interlocutory decree or order of a circuit court.

"This position would seem to be well taken, and would apply to attempts upon the part of Congress to
specify the classes of statutes whose constitutionality may be questioned by the courts, or to declare
the number of justices of the Supreme Court who will be required to concur in order to render a
judgment declaring the unconstitutionality of an act of Congress."

In State vs. Morrill (16 Ark., 384), the Supreme Court of Arkansas declared:

"The legislature may regulate the exercise of, but cannot abridge, the express or necessarily implied
powers granted to this court by the Constitution. If it could, it might encroach upon both the judicial and
executive departments, and draw to itself all the powers of government; and thereby destroy that
admirable system of checks and balances to be found in the organic framework of both the federal and
state institutions, and a favorite theory in the government of the American People * * *."

The members affected by the prohibition have heretofore disqualified themselves, partly because they
presumed the statute valid and partly because they would rather have no hand in the revision of the
appeals, for the purpose of avoiding even a breath of suspicion as to the impartiality of their actuations.
However, realizing upon a thorough analysis of the matter by counsel on both sides, the far-reaching
implications which the precedent might authorize, imperiling the independence of one coordinate
branch of the Government, they finally cast aside all reluctance to consider the point, and came out with
practical unanimity to condemn any legislation which impinges or might impinge upon the fundamental
independent powers of the judicature.

Some of them have no quarrel with legislative authority to enumerate instances in which judges may
not sit. They would even concede that. But, they say, let the rules be promulgated before the event
happens or litigation arises. To promulgate them after, would enable the Congress in specific situations
to order that Judge X shall not decide the controversy between Y and Z or that. Justice M shall not sit in
the appeal of P. S. and so on ad infinitum, and thus decisively influence the decision, for or against one
party litigant. Such legislative power might thus be wielded to interfere with the functions of the
judiciary, depriving Philippine citizens of their right to impartial awards from judges selected without any
reference to the parties or interests to be affected. Unnecessary to prove or impute sinister motives
behind the statutory disqualification. Enough that recognition of the power might give way to the
operation of unworthy combinations or oppressive designs.

Let it not be argued that the Court is the same, only the membership being different. Because Article
VIII, sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do not admit any composition of the Supreme Court other than
by the Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein mentioned appointed as therein provided. And the
infringement is enhanced and aggravated where a majority of the members of the Court as in this case
are replaced by judges of first instance. It is distinctly another Supreme Court in addition to this. And the
constitution provides for only one Supreme Court.

From all that has been said above it results that the ground for disqualification added by section 14 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682 to those already existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and
continued by it is not only arbitrary and irrational but positively violative of the organic law.

(b) In the face of the constitutional requirement (Art. VIII, section 5) that the members of the Supreme
Court should be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, we
are of opinion that no person not so appointed may act as Justice of the Supreme Court and that the
"designation" authorized in section 14 of the People's Court Act to be made by the President of any
Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-large of First Instance or Cadastral Judge, can not possibly be a
compliance with the provision requiring that appointment. An additional disqualifying circumstance of
the "designee" is the lack of confirmation by or consent of the Commission on Appointments. Without
intending the least reflection on the ability, learning, and integrity of any such "designee," we are merely
construing and applying the fundamental law of the land. A Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-large of
First Instance or Cadastral Judge, under section 149 of the Revised Administrative Code, need not be at
least forty years of age, nor have for ten years or more been a judge of a court of record or engaged in
the practice of law in the Philippines (as required by section 6 of Article VIII of the Constitution), because
under said section he need only have practiced law in the Philippines for a period of not less than five
years or have held during a like period within the Philippines an office requiring a lawyer's diploma. So
that it may happen that a "designee" under section 14 of the People's Court Act, sitting as a substitute
Justice of the Supreme Court in particular collaboration cases, and participating therein in the
deliberations and functions of the Supreme Court, like any regular Justice thereof, does not possess the
required constitutional qualifications of a regular member of said Court. Here again is another point of
repugnancy between the challenged section and the constitution. And if we consider the actual fact that
only four of the present ten Justices of this Court are not adversely affected by the disqualification
established in section 14 of the People's Court Act, we see that the "designees" constitute a majority
when sitting with said four Justices, giving rise to the result that, if the body composed by them all
should be considered as the Supreme Court, it would be composed by four members appointed and
confirmed pursuant to sections 4 and 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution and six who have not been so
appointed and confirmed. The situation would not be helped any by saying that such composition of the
Court is only temporary, for no temporary composition of the Supreme Court is authorized by the
constitution. This Tribunal, as established under the organic law, is one of the permanent institutions of
the government. The clause "unless otherwise provided by law" found in said section 4 can not be
construed to authorize any legislation which would alter the composition of the Supreme Court, as
determined by the constitution, for however brief a time as may be imagined. In principle, what really
matters is not the length or shortness of the alteration of the constitutional composition of the Court,
but the very permanence and unalterability of that composition so long as the constitution which
ordains it remains permanent and unaltered. We are furthermore of opinion that said clause refers to
the number of Justices who were to compose the Court upon its initial organization under the
Commonwealth, and the manner of its sitting; that is, that the Legislature, when providing for the initial
organization of the Supreme Court under the Commonwealth, was authorized to fix a different number
of Justices than eleven, and determine the manner of the Court's sitting differently from that
established in section 4 of Article VIII of the Constitution, but it was and is not empowered to alter the
qualifications of the Justices and the mode of their appointment, which are matters governed by
sections 5 and 6 of said Article VIII wherein the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" does not even
exist, nor the provision on who shall be the component members of the Court. Such a legislation was
enacted in the form of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259, the pertinent provisions of which amended
sections 133 and 134 of the Revised Administrative Code. But after liberation, the Chief Executive, by
Executive Order No. 40 (41 Off. Gaz., 187), amended sections 133 and 134 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 3 and sections 1 and 2 of Commonwealth Act
No. 259, and repealed all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of said executive order;
and the same Chief Executive, by Executive Order No. 86 (42 Off. Gaz., 15) further amended section 133
of the Revised Administrative Code, as thus previously amended, also repealing all acts or parts of acts
inconsistent therewith. Both by virtue of Executive Order No. 40 and Executive Order No. 86, the
number of Justices of the Supreme Court, as originally fixed at eleven by the Constitution, was restored.

(c) However temporary or brief may be the action or participation of a judge designated under section
14 of the People's Court Act in a collaboration case of the class therein defined, there is no escaping the
fact that he would be participating in the deliberations and acts of the Supreme Court, as the appellate
tribunal in such a case, and if allowed to do so, his vote would count as much as that of any regular
Justice of the Court. There can be no doubt that the Chief Justice and Associate Justices required by
section 4 of Article VIII of the Constitution to compose the Supreme Court are the regular members of
the Court indeed, a "temporary member" thereof would be a misnomer, implying a position not
contemplated by the constitution. Section 5 of the same Article VIII, in requiring the members of the
Supreme Court to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
makes it plainly indubitable that the Chief Justice and Associate Justices who are to compose the Court
and sit therein under section 4, have to be thus appointed and confirmed.

As already adverted to, a mere designation under section 14 of the People's Court Act does not satisfy
the constitutional requirement of appointment, with the additional circumstance that as to such
designation the Commission on Appointments is entirely dispensed with. We find absolutely nothing in
the context which may soundly be construed as authorizing, merely by legislation, any change in the
constitutional composition of the Supreme Court, or the performance of its functions by any but
its constitutional members. On the other hand, we have to go by the cardinal rule that "usually
provisions of a constitution are mandatory rather than directory, and mandatory provisions are binding
on all departments of the government." (16 C. J. S., 120).
"The main reason for this rule is that in Constitutions the sovereign itself speaks and is laying down rules
which, for the time at least, are to control alike the government and the governed. It is an instrument of
a solemn and permanent character, laying down fundamental maxims, and, ordinarily, is not supposed
to concern itself with mere rules of order in unessential matters" (Baker vs. Moorhead, 174 N. W., 430,
431; 103 Neb., 811);

"Court is loath to say that any language of the constitution is merely directory". Scopes vs. State, 289 S.
W., 363, 366; 154 Tenn., 106; 53 A. L. R., 821). (Footnote 93, C. J. S., 120.)

Under sections 4 and 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, it is clear that the framers intended the
Supreme Court to function through the members who are therein defined; and by section 6 they
determined who may be appointed such members. This naturally excludes the intervention of any
person or official who is not a member of the Court in the performance of its functions; and it is self-
evident that the "designees" spoken of in section 14 of the People's Court Act can not be such members
in view of the fact that they have not beenappointed and confirmed as such pursuant to said sections 5
and 6.

Hence, we do not see the way clear to the proposition that the "designees" in such a case can
constitutionally "sit temporarily as Justices" of the Supreme Court.

By an act of the United States Congress dated February 6, 1905, it was provided in part as follows:

"Temporary judges of Supreme Court; * * * Whenever by reason of temporary disability of any judge of
the Supreme Court or by reason of vacancies occurring therein, a quorum of the court shall not be
present for business the Governor General of the Philippine Islands is authorized to designate a judge or
judges of the court of first Instance in the islands to sit and act temporarily as a judge or judges of the
Supreme Court in order to constitute a quorum of said Supreme Court for business. * * *."

A part of the membership of the Court believes that this provision is still in force by virtue of Article XVI,
section 2, of the Constitution, and should still be applied to cases of "temporary disability * * * or
vacancies occurring" and preventing a quorum; while the other members are not prepared to subscribe
to the same view, for the reason that the designation" thereby authorized would be "inconsistent with
this Constitution," in the words of the cited section, the same as the "designation" authorized by section
14 of the People's Court Act. Anyway, we need not decide the point now.

This decision has been prepared before this date, and is being promulgated before the Court acts upon
the Solicitor General's motion to dismiss dated February 17, 1948, for the rulings contained herein.

For the foregoing considerations, it is declared and ordered: (a) that section 14 of the People's Court Act
is unconstitutional in the respects specified in the body of this resolution; and (b) that this case be dealt
with henceforward in pursuance of and in harmony with this resolution. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.
Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.
DECISION
SANCHEZ, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael
Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion
of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date
of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys’ fees; and the costs of
suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso’s plane
ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision “in all other
respects”, with costs against petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as “fully supported by the evidence of record”,
are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for
Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a “first class” round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in “first class”, but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the “first class” seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a “white man”, who, the
Manager alleged, had a “better right” to the seat. When asked to vacate his “first class” seat,
the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant’s Manager that his seat would
be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento,
“many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that
Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all
across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man”
(Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his “first class” seat
in the plane.3
1. The thrust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review “all the findings” 4 of
respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make
complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it. We are asked to consider
facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate court’s decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that “No decision shall be rendered by any
court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is based”. 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits
of the case shall state “clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based”; 6 and
that “Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all
issues properly raised before it”. 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law,
however, solely insists that a decision state the “essential ultimate facts” upon which the
court’s conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every
bit and piece of evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised.
Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation “to specify in the sentence the facts” which a
party “considered as proved”. 11 This is but a part of the mental process from which the Court
draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that
prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains
the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold therefrom
“any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense”. Because as this
Court well observed, “There is no law that so requires”. 12 Indeed, “the mere failure to specify
(in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them
is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the
Constitution”. It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact that the
findings “were based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without taking into
consideration or even mentioning the appellant’s side in the controversy as shown by his own
testimony”, would not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the
testimony of each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the defeated party, it
does not mean that the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At
any rate, the legal presumptions are that official duty has been regularly performed, and that
all the matters within an issue in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as “the written
statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court … and essential to support the decision
and judgment rendered thereon”. 16They consist of the court’s “conclusions” with respect to
the determinative facts in issue“. 17 A question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared
as “one which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties.” 18
2. By statute, “only questions of law may be raised” in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment
of the Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately
the business of this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner
a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and
complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have
confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class
protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he
would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class
seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before
the Court of Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: “The trial court erred in
finding that plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the
“definite” segments of his journey, particularly that from Saigon to Beirut”. 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was
no guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be
accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to
make arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary first-class reservation. We
are not impressed by such a reasoning. We cannot understand how a reputable firm like
defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to
honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it
allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the
ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or riot the tickets it issues
are to be honored or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner’s
contention, thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a “First class” ticket, there can be no
question. Apart from his testimony, see plaintiff’s Exhibits “A”, “A-1”, “B”, “B-1,” “B-2”, “C” and
“C-1”, and defendant’s own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff’s testimony and
testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks “O.K.” From what you know, what does this OK mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, “first class”. (Transcript, p. 169)
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael
Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a “first class” airplane ticket, the ticket
was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said
witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff’s Exhibits “A”, “A-
l”, “B”, “B-l”, “C” and “C-1” belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the
plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant’s own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that
the reservation for a “first class” accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court
cannot believe that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff
that the “first class” ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in
Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in
the amount refunded on Carrascoso’s ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a judgment
of affirmance has merged the judgment of the lower court. 24Implicit in that affirmance is a
determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was
free from prejudicial error and “all questions raised by the assignments of error and all
questions that might have been raised are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against the
appellant”. So also, the judgment affirmed “must be regarded as free from all error”. 25 We
reached this policy construction because nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeals on
this point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at war with those of the trial
court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or grounds different
from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat,
notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an
air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a
passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to
strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the
contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a
rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously
unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier,
adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused
to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon
which the Court of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first
class ticket and was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon
to Beirut leg of the flight. 27 We perceive no “welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of
petitioner’s statement of its position”, as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to
petitioner’s accusation that respondent Carrascoso “surreptitiously took a first class seat to
provoke an issue”. 29 And this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the
Manager at his office in Bangkok “to confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was told
again to see the Manager”. 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane
at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court’s award of moral damages. Petitioner’s trenchant claim
is that Carrascoso’s action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for
moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith;31 and that the decision of the
Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint
bearing on this issue are:
3. That … plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a
valuable consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant,
under which said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff,
First Class passage on defendant’s plane during the entire duration of plaintiff’s tour of Europe
with Hongkong as starting point up to and until plaintiff’s return trip to Manila, … .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to
Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after
protestations, arguments and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant’s
employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff
only Tourist Class accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, … the
plaintiff has been compelled by defendant’s employees to leave the First Class
accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and
embarrassments brought by defendant’s breach of contract was forced to take a Pan
American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila.32
xxx xxx xxx
2. That likewise, as a result of defendant’s failure to furnish First Class accommodations
aforesaid, plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby
causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and
the like injury, resulting in moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish
plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second,
That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at
Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when petitioner’s employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth “after he was already, seated” and
to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is
no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is
there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract was
averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on
wrongful expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent’s counsel placed
petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in
Bangkok, Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner’s manager who gave his seat to a white
man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented without
objection on the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or
not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages.
Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to
conform to the evidence is not even required. 36 On the question of bad faith, the Court of
Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane
belonging to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist
class not only without his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently established by
plaintiff in his testimony before the court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made by
the purser of the plane in his notebook which notation reads as follows:
“First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene”,
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The
captain of the plane who was asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to
intervene even refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever
contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to
present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his
disposition; but defendant did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated —
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man.
Hence, if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all
the seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked out as the
one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being
ejected from his seat in the presence of others. Instead of explaining to the white man the
improvidence committed by defendant’s employees, the manager adopted the more drastic
step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat. We are
strengthened in our belief that this probably was what happened there, by the testimony of
defendant’s witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning of the letters
“O.K.” appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said “that the space is confirmed for first class.
Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for defendant, who was the chief of the
Reservation Office of defendant, testified as follows:
“Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the passenger has
arranged with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation.” (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19, 1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, “white man” have a “better right”
to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The defendant airline did not
prove “any better”, nay, any right on the part of the “white man” to the “First class” seat that
the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid and was issued a corresponding “first class”
ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant’s Manager in Bangkok, the
defendant could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the said Manager by
deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption is that evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of Court]; and, under the circumstances,
the Court is constrained to find, as it does find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in
Bangkok not merely asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he did
not give up his “first class” seat because the said Manager wanted to accommodate, using
the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the “white man”. 38
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did
not use the term “bad faith”. But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to
bad faith? The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class
seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him
suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment – just to give way to
another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith.
Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law.
For, “bad faith” contemplates a “state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose.” 39
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in the
judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff in
bad faith, with the aggravating circumstances that defendant’s Manager in Bangkok went to
the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him thrown
out of the airplane to give the “first class” seat that he was occupying to, again using the
words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a “white man” whom he (defendant’s Manager)
wished to accommodate, and the defendant has not proven that this “white man” had any
“better right” to occupy the “first class” seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and
for which the corresponding “first class” ticket was issued by the defendant to him. 40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed.
It is well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner’s manager, petitioner, his
employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the
provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. 43And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the
public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts
and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended
with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier’s employees, naturally, could give
ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled
to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from
such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees
towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. 44
Thus, “Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger’s check, it was a breach of
contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to
falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection,
though the language used was not insulting and she was not ejected.” 46 And this, because,
although the relation of passenger and carrier is “contractual both in origin and nature”
nevertheless “the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort”. 47 And in another case,
“Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect his fare tendered
him the cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as
soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to destination,
there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in using
insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic,” 48 and the Supreme Court of South
Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.
Petitioner’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carrascoso’s action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation
of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso’s testimony, thus —
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
A When we left already — that was already in the trip — I could not help it. So one of the
flight attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and
she said, “We will note that you transferred to the tourist class”. I said, “Nothing of that kind.
That is tantamount to accepting my transfer.” And I also said, “You are not going to note
anything there because I am protesting to this transfer”.
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don’t have enough
leg room, I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there.
He told me, “I have recorded the incident in my notebook.” He read it and translated it to me
— because it was recorded in French — “First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist
class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene.”
Mr. VALTE —
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence
would be the notes. Your Honor.
COURT —
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49

Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in
his notebook reading “First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his
will, and that the captain refused to intervene” is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso’s
testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the
entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription
of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact
of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as
yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res
gestae. 50 For, they grow “out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of
the declarant”. 51 The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was
spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has
been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res
gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner.
It would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso’s testimony.
If it were really true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have
cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to
grant exemplary damages — in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that
defendant should have “acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner.” 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits
into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages.54
9. The right to attorney’s fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies
a similar judgment for attorneys’ fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt
that it is but just and equitable that attorneys’ fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith
with the tradition that discretion well exercised — as it was here — should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages,
and P3,000.00 as attorneys’ fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial
court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense
suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to
the reasonableness thereof.57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible
error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Bengzon, J.P., J., took no part.