Dunn (1968) The Identity of Histoy of Ideas

Royal Institute of Philosophy
The Identity of the History of Ideas

Author(s): John Dunn
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Philosophy, Vol. 43, No. 164 (Apr., 1968), pp. 85-104
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy
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THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL INSTITUTE
OF PHILOSOPHY
VOLTXLIII No. 164 APRIL 1968
THE IDENTITY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS

JOHN DUNN
Two typesofcriticism are frequentlylevelledat thehistory ofideas

in general' and the historyof politicaltheoryin particular.The
firstis verymuchthatofhistorians practisingin otherfields;thatitis
writtenas a saga in whichall the greatdeeds are done by entities
whichcould not,in principle,do anything.In it, Scienceis always
wrestlingwith Theology,Empiricismwith Rationalism,monism
withdualism,evolutionwiththeGreatChain ofBeing,artifice with
nature,Politikwithpoliticalmoralism.Its protagonists are never
humans,butonlyreified abstractions-or, ifhumansbyinadvertence,
humansonly as the loci of theseabstractions. The othercharge,
one morefrequently levelledby philosophers,is thatit is insensitive
to thedistinctive featuresofideas,unconcerned with,or moreoften
ineffectual in itsconcernwith,truthand falsehood, itsproductsmore
like intellectualseed.cataloguesthan adequate studiesof thought.
In shortit is characterisedby a persistenttensionbetweenthe
threatsoffalsityin itshistoryand incompetence in its philosophy.1
At firstsight both thesecharges seem plausible.One mightwell
supposethatthestatusofpropositions about the history of thought
of a
wouldbe at issuebothin theaccuracyoftheirlocation particular
eventin the past and in the adequacy oftheirunderstanding ofthe
natureof the eventso located.Statements about a typeof event in
the past, statements that eventX took place at time P, may be
mistakenin theirclaimsthat (the eventthattookplace at timeP)
was an eventof X-typeor that (an eventof X-type)didtakeplace
at timeP. Concentration on theidentificationofsometypesofevent
(e.g. in thehistory ofideas,thesubtlersortsofanalysisofclassicsof
philosophy)may well lead to greaterconcernforanalyticalcom-
plexityand forcethan formerehistoricity,3 and concentration on
merehistoricity may well lead to a shabbysortof level of under-
standingof whatit was thatdid existin the past. In thisway the
A 85
PHILOSOPHY
twotypesofcriticism can readilybe seenas theadvocacyofdifferent

formsof enquirywithinthe commonsubject-matter. This would
makethe issuebetweenthemnotone oftruthor falsitybut merely
of the tactical choice between competingsimplifications. The
cartographicmetaphoris clearlyapt here. It is not convenientto
attemptto representall conceivablyreplicablefeaturesof a geo-
graphicalenvironment on any singlemap. But thistellsus nothing
of the ontologicallimitations of cartography. Maps are maps, not
regrettably ineffectual surrogates forphysicalenvironments. And if
such a choice betweencompetingevils is necessary,it must be
equally legitimateto representit as a choice betweencompeting
goods.Thispainlessresolution is in factthatwhichmostpractitioners
adopt (in so far,thatis, as theysee any need forresolution;thisis,
at worst,forthema matterof discounting risks;not,of course,a
matterofmakingstatements whichare deliberately false,historically
or philosophically).Afterone has chosenthe aspect of a subject-
matterwhich most concernsone, the criticismsof those whose
interestin it is verydifferentare discounted.If choiceis necessary
and some sortof failurecertain,thenone shouldplainlychoose to
discountthecostsofthetypeoffailureone has chosen.Such axioms
about the necessarylimitations ofhumanskillsare nothingbut the
mostordinarycommonsense.
What I wishprincipallyto arguein thispaper is thatthecostsof
such self-abnegation are muchhigherthanis normallyrecognised;
thatthe connectionbetweenan adequate philosophicalaccountof
the notionsheld by an individualin the past and an accurate
historicalaccount of these notionsis an intimateone; thatboth
historicalspecificityand philosophicaldelicacyare morelikelyto be
attainediftheyare pursuedtogether, thanifone is desertedforthe
otherat an earlystageof the investigation. In otherwords,I wish
to claimthatthedisagreements overtheappropriatesubject-matter
and formof explanationforthe historyof ideas, thoughtheyare
indeedpersuasionsto chooseto examineone formof description of
intellectualacts in thepast ratherthananother,are also something
more.What is in questionis not merelya choicebetweentrue(or
false) storiesbut a problemintrinsic to the attemptto tell stories
about thistypeofdata. More precisely, I wishto claim: 1, thatthe
completionofbothtypesofinvestigation is a necessarypreliminary
to the construction of an indefeasibleexplanationof eithertype;
2, thata sensitiveexerciseofbothtypesofexplanationand a realisa-
tion of the sort of problemswhich an audience would have in
followingthe storywill tendto producea convergence of tacticin
this pursuit;that a rationalexplanationof a past philosophical
dilemma,a causal explanationofa pastphilosopher's enterpriseand
86
THE IDENTITY OF THE HISTORY OF IEAS
an accountof eitherof theserenderedintelligibleto an ignorant

laymanwilldisplaya considerablesymmetry offormand thatmost
oftheunsatisfactory featuresofthehistoryofideas as writtencomes
fromits notablelack of resemblanceto any such form.I hope to
makethesesomewhatcloudynotionsclearerin the finalsectionsof
thispaper.
There is nothingveryobscureabout thenotionthatmuchofthe
historyofideas as writtendisplaysa certainphilosophicalcrassness,
whetheror notthisis true.But whatexactlyare we to makeofthe
complaintmentioned aboveaboutthe'bloodlessness'ofthehistory of
ideas? I shall attemptto dramatisethischargein what follows,in
orderto make its appeal moreobvious.4The point,in essence,is
simpleenough.Apartfromodd examplesin the history ofreligious
developmentor scientific fewbranchesof the historyof
discovery,
ideas have been writtenas the historyof an activity.Complicated
structuresof ideas, arrangedin a mannerapproximating as closely
as maybe (frequently closerthantheevidencepermits)to deductive
systemshave been examinedat different pointsin time or their
morphology tracedoverthe centuries.Reifiedreconstructions of a
greatman'smoreaccessiblenotionshave been comparedwiththose
of othergreatmen; hencethe weirdtendencyof muchwriting, in
the historyof politicalthoughtmoreespecially,to be made up of
what propositions in what greatbooksremindthe authorof what
propositionsinwhatothergreatbooks.Key principles oftheexplana-
torythought-systems ofsocialgroups,ofcommunities, and ofwhole
countrieshave been pursuedthroughthe centuries.As a make-
weightto thistypeofanalysis,we have biographiesofgreatthinkers
whichidentify thecentralarguments oftheirmoreimportant works,
sketchin theirsocialbackgroundin somedetailand expatiateupon
theirmeritsor moralrelevanceto thepresentday. Finallywe have
formalphilosophicalanalysesof the worksof greatphilosophers or
scientistswhichtellus whatHobbes'stheoryofobligationor Plato's
theoryofjustice or Galileo's theoryof motionis and how farwe
shouldacceptit.5All oftheseenterprisesare recognised,and properly
recognised, as forming partofa pursuitwhichcan be labelledas the
'historyofideas'. Yet noneofthemis necessarily boundto (and few
everin factdo) provideany sortofhistoricalaccountofan activity
whichwe would recognise,in commonsenseterms,as 'thinking'.
The historyof thoughtas it is characteristically writtenis not a
historyof men battlingto achieve a coherentorderingof their
experience.It is,rather,a history
offictions-ofrationalist
constructs
out of the thoughtprocessesofindividuals,not ofplausibleabridg-
mentsof thesethoughtprocesses.It consistsnot of representations,
but, in the mostliteralsense,of reconstructions, not of plausible
87
PHILOSOPHY
accountsofhow men thought,but of moreor lesspainfulattempts

to elaboratetheirideas to a degreeofformalintellectual articulation
whichthereis no evidencethattheyeverattained.
Becauseofthesefeatures, it is oftenextremely unclearwhetherthe
historyof ideas is the historyof anythingwhichever did actually
existin thepast,whetherit is nothabituallyconductedin a manner
in which the relationshipof evidenceto conclusionis so tenuous
thatit providesno groundsat all forassent.For thereare certain
banal truthswhich the customaryapproachesappear to neglect;
that thinkingis an effortful activityon the part of humanbeings,
notsimplya unitaryperformance; thatincompleteness, incoherence,
instabilityand theeffort to overcometheseare itspersistent charac-
teristics;
thatit is notan activitywhichtakesitsmeaningfroma set
of finishedperformances whichhave been set up in typeand pre-
servedin libraries,but an activitywhichis conductedmoreor less
incompetently formostoftheirwakinglifeby a substantialpropor-
tion of the human race, which generatesconflictsand which is
used to resolvethese,whichis directedtowardsproblem-solving and
nottowardstheconstruction ofclosedformalgames;thattheworks
in whichat a singlepointin timea setofproblemsissuein an attempt
at a coherentrationalorderingof the relevantexperienceare in
some sense unintelligibleexcept in termsof this context; that
language is not, as the seventeenth-century savants mocked, a
repository offormaltruthsdonatedby God to Adam but simplythe
toolwhichhumanbeingsuse in theirstruggle to makesenseoftheir
experiences.Once talkingand thinkingare consideredseriouslyas
social activities,it will be apparentthatintellectualdiscussions will
onlybe fullyunderstood iftheyare seenas complicatedinstancesof
thesesocial activities.
All ofthisis, ofcourse,to beg thequestionat issue; but it has its
glib plausibility. Whetherit has anythingelse is whatI shall tryto
show.May thechargeperhapsamountto nothingmoreinteresting
than a pun on the word 'understanding'? The notionsof under-
standingand explaininghistoricaleventshave recentlyreceiveda
considerableamountofphilosophical attention.6Complicatedissues
of epistemology and of the logicalformsof explanationshave been
extensivelyexplored and the practice of historianssomewhat
clarified.But the extentof the disagreement whichremainsis still
considerableand its precisecharacterfrequently elusive.
Consider the followingplausible historians'assignments.1,
Explain why Plato wrote the Republic.2, Explain why Plato's
ideal statehas an authoritarian politicalstructure.3, Explain why
Plato criticisesThrasymachus'saccountof justice in the Republic.
4, ExplainwhytheRoman empirein thewestcollapsed.5, Explain
88
why therewas a FrenchRevolutionbetween 1750 and 1820. 65

Explainwhytherewas a FrenchRevolutionin 1789.7, Explainwhy
therewas not an EnglishRevolutionin 1831.
Someoftheseseemtobe problemsaboutthestatesofconsciousness
ofagents;othersdo not.Some seemto demandan accountoftheset
ofpremiseswhichmakea givenargumentor setofarguments seem
cogent.Some seem to be answerableby a detailednarrativeof a
periodof timein the past. Othersdo not seem to be susceptibleof
narrativetreatment at all. That is to say, a storyof the periodsin
pointseemsto leave the questionraised quite unanswered.What
storycould possiblyexplain why therewas a FrenchRevolution
between1750 and 1820? It wouldneed a mostremarkablestoryof
1789 to seem an appropriateanswerto thatquestion.Whyshould
one wishto assimilateone setofthesequestionsto another,stillless
reducethemall to one sort?Or, to put the issuedifferently, why
shouldone supposethatthevenerabledisputebetweenidealistand
positivistphilosophersof history,or its more recentavatar, that
betweenthe exponentsofcausal and thoseof 'rational'or narrative
explanations,betweenthe notionsof historyas applied general
sociologyoras storieswhichhappentobe true,is a realdisputeat all ?
Is it not ratheran attemptto legislateforthe typeof historical
explanations whichshouldideallybe given,a lengthy exercisein the
persuasivedefinition of the adjective'historical'?Whatconceivable
setofcausal laws could 3 be subsumedbeneath?Or whatnarrative
or set of reasonsconstitute an answerto 4 or 5? Givingreasonsfor
why an argumentseemedcogentto an individualin the past, or
why an act seemed appropriateis not an instanceof subsuming
anythingundera causal law, thoughthereare certainlycauses for
theappearanceofcogencyin theargument or appropriateness
in the
act. No explanationof the persistenceand change of a complex
social systemover time can be adequatelyprovidedby a story.
But both of theselast two enterprises, whetheror not theyhave
everbeencarriedout in a definitively satisfactorymanner,represent
intelligibleand characteristic explanatoryenterprises of historians
and the attemptto reducethemto the same typeof enterprise is
absurd. But to insistthat thereis a correctmodel forhistorical
explanationimpliesthat one or otherof these,causal or rational,
mustbe merelyprovisional, preliminaries to the constructionof an
explanationofthe approvedform.In any case, does eitherof them
provide an appropriateformof explanationfor the historyof
ideas (surelyan ideal exampleforthosewitha strongdistasteforthe
morescientistic aspirationsofhistorians) ?
What is the subject-matter of the historyofideas; past thinking,
philosophy, ideas,ideologies?And whatindeedis itsform;a set of
89
PHILOSOPHY
narratives,a set of subsumptionsof individualinstancesunder

coveringlaws, a set of reconstructed rationaliaforspecificphilo-
sophical performances?Most urgently,how far does causality
intrudeintothissensitiveintellectualist enquiryand how farare its
permitted intrusions a matterofintellectual tasteon thepartofthe
historianand howfara matterofprofessional obligation;howfarin
shortis the meaningof any set of ideas irreducibly infectedby the
conditionsofitsbirth?
One mightwantto saythatanystatement madebyanyindividual
at anytimecouldonlybe said to be fully understood ifone knewthe
conditioning-history and thesetofpresentstimulusconditions which
elicitedit. And yet human beingsdo to some extentunderstand
each otherand by the timetheyreachthe age of speech the very
notionof such a historyof theirconditioning seemsto elude our
picturesof them.(Not just, no one has ever been able to provide
such a specification, but who would seriouslyclaim to be able to
imaginewhatitwouldbe liketoknowsucha storyand thenconfront
theindividualwhosestoryit was,whatthelogicalrelationsbetween
such a storyand our own descriptions of actionswould be like?)8
Clearly,ifthiswerea necessaryconditionforunderstanding a state-
mentwe could not have acquiredtheverynotionofunderstanding
statements.Indeed, one mightsay that to suppose anythingso
implausibleis simplyto confusepsychology withepistemology, to
mistakethegeneticsofa statement foritslogicalstatus,a tirederror.
But the initialpropositionwas not thatone could not understand
statements at all but thatone could notfullyunderstand them;that
anyunderstanding was in principleliable to be exposedas including
a specificmisunderstanding ofsomefeatureofwhatit is claimedto
understand. Butwhatsortoffeature?For,anyexplanationofa given
linguisticact in termsofitshistory can onlygiveat bestthenecessary
and sufficient conditionsof its occurrence.It cannotgive any full
accountofitstruth status.9This doesnotmeanthatsuchan explana-
tioncannotincludean accountofwhyX thoughtit to be true(in so
faras he did do so)-plainly thismustbe included-nor even an
accountofwhyX thoughtit was truethoughmanywiththe same
valuesas X and greaterspecificskillswouldhave been able to show
conclusively whyit was false.What the explanationcannotgivein
purelyhistoricaltermsis an accountof whyit is trueor false.To
put the pointmostsimply,in the historyofscience,the full set of
statements about the sufficient conditionsofAristarchus of Samos's
heliocentrism does notserveto tellus thesensesin whichhistheory
was trueor false.10
If thisassertionis correct,importantconclusionsfollow.In the
historyof philosophy,for example, the only account of a past
90
philosophicalperformance whichcould be said to be completeat

any one timemustcomprisethe completeSkinnerianstoryof its
genesis'1andthebestavailableassessment ofitstruthstatus.Further-
more it implies that every completeaccount in the historyof
philosophyis implicitlydated. (Not, of course,everystatementin
the history ofphilosophy;as, forexample,Plato wrotetheRepublic;
the followingwordsoccur in the Republic in the followingorder:
even, Locke's Essaycontainscriticisms of a doctrinethatthereare
innatelyknowntruths.)For itstruthis contingent on the adequacy
of thisphilosophicalassessment;and the criteriaforthe adequacy
of the assessment changeover time.Perhaps,though,the pointis
trivial.So, afterall, do the criteriafortruthclaimsin psychology;
say,fromAquinastoDescartes,to Bain,to Skinner.In thenineteenth
centurythe idea of a completephysicsdid not seem fatuousand
hence a completepsychologyat least in principleconceivable.
Today, wherethe idea of indefeasible physicaltruthis so puzzling,
theidea ofan indefeasiblepsychology seems grotesque.Perhapsit is
grotesque.In whichcase theclaimcollapsesintothebanalitythatall
explanationsare implicitlydated. One could also perhapsargue
fora necessarytime-specificity in thephilosophicalaccounton lines
parallel to those which Danto uses12to distinguish betweencon-
temporary-and future-specific descriptions of events, as in the
Yeatspoemon Leda and theSwan: 'A shudderin theloinsengenders
there/The brokenwall,theburningroofand tower/And Agamemnon
dead.' But it seemsequally plausibletoday to argue fora time-
in the causal story.It's not simplywhat truestatements
specificity
thereare to make about the past (the contemporary- or future-
specificdescriptions of the past) whichalters;but whatone knows
the past to have been like.In the same way changesin physicalor
chemicalknowledgemay have effectsin geologywhichalter the
geologicalstory,whilethehistory ofthehumanrace as suchat most
altersthelabelsattachedto different areasofthegeologicalsubject-
matter.
Even at thislevelofabstraction theargumentclearlyimpliesthat
thereare twonecessarycomponents to theidentification
ofeverypast
performance of philosophicalimportance,two descriptions of the
act whichrequireverydifferent verificatory procedures.A major
argumentof thispaper is that much of the incoherenceand im-
plausibilityin thehistory ofideas stemsfromthefailureto separate
theseadequatelyand thatmostabstractmethodological arguments
in the subject depend upon an effortto make one of the two
descriptionsoftheact all-important and theothertrivial.Theyerrin
proffering one description as the overriding, the correct,
description
of the performance in place of the other. It seems clear that both
91
PHILOSOPHY
descriptions are in principlecorrect,thattheyconstitute answersto

different questionsabout the natureof the act. What is muchless
clear (perhaps,even,not alwaystruein practice)is the claim that
theycannot be broughtoffperfectly well separately.The causal
storyis clearlya veryintricatepieceofhistorical explanationbutthe
philosophicalanalysismaywell seemsimpler.May we notfollowa
suggestion of Alan Ryan's'3in leavingto thehistorian thequestion
of'whatLockeintended'and confining our attention to 'whatLocke
said'? The questionthenis simplyhow we mayknow'what Locke
said'. Perhaps,ifwe examinethehistory ofpoliticaltheorywe shall
contriveto discoversuch a temporally inviolateentity.
What is it thatthe historyof politicalthoughtis the historyof?
Two things,at least; thesetofarguedpropositions in thepastwhich
discusshow the politicalworldis and oughtto be and whatshould
constitute thecriteriaforproperactionwithinit; thesetofactivities
in whichmenwereengagedwhentheyenunciatedthesepropositions.
The precisedegreeof abstractionwhichplaces a givenproposition
insideor outsidethe categoryis obviouslyprettyarbitrary. But the
identification ofthecontinuumon whichthisbreakoccursis simple
enough-roughlyfromthe Republicor SocialChoiceand Individual
Valuesto the singleexpletive'Fascist'. To the two typesof history
therecorrespondtwo sortsof integralexplanation,'rational' and
causal.'4 Betweenthe two,and punningly encompassing both,there
lies a third,narrative,whichis 'rational'withoutthe humilityand
causal withoutthe criteriaof achievement.The firstlooks like a
historyof political arguments;the second a historyof political
arguing.One developsthe coherencewhicha set of politicalpro-
positionsseemsto have heldforitsproponents and comments on the
statusof thiscoherence(places it withincriteriaof rationality and
irrationalityto whichwe accede today); it maps the logicof argu-
mentsand setstheseout againstits own prescriptive logic,so that
theirstructure can be graspedclearly.All the statements contained
in it are statements about the relationshipsof propositions to pro-
positions.Men, breathing,excreting,hating,mocking,neverstep
insideit. Theirroleis merelyto label a particularsetofpropositions
with the name which theybear themselves. Their names appear
in thisstorybutnevertheirselves.It is a taleto be toldbycleverand
subtlemen,and it signifies muchbut in it thereis neithersoundnor
fury.But history,surely,is about the world and not about pro-
positions.Where,in the world,do these propositions have their
place? In whatdoes theirhistoricity consist?The answerplainlyis
that theyare not merelypropositions, logical structures; theyare
also statements. Men have said (or at least written)them.So the
men appear again in thestory,appear as speakers.It is in the role
92
THE IDENTITY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEMA
ofthe speakerthatthisdisembodiment of theproposition beginsto

be threatened.
For thereare threeways in commonsense termsthat one may
misunderstand what it is that a man has said. The meaningone
attributes to his wordsmaynot be a meaningthatcan properlybe
attributedto themin his public language (in whichcase the only
waytheinterpretation couldbe correctwouldbe ifhe characteristic-
ally misusedhis language in this particularway). The meaning
whichone attributesto themmay not have been that which he
intendedthemto bear.'5 The meaningwhichone attributes to his
act in sayingthem may be mistaken.One's identification of the
speech act may fail in its grasp of the lexical possibilities,of the
historical actualityoftheproposition whichhe intendedto enunciate
(usuallyone ofthelexicalpossibilities),'8 or ofwhathe was doingin
sayingit. The failureto graspa setofpropositions correctly
maybe
due towhatis necessarily a mistranslation(an erroraboutlanguage),
in facta misinterpretation ofwhatsomeonehas said (an errorabout
a propositional enterpriseofa humanbeing)or a misinterpretation
ofhisbehaviourin sayingit (an errorabout thenatureofa complex
action).
If the historicity of the historyof philosophyor politicaltheory
consistsin thefactthatthestatements weremade at a particulardate
by a particularperson,thenit seemsthattheenterprise ofidentifica-
tioncan be confinedto the avoidanceof the firsttwo typesof mis-
understanding. Surely,one mightsay,it matterswhatSocratessaid,
notjust whatwordshe used but whathe was sayingin usingthem
-what he meant.But it does not matter,as faras the historyof
philosophy is concerned,whathe wasdoing insayingthem.Philosophy
as themanipulation offaeces,as thedenunciation ofa sibling,as the
placationof a God or a Party,as a cryof pain, as a mode of self-
gratification, may be an apt enough descriptionof the historical
activitiesofphilosophers, butit has nothingto do withthehistory of
philosophy.No description of the psychologicalstateof the philo-
sophercan infectthetruthorfalsity ofwhathe maintains. Philosophy
is about truthnot about action.It may be a profoundsociological
truth(well,it might, anyway)thatsocialismis a cryofpain.'7 But
this tells us nothingof the truthstatusof such propositions and
argumentsas constituteSocialism.In logical terms,one can yelp
truthas readilyas speakit.18
The problem,however,is more pressingthan this. There are
occasionson whichone cannotknowwhata man meansunlessone
knowswhat he is doing. Suppose a personwere to give a parody
of the sortof argumentnormallyproducedin favourof a position
which he particularlydetests-say, in an argumentabout the
93
PHILOSOPHY
justificationforpunishinghomosexualacts as such,to describean

allegedcausal relationship betweenchangesin the sexual moresof
theRomanaristocracy and themilitary collapseoftheRomanempire
in theWest.If,at theend oftheimpassionedand sneeringrecital,a
listenerwereto be askedwhat the speakerin questionhad said, it
mightbe possibleforhimto providea fullrecordofthewordsused
and in thecorrectorderand withperfectunderstanding oftherules
forthe use foreach particularwordand yetstillnothave understood
whatwas said. Of course,such a misapprehension could readilybe
describedas a failureto graspwhatthespeakerwas doingin saying
thosewords;and thisis clearlyan apt description. But it does seem
at leastequallynaturalto describeit as notunderstanding 'whathe
was saying'. 'Doing thingswith words' is sayingthings,just as
sayingthingsis doingthingswithwords.19 Parodyorevenironyare
notjust acts whichhold the worldat a respectful distance.They
are ways of sayingthingsabout the world. It would surelybe
impossibleto writea coherentaccountofPlato'sideas in theGorgias
or Hume's in theDialoguesconcerning NaturalReligion withouttaking
noteofthefactthatsomeofthepropositions whichtheycontainare
highlyironicalin character.On the otherhand clearlya coherent
accountof the argumentsin theseworksdoes not necessarily itself
containlotsofironicalpropositions. The pointthatneedsemphasis
is onlythattheidentification ofwhatPlatoor Hume'sarguments are
is contingent on understanding whattheyweredoingin enunciating
certainpropositions at particularpointsin theirworks.But the sort
of specificand primitive failureof identificationherein questionis
hardlythemostfrequent danger.Mustit notin anycase be possible
to elicitthecorrectidentificationofthemeaningfromthetextitself?
For,itwouldbe mostembarrassing ifitis thecase thatwe needsome
accurateemotionaland cognitivechartofPlato's experiences while
writingthe work,or some sortof abridgedstoryof his intellectual
career beforehand, in orderto grasp it fully,since we manifestly
know almostnothingabout these except fromthe pages of the
dialogues.20 But,to take a vulgarexamplefromthe causal storyas
we have had it told,just what sortof lightdoes it shed on the
arguments oftheRepublic, supposingthatit werein somesensetrue,
to saythatit is an instanceoftheideologyofthedecliningAthenian
politicalelite?
Clearlyit doesnottellus whetheranyparticularargumentin the
workis trueor false.But iftheclaimabout thecausal storycan be
sustained,it mustto somedegreeimproveour identification of the
arguments as arguments. At firstsightthisseemsimplausible.For,
whatsortofacts can we adequatelyidentify in termsoftheirsocial
causation? Crudely,one can provide an account of the social
94
causation of acts which can be specifiedas the performance of

socially defined roles (this is circular). These can be widely
differentiated and may not look as thoughtheyhave any social
componentat all; attackingthegovernment, defending (or affirming
the rationality of) the social structure,lovingone's wife,praising
God, philosophising. The sole necessaryconditionis that the act
mustappear onlyas an instanceof the role (cf. 'lovingone's wife'
with'howone lovesone'swife'),and therolemustbe specified in the
description of the generalsocial order.The onlyparticularswhich
appear in the accountmustappear as instancesof universals.No
descriptionof a social structure, taken by itselfand withoutthe
additionofa hugenumberofdatedstatements abouttheindividual,
could enableone to deducethecompletelifestoryoftheindividual.
This is quite irrelevantto the issueofwhetherone can in principle
predict all human behaviour; merelya logical featureof any
explanationof individualacts in termsof a social structure. This
manifestly does not mean that one cannot improve one's under-
standingofan individualact by improving thesocial description of
it (cf.Whyis he kneelingin discomfort in thegloomconsuming that
tastelessfoodand ill-flavoured wine? Answer,he is partakingofthe
Body and the Blood of Christ.But comparethe complexitytoday
of the demand: 'Describejust what he is doing in "worshipping
God" in thatway'). Butwhatwouldit meanifit weretrue,ignoring
thevulgarity ofthe chosenphrasing,thattheRepublic was ideology
forthe decliningAthenianpoliticalelite,as it were,an-acceptable
substituteforbeing Critias? It clearlywould not mean thatany
descriptionof the social role of the decliningAthenianpolitical
6litewould have writtenthe Republic foryou. It is a veryabstract
descriptionof the book and what we are interested in, if we are
interested in the historyof philosophyor politicaltheory,is a very
concretedescription. Whatcould be said to be sociallycausedabout
the Republicis at most certain featuresof it.21 The authori-
tarianpoliticalstructureof Plato's Utopia is not the Republic, is
not why it appears in the historyof politicalthought,let alone
philosophy.22
But here again we have clearlyrejectedtoo much. For, those
featuresoftheRepublic forwhichwe mightattemptto sketchcausal
explanationsin termsof the social historyof Athenscan certainly
tell us somethingabout the argumentsof the book as such. It is
whenwe cometo lookfortheunstatedpremises ofPlato'sarguments
or attemptto understand whythestatedpremisesseemedto himto
need no further extrinsicjustification,
thatwe see theirrelevance.
All arguments have to startsomewhere.Different sortsof explana-
tionsoftheplausibility ofa premiseto an individualprovidedifferent
95
PHILOSOPHY
sortsofblocking-off pointsto theaccountwhichcan be givenofhis

argument.The constantthreatofanachronism, thewhollyspurious
transparency which sometimescharacterises what men have said
in the past, makes the correctidentification of the premisesof
arguments and theexplanationofthesethebasicprecondition foran
adequate account,whetherhistoricalor philosophical.If we are to
understandthecriteriaoftruthor falsehoodimplicitin a complex
we have to understandthe structures
intellectualarchitectonic, of
biographicalor social experiencewhichmade thesecriteriaseem
self-evident.To abstractan argumentfromthe contextof truth-
criteriawhichit was devisedto meetis to convertit intoa different
argument.If, in our insistent urge to learn fromthe arguments of
the past, we assumethat its consequentlyenhancedintelligibility
will teach us more,we merelyguaranteethat what it teachesus
mustbe something differentfromwhatit saysand furthermore that
whatit teachesus mustbe muchcloserto whatwe alreadyknow.If
the effortto learn fromphilosophersof the past is a plausible
philosophicalheuristic,it would be most odd if it can be best
carriedout ingeneral by failingto grasptheiractual arguments. As
it
John Passmoreput recently: 'Too often,indeed, such polemical
writingsconsistin tellingmenofstrawthattheyhave no brains'.23
If we wishto exploitthecausalstory,thehistory ofphilosophising,
forsuch a purpose,and ifwe are nevergrantedaccessto the very
specialcausal storiespreviouslysuggestedas paradigmsforexplana-
tion,fromwhatsortofstoriescan we benefit?Motive-explanations
and ideologicalexplanationscan bothbe made causal in form(the
former withsomedifficulty)and bothcouldundersomecircumstances
to a complexstructure
lend greaterintelligibility ofideas; but they
certainlyraise problems.Even a sociologicaltheorylike func-
tionalismiswildlyevasivewhengivenconsistent causalinterpretationM
and there have been psychologicalexperimentsabout emotions
designedto establishempirically whatare necessary logicaltruths.25
Even iftheyare to function as blocksto furtherrationalexplanation
they must be rationally-connected motivesor ideologies or no
explanationcan be providedofthespecificintellectual explicandum,
just a descriptionof it whichsuppressesits intellectualspecificity.
Clearly the sortofjejune retrospective sociologyof knowledgeor
randombiographicalinformation which we have at our disposal
before,say,thenineteenth centuryare notgoingto helpverymuch.
Butevenifthisis verymucha counselofperfection, or despair,it is
not one whichwe can honourablyavoid. There mustbe a pointin
any argumentat whicha man stopsbeing able to give reasons-
and at thatpointtheorganismhas to givethemfortheman. Some,
verygeneral,seemalmostbiologicaldata; like the demandto give
96
generalreasonsforthepracticeofself-preservation. Such a request,

whileit is intelligibleenoughto some (could evenbe said to have a
whole modernphilosophydevisedas an attemptedanswer),must
simplyseem a categorymistaketo mostpeople. A fewsuch teleo-
logical laws are widelycreditedas axioms.In describinga philo-
sophicalprojectcoherently someof the premisesmustbe authenti-
cated in thisway, extra-intellectually. Any deductivesystemmust
have someaxiomsand thereare someclaimsforanyonewhichare
simplyaxioms,wherea requestfora reasonforthe statement will
onlybe metby a causal explanationofitsaxiomaticstatus,thatit is
one of the stipulations of thisman's history.'I just do thinkeating
people is wrong.'Such causal explanationsmay be hard indeedto
findin the past. Even ifour explanatoryaccountscome to include
explicitfictionsas explanatoryterms(and afterall mosthistorical
accountscontainmore or less discreetfictions),at least this will
enableothersto attemptto testtheirtruthor falsity. Onlyifwe learn
to make our fictionsexplicitare we everlikelyto escape fromour
presentconceptualmorass,fromthe persisting problemof never
knowing just whatwe are talkingabout.26
Having in this disheartenedway evaded the question of
what sort of storiesto look for in the historyof philosophising,
thereremainsthe questionof what to look forthe storiesof. The
history ofphilosophy, thatPlatonicactivity whichhas beenextricated
belatedly from causality, deodorised,anaesthetised,pure, that
history mustnecessarily be written in termsofcurrentphilosophical
interests.This doesnotmeanthatithas to be falsified in termsofour
currentphilosophical tastes,becausethecausal story,in so faras we
can stilldiscoverit, has alwaysto be elaboratedfirst.Its historicity
isitssufficientand itssolelegitimate immunity fromourphilosophical
prejudices.To call thesearbitrary is vacuous.A man forwhomthe
philosophicalarticulations of a society,thinnedout in the tortuous
distillations of rationalityfrom'the furyand the mire of human
veins',appear arbitrary is a man whoseinadvertence takesin both
the philosophicaland the causal stories,a man forwhom every-
thingmustbe arbitrary. And in theinsightthateveryhumaninterest
is arbitrary (as withthestorythatall humanexperienceis a dream)
we do not gain a truth,we merelylose a word.If we did notwrite
it in termsofthesecurrentphilosophical interests
therewouldbe no
interestsin termsofwhichto defineit. A philosophical analysisofthe
Republic seemsapt,whereone oftheIliador theGortyn Codedoesnot,
and thisscarcelyraisesa problem.Epics and law codesin primitive
societiessimplyare not philosphical-eventhoughone mightbe a
littleembarrassed by beingpressedon thestatusof-say-Blake, or
Milton,or Dante; and even thoughPeterWinchwritesas though
97
PHILOSOPHY
Codewas necessarily'philo-
any sociologicalanalysisof the Gortyn
sophical'.27
No doubtthereare trueclaimsto be made in theseareasbysome-
what stretching the meaningof the word 'philosophical'.But the
centralpoint remainsthat epics and law codes are conceptually
set in well-defined areas of activity,whateverone can learnfrom
them about the historyof philosophy,28 and appeal explicitly or
implicitlyfor theirstandingto many criteriaaltogetherdiscrete
fromthenatureoftruth.29 The historyofphilosophy, likethehistory
ofscience,mustneedsbe Whigas to subject-matter, just as, likeall
history,it mustbe Tory as to truth.This does not mean thatone
shouldnecessarily studyKant ratherthan ChristianWolff;onlythat
one should selectphilosophically interestingphilosophy,afterone
has identified what philosophythereis to study.30 The criteriafor
selectingthis,as indeedin a broadersensethecriteriaofwhatin the
indentifiedpast is philosophyat all, are providedby philosophy
today.But thecriteriaprovidedby philosophytodayneed neverbe
merelythose of philosophyyesterday.The criterionof future
philosophicalinterest is theachievement oftheinvestigator, notthe
traditionofthe Schools.What we can learnfromthepast is always
whatwe can succeedin learning;and theeducativepastcan change
-as ifsomedisusedMendiplead-working wereone day to disclose
a new and precioussortofuranium.
But this hardlyprovidesany very helpfuldirection.To bring
togetherthe threadsof Utopian persuasion,we mustreturnto the
contextsof the utteranceswhich men produce. If a statementis
consideredin a fullyopen context,itsmeaningmaybe anylexically
possiblesetofcolligations oftheutteredpropositions. A man might
mean by it anything thata man mightmean by it. The problemof
interpretation is alwaysthe problemof closingthe context.What
closesthe contextin actualityis the intention(and, much more
broadly,the experiences)of the speaker.Locke, in talking,talks
about whathe talksabout. The problemof the historianis always
thathis experiencealso drasticallyclosesthe contextof utterance;
indeedall tooreadilyturnsa factaboutthepastintoa factaboutthe
intellectualbiographyofthehistorian.If in theseventeenth century
Lockeand Hobbesare thetwoEnglishpoliticaltheorists whomwe all
read and if,had we been writingLocke's majorwork,we should
surelyhave wished to addressourselvesmainlyto the worksof
Hobbes,it is a verysimpleellipseto supposethatLockemustsurely
have been addressing himselfto Hobbes. Indeed it is so simplethat
menwillgo to the most extraordinarilyintricatetheoreticallengths
torescuethissomewhatsubjective'appearance'.3'The solutiontothe
historian'sproblemis formally simple,to substitute the closureof
98
contextprovidedby the biographyofthespeakerforthatprovided

by the biographyofthehistorian.But such a projectis not merely,
in a trivialsense and pace Collingwood,logicallyimpossible.It is
also in a more pragmaticsense overwhelmingly difficult.
But the
difficultyis notone whichwe can consciously agreeto evade. Com-
municatingwhat Locke said and understanding what Locke said
both involvemakingcomprehensible the utteranceof Locke.It is
here that the symmetry betweenunderstanding, explainingand
givingan accountofa philosphicalclaimbecomesstrongest. For any
of these activitiesmust necessarilyinclude what are in effect
abridgments oftheothertwoactivitiesand any ofthemwhichfails
to do so maybe in principlecorrigible byeitheroftheothertwo.The
problemof communicating, forinstance,the meaningof Plato's
Republic to an audience,thesortofproblemwhichthe dim privacy
ofour writingin thehistoryofideas so notablyfailsto solve,is the
prototypicalproblemfor the historianof ideas. For it demands
notthesortofflashing ofprofessionalcreditcards,the GreatChain
of Being,associationism, Vico, whichservewell enoughinsidethe
profession when we all feeltired,that rigidand dead reactionto
recognised pointswhichas Professor Wisdomcomplainedofaesthetics
is 'sometimesfound in dog fanciersand characteristicof the
pharisees',32 but graspingthe point of the original intellectual
enterprise. In the reconstitution ofthisenterprise,theidentification
of the problem,the identification, again pace Collingwood,of why
it was a problemforits proponent(and why manythingswhich
wouldbe forus werenotforhim-firmlya partofthecausal story),
and in the criticaljudgmentof the solution,we turna theorem
about an intellectualenterprisein the past into an intellectual
enterprise in thepresent.All thepremisesin ourown understanding
and representation are insertedfirmlyintothepastas hypotheses for
historicaladjudication.When the audience can thinkof no more
questionsto ask and whenwe can thinkofno new questionsto ask
and can getno moreanswersto ourold questionsfromtheevidence,
such an investigation is completed;until the next investigation
followsin due course.What I wish to emphasiseis that such an
investigation, if at any timeit werecarriedto a conclusion, would
be the onlysortof explanationwhichwould necessarily meetboth
those typesof criticismof the historyof ideas in generalor the
history ofphilosophy or politicaltheoryin particularwhichI began
by noting.All thisindeedis whistling to keep our courageup and
in no immediatedangerofinstantiation. Butunlesswe havea picture
of the possibleshape ofsuccess,it will be hard to see whywe do it
all so badly.33
King'sCollege,
Cambridge.
99
PHILOSOPHY
1Imeanthistermtobe usedas widelyas itsuse in commonspeechwouldsuggest,

itssubject-matter as, in principle,all past thoughts, notjust the ratherindividual
meaninggivento it by ProfessorLovejoy and his pupils. The argumentof the
piece is thatthe historiesof particularintellectualpractices,of science,history,
political theory,economics,theology,etc., are special instancesof this single
unitarycategoryand that whateverautonomytheyenjoy withinit is simplya
matterofliteraryconvenience.In otherwordsit is deniedthata coherentaccount
can be given of any of themwhich lends to them any sort of epistemological
discreteness.
'This claim is clearlymoreplausiblewhenmade about the historyofpolitical
theorythanit is, forinstance,about thehistoryofphilosophy.But it seemsto me
to be quite unmetby even such a helpfulseriesof treatments as thoseedited by
ProfessorPassmore in BeiheftNo. 5, 'The Historiographyof the Historyof
Philosophy',of thejournal History and Theory. For examplesof the two different
perspectives in thehistory ofpoliticaltheoryin workofsomedistinction see on the
one hand Alan Ryan, 'Locke and the Dictatorshipof the Bourgeoisie',Political
Studies, vol. VIII, No. 2 (June,1965), p. 219 and on theother,QuentinSkinner,
'Hobbes's Leviathan'(review article on F. C. Hood, The Divine Politicsof
ThomasHobbes)The Historical Journal, vol. VII, No. 2 (1964), p. 333. For an
exampleofthesortofdifference whichis likelyto appear in full-length treatments
fromthesedifferent perspectivescf. Howard Warrender,The PoliticalPhilosophy
of Hobbes(Oxford: 1957) with the treatmentof Hobbes in C. B. Macpherson,
ThePoliticalTheory ofPossessive
Individualism (Oxford: 1962).
"It seemsto be thecase thattheinterpretation of the famouspassage in David
Hume's Treatise ofHumanNatureon deducing'ought' statementsfrom'is' state-
mentshas been distortedin just thisway. Cf. Treatise,Bk. III, 1, i, with, e.g.
R. M. Hare, TheLanguage ofMorals(Oxford:1952),p. 29. Butthisis controversial.
Cf. A. C. Macintyre,'Hume on "Is" and "Ought" ', Philosophical Review,vol.
LXVIII (October, 1959) with R. F. Atkinson,'Hume on "Is" and "Ought".
A Reply to Mr Macintyre',Philosophical Review,vol. LXX (April, 1961); M. J.
Scott-Taggart,'Macintyre's Hume', Philosophical Review,vol. LXX (April,
1961). Later, Geoffrey Hunter,'Hume on "Is" and "Ought"', Philosophy, vol.
XXXVII (April,1962).AntonyFlew,'On theInterpretation ofHume', Philosophy,
vol. XXXVIII (April, 1963) and Geoffrey Hunter,'A Reply to Professor Flew',
Philosophy, vol. XXXVIII (April,1963).
4In practice,it does notalwaysseemrelevantin particularinstances.The sense
in whichit is trueis I hope made clear by the end ofthe paper.
'This listis,ofcourse,a caricatureand intendedas such. It is notevenadequate
as a preliminary typologyofthesortofbooksthereare. Notablyit does not begin
to give an accountof the bestor the worstof the booksthatare written.In the
lattercase thisis hardlya vice. Butit is importantto emphasise,in orderto avoid
misunderstanding, the veryremarkablequalityof much of the workwhich has
been done in thesesubjectsby Cassirer,Koyrd,Kemp Smith,Lovejoy and many
others.
"I have learntmostfromthefollowing, withoutfullyagreeingwithanyof them:
R. G. Collingwood,TheIdea ofHistory (Oxfordpb. ed.: 1961); PatrickGardiner,
The Natureof HistoricalExplanation(Oxford: 1952); William Dray, Laws and
Explanation in History(Oxford: 1957); W. B. Gallie, Philosophy and theHistorical
Understanding (London: 1964); A. Donagan, TheLaterPhilosophy ofR. G. Collingwood
(Oxford: 1962); A. Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History(Cambridge: 1965);
variousof the articleseditedby PatrickGardinerin Theories ofHistory (Glencoe,
Ill.: 1959) and thejournal,History and Theory (ed. GeorgeNadel); also fromtwo
100
strikingworksby practisinghistorians,T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific

Revolutions(Chicago: 1962) and E. H. Gombrich,ArtandIllusion(London: 1959).
'Most historicalwritingforbetteror worsedoes not consistlargelyofexplana-
tions.This lends an adventitiousforceto the positionof the criticsof 'causal'
explanation.Butifthestoriesare stillto be true,somesortofconcernforcausality
seemsto be inexpugnable.The mostelegantliteraryconstructs in historydo come
to griefon aestheticallytrivialfacts.Pragmaticallythedisputeis reallyoverwhat
to do withthe data, once gathered.The solutionmustsurelybe thata historian
may organisethemin any way whichhe can show to be conceptuallycoherent.
In the particularinstancewhichI am discussingin thispaper the difficulty has
been that the conceptual organisationchosen has oftendeformedthe data.
Different historiansdo (and therecan be no reasonwhytheyshouldnot) design
theirworkas attemptsat applied generalsociologyor at 'storieswhichhappen to
be true'.Professional disputesmay,causally,ariseoverthisdifference oftastebut
theyare conducted,by professional etiquette,as disputesover the truth of pro-
positionsabout thedata. In this,at least,professional etiquetteseemsunassailable.
TIhisdoes not,ofcourse,meansthatsuch a novelformofcomprehension could
nevercome our way,just that it would be novel,i.e. we cannot know what it
would be like untilwe knowwhat it is like. See veryhelpfullyCharles Taylor,
TheExplanation ofBehaviour(London: 1964), pp. 45-48 esp.
'This claim is ambiguous.It does not hold forthosepropositionsthe truthor
falsityof which depends solelyupon the speaker'ssincerityin assertingthem;
reportsof intentions,more dubiouslypromises.For a superb account of the
problemsraised by thesesee J. L. Austin,How to do things withwords(Oxford:
1962). Issuesofsincerity do affectthe truthstatusofpropositions in worksofthe
highestintellectualcomplexity(indeed,thisinsighthas been made the keyto an
entiremethodof interpretation by ProfessorLeo Straussand his distinguished
groupofpupilsfromtheUniversity ofChicago),butit is clearthatthetruthstatus
ofanyproposition ofanydescriptive complexitycannotrestpurelyon thesincerity
ofitsproponent.
10Thereis an importantconventionalsensein whichone can understandwhat
anyonesayswithoutknowingwhetherit is trueor false.Butconsider,forexample,
theprojectofwritinga historyofsciencewithoutbeliefsas to the truthor falsity
of any scientificproposition.Conversely,if Aristarchusthoughtthat the earth
movedaroundthesun,we can understandthenotion,as expressedin theseterms,
withoutmuchdifficulty. But we do not therebyknow,or at least may not know
(i.e. do not know)what Aristarchusmeant unlesswe know the ontologicaland
physicalcontextsat the veryleast which gave definitionto his claim. Rudely,
what we knowis thatAristarchus anticipatedone ofour morefirmly established
beliefs.But thisis self-celebratorygibberish,not history.It is a poor attemptat
understanding Aristarchus.
"1Here,as elsewhere,thisphraseis usedforexemplary purposes.I have nowishto
forecloseon any formofattainedcausal explanationsof behaviour,but I do not
wish, particularlyin the face of Charles Taylor's The Explanation of Behaviour
(London: 1964), to assertthat the explanationsmustbe ultimatelyreducibleto
statements data language-whethera peripheralist
in a 'physical-object' analysis
ofbehaviouror a centralist analysisin terinsofneuro-physiology or bio-chemistry.
12Arthur C. Danto, Analytical
Philosophy ofHistory (Cambridge:1965).The whole
book is devoted to expoundingthe importanceof the difference betweencon-
temporary-specific and future-specific descriptionsof events,say, forexample,
oursand theirs,to theunderstanding ofhistoricalanalysis.The Yeats poem is very
deftlyquotedat page 151.To rephraseDanto's point,thedata-languageof history
B 101
PHILOSOPHY
changes throughouthistory.The futureconstantlychanges the set of true

descriptivestatementswhich could in principlebe made about the past. No
contemporary descriptionof an eventcan take thisparticularsortof accountof
the futurewhichit 'engenders'.
180p.cit. (note (1) above), p. 219. Such an account(sc. an analysisof Locke's
concept of property,taken fromthe SecondTreatisealone) 'may perhaps be in
dangerof refutation by the historianas an accountof whatLockeintended. It is in
less,even no, dangerof contradiction fromsuch a quarteras an accountof what
Lockesaid.And in case thisis thoughttoo smalla claim,let me pointout thatwe
usuallyhold people to what theysay, ratherthan to what theysupposeto follow
fromwhat theymeant to say.' I should like to emphasisethat the very able
articlein questiondoes not in practicesuffer at all fromill consequencesderiving
fromthis,to me, misconceivedmethodologicaldoctrine.
"4Thisagain is a wild over-simplification. I have deliberately beggedthemost
intractablequestion about psychologicalexplanation (what the formof an
adequate causal explanationofa piece ofhumanbehaviourwould be) by talking
of the more behavioural'activity'ratherthan the more intellectualist 'act'. I
quite accept thatunderstanding an act is neverjust a matterofsubsuminga piece
ofbehaviourundera setofcausal laws,but I shouldcertainlywant to claim that
part ofdoingso is frequently just such an operation.But cf.AlasdairMacintyre,
'A MistakeaboutCausalityin Social Science'inPeterLaslettand W. G. Runciman,
Philosophy, PoliticsandSociety(2nd Series) (Oxford: 1962) and convergentargu-
mentsin AnthonyKenny, Action,Emotionand Will (London: 1963); Charles
Taylor, TheExplanation ofBehaviour (London: 1964). Also PeterWinch, TheIdea
ofa SocialScience(London: 1958).
"L5.e.it may nothave been whathe meant, cf.notes(13) and (9) above. What a
man meantto say maydiffer fromwhathe succeededin sayingin numerousways.
He may,forinstance,as in manyofthecasesconsideredby SigmundFreudin the
Psychopathology of EverydayLife,speak a word different fromthe word which he
intendedto speak; or he mayspeak a wordin a foreignlanguagethinkingthatit
has a meaningwhichis otherthan the meaningwhichit does have, a common
occurrence;or he may use a word in his own language persistently while mis-
understanding its meaning(whetherby mistakingit foranotherwitha similar
sound, a malapropism;or by simplemis-identification). All of theseseem peri-
pheral. It is hard to imaginea man who neversaid what he meantto say (not,
of course,one who neversaid what he meant (wheremeant = feltlike saying).
There is nothingconceptuallydifficult in the notionof a consistenthypocrite.
Indeed, ifby chance one wereconfronted by someonewho neversaid what they
meantto say,one could onlyinterpret theirbehaviouras the resultof severeand
peculiarbraindamage. There are, ofcourse,numerousinstanceswheremen say
thingswhichare not consistent withotherthingswhichtheysay or feeland one
could,undersomecircumstances, describethesestatesofaffairs as instancesofmen
not meaningwhat theysay. But thisis a veryderivativeusage and surelycannot
be construedas meaningthattheydid notintendto conveywhattheydid convey
but ratherthat theydid not realisethe implicationsof what they,intentionally,
said and wouldnothave said itiftheyhad realisedthese.The suggestion in note(13)
above dependsupon therebeinga generaldistinction betweenwhatmensucceed
in sayingand what theyintendto say. The distinction whichdoesexistbetween
thesetwo scarcelyseemsof the righttype.If one is interested in tryingto under-
standan argument,theleastone wculd normallyattemptto do is to establishwhat
the protagonistmeant.
"1Itis morecommonforsomeonefroman aliencultureto misunderstand whata
102
personhas said thanit is forpeople in any culturenotto saywhattheymean.

I Cf. Emile Durkheim,Socialismand Saint-Simon (New York, pb. ed.: 1958),
p. 41.
"I.e. say it yelpingly;not yelps are propositions.Just that the truth-status
(whateverthatmay be) oftheproposition'God is Love' is no different whereit is
gasped out by the dying martyrin the blood-stainedarena fromwhen it is
enunciatedwiththeplummyself-assurance ofa well-fedagnosticin a rolewhichis
religiousonlyas an inconvenient historicalhangover.
"See J. L. Austin,How todothings withwords(Oxford: 1962),passim.
2"For an exampleof the acute interpretative whichthisfactraises,
difficulties
see theremarkablereconstruction by ProfessorRyle,Plato'sProgress (Cambridge:
1966).
21Thisdoes not mean thatthe ideas ofstupidperple can be explainedcausally
whilethe ideas of thosewho shareour own incomparableadvantageselude such
crude determination-thoughthereis a faintand horriblegrain of truthin an
extremeversionof such a view. Cf. Karl Popper's famousargument(set out in
briefin theprefaceto ThePoverty ofHistoricism,pp. ix-xiand refs.there(London:
1960, 2nd ed.). But the Popper argumentdoes not apply to making causal
statementsabout past ideas-it is the logical oddityof predictingnewideas on
whichit insists.It is a purelycontingent(thoughhighlyintractable)factthatin
the case of the Republicthe sortof data whichsurvivego no distancewhatever
towardsprovidingan account of the sufficient conditionsforthe writingof the
book.
2"Cf.Eugene Kamenka,'Marxismand theHistoryofPhilosophy',in Beiheft5.
History and Theory, pp. 83-104.
23JohnPassmore,'The Idea of a Historyof Philosophy',in Beiheft5, History
and Theory, p. 13.
"eSee,briefly, W. G. Runciman,SocialScienceandPoliticalTheory (Cambridge:
1963) cap. 6. For a penetratingaccount of the sourcesand deficienciesof the
notionas employedby Malinowskisee E. R. Leach, 'The EpistemologicalBack-
groundto Malinowski'sEmpiricism',in Man andCulture:AnEvaluation oftheWork
ofBronislaw Malinowski (ed. RaymondFirth,London: 1957).
"AnthonyKenny,Action, Emotion and Will (London: 1963), pp. 28-51.
"There are,ofcourse,dangersin learningto talkpreciselyaboutfictions instead
oftryingto talkabout the confusions oftheworld.Cf. in anotherarea C. Wright
Mills, TheSociologicalImagination (New York: 1959). But it is stillimportantin all
innocenceto advocate the attemptto combineboth.
"PeterWinch, TheIdea ofa SocialScience(Lcndon: 1958),passim.
8As a part of the causal story,thiscan be veryconsiderableindeed. Cf. on
Plato, ArthurW. H. Adkins,MeritandResponsibility (Oxford: 1950).
29Not that one would not employphilosophicalnotionsat any point in the
attemptto explain and assessthem; only,that mostof the operationof under-
standingthem(evenafterthestoryofhowtheycometo be thereis toldcompletely)
has nothingto do withphilosophy.
"Mutatismutandis, thiswould apply to the historyof any specialisedformof
reflection. Each such special extrapolationis derivedfroman unitarymatrix,the
causal storyofpast humanthought,theset ofnecessaryand sufficient conditions
fortheset ofpast human thoughts.
"1SeePeterLaslett (ed.), John Locke, Two Treatises ofGovernment (Cambridge:
1960),pp. 67-76.I am currently attempting tosetout thecharacterwhichthebook
did bear as it was written,in a full-length study,'The Political Philosophyof
JohnLocke'.
103
PHILOSOPHY
aProc. Arist.Soc. supplementaryvol. XXII, 'Thingsand Persons'(quoted by

JohnPassmore,'The Drearinessof Aesthetics',in WilliamElton (ed.), Aesthetics
andLanguage(Oxford: 1959), p. 40.
"This paper arisesout ofseveralyearsofdiscussionofthesubjectwithMr Peter
Laslett and, especially,Mr Quentin Skinner (see his article 'The Limits of
HistoricalExplanations',Philosophy,
vol. XLI (July,1966),fora partlyanalogous,
partlycontrasting view). I am verygratefulto themboth. Dr M. I. Finley,Dr
R. M. Young and MrsJoannaRyan verykindlyread it throughand helpedme to
clarifya numberofpoints.Whereit remainsopaque, it does so throughno faultof
theirs,but merelyas a resultof myown obstinacy.
104

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Royal Institute of Philosophy

The Identity of the History of Ideas

VOLTXLIII No. 164 APRIL 1968

THE IDENTITY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS

Two typesofcriticism are frequentlylevelledat thehistory ofideas

twotypesofcriticism can readilybe seenas theadvocacyofdifferent

an accountof eitherof theserenderedintelligibleto an ignorant

accountsofhow men thought,but of moreor lesspainfulattempts

why therewas a FrenchRevolutionbetween 1750 and 1820. 65

narratives,a set of subsumptionsof individualinstancesunder

philosophicalperformance whichcould be said to be completeat

descriptions are in principlecorrect,thattheyconstitute answersto

ofthe speakerthatthisdisembodiment of theproposition beginsto

justificationforpunishinghomosexualacts as such,to describean

causation of acts which can be specifiedas the performance of

sortsofblocking-off pointsto theaccountwhichcan be givenofhis

generalreasonsforthepracticeofself-preservation. Such a request,

contextprovidedby the biographyofthespeakerforthatprovided

1Imeanthistermtobe usedas widelyas itsuse in commonspeechwouldsuggest,

strikingworksby practisinghistorians,T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific

changes throughouthistory.The futureconstantlychanges the set of true

personhas said thanit is forpeople in any culturenotto saywhattheymean.

aProc. Arist.Soc. supplementaryvol. XXII, 'Thingsand Persons'(quoted by

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