MAGLUCOT-AW v.

MAGLUCOT

DOCTRINE: Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took
possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped from questioning the title to partition allotted
to another party.FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and damages alleging
thatthey are the owners of lot no. 1639-D which was originally part of lot no. 1639 which was covered
by OCT no. 67 issued in the names of Hermogenes Olis, Pascual Olis, Bartolome Maglucot, Anselmo Lara,
and Tomas Maglucot. Subsequently, Tomas and respondent's predecessor-in-interest filed a petition to
subdivide the lot into six portions and was granted

Then in 1963, respondents rented portions of lot 1639-d paying rentals therefore. They likewise built
houses on their corresponding leased lots. However, in 1992, they stopped paying rentals claiming
ownership over the subject lot. Petitioners maintained that there was a valid partition and that the
respondents are stopped from claiming to be co-owners of the subject lot in view of their agreement in
1946 and ruled that the sketch plan and tax declarations relied upon bypetitioners are not conclusive
evidence to partition.ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are estopped from questioning the title to
partition.HELD: YES. Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took
possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped from questioning the title to partition allotted
to another party. Here, respondents already occupied the lots in accordance with the sketch plan. This
occupation continued until this action was filed. They cannot now be heardto question the possession
and ownership of the other co-owners who took exclusive possession of lot 1639-d also in accordance
with the sketch plan. Also, the payment of rentals reveals that respondents' possession of the land is
that of a holder and not as owner thereof. One who possess as a mere holder acknowledges in another
a superior right which he believes to be ownership. Hence, petitioners were in possession of the subject
lot in the concept of anowner from 1952 up to the time the present action was commenced. Petition
was granted

http://documents.mx/documents/possession-case-digests.html

Ting vs Ting digest

Facts:

Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school.
They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already
pregnant with their first child. On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to
petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before
the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.

Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:

1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;

3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car
twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer
had money to pay the same; and

4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular financial
support to his family.

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a

respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted
and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week. Both
presented expert witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each others claim. RTC ruled in favor of the
respondent declaring the marriage null and void.

Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTC’s decision. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case

Issues:

1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth
under the Santos and Molina cases,

2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for
the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been
liberalized,

3. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void is
in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

Held:

1. No. respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should
not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new.

To be forthright, respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and
Molinashould not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisisis no longer
new. The sameargument was also raised but was struck down inPesca v. Pesca,and again inAntonio v.
Reyes. In these cases, weexplained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes
a part of the law as of the date thestatute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that thenew doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in
favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and haveacted in good faith, in accordance
therewith under the familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit
2. The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the
basis

3. of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant

facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

3. There is no evidence that adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is

psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that
he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago.

SANTOS VS. CA AND BEDIA-SANTOS

SANTOS vs. CA AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

FACTS: Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in
1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived
with Julia’s parents at the J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as
Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of things aside from the
interference of Julia’s parents into their family affairs.

Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouel’s pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her
departure, she called her husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in
July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a training program
under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of
no avail.

Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. He
argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than 5 years are
circumstances that show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.

ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.

Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual
problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied.
Notes:

psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

66. G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995 LEOUEL SANTOS, SR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES
LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDI

Facts: Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were
married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18,
1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in
the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia
Bedia. Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's
parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, as well
as the subsequent support of the boy because petitioner could not afford to do so. The boy's mother,
Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May 1988 to work. Petitioner alleged that he is not aware
of her whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the United States proved futile. Private respondents
claim that although abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending financial support to them for her son.
Petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was
staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the
boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental. The spouses Bedia
then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent. The trial court issued an order on the
same day awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia
Bedia. Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. It affirmed the trial court's order. His
motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner now brings the instant petition for review for
a reversal of the appellate court's decision. Issue: Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor
Leouel Santos, Jr.? Ruling: Leouel Santos, Sr., the child’s father. The right of custody accorded to parents
springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is
the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their
unemancipated children to the extent required by the

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/jan1995/gr_112019_1995.html

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/mar1995/gr_113054_1995.html

Republic vs CA and Molina

FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to
Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a
year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father
preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for
aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple
had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went
to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child.
Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological
incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is
indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital
responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the
marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity.
The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each
other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In
addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:

burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined

such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage

such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital
obligations of marriage

such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code

decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected

court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.

Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson MarcosG.R. No. 13649, Oct. 19, 20003

rd

Division
FACTS:

Petitioner Brenda Marcos and Respondent Wilson Marcos were married twice and hadfive children.
After the downfall of President Marcos, the respondent left the military service in1987. Consequently,
due to the respondent’s failure to engage in any gainful employment, theywould often quarrel and the
respondent would hit and beat the petitioner. As a result, in 1992they were already living separately.
Thus, petitioner filed for annulment of marriage assailingArt. 36 of the Family Code. The court a quo
found the respondent to be psychologicallyincapacitated to perform his marital obligations. However,
the Court of Appeals reversed thedecision of the RTC because psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence presented.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Respondent Wilson Marcos’ failure to find work to support his familyand his violent
attitude towards Petitioner Brenda Marcos and their children constituted psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The court ruled the negative.

RATIONALE:

The totality of the respondent’s acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his
part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” werealready present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable. Article 36 of theFamily Code is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time thecauses therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a partyeven before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady
so grave and so permanent as todeprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is aboutto assume.

POLICY:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of marriage, may beestablished by the
totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that therespondent should be
examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.

Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA

FACTS:

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding, they
proceed to the house of defendant’s mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during
their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon
in a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives went with them. Again, there was no sexual
intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking
chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed but no
attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical examination of
Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed.
There were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status
here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage
declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to
have their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is
physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still overcome
their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the result was
there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.

ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological
incapacity.

HELD:

The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious
personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the
Family Code.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital
obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.