FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 1

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
G.R. No. 212426 SERENO, J.:

RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, The petitions1 before this Court question the constitutionality
FRANCISCO "DODONG" NEMENZO, JR., SR. MARY of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
JOHN MANANZAN, PACIFICO A. AGABIN, ESTEBAN between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States
"STEVE" SALONGA, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., EVALYN of America (U.S.). Petitioners allege that respondents
G. URSUA, EDRE U. OLALIA, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN- committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
ARAULLO, DR. ROLAND SIMBULAN, AND TEDDY excess of jurisdiction when they entered into EDCA with the
CASIÑO, Petitioners, U.S.,2 claiming that the instrument violated multiple
vs. constitutional provisions.3 In reply, respondents argue that
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., petitioners lack standing to bring the suit. To support the
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY legality of their actions, respondents invoke the 1987
VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN Constitution, treaties, and judicial precedents.4
AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, JR.,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT A proper analysis of the issues requires this Court to lay down
SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, AND ARMED FORCES at the outset the basic parameters of the constitutional powers
OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL and roles of the President and the Senate in respect of the
EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, Respondents. above issues. A more detailed discussion of these powers and
roles will be made in the latter portions.
x-----------------------x
I. BROAD CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF THE POWERS
G.R. No. 212444 OF THE PRESIDENT: DEFENSE, FOREIGN RELATIONS,
AND EDCA
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN),
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO A. The Prime Duty of the State and the Consolidation of
M. REYES, JR., BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST Executive Power in the President
REPRESENTATIVES NERI J. COLMENARES AND
CARLOS ZARATE, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY-LIST Mataimtim kong pinanunumpaan (o pinatotohanan) na
REPRESENTATIVES LUZ ILAGAN AND EMERENCIANA tutuparin ko nang buong katapatan at sigasig ang aking mga
DE JESUS, ACT TEACHERS PARTY-LIST tungkulin bilang Pangulo (o Pangalawang Pangulo o
REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, ANAKPAWIS Nanunungkulang Pangulo) ng Pilipinas, pangangalagaan at
PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE FERNANDO HICAP, ipagtatanggol ang kanyang Konstitusyon, ipatutupad ang mga
KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE TERRY batas nito, magiging makatarungan sa bawat tao, at itatalaga
RIDON, MAKABAYANG KOALISYON NG MAMAMAYAN ang aking sarili sa paglilingkod sa Bansa. Kasihan nawa aka
(MAKABAYAN), REPRESENTED BY SATURNINO ng Diyos.
OCAMPO AND LIZA MAZA, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, JOEL
C. LAMANGAN, RAFAEL MARIANO, SALVADOR FRANCE, - Panunumpa sa Katungkulan ng Pangulo ng Pilipinas ayon
ROGELIO M. SOLUTA, AND CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, sa Saligang Batas5
Petitioners,
vs. The 1987 Constitution has "vested the executive power in the
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) President of the Republic of the Philippines."6 While the
SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT OF vastness of the executive power that has been consolidated
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, in the person of the President cannot be expressed fully in one
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., provision, the Constitution has stated the prime duty of the
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF government, of which the President is the head:
GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, DEFENSE
UNDERSECRETARY PIO LORENZO BATINO, The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the
AMBASSADOR LOURDES YPARRAGUIRRE, people. The Government may call upon the people to defend
AMBASSADOR J. EDUARDO MALAYA, DEPARTMENT OF the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be
JUSTICE UNDERSECRETARY FRANCISCO BARAAN III, required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal
AND DND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR STRATEGIC military or civil service.7 (Emphases supplied)
ASSESSMENTS RAYMUND JOSE QUILOP AS
CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE B. The duty to protect the territory and the citizens of the
NEGOTIATING PANEL FOR THE PHILIPPINES ON EDCA, Philippines, the power to call upon the people to defend the
Respondents. State, and the President as Commander-in-Chief

x-----------------------x
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRPERSON, ELMER LABOG, CONFEDERATION FOR
UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE),
REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT
FERDINAND GAITE, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR
UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS
NATIONAL PRESIDENT JOSELITO USTAREZ, NENITA
GONZAGA, VIOLETA ESPIRITU, VIRGINIA FLORES, AND
ARMANDO TEODORO, JR., Petitioners-in-Intervention,
RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., Petitioner-in-Intervention.
The duty to protect the State and its people must be carried
out earnestly and effectively throughout the whole territory of
the Philippines in accordance with the constitutional provision
on national territory. Hence, the President of the Philippines,
as the sole repository of executive power, is the guardian of
the Philippine archipelago, including all the islands and waters
embraced therein and all other territories over which it has
sovereignty or jurisdiction. These territories consist of its
terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains; including its territorial
sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas; and the waters around, between, and
connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their
breadth and dimensions.8

DECISION
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 2
To carry out this important duty, the President is equipped with
authority over the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),9
which is the protector of the people and the state. The AFP's
role is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity
of the national territory.10 In addition, the Executive is
constitutionally empowered to maintain peace and order;
protect life, liberty, and property; and promote the general
welfare.11
In recognition of these powers, Congress has specified that
the President must oversee, ensure, and reinforce our
defensive capabilities against external and internal threats12
and, in the same vein, ensure that the country is adequately
prepared for all national and local emergencies arising from
natural and man-made disasters.13
To be sure, this power is limited by the Constitution itself. To
illustrate, the President may call out the AFP to prevent or
suppress instances of lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion,14 but not suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus for a period exceeding 60 days, or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law exceeding
that same span. In the exercise of these powers, the President
is also duty-bound to submit a report to Congress, in person
or in writing, within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus; and Congress may in turn revoke the proclamation or
suspension. The same provision provides for the Supreme
Court's review of the factual basis for the proclamation or
suspension, as well as the promulgation of the decision within
30 days from filing.
C. The power and duty to conduct foreign relations
The President also carries the mandate of being the sole
organ in the conduct of foreign relations.15 Since every state
has the capacity to interact with and engage in relations with
other sovereign states,16 it is but logical that every state must
vest in an agent the authority to represent its interests to those
other sovereign states.
The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and
consequences, sometimes with life and death significance to
the nation especially in times of war. It can only be entrusted
to that department of government which can act on the basis
of the best available information and can decide with
decisiveness. x x x It is also the President who possesses the
most comprehensive and the most confidential information
about foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular
officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over the
world. He has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military
intelligence data. In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs
is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider
degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The
regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under less
stringent standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to
breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations,
forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment and a
plethora of other problems with equally undesirable
consequences.17
The role of the President in foreign affairs is qualified by the
Constitution in that the Chief Executive must give paramount
importance to the sovereignty of the nation, the integrity of its
territory, its interest, and the right of the sovereign Filipino
people to self-determination.18 In specific provisions, the
President's power is also limited, or at least shared, as in
Section 2 of Article II on the conduct of war; Sections 20 and
21 of Article VII on foreign loans, treaties, and international
agreements; Sections 4(2) and 5(2)(a) of Article VIII on the
judicial review of executive acts; Sections 4 and 25 of Article
XVIII on treaties and international agreements entered into
prior to the Constitution and on the presence of foreign military
troops, bases, or facilities.
D. The relationship between the two major presidential
functions and the role of the Senate
Clearly, the power to defend the State and to act as its
representative in the international sphere inheres in the
person of the President. This power, however, does not
crystallize into absolute discretion to craft whatever instrument
the Chief Executive so desires. As previously mentioned, the
Senate has a role in ensuring that treaties or international
agreements the President enters into, as contemplated in
Section 21 of Article VII of the Constitution, obtain the
approval of two-thirds of its members.
Previously, treaties under the 1973 Constitution required
ratification by a majority of the Batasang Pambansa,19 except
in instances wherein the President "may enter into
international treaties or agreements as the national welfare
and interest may require."20 This left a large margin of
discretion that the President could use to bypass the
Legislature altogether. This was a departure from the 1935
Constitution, which explicitly gave the President the power to
enter into treaties only with the concurrence of two-thirds of all
the Members of the Senate.21 The 1987 Constitution returned
the Senate's power22 and, with it, the legislative's traditional
role in foreign affairs.23
The responsibility of the President when it comes to treaties
and international agreements under the present Constitution
is therefore shared with the Senate. This shared role,
petitioners claim, is bypassed by EDCA.
II. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF EDCA
A. U.S. takeover of Spanish colonization and its military
bases, and the transition to Philippine independence
The presence of the U.S. military forces in the country can be
traced to their pivotal victory in the 1898 Battle of Manila Bay
during the Spanish-American War.24 Spain relinquished its
sovereignty over the Philippine Islands in favor of the U.S.
upon its formal surrender a few months later.25 By 1899, the
Americans had consolidated a military administration in the
archipelago.26
When it became clear that the American forces intended to
impose colonial control over the Philippine Islands, General
Emilio Aguinaldo immediately led the Filipinos into an all-out
war against the U.S.27 The Filipinos were ultimately defeated
in the Philippine-American War, which lasted until 1902 and
led to the downfall of the first Philippine Republic.28 The
Americans henceforth began to strengthen their foothold in
the country.29 They took over and expanded the former
Spanish Naval Base in Subic Bay, Zambales, and put up a
cavalry post called Fort Stotsenberg in Pampanga, now
known as Clark Air Base.30
When talks of the eventual independence of the Philippine
Islands gained ground, the U.S. manifested the desire to
maintain military bases and armed forces in the country.31
The U.S. Congress later enacted the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act
of 1933, which required that the proposed constitution of an
independent Philippines recognize the right of the U.S. to
maintain the latter's armed forces and military bases.32 The
Philippine Legislature rejected that law, as it also gave the
U.S. the power to unilaterally designate any part of Philippine
territory as a permanent military or naval base of the U.S.
within two years from complete independence.33
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 3
The U.S. Legislature subsequently crafted another law called
the Tydings-McDuffie Act or the Philippine Independence Act
of 1934. Compared to the old Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, the
new law provided for the surrender to the Commonwealth
Government of "all military and other reservations" of the U.S.
government in the Philippines, except "naval reservations and
refueling stations."34 Furthermore, the law authorized the
U.S. President to enter into negotiations for the adjustment
and settlement of all questions relating to naval reservations
and fueling stations within two years after the Philippines
would have gained independence.35 Under the Tydings-
McDuffie Act, the U.S. President would proclaim the American
withdrawal and surrender of sovereignty over the islands 10
years after the inauguration of the new government in the
Philippines.36 This law eventually led to the promulgation of
the 1935 Philippine Constitution.
The original plan to surrender the military bases changed.37
At the height of the Second World War, the Philippine and the
U.S. Legislatures each passed resolutions authorizing their
respective Presidents to negotiate the matter of retaining
military bases in the country after the planned withdrawal of
the U.S.38 Subsequently, in 1946, the countries entered into
the Treaty of General Relations, in which the U.S. relinquished
all control and sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, except
the areas that would be covered by the American military
bases in the country.39 This treaty eventually led to the
creation of the post-colonial legal regime on which would
hinge the continued presence of U.S. military forces until
1991: the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) of 1947, the
Military Assistance Agreement of 1947, and the Mutual
Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951.40
B. Former legal regime on the presence of U.S. armed forces
in the territory of an independent Philippines (1946-1991)
Soon after the Philippines was granted independence, the two
countries entered into their first military arrangement pursuant
to the Treaty of General Relations - the 1947 MBA.41 The
Senate concurred on the premise of "mutuality of security
interest,"42 which provided for the presence and operation of
23 U.S. military bases in the Philippines for 99 years or until
the year 2046.43 The treaty also obliged the Philippines to
negotiate with the U.S. to allow the latter to expand the
existing bases or to acquire new ones as military necessity
might require.44
A number of significant amendments to the 1947 MBA were
made.45 With respect to its duration, the parties entered into
the Ramos-Rusk Agreement of 1966, which reduced the term
of the treaty from 99 years to a total of 44 years or until
1991.46 Concerning the number of U.S. military bases in the
country, the Bohlen-Serrano Memorandum of Agreement
provided for the return to the Philippines of 17 U.S. military
bases covering a total area of 117,075 hectares.47 Twelve
years later, the U.S. returned Sangley Point in Cavite City
through an exchange of notes.48 Then, through the Romulo-
Murphy Exchange of Notes of 1979, the parties agreed to the
recognition of Philippine sovereignty over Clark and Subic
Bases and the reduction of the areas that could be used by
the U.S. military.49 The agreement also provided for the
mandatory review of the treaty every five years.50 In 1983,
the parties revised the 1947 MBA through the Romualdez-
Armacost Agreement.51 The revision pertained to the
operational use of the military bases by the U.S. government
within the context of Philippine sovereignty,52 including the
need for prior consultation with the Philippine government on
the former' s use of the bases for military combat operations
or the establishment of long-range missiles.53
Pursuant to the legislative authorization granted under
Republic Act No. 9,54 the President also entered into the 1947
Military Assistance Agreement55 with the U.S. This executive
agreement established the conditions under which U.S.
military assistance would be granted to the Philippines,56
particularly the provision of military arms, ammunitions,
supplies, equipment, vessels, services, and training for the
latter's defense forces.57 An exchange of notes in 1953 made
it clear that the agreement would remain in force until
terminated by any of the parties.58
To further strengthen their defense and security
relationship,59 the Philippines and the U.S. next entered into
the MDT in 1951. Concurred in by both the Philippine60 and
the U.S.61 Senates, the treaty has two main features: first, it
allowed for mutual assistance in maintaining and developing
their individual and collective capacities to resist an armed
attack;62 and second, it provided for their mutual self-defense
in the event of an armed attack against the territory of either
party.63 The treaty was premised on their recognition that an
armed attack on either of them would equally be a threat to
the security of the other.64
C. Current legal regime on the presence of U.S. armed forces
in the country
In view of the impending expiration of the 1947 MBA in 1991,
the Philippines and the U.S. negotiated for a possible renewal
of their defense and security relationship.65 Termed as the
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security, the countries
sought to recast their military ties by providing a new
framework for their defense cooperation and the use of
Philippine installations.66 One of the proposed provisions
included an arrangement in which U.S. forces would be
granted the use of certain installations within the Philippine
naval base in Subic.67 On 16 September 1991, the Senate
rejected the proposed treaty.68
The consequent expiration of the 1947 MBA and the resulting
paucity of any formal agreement dealing with the treatment of
U.S. personnel in the Philippines led to the suspension in 1995
of large-scale joint military exercises.69 In the meantime, the
respective governments of the two countries agreed70 to hold
joint exercises at a substantially reduced level.71 The military
arrangements between them were revived in 1999 when they
concluded the first Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).72
As a "reaffirm[ation] [of the] obligations under the MDT,"73 the
VFA has laid down the regulatory mechanism for the
treatment of U.S. military and civilian personnel visiting the
country.74 It contains provisions on the entry and departure of
U.S. personnel; the purpose, extent, and limitations of their
activities; criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction; the waiver of
certain claims; the importation and exportation of equipment,
materials, supplies, and other pieces of property owned by the
U.S. government; and the movement of U.S. military vehicles,
vessels, and aircraft into and within the country.75 The
Philippines and the U.S. also entered into a second
counterpart agreement (VFA II), which in turn regulated the
treatment of Philippine military and civilian personnel visiting
the U.S.76 The Philippine Senate concurred in the first VFA
on 27 May 1999.77
Beginning in January 2002, U.S. military and civilian
personnel started arriving in Mindanao to take part in joint
military exercises with their Filipino counterparts.78 Called
Balikatan, these exercises involved trainings aimed at
simulating joint military maneuvers pursuant to the MDT.79
In the same year, the Philippines and the U.S. entered into the
Mutual Logistics Support Agreement to "further the
interoperability, readiness, and effectiveness of their
respective military forces"80 in accordance with the MDT, the
Military Assistance Agreement of 1953, and the VFA.81 The
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 4
new agreement outlined the basic terms, conditions, and
procedures for facilitating the reciprocal provision of logistics
support, supplies, and services between the military forces of
the two countries.82 The phrase "logistics support and
services" includes billeting, operations support, construction
and use of temporary structures, and storage services during
an approved activity under the existing military
arrangements.83 Already extended twice, the agreement will
last until 2017.84
D. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
EDCA authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to
and conduct activities within certain "Agreed Locations" in the
country. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the
executive's understanding that to do so was no longer
necessary.85 Accordingly, in June 2014, the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the U.S. Embassy exchanged
diplomatic notes confirming the completion of all necessary
internal requirements for the agreement to enter into force in
the two countries.86
According to the Philippine government, the conclusion of
EDCA was the result of intensive and comprehensive
negotiations in the course of almost two years.87 After eight
rounds of negotiations, the Secretary of National Defense and
the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines signed the agreement
on 28 April 2014.88 President Benigno S. Aquino III ratified
EDCA on 6 June 2014.89 The OSG clarified during the oral
arguments90 that the Philippine and the U.S. governments
had yet to agree formally on the specific sites of the Agreed
Locations mentioned in the agreement.
Two petitions for certiorari were thereafter filed before us
assailing the constitutionality of EDCA. They primarily argue
that it should have been in the form of a treaty concurred in by
the Senate, not an executive agreement.
On 10 November 2015, months after the oral arguments were
concluded and the parties ordered to file their respective
memoranda, the Senators adopted Senate Resolution No.
(SR) 105.91 The resolution expresses the "strong sense"92 of
the Senators that for EDCA to become valid and effective, it
must first be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and
concurrence.
III. ISSUES
Petitioners mainly seek a declaration that the Executive
Department committed grave abuse of discretion in entering
into EDCA in the form of an executive agreement. For this
reason, we cull the issues before us:
A. Whether the essential requisites for judicial review are
present
B. Whether the President may enter into an executive
agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
C. Whether the provisions under EDCA are consistent with the
Constitution, as well as with existing laws and treaties
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Whether the essential requisites for judicial review have
been satisfied
Petitioners are hailing this Court's power of judicial review in
order to strike down EDCA for violating the Constitution. They
stress that our fundamental law is explicit in prohibiting the
presence of foreign military forces in the country, except under
a treaty concurred in by the Senate. Before this Court may
begin to analyze the constitutionality or validity of an official
act of a coequal branch of government, however, petitioners
must show that they have satisfied all the essential requisites
for judicial review.93
Distinguished from the general notion of judicial power, the
power of judicial review specially refers to both the authority
and the duty of this Court to determine whether a branch or
an instrumentality of government has acted beyond the scope
of the latter's constitutional powers.94 As articulated in
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, the power of judicial
review involves the power to resolve cases in which the
questions concern the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation.95 In Angara v. Electoral Commission, this Court
exhaustively discussed this "moderating power" as part of the
system of checks and balances under the Constitution. In our
fundamental law, the role of the Court is to determine whether
a branch of government has adhered to the specific
restrictions and limitations of the latter's power:96
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for
an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. x x x. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme
Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law,
and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution.
xxxx
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the
power of our people, acting through their delegates to so
provide, that instrument which is the expression of their
sovereignty however limited, has established a republican
government intended to operate and function as a harmonious
whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject
to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said
instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain
language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental
powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had
not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels, for then the
distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights
mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the
limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are
real as they should be in any living constitution. x x x. In our
case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by
clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of [the 1935]
Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government.
Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such
powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when
the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it
does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 5
it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties
in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly
is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. x x x x.
(Emphases supplied)
The power of judicial review has since been strengthened in
the 1987 Constitution. The scope of that power has been
extended to the determination of whether in matters
traditionally considered to be within the sphere of appreciation
of another branch of government, an exercise of discretion
has been attended with grave abuse.97 The expansion of this
power has made the political question doctrine "no longer the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or
the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative
actions from judicial inquiry or review."98
This moderating power, however, must be exercised carefully
and only if it cannot be completely avoided. We stress that our
Constitution is so incisively designed that it identifies the
spheres of expertise within which the different branches of
government shall function and the questions of policy that they
shall resolve.99 Since the power of judicial review involves the
delicate exercise of examining the validity or constitutionality
of an act of a coequal branch of government, this Court must
continually exercise restraint to avoid the risk of supplanting
the wisdom of the constitutionally appointed actor with that of
its own.100
Even as we are left with no recourse but to bare our power to
check an act of a coequal branch of government - in this case
the executive - we must abide by the stringent requirements
for the exercise of that power under the Constitution. Demetria
v. Alba101 and Francisco v. House of Representatives102 cite
the "pillars" of the limitations on the power of judicial review as
enunciated in the concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority.103 Francisco104 redressed these "pillars" under
the following categories:
1. That there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. That rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as
required by the facts of the case
3. That judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. That there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason
of the operation of the statute
5. That the parties are not in estoppel
6. That the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality
(Emphases supplied)
These are the specific safeguards laid down by the Court
when it exercises its power of judicial review.105 Guided by
these pillars, it may invoke the power only when the following
four stringent requirements are satisfied: (a) there is an actual
case or controversy; (b) petitioners possess locus standi; (c)
the question of constitutionality is raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality is the lis mota
of the case.106 Of these four, the first two conditions will be
the focus of our discussion.
1. Petitioners have shown the presence of an actual case or
controversy.
The OSG maintains107 that there is no actual case or
controversy that exists, since the Senators have not been
deprived of the opportunity to invoke the privileges of the
institution they are representing. It contends that the
nonparticipation of the Senators in the present petitions only
confirms that even they believe that EDCA is a binding
executive agreement that does not require their concurrence.
It must be emphasized that the Senate has already expressed
its position through SR 105.108 Through the Resolution, the
Senate has taken a position contrary to that of the OSG. As
the body tasked to participate in foreign affairs by ratifying
treaties, its belief that EDCA infringes upon its constitutional
role indicates that an actual controversy - albeit brought to the
Court by non-Senators, exists.
Moreover, we cannot consider the sheer abstention of the
Senators from the present proceedings as basis for finding
that there is no actual case or controversy before us. We point
out that the focus of this requirement is the ripeness for
adjudication of the matter at hand, as opposed to its being
merely conjectural or anticipatory.109 The case must involve
a definite and concrete issue involving real parties with
conflicting legal rights and legal claims admitting of specific
relief through a decree conclusive in nature.110 It should not
equate with a mere request for an opinion or advice on what
the law would be upon an abstract, hypothetical, or contingent
state of facts.111 As explained in Angara v. Electoral
Commission:112
[The] power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts
accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect
the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government. (Emphases supplied)
We find that the matter before us involves an actual case or
controversy that is already ripe for adjudication. The Executive
Department has already sent an official confirmation to the
U.S. Embassy that "all internal requirements of the Philippines
x x x have already been complied with."113 By this exchange
of diplomatic notes, the Executive Department effectively
performed the last act required under Article XII(l) of EDCA
before the agreement entered into force. Section 25, Article
XVIII of the Constitution, is clear that the presence of foreign
military forces in the country shall only be allowed by virtue of
a treaty concurred in by the Senate. Hence, the performance
of an official act by the Executive Department that led to the
entry into force of an executive agreement was sufficient to
satisfy the actual case or controversy requirement.
2. While petitioners Saguisag et. al., do not have legal
standing, they nonetheless raise issues involving matters of
transcendental importance.
The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the
determination of whether those assailing the governmental act
have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court
for adjudication.114 They must show that they have a
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they
have sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining,
some direct injury as a consequence of the enforcement of the
challenged governmental act.115 Here, "interest" in the
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 6
question involved must be material - an interest that is in issue
and will be affected by the official act - as distinguished from
being merely incidental or general.116 Clearly, it would be
insufficient to show that the law or any governmental act is
invalid, and that petitioners stand to suffer in some indefinite
way.117 They must show that they have a particular interest
in bringing the suit, and that they have been or are about to
be denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully
entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burden
or penalty by reason of the act complained of.118 The reason
why those who challenge the validity of a law or an
international agreement are required to allege the existence
of a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is "to
assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."119
The present petitions cannot qualify as citizens', taxpayers', or
legislators' suits; the Senate as a body has the requisite
standing, but considering that it has not formally filed a
pleading to join the suit, as it merely conveyed to the Supreme
Court its sense that EDCA needs the Senate's concurrence to
be valid, petitioners continue to suffer from lack of standing.
In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act,
petitioners suing as citizens may dodge the requirement of
having to establish a direct and personal interest if they show
that the act affects a public right.120 In arguing that they have
legal standing, they claim121 that the case they have filed is
a concerned citizen's suit. But aside from general statements
that the petitions involve the protection of a public right, and
that their constitutional rights as citizens would be violated,
they fail to make any specific assertion of a particular public
right that would be violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For
their failure to do so, the present petitions cannot be
considered by the Court as citizens' suits that would justify a
disregard of the aforementioned requirements.
In claiming that they have legal standing as taxpayers,
petitioners122 aver that the implementation of EDCA would
result in the unlawful use of public funds. They emphasize that
Article X(1) refers to an appropriation of funds; and that the
agreement entails a waiver of the payment of taxes, fees, and
rentals. During the oral arguments, however, they admitted
that the government had not yet appropriated or actually
disbursed public funds for the purpose of implementing the
agreement.123 The OSG, on the other hand, maintains that
petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers.124 Respondent explains
that EDCA is neither meant to be a tax measure, nor is it
directed at the disbursement of public funds.
A taxpayer's suit concerns a case in which the official act
complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation.125 Here, those
challenging the act must specifically show that they have
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public
money, and that they will sustain a direct injury as a result of
the enforcement of the assailed act.126 Applying that principle
to this case, they must establish that EDCA involves the
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers.127
We agree with the OSG that the petitions cannot qualify as
taxpayers' suits. We emphasize that a taxpayers' suit
contemplates a situation in which there is already an
appropriation or a disbursement of public funds.128 A reading
of Article X(l) of EDCA would show that there has been neither
an appropriation nor an authorization of disbursement of
funds. The cited provision reads:
All obligations under this Agreement are subject to the
availability of appropriated funds authorized for these
purposes. (Emphases supplied)
This provision means that if the implementation of EDCA
would require the disbursement of public funds, the money
must come from appropriated funds that are specifically
authorized for this purpose. Under the agreement, before
there can even be a disbursement of public funds, there must
first be a legislative action. Until and unless the Legislature
appropriates funds for EDCA, or unless petitioners can
pinpoint a specific item in the current budget that allows
expenditure under the agreement, we cannot at this time rule
that there is in fact an appropriation or a disbursement of funds
that would justify the filing of a taxpayers' suit.
Petitioners Bayan et al. also claim129 that their co-petitioners
who are party-list representatives have the standing to
challenge the act of the Executive Department, especially if it
impairs the constitutional prerogatives, powers, and privileges
of their office. While they admit that there is no incumbent
Senator who has taken part in the present petition, they
nonetheless assert that they also stand to sustain a derivative
but substantial injury as legislators. They argue that under the
Constitution, legislative power is vested in both the Senate
and the House of Representatives; consequently, it is the
entire Legislative Department that has a voice in determining
whether or not the presence of foreign military should be
allowed. They maintain that as members of the Legislature,
they have the requisite personality to bring a suit, especially
when a constitutional issue is raised.
The OSG counters130 that petitioners do not have any legal
standing to file the suits concerning the lack of Senate
concurrence in EDCA. Respondent emphasizes that the
power to concur in treaties and international agreements is an
"institutional prerogative" granted by the Constitution to the
Senate. Accordingly, the OSG argues that in case of an
allegation of impairment of that power, the injured party would
be the Senate as an institution or any of its incumbent
members, as it is the Senate's constitutional function that is
allegedly being violated.
The legal standing of an institution of the Legislature or of any
of its Members has already been recognized by this Court in
a number of cases.131 What is in question here is the alleged
impairment of the constitutional duties and powers granted to,
or the impermissible intrusion upon the domain of, the
Legislature or an institution thereof.132 In the case of suits
initiated by the legislators themselves, this Court has
recognized their standing to question the validity of any official
action that they claim infringes the prerogatives, powers, and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office.133 As
aptly explained by Justice Perfecto in Mabanag v. Lopez
Vito:134
Being members of Congress, they are even duty bound to see
that the latter act within the bounds of the Constitution which,
as representatives of the people, they should uphold, unless
they are to commit a flagrant betrayal of public trust. They are
representatives of the sovereign people and it is their sacred
duty to see to it that the fundamental law embodying the will
of the sovereign people is not trampled upon. (Emphases
supplied)
We emphasize that in a legislators' suit, those Members of
Congress who are challenging the official act have standing
only to the extent that the alleged violation impinges on their
right to participate in the exercise of the powers of the
institution of which they are members.135 Legislators have
the standing "to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers,
and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 7
allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action,
which they claim infringes their prerogatives as
legislators."136 As legislators, they must clearly show that
there was a direct injury to their persons or the institution to
which they belong.137
As correctly argued by respondent, the power to concur in a
treaty or an international agreement is an institutional
prerogative granted by the Constitution to the Senate, not to
the entire Legislature. In Pimentel v. Office of the Executive
Secretary, this Court did not recognize the standing of one of
the petitioners therein who was a member of the House of
Representatives. The petition in that case sought to compel
the transmission to the Senate for concurrence of the signed
text of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. Since
that petition invoked the power of the Senate to grant or
withhold its concurrence in a treaty entered into by the
Executive Department, only then incumbent Senator Pimentel
was allowed to assert that authority of the Senate of which he
was a member.
Therefore, none of the initial petitioners in the present
controversy has the standing to maintain the suits as
legislators.
Nevertheless, this Court finds that there is basis for it to review
the act of the Executive for the following reasons.
In any case, petitioners raise issues involving matters of
transcendental importance.
Petitioners138 argue that the Court may set aside procedural
technicalities, as the present petition tackles issues that are of
transcendental importance. They point out that the matter
before us is about the proper exercise of the Executive
Department's power to enter into international agreements in
relation to that of the Senate to concur in those agreements.
They also assert that EDCA would cause grave injustice, as
well as irreparable violation of the Constitution and of the
Filipino people's rights.
The OSG, on the other hand, insists139 that petitioners
cannot raise the mere fact that the present petitions involve
matters of transcendental importance in order to cure their
inability to comply with the constitutional requirement of
standing. Respondent bewails the overuse of "transcendental
importance" as an exception to the traditional requirements of
constitutional litigation. It stresses that one of the purposes of
these requirements is to protect the Supreme Court from
unnecessary litigation of constitutional questions.
In a number of cases,140 this Court has indeed taken a liberal
stance towards the requirement of legal standing, especially
when paramount interest is involved. Indeed, when those who
challenge the official act are able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people, the Court may
exercise its sound discretion and take cognizance of the suit.
It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show
that they have been personally injured by the operation of a
law or any other government act.
While this Court has yet to thoroughly delineate the outer limits
of this doctrine, we emphasize that not every other case,
however strong public interest may be, can qualify as an issue
of transcendental importance. Before it can be impelled to
brush aside the essential requisites for exercising its power of
judicial review, it must at the very least consider a number of
factors: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved
in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent
agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack
of any other party that has a more direct and specific interest
in raising the present questions.141
An exhaustive evaluation of the memoranda of the parties,
together with the oral arguments, shows that petitioners have
presented serious constitutional issues that provide ample
justification for the Court to set aside the rule on standing. The
transcendental importance of the issues presented here is
rooted in the Constitution itself. Section 25, Article XVIII
thereof, cannot be any clearer: there is a much stricter
mechanism required before foreign military troops, facilities,
or bases may be allowed in the country. The DFA has already
confirmed to the U.S. Embassy that "all internal requirements
of the Philippines x x x have already been complied with."142
It behooves the Court in this instance to take a liberal stance
towards the rule on standing and to determine forthwith
whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Executive Department.
We therefore rule that this case is a proper subject for judicial
review.
B. Whether the President may enter into an executive
agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
C. Whether the provisions under EDCA are consistent with the
Constitution, as well as with existing laws and treaties
Issues B and C shall be discussed together infra.
1. The role of the President as the executor of the law includes
the duty to defend the State, for which purpose he may use
that power in the conduct of foreign relations
Historically, the Philippines has mirrored the division of
powers in the U.S. government. When the Philippine
government was still an agency of the Congress of the U.S., it
was as an agent entrusted with powers categorized as
executive, legislative, and judicial, and divided among these
three great branches.143 By this division, the law implied that
the divided powers cannot be exercised except by the
department given the power.144
This divide continued throughout the different versions of the
Philippine Constitution and specifically vested the supreme
executive power in the Governor-General of the
Philippines,145 a position inherited by the President of the
Philippines when the country attained independence. One of
the principal functions of the supreme executive is the
responsibility for the faithful execution of the laws as
embodied by the oath of office.146 The oath of the President
prescribed by the 1987 Constitution reads thus:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and
conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or Vice-
President or Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and
defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every
man, and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So
help me God. (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be
omitted.)147 (Emphases supplied)
This Court has interpreted the faithful execution clause as an
obligation imposed on the President, and not a separate grant
of power.148 Section 1 7, Article VII of the Constitution,
expresses this duty in no uncertain terms and includes it in the
provision regarding the President's power of control over the
executive department, viz:
The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 8
The equivalent provisions in the next preceding Constitution
did not explicitly require this oath from the President. In the
1973 Constitution, for instance, the provision simply gives the
President control over the ministries.149 A similar language,
not in the form of the President's oath, was present in the 1935
Constitution, particularly in the enumeration of executive
functions.150 By 1987, executive power was codified not only
in the Constitution, but also in the Administrative Code:151
SECTION 1. Power of Control. - The President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the duty to faithfully execute the laws of the land is
inherent in executive power and is intimately related to the
other executive functions. These functions include the faithful
execution of the law in autonomous regions;152 the right to
prosecute crimes;153 the implementation of transportation
projects;154 the duty to ensure compliance with treaties,
executive agreements and executive orders;155 the authority
to deport undesirable aliens;156 the conferment of national
awards under the President's jurisdiction;157 and the overall
administration and control of the executive department.158
These obligations are as broad as they sound, for a President
cannot function with crippled hands, but must be capable of
securing the rule of law within all territories of the Philippine
Islands and be empowered to do so within constitutional limits.
Congress cannot, for instance, limit or take over the
President's power to adopt implementing rules and
regulations for a law it has enacted.159
More important, this mandate is self-executory by virtue of its
being inherently executive in nature.160 As Justice Antonio T.
Carpio previously wrote,161
[i]f the rules are issued by the President in implementation or
execution of self-executory constitutional powers vested in the
President, the rule-making power of the President is not a
delegated legislative power. The most important self-
executory constitutional power of the President is the
President's constitutional duty and mandate to "ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed." The rule is that the President
can execute the law without any delegation of power from the
legislature.
The import of this characteristic is that the manner of the
President's execution of the law, even if not expressly granted
by the law, is justified by necessity and limited only by law,
since the President must "take necessary and proper steps to
carry into execution the law."162 Justice George Malcolm
states this principle in a grand manner:163
The executive should be clothed with sufficient power to
administer efficiently the affairs of state. He should have
complete control of the instrumentalities through whom his
responsibility is discharged. It is still true, as said by Hamilton,
that "A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the
government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a
bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may
be in theory, must be in practice a bad government." The
mistakes of State governments need not be repeated here.
xxxx
Every other consideration to one side, this remains certain -
The Congress of the United States clearly intended that the
Governor-General's power should be commensurate with his
responsibility. The Congress never intended that the
Governor-General should be saddled with the responsibility of
administering the government and of executing the laws but
shorn of the power to do so. The interests of the Philippines
will be best served by strict adherence to the basic principles
of constitutional government.
In light of this constitutional duty, it is the President's
prerogative to do whatever is legal and necessary for
Philippine defense interests. It is no coincidence that the
constitutional provision on the faithful execution clause was
followed by that on the President's commander-in-chief
powers,164 which are specifically granted during
extraordinary events of lawless violence, invasion, or
rebellion. And this duty of defending the country is unceasing,
even in times when there is no state of lawlesss violence,
invasion, or rebellion. At such times, the President has full
powers to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.
It would therefore be remiss for the President and repugnant
to the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution to do
nothing when the call of the moment requires increasing the
military's defensive capabilities, which could include forging
alliances with states that hold a common interest with the
Philippines or bringing an international suit against an
offending state.
The context drawn in the analysis above has been termed by
Justice Arturo D. Brion's Dissenting Opinion as the beginning
of a "patent misconception."165 His dissent argues that this
approach taken in analyzing the President's role as executor
of the laws is preceded by the duty to preserve and defend the
Constitution, which was allegedly overlooked.166
In arguing against the approach, however, the dissent grossly
failed to appreciate the nuances of the analysis, if read
holistically and in context. The concept that the President
cannot function with crippled hands and therefore can
disregard the need for Senate concurrence in treaties167 was
never expressed or implied. Rather, the appropriate reading
of the preceding analysis shows that the point being
elucidated is the reality that the President's duty to execute
the laws and protect the Philippines is inextricably interwoven
with his foreign affairs powers, such that he must resolve
issues imbued with both concerns to the full extent of his
powers, subject only to the limits supplied by law. In other
words, apart from an expressly mandated limit, or an implied
limit by virtue of incompatibility, the manner of execution by
the President must be given utmost deference. This approach
is not different from that taken by the Court in situations with
fairly similar contexts.
Thus, the analysis portrayed by the dissent does not give the
President authority to bypass constitutional safeguards and
limits. In fact, it specifies what these limitations are, how these
limitations are triggered, how these limitations function, and
what can be done within the sphere of constitutional duties
and limitations of the President.
Justice Brion's dissent likewise misinterprets the analysis
proffered when it claims that the foreign relations power of the
President should not be interpreted in isolation.168 The
analysis itself demonstrates how the foreign affairs function,
while mostly the President's, is shared in several instances,
namely in Section 2 of Article II on the conduct of war;
Sections 20 and 21 of Article VII on foreign loans, treaties, and
international agreements; Sections 4(2) and 5(2)(a) of Article
VIII on the judicial review of executive acts; Sections 4 and 25
of Article XVIII on treaties and international agreements
entered into prior to the Constitution and on the presence of
foreign military troops, bases, or facilities.
In fact, the analysis devotes a whole subheading to the
relationship between the two major presidential functions and
the role of the Senate in it.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 9
This approach of giving utmost deference to presidential
initiatives in respect of foreign affairs is not novel to the Court.
The President's act of treating EDCA as an executive
agreement is not the principal power being analyzed as the
Dissenting Opinion seems to suggest. Rather, the preliminary
analysis is in reference to the expansive power of foreign
affairs. We have long treated this power as something the
Courts must not unduly restrict. As we stated recently in
Vinuya v. Romulo:
To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present
political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority
to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements.
However, the question whether the Philippine government
should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for
which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to
the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best
interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The
wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination
by the Executive Department via the instant petition for
certiorari.
In the seminal case of US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the
US Supreme Court held that "[t]he President is the sole organ
of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign relations."
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our
international relations, embarrassment - perhaps serious
embarrassment - is to be avoided and success for our aims
achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made
effective through negotiation and inquiry within the
international field must often accord to the President a degree
of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which
would not be admissible where domestic affairs alone
involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better
opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his
confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the
form of diplomatic, consular and other officials ....
This ruling has been incorporated in our jurisprudence through
Bavan v. Executive Secretary and Pimentel v. Executive
Secretary; its overreaching principle was, perhaps, best
articulated in (now Chief) Justice Puno's dissent in Secretary
of Justice v. Lantion:
. . . The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and
consequences, sometimes with life and death significance to
the nation especially in times of war. It can only be entrusted
to that department of government which can act on the basis
of the best available information and can decide with
decisiveness .... It is also the President who possesses the
most comprehensive and the most confidential information
about foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular
officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over the
world. He has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military
intelligence data. In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs
is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider
degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The
regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under less
stringent standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to
breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations,
forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment and a
plethora of other problems with equally undesirable
consequences.169 (Emphases supplied)
Understandably, this Court must view the instant case with the
same perspective and understanding, knowing full well the
constitutional and legal repercussions of any judicial
overreach.
2. The plain meaning of the Constitution prohibits the entry of
foreign military bases, troops or facilities, except by way of a
treaty concurred in by the Senate - a clear limitation on the
President's dual role as defender of the State and as sole
authority in foreign relations.
Despite the President's roles as defender of the State and sole
authority in foreign relations, the 1987 Constitution expressly
limits his ability in instances when it involves the entry of
foreign military bases, troops or facilities. The initial limitation
is found in Section 21 of the provisions on the Executive
Department: "No treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds
of all the Members of the Senate." The specific limitation is
given by Section 25 of the Transitory Provisions, the full text
of which reads as follows:
SECTION 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States
of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and,
when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that
purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State.
It is quite plain that the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution intended to add to the basic requirements of a
treaty under Section 21 of Article VII. This means that both
provisions must be read as additional limitations to the
President's overarching executive function in matters of
defense and foreign relations.
3. The President, however, may enter into an executive
agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, if (a)
it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to
implement an existing law or treaty.
Again we refer to Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution:
SECTION 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States
of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and,
when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that
purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State. (Emphases supplied)
In view of this provision, petitioners argue170 that EDCA must
be in the form of a "treaty" duly concurred in by the Senate.
They stress that the Constitution is unambigous in mandating
the transmission to the Senate of all international agreements
concluded after the expiration of the MBA in 1991 -
agreements that concern the presence of foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities in the country. Accordingly,
petitioners maintain that the Executive Department is not
given the choice to conclude agreements like EDCA in the
form of an executive agreement.
This is also the view of the Senate, which, through a majority
vote of 15 of its members - with 1 against and 2 abstaining -
says in SR 105171 that EDCA must be submitted to the
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 10
Senate in the form of a treaty for concurrence by at least two-
thirds of all its members.
The Senate cites two constitutional provisions (Article VI,
Section 21 and Article XVIII, Section 25) to support its
position. Compared with the lone constitutional provision that
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) cites, which is Article
XVIII, Section 4(2), which includes the constitutionality of
"executive agreement(s)" among the cases subject to the
Supreme Court's power of judicial review, the Constitution
clearly requires submission of EDCA to the Senate. Two
specific provisions versus one general provision means that
the specific provisions prevail. The term "executive
agreement" is "a term wandering alone in the Constitution,
bereft of provenance and an unidentified constitutional
mystery."
The author of SR 105, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago,
upon interpellation even added that the MDT, which the
Executive claims to be partly implemented through EDCA, is
already obsolete.
There are two insurmountable obstacles to this Court's
agreement with SR 105, as well as with the comment on
interpellation made by Senator Santiago.
First, the concept of "executive agreement" is so well-
entrenched in this Court's pronouncements on the powers of
the President. When the Court validated the concept of
"executive agreement," it did so with full knowledge of the
Senate's role in concurring in treaties. It was aware of the
problematique of distinguishing when an international
agreement needed Senate concurrence for validity, and when
it did not; and the Court continued to validate the existence of
"executive agreements" even after the 1987 Constitution.172
This follows a long line of similar decisions upholding the
power of the President to enter into an executive
agreement.173
Second, the MDT has not been rendered obsolescent,
considering that as late as 2009,174 this Court continued to
recognize its validity.
Third, to this Court, a plain textual reading of Article XIII,
Section 25, inevitably leads to the conclusion that it applies
only to a proposed agreement between our government and
a foreign government, whereby military bases, troops, or
facilities of such foreign government would be "allowed" or
would "gain entry" Philippine territory.
Note that the provision "shall not be allowed" is a negative
injunction. This wording signifies that the President is not
authorized by law to allow foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities to enter the Philippines, except under a treaty
concurred in by the Senate. Hence, the constitutionally
restricted authority pertains to the entry of the bases, troops,
or facilities, and not to the activities to be done after entry.
Under the principles of constitutional construction, of
paramount consideration is the plain meaning of the language
expressed in the Constitution, or the verba legis rule.175 It is
presumed that the provisions have been carefully crafted in
order to express the objective it seeks to attain.176 It is
incumbent upon the Court to refrain from going beyond the
plain meaning of the words used in the Constitution. It is
presumed that the framers and the people meant what they
said when they said it, and that this understanding was
reflected in the Constitution and understood by the people in
the way it was meant to be understood when the fundamental
law was ordained and promulgated.177 As this Court has
often said:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search
for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is
where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
present in the people's consciousness, its language as much
as possible should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates
the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that
the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus, these
are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum.178 (Emphases supplied)
It is only in those instances in which the constitutional
provision is unclear, ambiguous, or silent that further
construction must be done to elicit its meaning.179 In Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW v. Commission on Elections,180 we
reiterated this guiding principle:
it [is] safer to construe the Constitution from what appears
upon its face. The proper interpretation therefore depends
more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than
in the framers' understanding thereof. (Emphases supplied)
The effect of this statement is surprisingly profound, for, if
taken literally, the phrase "shall not be allowed in the
Philippines" plainly refers to the entry of bases, troops, or
facilities in the country. The Oxford English Dictionary defines
the word "allow" as a transitive verb that means "to permit,
enable"; "to give consent to the occurrence of or relax restraint
on (an action, event, or activity)"; "to consent to the presence
or attendance of (a person)"; and, when with an adverbial of
place, "to permit (a person or animal) to go, come, or be in,
out, near, etc."181 Black's Law Dictionary defines the term as
one that means "[t]o grant, approve, or permit."182
The verb "allow" is followed by the word "in," which is a
preposition used to indicate "place or position in space or
anything having material extension: Within the limits or
bounds of, within (any place or thing)."183 That something is
the Philippines, which is the noun that follows.
It is evident that the constitutional restriction refers solely to
the initial entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are
thereafter subject only to the limitations provided by the rest
of the Constitution and Philippine law, and not to the Section
25 requirement of validity through a treaty.
The VFA has already allowed the entry of troops in the
Philippines. This Court stated in Lim v. Executive Secretary:
After studied reflection, it appeared farfetched that the
ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word "activities"
arose from accident. In our view, it was deliberately made that
way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this
manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory
for purposes other than military. As conceived, the joint
exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol
and surveillance to protect the nation's marine resources, sea
search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress,
disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the
building of school houses, medical and humanitarian
missions, and the like.
Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current
Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that "Balikatan
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 11
02-1," a "mutual anti- terrorism advising, assisting and training
exercise," falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable
activities in the context of the agreement. Both the history and
intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the
conclusion that combat-related activities -as opposed to
combat itself-such as the one subject of the instant petition,
are indeed authorized.184 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the Court indicated that the Constitution continues
to govern the conduct of foreign military troops in the
Philippines,185 readily implying the legality of their initial entry
into the country.
The OSG emphasizes that EDCA can be in the form of an
executive agreement, since it merely involves "adjustments in
detail" in the implementation of the MDT and the VFA.186 It
points out that there are existing treaties between the
Philippines and the U.S. that have already been concurred in
by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the
requirements of the Constitution under Section 25. Because
of the status of these prior agreements, respondent
emphasizes that EDCA need not be transmitted to the Senate.
The aforecited Dissenting Opinion of Justice Brion disagrees
with the ponencia's application of verba legis construction to
the words of Article XVIII, Section 25.187 It claims that the
provision is "neither plain, nor that simple."188 To buttress its
disagreement, the dissent states that the provision refers to a
historical incident, which is the expiration of the 1947
MBA.189 Accordingly, this position requires questioning the
circumstances that led to the historical event, and the meaning
of the terms under Article XVIII, Section 25.
This objection is quite strange. The construction technique of
verba legis is not inapplicable just because a provision has a
specific historical context. In fact, every provision of the
Constitution has a specific historical context. The purpose of
constitutional and statutory construction is to set tiers of
interpretation to guide the Court as to how a particular
provision functions. Verba legis is of paramount consideration,
but it is not the only consideration. As this Court has often said:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search
for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is
where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
present in the people's consciousness, its language as much
as possible should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates
the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that
the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus, these
are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum.190 (Emphases supplied)
As applied, verba legis aids in construing the ordinary
meaning of terms. In this case, the phrase being construed is
"shall not be allowed in the Philippines" and not the preceding
one referring to "the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States
of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities." It is explicit in the wording of the provision
itself that any interpretation goes beyond the text itself and into
the discussion of the framers, the context of the Constitutional
Commission's time of drafting, and the history of the 1947
MBA. Without reference to these factors, a reader would not
understand those terms. However, for the phrase "shall not be
allowed in the Philippines," there is no need for such
reference. The law is clear. No less than the Senate
understood this when it ratified the VFA.
4. The President may generally enter into executive
agreements subject to limitations defined by the Constitution
and may be in furtherance of a treaty already concurred in by
the Senate.
We discuss in this section why the President can enter into
executive agreements.
It would be helpful to put into context the contested language
found in Article XVIII, Section 25. Its more exacting
requirement was introduced because of the previous
experience of the country when its representatives felt
compelled to consent to the old MBA.191 They felt
constrained to agree to the MBA in fulfilment of one of the
major conditions for the country to gain independence from
the U.S.192 As a result of that experience, a second layer of
consent for agreements that allow military bases, troops and
facilities in the country is now articulated in Article XVIII of our
present Constitution.
This second layer of consent, however, cannot be interpreted
in such a way that we completely ignore the intent of our
constitutional framers when they provided for that additional
layer, nor the vigorous statements of this Court that affirm the
continued existence of that class of international agreements
called "executive agreements."
The power of the President to enter into binding executive
agreements without Senate concurrence is already well-
established in this jurisdiction.193 That power has been
alluded to in our present and past Constitutions,194 in various
statutes,195 in Supreme Court decisions,196 and during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.197 They
cover a wide array of subjects with varying scopes and
purposes,198 including those that involve the presence of
foreign military forces in the country.199
As the sole organ of our foreign relations200 and the
constitutionally assigned chief architect of our foreign
policy,201 the President is vested with the exclusive power to
conduct and manage the country's interface with other states
and governments. Being the principal representative of the
Philippines, the Chief Executive speaks and listens for the
nation; initiates, maintains, and develops diplomatic relations
with other states and governments; negotiates and enters into
international agreements; promotes trade, investments,
tourism and other economic relations; and settles international
disputes with other states.202
As previously discussed, this constitutional mandate
emanates from the inherent power of the President to enter
into agreements with other states, including the prerogative to
conclude binding executive agreements that do not require
further Senate concurrence. The existence of this presidential
power203 is so well-entrenched that Section 5(2)(a), Article
VIII of the Constitution, even provides for a check on its
exercise. As expressed below, executive agreements are
among those official governmental acts that can be the subject
of this Court's power of judicial review:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question. (Emphases supplied)
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 12
In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading,
executive agreements are defined as "international
agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out
well-established national policies and traditions and those
involving arrangements of a more or less temporary
nature."204 In Bayan Muna v. Romulo, this Court further
clarified that executive agreements can cover a wide array of
subjects that have various scopes and purposes.205 They are
no longer limited to the traditional subjects that are usually
covered by executive agreements as identified in Eastern Sea
Trading. The Court thoroughly discussed this matter in the
following manner:
The categorization of subject matters that may be covered by
international agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading
is not cast in stone. x x x.
As may be noted, almost half a century has elapsed since the
Court rendered its decision in Eastern Sea Trading. Since
then, the conduct of foreign affairs has become more complex
and the domain of international law wider, as to include such
subjects as human rights, the environment, and the sea. In
fact, in the US alone, the executive agreements executed by
its President from 1980 to 2000 covered subjects such as
defense, trade, scientific cooperation, aviation, atomic energy,
environmental cooperation, peace corps, arms limitation, and
nuclear safety, among others. Surely, the enumeration in
Eastern Sea Trading cannot circumscribe the option of each
state on the matter of which the international agreement
format would be convenient to serve its best interest. As
Francis Sayre said in his work referred to earlier:
. . . It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large
variety of executive agreements as such concluded from time
to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those
entered into under the trade-agreement act, have been
negotiated with foreign governments. . . . They cover such
subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income
tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil air craft, custom
matters and commercial relations generally, international
claims, postal matters, the registration of trademarks and
copyrights, etc .... (Emphases Supplied)
One of the distinguishing features of executive agreements is
that their validity and effectivity are not affected by a lack of
Senate concurrence.206 This distinctive feature was
recognized as early as in Eastern Sea Trading (1961), viz:
Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with
the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Executive
agreements become binding through executive action without
the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress.
xxxx
[T]he right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements
without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval
has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of
our history we have entered into executive agreements
covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations,
most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and
copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and
the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been
seriously questioned by our courts. (Emphases Supplied)
That notion was carried over to the present Constitution. In
fact, the framers specifically deliberated on whether the
general term "international agreement" included executive
agreements, and whether it was necessary to include an
express proviso that would exclude executive agreements
from the requirement of Senate concurrence. After noted
constitutionalist Fr. Joaquin Bernas quoted the Court's ruling
in Eastern Sea Trading, the Constitutional Commission
members ultimately decided that the term "international
agreements" as contemplated in Section 21, Article VII, does
not include executive agreements, and that a proviso is no
longer needed. Their discussion is reproduced below:207
MS. AQUINO: Madam President, first I would like a
clarification from the Committee. We have retained the words
"international agreement" which I think is the correct judgment
on the matter because an international agreement is different
from a treaty. A treaty is a contract between parties which is
in the nature of international agreement and also a municipal
law in the sense that the people are bound. So there is a
conceptual difference. However, I would like to be clarified if
the international agreements include executive agreements.
MR. CONCEPCION: That depends upon the parties. All
parties to these international negotiations stipulate the
conditions which are necessary for the agreement or whatever
it may be to become valid or effective as regards the parties.
MS. AQUINO: Would that depend on the parties or would that
depend on the nature of the executive agreement? According
to common usage, there are two types of executive
agreement: one is purely proceeding from an executive act
which affects external relations independent of the legislative
and the other is an executive act in pursuance of legislative
authorization. The first kind might take the form of just
conventions or exchanges of notes or protocol while the other,
which would be pursuant to the legislative authorization, may
be in the nature of commercial agreements.
MR. CONCEPCION: Executive agreements are generally
made to implement a treaty already enforced or to determine
the details for the implementation of the treaty. We are
speaking of executive agreements, not international
agreements.
MS. AQUINO: I am in full agreement with that, except that it
does not cover the first kind of executive agreement which is
just protocol or an exchange of notes and this would be in the
nature of reinforcement of claims of a citizen against a
country, for example.
MR. CONCEPCION: The Commissioner is free to require
ratification for validity insofar as the Philippines is concerned.
MS. AQUINO: It is my humble submission that we should
provide, unless the Committee explains to us otherwise, an
explicit proviso which would except executive agreements
from the requirement of concurrence of two-thirds of the
Members of the Senate. Unless I am enlightened by the
Committee I propose that tentatively, the sentence should
read. "No treaty or international agreement EXCEPT
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS shall be valid and effective."
FR. BERNAS: I wonder if a quotation from the Supreme Court
decision [in Eastern Sea Trading] might help clarify this:
The right of the executive to enter into binding agreements
without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval
has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of
our history, we have entered into executive agreements
covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations,
most favored nation rights, patent rights, trademark and
copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and
the settlement of claims. The validity of this has never been
seriously questioned by our Courts.
Agreements with respect to the registration of trademarks
have been concluded by the executive of various countries
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 13
under the Act of Congress of March 3, 1881 (21 Stat. 502) . .
. International agreements involving political issues or
changes of national policy and those involving international
agreements of a permanent character usually take the form of
treaties. But international agreements embodying
adjustments of detail, carrying out well established national
policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a
more or less temporary nature usually take the form of
executive agreements.
MR. ROMULO: Is the Commissioner, therefore, excluding the
executive agreements?
FR. BERNAS: What we are referring to, therefore, when we
say international agreements which need concurrence by at
least two-thirds are those which are permanent in nature.
MS. AQUINO: And it may include commercial agreements
which are executive agreements essentially but which are
proceeding from the authorization of Congress. If that is our
understanding, then I am willing to withdraw that amendment.
FR. BERNAS: If it is with prior authorization of Congress, then
it does not need subsequent concurrence by Congress.
MS. AQUINO: In that case, I am withdrawing my amendment.
MR. TINGSON: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Is Commissioner Aquino satisfied?
MS. AQUINO: Yes. There is already an agreement among us
on the definition of "executive agreements" and that would
make unnecessary any explicit proviso on the matter.
xxx
MR. GUINGONA: I am not clear as to the meaning of
"executive agreements" because I heard that these executive
agreements must rely on treaties. In other words, there must
first be treaties.
MR. CONCEPCION: No, I was speaking about the common
use, as executive agreements being the implementation of
treaties, details of which do not affect the sovereignty of the
State.
MR. GUINGONA: But what about the matter of permanence,
Madam President? Would 99 years be considered
permanent? What would be the measure of permanency? I do
not conceive of a treaty that is going to be forever, so there
must be some kind of a time limit.
MR. CONCEPCION: I suppose the Commissioner's question
is whether this type of agreement should be included in a
provision of the Constitution requiring the concurrence of
Congress.
MR. GUINGONA: It depends on the concept of the executive
agreement of which I am not clear. If the executive agreement
partakes of the nature of a treaty, then it should also be
included.
MR. CONCEPCION: Whether it partakes or not of the nature
of a treaty, it is within the power of the Constitutional
Commission to require that.
MR. GUINGONA: Yes. That is why I am trying to clarify
whether the words "international agreements" would include
executive agreements.
MR. CONCEPCION: No, not necessarily; generally no.
xxx
MR. ROMULO: I wish to be recognized first. I have only one
question. Do we take it, therefore, that as far as the Committee
is concerned, the term "international agreements" does not
include the term "executive agreements" as read by the
Commissioner in that text?
FR. BERNAS: Yes. (Emphases Supplied)
The inapplicability to executive agreements of the
requirements under Section 21 was again recognized in
Bayan v. Zamora and in Bayan Muna v. Romulo. These
cases, both decided under the aegis of the present
Constitution, quoted Eastern Sea Trading in reiterating that
executive agreements are valid and binding even without the
concurrence of the Senate.
Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of
Senate concurrence because of the legal mandate with which
they are concluded. As culled from the afore-quoted
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, past Supreme
Court Decisions, and works of noted scholars,208 executive
agreements merely involve arrangements on the
implementation of existing policies, rules, laws, or
agreements. They are concluded (1) to adjust the details of a
treaty;209 (2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of
the Legislature;210 or (3) in the exercise of the President's
independent powers under the Constitution.211 The raison
d'etre of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional
or legislative authorizations.
The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a
domestic variation in international agreements. International
practice has accepted the use of various forms and
designations of international agreements, ranging from the
traditional notion of a treaty - which connotes a formal, solemn
instrument - to engagements concluded in modem, simplified
forms that no longer necessitate ratification.212 An
international agreement may take different forms: treaty, act,
protocol, agreement, concordat, compromis d'arbitrage,
convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of notes, statute,
pact, charter, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement,
modus vivendi, or some other form.213 Consequently, under
international law, the distinction between a treaty and an
international agreement or even an executive agreement is
irrelevant for purposes of determining international rights and
obligations.
However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law
distinguishing treaties, international agreements, and
executive agreements is relegated to a mere variation in form,
or that the constitutional requirement of Senate concurrence
is demoted to an optional constitutional directive. There
remain two very important features that distinguish treaties
from executive agreements and translate them into terms of
art in the domestic setting.
First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an
express or implied authorization under the Constitution,
statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents puts
the validity and effectivity of executive agreements under
serious question for the main function of the Executive is to
enforce the Constitution and the laws enacted by the
Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of
these rules.214 In turn, executive agreements cannot create
new international obligations that are not expressly allowed or
reasonably implied in the law they purport to implement.
Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior
to executive agreements. Treaties are products of the acts of
the Executive and the Senate215 unlike executive
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 14
agreements, which are solely executive actions.216 Because
of legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is
regarded as being on the same level as a statute.217 If there
is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty takes
precedence over one that is prior.218 An executive agreement
is treated differently. Executive agreements that are
inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered
ineffective.219 Both types of international agreement are
nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the Constitution.220
This rule does not imply, though, that the President is given
carte blanche to exercise this discretion. Although the Chief
Executive wields the exclusive authority to conduct our foreign
relations, this power must still be exercised within the context
and the parameters set by the Constitution, as well as by
existing domestic and international laws. There are
constitutional provisions that restrict or limit the President's
prerogative in concluding international agreements, such as
those that involve the following:
a. The policy of freedom from nuclear weapons within
Philippine territory221
b. The fixing of tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, which must
be pursuant to the authority granted by Congress222
c. The grant of any tax exemption, which must be pursuant to
a law concurred in by a majority of all the Members of
Congress223
d. The contracting or guaranteeing, on behalf of the
Philippines, of foreign loans that must be previously concurred
in by the Monetary Board224
e. The authorization of the presence of foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities in the country must be in the form of a treaty
duly concurred in by the Senate.225
f. For agreements that do not fall under paragraph 5, the
concurrence of the Senate is required, should the form of the
government chosen be a treaty.
5. The President had the choice to enter into EDCA by way of
an executive agreement or a treaty.
No court can tell the President to desist from choosing an
executive agreement over a treaty to embody an international
agreement, unless the case falls squarely within Article VIII,
Section 25.
As can be gleaned from the debates among the members of
the Constitutional Commission, they were aware that legally
binding international agreements were being entered into by
countries in forms other than a treaty. At the same time, it is
clear that they were also keen to preserve the concept of
"executive agreements" and the right of the President to enter
into such agreements.
What we can glean from the discussions of the Constitutional
Commissioners is that they understood the following realities:
1. Treaties, international agreements, and executive
agreements are all constitutional manifestations of the
conduct of foreign affairs with their distinct legal
characteristics.
a. Treaties are formal contracts between the Philippines and
other States-parties, which are in the nature of international
agreements, and also of municipal laws in the sense of their
binding nature.226
b. International agreements are similar instruments, the
provisions of which may require the ratification of a designated
number of parties thereto. These agreements involving
political issues or changes in national policy, as well as those
involving international agreements of a permanent character,
usually take the form of treaties. They may also include
commercial agreements, which are executive agreements
essentially, but which proceed from previous authorization by
Congress, thus dispensing with the requirement of
concurrence by the Senate.227
c. Executive agreements are generally intended to implement
a treaty already enforced or to determine the details of the
implementation thereof that do not affect the sovereignty of
the State.228
2. Treaties and international agreements that cannot be mere
executive agreements must, by constitutional decree, be
concurred in by at least two-thirds of the Senate.
3. However, an agreement - the subject of which is the entry
of foreign military troops, bases, or facilities - is particularly
restricted. The requirements are that it be in the form of a
treaty concurred in by the Senate; that when Congress so
requires, it be ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum held for that purpose; and that
it be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
4. Thus, executive agreements can continue to exist as a
species of international agreements.
That is why our Court has ruled the way it has in several
cases.
In Bayan Muna v. Romulo, we ruled that the President acted
within the scope of her constitutional authority and discretion
when she chose to enter into the RP-U.S. Non-Surrender
Agreement in the form of an executive agreement, instead of
a treaty, and in ratifying the agreement without Senate
concurrence. The Court en banc discussed this intrinsic
presidential prerogative as follows:
Petitioner parlays the notion that the Agreement is of dubious
validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it
must be duly concurred in by the Senate. x x x x. Pressing its
point, petitioner submits that the subject of the Agreement
does not fall under any of the subject-categories that xx x may
be covered by an executive agreement, such as
commercial/consular relations, most-favored nation rights,
patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and
navigation arrangements and settlement of claims.
The categorization of subject matters that may be covered by
international agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading
is not cast in stone. There are no hard and fast rules on the
propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or an
executive agreement as an instrument of international
relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the form
of agreement is the parties' intent and desire to craft an
international agreement in the form they so wish to further
their respective interests. Verily, the matter of form takes a
back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of
the enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the
parties in either international agreement each labor under the
pacta sunt servanda principle.
xxxx
But over and above the foregoing considerations is the fact
that - save for the situation and matters contemplated in Sec.
25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution - when a treaty is required,
the Constitution does not classify any subject, like that
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 15
involving political issues, to be in the form of, and ratified as,
a treaty. What the Constitution merely prescribes is that
treaties need the concurrence of the Senate by a vote defined
therein to complete the ratification process.
xxxx
x x x. As the President wields vast powers and influence, her
conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, as Bayan would
put it, "executive altogether." The right of the President to
enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been
confirmed by long practice.
In thus agreeing to conclude the Agreement thru E/N BF0-
028-03, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, represented
by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, acted within the scope of
the authority and discretion vested in her by the Constitution.
At the end of the day, the President - by ratifying, thru her
deputies, the non-surrender agreement - did nothing more
than discharge a constitutional duty and exercise a
prerogative that pertains to her office. (Emphases supplied)
Indeed, in the field of external affairs, the President must be
given a larger measure of authority and wider discretion,
subject only to the least amount of checks and restrictions
under the Constitution.229 The rationale behind this power
and discretion was recognized by the Court in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary, cited earlier.230
Section 9 of Executive Order No. 459, or the Guidelines in the
Negotiation of International Agreements and its Ratification,
thus, correctly reflected the inherent powers of the President
when it stated that the DFA "shall determine whether an
agreement is an executive agreement or a treaty."
Accordingly, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, the
Court does not look into whether an international agreement
should be in the form of a treaty or an executive agreement,
save in cases in which the Constitution or a statute requires
otherwise. Rather, in view of the vast constitutional powers
and prerogatives granted to the President in the field of foreign
affairs, the task of the Court is to determine whether the
international agreement is consistent with the applicable
limitations.
6. Executive agreements may cover the matter of foreign
military forces if it merely involves detail adjustments.
The practice of resorting to executive agreements in adjusting
the details of a law or a treaty that already deals with the
presence of foreign military forces is not at all unusual in this
jurisdiction. In fact, the Court has already implicitly
acknowledged this practice in Lim v. Executive Secretary.231
In that case, the Court was asked to scrutinize the
constitutionality of the Terms of Reference of the Balikatan 02-
1 joint military exercises, which sought to implement the VFA.
Concluded in the form of an executive agreement, the Terms
of Reference detailed the coverage of the term "activities"
mentioned in the treaty and settled the matters pertaining to
the construction of temporary structures for the U.S. troops
during the activities; the duration and location of the exercises;
the number of participants; and the extent of and limitations
on the activities of the U.S. forces. The Court upheld the
Terms of Reference as being consistent with the VFA. It no
longer took issue with the fact that the Balikatan Terms of
Reference was not in the form of a treaty concurred in by the
Senate, even if it dealt with the regulation of the activities of
foreign military forces on Philippine territory.
In Nicolas v. Romulo,232 the Court again impliedly affirmed
the use of an executive agreement in an attempt to adjust the
details of a provision of the VFA. The Philippines and the U.S.
entered into the Romulo-Kenney Agreement, which undertook
to clarify the detention of a U.S. Armed Forces member,
whose case was pending appeal after his conviction by a trial
court for the crime of rape. In testing the validity of the latter
agreement, the Court precisely alluded to one of the inherent
limitations of an executive agreement: it cannot go beyond the
terms of the treaty it purports to implement. It was eventually
ruled that the Romulo-Kenney Agreement was "not in accord"
with the VFA, since the former was squarely inconsistent with
a provision in the treaty requiring that the detention be "by
Philippine authorities." Consequently, the Court ordered the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs to comply with the VFA and
"forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for
the appropriate agreement on detention facilities under
Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA.
"233
Culling from the foregoing discussions, we reiterate the
following pronouncements to guide us in resolving the present
controversy:
1. Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution, contains
stringent requirements that must be fulfilled by the
international agreement allowing the presence of foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities in the Philippines: (a) the
agreement must be in the form of a treaty, and (b) it must be
duly concurred in by the Senate.
2. If the agreement is not covered by the above situation, then
the President may choose the form of the agreement (i.e.,
either an executive agreement or a treaty), provided that the
agreement dealing with foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities is not the principal agreement that first allows their
entry or presence in the Philippines.
3. The executive agreement must not go beyond the
parameters, limitations, and standards set by the law and/or
treaty that the former purports to implement; and must not
unduly expand the international obligation expressly
mentioned or necessarily implied in the law or treaty.
4. The executive agreement must be consistent with the
Constitution, as well as with existing laws and treaties.
In light of the President's choice to enter into EDCA in the form
of an executive agreement, respondents carry the burden of
proving that it is a mere implementation of existing laws and
treaties concurred in by the Senate. EDCA must thus be
carefully dissected to ascertain if it remains within the legal
parameters of a valid executive agreement.
7. EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose, and
framework of the MDT and the VFA
The starting point of our analysis is the rule that "an executive
agreement xx x may not be used to amend a treaty."234 In
Lim v. Executive Secretary and in Nicolas v. Romulo, the
Court approached the question of the validity of executive
agreements by comparing them with the general framework
and the specific provisions of the treaties they seek to
implement.
In Lim, the Terms of Reference of the joint military exercises
was scrutinized by studying "the framework of the treaty
antecedents to which the Philippines bound itself,"235 i.e., the
MDT and the VFA. The Court proceeded to examine the
extent of the term "activities" as contemplated in Articles 1236
and II237 of the VFA. It later on found that the term "activities"
was deliberately left undefined and ambiguous in order to
permit "a wide scope of undertakings subject only to the
approval of the Philippine government"238 and thereby allow
the parties "a certain leeway in negotiation."239 The Court
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 16
eventually ruled that the Terms of Reference fell within the
sanctioned or allowable activities, especially in the context of
the VFA and the MDT.
The Court applied the same approach to Nicolas v. Romulo. It
studied the provisions of the VFA on custody and detention to
ascertain the validity of the Romulo-Kenney Agreement.240 It
eventually found that the two international agreements were
not in accord, since the Romulo-Kenney Agreement had
stipulated that U.S. military personnel shall be detained at the
U.S. Embassy Compound and guarded by U.S. military
personnel, instead of by Philippine authorities. According to
the Court, the parties "recognized the difference between
custody during the trial and detention after conviction."241
Pursuant to Article V(6) of the VFA, the custody of a U.S.
military personnel resides with U.S. military authorities during
trial. Once there is a finding of guilt, Article V(l0) requires that
the confinement or detention be "by Philippine authorities."
Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen's Dissenting Opinion posits that
EDCA "substantially modifies or amends the VFA"242 and
follows with an enumeration of the differences between EDCA
and the VFA. While these arguments will be rebutted more
fully further on, an initial answer can already be given to each
of the concerns raised by his dissent.
The first difference emphasized is that EDCA does not only
regulate visits as the VFA does, but allows temporary
stationing on a rotational basis of U.S. military personnel and
their contractors in physical locations with permanent facilities
and pre-positioned military materiel.
This argument does not take into account that these
permanent facilities, while built by U.S. forces, are to be
owned by the Philippines once constructed.243 Even the VFA
allowed construction for the benefit of U.S. forces during their
temporary visits.
The second difference stated by the dissent is that EDCA
allows the prepositioning of military materiel, which can
include various types of warships, fighter planes, bombers,
and vessels, as well as land and amphibious vehicles and
their corresponding ammunition.244
However, the VFA clearly allows the same kind of equipment,
vehicles, vessels, and aircraft to be brought into the country.
Articles VII and VIII of the VFA contemplates that U.S.
equipment, materials, supplies, and other property are
imported into or acquired in the Philippines by or on behalf of
the U.S. Armed Forces; as are vehicles, vessels, and aircraft
operated by or for U.S. forces in connection with activities
under the VFA. These provisions likewise provide for the
waiver of the specific duties, taxes, charges, and fees that
correspond to these equipment.
The third difference adverted to by the Justice Leonen's
dissent is that the VFA contemplates the entry of troops for
training exercises, whereas EDCA allows the use of territory
for launching military and paramilitary operations conducted in
other states.245 The dissent of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-
De Castro also notes that VFA was intended for non-combat
activides only, whereas the entry and activities of U.S. forces
into Agreed Locations were borne of military necessity or had
a martial character, and were therefore not contemplated by
the VFA.246
This Court's jurisprudence however established in no
uncertain terms that combat-related activities, as opposed to
actual combat, were allowed under the MDT and VFA, viz:
Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and
the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities
as opposed to combat itself such as the one subject of the
instant petition, are indeed authorized.247
Hence, even if EDCA was borne of military necessity, it cannot
be said to have strayed from the intent of the VFA since
EDCA's combat-related components are allowed under the
treaty.
Moreover, both the VFA and EDCA are silent on what these
activities actually are. Both the VFA and EDCA deal with the
presence of U.S. forces within the Philippines, but make no
mention of being platforms for activity beyond Philippine
territory. While it may be that, as applied, military operations
under either the VFA or EDCA would be carried out in the
future the scope of judicial review does not cover potential
breaches of discretion but only actual occurrences or blatantly
illegal provisions. Hence, we cannot invalidate EDCA on the
basis of the potentially abusive use of its provisions.
The fourth difference is that EDCA supposedly introduces a
new concept not contemplated in the VFA or the MDT: Agreed
Locations, Contractors, Pre-positioning, and Operational
Control.248
As previously mentioned, these points shall be addressed fully
and individually in the latter analysis of EDCA's provisions.
However, it must already be clarified that the terms and details
used by an implementing agreement need not be found in the
mother treaty. They must be sourced from the authority
derived from the treaty, but are not necessarily expressed
word-for-word in the mother treaty. This concern shall be
further elucidated in this Decision.
The fifth difference highlighted by the Dissenting Opinion is
that the VFA does not have provisions that may be construed
as a restriction on or modification of obligations found in
existing statues, including the jurisdiction of courts, local
autonomy, and taxation. Implied in this argument is that EDCA
contains such restrictions or modifications.249
This last argument cannot be accepted in view of the clear
provisions of EDCA. Both the VFA and EDCA ensure
Philippine jurisdiction in all instances contemplated by both
agreements, with the exception of those outlined by the VFA
in Articles III-VI. In the VFA, taxes are clearly waived whereas
in EDCA, taxes are assumed by the government as will be
discussed later on. This fact does not, therefore, produce a
diminution of jurisdiction on the part of the Philippines, but
rather a recognition of sovereignty and the rights that attend
it, some of which may be waived as in the cases under Articles
III-VI of the VFA.
Taking off from these concerns, the provisions of EDCA must
be compared with those of the MDT and the VFA, which are
the two treaties from which EDCA allegedly draws its validity.
"Authorized presence" under the VFA versus "authorized
activities" under EDCA: (1) U.S. personnel and (2) U.S.
contractors
The OSG argues250 that EDCA merely details existing
policies under the MDT and the VFA. It explains that EDCA
articulates the principle of defensive preparation embodied in
Article II of the MDT; and seeks to enhance the defensive,
strategic, and technological capabilities of both parties
pursuant to the objective of the treaty to strengthen those
capabilities to prevent or resist a possible armed attack.
Respondent also points out that EDCA simply implements
Article I of the VFA, which already allows the entry of U.S.
troops and personnel into the country. Respondent stresses
this Court's recognition in Lim v. Executive Secretary that U.S.
troops and personnel are authorized to conduct activities that
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 17
promote the goal of maintaining and developing their defense
capability.
Petitioners contest251 the assertion that the provisions of
EDCA merely implement the MDT. According to them, the
treaty does not specifically authorize the entry of U.S. troops
in the country in order to maintain and develop the individual
and collective capacities of both the Philippines and the U.S.
to resist an armed attack. They emphasize that the treaty was
concluded at a time when there was as yet no specific
constitutional prohibition on the presence of foreign military
forces in the country.
Petitioners also challenge the argument that EDCA simply
implements the VFA. They assert that the agreement covers
only short-term or temporary visits of U.S. troops "from time to
time" for the specific purpose of combined military exercises
with their Filipino counterparts. They stress that, in contrast,
U.S. troops are allowed under EDCA to perform activities
beyond combined military exercises, such as those
enumerated in Articles 111(1) and IV(4) thereof. Furthermore,
there is some degree of permanence in the presence of U.S.
troops in the country, since the effectivity of EDCA is
continuous until terminated. They proceed to argue that while
troops have a "rotational" presence, this scheme in fact fosters
their permanent presence.
a. Admission of U.S. military and civilian personnel into
Philippine territory is already allowed under the VFA
We shall first deal with the recognition under EDCA of the
presence in the country of three distinct classes of individuals
who will be conducting different types of activities within the
Agreed Locations: (1) U.S. military personnel; (2) U.S. civilian
personnel; and (3) U.S. contractors. The agreement refers to
them as follows:
"United States personnel" means United States military and
civilian personnel temporarily in the territory of the Philippines
in connection with activities approved by the Philippines, as
those terms are defined in the VFA.252
"United States forces" means the entity comprising United
States personnel and all property, equipment, and materiel of
the United States Armed Forces present in the territory of the
Philippines.253
"United States contractors" means companies and firms, and
their employees, under contract or subcontract to or on behalf
of the United States Department of Defense. United States
contractors are not included as part of the definition of United
States personnel in this Agreement, including within the
context of the VFA.254
United States forces may contract for any materiel, supplies,
equipment, and services (including construction) to be
furnished or undertaken in the territory of the Philippines
without restriction as to choice of contractor, supplier, or
person who provides such materiel, supplies, equipment, or
services. Such contracts shall be solicited, awarded, and
administered in accordance with the laws and regulations of
the United States.255 (Emphases Supplied)
A thorough evaluation of how EDCA is phrased clarities that
the agreement does not deal with the entry into the country of
U.S. personnel and contractors per se. While Articles
I(l)(b)256 and II(4)257 speak of "the right to access and use"
the Agreed Locations, their wordings indicate the presumption
that these groups have already been allowed entry into
Philippine territory, for which, unlike the VFA, EDCA has no
specific provision. Instead, Article II of the latter simply alludes
to the VFA in describing U.S. personnel, a term defined under
Article I of the treaty as follows:
As used in this Agreement, "United States personnel" means
United States military and civilian personnel temporarily in the
Philippines in connection with activities approved by the
Philippine Government. Within this definition:
1. The term "military personnel" refers to military members of
the United States Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and
Coast Guard.
2. The term "civilian personnel" refers to individuals who are
neither nationals of nor ordinarily resident in the Philippines
and who are employed by the United States armed forces or
who are accompanying the United States armed forces, such
as employees of the American Red Cross and the United
Services Organization.258
Article II of EDCA must then be read with Article III of the VFA,
which provides for the entry accommodations to be accorded
to U.S. military and civilian personnel:
1. The Government of the Philippines shall facilitate the
admission of United States personnel and their departure from
the Philippines in connection with activities covered by this
agreement.
2. United States military personnel shall be exempt from
passport and visa regulations upon entering and departing the
Philippines.
3. The following documents only, which shall be required in
respect of United States military personnel who enter the
Philippines; xx xx.
4. United States civilian personnel shall be exempt from visa
requirements but shall present, upon demand, valid passports
upon entry and departure of the Philippines. (Emphases
Supplied)
By virtue of Articles I and III of the VFA, the Philippines already
allows U.S. military and civilian personnel to be "temporarily
in the Philippines," so long as their presence is "in connection
with activities approved by the Philippine Government." The
Philippines, through Article III, even guarantees that it shall
facilitate the admission of U.S. personnel into the country and
grant exemptions from passport and visa regulations. The
VFA does not even limit their temporary presence to specific
locations.
Based on the above provisions, the admission and presence
of U.S. military and civilian personnel in Philippine territory are
already allowed under the VFA, the treaty supposedly being
implemented by EDCA. What EDCA has effectively done, in
fact, is merely provide the mechanism to identify the locations
in which U.S. personnel may perform allowed activities
pursuant to the VFA. As the implementing agreement, it
regulates and limits the presence of U.S. personnel in the
country.
b. EDCA does not provide the legal basis for admission of U.S.
contractors into Philippine territory; their entry must be
sourced from extraneous Philippine statutes and regulations
for the admission of alien employees or business persons.
Of the three aforementioned classes of individuals who will be
conducting certain activities within the Agreed Locations, we
note that only U.S. contractors are not explicitly mentioned in
the VFA. This does not mean, though, that the recognition of
their presence under EDCA is ipso facto an amendment of the
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 18
treaty, and that there must be Senate concurrence before they
are allowed to enter the country.
Nowhere in EDCA are U.S. contractors guaranteed immediate
admission into the Philippines. Articles III and IV, in fact,
merely grant them the right of access to, and the authority to
conduct certain activities within the Agreed Locations. Since
Article II(3) of EDCA specifically leaves out U.S. contractors
from the coverage of the VFA, they shall not be granted the
same entry accommodations and privileges as those enjoyed
by U.S. military and civilian personnel under the VFA.
Consequently, it is neither mandatory nor obligatory on the
part of the Philippines to admit U.S. contractors into the
country.259 We emphasize that the admission of aliens into
Philippine territory is "a matter of pure permission and simple
tolerance which creates no obligation on the part of the
government to permit them to stay."260 Unlike U.S. personnel
who are accorded entry accommodations, U.S. contractors
are subject to Philippine immigration laws.261 The latter must
comply with our visa and passport regulations262 and prove
that they are not subject to exclusion under any provision of
Philippine immigration laws.263 The President may also deny
them entry pursuant to his absolute and unqualified power to
prohibit or prevent the admission of aliens whose presence in
the country would be inimical to public interest.264
In the same vein, the President may exercise the plenary
power to expel or deport U.S. contractors265 as may be
necessitated by national security, public safety, public health,
public morals, and national interest.266 They may also be
deported if they are found to be illegal or undesirable aliens
pursuant to the Philippine Immigration Act267 and the Data
Privacy Act.268 In contrast, Article 111(5) of the VFA requires
a request for removal from the Philippine government before
a member of the U.S. personnel may be "dispos[ed] xx x
outside of the Philippines."
c. Authorized activities of U.S. military and civilian personnel
within Philippine territory are in furtherance of the MDT and
the VFA
We begin our analysis by quoting the relevant sections of the
MDT and the VFA that pertain to the activities in which U.S.
military and civilian personnel may engage:
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY
Article II
In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this
Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and
mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and
collective capacity to resist armed attack.
Article III
The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies,
will consult together from time to time regarding the
implementation of this Treaty and whenever in the opinion of
either of them the territorial integrity, political independence or
security of either of the Parties is threatened by external
armed attack in the Pacific.
VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT
Preamble
xxx
Reaffirming their obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty
of August 30, 1951;
Noting that from time to time elements of the United States
armed forces may visit the Republic of the Philippines;
Considering that cooperation between the United States and
the Republic of the Philippines promotes their common
security interests;
xxx
Article I - Definitions
As used in this Agreement, "United States personnel" means
United States military and civilian personnel temporarily in the
Philippines in connection with activities approved by the
Philippine Government. Within this definition: xx x
Article II - Respect for Law
It is the duty of United States personnel to respect the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines and to abstain from any activity
inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and, in particular,
from any political activity in the Philippines. The Government
of the United States shall take all measures within its authority
to ensure that this is done.
Article VII - Importation and Exportation
1. United States Government equipment, materials, supplies,
and other property imported into or acquired in the Philippines
by or on behalf of the United States armed forces in
connection with activities to which this agreement applies,
shall be free of all Philippine duties, taxes and other similar
charges. Title to such property shall remain with the United
States, which may remove such property from the Philippines
at any time, free from export duties, taxes, and other similar
charges. x x x.
Article VIII - Movement of Vessels and Aircraft
1. Aircraft operated by or for the United States armed forces
may enter the Philippines upon approval of the Government
of the Philippines in accordance with procedures stipulated in
implementing arrangements.
2. Vessels operated by or for the United States armed forces
may enter the Philippines upon approval of the Government
of the Philippines. The movement of vessels shall be in
accordance with international custom and practice governing
such vessels, and such agreed implementing arrangements
as necessary. x x x (Emphases Supplied)
Manifest in these provisions is the abundance of references to
the creation of further "implementing arrangements" including
the identification of "activities [to be] approved by the
Philippine Government." To determine the parameters of
these implementing arrangements and activities, we referred
to the content, purpose, and framework of the MDT and the
VFA.
By its very language, the MDT contemplates a situation in
which both countries shall engage in joint activities, so that
they can maintain and develop their defense capabilities. The
wording itself evidently invites a reasonable construction that
the joint activities shall involve joint military trainings,
maneuvers, and exercises. Both the interpretation269 and the
subsequent practice270 of the parties show that the MDT
independently allows joint military exercises in the country.
Lim v. Executive Secretary271 and Nicolas v. Romulo272
recognized that Balikatan exercises, which are activities that
seek to enhance and develop the strategic and technological
capabilities of the parties to resist an armed attack, "fall
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 19
squarely under the provisions of the RP-US MDT."273 In Lim,
the Court especially noted that the Philippines and the U.S.
continued to conduct joint military exercises even after the
expiration of the MBA and even before the conclusion of the
VFA.274 These activities presumably related to the Status of
Forces Agreement, in which the parties agreed on the status
to be accorded to U.S. military and civilian personnel while
conducting activities in the Philippines in relation to the
MDT.275
Further, it can be logically inferred from Article V of the MDT
that these joint activities may be conducted on Philippine or
on U.S. soil. The article expressly provides that the term
armed attack includes "an armed attack on the metropolitan
territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories
under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces,
public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific." Surely, in maintaining
and developing our defense capabilities, an assessment or
training will need to be performed, separately and jointly by
self-help and mutual aid, in the territories of the contracting
parties. It is reasonable to conclude that the assessment of
defense capabilities would entail understanding the terrain,
wind flow patterns, and other environmental factors unique to
the Philippines.
It would also be reasonable to conclude that a simulation of
how to respond to attacks in vulnerable areas would be part
of the training of the parties to maintain and develop their
capacity to resist an actual armed attack and to test and
validate the defense plan of the Philippines. It is likewise
reasonable to imagine that part of the training would involve
an analysis of the effect of the weapons that may be used and
how to be prepared for the eventuality. This Court recognizes
that all of this may require training in the area where an armed
attack might be directed at the Philippine territory.
The provisions of the MDT must then be read in conjunction
with those of the VFA.
Article I of the VFA indicates that the presence of U.S. military
and civilian personnel in the Philippines is "in connection with
activities approved by the Philippine Government." While the
treaty does not expressly enumerate or detail the nature of
activities of U.S. troops in the country, its Preamble makes
explicit references to the reaffirmation of the obligations of
both countries under the MDT. These obligations include the
strengthening of international and regional security in the
Pacific area and the promotion of common security interests.
The Court has already settled in Lim v. Executive Secretary
that the phrase "activities approved by the Philippine
Government" under Article I of the VFA was intended to be
ambiguous in order to afford the parties flexibility to adjust the
details of the purpose of the visit of U.S. personnel.276 In
ruling that the Terms of Reference for the Balikatan Exercises
in 2002 fell within the context of the treaty, this Court
explained:
After studied reflection, it appeared farfetched that the
ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word "activities"
arose from accident. In our view, it was deliberately made that
way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this
manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory
for purposes other than military. As conceived, the joint
exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol
and surveillance to protect the nation's marine resources, sea
search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress,
disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the
building of school houses, medical and humanitarian
missions, and the like.
Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current
Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that "Balikatan
02-1," a "mutual anti-terrorism advising, assisting and training
exercise," falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable
activities in the context of the agreement. Both the history and
intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the
conclusion that combat-related activities - as opposed to
combat itself- such as the one subject of the instant petition,
are indeed authorized. (Emphases Supplied)
The joint report of the Senate committees on foreign relations
and on national defense and security further explains the wide
range and variety of activities contemplated in the VFA, and
how these activities shall be identified:277
These joint exercises envisioned in the VFA are not limited to
combat-related activities; they have a wide range and variety.
They include exercises that will reinforce the AFP's ability to
acquire new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect
the country's maritime resources; sea-search and rescue
operations to assist ships in distress; and disaster-relief
operations to aid the civilian victims of natural calamities, such
as earthquakes, typhoons and tidal waves.
xxxx
Joint activities under the VFA will include combat maneuvers;
training in aircraft maintenance and equipment repair; civic-
action projects; and consultations and meetings of the
Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board. It is at the level of the
Mutual Defense Board-which is headed jointly by the Chief of
Staff of the AFP and the Commander in Chief of the U.S.
Pacific Command-that the VFA exercises are planned. Final
approval of any activity involving U.S. forces is, however,
invariably given by the Philippine Government.
xxxx
Siazon clarified that it is not the VFA by itself that determines
what activities will be conducted between the armed forces of
the U.S. and the Philippines. The VFA regulates and provides
the legal framework for the presence, conduct and legal status
of U.S. personnel while they are in the country for visits, joint
exercises and other related activities. (Emphases Supplied)
What can be gleaned from the provisions of the VFA, the joint
report of the Senate committees on foreign relations and on
national defense and security, and the ruling of this Court in
Lim is that the "activities" referred to in the treaty are meant to
be specified and identified infurther agreements. EDCA is one
such agreement.
EDCA seeks to be an instrument that enumerates the
Philippine-approved activities of U.S. personnel referred to in
the VFA. EDCA allows U.S. military and civilian personnel to
perform "activities approved by the Philippines, as those terms
are defined in the VFA"278 and clarifies that these activities
include those conducted within the Agreed Locations:
1. Security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training
activities; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
activities; and such other activities as may be agreed upon by
the Parties279
2. Training; transit; support and related activities; refueling of
aircraft; bunkering of vessels; temporary maintenance of
vehicles, vessels, and aircraft; temporary accommodation of
personnel; communications; prepositioning of equipment,
supplies, and materiel; deployment of forces and materiel; and
such other activities as the Parties may agree280
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 20
3. Exercise of operational control over the Agreed Locations
for construction activities and other types of activity, including
alterations and improvements thereof281
4. Exercise of all rights and authorities within the Agreed
Locations that are necessary for their operational control or
defense, including the adoption of apfropriate measures to
protect U.S. forces and contractors282
5. Use of water, electricity, and other public utilities283
6. Operation of their own telecommunication systems,
including the utilization of such means and services as are
required to ensure the full ability to operate telecommunication
systems, as well as the use of the necessary radio spectrum
allocated for this purpose284
According to Article I of EDCA, one of the purposes of these
activities is to maintain and develop, jointly and by mutual aid,
the individual and collective capacities of both countries to
resist an armed attack. It further states that the activities are
in furtherance of the MDT and within the context of the VFA.
We note that these planned activities are very similar to those
under the Terms of Reference285 mentioned in Lim. Both
EDCA and the Terms of Reference authorize the U.S. to
perform the following: (a) participate in training exercises; (b)
retain command over their forces; (c) establish temporary
structures in the country; (d) share in the use of their
respective resources, equipment and other assets; and (e)
exercise their right to self-defense. We quote the relevant
portion of the Terms and Conditions as follows:286
I. POLICY LEVEL
xxxx
No permanent US basing and support facilities shall be
established. Temporary structures such as those for troop
billeting, classroom instruction and messing may be set up for
use by RP and US Forces during the Exercise.
The Exercise shall be implemented jointly by RP and US
Exercise Co-Directors under the authority of the Chief of Staff,
AFP. In no instance will US Forces operate independently
during field training exercises (FTX). AFP and US Unit
Commanders will retain command over their respective forces
under the overall authority of the Exercise Co-Directors. RP
and US participants shall comply with operational instructions
of the AFP during the FTX.
The exercise shall be conducted and completed within a
period of not more than six months, with the projected
participation of 660 US personnel and 3,800 RP Forces. The
Chief of Staff, AFP shall direct the Exercise Co-Directors to
wind up and terminate the Exercise and other activities within
the six month Exercise period.
The Exercise is a mutual counter-terrorism advising, assisting
and training Exercise relative to Philippine efforts against the
ASG, and will be conducted on the Island of Basilan. Further
advising, assisting and training exercises shall be conducted
in Malagutay and the Zamboanga area. Related activities in
Cebu will be for support of the Exercise.
xx xx.
US exercise participants shall not engage in combat, without
prejudice to their right of self-defense.
These terms of Reference are for purposes of this Exercise
only and do not create additional legal obligations between the
US Government and the Republic of the Philippines.
II. EXERCISE LEVEL
1. TRAINING
a. The Exercise shall involve the conduct of mutual military
assisting, advising and training of RP and US Forces with the
primary objective of enhancing the operational capabilities of
both forces to combat terrorism.
b. At no time shall US Forces operate independently within RP
territory.
c. Flight plans of all aircraft involved in the exercise will comply
with the local air traffic regulations.
2. ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS
xxxx
a. RP and US participating forces may share, in accordance
with their respective laws and regulations, in the use of their
resources, equipment and other assets. They will use their
respective logistics channels. x x x. (Emphases Supplied)
After a thorough examination of the content, purpose, and
framework of the MDT and the VFA, we find that EDCA has
remained within the parameters set in these two treaties. Just
like the Terms of Reference mentioned in Lim, mere
adjustments in detail to implement the MDT and the VFA can
be in the form of executive agreements.
Petitioners assert287 that the duration of the activities
mentioned in EDCA is no longer consistent with the temporary
nature of the visits as contemplated in the VFA. They point out
that Article XII(4) of EDCA has an initial term of 10 years, a
term automatically renewed unless the Philippines or the U.S.
terminates the agreement. According to petitioners, such
length of time already has a badge of permanency.
In connection with this, Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De
Castro likewise argues in her Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion that the VFA contemplated mere temporary visits
from U.S. forces, whereas EDCA allows an unlimited period
for U.S. forces to stay in the Philippines.288
However, the provisions of EDCA directly contradict this
argument by limiting itself to 10 years of effectivity. Although
this term is automatically renewed, the process for terminating
the agreement is unilateral and the right to do so automatically
accrues at the end of the 10 year period. Clearly, this method
does not create a permanent obligation.
Drawing on the reasoning in Lim, we also believe that it could
not have been by chance that the VFA does not include a
maximum time limit with respect to the presence of U.S.
personnel in the country. We construe this lack of specificity
as a deliberate effort on the part of the Philippine and the U.S.
governments to leave out this aspect and reserve it for the
"adjustment in detail" stage of the implementation of the
treaty. We interpret the subsequent, unconditional
concurrence of the Senate in the entire text of the VFA as an
implicit grant to the President of a margin of appreciation in
determining the duration of the "temporary" presence of U.S.
personnel in the country.
Justice Brion's dissent argues that the presence of U.S. forces
under EDCA is "more permanent" in nature.289 However, this
argument has not taken root by virtue of a simple glance at its
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 21
provisions on the effectivity period. EDCA does not grant
permanent bases, but rather temporary rotational access to
facilities for efficiency. As Professor Aileen S.P. Baviera notes:
The new EDCA would grant American troops, ships and
planes rotational access to facilities of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines – but not permanent bases which are
prohibited under the Philippine Constitution - with the result of
reducing response time should an external threat from a
common adversary crystallize.290
EDCA is far from being permanent in nature compared to the
practice of states as shown in other defense cooperation
agreements. For example, Article XIV(l) of the U.S.-Romania
defense agreement provides the following:
This Agreement is concluded for an indefinite period and shall
enter into force in accordance with the internal laws of each
Party x x x. (emphasis supplied)
Likewise, Article 36(2) of the US-Poland Status of Forces
Agreement reads:
This Agreement has been concluded for an indefinite period
of time. It may be terminated by written notification by either
Party and in that event it terminates 2 years after the receipt
of the notification. (emphasis supplied)
Section VIII of US.-Denmark Mutual Support Agreement
similarly provides:
8.1 This Agreement, which consists of a Preamble,
SECTIONs I-VIII, and Annexes A and B, shall become
effective on the date of the last signature affixed below and
shall remain in force until terminated by the Parties, provided
that it may be terminated by either Party upon 180 days written
notice of its intention to do so to the other Party. (emphasis
supplied)
On the other hand, Article XXI(3) of the US.-Australia Force
Posture Agreement provides a longer initial term:
3. This Agreement shall have an initial term of 25 years and
thereafter shall continue in force, but may be terminated by
either Party at any time upon one year's written notice to the
other Party through diplomatic channels. (emphasis supplied)
The phrasing in EDCA is similar to that in the U.S.-Australia
treaty but with a term less than half of that is provided in the
latter agreement. This means that EDCA merely follows the
practice of other states in not specifying a non-extendible
maximum term. This practice, however, does not
automatically grant a badge of permanency to its terms. Article
XII(4) of EDCA provides very clearly, in fact, that its effectivity
is for an initial term of 10 years, which is far shorter than the
terms of effectivity between the U.S. and other states. It is
simply illogical to conclude that the initial, extendible term of
10 years somehow gives EDCA provisions a permanent
character.
The reasoning behind this interpretation is rooted in the
constitutional role of the President who, as Commander-in-
Chief of our armed forces, is the principal strategist of the
nation and, as such, duty-bound to defend our national
sovereignty and territorial integrity;291 who, as chief architect
of our foreign relations, is the head policymaker tasked to
assess, ensure, and protect our national security and
interests;292 who holds the most comprehensive and most
confidential information about foreign countries293 that may
affect how we conduct our external affairs; and who has
unrestricted access to highly classified military intelligence
data294 that may threaten the life of the nation. Thus, if after
a geopolitical prognosis of situations affecting the country, a
belief is engendered that a much longer period of military
training is needed, the President must be given ample
discretion to adopt necessary measures including the
flexibility to set an extended timetable.
Due to the sensitivity and often strict confidentiality of these
concerns, we acknowledge that the President may not always
be able to candidly and openly discuss the complete situation
being faced by the nation. The Chief Executive's hands must
not be unduly tied, especially if the situation calls for crafting
programs and setting timelines for approved activities. These
activities may be necessary for maintaining and developing
our capacity to resist an armed attack, ensuring our national
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and securing our national
interests. If the Senate decides that the President is in the best
position to define in operational terms the meaning of
temporary in relation to the visits, considered individually or in
their totality, the Court must respect that policy decision. If the
Senate feels that there is no need to set a time limit to these
visits, neither should we.
Evidently, the fact that the VFA does not provide specificity in
regard to the extent of the "temporary" nature of the visits of
U.S. personnel does not suggest that the duration to which the
President may agree is unlimited. Instead, the boundaries of
the meaning of the term temporary in Article I of the treaty
must be measured depending on the purpose of each visit or
activity.295 That purpose must be analyzed on a case-by-
case basis depending on the factual circumstances
surrounding the conclusion of the implementing agreement.
While the validity of the President's actions will be judged
under less stringent standards, the power of this Court to
determine whether there was grave abuse of discretion
remains unimpaired.
d. Authorized activities performed by US. contractors within
Philippine territory - who were legitimately permitted to enter
the country independent of EDCA - are subject to relevant
Philippine statutes and regulations and must be consistent
with the MDT and the VFA
Petitioners also raise296 concerns about the U.S.
government's purported practice of hiring private security
contractors in other countries. They claim that these
contractors - one of which has already been operating in
Mindanao since 2004 - have been implicated in incidents or
scandals in other parts of the globe involving rendition, torture
and other human rights violations. They also assert that these
contractors employ paramilitary forces in other countries
where they are operating.
Under Articles III and IV of EDCA, U.S. contractors are
authorized to perform only the following activities:
1. Training; transit; support and related activities; refueling of
aircraft; bunkering of vessels; temporary maintenance of
vehicles, vessels, and aircraft; temporary accommodation of
personnel; communications; prepositioning of equipment,
supplies, and materiel; deployment of forces and materiel; and
such other activities as the Parties may agree297
2. Prepositioning and storage of defense equipment, supplies,
and materiel, including delivery, management, inspection,
use, maintenance, and removal of such equipment, supplies
and materiel298
3. Carrying out of matters in accordance with, and to the
extent permissible under, U.S. laws, regulations, and
policies299
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 22
EDCA requires that all activities within Philippine territory be
in accordance with Philippine law. This means that certain
privileges denied to aliens are likewise denied to foreign
military contractors. Relevantly, providing security300 and
carrying, owning, and possessing firearms301 are illegal for
foreign civilians.
The laws in place already address issues regarding the
regulation of contractors. In the 2015 Foreign Investment
Negative list,302 the Executive Department has already
identified corporations that have equity restrictions in
Philippine jurisdiction. Of note is No. 5 on the list - private
security agencies that cannot have any foreign equity by virtue
of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5487;303 and No. 15, which
regulates contracts for the construction of defense-related
structures based on Commonwealth Act No. 541.
Hence, any other entity brought into the Philippines by virtue
of EDCA must subscribe to corporate and civil requirements
imposed by the law, depending on the entity's corporate
structure and the nature of its business.
That Philippine laws extraneous to EDCA shall govern the
regulation of the activities of U.S. contractors has been clear
even to some of the present members of the Senate.
For instance, in 2012, a U.S. Navy contractor, the Glenn
Marine, was accused of spilling fuel in the waters off Manila
Bay.304 The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Senate Committee on Environment and Natural Resources
chairperson claimed environmental and procedural violations
by the contractor.305 The U.S. Navy investigated the
contractor and promised stricter guidelines to be imposed
upon its contractors.306 The statement attributed to
Commander Ron Steiner of the public affairs office of the U.S.
Navy's 7th Fleet - that U.S. Navy contractors are bound by
Philippine laws - is of particular relevance. The statement
acknowledges not just the presence of the contractors, but
also the U.S. position that these contractors are bound by the
local laws of their host state. This stance was echoed by other
U.S. Navy representatives.307
This incident simply shows that the Senate was well aware of
the presence of U.S. contractors for the purpose of fulfilling
the terms of the VFA. That they are bound by Philippine law is
clear to all, even to the U.S.
As applied to EDCA, even when U.S. contractors are granted
access to the Agreed Locations, all their activities must be
consistent with Philippine laws and regulations and pursuant
to the MDT and the VFA.
While we recognize the concerns of petitioners, they do not
give the Court enough justification to strike down EDCA. In
Lim v. Executive Secretary, we have already explained that
we cannot take judicial notice of claims aired in news reports,
"not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or
impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be
established in accordance with the rules of evidence."308
What is more, we cannot move one step ahead and speculate
that the alleged illegal activities of these contractors in other
countries would take place in the Philippines with certainty. As
can be seen from the above discussion, making sure that U.S.
contractors comply with Philippine laws is a function of law
enforcement. EDCA does not stand in the way of law
enforcement.
Nevertheless, we emphasize that U.S. contractors are
explicitly excluded from the coverage of the VFA. As visiting
aliens, their entry, presence, and activities are subject to all
laws and treaties applicable within the Philippine territory.
They may be refused entry or expelled from the country if they
engage in illegal or undesirable activities. There is nothing that
prevents them from being detained in the country or being
subject to the jurisdiction of our courts. Our penal laws,309
labor laws,310 and immigrations laws311 apply to them and
therefore limit their activities here. Until and unless there is
another law or treaty that specifically deals with their entry and
activities, their presence in the country is subject to unqualified
Philippine jurisdiction.
EDCA does not allow the presence of U.S.-owned or -
controlled military facilities and bases in the Philippines
Petitioners Saguisag et al. claim that EDCA permits the
establishment of U.S. military bases through the
"euphemistically" termed "Agreed Locations. "312 Alluding to
the definition of this term in Article II(4) of EDCA, they point
out that these locations are actually military bases, as the
definition refers to facilities and areas to which U.S. military
forces have access for a variety of purposes. Petitioners claim
that there are several badges of exclusivity in the use of the
Agreed Locations by U.S. forces. First, Article V(2) of EDCA
alludes to a "return" of these areas once they are no longer
needed by U.S. forces, indicating that there would be some
transfer of use. Second, Article IV(4) ofEDCA talks about
American forces' unimpeded access to the Agreed Locations
for all matters relating to the prepositioning and storage of
U.S. military equipment, supplies, and materiel. Third, Article
VII of EDCA authorizes U.S. forces to use public utilities and
to operate their own telecommunications system.
a. Preliminary point on badges of exclusivity
As a preliminary observation, petitioners have cherry-picked
provisions of EDCA by presenting so-called "badges of
exclusivity," despite the presence of contrary provisions within
the text of the agreement itself.
First, they clarify the word "return" in Article V(2) of EDCA.
However, the use of the word "return" is within the context of
a lengthy provision. The provision as a whole reads as follows:
The United States shall return to the Philippines any Agreed
Locations, or any portion thereof, including non-relocatable
structures and assemblies constructed, modified, or improved
by the United States, once no longer required by United States
forces for activities under this Agreement. The Parties or the
Designated Authorities shall consult regarding the terms of
return of any Agreed Locations, including possible
compensation for improvements or construction.
The context of use is "required by United States forces for
activities under this Agreement." Therefore, the return of an
Agreed Location would be within the parameters of an activity
that the Mutual Defense Board (MDB) and the Security
Engagement Board (SEB) would authorize. Thus, possession
by the U.S. prior to its return of the Agreed Location would be
based on the authority given to it by a joint body co-chaired by
the "AFP Chief of Staff and Commander, U.S. PACOM with
representatives from the Philippines' Department of National
Defense and Department of Foreign Affairs sitting as
members."313 The terms shall be negotiated by both the
Philippines and the U.S., or through their Designated
Authorities. This provision, seen as a whole, contradicts
petitioners' interpretation of the return as a "badge of
exclusivity." In fact, it shows the cooperation and partnership
aspect of EDCA in full bloom.
Second, the term "unimpeded access" must likewise be
viewed from a contextual perspective. Article IV(4) states that
U.S. forces and U.S. contractors shall have "unimpeded
access to Agreed Locations for all matters relating to the
prepositioning and storage of defense equipment, supplies,
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 23
and materiel, including delivery, management, inspection,
use, maintenance, and removal of such equipment, supplies
and materiel."
At the beginning of Article IV, EDCA states that the Philippines
gives the U.S. the authority to bring in these equipment,
supplies, and materiel through the MDB and SEB security
mechanism. These items are owned by the U.S.,314 are
exclusively for the use of the U.S.315 and, after going through
the joint consent mechanisms of the MDB and the SEB, are
within the control of the U.S.316 More importantly, before
these items are considered prepositioned, they must have
gone through the process of prior authorization by the MDB
and the SEB and given proper notification to the AFP.317
Therefore, this "unimpeded access" to the Agreed Locations
is a necessary adjunct to the ownership, use, and control of
the U.S. over its own equipment, supplies, and materiel and
must have first been allowed by the joint mechanisms in play
between the two states since the time of the MDT and the
VFA. It is not the use of the Agreed Locations that is exclusive
per se; it is mere access to items in order to exercise the rights
of ownership granted by virtue of the Philippine Civil Code.318
As for the view that EDCA authorizes U.S. forces to use public
utilities and to operate their own telecommunications system,
it will be met and answered in part D, infra.
Petitioners also point out319 that EDCA is strongly
reminiscent of and in fact bears a one-to-one correspondence
with the provisions of the 1947 MBA. They assert that both
agreements (a) allow similar activities within the area; (b)
provide for the same "species of ownership" over facilities;
and (c) grant operational control over the entire area. Finally,
they argue320 that EDCA is in fact an implementation of the
new defense policy of the U.S. According to them, this policy
was not what was originally intended either by the MDT or by
the VFA.
On these points, the Court is not persuaded.
The similar activities cited by petitioners321 simply show that
under the MBA, the U.S. had the right to construct, operate,
maintain, utilize, occupy, garrison, and control the bases. The
so-called parallel provisions of EDCA allow only operational
control over the Agreed Locations specifically for construction
activities. They do not allow the overarching power to operate,
maintain, utilize, occupy, garrison, and control a base with full
discretion. EDCA in fact limits the rights of the U.S. in respect
of every activity, including construction, by giving the MDB and
the SEB the power to determine the details of all activities
such as, but not limited to, operation, maintenance, utility,
occupancy, garrisoning, and control.322
The "species of ownership" on the other hand, is distinguished
by the nature of the property. For immovable property
constructed or developed by the U.S., EDCA expresses that
ownership will automatically be vested to the Philippines.323
On the other hand, for movable properties brought into the
Philippines by the U.S., EDCA provides that ownership is
retained by the latter. In contrast, the MBA dictates that the
U.S. retains ownership over immovable and movable
properties.
To our mind, both EDCA and the MBA simply incorporate what
is already the law of the land in the Philippines. The Civil
Code's provisions on ownership, as applied, grant the owner
of a movable property full rights over that property, even if
located in another person's property.324
The parallelism, however, ends when the situation involves
facilities that can be considered immovable. Under the MBA,
the U.S. retains ownership if it paid for the facility.325 Under
EDCA, an immovable is owned by the Philippines, even if built
completely on the back of U.S. funding.326 This is consistent
with the constitutional prohibition on foreign land
ownership.327
Despite the apparent similarity, the ownership of property is
but a part of a larger whole that must be considered before the
constitutional restriction is violated. Thus, petitioners' points
on operational control will be given more attention in the
discussion below. The arguments on policy are, however,
outside the scope of judicial review and will not be discussed
Moreover, a direct comparison of the MBA and EDCA will
result in several important distinctions that would allay
suspicion that EDCA is but a disguised version of the MBA.
b. There are substantial matters that the US. cannot do under
EDCA, but which it was authorized to do under the 1947 MBA
The Philippine experience with U.S. military bases under the
1947 MBA is simply not possible under EDCA for a number of
important reasons.
First, in the 1947 MBA, the U.S. retained all rights of
jurisdiction in and over Philippine territory occupied by
American bases. In contrast, the U.S. under EDCA does not
enjoy any such right over any part of the Philippines in which
its forces or equipment may be found. Below is a comparative
table between the old treaty and EDCA:
1947 MBA/ 1946 Treaty of General Relations EDCA
1947 MBA, Art. I(1):
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines
(hereinafter referred to as the Philippines) grants to the
Government of the United States of America (hereinafter
referred to as the United States) the right to retain the use of
the bases in the Philippines listed in Annex A attached hereto.
1947 MBA, Art. XVII(2):
All buildings and structures which are erected by the United
States in the bases shall be the property of the United States
and may be removed by it before the expiration of this
Agreement or the earlier relinquishment of the base on which
the structures are situated. There shall be no obligation on the
part of the Philippines or of the United States to rebuild or
repair any destruction or damage inflicted from any cause
whatsoever on any of the said buildings or structures owned
or used by the United States in the bases. x x x x.
1946 Treaty of Gen. Relations, Art. I:
The United States of America agrees to withdraw and
surrender, and does hereby withdraw and surrender, all rights
of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control or sovereignty
existing and exercised by the United States of America in and
over the territory and the people of the Philippine Islands,
except the use of such bases, necessary appurtenances to
such bases, and the rights incident thereto, as the United
States of America, by agreement with the Republic of the
Philippines may deem necessary to retain for the mutual
protection of the Republic of the Philippines and of the United
States of America. x x x.
EDCA, preamble:
Affirming that the Parties share an understanding for the
United States not to establish a permanent military presence
or base in the territory of the Philippines;
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 24
xxxx
Recognizing that all United States access to and use of
facilities and areas will be at the invitation of the Philippines
and with full respect for the Philippine Constitution and
Philippine laws;
xxxx
EDCA, Art. II(4):
"Agreed Locations" means facilities and areas that are
provided by the Government of the Philippines through the
AFP and that United States forces, United States contractors,
and others as mutually agreed, shall have the right to access
and use pursuant to this Agreement. Such Agreed Locations
may be listed in an annex to be appended to this Agreement,
and may be further described in implementing arrangements.
EDCA, Art. V:
1. The Philippines shall retain ownership of and title to Agreed
Locations.
xxxx
4. All buildings, non-relocatable structures, and assemblies
affixed to the land in the Agreed Locations, including ones
altered or improved by United States forces, remain the
property of the Philippines. Permanent buildings constructed
by United States forces become the property of the
Philippines, once constructed, but shall be used by United
States forces until no longer required by United States forces.
Second, in the bases agreement, the U.S. and the Philippines
were visibly not on equal footing when it came to deciding
whether to expand or to increase the number of bases, as the
Philippines may be compelled to negotiate with the U.S. the
moment the latter requested an expansion of the existing
bases or to acquire additional bases. In EDCA, U.S. access is
purely at the invitation of the Philippines.
1947 MBA/ 1946 Treaty of General Relations EDCA
1947 MBA, Art.I(3):
The Philippines agree to enter into negotiations with the
United States at the latter's request, to permit the United
States to expand such bases, to exchange such bases for
other bases, to acquire additional bases, or relinquish rights
to bases, as any of such exigencies may be required by
military necessity.
1946 Treaty of Gen. Relations, Art. I:
The United States of America agrees to withdraw and
surrender, and does hereby withdraw and surrender, all rights
of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control or sovereignty
existing and exercised by the United States of America in and
over the territory and the people of the Philippine Islands,
except the use of such bases, necessary appurtenances to
such bases, and the rights incident thereto, as the United
States of America, by agreement with the Republic of the
Philippines may deem necessary to retain for the mutual
protection of the Republic of the Philippines and of the United
States of America. x x x.
EDCA, preamble:
Recognizing that all United States access to and use of
facilities and areas will be at the invitation of the Philippines
and with full respect for the Philippine Constitution and
Philippine laws;
xxxx
EDCA. Art. II(4):
"Agreed Locations" means facilities and areas that are
provided by the Government of the Philippines through the
AFP and that United States forces, United States contractors,
and others as mutually agreed, shall have the right to access
and use pursuant to this Agreement. Such Agreed Locations
may be listed in an annex to be appended to this Agreement,
and may be further described in implementing arrangements.
Third, in EDCA, the Philippines is- guaranteed access over
the entire area of the Agreed Locations. On the other hand,
given that the U.S. had complete control over its military bases
under the 1947 MBA, the treaty did not provide for any
express recognition of the right of access of Philippine
authorities. Without that provision and in light of the retention
of U.S. sovereignty over the old military bases, the U.S. could
effectively prevent Philippine authorities from entering those
bases.
1947 MBA EDCA
No equivalent provision.
EDCA, Art. III(5):
The Philippine Designated Authority and its authorized
representative shall have access to the entire area of the
Agreed Locations. Such access shall be provided promptly
consistent with operational safety and security requirements
in accordance with agreed procedures developed by the
Parties.
Fourth, in the bases agreement, the U.S. retained the right,
power, and authority over the establishment, use, operation,
defense, and control of military bases, including the limits of
territorial waters and air space adjacent to or in the vicinity of
those bases. The only standard used in determining the extent
of its control was military necessity. On the other hand, there
is no such grant of power or authority under EDCA. It merely
allows the U.S. to exercise operational control over the
construction of Philippine-owned structures and facilities:
1947 MBA EDCA
1947 MBA, Art.I(2):
The Philippines agrees to permit the United States, upon
notice to the Philippines, to use such of those bases listed in
Annex B as the United States determines to be required by
military necessity.
1947 MBA, Art. III(1):
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the
rights, power and authority within the bases which are
necessary for the establishment, use, operation and defense
thereof or appropriate for the control thereof and all the rights,
power and authority within the limits of territorial waters and
air space adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the bases which are
necessary to provide access to them, or appropriate for their
control.
EDCA, Art. III(4):
The Philippines hereby grants to the United States, through
bilateral security mechanisms, such as the MDB and SEB,
operational control of Agreed Locations for construction
activities and authority to undertake such activities on, and
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 25
make alterations and improvements to, Agreed Locations.
United States forces shall consult on issues regarding such
construction, alterations, and improvements based on the
Parties' shared intent that the technical requirements and
construction standards of any such projects undertaken by or
on behalf of United States forces should be consistent with the
requirements and standards of both Parties.
Fifth, the U.S. under the bases agreement was given the
authority to use Philippine territory for additional staging
areas, bombing and gunnery ranges. No such right is given
under EDCA, as seen below:
1947 MBA EDCA
1947 MBA, Art. VI:
The United States shall, subject to previous agreement with
the Philippines, have the right to use land and coastal sea
areas of appropriate size and location for periodic maneuvers,
for additional staging areas, bombing and gunnery ranges,
and for such intermediate airfields as may be required for safe
and efficient air operations. Operations in such areas shall be
carried on with due regard and safeguards for the public
safety.
1947 MBA, Art.I(2):
The Philippines agrees to permit the United States, upon
notice to the Philippines, to use such of those bases listed in
Annex B as the United States determines to be required by
military necessity.
EDCA, Art. III(1):
With consideration of the views of the Parties, the Philippines
hereby authorizes and agrees that United States forces,
United States contractors, and vehicles, vessels, and aircraft
operated by or for United States forces may conduct the
following activities with respect to Agreed Locations: training;
transit; support and related activities; refueling of aircraft;
bunkering of vessels; temporary maintenance of vehicles,
vessels, and aircraft; temporary accommodation of personnel;
communications; prepositioning of equipment, supplies, and
materiel; deploying forces and materiel; and such other
activities as the Parties may agree.
Sixth, under the MBA, the U.S. was given the right, power, and
authority to control and prohibit the movement and operation
of all types of vehicles within the vicinity of the bases. The U.S.
does not have any right, power, or authority to do so under
EDCA.
1947 MBA EDCA
1947 MBA, Art. 111(2)(c)
Such rights, power and authority shall include, inter alia, the
right, power and authority: x x x x to control (including the right
to prohibit) in so far as may be required for the efficient
operation and safety of the bases, and within the limits of
military necessity, anchorages, moorings, landings, takeoffs,
movements and operation of ships and water-borne craft,
aircraft and other vehicles on water, in the air or on land
comprising
No equivalent provision.
Seventh, under EDCA, the U.S. is merely given temporary
access to land and facilities (including roads, ports, and
airfields). On the other hand, the old treaty gave the U.S. the
right to improve and deepen the harbors, channels, entrances,
and anchorages; and to construct or maintain necessary
roads and bridges that would afford it access to its military
bases.
1947 MBA EDCA
1947 MBA, Art. III(2)(b):
Such rights, power and authority shall include, inter alia, the
right, power and authority: x x x x to improve and deepen the
harbors, channels, entrances and anchorages, and to
construct or maintain necessary roads and bridges affording
access to the bases.
EDCA, Art. III(2):
When requested, the Designated Authority of the Philippines
shall assist in facilitating transit or temporary access by United
States forces to public land and facilities (including roads,
ports, and airfields), including those owned or controlled by
local governments, and to other land and facilities (including
roads, ports, and airfields).
Eighth, in the 1947 MBA, the U.S. was granted the automatic
right to use any and all public utilities, services and facilities,
airfields, ports, harbors, roads, highways, railroads, bridges,
viaducts, canals, lakes, rivers, and streams in the Philippines
in the same manner that Philippine military forces enjoyed that
right. No such arrangement appears in EDCA. In fact, it merely
extends to U.S. forces temporary access to public land and
facilities when requested:
1947 MBA EDCA
1947 MBA, Art. VII:
It is mutually agreed that the United States may employ and
use for United States military forces any and all public utilities,
other services and facilities, airfields, ports, harbors, roads,
highways, railroads, bridges, viaducts, canals, lakes, rivers
and streams in the Philippines under conditions no less
favorable than those that may be applicable from time to time
to the military forces of the Philippines.
EDCA, Art. III(2):
When requested, the Designated Authority of the Philippines
shall assist in facilitating transit or temporary access by United
States forces to public land and facilities (including roads,
ports, and airfields), including those owned or controlled by
local governments, and to other land and facilities (including
roads, ports, and airfields).
Ninth, under EDCA, the U.S. no longer has the right, power,
and authority to construct, install, maintain, and employ any
type of facility, weapon, substance, device, vessel or vehicle,
or system unlike in the old treaty. EDCA merely grants the
U.S., through bilateral security mechanisms, the authority to
undertake construction, alteration, or improvements on the
Philippine-owned Agreed Locations.
1947 MBA EDCA
1947 MBA, Art. III(2)(e):
Such rights, power and authority shall include, inter alia, the
right, power and authority: x x x x to construct, install,
maintain, and employ on any base any type of facilities,
weapons, substance, device, vessel or vehicle on or under the
ground, in the air or on or under the water that may be
requisite or appropriate, including meteorological systems,
aerial and water navigation lights, radio and radar apparatus
and electronic devices, of any desired power, type of emission
and frequency.
EDCA, Art. III(4):
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 26
The Philippines hereby grants to the United States, through
bilateral security mechanisms, such as the MDB and SEB,
operational control of Agreed Locations for construction
activities and authority to undertake such activities on, and
make alterations and improvements to, Agreed Locations.
United States forces shall consult on issues regarding such
construction, alterations, and improvements based on the
Parties' shared intent that the technical requirements and
construction standards of any such projects undertaken by or
on behalf of United States forces should be consistent with the
requirements and standards of both Parties.
Tenth, EDCA does not allow the U.S. to acquire, by
condemnation or expropriation proceedings, real property
belonging to any private person. The old military bases
agreement gave this right to the U.S. as seen below:
1947 MBA EDCA
1947 MBA, Art. XXII(l):
Whenever it is necessary to acquire by
condemnation or expropriation proceedings real property
belonging to any private persons, associations or corporations
located in bases named in Annex A and Annex B in order to
carry out the purposes of this Agreement, the Philippines will
institute and prosecute such condemnation or expropriation
proceedings in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
The United States agrees to reimburse the Philippines for all
the reasonable expenses, damages and costs therebv
incurred, including the value of the property as determined by
the Court. In addition, subject to the mutual agreement of the
two Governments, the United States will reimburse the
Philippines for the reasonable costs of transportation and
removal of any occupants displaced or ejected by reason of
the condemnation or expropriation.
No equivalent provision.
Eleventh, EDCA does not allow the U.S. to unilaterally bring
into the country non-Philippine nationals who are under its
employ, together with their families, in connection with the
construction, maintenance, or operation of the bases. EDCA
strictly adheres to the limits under the VFA.
1947 MBA EDCA
1947 MBA, Art. XI(l):
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the right
to bring into the Philippines members of the United States
military forces and the United States nationals employed by or
under a contract with the United States together with their
families, and technical personnel of other nationalities (not
being persons excluded by the laws of the Philippines) in
connection with the construction, maintenance, or operation
of the bases. The United States shall make suitable
arrangements so that such persons may be readily identified
and their status established when necessary by the Philippine
authorities. Such persons, other than members of the United
States armed forces in uniform, shall present their travel
documents to the appropriate Philippine authorities for visas,
it being understood that no objection will be made to their
travel to the Philippines as non-immigrants.
EDCA, Art. II:
1. "United States personnel" means United States military and
civilian personnel temporarily in the territory of the Philippines
in connection with activities approved by the Philippines, as
those terms are defined in the VFA.
x xx x
3. "United States contractors" means companies and firms,
and their employees, under contract or subcontract to or on
behalf of the United States Department of Defense. United
States contractors are not included as part of the definition of
United States personnel in this Agreement, including within
the context of the VFA.
Twelfth, EDCA does not allow the U.S. to exercise jurisdiction
over any offense committed by any person within the Agreed
Locations, unlike in the former military bases:
1947 MBA EDCA
1947 MBA, Art. XIII(l)(a):
The Philippines consents that the United
States shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over the
following offenses: (a) Any offense committed by any person
within any base except where the offender and offended
parties are both Philippine citizens (not members of the armed
forces of the United States on active duty) or the offense is
against the security of the Philippines.
No equivalent provision.
Thirteenth, EDCA does not allow the U.S. to operate military
post exchange (PX) facilities, which is free of customs duties
and taxes, unlike what the expired MBA expressly allowed.
Parenthetically, the PX store has become the cultural icon of
U.S. military presence in the country.
1947 MBA EDCA
1947 MBA, Art. XVIII(l):
It is mutually agreed that the United States
shall have the right to establish on bases, free of all licenses;
fees; sales, excise or other taxes, or imposts; Government
agencies, including concessions, such as sales commissaries
and post exchanges; messes and social clubs, for the
exclusive use of the United States military forces and
authorized civilian personnel and their families. The
merchandise or services sold or dispensed by such agencies
shall be free of all taxes, duties and inspection by the
Philippine authorities. Administrative measures shall be taken
by the appropriate authorities of the United States to prevent
the resale of goods which are sold under the provisions of this
Article to persons not entitled to buy goods at such agencies
and, generally, to prevent abuse of the privileges granted
under this Article. There shall be cooperation between such
authorities and the Philippines to this end.
No equivalent provision.
In sum, EDCA is a far cry from a basing agreement as was
understood by the people at the time that the 1987
Constitution was adopted.
Nevertheless, a comprehensive review of what the
Constitution means by "foreign military bases" and "facilities"
is required before EDCA can be deemed to have passed
judicial scrutiny.
c. The meaning of military facilities and bases
An appreciation of what a military base is, as understood by
the Filipino people in 1987, would be vital in determining
whether EDCA breached the constitutional restriction.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 27
Prior to the drafting of the 1987 Constitution, the last definition
of "military base" was provided under Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 1227.328 Unlawful entry into a military base is
punishable under the decree as supported by Article 281 of
the Revised Penal Code, which itself prohibits the act of
trespass.
Section 2 of the law defines the term in this manner: "'[M]ilitary
base' as used in this decree means any military, air, naval, or
coast guard reservation, base, fort, camp, arsenal, yard,
station, or installation in the Philippines."
Commissioner Tadeo, in presenting his objections to U.S.
presence in the Philippines before the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, listed the areas that he considered as military
bases:
1,000 hectares Camp O'Donnel
20,000 hectares Crow Valley Weapon's Range
55,000 hectares Clark Air Base
150 hectares Wallace Air Station
400 hectares John Hay Air Station
15,000 hectares Subic Naval Base
1,000 hectares San Miguel Naval Communication
750 hectares Radio Transmitter in Capas, Tarlac
900 hectares Radio Bigot Annex at Bamban, Tarlac329
The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992
described its coverage in its Declaration of Policies:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the
policy of the Government to accelerate the sound and
balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the
Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions
(John Hay Station, Wallace Air Station, O'Donnell Transmitter
Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station and
Capas Relay Station), to raise funds by the sale of portions of
Metro Manila military camps, and to apply said funds as
provided herein for the development and conversion to
productive civilian use of the lands covered under the 194 7
Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the
United States of America, as amended.330
The result of the debates and subsequent voting is Section
25, Article XVIII of the Constitution, which specifically restricts,
among others, foreign military facilities or bases. At the time
of its crafting of the Constitution, the 1986 Constitutional
Commission had a clear idea of what exactly it was restricting.
While the term "facilities and bases" was left undefined, its
point of reference was clearly those areas covered by the
1947 MBA as amended.
Notably, nearly 30 years have passed since then, and the
ever-evolving world of military technology and geopolitics has
surpassed the understanding of the Philippine people in 1986.
The last direct military action of the U.S. in the region was the
use of Subic base as the staging ground for Desert Shield and
Desert Storm during the Gulf War.331 In 1991, the Philippine
Senate rejected the successor treaty of the 1947 MBA that
would have allowed the continuation of U.S. bases in the
Philippines.
Henceforth, any proposed entry of U.S. forces into the
Philippines had to evolve likewise, taking into consideration
the subsisting agreements between both parties, the rejection
of the 1991 proposal, and a concrete understanding of what
was constitutionally restricted. This trend birthed the VFA
which, as discussed, has already been upheld by this Court.
The latest agreement is EDCA, which proposes a novel
concept termed "Agreed Locations."
By definition, Agreed Locations are
facilities and areas that are provided by the Government of the
Philippines through the AFP and that United States forces,
United States contractors, and others as mutually agreed,
shall have the right to access and use pursuant to this
Agreement. Such Agreed Locations may be listed in an annex
to be appended to this Agreement, and may be further
described in implementing arrangements.332
Preliminarily, respondent already claims that the proviso that
the Philippines shall retain ownership of and title to the Agreed
Locations means that EDCA is "consistent with Article II of the
VFA which recognizes Philippine sovereignty and jurisdiction
over locations within Philippine territory.333
By this interpretation, respondent acknowledges that the
contention of petitioners springs from an understanding that
the Agreed Locations merely circumvent the constitutional
restrictions. Framed differently, the bone of contention is
whether the Agreed Locations are, from a legal perspective,
foreign military facilities or bases. This legal framework
triggers Section 25, Article XVIII, and makes Senate
concurrence a sine qua non.
Article III of EDCA provides for Agreed Locations, in which the
U.S. is authorized by the Philippines to "conduct the following
activities: "training; transit; support and related activities;
refueling of aircraft; bunkering of vessels; temporary
maintenance of vehicles, vessels and aircraft; temporary
accommodation of personnel; communications;
prepositioning of equipment, supplies and materiel; deploying
forces and materiel; and such other activities as the Parties
may agree."
This creation of EDCA must then be tested against a proper
interpretation of the Section 25 restriction.
d. Reasons for the constitutional requirements and legal
standards for constitutionally compatible military bases and
facilities
Section 25 does not define what is meant by a "foreign military
facility or base." While it specifically alludes to U.S. military
facilities and bases that existed during the framing of the
Constitution, the provision was clearly meant to apply to those
bases existing at the time and to any future facility or base.
The basis for the restriction must first be deduced from the
spirit of the law, in order to set a standard for the application
of its text, given the particular historical events preceding the
agreement.
Once more, we must look to the 1986 Constitutional
Commissioners to glean, from their collective wisdom, the
intent of Section 25. Their speeches are rich with history and
wisdom and present a clear picture of what they considered in
the crafting the provision.
SPEECH OF COMMISSIONER REGALADO334
xxxx
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 28
We have been regaled here by those who favor the adoption
of the anti-bases provisions with what purports to be an
objective presentation of the historical background of the
military bases in the Philippines. Care appears, however, to
have been taken to underscore the inequity in their inception
as well as their implementation, as to seriously reflect on the
supposed objectivity of the report. Pronouncements of military
and civilian officials shortly after World War II are quoted in
support of the proposition on neutrality; regrettably, the
implication is that the same remains valid today, as if the world
and international activity stood still for the last 40 years.
We have been given inspired lectures on the effect of the
presence of the military bases on our sovereignty - whether in
its legal or political sense is not clear - and the theory that any
country with foreign bases in its territory cannot claim to be
fully sovereign or completely independent. I was not aware
that the concepts of sovereignty and independence have now
assumed the totality principle, such that a willing assumption
of some delimitations in the exercise of some aspects thereof
would put that State in a lower bracket of nationhood.
xxxx
We have been receiving a continuous influx of materials on
the pros and cons on the advisability of having military bases
within our shores. Most of us who, only about three months
ago, were just mulling the prospects of these varying
contentions are now expected, like armchair generals, to
decide not only on the geopolitical aspects and contingent
implications of the military bases but also on their political,
social, economic and cultural impact on our national life. We
are asked to answer a plethora of questions, such as: 1)
whether the bases are magnets of nuclear attack or are
deterrents to such attack; 2) whether an alliance or mutual
defense treaty is a derogation of our national sovereignty; 3)
whether criticism of us by Russia, Vietnam and North Korea is
outweighed by the support for us of the ASEAN countries, the
United States, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia and New
Zealand; and 4) whether the social, moral and legal problems
spawned by the military bases and their operations can be
compensated by the economic benefits outlined in papers
which have been furnished recently to all of us.335
xxxx
Of course, one side of persuasion has submitted categorical,
unequivocal and forceful assertions of their positions. They
are entitled to the luxury of the absolutes. We are urged now
to adopt the proposed declaration as a "golden," "unique" and
"last" opportunity for Filipinos to assert their sovereign rights.
Unfortunately, I have never been enchanted by superlatives,
much less for the applause of the moment or the ovation of
the hour. Nor do I look forward to any glorious summer after a
winter of political discontent. Hence, if I may join
Commissioner Laurel, I also invoke a caveat not only against
the tyranny of labels but also the tyranny of slogans.336
xxxx
SPEECH OF COMMISSIONER SUAREZ337
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
I am quite satisfied that the crucial issues involved in the
resolution of the problem of the removal of foreign bases from
the Philippines have been adequately treated by previous
speakers. Let me, therefore, just recapitulate the arguments
adduced in favor of a foreign bases-free Philippines:
1. That every nation should be free to shape its own destiny
without outside interference;
2. That no lasting peace and no true sovereignty would ever
be achieved so long as there are foreign military forces in our
country;
3. That the presence of foreign military bases deprives us of
the very substance of national sovereignty and this is a
constant source of national embarrassment and an insult to
our national dignity and selfrespect as a nation;
4. That these foreign military bases unnecessarily expose our
country to devastating nuclear attacks;
5. That these foreign military bases create social problems
and are designed to perpetuate the strangle-hold of United
States interests in our national economy and development;
6. That the extraterritorial rights enjoyed by these foreign
bases operate to deprive our country of jurisdiction over civil
and criminal offenses committed within our own national
territory and against Filipinos;
7. That the bases agreements are colonial impositions and
dictations upon our helpless country; and
8. That on the legal viewpoint and in the ultimate analysis, all
the bases agreements are null and void ab initio, especially
because they did not count the sovereign consent and will of
the Filipino people.338
xxxx
In the real sense, Madam President, if we in the Commission
could accommodate the provisions I have cited, what is our
objection to include in our Constitution a matter as priceless
as the nationalist values we cherish? A matter of the gravest
concern for the safety and survival of this nation indeed
deserves a place in our Constitution.
xxxx
x x x Why should we bargain away our dignity and our self-
respect as a nation and the future of generations to come with
thirty pieces of silver?339
SPEECH OF COMMISSIONER BENNAGEN340
xxxx
The underlying principle of military bases and nuclear
weapons wherever they are found and whoever owns them is
that those are for killing people or for terrorizing humanity. This
objective by itself at any point in history is morally repugnant.
This alone is reason enough for us to constitutionalize the ban
on foreign military bases and on nuclear weapons.341
SPEECH OF COMMISSIONER BACANI342
xxxx
x x x Hence, the remedy to prostitution does not seem to be
primarily to remove the bases because even if the bases are
removed, the girls mired in poverty will look for their clientele
elsewhere. The remedy to the problem of prostitution lies
primarily elsewhere - in an alert and concerned citizenry, a
healthy economy and a sound education in values.343
SPEECH OF COMMISSIONER JAMIR344
xxxx
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 29
One of the reasons advanced against the maintenance of
foreign military bases here is that they impair portions of our
sovereignty. While I agree that our country's sovereignty
should not be impaired, I also hold the view that there are
times when it is necessary to do so according to the
imperatives of national interest. There are precedents to this
effect. Thus, during World War II, England leased its bases in
the West Indies and in Bermuda for 99 years to the United
States for its use as naval and air bases. It was done in
consideration of 50 overaged destroyers which the United
States gave to England for its use in the Battle of the Atlantic.
A few years ago, England gave the Island of Diego Garcia to
the United States for the latter's use as a naval base in the
Indian Ocean. About the same time, the United States
obtained bases in Spain, Egypt and Israel. In doing so, these
countries, in effect, contributed to the launching of a
preventive defense posture against possible trouble in the
Middle East and in the Indian Ocean for their own
protection.345
SPEECH OF COMMISSIONER TINGSON346
xxxx
In the case of the Philippines and the other Southeast Asian
nations, the presence of American troops in the country is a
projection of America's security interest. Enrile said that
nonetheless, they also serve, although in an incidental and
secondary way, the security interest of the Republic of the
Philippines and the region. Yes, of course, Mr. Enrile also
echoes the sentiments of most of us in this Commission,
namely: It is ideal for us as an independent and sovereign
nation to ultimately abrogate the RP-US military treaty and, at
the right time, build our own air and naval might.347
xxxx
Allow me to say in summation that I am for the retention of
American military bases in the Philippines provided that such
an extension from one period to another shall be concluded
upon concurrence of the parties, and such extension shall be
based on justice, the historical amity of the people of the
Philippines and the United States and their common defense
interest.348
SPEECH OF COMMISSIONER ALONTO349
xxxx
Madam President, sometime ago after this Commission
started with this task of framing a constitution, I read a
statement of President Aquino to the effect that she is for the
removal of the U.S. military bases in this country but that the
removal of the U.S. military bases should not be done just to
give way to other foreign bases. Today, there are two world
superpowers, both vying to control any and all countries which
have importance to their strategy for world domination. The
Philippines is one such country.
Madam President, I submit that I am one of those ready to
completely remove any vestiges of the days of enslavement,
but not prepared to erase them if to do so would merely leave
a vacuum to be occupied by a far worse type.350
SPEECH OF COMMISSIONER GASCON351
xxxx
Let us consider the situation of peace in our world today.
Consider our brethren in the Middle East, in Indo-China,
Central America, in South Africa - there has been escalation
of war in some of these areas because of foreign intervention
which views these conflicts through the narrow prism of the
East-West conflict. The United States bases have been used
as springboards for intervention in some of these conflicts. We
should not allow ourselves to be party to the warlike mentality
of these foreign interventionists. We must always be on the
side of peace – this means that we should not always rely on
military solution.352
xxxx
x x x The United States bases, therefore, are springboards for
intervention in our own internal affairs and in the affairs of
other nations in this region.
xxxx
Thus, I firmly believe that a self-respecting nation should
safeguard its fundamental freedoms which should logically be
declared in black and white in our fundamental law of the land
- the Constitution. Let us express our desire for national
sovereignty so we may be able to achieve national self-
determination. Let us express our desire for neutrality so that
we may be able to follow active nonaligned independent
foreign policies. Let us express our desire for peace and a
nuclear-free zone so we may be able to pursue a healthy and
tranquil existence, to have peace that is autonomous and not
imposed. 353
xxxx
SPEECH OF COMMISSIONER TADEO354
Para sa magbubukid, ano ha ang kahulugan ng U.S. military
bases? Para sa magbubukid, ang kahulugan nito ay
pagkaalipin. Para sa magbubukid, ang pananatili ng U.S.
military bases ay tinik sa dibdib ng sambayanang Pilipinong
patuloy na nakabaon. Para sa sambayanang magbubukid,
ang ibig sabihin ng U.S. military bases ay batong pabigat na
patuloy na pinapasan ng sambayanang Pilipino. Para sa
sambayanang magbubukid, ang pananatili ng U.S. military
bases ay isang nagdudumilat na katotohanan ng patuloy na
paggahasa ng imperyalistang Estados Unidos sa ating Inang
Bayan - economically, politically and culturally. Para sa
sambayanang magbubukid ang U.S. military bases ay
kasingkahulugan ng nuclear weapon - ang kahulugan ay
magneto ng isang nuclear war. Para sa sambayanang
magbubukid, ang kahulugan ng U.S. military bases ay isang
salot.355
SPEECH OF COMMISSIONER QUESADA356
xxxx
The drift in the voting on issues related to freeing ourselves
from the instruments of domination and subservience has
clearly been defined these past weeks.
xxxx
So for the record, Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to declare
my support for the committee's position to enshrine in the
Constitution a fundamental principle forbidding foreign military
bases, troops or facilities in any part of the Philippine territory
as a clear and concrete manifestation of our inherent right to
national self-determination, independence and sovereignty.
Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to relate now these attributes
of genuine nationhood to the social cost of allowing foreign
countries to maintain military bases in our country. Previous
speakers have dwelt on this subject, either to highlight its
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 30
importance in relation to the other issues or to gloss over its
significance and !llake this a part of future negotiations.357
xxxx
Mr. Presiding Officer, I feel that banning foreign military bases
is one of the solutions and is the response of the Filipino
people against this condition and other conditions that have
already been clearly and emphatically discussed in past
deliberations. The deletion, therefore, of Section 3 in the
Constitution we are drafting will have the following
implications:
First, the failure of the Constitutional Commission to decisively
respond to the continuing violation of our territorial integrity via
the military bases agreement which permits the retention of
U.S. facilities within the Philippine soil over which our
authorities have no exclusive jurisdiction contrary to the
accepted definition of the exercise of sovereignty.
Second, consent by this forum, this Constitutional
Commission, to an exception in the application of a provision
in the Bill of Rights that we have just drafted regarding equal
application of the laws of the land to all inhabitants, permanent
or otherwise, within its territorial boundaries.
Third, the continued exercise by the United States of
extraterritoriality despite the condemnations of such practice
by the world community of nations in the light of overwhelming
international approval of eradicating all vestiges of
colonialism.358
xxxx
Sixth, the deification of a new concept called pragmatic
sovereignty, in the hope that such can be wielded to force the
United States government to concede to better terms and
conditions concerning the military bases agreement, including
the transfer of complete control to the Philippine government
of the U.S. facilities, while in the meantime we have to suffer
all existing indignities and disrespect towards our rights as a
sovereign nation.
xxxx
Eighth, the utter failure of this forum to view the issue of
foreign military bases as essentially a question of sovereignty
which does not require in-depth studies or analyses and which
this forum has, as a constituent assembly drafting a
constitution, the expertise and capacity to decide on except
that it lacks the political will that brought it to existence and
now engages in an elaborate scheme of buck-passing.
xxxx
Without any doubt we can establish a new social order in our
country, if we reclaim, restore, uphold and defend our national
sovereignty. National sovereignty is what the military bases
issue is all about. It is only the sovereign people exercising
their national sovereignty who can design an independent
course and take full control of their national destiny.359
SPEECH OF COMMISSIONER P ADILLA360
xxxx
Mr. Presiding Officer, in advocating the majority committee
report, specifically Sections 3 and 4 on neutrality, nuclear and
bases-free country, some views stress sovereignty of the
Republic and even invoke survival of the Filipino nation and
people.361
REBUTTAL OF COMMISSIONER NOLLEDO362
xxxx
The anachronistic and ephemeral arguments against the
provisions of the committee report to dismantle the American
bases after 1991 only show the urgent need to free our
country from the entangling alliance with any power bloc.363
xxxx
xx x Mr. Presiding Officer, it is not necessary for us to possess
expertise to know that the so-called RP-US Bases Agreement
will expire in 1991, that it infringes on our sovereignty and
jurisdiction as well as national dignity and honor, that it goes
against the UN policy of disarmament and that it constitutes
unjust intervention in our internal affairs.364 (Emphases
Supplied)
The Constitutional Commission eventually agreed to allow
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, subject to the
provisions of Section 25. It is thus important to read its
discussions carefully. From these discussions, we can deduce
three legal standards that were articulated by the
Constitutional Commission Members. These are
characteristics of any agreement that the country, and by
extension this Court, must ensure are observed. We can
thereby determine whether a military base or facility in the
Philippines, which houses or is accessed by foreign military
troops, is foreign or remains a Philippine military base or
facility. The legal standards we find applicable are:
independence from foreign control, sovereignty and
applicable law, and national security and territorial integrity.
i. First standard: independence from foreign control
Very clearly, much of the opposition to the U.S. bases at the
time of the Constitution's drafting was aimed at asserting
Philippine independence from the U.S., as well as control over
our country's territory and military.
Under the Civil Code, there are several aspects of control
exercised over property.
Property is classified as private or public.365 It is public if
"intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character[,]" or
"[t]hose which belong to the State, without being for public
use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth. "366
Quite clearly, the Agreed Locations are contained within a
property for public use, be it within a government military camp
or property that belongs to the Philippines.1avvphi1
Once ownership is established, then the rights of ownership
flow freely. Article 428 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he
owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without
other limitations than those established by law." Moreover, the
owner "has also a right of action against the holder and
possessor of the thing in order to recover it."
Philippine civil law therefore accords very strong rights to the
owner of property, even against those who hold the property.
Possession, after all, merely raises a disputable presumption
of ownership, which can be contested through normal judicial
processes.367
In this case, EDCA explicitly provides that ownership of the
Agreed Locations remains with the Philippine govemment.368
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 31
What U.S. personnel have a right to, pending mutual
agreement, is access to and use of these locations.369
The right of the owner of the property to allow access and use
is consistent with the Civil Code, since the owner may dispose
of the property in whatever way deemed fit, subject to the
limits of the law. So long as the right of ownership itself is not
transferred, then whatever rights are transmitted by
agreement does not completely divest the owner of the rights
over the property, but may only limit them in accordance with
law.
Hence, even control over the property is something that an
owner may transmit freely. This act does not translate into the
full transfer of ownership, but only of certain rights. In Roman
Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. v. Land
Registration Commission, we stated that the constitutional
proscription on property ownership is not violated despite the
foreign national's control over the property.370
EDCA, in respect of its provisions on Agreed Locations, is
essentially a contract of use and access. Under its pertinent
provisions, it is the Designated Authority of the Philippines that
shall, when requested, assist in facilitating transit or access to
public land and facilities.371 The activities carried out within
these locations are subject to agreement as authorized by the
Philippine govemment.372 Granting the U.S. operational
control over these locations is likewise subject to EDCA' s
security mechanisms, which are bilateral procedures involving
Philippine consent and cooperation.373 Finally, the Philippine
Designated Authority or a duly designated representative is
given access to the Agreed Locations.374
To our mind, these provisions do not raise the spectre of U.S.
control, which was so feared by the Constitutional
Commission. In fact, they seem to have been the product of
deliberate negotiation from the point of view of the Philippine
government, which balanced constitutional restrictions on
foreign military bases and facilities against the security needs
of the country. In the 1947 MBA, the U.S. forces had "the right,
power and authority x x x to construct (including dredging and
filling), operate, maintain, utilize, occupy, garrison and control
the bases."375 No similarly explicit provision is present in
EDCA.
Nevertheless, the threshold for allowing the presence of
foreign military facilities and bases has been raised by the
present Constitution. Section 25 is explicit that foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines, except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate. Merely stating that the Philippines would retain
ownership would do violence to the constitutional requirement
if the Agreed Locations were simply to become a less obvious
manifestation of the U.S. bases that were rejected in 1991.
When debates took place over the military provisions of the
Constitution, the committee rejected a specific provision
proposed by Commissioner Sarmiento. The discussion
illuminates and provides context to the 1986 Constitutional
Commission's vision of control and independence from the
U.S., to wit:
MR. SARMIENTO: Madam President, my proposed
amendment reads as follows: "THE STATE SHALL
ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN AN INDEPENDENT AND
SELF-RELIANT ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES."
Allow me to briefly explain, Madam President. The Armed
Forces of the Philippines is a vital component of Philippine
society depending upon its training, orientation and support. It
will either be the people's protector or a staunch supporter of
a usurper or tyrant, local and foreign interest. The Armed
Forces of the Philippines' past and recent experience shows
it has never been independent and self-reliant. Facts, data
and statistics will show that it has been substantially
dependent upon a foreign power. In March 1968,
Congressman Barbero, himself a member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, revealed top secret documents
showing what he described as U.S. dictation over the affairs
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. He showed that under
existing arrangements, the United States unilaterally
determines not only the types and quantity of arms and
equipments that our armed forces would have, but also the
time when these items are to be made available to us. It is
clear, as he pointed out, that the composition, capability and
schedule of development of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines is under the effective control of the U.S.
government.376 (Emphases supplied)
Commissioner Sarmiento proposed a motherhood statement
in the 1987 Constitution that would assert "independent" and
"self-reliant" armed forces. This proposal was rejected by the
committee, however. As Commissioner De Castro asserted,
the involvement of the Philippine military with the U.S. did not,
by itself, rob the Philippines of its real independence. He made
reference to the context of the times: that the limited resources
of the Philippines and the current insurgency at that time
necessitated a strong military relationship with the U.S. He
said that the U.S. would not in any way control the Philippine
military despite this relationship and the fact that the former
would furnish military hardware or extend military assistance
and training to our military. Rather, he claimed that the
proposal was in compliance with the treaties between the two
states.
MR. DE CASTRO: If the Commissioner will take note of my
speech on U.S. military bases on 12 September 1986, I spoke
on the selfreliance policy of the armed forces. However, due
to very limited resources, the only thing we could do is
manufacture small arms ammunition. We cannot blame the
armed forces. We have to blame the whole Republic of the
Philippines for failure to provide the necessary funds to make
the Philippine Armed Forces self-reliant. Indeed that is a
beautiful dream. And I would like it that way. But as of this
time, fighting an insurgency case, a rebellion in our country -
insurgency - and with very limited funds and very limited
number of men, it will be quite impossible for the Philippines
to appropriate the necessary funds therefor. However, if we
say that the U.S. government is furnishing us the military
hardware, it is not control of our armed forces or of our
government. It is in compliance with the Mutual Defense
Treaty. It is under the military assistance program that it
becomes the responsibility of the United States to furnish us
the necessary hardware in connection with the military bases
agreement. Please be informed that there are three (3)
treaties connected with the military bases agreement; namely:
the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the Mutual Defense
Treaty and the Military Assistance Program.
My dear Commissioner, when we enter into a treaty and we
are furnished the military hardware pursuant to that treaty, it
is not in control of our armed forces nor control of our
government. True indeed, we have military officers trained in
the U.S. armed forces school. This is part of our Military
Assistance Program, but it does not mean that the minds of
our military officers are for the U.S. government, no. I am one
of those who took four courses in the United States schools,
but I assure you, my mind is for the Filipino people. Also, while
we are sending military officers to train or to study in U.S.
military schools, we are also sending our officers to study in
other military schools such as in Australia, England and in
Paris. So, it does not mean that when we send military officers
to United States schools or to other military schools, we will
be under the control of that country. We also have foreign
officers in our schools, we in the Command and General Staff
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 32
College in Fort Bonifacio and in our National Defense College,
also in Fort Bonifacio.377 (Emphases supplied)
This logic was accepted in Tañada v. Angara, in which the
Court ruled that independence does not mean the absence of
foreign participation:
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and
independent national economy" does not necessarily rule out
the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy
in the international community." As explained by
Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of
this constitutional policy:
Economic self reliance is a primary objective of a developing
country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external
assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean
autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding
mendicancy in the international community. Independence
refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the
national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in
the development of natural resources and public utilities.378
(Emphases supplied)
The heart of the constitutional restriction on foreign military
facilities and bases is therefore the assertion of independence
from the U.S. and other foreign powers, as independence is
exhibited by the degree of foreign control exerted over these
areas.1âwphi1 The essence of that independence is self-
governance and self-control.379 Independence itself is "[t]he
state or condition of being free from dependence, subjection,
or control. "380
Petitioners assert that EDCA provides the U.S. extensive
control and authority over Philippine facilities and locations,
such that the agreement effectively violates Section 25 of the
1987 Constitution.381
Under Article VI(3) of EDCA, U.S. forces are authorized to act
as necessary for "operational control and defense." The term
"operational control" has led petitioners to regard U.S. control
over the Agreed Locations as unqualified and, therefore,
total.382 Petitioners contend that the word "their" refers to the
subject "Agreed Locations."
This argument misreads the text, which is quoted below:
United States forces are authorized to exercise all rights and
authorities within Agreed Locations that are necessary for
their operational control or defense, including taking
appropriate measure to protect United States forces and
United States contractors. The United States should
coordinate such measures with appropriate authorities of the
Philippines.
A basic textual construction would show that the word "their,"
as understood above, is a possessive pronoun for the subject
"they," a third-person personal pronoun in plural form. Thus,
"their" cannot be used for a non-personal subject such as
"Agreed Locations." The simple grammatical conclusion is
that "their" refers to the previous third-person plural noun,
which is "United States forces." This conclusion is in line with
the definition of operational control.
a. U.S. operational control as the exercise of authority over
U.S. personnel, and not over the Agreed Locations
Operational control, as cited by both petitioner and
respondents, is a military term referring to
[t]he authority to perform those functions of command over
subordinate forces involving organizing and employing
commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objective,
and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the
mission.383
At times, though, operational control can mean something
slightly different. In JUSMAG Philippines v. National Labor
Relations Commission, the Memorandum of Agreement
between the AFP and JUSMAG Philippines defined the term
as follows:384
The term "Operational Control" includes, but is not limited to,
all personnel administrative actions, such as: hiring
recommendations; firing recommendations; position
classification; discipline; nomination and approval of incentive
awards; and payroll computation.
Clearly, traditional standards define "operational control" as
personnel control. Philippine law, for instance, deems
operational control as one exercised by police officers and
civilian authorities over their subordinates and is distinct from
the administrative control that they also exercise over police
subordinates.385 Similarly, a municipal mayor exercises
operational control over the police within the municipal
government,386 just as city mayor possesses the same power
over the police within the city government.387
Thus, the legal concept of operational control involves
authority over personnel in a commander-subordinate
relationship and does not include control over the Agreed
Locations in this particular case. Though not necessarily
stated in EDCA provisions, this interpretation is readily implied
by the reference to the taking of "appropriate measures to
protect United States forces and United States contractors."
It is but logical, even necessary, for the U.S. to have
operational control over its own forces, in much the same way
that the Philippines exercises operational control over its own
units.
For actual operations, EDCA is clear that any activity must be
planned and pre-approved by the MDB-SEB.388 This
provision evinces the partnership aspect of EDCA, such that
both stakeholders have a say on how its provisions should be
put into effect.
b. Operational control vis-à-vis effective command and control
Petitioners assert that beyond the concept of operational
control over personnel, qualifying access to the Agreed
Locations by the Philippine Designated Authority with the
phrase "consistent with operational safety and security
requirements in accordance with agreed procedures
developed by the Parties" leads to the conclusion that the U.S.
exercises effective control over the Agreed Locations.389
They claim that if the Philippines exercises possession of and
control over a given area, its representative should not have
to be authorized by a special provision.390
For these reasons, petitioners argue that the "operational
control" in EDCA is the "effective command and control" in the
1947 MBA.391 In their Memorandum, they distinguish
effective command and control from operational control in
U.S. parlance.392 Citing the Doctrine for the Armed Forces of
the United States, Joint Publication 1, "command and control
(C2)" is defined as "the exercise of authority and direction by
a properly designated commander over assigned and
attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission x x
x."393 Operational control, on the other hand, refers to
"[t]hose functions of command over assigned forces involving
the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 33
tasks, the designation of objectives, the overall control of
assigned resources, and the full authoritative direction
necessary to accomplish the mission."394
Two things demonstrate the errors in petitioners' line of
argument.
Firstly, the phrase "consistent with operational safety and
security requirements in accordance with agreed procedures
developed by the Parties" does not add any qualification
beyond that which is already imposed by existing treaties. To
recall, EDCA is based upon prior treaties, namely the VFA and
the MDT.395 Treaties are in themselves contracts from which
rights and obligations may be claimed or waived.396 In this
particular case, the Philippines has already agreed to abide
by the security mechanisms that have long been in place
between the U.S. and the Philippines based on the
implementation of their treaty relations.397
Secondly, the full document cited by petitioners contradicts
the equation of "operational control" with "effective command
and control," since it defines the terms quite differently,
viz:398
Command and control encompasses the exercise of authority,
responsibility, and direction by a commander over assigned
and attached forces to accomplish the mission. Command at
all levels is the art of motivating and directing people and
organizations into action to accomplish missions. Control is
inherent in command. To control is to manage and direct
forces and functions consistent with a commander's command
authority. Control of forces and functions helps commanders
and staffs compute requirements, allocate means, and
integrate efforts. Mission command is the preferred method of
exercising C2. A complete discussion of tenets, organization,
and processes for effective C2 is provided in Section B,
"Command and Control of Joint Forces," of Chapter V "Joint
Command and Control."
Operational control is defined thus:399
OPCON is able to be delegated from a lesser authority than
COCOM. It is the authority to perform those functions of
command over subordinate forces involving organizing and
employing commands and forces, assigning tasks,
designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over
all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary
to accomplish the mission. It should be delegated to and
exercised by the commanders of subordinate organizations;
normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate
JFCs, Service, and/or functional component commanders.
OPCON provides authority to organize and employ
commands and forces as the commander considers
necessary to accomplish assigned missions. It does not
include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of
administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit
training. These elements of COCOM must be specifically
delegated by the CCDR. OPCON does include the authority
to delineate functional responsibilities and operational areas
of subordinate JFCs.
Operational control is therefore the delegable aspect of
combatant command, while command and control is the
overall power and responsibility exercised by the commander
with reference to a mission. Operational control is a narrower
power and must be given, while command and control is
plenary and vested in a commander. Operational control does
not include the planning, programming, budgeting, and
execution process input; the assignment of subordinate
commanders; the building of relationships with Department of
Defense agencies; or the directive authority for logistics,
whereas these factors are included in the concept of
command and control.400
This distinction, found in the same document cited by
petitioners, destroys the very foundation of the arguments
they have built: that EDCA is the same as the MBA.
c. Limited operational control over the Agreed Locations only
for construction activitites
As petitioners assert, EDCA indeed contains a specific
provision that gives to the U.S. operational control within the
Agreed Locations during construction activities.401 This
exercise of operational control is premised upon the approval
by the MDB and the SEB of the construction activity through
consultation and mutual agreement on the requirements and
standards of the construction, alteration, or improvement.402
Despite this grant of operational control to the U.S., it must be
emphasized that the grant is only for construction activities.
The narrow and limited instance wherein the U.S. is given
operational control within an Agreed Location cannot be
equated with foreign military control, which is so abhorred by
the Constitution.
The clear import of the provision is that in the absence of
construction activities, operational control over the Agreed
Location is vested in the Philippine authorities. This meaning
is implicit in the specific grant of operational control only during
construction activities. The principle of constitutional
construction, "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," means
the failure to mention the thing becomes the ground for
inferring that it was deliberately excluded.403 Following this
construction, since EDCA mentions the existence of U.S.
operational control over the Agreed Locations for construction
activities, then it is quite logical to conclude that it is not
exercised over other activities.
Limited control does not violate the Constitution. The fear of
the commissioners was total control, to the point that the
foreign military forces might dictate the terms of their acts
within the Philippines.404 More important, limited control does
not mean an abdication or derogation of Philippine
sovereignty and legal jurisdiction over the Agreed Locations.
It is more akin to the extension of diplomatic courtesies and
rights to diplomatic agents,405 which is a waiver of control on
a limited scale and subject to the terms of the treaty.
This point leads us to the second standard envisioned by the
framers of the Constitution: that the Philippines must retain
sovereignty and jurisdiction over its territory.
ii. Second standard: Philippine sovereignty and applicable law
EDCA states in its Preamble the "understanding for the United
States not to establish a permanent military presence or base
in the territory of the Philippines." Further on, it likewise states
the recognition that "all United States access to and use of
facilities and areas will be at the invitation of the Philippines
and with full respect for the Philippine Constitution and
Philippine laws."
The sensitivity of EDCA provisions to the laws of the
Philippines must be seen in light of Philippine sovereignty and
jurisdiction over the Agreed Locations.
Sovereignty is the possession of sovereign power,406 while
jurisdiction is the conferment by law of power and authority to
apply the law.407 Article I of the 1987 Constitution states:
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago,
with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 34
territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial
domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil,
the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form
part of the internal waters of the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied)
From the text of EDCA itself, Agreed Locations are territories
of the Philippines that the U.S. forces are allowed to access
and use.408 By withholding ownership of these areas and
retaining unrestricted access to them, the government asserts
sovereignty over its territory. That sovereignty exists so long
as the Filipino people exist.409
Significantly, the Philippines retains primary responsibility for
security with respect to the Agreed Locations.410 Hence,
Philippine law remains in force therein, and it cannot be said
that jurisdiction has been transferred to the U.S. Even the
previously discussed necessary measures for operational
control and defense over U.S. forces must be coordinated with
Philippine authorities.411
Jurisprudence bears out the fact that even under the former
legal regime of the MBA, Philippine laws continue to be in
force within the bases.412 The difference between then and
now is that EDCA retains the primary jurisdiction of the
Philippines over the security of the Agreed Locations, an
important provision that gives it actual control over those
locations. Previously, it was the provost marshal of the U.S.
who kept the peace and enforced Philippine law in the bases.
In this instance, Philippine forces act as peace officers, in
stark contrast to the 1947 MBA provisions on jurisdiction.413
iii. Third standard: must respect national security and territorial
integrity
The last standard this Court must set is that the EDCA
provisions on the Agreed Locations must not impair or
threaten the national security and territorial integrity of the
Philippines.
This Court acknowledged in Bayan v. Zamora that the
evolution of technology has essentially rendered the prior
notion of permanent military bases obsolete.
Moreover, military bases established within the territory of
another state is no longer viable because of the alternatives
offered by new means and weapons of warfare such as
nuclear weapons, guided missiles as well as huge sea vessels
that can stay afloat in the sea even for months and years
without returning to their home country. These military
warships are actually used as substitutes for a land-home
base not only of military aircraft but also of military personnel
and facilities. Besides, vessels are mobile as compared to a
land-based military headquarters.414
The VFA serves as the basis for the entry of U.S. troops in a
limited scope. It does not allow, for instance, the re-
establishment of the Subic military base or the Clark Air Field
as U.S. military reservations. In this context, therefore, this
Court has interpreted the restrictions on foreign bases, troops,
or facilities as three independent restrictions. In accord with
this interpretation, each restriction must have its own
qualification.
Petitioners quote from the website http://en.wikipedia.org to
define what a military base is.415 While the source is not
authoritative, petitioners make the point that the Agreed
Locations, by granting access and use to U.S. forces and
contractors, are U.S. bases under a different name.416 More
important, they claim that the Agreed Locations invite
instances of attack on the Philippines from enemies of the
U.S.417
We believe that the raised fear of an attack on the Philippines
is not in the realm of law, but of politics and policy. At the very
least, we can say that under international law, EDCA does not
provide a legal basis for a justified attack on the Philippines.
In the first place, international law disallows any attack on the
Agreed Locations simply because of the presence of U.S.
personnel. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter states
that "All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."418 Any
unlawful attack on the Philippines breaches the treaty, and
triggers Article 51 of the same charter, which guarantees the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence.
Moreover, even if the lawfulness of the attack were not in
question, international humanitarian law standards prevent
participants in an armed conflict from targeting non-
participants. International humanitarian law, which is the
branch of international law applicable to armed conflict,
expressly limits allowable military conduct exhibited by forces
of a participant in an armed conflict.419 Under this legal
regime, participants to an armed conflict are held to specific
standards of conduct that require them to distinguish between
combatants and non-combatants,420 as embodied by the
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols.421
Corollary to this point, Professor John Woodcliffe, professor of
international law at the University of Leicester, noted that there
is no legal consensus for what constitutes a base, as opposed
to other terms such as "facilities" or "installation."422 In
strategic literature, "base" is defined as an installation "over
which the user State has a right to exclusive control in an
extraterritorial sense."423 Since this definition would exclude
most foreign military installations, a more important distinction
must be made.
For Woodcliffe, a type of installation excluded from the
definition of "base" is one that does not fulfill a combat role.
He cites an example of the use of the territory of a state for
training purposes, such as to obtain experience in local
geography and climactic conditions or to carry out joint
exercises.424 Another example given is an advanced
communications technology installation for purposes of
information gathering and communication.425 Unsurprisingly,
he deems these non-combat uses as borderline situations that
would be excluded from the functional understanding of
military bases and installations.426
By virtue of this ambiguity, the laws of war dictate that the
status of a building or person is presumed to be protected,
unless proven otherwise.427 Moreover, the principle of
distinction requires combatants in an armed conflict to
distinguish between lawful targets428 and protected
targets.429 In an actual armed conflict between the U.S. and
a third state, the Agreed Locations cannot be considered U.S.
territory, since ownership of territory even in times of armed
conflict does not change.430
Hence, any armed attack by forces of a third state against an
Agreed Location can only be legitimate under international
humanitarian law if it is against a bona fide U.S. military base,
facility, or installation that directly contributes to the military
effort of the U.S. Moreover, the third state's forces must take
all measures to ensure that they have complied with the
principle of distinction (between combatants and non-
combatants).
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 35
There is, then, ample legal protection for the Philippines under
international law that would ensure its territorial integrity and
national security in the event an Agreed Location is subjected
to attack. As EDCA stands, it does not create the situation so
feared by petitioners - one in which the Philippines, while not
participating in an armed conflict, would be legitimately
targeted by an enemy of the U.S.431
In the second place, this is a policy question about the wisdom
of allowing the presence of U.S. personnel within our territory
and is therefore outside the scope of judicial review.
Evidently, the concept of giving foreign troops access to
"agreed" locations, areas, or facilities within the military base
of another sovereign state is nothing new on the international
plane. In fact, this arrangement has been used as the
framework for several defense cooperation agreements, such
as in the following:
1. 2006 U.S.-Bulgaria Defense Cooperation Agreement432
2. 2009 U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement433
3. 2009 U.S.-Poland Status of Forces Agreement434
4. 2014 U.S.-Australia Force Posture Agreement435
5. 2014 U.S.-Afghanistan Security and Defense Cooperation
Agreement436
In all of these arrangements, the host state grants U.S. forces
access to their military bases.437 That access is without rental
or similar costs to the U.S.438 Further, U.S. forces are allowed
to undertake construction activities in, and make alterations
and improvements to, the agreed locations, facilities, or
areas.439 As in EDCA, the host states retain ownership and
jurisdiction over the said bases.440
In fact, some of the host states in these agreements give
specific military-related rights to the U.S. For example, under
Article IV(l) of the US.-Bulgaria Defense Cooperation
Agreement, "the United States forces x x x are authorized
access to and may use agreed facilities and areas x x x for
staging and deploying of forces and materiel, with the purpose
of conducting x x x contingency operations and other
missions, including those undertaken in the framework of the
North Atlantic Treaty." In some of these agreements, host
countries allow U.S. forces to construct facilities for the latter’s
exclusive use.441
Troop billeting, including construction of temporary structures,
is nothing new. In Lim v. Executive Secretary, the Court
already upheld the Terms of Reference of Balikatan 02-1,
which authorized U.S. forces to set up "[t]emporary structures
such as those for troop billeting, classroom instruction and
messing x x x during the Exercise." Similar provisions are also
in the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement of 2002 and 2007,
which are essentially executive agreements that implement
the VFA, the MDT, and the 1953 Military Assistance
Agreement. These executive agreements similarly tackle the
"reciprocal provision of logistic support, supplies, and
services,"442 which include "[b ]illeting, x x x operations
support (and construction and use of temporary structures
incident to operations support), training services, x x x storage
services, x x x during an approved activity."443 These logistic
supplies, support, and services include temporary use of
"nonlethal items of military equipment which are not
designated as significant military equipment on the U.S.
Munitions List, during an approved activity."444 The first
Mutual Logistics Support Agreement has lapsed, while the
second one has been extended until 2017 without any formal
objection before this Court from the Senate or any of its
members.
The provisions in EDCA dealing with Agreed Locations are
analogous to those in the aforementioned executive
agreements. Instead of authorizing the building of temporary
structures as previous agreements have done, EDCA
authorizes the U.S. to build permanent structures or alter or
improve existing ones for, and to be owned by, the
Philippines.445 EDCA is clear that the Philippines retains
ownership of altered or improved facilities and newly
constructed permanent or non-relocatable structures.446
Under EDCA, U.S. forces will also be allowed to use facilities
and areas for "training; x x x; support and related activities; x
x x; temporary accommodation of personnel;
communications" and agreed activities.447
Concerns on national security problems that arise from foreign
military equipment being present in the Philippines must
likewise be contextualized. Most significantly, the VFA already
authorizes the presence of U.S. military equipment in the
country. Article VII of the VFA already authorizes the U.S. to
import into or acquire in the Philippines "equipment, materials,
supplies, and other property" that will be used "in connection
with activities" contemplated therein. The same section also
recognizes that "[t]itle to such property shall remain" with the
US and that they have the discretion to "remove such property
from the Philippines at any time."
There is nothing novel, either, in the EDCA provision on the
prepositioning and storing of "defense equipment, supplies,
and materiel,"448 since these are sanctioned in the VFA. In
fact, the two countries have already entered into various
implementing agreements in the past that are comparable to
the present one. The Balikatan 02-1 Terms of Reference
mentioned in Lim v. Executive Secretary specifically
recognizes that Philippine and U.S. forces "may share x x x in
the use of their resources, equipment and other assets." Both
the 2002 and 2007 Mutual Logistics Support Agreements
speak of the provision of support and services, including the
"construction and use of temporary structures incident to
operations support" and "storage services" during approved
activities.449 These logistic supplies, support, and services
include the "temporary use of x x x nonlethal items of military
equipment which are not designated as significant military
equipment on the U.S. Munitions List, during an approved
activity."450 Those activities include "combined exercises and
training, operations and other deployments" and "cooperative
efforts, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and
rescue operations, and maritime anti-pollution operations"
within or outside Philippine territory.451 Under EDCA, the
equipment, supplies, and materiel that will be prepositioned at
Agreed Locations include "humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief equipment, supplies, and materiel. "452 Nuclear
weapons are specifically excluded from the materiel that will
be prepositioned.
Therefore, there is no basis to invalidate EDCA on fears that
it increases the threat to our national security. If anything,
EDCA increases the likelihood that, in an event requiring a
defensive response, the Philippines will be prepared
alongside the U.S. to defend its islands and insure its territorial
integrity pursuant to a relationship built on the MDT and VFA.
8. Others issues and concerns raised
A point was raised during the oral arguments that the
language of the MDT only refers to mutual help and defense
in the Pacific area.453 We believe that any discussion of the
activities to be undertaken under EDCA vis-a-vis the defense
of areas beyond the Pacific is premature. We note that a
proper petition on that issue must be filed before we rule
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 36
thereon. We also note that none of the petitions or
memoranda has attempted to discuss this issue, except only
to theorize that the U.S. will not come to our aid in the event
of an attack outside of the Pacific. This is a matter of policy
and is beyond the scope of this judicial review.
In reference to the issue on telecommunications, suffice it to
say that the initial impression of the facility adverted to does
appear to be one of those that require a public franchise by
way of congressional action under Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution. As respondents submit, however, the system
referred to in the agreement does not provide
telecommunications services to the public for
compensation.454 It is clear from Article VIl(2) of EDCA that
the telecommunication system is solely for the use of the U.S.
and not the public in general, and that this system will not
interfere with that which local operators use. Consequently, a
public franchise is no longer necessary.
Additionally, the charge that EDCA allows nuclear weapons
within Philippine territory is entirely speculative. It is
noteworthy that the agreement in fact specifies that the
prepositioned materiel shall not include nuclear weapons.455
Petitioners argue that only prepositioned nuclear weapons are
prohibited by EDCA; and that, therefore, the U.S. would
insidiously bring nuclear weapons to Philippine territory.456
The general prohibition on nuclear weapons, whether
prepositioned or not, is already expressed in the 1987
Constitution.457 It would be unnecessary or superfluous to
include all prohibitions already in the Constitution or in the law
through a document like EDCA.
Finally, petitioners allege that EDCA creates a tax exemption,
which under the law must originate from Congress. This
allegation ignores jurisprudence on the government's
assumption of tax liability. EDCA simply states that the taxes
on the use of water, electricity, and public utilities are for the
account of the Philippine Government.458 This provision
creates a situation in which a contracting party assumes the
tax liability of the other.459 In National Power Corporation v.
Province of Quezon, we distinguished between enforceable
and unenforceable stipulations on the assumption of tax
liability. Afterwards, we concluded that an enforceable
assumption of tax liability requires the party assuming the
liability to have actual interest in the property taxed.460 This
rule applies to EDCA, since the Philippine Government stands
to benefit not only from the structures to be built thereon or
improved, but also from the joint training with U.S. forces,
disaster preparation, and the preferential use of Philippine
suppliers.461 Hence, the provision on the assumption of tax
liability does not constitute a tax exemption as petitioners have
posited.
Additional issues were raised by petitioners, all relating
principally to provisions already sufficiently addressed above.
This Court takes this occasion to emphasize that the
agreement has been construed herein as to absolutely
disauthorize the violation of the Constitution or any applicable
statute. On the contrary, the applicability of Philippine law is
explicit in EDCA.
EPILOGUE
The fear that EDCA is a reincarnation of the U.S. bases so
zealously protested by noted personalities in Philippine history
arises not so much from xenophobia, but from a genuine
desire for self-determination, nationalism, and above all a
commitment to ensure the independence of the Philippine
Republic from any foreign domination.
Mere fears, however, cannot curtail the exercise by the
President of the Philippines of his Constitutional prerogatives
in respect of foreign affairs. They cannot cripple him when he
deems that additional security measures are made necessary
by the times. As it stands, the Philippines through the
Department of Foreign Affairs has filed several diplomatic
protests against the actions of the People's Republic of China
in the West Philippine Sea;462 initiated arbitration against that
country under the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea;463 is in the process of negotiations with the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front for peace in Southern Philippines,464
which is the subject of a current case before this Court; and
faces increasing incidents of kidnappings of Filipinos and
foreigners allegedly by the Abu Sayyaf or the New People's
Army.465 The Philippine military is conducting reforms that
seek to ensure the security and safety of the nation in the
years to come.466 In the future, the Philippines must navigate
a world in which armed forces fight with increasing
sophistication in both strategy and technology, while
employing asymmetric warfare and remote weapons.
Additionally, our country is fighting a most terrifying enemy:
the backlash of Mother Nature. The Philippines is one of the
countries most directly affected and damaged by climate
change. It is no coincidence that the record-setting tropical
cyclone Yolanda (internationally named Haiyan), one of the
most devastating forces of nature the world has ever seen hit
the Philippines on 8 November 2013 and killed at least 6,000
people.467 This necessitated a massive rehabilitation
project.468 In the aftermath, the U.S. military was among the
first to extend help and support to the Philippines.
That calamity brought out the best in the Filipinos as
thousands upon thousands volunteered their help, their
wealth, and their prayers to those affected. It also brought to
the fore the value of having friends in the international
community.
In order to keep the peace in its archipelago in this region of
the world, and to sustain itself at the same time against the
destructive forces of nature, the Philippines will need friends.
Who they are, and what form the friendships will take, are for
the President to decide. The only restriction is what the
Constitution itself expressly prohibits. It appears that this
overarching concern for balancing constitutional requirements
against the dictates of necessity was what led to EDCA.
As it is, EDCA is not constitutionally infirm. As an executive
agreement, it remains consistent with existing laws and
treaties that it purports to implement.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petitions.
SO ORDERED.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 37
G.R. No. 175888 February 11, 2009
SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of
Foreign Affairs; RAUL GONZALEZ, in his capacity as
Secretary of Justice; EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity
as Executive Secretary; RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity
as Secretary of the Interior and Local Government;
SERGIO APOSTOL, in his capacity as Presidential Legal
Counsel; and L/CPL. DANIEL SMITH, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176051 February 11, 2009
JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, JOSE DE
LA RAMA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, H. HARRY L. ROQUE,
JR., FLORIN HILBAY, and BENJAMIN POZON, Petitioners,
vs.
DANIEL SMITH, SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ,
PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL SERGIO APOSTOL,
SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, SECRETARY ALBERTO
ROMULO, The Special 16th Division of the COURT OF
APPEALS, and all persons acting in their capacity,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176222 February 11, 2009
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN),
represented by Dr. Carol Araullo; GABRIELA, represented by
Emerenciana de Jesus; BAYAN MUNA, represented by Rep.
Satur Ocampo; GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, represented
by Rep. Liza Maza; KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU),
represented by Elmer Labog; KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG
PILIPINAS (KMP), represented by Willy Marbella; LEAGUE
OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), represented by Vencer
Crisostomo; and THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER,
represented by Atty. Rachel Pastores, Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her
capacity as concurrent Defense Secretary, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, JUSTICE SECRETARY
RAUL GONZALEZ, AND INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO,
Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
These are petitions for certiorari, etc. as special civil actions
and/or for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith v. Hon. Benjamin T. Pozon, et
al., in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212, dated January 2, 2007.
The facts are not disputed.
Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a
member of the United States Armed Forces. He was charged
with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, petitioner
herein, sometime on November 1, 2005, as follows:
The undersigned accused LCpl. Daniel Smith, Ssgt. Chad
Brian Carpentier, Dominic Duplantis, Keith Silkwood and
Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr. of the crime of Rape under Article 266-
A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
8353, upon a complaint under oath filed by Suzette S. Nicolas,
which is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as
Annex "A," committed as follows:
"That on or about the First (1st) day of November 2005, inside
the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Olongapo City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused’s (sic), being then members of the United States
Marine Corps, except Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with
lewd design and by means of force, threat and intimidation,
with abuse of superior strength and taking advantage of the
intoxication of the victim, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sexually abuse and have sexual intercourse
with or carnal knowledge of one Suzette S. Nicolas, a 22-year
old unmarried woman inside a Starex Van with Plate No.
WKF-162, owned by Starways Travel and Tours, with Office
address at 8900 P. Victor St., Guadalupe, Makati City, and
driven by accused Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., against the will and
consent of the said Suzette S. Nicolas, to her damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW."1
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into
on February 10, 1998, the United States, at its request, was
granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings.
During the trial, which was transferred from the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Zambales to the RTC of Makati for security
reasons, the United States Government faithfully complied
with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court
every time his presence was required.
On December 4, 2006, the RTC of Makati, following the end
of the trial, rendered its Decision, finding defendant Smith
guilty, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the
prosecution to adduce sufficient evidence against accused
S/SGT. CHAD BRIAN CARPENTER, L/CPL. KEITH
SILKWOOD AND L/CPL. DOMINIC DUPLANTIS, all of the US
Marine Corps assigned at the USS Essex, are hereby
ACQUITTED to the crime charged.
The prosecution having presented sufficient evidence against
accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH, also of the US Marine
Corps at the USS Essex, this Court hereby finds him GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of RAPE
defined under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, and, in accordance
with Article 266-B, first paragraph thereof, hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with
the accessory penalties provided for under Article 41 of the
same Code.
Pursuant to Article V, paragraph No. 10, of the Visiting Forces
Agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United
States, accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH shall serve his
sentence in the facilities that shall, thereafter, be agreed upon
by appropriate Philippine and United States authorities.
Pending agreement on such facilities, accused L/CPL.
DANIEL J. SMITH is hereby temporarily committed to the
Makati City Jail.
Accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH is further sentenced to
indemnify complainant SUZETTE S. NICOLAS in the amount
of ₱50,000.00 as compensatory damages plus ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages.
SO ORDERED.2
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 38
As a result, the Makati court ordered Smith detained at the
Makati jail until further orders.
On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken
out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law
enforcement agents, purportedly acting under orders of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government, and
brought to a facility for detention under the control of the
United States government, provided for under new
agreements between the Philippines and the United States,
referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December
19, 2006 which states:
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America agree that, in
accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed
between our two nations, Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith,
United States Marine Corps, be returned to U.S. military
custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.
(Sgd.) Kristie A. Kenney
Representative of the United States of America
DATE: 12-19-06 (Sgd.) Alberto G. Romulo
Representative of the Republic of the Philippines
DATE: December 19, 2006
and the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22, 2006
which states:
The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Embassy of the United States of America
agree that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement
signed between the two nations, upon transfer of Lance
Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, from
the Makati City Jail, he will be detained at the first floor, Rowe
(JUSMAG) Building, U.S. Embassy Compound in a room of
approximately 10 x 12 square feet. He will be guarded round
the clock by U.S. military personnel. The Philippine police and
jail authorities, under the direct supervision of the Philippine
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) will have
access to the place of detention to ensure the United States
is in compliance with the terms of the VFA.
The matter was brought before the Court of Appeals which
decided on January 2, 2007, as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, we resolved to
DISMISS the petition for having become moot.3
Hence, the present actions.
The petitions were heard on oral arguments on September 19,
2008, after which the parties submitted their memoranda.
Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody
of defendant L/CPL Smith because, first of all, the VFA is void
and unconstitutional.
This issue had been raised before, and this Court resolved in
favor of the constitutionality of the VFA. This was in Bayan v.
Zamora,4 brought by Bayan, one of petitioners in the present
cases.
Against the barriers of res judicata vis-à-vis Bayan, and stare
decisis vis-à-vis all the parties, the reversal of the previous
ruling is sought on the ground that the issue is of primordial
importance, involving the sovereignty of the Republic, as well
as a specific mandate of the Constitution.
The provision of the Constitution is Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 which
states:
Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement
between the Philippines and the United States of America
concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a
treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast
by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose,
and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
The reason for this provision lies in history and the Philippine
experience in regard to the United States military bases in the
country.
It will be recalled that under the Philippine Bill of 1902, which
laid the basis for the Philippine Commonwealth and,
eventually, for the recognition of independence, the United
States agreed to cede to the Philippines all the territory it
acquired from Spain under the Treaty of Paris, plus a few
islands later added to its realm, except certain naval ports
and/or military bases and facilities, which the United States
retained for itself.
This is noteworthy, because what this means is that Clark and
Subic and the other places in the Philippines covered by the
RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947 were not Philippine
territory, as they were excluded from the cession and retained
by the US.
Accordingly, the Philippines had no jurisdiction over these
bases except to the extent allowed by the United States.
Furthermore, the RP-US Military Bases Agreement was never
advised for ratification by the United States Senate, a disparity
in treatment, because the Philippines regarded it as a treaty
and had it concurred in by our Senate.
Subsequently, the United States agreed to turn over these
bases to the Philippines; and with the expiration of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the territory covered by
these bases were finally ceded to the Philippines.
To prevent a recurrence of this experience, the provision in
question was adopted in the 1987 Constitution.
The provision is thus designed to ensure that any agreement
allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops or
facilities in Philippine territory shall be equally binding on the
Philippines and the foreign sovereign State involved. The idea
is to prevent a recurrence of the situation in which the terms
and conditions governing the presence of foreign armed
forces in our territory were binding upon us but not upon the
foreign State.
Applying the provision to the situation involved in these cases,
the question is whether or not the presence of US Armed
Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA is allowed
"under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate xxx and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State."
This Court finds that it is, for two reasons.
First, as held in Bayan v. Zamora,5 the VFA was duly
concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been
recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and
certified by the duly authorized representative of the United
States government.
The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and
consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its
status as a binding international agreement or treaty
recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal
United States law. Notice can be taken of the internationally
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 39
known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate
for advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in
nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement
these policymaking agreements are merely submitted to
Congress, under the provisions of the so-called Case–
Zablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification.6
The second reason has to do with the relation between the
VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30,
1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly ratified with
the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United
States Senate.
The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty states:7
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA. Signed at Washington, August 30, 1951.
The Parties of this Treaty
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace
with all peoples and all governments, and desiring to
strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area.
Recalling with mutual pride the historic relationship which
brought their two peoples together in a common bond of
sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side-by-side against
imperialist aggression during the last war.
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity
and their common determination to defend themselves
against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor
could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in
the Pacific area.
Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for
collective defense for the preservation of peace and security
pending the development of a more comprehensive system of
regional security in the Pacific area.
Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument shall be
considered or interpreted as in any way or sense altering or
diminishing any existing agreements or understandings
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States
of America.
Have agreed as follows:
Article I. The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of
the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in
which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security and justice are
not endangered and to refrain in their international relation
from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations.
Article II. In order more effectively to achieve the objective of
this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and
mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and
collective capacity to resist armed attack.
Article III. The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their
deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the
implementation of this Treaty and whenever in the opinion of
either of them the territorial integrity, political independence or
security of either of the Parties is threatened by external
armed attack in the Pacific.
Article IV. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the
Pacific area on either of the parties would be dangerous to its
own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet
the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional
processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result
thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated
when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary
to restore and maintain international peace and security.
Article V. For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on
either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on
the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the
island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean, its
armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.
Article VI. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be
interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations
of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the
responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
Article VII. This Treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of the
Philippines and the United Nations of America in accordance
with their respective constitutional processes and will come
into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been
exchanged by them at Manila.
Article VIII. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either
Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to
the other party.
In withness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have
signed this Treaty.
Done in duplicate at Washington this thirtieth day of August,
1951.
For the Republic of the Philippines:
(Sgd.) Carlos P. Romulo
(Sgd.) Joaquin M. Elizalde
(Sgd.) Vicente J. Francisco
(Sgd.) Diosdado Macapagal
For the United States of America:
(Sgd.) Dean Acheson
(Sgd.) John Foster Dulles
(Sgd.) Tom Connally
(Sgd.) Alexander Wiley8
Clearly, therefore, joint RP-US military exercises for the
purpose of developing the capability to resist an armed attack
fall squarely under the provisions of the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty. The VFA, which is the instrument agreed
upon to provide for the joint RP-US military exercises, is
simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Military
Defense Treaty. The Preamble of the VFA states:
The Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations and their desire to strengthen
international and regional security in the Pacific area;
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 40
Reaffirming their obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty
of August 30, 1951;
Noting that from time to time elements of the United States
armed forces may visit the Republic of the Philippines;
Considering that cooperation between the United States and
the Republic of the Philippines promotes their common
security interests;
Recognizing the desirability of defining the treatment of United
States personnel visiting the Republic of the Philippines;
Have agreed as follows:9
Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the RP-US
Mutual Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to submit the
VFA to the US Senate for advice and consent, but merely to
the US Congress under the Case–Zablocki Act within 60 days
of its ratification. It is for this reason that the US has certified
that it recognizes the VFA as a binding international
agreement, i.e., a treaty, and this substantially complies with
the requirements of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of our Constitution.10
The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is
complied with by virtue of the fact that the presence of the US
Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence "allowed under"
the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty itself has been ratified and concurred in by
both the Philippine Senate and the US Senate, there is no
violation of the Constitutional provision resulting from such
presence.
The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are
required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms
and provisions.
The VFA provides that in cases of offenses committed by the
members of the US Armed Forces in the Philippines, the
following rules apply:
Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction
xxx
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the
Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside
with United States military authorities, if they so request, from
the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial
proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon
formal notification by the Philippine authorities and without
delay, make such personnel available to those authorities in
time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the
offense with which the person has been charged. In
extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present
its position to the United States Government regarding
custody, which the United States Government shall take into
full account. In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are
not completed within one year, the United States shall be
relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one year
period will not include the time necessary to appeal. Also, the
one year period will not include any time during which
scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United
States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine
authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to
do so.
Petitioners contend that these undertakings violate another
provision of the Constitution, namely, that providing for the
exclusive power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure for
all courts in the Philippines (Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5]). They argue
that to allow the transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign
power is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that
accused, which also violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 1.).
Again, this Court finds no violation of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is
a substantial basis for a different treatment of a member
of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our
territory and all other accused.11
The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces
allowed to enter one’s territory is immune from local
jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of
Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the
world vary in terms and conditions, according to the situation
of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But
the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise
jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the
extent agreed upon by the parties.12
As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power
of this Court to adopt rules of procedure is curtailed or
violated, but rather one in which, as is normally encountered
around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of
one State do not extend or apply – except to the extent agreed
upon – to subjects of another State due to the recognition of
extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting
foreign armed forces.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements
recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some aspects of
jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-recognized
subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and
members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State
allowed to enter another State’s territory. On the contrary, the
Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2).
Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that
there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as
against custody. The moment the accused has to be detained,
e.g., after conviction, the rule that governs is the following
provision of the VFA:
Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction
xxx
Sec. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine
authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out in
facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United
States authorities. United States personnel serving sentences
in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and material
assistance.
It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference
between custody during the trial and detention after
conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement
to cover detention. And this specific arrangement clearly
states not only that the detention shall be carried out in
facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that
the detention shall be "by Philippine authorities." Therefore,
the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22,
2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 41
in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA
itself because such detention is not "by Philippine authorities."
Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and
negotiate with representatives of the United States towards an
agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities
as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA.
Next, the Court addresses the recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Medellin v. Texas ( 552 US ___ No.
06-984, March 25, 2008), which held that treaties entered into
by the United States are not automatically part of their
domestic law unless these treaties are self-executing or there
is an implementing legislation to make them
enforceable.1avvphi1
On February 3, 2009, the Court issued a Resolution, thus:
"G.R. No. 175888 (Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon v. Alberto
Romulo, et al.); G.R. No. 176051 (Jovito R. Salonga, et al. v.
Daniel Smith, et al.); and G.R. No. 176222 (Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan [BAYAN], et al. v. President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.).
The parties, including the Solicitor General, are required to
submit within three (3) days a Comment/Manifestation on the
following points:
1. What is the implication on the RP-US Visiting Forces
Agreement of the recent US Supreme Court decision in Jose
Ernesto Medellin v. Texas, dated March 25, 2008, to the effect
that treaty stipulations that are not self-executory can only be
enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect; and
that, while treaties may comprise international commitments,
they are not domestic law unless Congress has enacted
implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention
that it be "self-executory" and is ratified on these terms?
2. Whether the VFA is enforceable in the US as domestic law,
either because it is self-executory or because there exists
legislation to implement it.
3. Whether the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30,
1951 was concurred in by the US Senate and, if so, is there
proof of the US Senate advice and consent resolution?
Peralta, J., no part."
After deliberation, the Court holds, on these points, as follows:
First, the VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that term
is defined in Medellin itself, because the parties intend its
provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the
Agreement is intended to carry out obligations and
undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As
a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and
executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to
produce L/CPL Smith before the court during the trial.
Secondly, the VFA is covered by implementing legislation,
namely, the Case-Zablocki Act, USC Sec. 112(b),
inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US
Congress that executive agreements registered under
this Act within 60 days from their ratification be
immediately implemented. The parties to these present
cases do not question the fact that the VFA has been
registered under the Case-Zablocki Act.1avvphi1
In sum, therefore, the VFA differs from the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations and the Avena
decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
subject matter of the Medellin decision. The Convention
and the ICJ decision are not self-executing and are not
registrable under the Case-Zablocki Act, and thus lack
legislative implementing authority.
Finally, the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and
consented to by the US Senate on March 20, 1952, as
reflected in the US Congressional Record, 82nd Congress,
Second Session, Vol. 98 – Part 2, pp. 2594-2595.
The framers of the Constitution were aware that the
application of international law in domestic courts varies from
country to country.
As Ward N. Ferdinandusse states in his Treatise, DIRECT
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN
NATIONAL COURTS, some countries require legislation
whereas others do not.
It was not the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution,
in adopting Article XVIII, Sec. 25, to require the other
contracting State to convert their system to achieve alignment
and parity with ours. It was simply required that the treaty be
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. With
that, it becomes for both parties a binding international
obligation and the enforcement of that obligation is left to the
normal recourse and processes under international law.
Furthermore, as held by the US Supreme Court in Weinberger
v. Rossi,13 an executive agreement is a "treaty" within the
meaning of that word in international law and constitutes
enforceable domestic law vis-à-vis the United States. Thus,
the US Supreme Court in Weinberger enforced the provisions
of the executive agreement granting preferential employment
to Filipinos in the US Bases here.
Accordingly, there are three types of treaties in the American
system:
1. Art. II, Sec. 2 treaties – These are advised and consented
to by the US Senate in accordance with Art. II, Sec. 2 of the
US Constitution.
2. Executive–Congressional Agreements: These are joint
agreements of the President and Congress and need not be
submitted to the Senate.
3. Sole Executive Agreements. – These are agreements
entered into by the President. They are to be submitted to
Congress within sixty (60) days of ratification under the
provisions of the Case-Zablocki Act, after which they are
recognized by the Congress and may be implemented.
As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and
this can only be done through implementing legislation. The
VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED, and the
Court of Appeals’ Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212 dated
January 2, 2007 is MODIFIED. The Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States, entered into on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as
constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of
December 19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in
accordance with the VFA, and respondent Secretary of
Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to forthwith negotiate with
the United States representatives for the appropriate
agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities
as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA, pending which the
status quo shall be maintained until further orders by this
Court.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 42

The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve without

delay the related matters pending therein, namely, the petition
for contempt and the appeal of L/CPL Daniel Smith from the
judgment of conviction.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 43
G.R. No. 162230 April 28, 2010
ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C. DELA PEÑA,
HERMINIHILDA MANIMBO, LEONOR H. SUMAWANG,
CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L. QUILANTANG,
MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M.
NAVARO, FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA
MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG, ESTER M.
PALACIO, MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A. SAGUM,
FELICIDAD TURLA, FLORENCIA M. DELA PEÑA,
EUGENIA M. LALU, JULIANA G. MAGAT, CECILIA
SANGUYO, ANA ALONZO, RUFINA P. MALLARI,
ROSARIO M. ALARCON, RUFINA C. GULAPA, ZOILA B.
MANALUS, CORAZON C. CALMA, MARTA A. GULAPA,
TEODORA M. HERNANDEZ, FERMIN B. DELA PEÑA,
MARIA DELA PAZ B. CULALA, ESPERANZA MANAPOL,
JUANITA M. BRIONES, VERGINIA M. GUEVARRA,
MAXIMA ANGULO, EMILIA SANGIL, TEOFILA R.
PUNZALAN, JANUARIA G. GARCIA, PERLA B. BALINGIT,
BELEN A. CULALA, PILAR Q. GALANG, ROSARIO C.
BUCO, GAUDENCIA C. DELA PEÑA, RUFINA Q.
CATACUTAN, FRANCIA A. BUCO, PASTORA C.
GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA O.
DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ, CORAZON M.
SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ,
ROSALINA M. BUCO, PATRICIA A. BERNARDO, LUCILA
H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA LIWAG, ESTER C. BALINGIT,
JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C. MANGILIT, VERGINIA M.
BANGIT, GUILLERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA
PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C.
GULAPA, SEFERINA S. TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA,
LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA,
CATALINA Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L.
TURLA, et al. In their capacity and as members of the
"Malaya Lolas Organization", Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO
G. ROMULO, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGO-ALBERT, THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N.
GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR
GENERAL ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as it barred future
claims such as those asserted by plaintiffs in these actions,
exchanged full compensation of plaintiffs for a future peace.
History has vindicated the wisdom of that bargain. And while
full compensation for plaintiffs' hardships, in the purely
economic sense, has been denied these former prisoners and
countless other survivors of the war, the immeasurable bounty
of life for themselves and their posterity in a free society and
in a more peaceful world services the debt.1
There is a broad range of vitally important areas that must be
regularly decided by the Executive Department without either
challenge or interference by the Judiciary. One such area
involves the delicate arena of foreign relations. It would be
strange indeed if the courts and the executive spoke with
different voices in the realm of foreign policy. Precisely
because of the nature of the questions presented, and the
lapse of more than 60 years since the conduct complained of,
we make no attempt to lay down general guidelines covering
other situations not involved here, and confine the opinion only
to the very questions necessary to reach a decision on this
matter.
Factual Antecedents
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the
Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Secretary of the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-
stock, non-profit organization registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission, established for the purpose of
providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces
in the Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the
Japanese army attacked villages and systematically raped the
women as part of the destruction of the village. Their
communities were bombed, houses were looted and burned,
and civilians were publicly tortured, mutilated, and
slaughtered. Japanese soldiers forcibly seized the women
and held them in houses or cells, where they were repeatedly
raped, beaten, and abused by Japanese soldiers. As a result
of the actions of their Japanese tormentors, the petitioners
have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical
injuries, pain and disability, and mental and emotional
suffering.2
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the
Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG,
requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese
officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of
the "comfort women" stations in the Philippines. However,
officials of the Executive Department declined to assist
the petitioners, and took the position that the individual
claims of the comfort women for compensation had
already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with
the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Issues
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a)
declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to
espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war
crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the
respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and
other forms of reparations against Japan before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international
tribunals.
Petitioners’ arguments
Petitioners argue that the general waiver of claims made by
the Philippine government in the Treaty of Peace with Japan
is void. They claim that the comfort women system
established by Japan, and the brutal rape and enslavement of
petitioners constituted a crime against humanity,3 sexual
slavery,4 and torture.5 They allege that the prohibition against
these international crimes is jus cogens norms from which no
derogation is possible; as such, in waiving the claims of
Filipina comfort women and failing to espouse their complaints
against Japan, the Philippine government is in breach of its
legal obligation not to afford impunity for crimes against
humanity. Finally, petitioners assert that the Philippine
government’s acceptance of the "apologies" made by Japan
as well as funds from the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) were
contrary to international law.
Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its
nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 44
Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations
Agreement of 1956.6
Article 14 of the Treaty of Peace7 provides:
Article 14. Claims and Property
a) It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the
Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it
during the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the
resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to
maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for
all such damage and suffering and at the present time meet
its other obligations.
b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the
Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied
Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals
arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in
the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the
Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.
In addition, respondents argue that the apologies made by
Japan8 have been satisfactory, and that Japan had
addressed the individual claims of the women through the
atonement money paid by the Asian Women’s Fund.1avvphi1
Historical Background
The comfort women system was the tragic legacy of the Rape
of Nanking. In December 1937, Japanese military forces
captured the city of Nanking in China and began a "barbaric
campaign of terror" known as the Rape of Nanking, which
included the rapes and murders of an estimated 20,000 to
80,000 Chinese women, including young girls, pregnant
mothers, and elderly women.9 Document1zzF24331552898
In reaction to international outcry over the incident, the
Japanese government sought ways to end international
condemnation10 by establishing the "comfort women"
system. Under this system, the military could simultaneously
appease soldiers' sexual appetites and contain soldiers'
activities within a regulated environment.11 Comfort stations
would also prevent the spread of venereal disease among
soldiers and discourage soldiers from raping inhabitants of
occupied territories.12
Daily life as a comfort woman was "unmitigated misery."13
The military forced victims into barracks-style stations divided
into tiny cubicles where they were forced to live, sleep, and
have sex with as many 30 soldiers per day.14 The 30 minutes
allotted for sexual relations with each soldier were 30-minute
increments of unimaginable horror for the women.15 Disease
was rampant.16 Military doctors regularly examined the
women, but these checks were carried out to prevent the
spread of venereal diseases; little notice was taken of the
frequent cigarette burns, bruises, bayonet stabs and even
broken bones inflicted on the women by soldiers.
Document1zzF48331552898
Fewer than 30% of the women survived the war.17 Their
agony continued in having to suffer with the residual physical,
psychological, and emotional scars from their former lives.
Some returned home and were ostracized by their families.
Some committed suicide. Others, out of shame, never
returned home.18
Efforts to Secure Reparation
The most prominent attempts to compel the Japanese
government to accept legal responsibility and pay
compensatory damages for the comfort women system were
through a series of lawsuits, discussion at the United Nations
(UN), resolutions by various nations, and the Women’s
International Criminal Tribunal. The Japanese government, in
turn, responded through a series of public apologies and the
creation of the AWF.19
Lawsuits
In December 1991, Kim Hak-Sun and two other survivors filed
the first lawsuit in Japan by former comfort women against the
Japanese government. The Tokyo District Court however
dismissed their case.20 Other suits followed,21 but the
Japanese government has, thus far, successfully caused the
dismissal of every case.22
Undoubtedly frustrated by the failure of litigation before
Japanese courts, victims of the comfort women system
brought their claims before the United States (US). On
September 18, 2000, 15 comfort women filed a class action
lawsuit in the US District Court for the District of Columbia23
"seeking money damages for [allegedly] having been
subjected to sexual slavery and torture before and during
World War II," in violation of "both positive and customary
international law." The case was filed pursuant to the Alien
Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"),24 which allowed the plaintiffs to sue
the Japanese government in a US federal district court.25 On
October 4, 2001, the district court dismissed the lawsuit due
to lack of jurisdiction over Japan, stating that "[t]here is no
question that this court is not the appropriate forum in which
plaintiffs may seek to reopen x x x discussions nearly half a
century later x x x [E]ven if Japan did not enjoy sovereign
immunity, plaintiffs' claims are non-justiciable and must be
dismissed."
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of the case.26 On appeal, the US Supreme
Court granted the women’s petition for writ of certiorari,
vacated the judgment of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, and remanded the case.27 On remand, the Court of
Appeals affirmed its prior decision, noting that "much as we
may feel for the plight of the appellants, the courts of the US
simply are not authorized to hear their case."28 The women
again brought their case to the US Supreme Court which
denied their petition for writ of certiorari on February 21, 2006.
Efforts at the United Nations
In 1992, the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military
Sexual Slavery by Japan (KCWS), submitted a petition to the
UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), asking for
assistance in investigating crimes committed by Japan
against Korean women and seeking reparations for former
comfort women.29 The UNHRC placed the issue on its
agenda and appointed Radhika Coomaraswamy as the
issue's special investigator. In 1996, Coomaraswamy issued
a Report reaffirming Japan's responsibility in forcing Korean
women to act as sex slaves for the imperial army, and made
the following recommendations:
A. At the national level
137. The Government of Japan should:
(a) Acknowledge that the system of comfort stations set up by
the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War
was a violation of its obligations under international law and
accept legal responsibility for that violation;
(b) Pay compensation to individual victims of Japanese
military sexual slavery according to principles outlined by the
Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on the right to
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 45
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of
grave violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
A special administrative tribunal for this purpose should be set
up with a limited time-frame since many of the victims are of a
very advanced age;
(c) Make a full disclosure of documents and materials in its
possession with regard to comfort stations and other related
activities of the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second
World War;
(d) Make a public apology in writing to individual women who
have come forward and can be substantiated as women
victims of Japanese military sexual slavery;
(e) Raise awareness of these issues by amending educational
curricula to reflect historical realities;
(f) Identify and punish, as far as possible, perpetrators
involved in the recruitment and institutionalization of comfort
stations during the Second World War.
Gay J. McDougal, the Special Rapporteur for the UN Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, also presented a report to the Sub-Committee on
June 22, 1998 entitled Contemporary Forms of Slavery:
Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices
During Armed Conflict. The report included an appendix
entitled An Analysis of the Legal Liability of the Government
of Japan for 'Comfort Women Stations' established during the
Second World War,30 which contained the following findings:
68. The present report concludes that the Japanese
Government remains liable for grave violations of human
rights and humanitarian law, violations that amount in their
totality to crimes against humanity. The Japanese
Government’s arguments to the contrary, including arguments
that seek to attack the underlying humanitarian law prohibition
of enslavement and rape, remain as unpersuasive today as
they were when they were first raised before the Nuremberg
war crimes tribunal more than 50 years ago. In addition, the
Japanese Government’s argument that Japan has already
settled all claims from the Second World War through peace
treaties and reparations agreements following the war
remains equally unpersuasive. This is due, in large part, to the
failure until very recently of the Japanese Government to
admit the extent of the Japanese military’s direct involvement
in the establishment and maintenance of these rape centres.
The Japanese Government’s silence on this point during the
period in which peace and reparations agreements between
Japan and other Asian Governments were being negotiated
following the end of the war must, as a matter of law and
justice, preclude Japan from relying today on these peace
treaties to extinguish liability in these cases.
69. The failure to settle these claims more than half a century
after the cessation of hostilities is a testament to the degree to
which the lives of women continue to be undervalued. Sadly,
this failure to address crimes of a sexual nature committed on
a massive scale during the Second World War has added to
the level of impunity with which similar crimes are committed
today. The Government of Japan has taken some steps to
apologize and atone for the rape and enslavement of over
200,000 women and girls who were brutalized in "comfort
stations" during the Second World War. However, anything
less than full and unqualified acceptance by the Government
of Japan of legal liability and the consequences that flow from
such liability is wholly inadequate. It must now fall to the
Government of Japan to take the necessary final steps to
provide adequate redress.
The UN, since then, has not taken any official action directing
Japan to provide the reparations sought.
Women's International War Crimes
Tribunal
The Women's International War Crimes Tribunal (WIWCT)
was a "people's tribunal" established by a number of Asian
women and human rights organizations, supported by an
international coalition of non-governmental organizations.31
First proposed in 1998, the WIWCT convened in Tokyo in
2000 in order to "adjudicate Japan's military sexual violence,
in particular the enslavement of comfort women, to bring those
responsible for it to justice, and to end the ongoing cycle of
impunity for wartime sexual violence against women."
After examining the evidence for more than a year, the
"tribunal" issued its verdict on December 4, 2001, finding the
former Emperor Hirohito and the State of Japan guilty of
crimes against humanity for the rape and sexual slavery of
women.32 It bears stressing, however, that although the
tribunal included prosecutors, witnesses, and judges, its
judgment was not legally binding since the tribunal itself was
organized by private citizens.
Action by Individual Governments
On January 31, 2007, US Representative Michael Honda of
California, along with six co-sponsor representatives,
introduced House Resolution 121 which called for Japanese
action in light of the ongoing struggle for closure by former
comfort women. The Resolution was formally passed on July
30, 2007,33 and made four distinct demands:
[I]t is the sense of the House of Representatives that the
Government of Japan (1) should formally acknowledge,
apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and
unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Forces' coercion
of young women into sexual slavery, known to the world as
"comfort women", during its colonial and wartime occupation
of Asia and the Pacific Islands from the 1930s through the
duration of World War II; (2) would help to resolve recurring
questions about the sincerity and status of prior statements if
the Prime Minister of Japan were to make such an apology as
a public statement in his official capacity; (3) should clearly
and publicly refute any claims that the sexual enslavement
and trafficking of the "comfort women" for the Japanese
Imperial Army never occurred; and (4) should educate current
and future generations about this horrible crime while
following the recommendations of the international community
with respect to the "comfort women."34
In December 2007, the European Parliament, the governing
body of the European Union, drafted a resolution similar to
House Resolution 121.35 Entitled, "Justice for Comfort
Women," the resolution demanded: (1) a formal
acknowledgment of responsibility by the Japanese
government; (2) a removal of the legal obstacles preventing
compensation; and (3) unabridged education of the past. The
resolution also stressed the urgency with which Japan should
act on these issues, stating: "the right of individuals to claim
reparations against the government should be expressly
recognized in national law, and cases for reparations for the
survivors of sexual slavery, as a crime under international law,
should be prioritized, taking into account the age of the
survivors."
The Canadian and Dutch parliaments have each followed suit
in drafting resolutions against Japan. Canada's resolution
demands the Japanese government to issue a formal apology,
to admit that its Imperial Military coerced or forced hundreds
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 46
of thousands of women into sexual slavery, and to restore
references in Japanese textbooks to its war crimes.36 The
Dutch parliament's resolution calls for the Japanese
government to uphold the 1993 declaration of remorse made
by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono.
The Foreign Affairs Committee of the United Kingdom’s
Parliament also produced a report in November, 2008 entitled,
"Global Security: Japan and Korea" which concluded that
Japan should acknowledge the pain caused by the issue of
comfort women in order to ensure cooperation between Japan
and Korea.
Statements of Remorse made by representatives of the
Japanese government
Various officials of the Government of Japan have issued the
following public statements concerning the comfort system:
a) Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono in
1993:
The Government of Japan has been conducting a study on
the issue of wartime "comfort women" since December 1991.
I wish to announce the findings as a result of that study.
As a result of the study which indicates that comfort stations
were operated in extensive areas for long periods, it is
apparent that there existed a great number of comfort women.
Comfort stations were operated in response to the request of
the military authorities of the day. The then Japanese military
was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and
management of the comfort stations and the transfer of
comfort women. The recruitment of the comfort women was
conducted mainly by private recruiters who acted in response
to the request of the military. The Government study has
revealed that in many cases they were recruited against their
own will, through coaxing coercion, etc., and that, at times,
administrative/military personnel directly took part in the
recruitments. They lived in misery at comfort stations under a
coercive atmosphere.
As to the origin of those comfort women who were transferred
to the war areas, excluding those from Japan, those from the
Korean Peninsula accounted for a large part. The Korean
Peninsula was under Japanese rule in those days, and their
recruitment, transfer, control, etc., were conducted generally
against their will, through coaxing, coercion, etc.
Undeniably, this was an act, with the involvement of the
military authorities of the day that severely injured the honor
and dignity of many women. The Government of Japan would
like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere
apologies and remorse to all those, irrespective of place of
origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable
physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.
It is incumbent upon us, the Government of Japan, to continue
to consider seriously, while listening to the views of learned
circles, how best we can express this sentiment.
We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above
instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of
history. We hereby reiterated our firm determination never to
repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in
our memories through the study and teaching of history.
As actions have been brought to court in Japan and interests
have been shown in this issue outside Japan, the Government
of Japan shall continue to pay full attention to this matter,
including private researched related thereto.
b) Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama’s Statement in 1994
On the issue of wartime "comfort women", which seriously
stained the honor and dignity of many women, I would like to
take this opportunity once again to express my profound and
sincere remorse and apologies"
c) Letters from the Prime Minister of Japan to Individual
Comfort Women
The issue of comfort women, with the involvement of the
Japanese military authorities at that time, was a grave affront
to the honor and dignity of a large number of women.
As Prime Minister of Japan, I thus extend anew my most
sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who endured
immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable
physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.
I believe that our country, painfully aware of its moral
responsibilities, with feelings of apology and remorse, should
face up squarely to its past history and accurately convey it to
future generations.
d) The Diet (Japanese Parliament) passed resolutions in 1995
and 2005
Solemnly reflecting upon the many instances of colonial rule
and acts of aggression that occurred in modern world history,
and recognizing that Japan carried out such acts in the past
and inflicted suffering on the people of other countries,
especially in Asia, the Members of this House hereby express
deep remorse. (Resolution of the House of Representatives
adopted on June 9, 1995)
e) Various Public Statements by Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe
I have talked about this matter in the Diet sessions last year,
and recently as well, and to the press. I have been consistent.
I will stand by the Kono Statement. This is our consistent
position. Further, we have been apologizing sincerely to those
who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable psychological
wounds as comfort women. Former Prime Ministers, including
Prime Ministers Koizumi and Hashimoto, have issued letters
to the comfort women. I would like to be clear that I carry the
same feeling. This has not changed even slightly. (Excerpt
from Remarks by Prime Minister Abe at an Interview by NHK,
March 11, 2007).
I am apologizing here and now. I am apologizing as the Prime
Minister and it is as stated in the statement by the Chief
Cabinet Secretary Kono. (Excerpt from Remarks by Prime
Minister Abe at the Budget Committee, the House of
Councilors, the Diet of Japan, March 26, 2007).
I am deeply sympathetic to the former comfort women who
suffered hardships, and I have expressed my apologies for the
extremely agonizing circumstances into which they were
placed. (Excerpt from Telephone Conference by Prime
Minister Abe to President George W. Bush, April 3, 2007).
I have to express sympathy from the bottom of my heart to
those people who were taken as wartime comfort women. As
a human being, I would like to express my sympathies, and
also as prime minister of Japan I need to apologize to them.
My administration has been saying all along that we continue
to stand by the Kono Statement. We feel responsible for
having forced these women to go through that hardship and
pain as comfort women under the circumstances at the time.
(Excerpt from an interview article "A Conversation with Shinzo
Abe" by the Washington Post, April 22, 2007).
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 47
x x x both personally and as Prime Minister of Japan, my heart
goes out in sympathy to all those who suffered extreme
hardships as comfort women; and I expressed my apologies
for the fact that they were forced to endure such extreme and
harsh conditions. Human rights are violated in many parts of
the world during the 20th Century; therefore we must work to
make the 21st Century a wonderful century in which no human
rights are violated. And the Government of Japan and I wish
to make significant contributions to that end. (Excerpt from
Prime Minister Abe's remarks at the Joint Press Availability
after the summit meeting at Camp David between Prime
Minister Abe and President Bush, April 27, 2007).
The Asian Women's Fund
Established by the Japanese government in 1995, the AWF
represented the government's concrete attempt to address its
moral responsibility by offering monetary compensation to
victims of the comfort women system.37 The purpose of the
AWF was to show atonement of the Japanese people through
expressions of apology and remorse to the former wartime
comfort women, to restore their honor, and to demonstrate
Japan’s strong respect for women.38
The AWF announced three programs for former comfort
women who applied for assistance: (1) an atonement fund
paying ¥2 million (approximately $20,000) to each woman; (2)
medical and welfare support programs, paying ¥2.5-3 million
($25,000-$30,000) for each woman; and (3) a letter of apology
from the Japanese Prime Minister to each woman. Funding
for the program came from the Japanese government and
private donations from the Japanese people. As of March
2006, the AWF provided ¥700 million (approximately $7
million) for these programs in South Korea, Taiwan, and the
Philippines; ¥380 million (approximately $3.8 million) in
Indonesia; and ¥242 million (approximately $2.4 million) in the
Netherlands.
On January 15, 1997, the AWF and the Philippine government
signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and
welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the
next five years, these were implemented by the Department
of Social Welfare and Development.
Our Ruling
Stripped down to its essentials, the issue in this case is
whether the Executive Department committed grave
abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners’ claims
for official apology and other forms of reparations against
Japan.
The petition lacks merit.
From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive
Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine
whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan.
Baker v. Carr39 remains the starting point for analysis under
the political question doctrine. There the US Supreme Court
explained that:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
question.
In Tañada v. Cuenco,40 we held that political questions refer
"to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure."
Certain types of cases often have been found to present
political questions.41 One such category involves questions
of foreign relations. It is well-established that "[t]he conduct of
the foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislative--'the political'--
departments of the government, and the propriety of what may
be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision."42 The US Supreme Court has
further cautioned that decisions relating to foreign policy are
delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.
They are and should be undertaken only by those directly
responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or
imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary
has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility.43
To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present
political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority
to construe or invalidate treaties and executive
agreements.44 However, the question whether the Philippine
government should espouse claims of its nationals against a
foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority
for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not
to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best
interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The
wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination
by the Executive Department via the instant petition for
certiorari.
In the seminal case of US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,45
the US Supreme Court held that "[t]he President is the sole
organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign relations."
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our
international relations, embarrassment -- perhaps serious
embarrassment -- is to be avoided and success for our aims
achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made
effective through negotiation and inquiry within the
international field must often accord to the President a degree
of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which
would not be admissible where domestic affairs alone
involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better
opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his
confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the
form of diplomatic, consular and other officials. x x x
This ruling has been incorporated in our jurisprudence through
Bayan v. Executive Secretary46 and Pimentel v. Executive
Secretary;47 its overreaching principle was, perhaps, best
articulated in (now Chief) Justice Puno’s dissent in Secretary
of Justice v. Lantion:48
x x x The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and
consequences, sometimes with life and death significance to
the nation especially in times of war. It can only be entrusted
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 48
to that department of government which can act on the basis
of the best available information and can decide with
decisiveness. x x x It is also the President who possesses the
most comprehensive and the most confidential information
about foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular
officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over the
world. He has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military
intelligence data. In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs
is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider
degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The
regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under less
stringent standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to
breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations,
forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment and a
plethora of other problems with equally undesirable
consequences.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up
petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s
foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations
with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for
stability in this region. For us to overturn the Executive
Department’s determination would mean an assessment of
the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch
to which authority to make that judgment has been
constitutionally committed.
In any event, it cannot reasonably be maintained that the
Philippine government was without authority to negotiate the
Treaty of Peace with Japan. And it is equally true that, since
time immemorial, when negotiating peace accords and
settling international claims:
x x x [g]overnments have dealt with x x x private claims as
their own, treating them as national assets, and as counters,
`chips', in international bargaining. Settlement agreements
have lumped, or linked, claims deriving from private debts with
others that were intergovernmental in origin, and concessions
in regard to one category of claims might be set off against
concessions in the other, or against larger political
considerations unrelated to debts.49
Indeed, except as an agreement might otherwise provide,
international settlements generally wipe out the underlying
private claims, thereby terminating any recourse under
domestic law. In Ware v. Hylton,50 a case brought by a British
subject to recover a debt confiscated by the Commonwealth
of Virginia during the war, Justice Chase wrote:
I apprehend that the treaty of peace abolishes the subject of
the war, and that after peace is concluded, neither the matter
in dispute, nor the conduct of either party, during the war, can
ever be revived, or brought into contest again. All violences,
injuries, or damages sustained by the government, or people
of either, during the war, are buried in oblivion; and all those
things are implied by the very treaty of peace; and therefore
not necessary to be expressed. Hence it follows, that the
restitution of, or compensation for, British property
confiscated, or extinguished, during the war, by any of the
United States, could only be provided for by the treaty of
peace; and if there had been no provision, respecting these
subjects, in the treaty, they could not be agitated after the
treaty, by the British government, much less by her subjects
in courts of justice. (Emphasis supplied).
This practice of settling claims by means of a peace treaty is
certainly nothing new. For instance, in Dames & Moore v.
Regan,51 the US Supreme Court held:
Not infrequently in affairs between nations, outstanding claims
by nationals of one country against the government of another
country are "sources of friction" between the two sovereigns.
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 225, 62 S.Ct. 552, 563,
86 L.Ed. 796 (1942). To resolve these difficulties, nations have
often entered into agreements settling the claims of their
respective nationals. As one treatise writer puts it,
international agreements settling claims by nationals of one
state against the government of another "are established
international practice reflecting traditional international
theory." L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 262
(1972). Consistent with that principle, the United States has
repeatedly exercised its sovereign authority to settle the
claims of its nationals against foreign countries. x x x Under
such agreements, the President has agreed to renounce or
extinguish claims of United States nationals against foreign
governments in return for lump-sum payments or the
establishment of arbitration procedures. To be sure, many of
these settlements were encouraged by the United States
claimants themselves, since a claimant's only hope of
obtaining any payment at all might lie in having his
Government negotiate a diplomatic settlement on his behalf.
But it is also undisputed that the "United States has
sometimes disposed of the claims of its citizens without their
consent, or even without consultation with them, usually
without exclusive regard for their interests, as distinguished
from those of the nation as a whole." Henkin, supra, at 262-
263. Accord, Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States § 213 (1965) (President "may waive or
settle a claim against a foreign state x x x [even] without the
consent of the [injured] national"). It is clear that the practice
of settling claims continues today.
Respondents explain that the Allied Powers concluded the
Peace Treaty with Japan not necessarily for the complete
atonement of the suffering caused by Japanese aggression
during the war, not for the payment of adequate reparations,
but for security purposes. The treaty sought to prevent the
spread of communism in Japan, which occupied a strategic
position in the Far East. Thus, the Peace Treaty compromised
individual claims in the collective interest of the free world.
This was also the finding in a similar case involving American
victims of Japanese slave labor during the war.52 In a
consolidated case in the Northern District of California,53 the
court dismissed the lawsuits filed, relying on the 1951 peace
treaty with Japan,54 because of the following policy
considerations:
The official record of treaty negotiations establishes that a
fundamental goal of the agreement was to settle the
reparations issue once and for all. As the statement of the
chief United States negotiator, John Foster Dulles, makes
clear, it was well understood that leaving open the possibility
of future claims would be an unacceptable impediment to a
lasting peace:
Reparation is usually the most controversial aspect of
peacemaking. The present peace is no exception.
On the one hand, there are claims both vast and just. Japan's
aggression caused tremendous cost, losses and suffering.
On the other hand, to meet these claims, there stands a Japan
presently reduced to four home islands which are unable to
produce the food its people need to live, or the raw materials
they need to work. x x x
The policy of the United States that Japanese liability for
reparations should be sharply limited was informed by the
experience of six years of United States-led occupation of
Japan. During the occupation the Supreme Commander of the
Allied Powers (SCAP) for the region, General Douglas
MacArthur, confiscated Japanese assets in conjunction with
the task of managing the economic affairs of the vanquished
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 49
nation and with a view to reparations payments. It soon
became clear that Japan's financial condition would render
any aggressive reparations plan an exercise in futility.
Meanwhile, the importance of a stable, democratic Japan as
a bulwark to communism in the region increased. At the end
of 1948, MacArthur expressed the view that "[t]he use of
reparations as a weapon to retard the reconstruction of a
viable economy in Japan should be combated with all possible
means" and "recommended that the reparations issue be
settled finally and without delay."
That this policy was embodied in the treaty is clear not only
from the negotiations history but also from the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee report recommending approval of the
treaty by the Senate. The committee noted, for example:
Obviously insistence upon the payment of reparations in any
proportion commensurate with the claims of the injured
countries and their nationals would wreck Japan's economy,
dissipate any credit that it may possess at present, destroy the
initiative of its people, and create misery and chaos in which
the seeds of discontent and communism would flourish. In
short, [it] would be contrary to the basic purposes and policy
of x x x the United States x x x.
We thus hold that, from a municipal law perspective, that
certiorari will not lie. As a general principle – and particularly
here, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed
between the treaty’s conclusion and our consideration – the
Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the
foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against
Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the
petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis
if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are
appropriate or necessary.
The Philippines is not under any international obligation
to espouse petitioners’ claims.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means
available for individuals to bring a claim within the international
legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade
a government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf.55
Even then, it is not the individual’s rights that are being
asserted, but rather, the state’s own rights. Nowhere is this
position more clearly reflected than in the dictum of the
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the 1924
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case:
By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting
to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his
behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in
the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international
law. The question, therefore, whether the present dispute
originates in an injury to a private interest, which in point of
fact is the case in many international disputes, is irrelevant
from this standpoint. Once a State has taken up a case on
behalf of one of its subjects before an international tribunal, in
the eyes of the latter the State is sole claimant.56
Since the exercise of diplomatic protection is the right of the
State, reliance on the right is within the absolute discretion of
states, and the decision whether to exercise the discretion
may invariably be influenced by political considerations other
than the legal merits of the particular claim.57 As clearly
stated by the ICJ in
Barcelona Traction:
The Court would here observe that, within the limits prescribed
by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic
protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks
fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the
natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider
that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no
remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national
law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their
cause or obtaining redress. The municipal legislator may lay
upon the State an obligation to protect its citizens abroad, and
may also confer upon the national a right to demand the
performance of that obligation, and clothe the right with
corresponding sanctions.1awwphi1 However, all these
questions remain within the province of municipal law and do
not affect the position internationally.58 (Emphasis supplied)
The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its
protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and
when will it cease. It retains, in this respect, a discretionary
power the exercise of which may be determined by
considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the
particular case.
The International Law Commission’s (ILC’s) Draft Articles on
Diplomatic Protection fully support this traditional view. They
(i) state that "the right of diplomatic protection belongs to or
vests in the State,"59 (ii) affirm its discretionary nature by
clarifying that diplomatic protection is a "sovereign
prerogative" of the State;60 and (iii) stress that the state "has
the right to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of a
national. It is under no duty or obligation to do so."61
It has been argued, as petitioners argue now, that the State
has a duty to protect its nationals and act on his/her behalf
when rights are injured.62 However, at present, there is no
sufficient evidence to establish a general international
obligation for States to exercise diplomatic protection of their
own nationals abroad.63 Though, perhaps desirable, neither
state practice nor opinio juris has evolved in such a direction.
If it is a duty internationally, it is only a moral and not a legal
duty, and there is no means of enforcing its
fulfillment.641avvphi1
We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual
violence are morally reprehensible as well as legally
prohibited under contemporary international law.65 However,
petitioners take quite a theoretical leap in claiming that these
proscriptions automatically imply that that the Philippines is
under a non-derogable obligation to prosecute international
crimes, particularly since petitioners do not demand the
imputation of individual criminal liability, but seek to recover
monetary reparations from the state of Japan. Absent the
consent of states, an applicable treaty regime, or a directive
by the Security Council, there is no non-derogable duty to
institute proceedings against Japan. Indeed, precisely
because of states’ reluctance to directly prosecute claims
against another state, recent developments support the
modern trend to empower individuals to directly participate in
suits against perpetrators of international crimes.66
Nonetheless, notwithstanding an array of General Assembly
resolutions calling for the prosecution of crimes against
humanity and the strong policy arguments warranting such a
rule, the practice of states does not yet support the present
existence of an obligation to prosecute international crimes.67
Of course a customary duty of prosecution is ideal, but we
cannot find enough evidence to reasonably assert its
existence. To the extent that any state practice in this area is
widespread, it is in the practice of granting amnesties,
immunity, selective prosecution, or de facto impunity to those
who commit crimes against humanity."68
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes
obligations will not alter this analysis. Even if we sidestep the
question of whether jus cogens norms existed in 1951,
petitioners have not deigned to show that the crimes
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 50

committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens
prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that
the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an
erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus
cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in
international law has been used as a legal term describing
obligations owed by States towards the community of states
as a whole. The concept was recognized by the ICJ in
Barcelona Traction:
x x x an essential distinction should be drawn between the
obligations of a State towards the international community as
a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field
of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are
the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga
omnes.http://www.search.com/reference/Erga_omnes -
_note-0#_note-0
Of course, we greatly sympathize with the cause of
petitioners, and we cannot begin to comprehend the
unimaginable horror they underwent at the hands of the
Japanese soldiers. We are also deeply concerned that, in
apparent contravention of fundamental principles of law, the
petitioners appear to be without a remedy to challenge those
that have offended them before appropriate fora. Needless to
say, our government should take the lead in protecting its
citizens against violation of their fundamental human rights.
Regrettably, it is not within our power to order the Executive
Department to take up the petitioners’ cause. Ours is only the
power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take
up petitioners’ cause.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary

international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and
of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning
the basic rights of the human person, including protection from
slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding
rights of protection have entered into the body of general
international law … others are conferred by international
instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character.

The Latin phrase, ‘erga omnes,’ has since become one of the
rallying cries of those sharing a belief in the emergence of a
value-based international public order. However, as is so often
the case, the reality is neither so clear nor so bright. Whatever
the relevance of obligations erga omnes as a legal concept,
its full potential remains to be realized in practice.69

The term is closely connected with the international law

concept of jus cogens. In international law, the term "jus
cogens" (literally, "compelling law") refers to norms that
command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting
treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered
peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit
derogation, and can be modified only by general international
norms of equivalent authority.70

Early strains of the jus cogens doctrine have existed since the
1700s,71 but peremptory norms began to attract greater
scholarly attention with the publication of Alfred von
Verdross's influential 1937 article, Forbidden Treaties in
International Law.72 The recognition of jus cogens gained
even more force in the 1950s and 1960s with the ILC’s
preparation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT).73 Though there was a consensus that certain
international norms had attained the status of jus cogens,74
the ILC was unable to reach a consensus on the proper
criteria for identifying peremptory norms.

After an extended debate over these and other theories of jus

cogens, the ILC concluded ruefully in 1963 that "there is not
as yet any generally accepted criterion by which to identify a
general rule of international law as having the character of jus
cogens."75 In a commentary accompanying the draft
convention, the ILC indicated that "the prudent course seems
to be to x x x leave the full content of this rule to be worked
out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international
tribunals."76 Thus, while the existence of jus cogens in
international law is undisputed, no consensus exists on its
substance,77 beyond a tiny core of principles and rules.78
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 51
"G.R. No. 84642 -- (PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT FOR PRESS
FREEDOM, ET AL. V. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS, ET AL.)
The petitioners, invoking the constitutional provisions on
freedom of speech and the press (Constitution, Article III,
section 7) seek to compel the respondents who are
representatives of the President of the Philippine sin the on-
going negotiations of the RP-US Military Base Agreement
to:
(1) Open to petitioners their negotiations/sessions with the
U.S. counterparts on the RP-US Military Agreement:
(2) Reveal and/or give petitioners access to the items which
they (respondents) have already agreed upon with their
American counterparts relative to the review of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement, and 92) reveal and/or make
accessible to petitioners the respective positions of
respondents and their US counterparts on items they have not
agreed upon, particularly the compensation package for the
continued use by the U.S. of their military bases and facilities
in the Philippines.
The petitioners argue that the closed-door negotiations
held by the two countries negotiating panels’ amount to
the denial of the petitioners' right to press freedom as well
as their right to information on matter of public concern.
They specifically mention the fact that their organization
should be given access to information on the negotiations so
that they can pursue and protect, within the democratic
framework, their legitimate and collective interests and
aspirations thru peaceful and lawful means and can effectively
and reasonably participate at this level of political decision as
mandated by the Constitution.
Under the Constitution, the conduct of foreign relations
of our Government especially the sensitive matter of
negotiating a treaty with a foreign government is lodged
with the political Departments of the Government. It has
been ruled that the "propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial
inquiry or decision." (Otejen v. Central Leather Co., 246 US
297, 306, 62, 2ed. 726, 732, 38 S Ct. 309, See also Baker v.
Carr, 369 US 186, 7L ed 2nd 663, 82 S Ct. 691). The Court
finds no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction which would warrant the exercise of judicial
power.
As regards the President's power to conclude treaties, the
Constitution limits the role of the Supreme Court "to review,
revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari x x x
the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, x x x (Article VIII, Section 5, number 2
paragraph (a), 1987 Constitution.
Undoubtedly, this Court has no jurisdiction over a case
until the treaty or agreement has been concluded and its
terms questioned in an appropriate case. The Court
stresses that secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is
not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of
speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to
information --
"The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority
and expedition of decision which are inherent in executive
action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its
confidential nature. Although much has been said about 'open'
and 'secret' diplomacy, with disparagement of the latter,
Secretaries of State Hughes and Stimson have clearly
analyzed and justified the practice. In the words of Mr.
Stimson: "A complicated negotiation... cannot be carried
through without many, many private talks and discussions,
man to man; many tentative suggestions and proposals.
Delegates from other countries come and tell you in
confidence of their troubles at home and of their differences
with other countries and with other delegates; they tell you of
what they would do under certain circumstances and would
not do under other circumstances.... If these reports ... should
become public.... who would ever trust American Delegations
in another conference? (United States Department of State,
Press Releases, June 7, 1930, pp.
282-284.)."
"There is frequent criticism of the secrecy in which negotiation
with foreign powers on nearly all subjects is concerned. This,
it is claimed, is incompatible with the substance of democracy.
As expressed by one writer 'It can be said that there is no more
rigid system of silence anywhere in the world.' (E.J. Young,
Looking Behind the Censorship, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1938)
President Wilson in starting his efforts for the conclusion of the
World War declared that we must have 'open covenants,
openly arrived at.' He quickly abandoned his thought.
"No one who has studied the question believes that such a
method of publicity is possible. In the moment that
negotiations are started, pressure groups attempt to 'muscle
in'. An ill-timed speech by one of the parties or a frank
declaration of the concessions which are exacted or offered
on both sides would quickly lead to widespread propaganda
to block the negotiations. After a treaty has been drafted and
its terms are fully published, there is ample opportunity for
discussion before it is approved." (The New American
Government and Its Works, James T. Young, 4thEdition, p.
194)
The negotiation of treaties calls for a class of expertise,
experience, and sensitivity to national interest of an
extremely high order. It would be a sad day indeed if in
the negotiation leading to a treaty, the Philippine panel
and the President would be hampered or embarrassed by
criticisms or comments from persons with inadequate
knowledge of the nuances of treaty negotiations or worse
by publicity seekers
or idle kibitzers.
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (299 U.S. 304,
1936) and notwithstanding the power of the American Senate
to give "advice and consent" to the President in the making of
a treaty, it was emphasized that the President alone
negotiates. Not even the Senate or the House of
Representatives, unless they are asked, may intrude. The
pertinent portions of the decision read:
xxx xxx xxx
"x x x In this vast external realm, with its important,
complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of
the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of
the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of
negotiation the senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is,
powerless to invade it. As Marshall said in his great argument
of March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, 'The
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign
nations.' Annals, 6th Cong., col. 613...
"It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not
alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion
of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the
sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations -- a power which does not require as a
basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course,
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 52

like every other governmental power, must be exercised in

subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our
international relations, embarrassment -- perhaps serious
embarrassment is to be avoided and success for our aims
achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made
effective through negotiation and inquiry within the
international field must often accord to the President a degree
of discretion and freedom admissible were domestic affairs
alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better
opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his
confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the
form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.

Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be

highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it
productive of harmful results. Indeed, so clearly is this true that
the first President refused to accede to a request to lay before
the House of Representatives the instructions,
correspondence and documents relating to the negotiation of
the Jay Treaty- a refusal the wisdom of which was recognized
by the House itself and has never since been doubted. In his
reply to the request, President Washington said: " 'The nature
of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success
must often depend on secrecy: and even when brought to a
conclusion a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or
eventual concessions which may have been proposed or
contemplated would be extremely impolitic; fo this might have
a pernicious influence on future negotiations, or produce
immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in
relation to other powers. The necessity of such caution and
secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the power of
making treaties in the President, with the advice and consent
ot the Senate, the principle on which that body was formed
confining it to a small number of members. To admit, then, a
right in the House of Representatives to demand and to have
as a matter of course all the papers respecting a negotiation
with a foreign power would be to establish a dangerous
precedent.' 1 Messages and Pares of the Presidents, p. 194."
(at pp. 297-298)

We have the same doctrine of separation of powers in the

Constitution and the same grant of authority over foreign
affairs to the President as in the American System. The same
reasoning applies to treaty negotiations by our Government.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for manifest
lack of merit."
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 53
G.R. No. L-14279 October 31, 1961
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, petitioners,
vs.
EASTERN SEA TRADING, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Valentin Gutierrez for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petition for review of a judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals
reversing a decision of the Commissioner of Customs.
Respondent Eastern Sea Trading was the consignee of
several shipments of onion and garlic which arrived at the Port
of Manila from August 25 to September 7, 1954. Some
shipments came from Japan and others from Hong Kong. In
as much as none of the shipments had the certificate
required by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 for the
release thereof, the goods thus imported were seized and
subjected to forfeiture proceedings for alleged violations
of section 1363(f) of the Revised Administrative Code, in
relation to the aforementioned circulars of the Central
Bank. In due course, the Collector of Customs of Manila
rendered a decision on September 4, 1956, declaring said
goods forfeited to the Government and — the goods having
been, in the meantime, released to the consignees on surety
bonds, filed by the same, as principal, and the Alto Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc., as surety, in compliance with orders of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, in Civil Cases Nos. 23942
and 23852 thereof — directing that the amounts of said bonds
be paid, by said principal and surety, jointly and severally, to
the Bureau of Customs, within thirty (30) days from notice.
On appeal taken by the consignee, said decision was
affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs on December
27, 1956. Subsequently, the consignee sought a review of the
decision of said two (2) officers by the Court of Tax Appeals,
which reversed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs
and ordered that the aforementioned bonds be cancelled and
withdrawn. Hence, the present petition of the Commissioner
of Customs for review of the decision of the Court of Tax
Appeals.
The latter is based upon the following premises, namely: that
the Central Bank has no authority to regulate transactions
not involving foreign exchange; that the shipments in
question are in the nature of "no-dollar" imports; that, as
such, the aforementioned shipments do not involve foreign
exchange; that, insofar as a Central Bank license and a
certificate authorizing the importation or release of the goods
under consideration are required by Central Bank Circulars
Nos. 44 and 45, the latter are null and void; and that the
seizure and forfeiture of the goods imported from Japan
cannot be justified under Executive Order No. 328,1 not only
because the same seeks to implement an executive
agreement2 — extending the effectivity of our3 Trades and
Financial Agreements4 with Japan — which (executive
agreement), it believed, is of dubious validity, but, also,
because there is no governmental agency authorized to issue
the import license required by the aforementioned executive
order.
The authority of the Central Bank to regulate no-dollar imports
and the validity of the aforementioned Circulars Nos. 44, and
45 have already been passed upon and repeatedly upheld by
this Court (Pascual vs. Commissioner of Customs, L-10979
[June 30, 1959]; Acting Commissioner of Customs vs.
Leuterio, L-9142 [October 17, 1959] Commissioner of
Customs vs. Pascual, L-9836 [November 18, 1959];
Commissioner of Customs vs. Serree Investment Co., L-
12007 [May 16, 1960]; Commissioner of Customs vs. Serree
Investment Co., L-14274 [November 29, 1960]), for the
reason that the broad powers of the Central Bank, under
its charter, to maintain our monetary stability and to
preserve the international value of our currency, under
section 2 of Republic Act No. 265, in relation to section 14
of said Act — authorizing the bank to issue such rules
and regulations as it may consider necessary for the
effective discharge of the responsibilities and the
exercise of the powers assigned to the Monetary Board
and to the Central Bank — connote the authority to regulate
no-dollar imports, owing to the influence and effect that the
same may and do have upon the stability of our peso and its
international value.
The Court of Tax Appeals entertained doubts on the legality
of the executive agreement sought to be implemented by
Executive Order No. 328, owing to the fact that our Senate
had not concurred in the making of said executive agreement.
The concurrence of said House of Congress is required by our
fundamental law in the making of "treaties" (Constitution of the
Philippines, Article VII, Section 10[7]), which are, however,
distinct and different from "executive agreements," which may
be validly entered into without such concurrence.
Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with
the approval of two thirds of the Senate. Executive
agreements become binding through executive action
without the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements
without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval
has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of
our history we have entered into executive agreements
covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations,
most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and
copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and
the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been
seriously questioned by our courts.
xxx xxx xxx
Agreements with respect to the registration of trade-marks
have been concluded by the Executive with various countries
under the Act of Congress of March 3, 1881 (21 Stat. 502).
Postal conventions regulating the reciprocal treatment of mail
matters, money orders, parcel post, etc., have been
concluded by the Postmaster General with various countries
under authorization by Congress beginning with the Act of
February 20, 1792 (1 Stat. 232, 239). Ten executive
agreements were concluded by the President pursuant to
the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 (26 Stat. 567, 612), and
nine such agreements were entered into under the
Dingley Tariff Act 1897 (30 Stat. 151, 203, 214). A very
much larger number of agreements, along the lines of the
one with Rumania previously referred to, providing for
most-favored-nation treatment in customs and related
matters have been entered into since the passage of the
Tariff Act of 1922, not by direction of the Act but in
harmony with it.
xxx xxx xxx
International agreements involving political issues or changes
of national policy and those involving international
arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form
of treaties. But international agreements embodying
adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national
policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 54

more or less temporary nature usually take the form of
executive agreements.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressly
recognized the validity and constitutionality of executive
agreements entered into without Senate approval. (39
Columbia Law Review, pp. 753-754) (See, also, U.S. vs.
Curtis-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 81 L. ed. 255;
U.S. vs. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 81 L. ed. 1134; U.S. vs. Pink,
315 U.S. 203, 86 L. ed. 796; Ozanic vs. U.S., 188 F. 2d. 288;
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 15, pp. 1905-1906; California Law
Review, Vol. 25, pp. 670-675; Hyde on International Law
[Revised Edition], Vol. 2, pp. 1405, 1416-1418; Willoughby on
the U.S. Constitutional Law, Vol. I [2d ed.], pp. 537-540;
Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 210-218;
Hackworth, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 390-407).
(Emphasis supplied.)
licenses was not vested exclusively upon the Import Control
Commission or Administration. Executive Order No. 328
provided for export or import licenses "from the Central
Bank of the Philippines or the Import Control
Administration" or Commission. Indeed, the latter was
created only to perform the task of implementing certain
objectives of the Monetary Board and the Central Bank,
which otherwise had to be undertaken by these two (2)
agencies. Upon the abolition of said Commission, the duty to
provide means and ways for the accomplishment of said
objectives had merely to be discharged directly by the
Monetary Board and the Central Bank, even if the
aforementioned Executive Order had been silent thereon.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed and another one shall be entered affirming that of
the Commissioner of Customs, with cost against respondent’s
defendant-appellee, Eastern Sea Trading. It is so ordered.

In this connection, Francis B. Sayre, former U.S. High

Commissioner to the Philippines, said in his work on "The
Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts":

Agreements concluded by the President which fall short

of treaties are commonly referred to as executive
agreements and are no less common in our scheme of
government than are the more formal instruments —
treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of
exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal
documents denominated "agreements" time or "protocols".

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and

other governments ends and agreements — whether
denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or
otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready
ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss
here the large variety of executive agreements as such,
concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive
agreements, other than those entered into under the trade-
agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign
governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to
show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not
anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that
they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain
classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the
Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover such
subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income
tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs
matters, and commercial relations generally, international
claims, postal matters, the registration of trademarks and
copyrights, etcetera. Some of them were concluded not by
specific congressional authorization but in conformity with
policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the
general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others,
particularly those with respect of the settlement of claims
against foreign governments, were concluded independently
of any legislation." (39 Columbia Law Review, pp. 651, 755.)

The validity of the executive agreement in question is

thus patent. In fact, the so-called Parity Rights provided for
in the Ordinance Appended to our Constitution were, prior
thereto, the subject of an executive agreement, made without
the concurrence of two-thirds (2/3) of the Senate of the United
States.

Lastly, the lower court held that it would be unreasonable to

require from respondent-appellee an import license when the
Import Control Commission was no longer in existence and,
hence, there was, said court believed, no agency authorized
to issue the aforementioned license. This conclusion is
untenable, for the authority to issue the aforementioned
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 55
G.R. No. L-23846 September 9, 1977
GO TEK petitioner-appelle,
vs.
DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellant.
Teodoro C. Ronquillo for appelle.
Solicitor-General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor general
Felicisimo R. Rosete and Solicitor Octavio R. Ramirez for
appellant.
AQUINO, J.:
This is a deportation case. On March 3, 1964 the chief
prosecutor of the Deportation Board filed a complaint against
Go Tek a Chinaman residing at Ilagan, Isabela and 1208-B,
Misericordia Street, Sta. Cruz Manila.
It was alleged in the complaint that in December, 1963 certain
agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
searched an office located at 1439 O'Donnel Street, Sta.
Cruz, Manila believed to be the headquarters of a guerilla
unit of the "Emergency Intelligence Section, Army of the
United States" and that among those arrested thereat was
Go Tek an alleged sector commander and intelligence
and record officer of that guerilla unit.
It was further alleged that fake dollar checks were found in
Go Tek's possession and that, therefore, he had violated
article 168 of the Revised Penal Code and rendered
himself an undesirable alien.
The prosecutor prayed that after trial the Board should
recommend to the President of the Philippines the
immediate deportation of Go Tek as an undesirable alien,
"his presence in this country having been, and will always be
and a menace to the peace , welfare, and security of the
community". Case No. R1116).
Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint was premature bemuse them was a pending case
against him in the city fiscal's office of Manila for violation of
article 168 (IS 64-7267). He contended that the board had no
jurisdiction to try the case in view of the obiter dictum in Qua
Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 118 Phil. 868, 875, that the
t may deport aliens only on the grounds specified in the law.
The Board, composed of Manuel A. Concordia, Arturo A.
Alafriz and Manuel V. Reyes, in its resolution of April 21, 1964
denied Go Teks motion. The Board reasoned out that a
conviction is not a prerequisite before the State my exercise
its rights to deport an undesirable alien and that the Board is
only a fact finding body whose function is to make a report and
recommendation to the President in whom is lodged the
exclusive power to deport an alien or a deportation
proceeding.
In view of the denial of his motion to quash, Go Tek on June
10, 1964 filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a
prohibition action against the Board. On July 8, 1964 the court
issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the board
from hearing Go Tek's case.
After hearing, the trial court (Judge Federico C. Alikpala
presiding) in its decision of 31, 1964 granted the writ
prohibition and the Board to desist from taking cognizance of
the Go Tek.
The court, citing the said obiter dictum in the Qua Chee Gan
case, held that mere ion of forged dollar checks is not a ground
for deportation under the Immigration Law; that under section
37(3) of the law before an alien may be deported for having
been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of
one year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude a
conviction is and that since Go Tek had not been convicted of
the offense punished in article 168, the deportation was
premature.
The Board appealed to this Court on the ground that the
decision is contrary to law. The Solicitor General contends that
the trial court erred in assuming that the President may deport
undesirable aliens only to grounds enumerated by law; in
holding that mere possession of forged dollar checks is not a
ground for deportation and that a criminal conviction is
necessary, and in not finding that the Board has jurisdiction
over Go Tek's case.
The parties stipulated that the Deportation Board is an of the
President of the Philippines charged with the investigation of
undesirable aliens and to report and recommend proper action
on the basis of its findings therein."
The issue is whether the Deportation Board can entertain
a deportation proceeding based on a ground which is not
specified in section 37 of the Immigration Law and
although the aliens has not yet been convicted of the
offense imputed to him.
We hold that the Board has jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek
for illegal possession of fake dollar checks (as well as his
alleged "guerilla" activities) in spite of the fact that he has not
yet been convicted of illegal possession thereof under article
168 of the Revised Penal Code and notwithstanding that act
is not the grounds for the deportation of undesirable aliens as
enumerated in section 37 of the Immigration Law. The charge
against Go Tek before- the Board was not premature.
The aforementioned obiter dictum the Qua Chee Gan case
invoked by Go Tek and relied upon by the trial court, is not of
this case. In the Qua Chee Gan case the aliens were with
economic sabotage which is a ground for deportation under
Republic Act No. 503.
The ratio decidendi of the Qua Chee Gan case is that the
provision of Executive Order No. 398, of 1951, the Deportation
Board to issue a warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal
charges against an alien, is "illegal" or unconstitutional
because it is contrary to the provinsion in section 1(3), Article
III of the 1935 Constitution that warrants shall issue upon to
be de by the judge after e under oath the t and the witness he
may produce. (Note that under section 3, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution cause may be determined "by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law". See
Santos vs. Commissioner of Immigration L-25694, November
29, 1976, 74 SCRA 96, per Fernando, J.)
A thorough comprehension of the President's power to deport
aliens may show the baselessness of the instant prohibition
action of Go Tek The President's power to deport aliens and
the investigation of aliens subject to deportation are provided
for in the following provisions of the Revised Administrative
Code:
SEC. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. — A subject
of a foreign power residing in the Philippine Islands shall not
be deported expelled, or excluded from said Islands or
repatriated to his own country by the Governor-General
except upon prior investigator, conducted by said Executive
or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action
is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall he
informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be
allowed not less than three days for the preparation of his
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 56

defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or
counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-
examine the opposing witnesses.
On the other hand, section 37 of the Immigration Law Provides
that certain aliens may be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer
designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
Commissioner's warrant - "after a determination by the Board
of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien." Thirteen classes of
aliens who may be deported by the Commissioner are
specified in section 37 (See Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo, L-24792,
February 14, 1975, 62 SCRA 363, 368).
So, under existing law; the deportation of an undesirable alien
may be effected (1) by order of the President, after due
investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code and (2) by the Commissioner of
Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of
Commissioners under section 37 of the immigration Law (Qua
Chee Gan vs- Deportation Board, supra).
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens
(Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40
Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercise by the Chief
Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the
peace and domestic tranquility of the nation Justice Johnson's
is that there the Chief Executive rinds that there are aliens
whose continued in the country is injurious to the public
interest he may, even in the absence of express law,
deport them (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield 16
Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).
The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because
their continued presence is rental to public welfare is
absolute and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs.
Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104
Phil. 949, 956).
evidence on which he acted. (Martin vs. Mott 12 Wheat., 19,
31, cited in In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41, 62).
In the Dick case it was noted "that every alien forfeits his right
to asylum in the country in which he resides, in the absence
of treaty provisions to the contrary when his conduct or his
mode of life renders his prance there inimical to the public
interests". "The reasons may be summed up and co in a single
word: the public interest of the State." (38 Phil. 41, 47, 100).
"It is fundamental that an executive order for deportation is not
dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a case" (Ang Bong
vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 100 Phil. 801, 803). Thus, it
was held that the fact that an alien has been acquitted in a of
the charge does not prevent the deportation of such alien
based on the same charge. Such acquittal does not constitute
res judicata in the deportation proceedings. Conviction of a
crime is not n to warrant deportation. (3 C.J.S. 743, note 40,
citing Lewis vs. Frick, 233 U.S. 291, 58 L. Ed. 967 and U.S.
ex.. Mastoras vs. McCandless 61 F. 2nd 366; Tama Miyake
vs. U.S. 257 F. 732).
And in the Tan Tong case, supra, it was ruled that the
Deportation Board could take cognizance of the charge of
illegal importation against an alien as a ground for deportation,
even if he of the Deportation Board is merely
recommendatory. The Chief Executive has to approve the
board's recommendatory Abuses or rents committed by the
prosecutor or by the Board should first be brought to his
attention.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set
aside. The writ of preliminary injunction is dissolved. The case
is to the Deportation Board for further proceedings. Costs
against the petitioner-appellee.
SO ORDERED.

The Deportation Board is composed of the Undersecretary of

Justice as chairman, the solicitor General, and a
representative of the Secretary of National Defense
(Executive Order No. 455 dated June 25, 1951, 47 O.G. 28M).

SECTION 69 and Executive Order No. 398, the Deportation

Board, do not specify the grounds for deportation Paragraph
l(a) of Executive Order No. 398 merely provides that "the
Deportation Board, motu proprio or upon complaint of any
person is authorized to conduct investigations in the manner
prescribed in section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code
to determine whether a subject of a foreign power in the
Philippines is an undesirable alien or not, and thereafter to
recommend to the President of the Philippines the deportation
of such alien."

As observed by Justice Labrador, there is no legal nor

constitutes provision defining the power to deport aliens
because the intention of the law is to grant the Chief Executive
"full discretion to determine whether an alien's residence in the
country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security
welfare or interest of the state. The adjudication of facts upon
which deportation is predicated also devolves on the Chief
Executive whose decision is final and executory." (Tan Tong
vs. Deportation Board 96 Phil. 934, 936; Tan Sin vs.
Deportation Board, 104 PhiL 868, 872).

It has been held that the Chief Executive is the sole and
exclusive judge of the existence of facts which warrant
the deportation of aliens as disclosed in an investigation
conducted in accordance with 69. No other tribunal is at
liberty to reexamine or to controvert the sufficiency of the
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 57
G.R. No. 204605
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERT DEL ROSARIO,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND HON.
RICARDO BLANCAFLOR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY OFFICE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, the
Intellectual Property Association of the Philippines (IPAP)
seeks to declare the accession of the Philippines to the
Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the
International Registration of Marks (Madrid Protocol)
unconstitutional on the ground of the lack of concurrence by
the Senate, and in the alternative, to declare the
implementation thereof as unconstitutional because it conflicts
with Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the
Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (IP Code).1
We find and declare that the President's ratification is valid
and constitutional because the Madrid Protocol, being an
executive agreement as determined by the Department of
Foreign Affairs, does not require the concurrence of the
Senate.
Antecedents
The Madrid System for the International Registration of
Marks (Madrid System), which is the centralized system
providing a one-stop solution for registering and managing
marks worldwide, allows the trademark owner to file one
application in one language, and to pay one set of fees to
protect his mark in the territories of up to 97 member-states.2
The Madrid System is governed by the Madrid Agreement,
concluded in 1891, and the Madrid Protocol, concluded in
1989.3
The Madrid Protocol, which was adopted in order to remove
the challenges deterring some countries from acceding to the
Madrid Agreement, has two objectives, namely: (1) to
facilitate securing protection for marks; and (2) to make
the management of the registered marks easier in
different countries.4
In 2004; the Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines
(IPOPHL), the government agency mandated to administer
the intellectual property system of the country and to
implement the state policies on intellectual property; began
considering the country's accession to the Madrid Protocol.
However, based on its assessment in 2005, the IPOPHL
needed to first improve its own operations before making the
recommendation in favor of accession. The IPOPHL thus
implemented reforms to eliminate trademark backlogs and to
reduce the turnaround time for the registration of marks.5
In the meanwhile, the IPOPHL mounted a campaign for
information dissemination to raise awareness of the Madrid
Protocol. It launched a series of consultations with
stakeholders and various business groups regarding the
Philippines' accession to the Madrid Protocol. It ultimately
arrived at the conclusion that accession would benefit the
country and help raise the level of competitiveness for Filipino
brands. Hence, it recommended in September 2011 to the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) that the Philippines
should accede to the Madrid Protocol.6
After its own review, the DFA endorsed to the President the
country's accession to the Madrid Protocol. Conformably with
its express authority under Section 9 of Executive Order No.
459 (Providing for the Guidelines in the Negotiation of
International Agreements and its Ratification) dated
November 25, 1997, the DFA determined that the Madrid
Protocol was an executive agreement.1âwphi1 The IPOPHL,
the Department of Science and Technology, and the
Department of Trade and Industry concurred in the
recommendation of the DFA.7
On March 27, 2012, President Benigno C. Aquino III ratified
the Madrid Protocol through an instrument of accession, The
instrument of accession was deposited with the Director
General of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) on April 25, 2012.8 The Madrid Protocol entered into
force in the Philippines on July 25, 2012.9
Petitioner IP AP, an association of more than 100 law firms
and individual practitioners in Intellectual Property Law whose
main objective is to promote and protect intellectual property
rights in the Philippines through constant assistance and
involvement in the legislation of intellectual property law,10
has commenced this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition11 to challenge the validity of the President's
accession to the Madrid Protocol without the concurrence of
the Senate. Citing Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive
Secretary, the IPAP has averred:
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to
negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a
limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of
all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty
entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that "no treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by
at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." The 1935
and the 1973 Constitution also required the concurrence by
the legislature to the treaties entered into by the executive.12
According to the IPAP, the Madrid Protocol is a treaty, not
an executive agreement; hence, respondent DFA
Secretary Albert Del Rosario acted with grave abuse of
discretion in determining the Madrid Protocol as an
executive agreement.13
The IPAP has argued that the implementation of the Madrid
Protocol in the Philippines; specifically the processing of
foreign trademark applications, conflicts with the IP Code,14
whose Section 125 states:
Sec. 125. Representation; Address for Service. - If the
applicant is not domiciled or has no real and effective
commercial establishment in the Philippines; he shall
designate by a written document filed in the office, the name
and address of a Philippine resident who may be served
notices or process in proceedings affecting the mark. Such
notices or services may be served upon the person so
designated by leaving a copy thereof at the address specified
in the last designation filed. If the person so designated cannot
be found at the address given in the last designation, such
notice or process may be served upon the Director. (Sec. 3;
R.A. No. 166 a)
It has posited that Article 2 of the Madrid Protocol provides in
contrast:
Article 2
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 58
Securing Protection through International Registration
(1) Where an application for the registration of a mark has
been filed with the Office of a Contracting Party, or where a
mark has been registered in the register of the Office of a
Contracting Party, the person in whose name that application
(hereinafter referred to as "the basic application;') or that
registration (hereinafter referred to as "the basic registration")
stands may, subject to the provisions of this Protocol secure
protection for his mark in the territory of the Contracting
Parties, by obtaining the registration of that mark in the
register of the International Bureau of the World Intellectual
Property Organization (hereinafter referred to as "the
international registration," "the International Register," "the
International Bureau" and "the Organization'', respectively),
provided that,
(i) where the basic application has been filed with the Office of
a Contracting State or where the basic registration has been
made by such an Office, the person in whose name that
application or registration stands is a national of that
Contracting State, or is domiciled, or has a real and effective
industrial or commercial establishment, in the said Contracting
State,
(ii) where the basic application has been filed with the Office
of a Contracting Organization or where the basic registration
has been made by such an Office, the person in whose name
that application or registration stands is a national of a State
member of that Contracting Organization, or is domiciled, or
has a real and effective industrial or commercial
establishment, in the territory of the said Contracting
Organization.
(2) The application for international registration (hereinafter
referred to as "the international application") shall be filed with
the International Bureau through the intermediary of the Office
with which the basic application was filed or by which the basic
registration was made (hereinafter referred to as "the Office of
origin"), as the case may be.
(3) Any reference in this Protocol to an "Office" or an "Office
of a Contracting Party" shall be construed as a reference to
the office that is in charge, on behalf of a Contracting Party, of
the registration of marks, and any reference in this Protocol to
"marks" shall be construed as a reference to trademarks and
service marks.
(4) For the purposes of this Protocol, "territory of a Contracting
Party" means, where the Contracting Party is a State, the
territory of that State and, where the Contracting Party is an
intergovernmental organization, the territory in which the
constituting treaty of that intergovernmental organization
applied.
The IPAP has insisted that Article 2 of the Madrid Protocol
means that foreign trademark applicants may file their
applications through the International Bureau or the WIPO,
and their applications will be automatically granted trademark
protection without the need for designating their resident
agents in the country.15
Moreover, the IPAP has submitted that the procedure outlined
in the Guide to the International Registration of Marks relating
to representation before the International Bureau is the
following, to wit:
Rule 3(1)(a) 09.02 References in the Regulations,
Administrative Instructions or in this Guide to representation
relate only to representation before the International Bureau.
The questions of the need for a representative before the
Office of origin or the Office of a designated Contracting Party
(for example, in the event of a refusal of protection issued by
such an Office), who may act as a representative in such
cases and the method of appointment, are outside the scope
of the Agreement, Protocol and Regulations and are governed
by the law and practice of the Contracting Party concerned.
which procedure is in conflict with that under Section 125 of
the IP Code, and constitutes in effect an amendment of the
local law by the Executive Department.16
The IPAP has prayed that the implementation of the
Madrid Protocol in the Philippines be restrained in order
to prevent future wrongs considering that the IP AP and
its constituency have a clear and unmistakable right not
to be deprived of the rights granted them by the IP Code
and existing local laws.17
In its comment in behalf of the respondents, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) has stated that the IPAP does not
have the locus standi to challenge the accession to the Madrid
Protocol; that the IPAP cannot invoke the Court's original
jurisdiction absent a showing of any grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the respondents; that the President's ratification
of the Madrid Protocol as an executive agreement is valid
because the Madrid Protocol is only procedural, does not
create substantive rights, and does not require the
amendment of the IP Code; that the IPAP is not entitled to the
restraining order or injunction because it suffers no damage
from the ratification by the President, and there is also no
urgency for such relief; and the IPAP has no clear
unmistakable right to the relief sought.18
Issues
The following issues are to be resolved, namely:
I. Whether or not the IP AP has locus standi to challenge the
President's ratification of the Madrid Protocol;
II. Whether or not the President's ratification of the Madrid
Protocol is valid and constitutional; and
III. Whether or not the Madrid Protocol is in conflict with the IP
Code.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari and prohibition is without merit.
A.
The issue of legal standing to sue, or locus standi
The IPAP argues in its reply19 that it has the locus standi to
file the present case by virtue of its being an association
whose members stand to be injured as a result of the
enforcement of the Madrid Protocol in the Philippines; that the
injury pertains to the acceptance and approval of applications
submitted through the Madrid Protocol without local
representation as required by Section 125 of the IP Code;20
and that such will diminish the rights granted by the IP Code
to Intellectual Property Law practitioners like the members of
the IPAP.21
The argument of the IPAP is untenable.
Legal standing refers to "a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question."22 According to Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,23standing is
"a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some
cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or any other
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 59
government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters
who actually sue in the public interest."
The Court has frequently felt the need to dwell on the issue of
standing in public or constitutional litigations to sift the worthy
from the unworthy public law litigants seeking redress or relief.
The following elucidation in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar
Council24offers the general understanding of the context of
legal standing, or locus standi for that purpose, viz. :
In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often
burdened with the determination of the locus standi of the
petitioners due to the ever-present need to regulate the
invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct any official
action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the efficient
functioning of public officials and offices involved in public
service. It is required, therefore, that the petitioner must have
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, for, as
indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals
Co., Inc.:
The question on legal standing is whether such parties have
"'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions," Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a
person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be
direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that
the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some
right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason
of the statute or act complained of.
It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera, the Court
adopted the direct injury test for determining whether a
petitioner in a public action had locus standi. There, the Court
held that the person who would assail the validity of a statute
must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a
result." Vera was followed in Custodio v. President of the
Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers' Association v. De la
Fuente, Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix, and
Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works.
Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus
standi, being a mere procedural technicality, can be waived
by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. For instance, in
1949, in Araneta v. Dinglasan, the Court liberalized the
approach when the cases had "transcendental importance."
Some notable controversies whose petitioners did not pass
the direct injury test were allowed to be treated in the same
way as in Araneta v. Dinglasan.
In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on Elections,
this Court decided to resolve the issues raised by the petition
due to their "farreaching implications,'; even if the petitioner
had no personality to file the suit. The liberal approach of
Aquino v. Commission on Elections has been adopted in
several notable cases, permitting ordinary citizens, legislators,
and civic organizations to bring their suits involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations, and rulings.
However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for
challenging a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive
or legislative action rests on the theory that the petitioner
represents the public in general. Although such petitioner may
not be as adversely affected by the action complained against
as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in
his petition that he is entitled to protection or relief from the
Court in the vindication ofa public right.25
The injury that the IPAP will allegedly suffer from the
implementation of the Madrid Protocol is imaginary, incidental
and speculative as opposed to a direct and material injury
required by the foregoing tenets on locus standi. Additionally,
as the OSG points out in the comment,26 the IPAP has
misinterpreted Section 125 of the IP Code on the issue of
representation. The provision only states that a foreign
trademark applicant "shall designate by a written document
filed in the office, the name and address of a Philippine
resident who may be served notices or process in proceedings
affecting the mark;" it does not grant anyone in particular the
right to represent the foreign trademark applicant. Hence, the
IPAP cannot justly claim that it will suffer irreparable injury or
diminution of rights granted to it by Section 125 of the IP Code
from the implementation of the Madrid Protocol.
Nonetheless, the IPAP also emphasizes that the paramount
public interest involved has transcendental importance
because its petition asserts that the Executive Department
has overstepped the bounds of its authority by thereby cutting
into another branch's functions and responsibilities.27 The
assertion of the IPAP may be valid on this score. There is little
question that the issues raised herein against the
implementation of the Madrid Protocol are of transcendental
importance. Accordingly, we recognize IPAP's locus standi to
bring the present challenge. Indeed, the Court has adopted a
liberal attitude towards locus standi whenever the issue
presented for consideration has transcendental significance to
the people, or whenever the issues raised are of paramount
importance to the public.28
B.Accession to the Madrid Protocol was constitutional
The IPAP submits that respondents Executive Secretary and
DFA Secretary Del Rosario gravely abused their discretion in
determining that there was no need for the Philippine Senate's
concurrence with the Madrid Protocol; that the Madrid
Protocol involves changes of national policy, and its
being of a permanent character requires the Senate's
concurrence,29 pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the
Constitution, which states that "no treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred
in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate."
Before going further, we have to distinguish between treaties
and international agreements, which require the Senate's
concurrence, on one hand, and executive agreements, which
may be validly entered into without the Senate's concurrence.
Executive Order No. 459, Series of 1997,30 notes the
following definitions, to wit:
Sec. 2. Definition of Terms.
a. International agreement - shall refer to a contract or
understanding, regardless of nomenclature, entered into
between the Philippines and another government in written
form and governed by international law, whether embodied in
a single instrument or in two or more related instruments.
b. Treaties - international agreements entered into by the
Philippines which require legislative concurrence after
executive ratification. This term may include compacts like
conventions, declarations, covenants and acts.
c. Executive Agreements - similar to treaties except that they
do not require legislative concurrence.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 60
The Court has highlighted the difference between treaties and
executive agreements in Commissioner of Customs v.
Eastern Sea Trading,31 thusly:
International agreements involving political issues or
changes of national policy and those involving
international arrangements of a permanent character
usually take the form of treaties. But international
agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying
out well-established national policies and traditions and
those involving arrangements of a more or less
temporary nature usually take the form of executive
agreements.
In the Philippines, the DFA, by virtue of Section 9, Executive
Order No. 459,32 is initially given the power to determine
whether an agreement is to be treated as a treaty or as an
executive agreement. To determine the issue of whether DFA
Secretary Del Rosario gravely abused his discretion in making
his determination relative to the Madrid Protocol, we review
the jurisprudence on the nature of executive agreements, as
well as the subject matters to be covered by executive
agreements.
The pronouncement in Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern
Sea Trading33is instructive, to wit:
x x x The concurrence of said House of Congress is required
by our fundamental law in the making of "treaties"
(Constitution of the Philippines; Article VII, Section 10[7]),
which are, however, distinct and different from "executive
agreements," which may be validly entered into without such
concurrence.
"Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with
the approval of two thirds of the Senate. Executive
agreements become binding through executive action without
the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress.
xxxx
"x x x the right of the Executive to enter into binding
agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage.
From the earliest days of our history we have entered into
executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial
and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent
rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and
navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The
validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our
courts.
xxxx
Agreements with respect to the registration of trademarks
have been concluded by the Executive with various countries
under the Act of Congress of March 3, 1881 (21 Stat. 502), x
xx
xxxx
In this connection, Francis B. Sayre, former U.S. High
Commissioner to the Philippines, said in his work on "The
Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts":
Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of
treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements
and are no less common in our scheme of government than
are the more formal instruments - treaties and conventions.
They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at
other times that or more formal documents denominated
'agreements' or 'protocols'. The point where ordinary
correspondence between this and other government’s ends
and agreements - whether denominated executive
agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise - begin, may
sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be
useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of
executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time.
Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered
into under the trade-agreements act, have been negotiated
with foreign governments. x x x It would seem to be sufficient,
in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of
1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not
treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history,
to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered
into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They
cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation
dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil
aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally,
international claims, postal matters, the registration of
trademarks and copyrights, etcetera. Some of them were
concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in
conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with
respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while
still others, particularly those with respect of the settlement of
claims against foreign governments, were concluded
independently of any legislation. (Emphasis ours)
As the foregoing pronouncement indicates, the registration of
trademarks and copyrights have been the subject of executive
agreements entered into without the concurrence of the
Senate. Some executive agreements have been concluded in
conformity with the policies declared in the acts of Congress
with respect to the general subject matter.
It then becomes relevant to examine our state policy on
intellectual property in general, as reflected in Section 2 of our
IP Code, to wit:
Section 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The State
recognizes that an effective intellectual and industrial
property system is vital to the development of domestic
and creative activity, facilitates transfer of technology,
attracts foreign investments, and ensures market access
for our products. It shall protect and secure the exclusive
rights of scientists, inventors, artists and other gifted
citizens to their intellectual property and creations,
particularly when beneficial to the people, for such
periods as provided in this Act.
The use of intellectual property bears a social function.
To this end, the State shall promote the diffusion of
knowledge and information for the promotion of national
development and progress and the common good.
It is also the policy of the State to streamline administrative
procedures of registering patents, trademarks and copyright,
to liberalize the registration on the transfer of technology; and
to enhance the enforcement of intellectual property rights in
the Philippines.
In view of the expression of state policy having been made by
the Congress itself, the IPAP is plainly mistaken in
asserting that "there was no Congressional act that
authorized the accession of the Philippines to the Madrid
Protocol."34
Accordingly, DFA Secretary Del Rosario’s determination
and treatment of the Madrid Protocol as an executive
agreement; being in apparent contemplation of the
express state policies on intellectual property as well as
within his power under Executive Order No. 459, are
upheld. We observe at this point that there are no hard and
fast rules on the propriety of entering into a treaty or an
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 61

executive agreement on a given subject as an instrument of

international relations. The primary consideration in the choice
of the form of agreement is the parties' intent and desire to
craft their international agreement in the form they so wish to
further their respective interests. The matter of form takes a
back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of
the enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement;
inasmuch as all the parties; regardless of the form, become
obliged to comply conformably with the time-honored principle
of pacta sunt servanda.35The principle binds the parties to
perform in good faith their parts in the agreements.36

c. There is no conflict between the Madrid Protocol and

the IP Code.

The IPAP also rests its challenge on the supposed conflict

between the Madrid Protocol and the IP Code, contending that
the Madrid Protocol does away with the requirement of a
resident agent under Section 125 of the IP Code; and that the
Madrid Protocol is unconstitutional for being in conflict with the
local law, which it cannot modify.

The IPAP's contentions stand on a faulty premise. The

method of registration through the IPOPHL, as laid down
by the IP Code, is distinct and separate from the method
of registration through the WIPO, as set in the Madrid
Protocol. Comparing the two methods of registration
despite their being governed by two separate systems of
registration is thus misplaced.

In arguing that the Madrid Protocol conflicts with Section 125

of the IP Code, the IP AP highlights the importance of the
requirement for the designation of a resident agent. It
underscores that the requirement is intended to ensure that
non-resident entities seeking protection or privileges under
Philippine Intellectual Property Laws will be subjected to the
country's jurisdiction. It submits that without such resident
agent, there will be a need to resort to costly, time consuming
and cumbersome extraterritorial service of writs and
processes.37

The IPAP misapprehends the procedure for examination

under the Madrid Protocol, The difficulty, which the IPAP
illustrates, is minimal, if not altogether inexistent. The IPOPHL
actually requires the designation of the resident agent when it
refuses the registration of a mark. Local representation is
further required in the submission of the Declaration of Actual
Use, as well as in the submission of the license contract.38
The Madrid Protocol accords with the intent and spirit of the
IP Code, particularly on the subject of the registration of
trademarks. The Madrid Protocol does not amend or modify
the IP Code on the acquisition of trademark rights considering
that the applications under the Madrid Protocol are still
examined according to the relevant national law, In that
regard, the IPOPHL will only grant protection to a mark that
meets the local registration requirements.

WHEREFORE, this Court DISMISSES the petition for

certiorari and prohibition for lack of merit; and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 62
LEGISLATION
It must be noted also that much of the needed legislation of
the country today considered by Congress originates from the
executive branch. Each year after the President of the
Philippines outlines his legislative program in his State-of-the-
Nation Address, executive departments and agencies
transmit to the House and the Senate drafts of proposed
legislations to carry out the President’s program.
Article VII, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution vests executive
power on the President of the Philippines. The President is the
Head of State and Head of Government, and functions as the
commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
As chief executive, the President exercises control over all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
The President of the Philippines is elected by direct vote by
the people for a term of six years. He may only serve for one
term, and is ineligible for reelection. The term of the President
of the Philippines starts at noon of the 30th day of June after
the election.
QUALIFICATIONS
The qualifications for an individual aspiring to become the
President of the Philippines are outlined in Article VII, Section
2 of the 1987 Constitution. According to the constitution, an
individual may become President provided he meets the
following criteria:
1. natural born Filipino;
2. a registered voter;
3. must be able to read and write;
4. 40 years of age at the day of the election; and
5. must have resided in the Philippines ten years before
the election is held.
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
Besides the constitution, the powers of the President of the
Philippines are specifically outlined in Executive Order No.
292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987. The following powers are:
1. POWER OF CONTROL OVER THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
The President of the Philippines has the mandate of control
over all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This
includes restructuring, reconfiguring, and appointments of
their respective officials. The Administrative Code also
provides for the President to be responsible for the
abovementioned offices’ strict implementation of laws.
2. POWER ORDINANCE POWER
The President of the Philippines has the power to give
executive issuances, which are means to streamline the policy
and programs of an administration. There are six issuances
that the President may issue. They are the following as
defined in the Administrative Code of 1987:
Executive orders — Acts of the President providing for rules
of a general or permanent character in implementation or
execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be
promulgated in executive orders.
Administrative orders — Acts of the President which relate to
particular aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of
his duties as the administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders.
Proclamations — Acts of the President fixing a date or
declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest,
upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or
regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in
proclamations which shall have the force of an executive
order.
Memorandum orders — Acts of the President on matters of
administrative detail, or of subordinate or temporary interest
which only concern a particular officer or government office
shall be embodied in memorandum orders.
Memorandum circulars — Acts of the President on matters
relating to internal administration, which the President desires
to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments,
agencies, bureaus, or offices of the government, for
information or compliance, shall be embodied in
memorandum circulars.
General or special orders — Acts and commands of the
President in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special
orders.
It is important to note that during the term of President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, he used executive issuances known
as presidential decrees as a form of legislation. These
decrees have the full force and effect of laws because at the
time the legislature did not exist and, when the 1973
Constitution was put into full force and effect, it gave the power
to the President to do as such. This continued until the first
year of President Corazon C. Aquino’s term. However,
President Aquino opted to used executive orders instead of
presidential decrees. President Aquino’s executive orders,
however, still had the full force and effect of laws until the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
3. POWER OVER ALIENS
The President of the Philippines has certain powers over non-
Filipinos in the Philippines. The powers he may exercise over
foreigners in the country are as follows:
 The chief executive may have an alien in the
Philippines deported from the country after due
process.
 The President may change the status of a foreigner,
as prescribed by law, from a non-immigrant status to
a permanent resident status without necessity of
visa.
 The President may choose to overrule the Board of
Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration before
their decision becomes final and executory (after 30
days of the issuance of the decision). The Board of
Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration has
jurisdiction over all deportation cases.
 The president is also mandated by the Administrative
Code of 1987 to exercise powers as recognized by
the generally accepted principles of international law.
4. POWERS OF EMINENT DOMAIN,
ESCHEAT, LAND RESERVATION AND
RECOVERY OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH
The President of the Philippines has the authority to exercise
the power of eminent domain. The power of eminent domains
means the state has the power to seize or authorize the
seizure of private property for public use with just
compensation. There are two constitutional provisions,
however, that limit the exercise of such power: Article III,
Section 9 (1) of the Constitution provides that no person shall
be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or property without due
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 63
process of law. Furthermore, Article III, Section 9 (2), provides
that private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation.
Once the aforementioned conditions are met, the President
may exercise the power of eminent domain which are as
follows:
Power of eminent domain — The President shall determine
when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the power
of eminent domain in behalf of the national government, and
direct the solicitor general, whenever he deems the action
advisable, to institute expropriation proceedings in the proper
court.
Power to direct escheat or reversion proceedings — The
President shall direct the solicitor general to institute escheat
or reversion proceedings over all lands transferred or
assigned to persons disqualified under the constitution to
acquire land.
Power to reserve lands of the public and private domain of the
government —
(1) The president shall have the power to reserve for
settlement or public use, and for specific public purposes, any
of the lands of the public domain, the use of which is not
otherwise directed by law. The reserved land shall thereafter
remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated until
otherwise provided by law or proclamation.
(2) He shall also have the power to reserve from sale or other
disposition and for specific public uses or purposes, any land
belonging to the private domain of the government, or any of
the friar lands, the use of which is not otherwise directed by
law, and thereafter such land shall be used for the purposes
specified by such proclamation until otherwise provided by
law.
Power over ill-gotten wealth — The President shall direct the
solicitor general to institute proceedings to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from
them or from their nominees or transferees.
Within the period fixed in, or any extension thereof authorized
by, the constitution, the President shall have the authority to
recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and
supporters of the previous regime, and protect the interest of
the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of
assets or accounts.
5. POWER OF APPOINTMENT
The President may appoint officials of the Philippine
government as provided by the constitution and laws of the
Philippines. Some of these appointments, however, may need
the approval of the Committee on Appointments (a committee
composed of members from the House of Representatives
and the Senate of the Philippines).
6. POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION
OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
The President of the Philippines, as chief executive, has the
mandate to supervise local governments in the Philippines,
despite their autonomous status as provided by Republic Act
No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991.
Traditionally, this is done by the Department of the Interior and
Local Government, headed by a cabinet secretary—an alter
ego of the President.
7. VETO POWER
SECTION 26, ART VI - The President shall communicate his
veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty
days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall
become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the
veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not
object.
8. EMERGENCY POWERS
SECTION 23 (2) In times of war or other national emergency,
the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.
9. OTHER POWERS
Aside from the aforementioned powers of the President of the
Philippines, he can also exercise powers enumerated in the
constitution, and powers given to him by law.
LINE OF SUCCESSION
The constitution provides for a line of succession in the event
that the elected President of the Philippines is not able to
discharge the duties of his office due to death, disability, or
resignation. The following is the line of succession:
1. Vice President — in cases of the death, disability, or
resignation of the President
2. Senate President — in cases of the death, disability,
or resignation of the President and Vice President
3. Speaker of the House of Representatives — in cases
of the death, disability, or resignation of the
President, Vice President, and Senate President
Contrary to popular belief, the constitution doesn’t include the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in the President’s line of
succession.
The Congress of the Philippines is mandated enact a law
calling for a special election three days after the vacancy in
the Office of the President and Vice President. The special
election should occur 40 days after the enactment of the law,
but not later than 60 days after the enactment of the law.
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
The Vice President of the Philippines is elected by direct vote
by the people for a term of six years, and may run for
reelection once. The term of the Vice President of the
Philippines starts at noon of the 30th day of June after
a regular election is held.
QUALIFICATIONS
The qualifications for aspirants to the Office of the Vice
President is outlined in Article VII, Section 3. According to the
constitution, the qualifications for the President is the same for
the Vice President.
DUTIES OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 64
According to the constitution, the vice president may
concurrently assume a cabinet position should the President
of the Philippines offer the former one. The vice president will
become a secretary concurrent to the position of vice
president.
Aside from the cabinet post, the vice president is mandated to
assume the presidency in case of the death, disability, or
resignation of the incumbent President.
LINE OF SUCCESSION
Should there be a vacancy of the Office of the Vice President,
the President of the Philippines is required by the constitution
to nominate a replacement with the concurrence of Committee
on Appointments.
CABINET SECRETARIES
FUNCTIONS OF A CABINET SECRETARY
Cabinet secretaries act as the alter ego of the President
executing, with his authority, the power of the Office of the
President in their respective departments.
The number of cabinet secretaries varies from time to time
depending on the need of an administration. According to the
Administrative Code of 1987, the President of the Philippines
may create or dissolve any department as he sees fit.
APPOINTMENT OF CABINET SECRETARIES
According to the Article 7, Section 16, the President may
appoint anyone to executive departments with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments. Names of individuals
nominated to cabinet posts are submitted to the Commission
on Appointments for their consideration.
An individual may not assume his post in a given department
unless confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
However, the constitution provides for individuals becoming
cabinet secretaries in an acting capacity before they are
confirmed. According to Article VII, Section 16 of the
constitution, the president may appoint anyone to cabinet
posts even if Congress is in recess. These appointments are
valid until the Commission on Appointments disapproves
them, or at the end of the next session of Congress.
Not all cabinet members, however, are subject to confirmation
of the Commission on Appointments. According to the
Commission of Appointments website, the following need
confirmation in order to assume their posts:
1. Executive Secretary
2. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
3. Secretary of Agriculture
4. Secretary of Budget and Management
5. Secretary of Education
6. Secretary of Energy
7. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources
8. Secretary of Finance
9. Secretary of Foreign Affairs
10. Secretary of Health
11. Secretary of Justice
12. Secretary of Labor and Employment
13. Secretary of National Defense
14. Secretary of Public Works and Highways
15. Secretary of Science and Technology
16. Secretary of Social Welfare and
Development
17. Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government
18. Secretary of Trade and Industry
19. Secretary of Transportation and
Communications
20. Secretary of Tourism
21. Commission on Higher Education
22. Director General of the National Economic
and Development Authority
POWERS OF A CABINET SECRETARY
As stated above, a cabinet secretary is the alter ego of the
President in their respective departments. Thus, they posses
the power to issue directives relative to their departments,
such as department orders. These orders only apply to offices
under a specific department under the cabinet secretary’s
jurisdiction. Cabinet secretaries also act as advisors to the
President of the Philippines for their areas.
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
The executive branch extends beyond the national
government. According to Article X, Section 4 of the
constitution, the President of the Philippines is mandated to
supervise local governments all over the country. However,
because of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, local governments enjoy
relative autonomy from the national government.
Among the social services and facilities that local government
should provide, as stipulated in Section 17 of the Local
Government Code, are the following:
 facilities and research services for agriculture and
fishery activities, which include seedling nurseries,
demonstration farms, and irrigation systems;
 health services, which include access to primary
health care, maternal and child care, and medicines,
medical supplies and equipment;
 social welfare services, which include programs and
projects for women, children, elderly, and persons
with disabilities, as well as vagrants, beggars, street
children, juvenile delinquents, and victims of drug
abuse;
 information services, which include job placement
information systems and a public library;
 a solid waste disposal system or environmental
management system;
 municipal/city/provincial buildings, cultural centers,
public parks, playgrounds, and sports facilities and
equipment;
 infrastructure facilities such as roads, bridges, school
buildings, health clinics, fish ports, water supply
systems, seawalls, dikes, drainage and sewerage,
and traffic signals and road signs;
 public markets, slaughterhouses, and other local
enterprises;
 public cemetery;
 tourism facilities and other tourist attractions; and
 sites for police and fire stations and substations and
municipal jail.
Local government units also have the power to create its own
sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges that
shall accrue exclusively to them.
Each local government has its own chief executive. The
following is the list of local chief executives:
1. barangay — punong barangay (barangay chairman)
2. municipality — municipal mayor
3. city — city mayor
4. province — provincial governor
The local chief executives have the power to approve or veto
local ordinances recommended by the local legislators.
Punong barangay
The punong barangay, as the chief executive of the barangay
government, shall exercise and perform the following powers
and functions:
1. enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable
within the barangay;
2. negotiate, enter into, and sign contracts for and in
behalf of the barangay, upon authorization of the
Sangguniang Barangay;
3. maintain public order in the barangay;
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 65
4. call and preside over the sessions of the
Sangguniang Barangay and the Barangay
Assembly;
5. appoint or replace the barangay treasurer, the
barangay secretary, and other appointive barangay
officials;
6. organize and lead an emergency group for the
maintenance of peace and order or on occasions of
emergency or calamity within the barangay;
7. prepare the annual executive and supplemental
budgets of the barangay, in coordination with the
Barangay Development Council;
8. approve vouchers relating to the disbursement of
barangay funds;
9. enforce laws and regulations relating to pollution
control and protection of the environment;
10. administer the operation of the Katarungang
Pambarangay;
11. exercise general supervision over the activities of the
Sangguniang Kabataan;
12. ensure the delivery of basic social services and
access to facilities;
13. conduct an annual palarong barangay which shall
feature traditional sports and disciplines included in
national and international games; and
14. promote the general welfare of the barangay.
Municipal and city mayors
The municipal mayor and city mayor, as the chief executive of
the municipal government and city government, respectively,
shall exercise and perform the following powers and functions:
1. Exercise general supervision and control over all
programs, projects, services, and activities of the
municipal or city government:
1. determine the guidelines of municipal
policies and be responsible to the
Sangguniang Bayan or Panlungsod for the
program of government;
2. direct the formulation of the municipal or
city development plan;
3. at the opening of the regular session of the
Sangguniang Bayan or Panlungsod,
present the program of government and
propose policies and projects for
consideration;
4. initiate and propose legislative measures to
the Sangguniang Bayan or Panlungsod;
5. represent the municipality or city in all its
business transactions and sign on its behalf
all bonds, contracts, and obligations, upon
authorization by the Sangguniang Bayan;
6. carry out emergency measures as may be
necessary during and in the aftermath of
man-made and natural disasters;
7. examine the books, records and other
documents of all offices, officials, agents or
employees of the municipality or city;
8. visit component barangays of the
municipality or city at least once every six
months;
9. solemnize marriages, any provision of law
to the contrary notwithstanding;
10. conduct a palarong bayan or panlungsod;
and
11. submit to the provincial governor an annual
report on the administration of the
municipality or city, and supplemental
reports when unexpected events and
situations such as calamities arise.
2. Enforce all laws and ordinances, and implement all
approved policies, programs, projects, services and
activities of the municipality or city:
1. issue executive orders as are necessary for
the proper enforcement and execution of
laws and ordinances;
2. call conventions, seminars or meetings of
any elective and appointive officials of the
municipality or city;
3. formulate and implement the peace and
order plan of the municipality or city; and
4. call upon the appropriate law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless
violence, rebellion or sedition or to
apprehend violators of the law.
3. Initiate and maximize the generation of resources
and revenues, to be used for the implementation of
development plans, program objectives and
priorities:
1. prepare and submit to the Sangguniang
Bayan or Panlungsod for approval the
annual executive and supplemental
budgets of the municipality or city;
2. ensure that all taxes and other revenues of
the municipality or city are collected;
3. issue, suspend or revoke licenses and
permits;
4. adopt measures to safeguard and conserve
land, mineral, marine, forest, and other
resources of the municipality or city;
5. provide efficient and effective property and
supply management in the municipality or
city; and protect the funds, credits, rights
and other properties of the municipality or
city; and
6. institute or cause to be instituted
administrative or judicial proceedings for
violation of ordinances in the collection of
taxes, fees or charges, and for the recovery
of funds and property.
4. Ensure the delivery of basic services and the
provision of adequate facilities as provided for under
Section 17 of the Local Government Code.
Provincial governors
The provincial governor, as the chief executive of the
provincial government, shall exercise and perform the
following powers and duties:
1. Exercise general supervision and control over all
programs, projects, services, and activities of the
provincial government:
1. determine the guidelines of municipal
policies and be responsible to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for the program
of government;
2. direct the formulation of the provincial
development plan;
3. at the opening of the regular session of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, present the
program of government and propose
policies and projects for consideration;
4. initiate and propose legislative measures to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan;
5. represent the province in all its business
transactions and sign on its behalf all
bonds, contracts, and obligations, upon
authorization by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan;
6. carry out emergency measures as may be
necessary during and in the aftermath of
man-made and natural disasters;
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 66

7. examine the books, records and other

documents of all offices, officials, agents or
employees of the province;
8. furnish copies of executive orders issued by
him to the Office of the President within 72
hours after their issuance;
9. visit component cities and municipalities at
least once every six months;
10. represent the province in inter-provincial or
regional sports councils or committees, and
coordinate the efforts of component cities or
municipalities in the regional or national
palaro or sports development activities;
11. conduct an annual palarong panlalawigan;
and
12. submit to the Office of the President an
annual report on the administration and
development of the province, and
supplemental reports when unexpected
events and situations such as calamities
arise.
2. Enforce all laws and ordinances, and implement all
approved policies, programs, projects, services and
activities of the province:
1. issue executive orders as are necessary for
the proper enforcement and execution of
laws and ordinances;
2. call conventions, seminars or meetings of
any elective and appointive officials of the
province;
3. in coordination with the component cities
and municipalities, and the National Police
Commission, formulate and implement the
peace and order plan of the province; and
4. call upon the appropriate law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless
violence, rebellion or sedition or to
apprehend violators of the law.
3. Initiate and maximize the generation of resources
and revenues, to be used for the implementation of
development plans, program objectives and
priorities:
1. prepare and submit to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for approval the annual
executive and supplemental budgets of the
province;
2. ensure that all taxes and other revenues of
the province are collected;
3. issue, suspend or revoke licenses and
permits;
4. adopt measures to safeguard and conserve
land, mineral, marine, forest, and other
resources of the province;
5. provide efficient and effective property and
supply management in the province; and
protect the funds, credits, rights and other
properties of the province; and
6. institute or cause to be instituted
administrative or judicial proceedings for
violation of ordinances in the collection of
taxes, fees or charges, and for the recovery
of funds and property.
4. Ensure the delivery of basic services and the
provision of adequate facilities as provided for under
Section 17 of the Local Government Code.

TERM LIMITS
The offices of the abovementioned local chief executives are
limited to three consecutive three-year terms. Once they end
their third term, they may not run for reelection, but may run
again once they let one term pass.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 67
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK
K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35,
UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the
Department of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY
FISCAL OF MANILA and PRESIDENT CORAZON C.
AQUINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of
Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, THE HON.
LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN
POLICE DISTRICT, and THE MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS
SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA, respondents.
G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG,
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ,
UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III,
THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS F. GUERRERO, and
JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch
35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners
in G.R. No. 82585.
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P.
Fernandez for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 82827 and 83979.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were
raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due
process when informations for libel were filed against
them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie
case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice
and, subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or not
the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when
respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest
without personally examining the complainant and the
witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3)
whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the
Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against
the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and
academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the
resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City
Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A
second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran
was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On
appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary,
affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2,
1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these
developments, petitioners' contention that they have been
denied the administrative remedies available under the law
has lost factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran,
the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary
investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting
his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare
Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the
complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does
not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file
his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is
deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent
be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so
minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an
interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of
warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination nder
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word
"determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the
1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible
officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently
convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires
the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate
interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself
of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof
he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would
be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating
on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted
Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance of
warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is
reiterated and clarified in this resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated
from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the
issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot
be sustained.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 68
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the
reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit
impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that
if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's
filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently
have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her
under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran,
would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from
suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be
exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege
of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance
or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive
of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all
of the office holder's time, also demands undivided
attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only
by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in
which the President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case
from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the
President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The
choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it
is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that
cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could
not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character
or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of
facts and that such a defense is best left to the trial court to
appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties.
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to
proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom,
the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.
The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through
their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to
amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and
prohibition prayed for cannot issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the
petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to
maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the
Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the
Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-
Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it involves the
three principal issues mentioned in its opening statement.
However, as to the more important issue on whether or not
the prosecution of the libel case would produce a "chilling
effect" on press freedom, I beg to reserve my vote. I believe
this is the more important issue in these petitions and it should
be resolved now rather that later.
Consistent with our decision in Salonga v. Cruz Pano (134
SCRA 438 [1985]), the Court should not hesitate to quash a
criminal prosecution in the interest of more enlightened and
substantial justice where it is not alone the criminal liability of
an accused in a seemingly minor libel case which is involved
but broader considerations of governmental power versus a
preferred freedom.
We have in these four petitions the unusual situation where
the highest official of the Republic and one who enjoys
unprecedented public support asks for the prosecution of a
newspaper columnist, the publisher and chairman of the
editorial board, the managing editor and the business
manager in a not too indubitable a case for alleged libel.
I am fully in accord with an all out prosecution if the effect will
be limited to punishing a newspaperman who, instead of
observing accuracy and fairness, engages in unwarranted
personal attacks, irresponsible twisting of facts, of malicious
distortions of half-truths which tend to cause dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of the complainant. However, this case
is not a simple prosecution for libel. We have as complainant
a powerful and popular President who heads the investigation
and prosecution service and appoints members of appellate
courts but who feels so terribly maligned that she has taken
the unorthodox step of going to court inspite of the invocations
of freedom of the press which would inevitably follow.
I believe that this Court should have acted on this issue now
instead of leaving the matter to fiscals and defense lawyers to
argue before a trial judge.
There is always bound to be harassment inherent in any
criminal prosecution. Where the harassment goes beyond the
usual difficulties encountered by any accused and results in
an unwillingness of media to freely criticize government or to
question government handling of sensitive issues and public
affairs, this Court and not a lower tribunal should draw the
demarcation line.
As early as March 8, 1918, the decision in United States v.
Bustos (37 Phil. 731) stated that "(c)omplete liberty to
comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case
of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the
abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under
a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged
with the balm of a clear conscience." The Court pointed out
that while defamation is not authorized, criticism is to be
expected and should be borne for the common good.
In People v. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887 [1922]), the Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
... No longer is there a Minister of the Crown own or a person
in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak
of him only with bated breath. "In the eye of our Constitution
and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman,
and has equal rights with every other man." (at p. 900)
In fact, the Court observed that high official position, instead
of affording immunity from slanderous and libelous charges,
would actually invite attacks by those who desire to create
sensation. It would seem that what would ordinarily be slander
if directed at the typical person should be examined from
various perspectives if directed at a high government official.
Again, the Supreme Court should draw this fine line instead of
leaving it to lower tribunals.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 69
This Court has stressed as authoritative doctrine in Elizalde v.
Gutierrez (76 SCRA 448 [1977]) that a prosecution for libel
lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary within
the shelter of the free press guaranty. In other words, a
prosecution for libel should not be allowed to continue, where
after discounting the possibility that the words may not be
really that libelous, there is likely to be a chilling effect, a
patently inhibiting factor on the willingness of newspapermen,
especially editors and publishers to courageously perform
their critical role in society. If, instead of merely reading more
carefully what a columnist writes in his daily column, the
editors tell their people to lay off certain issues or certain
officials, the effect on a free press would be highly injurious.
Because many questions regarding press freedom are left
unanswered by our resolution, I must call attention to our
decisions which caution that "no inroads on press freedom
should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on
what otherwise should be characterized as libel." (Lopez v.
Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 117 [1970]; See also the citations
in Elizalde v. Gutierrez, supra).
The United States Supreme Court is even more emphatic, to
wit:
In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither
precedent nor policy to give any more weight to the epithet
"libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of state law. N. A.
A. C. P. v. Button, 371 US 415, 429, 9L ed 2d 405, 415, 83 S
Ct 328. Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful
acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal
business, and the other various other formulae for the
repression of expression that have been challenged in this
Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from
constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards
that satisfy the First Amendment.
xxx xxx xxx
Those who won our independence believed ... that public
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government. They
recognized the risk to which all human institutions are subject.
But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through
fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to
discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces
stable government; that the path of safety lies in the
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and
proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsel
is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied
through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by
law—the argument of force in its worst form. ...
Thus we consider this case against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.
... (at pp. 700-701)
Shunting aside the individual liability of Mr. Luis Beltran, is
there a prima facie showing that Messrs. Maximo Soliven,
Antonio V. Roces, Frederick K. Agcaoili, and Godofredo L.
Manzanas knowingly participated in a wilful purveying of
falsehood? Considering the free speech aspects of these
petitions, should not a differentiated approach to their
particular liabilities be taken instead of lumping up everybody
with the offending columnist? I realize that the law includes
publishers and editors but perhaps the "chilling effect" issue
applies with singular effectivity to publishers and editors vis-a-
vis newspaper columnists. There is no question that,
ordinarily, libel is not protected by the free speech clause but
we have to understand that some provocative words, which if
taken literally may appear to shame or disparage a public
figure, may really be intended to provoke debate on public
issues when uttered or written by a media personality. Will not
a criminal prosecution in the type of case now before us
dampen the vigor and limit the variety of public debate? There
are many other questions arising from this unusual case which
have not been considered.
I, of course, concur with the Court's opinion because it has
decided to limit the issues to narrowly drawn ones. I see no
reason to disagree with the way the Court has resolved them.
The first issue on prematurity is moot. The second issue
discusses a procedure now embodied in the recently
amended Rules of Court on how a Judge should proceed
before he issues a warrant of arrest. Anent the third issue,
considerations of public policy dictate that an incumbent
President should not be sued. At the same time, the President
cannot stand by helplessly bereft of legal remedies if
somebody vilifies or maligns him or her.
The Court has decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a
later day. To this, I take exception. I know that most of our
fiscals and judges are courageous individuals who would not
allow any considerations of possible consequences to their
careers to stand in the way of public duty. But why should we
subject them to this problem? And why should we allow the
possibility of the trial court treating and deciding the case as
one for ordinary libel without bothering to fully explore the
more important areas of concern, the extremely difficult issues
involving government power and freedom of expression.
However, since we have decided to defer the "chilling effect"
issue for a later day, I limit myself to reiterating the dissenting
words of Mr. Justice Jackson in the American case of
Beaurnhais v. Illinois (343 U. S. 250) when he said:
If one can claim to announce the judgment of legal history on
any subject, it is that criminal libel laws are consistent with the
concept of ordered liberty only when applied with safeguards
evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of expression.
In the trial of the libel case against the petitioners, the
safeguards in the name of freedom of expression should be
faithfully applied.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it involves the
three principal issues mentioned in its opening statement.
However, as to the more important issue on whether or not
the prosecution of the libel case would produce a "chilling
effect" on press freedom, I beg to reserve my vote. I believe
this is the more important issue in these petitions and it should
be resolved now rather that later.
Consistent with our decision in Salonga v. Cruz Pano (134
SCRA 438 [1985]), the Court should not hesitate to quash a
criminal prosecution in the interest of more enlightened and
substantial justice where it is not alone the criminal liability of
an accused in a seemingly minor libel case which is involved
but broader considerations of governmental power versus a
preferred freedom.
We have in these four petitions the unusual situation where
the highest official of the Republic and one who enjoys
unprecedented public support asks for the prosecution of a
newspaper columnist, the publisher and chairman of the
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 70
editorial board, the managing editor and the business
manager in a not too indubitable a case for alleged libel.
I am fully in accord with an all out prosecution if the effect will
be limited to punishing a newspaperman who, instead of
observing accuracy and fairness, engages in unwarranted
personal attacks, irresponsible twisting of facts, of malicious
distortions of half-truths which tend to cause dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of the complainant. However, this case
is not a simple prosecution for libel. We have as complainant
a powerful and popular President who heads the investigation
and prosecution service and appoints members of appellate
courts but who feels so terribly maligned that she has taken
the unorthodox step of going to court inspite of the invocations
of freedom of the press which would inevitably follow.
I believe that this Court should have acted on this issue now
instead of leaving the matter to fiscals and defense lawyers to
argue before a trial judge.
There is always bound to be harassment inherent in any
criminal prosecution. Where the harassment goes beyond the
usual difficulties encountered by any accused and results in
an unwillingness of media to freely criticize government or to
question government handling of sensitive issues and public
affairs, this Court and not a lower tribunal should draw the
demarcation line.
As early as March 8, 1918, the decision in United States v.
Bustos (37 Phil. 731) stated that "(c)omplete liberty to
comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case
of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the
abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under
a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged
with the balm of a clear conscience." The Court pointed out
that while defamation is not authorized, criticism is to be
expected and should be borne for the common good.
In People v. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887 [1922]), the Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
... No longer is there a Minister of the Crown own or a person
in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak
of him only with bated breath. "In the eye of our Constitution
and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman,
and has equal rights with every other man." (at p. 900)
In fact, the Court observed that high official position, instead
of affording immunity from slanderous and libelous charges,
would actually invite attacks by those who desire to create
sensation. It would seem that what would ordinarily be slander
if directed at the typical person should be examined from
various perspectives if directed at a high government official.
Again, the Supreme Court should draw this fine line instead of
leaving it to lower tribunals.
This Court has stressed as authoritative doctrine in Elizalde v.
Gutierrez (76 SCRA 448 [1977]) that a prosecution for libel
lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary within
the shelter of the free press guaranty. In other words, a
prosecution for libel should not be allowed to continue, where
after discounting the possibility that the words may not be
really that libelous, there is likely to be a chilling effect, a
patently inhibiting factor on the willingness of newspapermen,
especially editors and publishers to courageously perform
their critical role in society. If, instead of merely reading more
carefully what a columnist writes in his daily column, the
editors tell their people to lay off certain issues or certain
officials, the effect on a free press would be highly injurious.
Because many questions regarding press freedom are left
unanswered by our resolution, I must call attention to our
decisions which caution that "no inroads on press freedom
should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on
what otherwise should be characterized as libel." (Lopez v.
Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 117 [1970]; See also the citations
in Elizalde v. Gutierrez, supra).<äre||anº•1àw>
The United States Supreme Court is even more emphatic, to
wit:
In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither
precedent nor policy to give any more weight to the epithet
"libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of state law. N. A.
A. C. P. v. Button, 371 US 415, 429, 9L ed 2d 405, 415, 83 S
Ct 328. Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful
acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal
business, and the other various other formulae for the
repression of expression that have been challenged in this
Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from
constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards
that satisfy the First Amendment.
xxx xxx xxx
Those who won our independence believed ... that public
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government. They
recognized the risk to which all human institutions are subject.
But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through
fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to
discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces
stable government; that the path of safety lies in the
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and
proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsel
is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied
through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by
law—the argument of force in its worst form. ...
Thus we consider this case against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.
... (at pp. 700-701)
Shunting aside the individual liability of Mr. Luis Beltran, is
there a prima facie showing that Messrs. Maximo Soliven,
Antonio V. Roces, Frederick K. Agcaoili, and Godofredo L.
Manzanas knowingly participated in a wilful purveying of
falsehood? Considering the free speech aspects of these
petitions, should not a differentiated approach to their
particular liabilities be taken instead of lumping up everybody
with the offending columnist? I realize that the law includes
publishers and editors but perhaps the "chilling effect" issue
applies with singular effectivity to publishers and editors vis-a-
vis newspaper columnists. There is no question that,
ordinarily, libel is not protected by the free speech clause but
we have to understand that some provocative words, which if
taken literally may appear to shame or disparage a public
figure, may really be intended to provoke debate on public
issues when uttered or written by a media personality. Will not
a criminal prosecution in the type of case now before us
dampen the vigor and limit the variety of public debate? There
are many other questions arising from this unusual case which
have not been considered.
I, of course, concur with the Court's opinion because it has
decided to limit the issues to narrowly drawn ones. I see no
reason to disagree with the way the Court has resolved them.
The first issue on prematurity is moot. The second issue
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 71

discusses a procedure now embodied in the recently

amended Rules of Court on how a Judge should proceed
before he issues a warrant of arrest. Anent the third issue,
considerations of public policy dictate that an incumbent
President should not be sued. At the same time, the President
cannot stand by helplessly bereft of legal remedies if
somebody vilifies or maligns him or her.

The Court has decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a
later day. To this, I take exception. I know that most of our
fiscals and judges are courageous individuals who would not
allow any considerations of possible consequences to their
careers to stand in the way of public duty. But why should we
subject them to this problem? And why should we allow the
possibility of the trial court treating and deciding the case as
one for ordinary libel without bothering to fully explore the
more important areas of concern, the extremely difficult issues
involving government power and freedom of expression.

However, since we have decided to defer the "chilling effect"

issue for a later day, I limit myself to reiterating the dissenting
words of Mr. Justice Jackson in the American case of
Beaurnhais v. Illinois (343 U. S. 250) when he said:

If one can claim to announce the judgment of legal history on

any subject, it is that criminal libel laws are consistent with the
concept of ordered liberty only when applied with safeguards
evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of expression.

In the trial of the libel case against the petitioners, the

safeguards in the name of freedom of expression should be
faithfully applied.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 72
THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
JUDICIAL POWER- Judicial power rests with the Supreme
Court and the lower courts, as established by law (Art. VIII,
sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution). Its duty is to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable (Art. VIII Sec. 1 (2).
THE SUPREME COURT
COMPOSITION
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or, in its
discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members. (Art.
VIII, §4)
APPOINTMENTS AND QUALIFICATIONS
Its members shall be appointed by the President from a list of
at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy, without need of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. (Art.VIII, §9)
Members of the Supreme Court are required to have proven
competence, integrity, probity and independence; they must
be natural-born citizens of the Philippines, at least forty years
old, with at least fifteen years of experience as a judge of a
lower court or law practice in the country. (Art. VIII, §7)
Justices shall hold office during good behavior until they reach
the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of office. (Art. VIII, §11)
THE MEMBERS OF THE COURT
The Chief Justice Hon. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
The Senior Associate Justice Hon. ANTONIO T. CARPIO
The Associate Justices Hon. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Hon. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Hon. ARTURO D. BRION
Hon. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Hon. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Hon. MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Hon. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Hon. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Hon. BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Hon. ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Hon. MARVIC M. V. F. LEONEN
Hon. FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Hon. ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
Administrative Officers
Clerk of Court En Banc Atty. Felipa B. Anama
Deputy Clerk of Court En Banc Atty. Anna-Li R. Papa-Gombio
First Division Clerk of Court Atty. Edgar O. Aricheta
Second Division Clerk of Court Atty. Ma. Lourdes C. Perfecto
Third Division Clerk of Court Atty. Wilfredo V. Lapitan
Office of Administrative Services
Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Chief
Fiscal Management and Budget Office
Atty. Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores, Chief
Chief Attorney Atty. Maria Regina A. F. M. Ignacio, Acting
Chief
Office of the Reporter Atty. Edna B. Camba, Chief
Management Information Systems
Office
Atty. Carlos N. Garay, Acting Chief
Bar Confidant Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa, Chief
Judicial Records Office Atty. Basilia T. Ringol, Chief
Library Services Mrs. Milagros S. Ong, Chief
Public Information Office Atty. Theodore O. Te, Chief
Judicial Power and Jurisdiction
Under Article VIII, §1, the judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be provided
by law. This power includes the duty to settle actual
controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine if any branch or instrumentality
of government has acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has both original and appellate
jurisdiction. It exercises original jurisdiction (cases are directly
filed with the SC in the first instance without passing through
any of the lower courts) over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus. (Art. VIII, §5(1)). It also has original
jurisdiction over writs of amparo, habeas data and the
environmental writ of kalikasan. It exercises appellate
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm final
judgments, and orders of the lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,
assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in
issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved. (Art. VIII, §5(1), (2))
The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all
courts and court personnel. (Article VIII, §6) It exercises this
power through the Office of the Court Administrator.
Rule-making Powers
The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Any such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Art. VIII, §54(5))
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 73
NO NON-JUDCIAL WORK FOR JUDGES
G.R. No. L-37878 November 25, 1932
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., ET AL.,
respondents.
Ross, Lawrence & Selph for petitioner.
Rivera & Francisco for respondent Pasay Transportation
Co.
P. A. Remigio for respondent E. B. Gutierrez. A. M. Zarate
for respondent Raymundo Transportation Co.
Vicente Ampil for respondent J. Ampil.
MALCOLM, J.:
The preliminary and basic question presented by the petition
of the Manila Electric Company, requesting the members of
the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the
terms upon which certain transportation companies shall
be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric
Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila
Electric Company by such transportation companies,
relates to the validity of section 11 of Act No. 1446 and to
the legal right of the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, to act on the petition. Act
No. 1446 above referred to is entitled. "An Act granting a
franchise to Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain, and
operate an electric railway, and to construct, maintain, and
operate an electric light, heat, and power system from a point
in the City of Manila in an easterly direction to the town of
Pasig, in the Province of Rizal." Section 11 of the Act provides:
"Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any
other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence,
over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the
terms on which said other person or corporation shall use
such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the
grantee herein by such other person or corporation for said
use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of
whom shall be final."
When the petition of the Manila Electric Company was filed in
this court, it was ordered that the petitioner be required to
serve copies on the Attorney-General and the transportation
companies affected by the petition. Thereafter, the Attorney-
General disclaimed any interest in the proceedings, and
opposition was entered to the petition by a number of public
utility operators. On the submission of memoranda after an
oral hearing, the petition was made ready for resolution.
Examining the statutory provision which is here invoked, it is
first noted that power is attempted to be granted to the
members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of
arbitrators and to the Supreme Court as an entity. It is next
seen that the decision of a majority of the members of the
Supreme Court is made final. And it is finally observed that the
franchise granted the Manila Electric Company by the
Government of the Philippine Islands, although only a contract
between the parties to it, is now made to effect the rights of
persons not signatories to the covenant.
The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of the
parties' own choice. A submission to arbitration is a contract.
The parties to an arbitration agreement may not oust the
courts of jurisdiction of the matters submitted to arbitration.
These are familiar rules which find support in articles 1820 and
1821 of the Civil Code. Citation of authority is hardly
necessary, except that it should be recalled that in the
Philippines, and in the United States for that matter, it has
been held that a clause in a contract, providing that all matters
in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitrators
and to them alone, is contrary to public policy and cannot oust
the courts of jurisdiction (Wahl and Wahl vs. Donaldson, Sims
& Co. [1903], 2 Phil., 301; Puentebella vs. Negros Coal Co.
[1927], 50 Phil., 69; Vega vs. San Carlos Milling Co. [1924],
51 Phil., 908; District of Columbia vs. Bailey [1897], 171 U. S.,
161.)
We would not be understood as extending the principles
governing arbitration and award too far. Unless the arbitration
agreement is such as absolutely to close the doors of the
courts against the parties, the courts should look with favor
upon such amicable arrangements. We can also perceive a
distinction between a private contract for submission to
arbitration and agreements to arbitrate falling within the terms
of a statute enacted for such purpose and affecting others
than the parties to a particular franchise. Here, however,
whatever else may be said in extenuation, it remains true that
the decision of the board of arbitrators is made final, which if
literally enforced would leave a public utility, not a party to the
contract authorized by Act No. 1446, without recourse to the
courts for a judicial determination of the question in dispute.
Counsel for the petitioner rely principally on the case of
Tallassee Falls Mfg. Co. vs. Commissioner's Court [1908],
158 Ala., 263. It was there held that an Act of a state
legislature authorizing the commissioners' court of a certain
county to regulate and fix the rate of toll to be charged by the
owners of a bridge is not unconstitutional as delegating
legislative power to the courts. But that is not the question
before us. Here the question is not one of whether or not there
has been a delegation of legislative authority to a court. More
precisely, the issue concerns the legal right of the members of
the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators the
decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act in that
capacity.
We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise
judicial functions, or the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as board of arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi
judicial functions. The first case would appear not to fall
within the jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court. Even
conceding that it does, it would presuppose the right to bring
the matter in dispute before the courts, for any other
construction would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction and
render the award a nullity. But if this be the proper
construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision
by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually
coming before the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court
would review the decision of its members acting as arbitrators.
Or in the second case, if the functions performed by the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, be considered as administrative or quasi judicial in
nature, that would result in the performance of duties which
the members of the Supreme Court could not lawfully take it
upon themselves to perform. The present petition also
furnishes an apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find the
Supreme Court as a court asked to determine if the members
of the court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is
not a court at all.lawphil.net
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one
of the three divisions of power in our government. It is judicial
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 74

power and judicial power only which is exercised by the

Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian
of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any
other department of the government, so should it as strictly
confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or
by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The
Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be
required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to
assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the
administering of judicial functions.

The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the

Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as
heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall
hereafter be prescribed by law (sec. 26). When the Organic
Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme
Court, it could not only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by
the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly mean
the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators. There is an important
distinction between the Supreme Court as an entity and the
members of the Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not
a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and possesses none
of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be
exercised by the Supreme Court.lawph!l.net

In the last judicial paper from the pen of Chief Justice Taney,
it was said:

The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and

it cannot be required or authorized to exercise any other. . . .
Its jurisdiction and powers and duties being defined in the
organic law of the government, and being all strictly judicial,
Congress cannot require or authorize the court to exercise any
other jurisdiction or power, or perform any other duty. . . . The
award of execution is a part, and an essential part of every
judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power. It is no
judgment, in the legal sense of the term, without it. Without
such an award the judgment would be inoperative and
nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without a remedy. It
would be merely an opinion, which would remain a dead letter,
and without any operation upon the rights of the parties,
unless Congress should at some future time sanction it, and
pass a law authorizing the court to carry its opinion into effect.
Such is not the judicial power confided to this court, in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; yet it is the whole power
that the court is allowed to exercise under this act of
Congress. . . . And while it executes firmly all the judicial
powers entrusted to it, the court will carefully abstain from
exercising any power that is not strictly judicial in its character,
and which is not clearly confided to it by the Constitution. . . .
(Gordon vs. United States [1864], 2 Wall., 561; 117 U. S., 697
Appendix.)

Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the

Supreme Court holds that section 11 of Act No. 1446
contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a
democratic government constitutionally established, and that
it would be improper and illegal for the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision
of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of
the Manila Electric Company. As a result, the members of the
Supreme Court decline to proceed further in the matter.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 75
A.M. No. 198-J May 31, 1971
PAZ M. GARCIA, complainant,
vs.
HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
BARREDO, J.:
Administrative complaint filed by one Paz M. Garcia against
the Honorable Catalino Macaraig, Jr., formerly Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI, now
Undersecretary of Justice, in his former capacity as judge, for
alleged "dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge ...
gross incompetence, violation of Republic Act 296 or the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, (particularly) Sections 5,
55 and 58 thereof, committed (allegedly) as follows:
2. That from July 1, 1970 up to February 28, 1971 inclusive,
as such incumbent Judge, respondent herein, has not
submitted his monthly reports containing the number of
cases filed, disposed of, decided and/or resolved, the
number of cases pending decisions for one month, two
months to over three months, together with the title,
number, number of hours of court session held a day,
etc., as evidenced by the certificate issued by Hon. Eulalio D.
Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice, copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex "A", Item No. 1, in violation
of Circular No. 10 of the Dept. of Justice dated February 6,
1952, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B";
3. That he has not submitted his certificate of service (New
Judicial Form No. 86, Revised 1966) from July to December,
1970 and from January to February, 1971 inclusive as
evidenced by the certificate issued by Judge Pichay, Judicial
Superintendent, Dept. of Justice Annex "A", Item No. 2
thereof;
4. That as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, Court of First
Instance of Laguna and San Pablo and knowing fully well that
he has never performed his official duties or discharged the
duties appertaining to his office, he has collected and was paid
his salaries from July to December, 1970 and from January to
February 1971 as evidenced by the certificate issued by the
cashier Mrs. Santos of the Department of Justice hereto
attached as Annex "C" and the certificate of Mr. Pichay Annex
"A", last paragraph thereof, aggravated by his repeated failure
to submit the certificate of service in flagrant violation of action
5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which provides as
follows:
... District judges, judges of City Courts, and municipal Judges
shall certify on their application for leave, and upon salary
vouchers presented by them for payment, or upon the payrolls
upon which their salaries are paid, that all special
proceedings, applications, petitions, motions, and all civil and
criminal cases which have been under submission for decision
or determination for a period of ninety days or more have been
determined and decided on or before the date of making the
certificate and ... no salary shall be paid without such
certificate' (Emphasis supplied).
5. That his deliberate failure to submit the monthly reports
from July to December, 1970 and from January, 1971 to
February, 1971 stating therein the number of hours of session
that the Court holds daily, the accomplishments of the Court
constitutes a clear violation of Sections 55 and 58 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
6. That by his deliberate violation of his Oath of Office as a
District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San
Pablo, Branch VI he has manifested such moral bankruptcy
as to deny his fitness to perform or discharge official duties in
the administration of justice.
7. That on June 29, 1970, respondent Judge wrote to the
Honorable Secretary of Justice informing him that he was
entering upon the performance of his duties, which letter of his
reads in full:
'I have the honor to inform you that I am entering upon the
performance of the duties of the office of Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City (Branch VI)
today, June 29, 1970.'
That such actuation of deliberately telling a deliberate
falsehood aggravates his moral bankruptcy incompatible to
the requirements of the highest degree of honesty, integrity
and good moral character appertaining to holding the position
of Judge in the administration of justice.
Upon being so required, in due time, respondent filed an
answer alleging pertinently that:
THE FACTS
Respondent took his oath as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City with station at
Calamba on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112
newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from
scratch. After consultations with the officials of the province of
Laguna, the municipality of Calamba and the Department of
Justice, respondent decided to accept the offer of the
Calamba Municipal Government to supply the space for the
courtroom and offices of the court; to utilize the financial
assistance promised by the Laguna provincial government for
the purchase of the necessary supplies and materials; and to
rely on the national government for the equipment needed by
the court (Under Section 190 of the Revised Administrative
Code, all these items must be furnished by the provincial
government. The provincial officials of Laguna, however,
informed the respondent that the province was not in a
position to do so).
As to the space requirements of the court, the Municipal
Mayor of Calamba assured the respondent that the court
could be accommodated in the west wing of the Calamba
municipal building as soon as the office of the municipal
treasurer and his personnel are transferred to another
location. When the projected transfer of the municipal
treasurer's office was about to be effected, the treasurer and
several municipal councilors objected. The municipal mayor
then requested the respondent to look over some of the office
spaces for rent in Calamba, with the commitment that the
municipal government will shoulder the payment of the
rentals. Respondent's first choice was the second floor of the
Republic Bank branch in Calamba, but the negotiations failed
when the owner of the building refused to reduce the rent to
P300 a month. The next suitable space selected by
respondent was the second floor of the Laguna Development
Bank. After a month's negotiations, the municipality finally
signed a lease agreement with the owner on October 26,
1970. Another month passed before the municipal
government could release the amount necessary for the
improvements to convert the space that was rented, which
was a big hall without partitions, into a courtroom and offices
for the personnel of the court and for the assistant provincial
fiscal. Thereafter, upon respondent's representations, the
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 76
provincial government appropriated the amount of P5,000 for
the purchase of the supplies and materials needed by the
court. Early in December, 1970 respondent also placed his
order for the necessary equipment with the Property Officer of
the Department of Justice but, unfortunately, the appropriation
for the equipment of courts of first instance was released only
on December 23, 1970 and the procurement of the equipment
chargeable against this allotment is still under way (please see
enclosed certification of the Financial Officer of the
Department of Justice marked Annex "A").
"When respondent realized that it would be sometime before
he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an
extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the
Department of Justice, respondent had, due to pressure of
duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his
forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the
maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary of
Justice, however, prevailed upon respondent to forego his
leave and instead to assist him, without being extended a
formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy attending to
the needs of his court.
"Charges Have No Basis -- .
"Complainant has charged respondent with dishonesty,
violation of his oath of office, grave incompetence and
violation of Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act.
"It is respectfully submitted that -- .
"A. Respondent's inability to perform his judicial duties under
the circumstances mentioned above does not constitute
incompetence. Respondent was like every lawyer who gets
his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial
duties and rid himself of the stigma of being 'a judge without a
sala', but forces and circumstances beyond his control
prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.
"B. Respondent's collection of salaries as judge does not
constitute dishonesty because aside from the time, effort and
money he spent in organizing the CFI at Calamba, he worked
in the Department of Justice (please see enclosed certification
of Undersecretary of Justice Guillermo S. Santos marked
Annex 'B'). Indeed, even if respondent did no more than exert
efforts to organize his court, he could, as other judges have
done, have collected his salaries as judge without being guilty
of dishonesty.
"Incidentally, when respondent took his oath as CFI judge
which position then carried a salary of P19,000 per annum, he
automatically ceased to be Chief of the Technical Staff of the
Department of Justice and Member of the Board of Pardons
and Parole, positions from which he was receiving P16,200
and P8,000 per annum, respectively. Also, in anticipation of
the judicial duties which he was about to assume, respondent
took a leave of absence from his professorial lecturer's duties
in the U.P. College of Law where he was receiving
approximately P600 a month.
"C. Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No.
10 dated February 6, 1952 of the Department of Justice are
not applicable to a Judge not actually discharging his judicial
duties.
"The Department of Justice has never required judges who
have not actually started, to perform their judicial duties to
comply with the abovementioned statutory-provisions and
circular (please see enclosed certification of Judge Eulalio D.
Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, marked Annex 'C').
"Moreover, a reading of these sections and circular makes
evident the folly of requiring a judge who has not entered into
the Performance of his judicial duties to comply with them.
Taking Section 5, how could a judge who has not started to
discharge his judicial duties certify that 'all special
proceedings, applications, petitions, motions, and all civil and
criminal cases, which have been under submission for
decision or determination for a period of ninety days or more
have been determined and decided on or before the date of
making the certificate.' And bow could such a judge hold court
in his place of permanent station as required by Section 55;
observe the hours of daily sessions of the court as prescribed
by Section 58; and render the reports required by Circular No.
10 when his court is not yet in physical existence Clearly,
therefore, Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and
Circular No. 10 cannot apply to such a judge." .
In view of the nature of the allegations of complainant and
respondent in their respective complaint and answer and
considering, in the light thereof, that the material facts are
more or less undisputed, the Court feels that this case can be
disposed of without any further proceeding.
After mature study and deliberation, the Court is convinced
that the complaint must be dismissed. To begin with, We
cannot discern any tinge of dishonesty in the actuations for
the respondent complained of. As We see it, the situation is
not exactly as complainant has attempted to portray it.
Complainant's theory is that respondent collected or received
salaries as judge when in fact he has never acted as such,
since the date he took his oath up to the filing of the complaint.
In the sense that respondent has not yet performed any
judicial function, it may be admitted that respondent has not
really performed the duties of judge. What is lost sight of,
however, is that after taking his oath and formally assuming
this position as judge, respondent had a perfect right to earn
the salary of a judge even in the extreme supposition that he
did not perform any judicial function for he could, while
preparing himself for his new job or for any good reason, take
a leave, as in fact, he had planned to do, were it not for the
request of the Secretary of Justice for him to forego the idea
and, instead, help the Department in whatever way possible
which would not, it must be presumed, impair his position as
a judge. This is more so, when, as in this case, the
government officials or officers in duty bound to furnish him
the necessary place and facilities for his court and the
performance of his functions have failed to provide him
therewith without any fault on his part. That respondent took it
upon himself to personally work for early action on the part of
the corresponding officials in this direction and, in his spare
time, made himself available to the Department of Justice to
assist the Secretary, what with his vast experience, having
worked therein for sixteen years, is, far from being dishonesty,
to his credit. In the circumstances, it was certainly not
improper that he rendered some kind of service to the
government, since he was receiving salaries, while being
unable to perform his regular duties as judge without any fault
on, his part. As to whether or not in doing so he, placed in
jeopardy the independence of the judiciary and failed to act
according to the correct norm of conduct which a judge should
observe vis-a-vis service to the other departments of the
government will be discussed a non. At this juncture, the only
point We settle is that complainant's theory of dishonesty
cannot hold water.
Admittedly respondent has not prepared and submitted any of
the reports of accomplishments and status of cases in his sala
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 77

which are usually required of judges under existing laws as

well as the corresponding circulars of the Department of
Justice. The reason is simple. He has not yet started
performing any judicial functions. None of those laws and
circulars apply to him for all of them contemplate judges who
are actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions
and others. On the other hand, respondent Could not be
blamed for taking his oath as he did, for he had a valid
confirmed appointment in his favor. In other words, he simply
made himself available for the purpose for which he was
appointed. That he could not actually hold office in the court
to which he was appointed was not of his making. The other
officials in charge of providing him therewith seem to have
been caught unprepared and have not had enough time to
have it read. Conceivably, under the law, with the permission
of this Court, respondent could have been assigned to another
court pending all these preparations, but that is something
within the initiative control of the Secretary of Justice and nor
of the respondent.

Of course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that this

Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing to be
sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of Justice
to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection
with his work of exercising administrative authority over
the courts. The line between what a judge may do and
what he may not do in collaborating or working with other
offices or officers under the other great departments of
the government must always be kept clear and jealously
observed, least the principle of separation of powers on
which our government rests by mandate of the people
thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices
purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest
of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the
necessity of the independence of said three departments from
each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts
a check and balance between and among them, have long
been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of
any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or
exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary
under our present constitutional scheme of government
that no judge or even the lowest court in this Republic
should place himself in a position where his actuations
on matters submitted to him for action or resolution
would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst
still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any
authority other than the Court of Appeals or this Supreme
Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, this Court feels
very strongly that, it is best that this practice is discontinued.

WHEREFORE, the herein administrative complaint is hereby

dismissed. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the
Secretary of Justice.

Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and

Villamor, JJ., concur.

Castro and Teekankee, JJ., took no part.

Fernando, J., concurs fully and in addition submits a brief

separate opinion. Makasiar, J., concurs with the opinion Mr.
Justice Fernando.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 78
SALARY
G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987
DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO
A. SAVELLANO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE
FINANCIAL OFFICER, SUPREME COURT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding
over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations
in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin
respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and
the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making
any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their
emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a
decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the
provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the
Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said
Constitution."
It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with
the matter administratively in response to representations that
the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the
withholding of taxes from salaries of members of the Bench.
Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed the
Chief Justice's directive as follows:
RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. — The
Court REAFFIRMED the Chief Justice's previous and
standing directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget
Office of this Court to continue with the deduction of the
withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices of the
Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all other
members of the judiciary.
That should have resolved the question. However, with the
filing of this petition, the Court has deemed it best to settle the
legal issue raised through this judicial pronouncement. As will
be shown hereinafter, the clear intent of the Constitutional
Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of
exemption from payment of income tax to members of the
Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality among the three
branches of Government" in the words of Commissioner
Rigos. In the course of the deliberations, it was further
expressly made clear, specially with regard to Commissioner
Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted amendment to the amendment
of Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of members of the
Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax applied
to all taxpayers.
This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set
forth in the final text of the Constitution as approved and
ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent
may have been obscured by the failure to include in the
General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any
public officer or employee, including constitutional officers,
from payment of income tax, the Court since then has
authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding
tax from the salaries of the members of the Supreme Court,
as well as from the salaries of all other members of the
Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of record that it had then
discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs.
David, infra, that declared the salaries of members of the
Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and
considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries
during their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates
that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject
to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners
and that the payment of such income tax by Justices and
Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection
against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in
office.
A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is
called for. The 1935 Constitution provided:
... (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of
inferior courts) shall receive such compensation as may be
fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office ... 1 (Emphasis supplied).
Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices
of the Supreme court, and of judges of inferior courts shall be
fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during their
continuance in office. ... 2 (Emphasis ours).
And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in
the same 1973 Constitution specifically stipulated:
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer
or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be
exempt from payment of income tax. 3
The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely
on, reads:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be
fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased. 4(Emphasis supplied).
The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to
Section 6, Article XV of the 1973 Constitution, for which
reason, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to
revert to the original concept of "non-diminution "of salaries of
judicial officers.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
relevant to Section 10, Article VIII, negate such contention.
The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987
Constitution read:
Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court and of judges of the lower
courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be diminished nor subjected to income
tax. Until the National Assembly shall provide otherwise, the
Chief Justice shall receive an annual salary of
_____________ and each Associate Justice
______________ pesos. 5(Emphasis ours)
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 79
During the debates on the draft Article (Committee Report No.
18), two Commissioners presented their objections to the
provision on tax exemption, thus:
MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of exemption from tax of
the salary of justices, does this not violate the principle of the
uniformity of taxation and the principle of equal protection of
the law? After all, tax is levied not on the salary but on the
combined income, such that when the judge receives a salary
and it is comingled with the other income, we tax the income,
not the salary. Why do we have to give special privileges to
the salary of justices?
MR. CONCEPCION. It is the independence of the judiciary.
We prohibit the increase or decrease of their salary during
their term. This is an indirect way of decreasing their salary
and affecting the independence of the judges.
MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be in the nature of a clause
to respect tenure, but the special privilege on taxation might,
in effect, be a violation of the principle of uniformity in taxation
and the equal protection clause. 6
xxx xxx xxx
MR. OPLE. x x x
Of course, we share deeply the concern expressed by the
sponsor, Commissioner Roberto Concepcion, for whom we
have the highest respect, to surround the Supreme Court and
the judicial system as a whole with the whole armor of defense
against the executive and legislative invasion of their
independence. But in so doing, some of the citizens outside,
especially the humble government employees, might say that
in trying to erect a bastion of justice, we might end up with the
fortress of privileges, an island of extra territoriality under the
Republic of the Philippines, because a good number of
powers and rights accorded to the Judiciary here may not be
enjoyed in the remotest degree by other employees of the
government.
An example is the exception from income tax, which is a kind
of economic immunity, which is, of course, denied to the entire
executive department and the legislative. 7
And during the period of amendments on the draft Article, on
July 14, 1986, Commissioner Cirilo A. Rigos proposed that the
term "diminished" be changed to "decreased" and that the
words "nor subjected to income tax" be deleted so as to "give
substance to equality among the three branches in the
government.
Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on behalf of the
Committee on the Judiciary, defended the original draft and
referred to the ruling of this Court in Perfecto vs. Meer 8 that
"the independence of the judges is of far greater importance
than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries."
Commissioner Rigos then moved that the matter be put to a
vote. Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas stood up "in support
of an amendment to the amendment with the request for a
modification of the amendment," as follows:
FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose an amendment to
the amendment saying that it is not enough to drop the phrase
"shall not be subjected to income tax," because if that is all
that the Gentleman will do, then he will just fall back on the
decision in Perfecto vs. Meer and in Dencia vs. David [should
be Endencia and Jugo vs. David, etc., 93 Phil. 696[ which
excludes them from income tax, but rather I would propose
that the statement will read: "During their continuance in
office, their salary shall not be diminished BUT MAY BE
SUBJECT TO GENERAL INCOME TAX."IN support of this
position, I would say that the argument seems to be that the
justice and judges should not be subjected to income tax
because they already gave up the income from their practice.
That is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees.
And I know right now, for instance, there are many people who
have accepted employment in the government involving a
reduction of income and yet are still subject to income tax. So,
they are not the only citizens whose income is reduced by
accepting service in government.
Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed amendment to
the amendment. Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr.
then moved for a suspension of the session. Upon
resumption, Commissioner Bernas announced:
During the suspension, we came to an understanding with the
original proponent, Commissioner Rigos, that his amendment
on page 6,. line 4 would read: "During their continuance in
office, their salary shall not be DECREASED."But this is on
the understanding that there will be a provision in the
Constitution similar to Section 6 of Article XV, the General
Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which says:
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer
or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be
exempt from payment of income tax.
So, we put a period (.) after "DECREASED" on the
understanding that the salary of justices is subject to tax.
When queried about the specific Article in the General
Provisions on non-exemption from tax of salaries of public
officers, Commissioner Bernas replied:
FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be found
in the General Provisions. But at any rate, when we put a
period (.) after "DECREASED," it is on the understanding that
the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David will not
apply anymore.
The amendment to the original draft, as discussed and
understood, was finally approved without objection.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The
understanding, therefore, is that there will be a provision under
the Article on General Provisions. Could Commissioner
Rosario Braid kindly take note that the salaries of officials of
the government including constitutional officers shall not be
exempt from income tax? The amendment proposed herein
and accepted by the Committee now reads as follows: "During
their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
DECREASED"; and the phrase "nor subjected to income tax"
is deleted.9
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed
regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was
finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true
intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it,
was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable.
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect.10 The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 80

people in the adoption of the Constitution.11it may also be

safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution
were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.12 1avvphi1

Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987

Constitution, which, for clarity, is again reproduced hereunder:

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices

of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be
fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased. (Emphasis supplied).

it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a

law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and
Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are
receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be
applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would
be a strained construction to read into the provision an
exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the
Constitutional Commission.

With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the

ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of
judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the
Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer,13 as affirmed in Endencia
vs. David 14 must be declared discarded. The framers of the
fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have
expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and
import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that
they have adopted Stated otherwise, we accord due respect
to the intent of the people, through the discussions and
deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all
citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining
the government and should share the burden of general
income taxation equitably.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is

hereby dismissed.

Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,

Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and
Cortes, JJ., concur.

Yap, J., is on leave.

FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 81
A.M. No. 88-4-5433 April 15, 1988
IN RE FIRST INDORSEMET FROM HONORABLE RAUL M.
GONZALEZ DATED 16 MARCH 1988 REQUESTING
HONORABLE JUSTICE MARCELO B. FERNAN TO
COMMENT ON AN ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16
March 1988 from Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez,
"Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor" forwarding to Mr. Justice
Marcelo B. Fernan a "letter-complaint, dated 14 December
1987 with enclosure of the Concerned Employees of the
Supreme Court," together with a telegram of Miguel Cuenco,
for "comment within ten (10) days from receipt hereof." Mr.
Justice Fernan had brought this 1st Indorsement to the
attention of the Court en banc in view of the important
implications of policy raised by said 1st Indorsement.
The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments.
First, an anonymous letter by "Concerned Employees of the
Supreme Court" addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez
referring to charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel
Cuenco against Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan and asking Mr.
Gonzalez "to do something about this." The second
attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel Cuenco
addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco
refers to pleadings he apparently filed on 29 February 1988
with the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 3135,
which, in the opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper any
"intervention" by Mr. Raul Gonzalez. Mr. Cuenco,
nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez "to file responsive
pleading Supreme Court en banc to comply with Petition
Concerned Employees Supreme Court asking Tanodbayan's
intervention.
The Court DIRECTED the Clerk of Court to FURNISH Mr.
Raul M Gonzales a copy of the per curiam Resolution,
dated 17 February 1988 of the Court in Administrative Case
No. 3135 entitled "Miguel Cuenco v. Honorable Marcelo B.
Fernan" in which Resolution, the Court Resolved to dismiss
the charges made by complaint Cuenco against Mr.Justice
Fernan for utter lack of merit. In the same Resolution, the
Court Resolved to require complainant Cuenco to show cause
why he should not be administratively dealt with for making
unfounded serious accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan.
Upon request of Mr. Cueco, the Court had granted him an
extension of up to 30 March 1988, Mr. Cuenco filed a pleading
which appears to be an omnibus pleading relating to, inter alia,
Administrative Case No. 3135. Insofar as Administrative Case
No. 3135 is concerned, the Court treated this pleading as a
Motion for Reconsideration. By a per curiam Resolution dated
15 April 1988, the Court denied with finality Mr Cuenco's
Motion for Reconsideration.
It is important to underscore the rule of constitution law here
involved. This principle may be succinctly formulated in the
following terms. A public officer who under the Constitution is
required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a
qualification for the office held by him and who may be
removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged
with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer.
Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be
charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other
court with any offence which carries with it the penalty of
removal from office, or any penalty service of which would
amount to removal from office.
The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17
February 1988 in Administrative Case No. 3135 in the
following terms:
There is another reason why the complaining for disbarment
here must be dismissed. Members of the Supreme Court
must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be
members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from
office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution).
To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the
Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect
be to circumbent and hence to run afoul of the
constitutional mandate theat Members of the Court may
be removed from office only by impeachment for and
conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the
Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of
the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to
Article XI [2], Id.), a majority of the members of the
Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in relation to
Article XI [2], Id. and the members of the Commission on Audit
who are not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1][1],
Id.), all of whom are constitutionally required to be members
of the Philippine Bar. (Emphasis supplied)
This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on
this matter. In Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 1 the Court said:
The broad power of the New Constitution vests the
respondent court with jurisdiction over "public officers and
employees, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations." There are exceptions, however, like
constitutional officers, particularly those declared to be
removed by impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution provides:
Sec. 2 The President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions
shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, other high crimes, or graft and
corruption."
Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from office of
the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other
method; otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be
removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally
while holding his office, would be violative of the clear
mandate of the fundamental law.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his authoritative
dissertation on the New Constitution, states that "judgement
in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from
office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or
profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution trial, and punishment, in accordance with law. The
above provision is a reproduction of what was found in the
1935 Constitution. It is quite apparent from the explicit
character of the above provision that the effect of
impeachment is limited to the loss of position and
disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under
the Republic. It is equally manifest that the party this convicted
may be proceeded against, tried and thereafter punished in
accordance with law. There can be no clearer expression of
the constitutional intent as to the scope of the impeachment
process (The Constitution f the Philippines, pp. 465-466)." The
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 82

clear implication is, the party convicted in the impeachment

proceeding shall nevertheless be liable and subject of
prosecution, trial and punishment according to law; and
that if the same does not result in a conviction and the
official is not thereby removed, the filing of a criminal
action "in accordance with law" may not prosper. 2

The provisions of the 1973 Constitution we referred to above

in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan are substantially reproduced in
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:

Sec. 2 The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the

Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

Sec. 3 xxx xxx xxx

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further

than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office
under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial
and punishment according to law.

It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying

that it Members or the other constitutional officers we referred
to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly
criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is
saying is that there is a fundamental procedural
requirements that must be observed before such liability
may be determined and enforced. A Member of the
Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the
constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2
and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the
tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated
by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either
criminally or administratively (by disbarment
proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that may be
proven against him in appropriate proceedings.

The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial

independence and separation of powers. The rule is
important because judicial independence is important.
Without the protection of this rule, Members of the
Supreme Court would be brought against them by
unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties
who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the
exercise of judicial authority by the Court.

It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting

officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges
brought against a Member of this Court. The remedy of a
person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment
proceedings.

The Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to serve a copy of

this Resolution upon Hon. Raul M. Gonzales and Mr Miguel
Cuenco.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 83
JURISDICTION
G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970
TEODORO C. SANTIAGO, JR. Minor, Represented by his
Mother, Mrs. Angelita C. Santiago, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MISS JUANITA BAUTISTA, ROSALINDA ALPAS,
REBECCA MATUGAS, MILKITA INAMAC, ROMEO
AGUSTIN, AIDA CAMINO, LUNA SARMAGO, AURORA
LORENA, SOLEDAD FRANCISCO and MR. FLOR
MARCELO, respondents-appellees.
Teodoro M. Santiago for petitioner-appellant.
Ramon C. Carag for respondent-apellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato dismissing, on a motion to dismiss, its Civil Case No.
2012 — for certiorari, injunction and damages — on the
ground that the complaint therein states no cause of action,
and from the subsequent order of the court a quo denying the
motion for the reconsideration of the said order of dismissal.
The record shows that at the time Civil Case No. 2012 was
commenced in the court below, appellant Teodoro
Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the public school
named Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City. As the
school year 1964-1965 was then about to end, the
"Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor" was
constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the
purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating
class. With the school Principal, Mrs. Aurora Lorena, as
chairman, and Juanita Bautista, Rosalinda Alpas, Rebecca
Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin, Aida Camino and
Luna Sarmago, as members, the above-named committee
deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia
Liñgat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third
honors, respectively. The school's graduation exercises were
thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before that
date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr.,
represented by his mother, and with his father as counsel,
sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students"
thus made, by instituting the above-mentioned civil case
in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, against the
above-named committee members along with the District
Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place.
The corresponding complaint filed alleged, inter alia: that
plaintiff-petitioner Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. is a sixth grader at
the Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City scheduled to be
graduated on May 21st, 1965 with the honor rank of third
place, which is disputed; that the teachers of the school had
been made respondents as they compose the "Committee on
the Rating of Student for Honor", whose grave abuse of official
discretion is the subject of suit, while the other defendants
were included as Principal, District Supervisor and Academic
Supervisor of the school; that Teodoro Santiago, Jr. had been
a consistent honor pupil from Grade I to Grade V of the Sero
Elementary School, while Patricia Liñgat (second placer in the
disputed ranking in Grade VI) had never been a close rival of
petitioner before, except in Grade V wherein she ranked third;
that Santiago, Jr. had been prejudiced, while his closest rival
had been so much benefited, by the circumstance that the
latter, Socorro Medina, was coached and tutored during the
summer vacation of 1964 by Mrs. Alpas who became the
teacher of both pupils in English in Grade VI, resulting in the
far lead Medina obtained over the other pupil; that the
committee referred to in this case had been illegally
constituted as the same was composed of all the Grade VI
teachers only, in violation of the Service Manual for Teachers
of the Bureau of Public Schools which provides that the
committee to select the honor students should be composed
of all teachers in Grades V and VI; that there are direct and
circumstantial matters, which shall be proven during the trial,
wherein respondents have exercised grave abuse of
discretion and irregularities, such as the changing of the final
ratings on the grading sheets of Socorro Medina and Patricia
Liñgat from 80% to 85%, and some teachers giving petitioner
a starting grade of 75% in Grade VI, which proves that there
has already an intention to pull him to a much lower rank at
the end of the school year; that several district examinations
outside of teachers' daily units and other than periodical tests
were given, ratings in which were heavily considered in the
determination of periodical ratings, whereas according to the
Academic Supervisor and Acting Division Superintendent of
schools of the place such district examinations were not
advisable; that there was a unanimous agreement and
understanding among the respondent teachers to insult and
prejudice the second and third honors by rating Socorro
Medina with a perfect score, which is very unnatural; that the
words "first place" in petitioner's certificate in Grade I was
erased and replaced with the words "second place", which is
an instance of the unjust and discriminating abuses committed
by the respondent teachers in the disputed selection of honor
pupils they made; that petitioner personally appealed the
matter to the School Principal, to the District Supervisor, and
to the Academic Supervisor, but said officials "passed the
buck to each other" to delay his grievances, and as to appeal
to higher authorities will be too late, there is no other speedy
and adequate remedy under the circumstances; and, that
petitioner and his parents suffered mental and moral damages
in the amount of P10,000.00. They prayed the court, among
others, to set aside the final list of honor students in Grade VI
of the Sero Elementary School for that school year 1964-1965,
and, during the pendency of the suit, to enjoin the respondent
teachers from officially and formally publishing and
proclaiming the said honor pupils in Grade VI in the graduation
exercises the school was scheduled to hold on the 21st of May
of that year 1965. The injunction prayed for was denied by the
lower court in its order of May 20, 1965, the said court
reasoning out that the graduation exercises were then already
set on the following day, May 21, 1965, and the restraining of
the same would be shocking to the school authorities, parents,
and the community who had eagerly looked forward to the
coming of that yearly happy event. As scheduled, the
graduation exercises of the Sero Elementary School for the
school year 1964-1965 was held on May 21, with the same
protested list of honor students.
Having been required by the above-mentioned order to
answer the petition within ten (10) days, respondents moved
for the dismissal of the case instead. Under date of May 24,
1965, they filed a motion to dismiss, on the grounds (1) that
the action for certiorari was improper, and (2) that even
assuming the propriety of the action, the question brought
before the court had already become academic. This was
opposed by petitioner.
In an order dated June 4, 1965, the motion to dismiss of
respondents was granted, the court reasoning thus:
The respondents now move to dismiss the petition for
being improper and for being academic. In order to resolve
the motion to dismiss, the Court has carefully examined the
petition to determine the sufficiency of the alleged cause of
action constituting the special civil action of certiorari.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 84
The pertinent portions of the petition alleging 'grave abuse of
discretion' are found in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.
These allegations may be substantially summarized as
follows: Paragraph 3 alleges that since grades one to six, the
students closely contending for class honors were Socorro
Medina, Teodoro Santiago, Jr., Dolores Dalican and Patricia
Liñgat.
Socorro Medina obtained first honor thrice (grades I, V and
VI); once second honor (grade IV), and twice third place
(grades II and III).
Teodoro Santiago, Jr. obtained first place once (grade IV);
four times second place (grades I, II, III, and V) and once third
place (grade VI).
Dolores Dalican obtained twice first place (grades II, III); once
third place (grade I).
Patricia Liñgat once third place (grade V); and once second
place (grade VI).
That as now ranked in the graduation Liñgat is given second
place while Teodoro Santiago, Jr., is given the third place only.
This is the ranking now disputed by petitioner, Teodoro
Santiago, Jr.
Paragraph 4 alleges that Socorro Medina was tutored in the
summer of 1964 by Mrs. Rosalinda Alpas who became her
English teacher in the sixth grade; that as such, Mrs. Alpas
unjustly favored Socorro against her rivals.
Paragraph 5 alleges that the teachers who composed the
committee on honor students are all grade six teachers while
the Service Manual For Teachers provides that the committee
shall be composed of the teachers from the fifth and sixth
grades.
Paragraph 6 alleges that there are direct and circumstantial
evidence showing the change of ratings of Socorro Medina
and Patricia Liñgat from 80% to 85% and the intention to junk
petitioner to a lower rank.
Paragraph 7 alleges that the giving of district examinations
upon which ratings were partly based were not advisable.
Paragraph 8 alleges that the teachers rated Socorro Medina
a perfect pupil which is unnatural.
Paragraph 9 alleges that on the first grade certificate of the
petitioner the word "First Place" was erased and changed to
"Second Place".
Paragraph 10 alleges that petitioner personally appealed to
the school authorities but they only 'passed the buck to each
other.'
SECOND PARAGRAPH VIOLATED
Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
'Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board,
or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings,
as the law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer.'
'The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of
the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of
all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.'
It is striking, indeed, that this petition has not been
accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order
complained of, together with all pleadings and documents
which are relevant thereto, as required by the second,
paragraph of the aforequoted rule. This violation renders the
petition extremely indefinite and uncertain. There is no written
formal judgment or order of respondents that is submitted for
revision or correction of this Court. This violation is fatal to the
petition.
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES NEGLECTED
All that the petition alleges is that the petitioner personally
appealed to the school authorities who only 'passed the buck
to each other.' This allegation does not show that petitioner
formally availed of and exhausted the administrative remedies
of the Department of Education. The petition implies that this
is the first formal complaint of petitioner against his teachers.
The administrative agencies of the Department of Education
could have investigated the grievances of the petitioner with
dispatch and give effective remedies, but petitioner
negligently abandoned them. Petitioner cannot now claim that
he lacked any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion'
on the part of teachers refer to errors, mistakes, or
irregularities rather than to real grave abuse of discretion that
would amount to lack of jurisdiction. Mere commission of
errors in the exercise of jurisdiction may not be corrected by
means of certiorari.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion, and so
holds, that the petition states no cause of action and
should be, as it is hereby dismissed.
Upon receipt of a copy of the above-quoted order, the
petitioner moved for the reconsideration thereof, but the same
proved to be futile, hence, this appeal.
Appellant here assails the holding of the lower court that his
petition states no cause of action on the grounds — discussed
by the court a quo in the appealed order above-quoted — (1)
that the petition does not comply with the second paragraph
of Sec. 1 of Rule 65 because it has not been accompanied by
a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof,
together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant
and pertinent thereto; (2) that administrative remedies were
not first exhausted; and (3) that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the teachers who constituted the
committee referred to. On the other hand, appellees maintain
that the court below did not err in dismissing the case on said
grounds. Further, they argue in favor of the questioned order
of dismissal upon the additional ground that the "committee
on the ratings of students for honor" whose actions are here
condemned by appellant is not the "tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial functions" against which an action for
certiorari may lie under Section 1 of Rule 65.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 85
The last point raised by appellees deserves first consideration,
for if really the said committee of teachers does not fall within
the category of the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
functions contemplated by Rule 65, further discussion of the
issues raised by appellant may no longer be necessary. To
resolve this problem the following tests may be employed:
In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action instituted
against 'any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
functions.' (Section 1, Rule 67.) A judicial function is an act
performed by virtue of judicial powers; the exercise of a
judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the
action of the court (34 C.J. 1182). In order that a special civil
action of certiorari may be invoked in this jurisdiction the
following circumstances must exist: (1) that there must be a
specific controversy involving rights of persons or property
and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or
officer for hearing and determination of their respective rights
and obligations.
'Judicial action is an adjudication upon the rights of parties
who in general appear or are brought before the tribunal by
notice or process, and upon whose claims some decision or
judgment is rendered. It implies impartiality,
disinterestedness, a weighing of adverse claims, and is
inconsistent with discretion on the one hand — for the tribunal
must decide according to law and the rights of the parties —
or with dictation on the other; for in the first instance it must
exercise its own judgment under the law, and not act under a
mandate from another power. ... The character of its action in
a given case must decide whether that action is judicial,
ministerial, or legislative, or whether it be simply that of a
public agent of the country or State, as in its varied
jurisdictions it may by turns be each.' (In Re Saline County
Subscription, 100 Am. Dec. 337, 338, cited in Southeastern
Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 181
S. E. 836-837.)
'It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial function
is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of
parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and
whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and
undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.'
(State ex rel. Board of Commissioners of St. Louis County, et
al. v. Dunn, 90 N. W. 772-773.)
(2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy
is brought must have the power and authority to pronounce
judgment and render a decision on the controversy construing
and applying the laws to that end.
'The phrase "judicial power" is not capable of a precise
definition which would be applicable to all cases. The term has
been variously defined as the authority to determine the rights
of persons or property by arbitrating between adversaries in
specific controversies at the instance of a party thereto; the
authority exercised by that department of government which
is charged with the declaration of what the law is and its
construction so far as it is written law; the authority or power
vested in the judges or in the courts; the authority vested in
some court, officer, or persons to hear and determine when
the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an
act is the subject matter of adjudication; the power belonging
to or emanating from a judge as such; the power conferred
upon a public officer, involving the exercise of judgment and
discretion in the determination of questions of right in specific
cases affecting the interest of persons or property, as
distinguished from ministerial power or authority to carry out
the mandates of judicial power or the law; the power exercised
by courts in hearing and determining cases before them, or
some matter incidental thereto, and of which they have
jurisdiction; the power of a court to decide and pronounce a
judgment; the power which adjudicates upon and protects the
rights and interests of individual citizens, and to that end
construes and applies the law. "Judicial power" implies the
construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights. It
includes the power to hear and determine but not everyone
who may hear and determine has judicial power. The term
"judicial power" does not necessarily include the power to hear
and determine a matter that is not in the nature of a suit or
action between the parties.' (34 C.J. 1183-1184.) .
(3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of
the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least,
which does not belong to the legislative or executive
department.
... the distinction between legislative or ministerial functions
and judicial functions is difficult to point out. What is a judicial
function does not depend solely upon the mental operation by
which it is performed or the importance of the act. In solving
this question, due regard must be had to the organic law of
the state and the division of power of government. In the
discharge of executive and legislative duties, the exercise of
discretion and judgment of the highest order is necessary, and
matters of the greatest weight and importance are dealt with.
It is not enough to make a function judicial that it requires
discretion, deliberation, thought, and judgment. It must be the
exercise of discretion and judgment within that subdivision of
the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or, at
least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive
department. If the matter, in respect to which it is exercised,
belongs to either of the two last-named departments of
government, it is not judicial. As to what is judicial and what is
not seems to be better indicated by the nature of a thing, than
its definition.' (Whealing & Elm Grove Railroad Co. Appt. v.
Town of Triadelphia, et al., 4 L.R.A. (N. S.) pp. 321, 328-329.)
[Emphasis supplied]1
'WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is
difficult, if not impossible, precisely to define what are judicial
or quasi judicial acts, and there is considerable conflict in the
decisions in regard thereto, in connection with the law as to
the right to the writ of certiorari. It is clear, however, that it is
the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office,
board, or body which performs it, that determines whether or
not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It
is not essential that the proceedings should be strictly and
technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is used
when applied to the courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they
are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially in
making their decision, whatever may be their public character.
...' "In State ex rel. Board of Commrs. vs. Dunn (86 Minn. 301,
304), the following statements were made:
'The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and
what are administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult
to determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve
the performance of legislative or administrative duties, and the
performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a
measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be
said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to
determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties
are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an
officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to
determine those questions, he acts judicially.'2
It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called
committee on the rating of students for honor whose actions
are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 86
judicial functions in the performance of its assigned task. From
the above-quoted portions of the decision cited, it will be
gleaned that before tribunal board, or officer may exercise
judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a
law that give rise to some specific rights of persons or property
under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the
controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the
tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to
determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the
respective rights of the contending parties. As pointed out by
appellees,3 however, there is nothing on record about any rule
of law that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the
individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for
honors, such function involves the determination of what the
law is and that they are therefore automatically vested with
judicial or quasi judicial functions. Worse still, this Court has
not even been appraised by appellant of the pertinent
provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public
Schools appellees allegedly violated in the composition of the
committee they constituted thereunder, and, in the
performance of that committee's duties.
At any rate, the situation brought before Us in this case, the
seemingly one of first impression, is not without substantial
parallel. In the case of Felipe vs. Leuterio, etc., et al.,4 the
issue presented for determination was whether or not the
courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of
judges of an oratorical contest, and this Court declared that
the judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board
of judges of that contest and, for that matter, it would not
interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and similar
competitions. It was reasoned out thus:
For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been held
periodically by schools and colleges in this islands. Inter-
collegiate oratorical competitions are of more recent origin.
Members of this court have taken part in them either as
contestants in their school days (In the College of Law, U.P.
annual oratorical contest, first prize was awarded to Justice
Montemayor in 1914 and to Justice Labrador in 1916), or as
members of the board of judges afterwards. They know some
few verdicts did not reflect the audience's preference and that
errors have sometimes been ascribed to the award of the
judges. Yet no party ever presumed to invoke judicial
intervention; for it is unwritten law in such contests that the
board's decision is final and unappealable.
Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments
of the Word apply the highest tenets of sportsmanship: finality
of referee's verdict. No alibis, no murmurs of protest. The
participants are supposed to join the competition to contribute
to its success by striving their utmost: the prizes are
secondary.
No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants,
because theirs was merely the privilege to compete for the
prize, and that privilege did not ripen into a demandable right
unless and until they were proclaimed winners of the
competition by the appointed arbiters or referees or judges.
Incidentally, these school activities have been imported from
the United States. We found in American jurisprudence no
litigation questioning the determination of the board of judges.
Now, the fact that a particular action has had no precedent
during a long period affords some reason for doubting the
existence of the right sought to be enforced, especially where
occasion for its assertion must have often arisen; and courts
are cautious before allowing it, being loath to establish a new
legal principle not in harmony with the generally accepted
views thereon. (See C.J.S. Vol. 1, p. 1012.)
We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the
respondent judge reasoned out that where there is a wrong
there is a remedy and that courts of first instance are courts of
general jurisdiction.
The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial
suffered some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. If at
all, there was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and
wrong do not mean the same thing. 'Wrong' as used in the
aforesaid principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. As
stated before, a contestant has no right to the prize unless and
until he or she is declared winner by the board of referees or
judges.
Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law
there are instances of 'damnum absque injuria'. This is one of
them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a
different proposition. But then her action should be directed
against the individual judge or judges who fraudulently or
maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges.
But even were We to assume for the moment, as the court
below apparently did, that judicial intervention might be sought
in cases of this nature, still, We are inclined to sustain the
order of dismissal appealed from for failure on the part of
appellant to comply with the requirements of Section 1 of Rule
65. To be sure, the lower court's holding that appellant's failure
to accompany his petition with a copy of the judgment or order
subject thereof together with copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto "is fatal to his
cause" is supported not only by the provision of that Rule but
by precedents as well. In the case of Alajar, et al. vs. Court of
Industrial Relations,5where it was claimed by therein
petitioners that the respondent court had acted with grave
abuse of discretion in estimating certain rice harvests involved
in the case in terms of cavans instead of cans, allegedly in
complete disregard of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas in Expropriation Proceedings No. 84
and of this Court in G.R. No.
L-6191,6 and in ordering thereafter the division of the said rice
harvests on the ratio of 70-30 in favor of the tenants, this Court
denied the petition for certiorari on the ground, among others,
of failure on the part of said petitioners to attach to their
petition copies of the decisions allegedly violated. Speaking
thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes then, this Court held:
The petition is patently without merit. In the first place, it is not
even sufficient in form and substance to justify the issuance of
the writ of certiorari prayed for. It charges that the Court of
Industrial Relations abused its discretion in disregarding the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in
Expropriation Proceedings No. 84 and of this Court in G.R.
No. L-6191; yet it does not attach to the petition the decisions
allegedly violated by the Court below and point out which
particular portion or portions thereof have been disregarded
by the respondent Court.
The same principle was applied in the more recent case of
NAWASA vs. Municipality of Libmanan, et al.,7 wherein this
Court dismissed (by Resolution) the petition for certiorari and
mandamus filed by the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority against the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
and the municipality of Libmanan. In the following language,
this Court emphasized the importance of complying with the
said requirement of Rule 65:
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 87

While paragraph 3 of the petition speaks of the complaint filed

by the respondent municipality with the respondent court for
recovery of property with damages (Civil Case No. L-161) no
copy thereof is attached to the petition.

Similarly, paragraph 4 of the petition mentions the decision

rendered by the respondent court on December 10, 1965, but
no copy thereof is attached to the petition.

Again, paragraph 5 of the petition speaks of the order of

default entered by the respondent court and of the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the case above-
mentioned, but no copy of the order of default is attached to
its petition.

Bearing in mind that the petition under consideration was filed

for the purpose of enjoining the respondent court from
executing the decision rendered in Civil Case No. L-161, the
importance of the missing pleadings is obvious.

Moreover, the petition is also for the purpose of securing an

order commanding the respondent court to approve either the
original or the amended record on appeal filed petition, but no
copy of either is attached to its petition.

In view of the foregoing, the petition under consideration is

dismissed.

It might be true, as pointed out by appellant, that he received

a copy of the programme of the graduation exercises held by
the Sero Elementary School in the morning of the very day of
that graduation exercises, implying that he could not have
attached then a copy thereof (to show the decision of the
committee of teachers in the ranking of students complained
of) to his petition. The stubborn fact remains, however, that
appellant had known of such decision of the said committee
of teachers much earlier, as shown by the circumstance that
according to him, even before the filing of his petition with the
lower court on the 19th of May, 1965, he had personally
appealed the said committee's decision with various higher
authorities of the above-named school, who merely passed
the buck to each other. Moreover, appellant mentions in his
petition various other documents or papers — as the Service
Manual for Teachers allegedly violated by appellees in the
constitution of their committee; altered grading sheets; and
erasures in his Grade I certificate — which appellant never
bothered to attach to his petition. There could be no doubt
then that he miserably failed to comply with the requirement
of Rule 65 above-mentioned. With this conclusion, it is no
longer necessary to pass upon the other two errors assigned
by appellant.

FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment

appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,

Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 88
G.R. No. L-4606 May 30, 1952
RAMON B. FELIPE, SR., as Chairman, Board of Judges,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE N. LEUTERIO, Judge, Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur, EMMA IMPERIAL, represented by her
guardian-ad-litem JUSTO V. IMPERIAL, and SOUTHERN
LUZON COLLEGE, respondents.
Ramon Felipe, Jr., and L. B. Karingal for petitioner.
Ezequiel S. Grageda and Victoriano Yamson for respondents
Judge Leuterio and Emma Imperial.
Padilla and San Juan for respondent Southern Luzon College.
BENGZON, J.:
Statement of the case. The issue in the litigation is whether
the courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board
of judges of an oratorical competition.
In an oratorical contest held in Naga, Camarines Sur, first
honor was given by the board of five judges to Nestor Nosce,
and second honor to Emma Imperial. Six days later, Emma
asked the court of the first instance of that province to
reversed that award, alleging that one of the judges had fallen
to error in grading her performance. After a hearing, and over
the objection of the other four judges of the contest, the court
declared Emma Imperial winner of the first place. Hence this
special civil action challenging the court's power to modify the
board's verdict.
The facts. There is no dispute about the facts:
1. On March 12, 1950 a benefit inter-collegiate oratorical
contest was held in Naga City. The contestants were eight,
among them Nestor Nosce, Emma Imperial, and Luis General,
Jr.
2. There were five judges of the competition, the petitioner
Ramon B. Felipe, Sr. being the Chairman.
3. After the orators had delivered their respective pieces, and
after the judges had expressed their votes, the Chairman
publicly announced their decision awarding first price to
Nestor Nosce, second price to Emma Imperial, third price to
Menandro Benavides and fourth place to Luis General, Jr.
4. Four days afterwards, Emma Imperial addressed a letter to
the Board of Judges protesting the verdict, and alleging that
one of the Judges had committed a mathematical mistake,
resulting in her second place only, instead of the first, which
she therefore claimed.
5. Upon refusal of the Board to amend their award, she filed a
complaint in the court of first instance.
6. At the contest the five judges were each furnished a blank
form wherein he give the participants grades according to his
estimate of their abilities, giving number 1 to the best, number
2 to the second best etc., down to number 8. Then the grades
were added, and the contestant receiving the lowest number
got first prize, the next second prize, etc.
7. The sums for the first four winners were: Nosce 10; Imperial
10; Benevides 17, General 17, the Board of judges having
voted as follows:
Judge Nosce Imperial Buenavides General
Felipe Sr. ......... 3 1 2 4
Obias .............. 1 2 4 3
Rodriguez .......... 1 4 5 3
Prado .............. 3 2 1 3
Moll ............... 2 1 5 4
10 10 17 17
8. It appearing that Nestor Nosce and Emma Imperial had tied
for the first place, the Chairman, apparently with the consent
of the board, broke the tie awarding first honors to Nosce and
second honors to Imperial.
9. For the convenience of the judges the typewritten forms
contained blank spaces in which, after the names of the rival
orators and their respective orations, the judge could not jot
down the grades he thought the contestants deserved
according to "Originality", "Timeliness", "English", "Stage
Personality", "Pronunciation and Enunciation" and "Voice".
From such data he made up his vote.
10. It was discovered later that the form filed by Delfin
Rodriguez, one of the Judges, gave Imperial and General the
following ratings under the above headings; Imperial 19-15-
15-18-14-14 Total 94-Place 4th General 19-15-15 or 14-19-
14-14 Total 95-Place 3rd.
11. Imperial asserts that her total should be 95 instead of 94
and therefore should rank 3rd place in Rodriguez' vote. And if
she got 3 from Rodriguez, her total vote should have been 9
instead of ten, with the result that she copped first place in the
speaking joust.
12. Rodriguez testified that he made a mistake in adding up
Imperial's ratings; that she should have been given a total of
95, or placed No. 3, the same as General; that he was not
disposed to break the tie between her and General and
insisted that he wanted to give rank 3 to Imperial and rank 3
also to General.
Discussion. Although it would seem anomalous for one judge
to give the same rank to two contestants, we will concede for
the moment that Delfin Rodriguez could have given 3 to
Imperial to General.
However if deductions are to be made from his recorded vote
(Exhibit 3) one may infer that after the contest and before
submitting his vote he decided to give General an edge over
Imperial. How? Under the caption "English" General was
given by himself at first "14", later increased to "15". Evidently
because after he had added the ratings of Imperial and
(erroneously) reached the sum of 94, he added the ratings of
General (which were the same as Imperial with 14 under
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 89

"English") and (mistakenly) reached 94 also. So what did he
also? He raised the 14 to 15 and thus gave general 95 to place
him over Imperial's 94. (Mistakingly again, because with 15
General got 96 instead of 95).
But to us the important thing is Rodriguez' vote during and
immediately after the affair. His vote in Exhibit 3 definitely
gave General place No. 3 and Imperial place No. 4. His
calculations recorded on Exhibit 3 were not material. In fact
the Chairman did not bother to fill out the blank spaces in his
own form, and merely set down his conclusions giving one to
Imperial, 2 to Benavides etc. without specifying the ratings for
"Voice", "English", "Stage Personality" etc. In other words
what counted was the vote.
Probably for the above reasons the board refused to "correct"
the alleged error.
The situation then is this: Days after a contest has been
conducted and the winners announced, one of the judges
confesses he made a mistake, that the ratings he gave the
second place winner should have been such as would entitle
her to first place. The other judges refuse to alter their verdict.
May the matter be brought to the court to obtain a new
award, reversing the decision of the board of judges?
For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been held
periodically by schools and colleges in these islands. Inter-
collegiate oratorical competitions are of more recent origin.
Members of this court have taken part in them either as
contestants in their school days1, or as members of the board
of judges afterwards. They know some (few) verdicts did not
reflect the audience's preference and that errors have
sometimes been ascribed to the award of the judges. Yet no
party ever presumed to invoke judicial intervention; for it is
unwritten law in such contests that the board's decision is final
and unappealable.
The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial
suffered some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. If at
all, there was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and
wrong do not mean the same thing. "Wrong" as used in the
aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or violation of a
right. As stated before, a contestant has no right to the prize
unless and until he or she is declared winner by the board of
referees or judges.
Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in
law there are instances of "damnum absque injuria". This
is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it
would be a different proposition. But then her action
should be directed against the individual judge or judges
who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against
the other judges.
By the way what is here in stated must not be understood as
applying to those activities which the government has chosen
to regulate with the creation of the Games and Amusements
Board in Executive Order No. 392, Series 1950.
Judgment. In view of all the foregoing, we are of the opinion
and so declare, that the judiciary has no power to reverse
the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest.
For that matter it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty
contests and similar competitions.
Wherefore the order in controversy is hereby set aside. No
costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo
and Ladrador, JJ., concur.
Feria, J., concurs in the result.

Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments

of the Word apply the highest tenets of sportmanship: finally
of the referee's verdict. No alibis, no murmurs of protest. The
participants are supposed to join the competition to contribute
to its success by striving their utmost: the prizes are
secondary.

No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants,

because their's was merely the privilege to compete for the
prize, and that privilege did not ripen into a demandable right
unless and until they were proclaimed winners of the
competition by the appointed arbiters or referees or judges.

Incidentally, these school activities have been imported from

the United States. We found in American jurisprudence no
litigation questioning the determination of the board of judges.

Now, the fact that a particular action has had no precedent

during a long period affords some reason for doubting the
existence of the right sought to be enforced, especially where
occasion for its assertion must have often arisen; and courts
are cautious before allowing it, being loath to establish a new
legal principle not in harmony with the generally accepted
views thereon. (See C.J.S. Vol. 1, p. 1012).

We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the

respondent judge reasoned out that where there is a wrong
there is a remedy and that courts of first instance are courts of
general jurisdiction.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 90
REQUIREMENTS AS TO DECISIONS
G.R. No. L-52364 March 25, 1983
RICARDO VALLADOLID, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, Deputy Minister of Labor, and
COPACABANA APARTMENT-HOTEL, respondents.
G.R. No.L-53349 March 25, 1983
J.R.M. & CO., INC. as owner and operator of Copacabana
Apartment-Hotel petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, as Deputy Minister of
Labor,HON. FRANCISCO L. ESTRELLA, as Regional
Director of the National Capital Region, Ministry of Labor, nd
RICARDO VALLADOLID, respondents.
Daniel Co for petitioner Ricardo Valadolid.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
Vicente V. Ocampo & Antonio V. de Ocampo for J.R.M. & Co.,
Inc.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The Order dated December 26, 1979 of the Deputy Minister
of Labor affirming the Order of May 2, 1979 for
reinstatement without backwages issued by Regional
Director Francisco L. Estrella in Case No. R4-STF-2-1316-
79 entitled, "Ricardo C. Valladolid, Jr. vs. Copacabana
Apartment-Hotel," is being assailed by the parties in these
petitions.
J. R. M. & Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as JRM), as
petitioner in G.R. No. 53349, is also the respondent in G.R.
No. 52364 named therein as Copacabana Apartment-Hotel.
JRM originally owned and operated not only Copacabana but
also Tropicana Apartment-Hotel. The principal stockholders of
JRM were the brothers Joseph, Manuel, Vicente and Roman,
all surnamed Yu. Upon the death of Joseph on October 12,
1975, although both Copacabana and Tropicana continued
technically as owned by JRM, the controlling (70%) interest in
Copacabana was lodged in the surviving heirs of Joseph, with
brothers Manuel and Roman having a 15% interest each. JRM
was placed under the management of the heirs of Joseph. The
brothers Manuel, Roman and Vicente were allowed 100%
equity interest in Tropicana, which was operated separately
from JRM. Eventually, Tropicana and Copacabana became
competing businesses.
Ricardo Valladolid, petitioner in G.R. No. 52364 and
respondent in G.R. No. 53349, after the death of Joseph, was
employed by JRM in 1977 as a telephone switchboard
operator. He was subsequently transferred to the position of
clerk-collector by Mrs. Lourdes T. Yu, President of JRM.
According to the affidavit of Daniel T. Yu, Executive Vice-
President, attached to the position paper submitted by JRM
before the Regional Director, the transfer was motivated by
the fact:
xxx xxx xxx
That as such switchboard operator numerous telephone
conversations and communications relating to business and
confidential matters were intercepted and relayed to
Tropicana Apartment-Hotel, a competitor;
That to confirm suspicion on Ricardo Valladolid as the person
responsible for said interception and relay, Mrs. Lourdes T.
Yu, President of JRM & Co., Inc. sent him on an errand to
Manila Hotel to bring flowers on the occasion of Wedding
Anniversary of Mr. & Mrs. Yu Hong Ty. Matters which Mrs.
Lourdes Yu told him in confidence and admonitions not to tell
anyone, reached Tropicana people;
xxx xxx xxx 1
The affidavit further disclosed:
xxx xxx xxx
That while serving in his capacity as clerk/collector, copies of
Accounts Receivables, reach Tropicana Management
although said copies were not referred to them;
That conferred (sic) on numerous confidential matters taken
in the office of Copacabana Apartment-Hotel reached
Tropicana Apartment-Hotel;
That to finally and fully confirmed suspicions that Ricardo
Valladolid was the person responsible for the aforementioned
disclosures, a plan for the entrapment was conceived by the
management of Copacabana Apartment- Hotel;
That on November 9, 1979, pursuance of said plan, a cash
voucher for P500,000.00 supposedly in payment for
representation expenses to myself with the corresponding
check were prepared and issued respectively by Juan V.
Bermudo, Apartment-Hotel Manager, who thereafter called
Ricardo Valladolid and asked the latter to bring the said cash
voucher and check to my room which he did; few minutes later
I came down to the office and asked Mr. Ricardo Valladolid to
prepare the corresponding deposit slip to Pacific Banking
Corporation for said check;
That thereafter, the aforementioned cash voucher,
corresponding check and deposit slip were kept in the hotel
vault with no other person other than myself, Juan Bermudo
and Ricardo Valladolid having any knowledge of preparation
and existence thereof;
That unknown to Ricardo Villadolid, the aforementioned
check, cash voucher and deposit slip were cancelled;
That on December 4, 1978, Mr. Manuel Yu Chua, came to
Copacabana Apartment-Hotel as minority stockholder of the
latter, vehemently demanding for an accounting of
Copacabana books;
That he strongly charged that information reached him that I
received a disbursement of P500,000.00 from Copacabana
Apartment-Hotel as representation expenses in my capacity
as Executive Vice-President thereof;
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 91
That at this juncture, I brought out the cancelled cash voucher,
check and deposit slip with mouth agape Manuel Yu Chua,
could do nothing else but admit that in fact, his informer within
Copacabana Apartment-Hotel was no other than Mr. Ricardo
C. Villadolid;
That I then informed Manuel Yu Chua, that under the
circumstances, I could no longer repose any trust whatsoever
on Ricardo Valladolid and requested him to take the latter to
Tropicana Apartment-Hotel and just swap him with someone
else; Mr. Manuel Yu Chua directed me to tell Valladolid to see
him;
That after few days, Ricardo Valladolid came back and told
me that Manuel Yu Chua has no place for him at Tropicana
Apartment-Hotel; in this conversation, Ricardo Valladolid
apologized for having betrayed the trust that we had reposed
on him, especially after Mrs. Lourdes T. Yu had told him to
stay impartial; that he then having done this for Manuel Yu
Chua, the latter could not even accept him in Tropicana
Apartment-Hotel;
xxx xxx xxx 2
The entrapment scheme was corroborated by the affidavits of
Sofia Mo. Gianan, External Auditor of J.R.M. & Co., Inc., and
Juan V. Bermudo, Copacabana Apartment-Hotel Manager,
which affidavits formed part of JRM's position paper filed
before the agency below. 3 The cancelled Cash Voucher, the
uncashed check, and the unused deposit slip, all in the
respective amounts of P500,000.00 were also attached to the
same position paper as Exhibits "4", "5" and "6".
On December 29, 1978, or after the entrapment scheme had
been effected, Valladolid filed a written request for a five (5)
day vacation leave starting December 30, 1978 with the
Manager of Copacabana, stating therein that he would report
for work on January 5, 1979. 4 He did not report for work on
January 5 but sent a telegram from Bicol on January 8, 1979
requesting for 15 days sick leave as he was confined for flu at
the Dr. Estrellado Clinic. 5 On January 23, 1979, Valladolid's
wife allegedly called up JRM informing the company through
its accountant, Eddie Escueta, that her husband was still sick
and requested for 30 days sick leave, which was allegedly
granted. This was denied by JRM.
Valladolid reported for work on February 16, 1979. The
Executive Vice- President, Mr. Daniel Yu, allegedly refused to
admit him and instead asked him to resign. JRM maintains
that Valladolid left the office that same day and never
returned, because he was reprimanded for his unauthorized
absences.
On February 22, 1979, Valladolid filed a Complaint for Illegal
Dismissal with vacation and sick leave pay. 6
On February 24, 1979, JRM sent a letter to Valladolid signed
by Daniel T. Yu, advising him of his preventive suspension
effective February 26, 1979 preparatory to the termination of
his services 10 days from receipt of a copy of the application
for clearance to dismiss him. The grounds given were: (1)
Willful Breach of Trust for having divulged, in various
instances, confidential business matters to competitors of the
company; and (2) Gross Neglect of Duty for having been
absent without leave or notice for more than 25 days, to the
detriment of the company. 7
On February 28, 1979, JRM filed said application for
clearance with the Ministry of Labor. 8 The application for
clearance and Valladolid's complaint for Illegal Dismissal were
consolidated and docketed as R4-STF-2-1316-79. The parties
submitted their respective position papers and documentary
evidence. On May 2, 1979, the Regional Director issued the
following challenged Order:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for
clearance with preventive suspension is hereby denied.
Respondent is hereby ordered to reinstate complainant to his
former position without backwages and without loss of
seniority rights. Let the time this case was pending be
considered as complainant's suspension for his absences.
The claim for vacation sick leave pay is dismissed for failure
to substantiate the same.
Valladolid appealed the foregoing order to the Minister of
Labor seeking modification of the same, praying for the award
of backwages from the time he was illegally dismissed on
February 16, 1979 to the date of his actual reinstatement. JRM
also appealed the said Order.
On December 26, 1979, the Deputy Minister of Labor, in a
succinct Order, dismissed both appeals after finding "no
sufficient justification or valid reason to alter, modify, much
less reverse the Order appealed from."
On January 21, 1980, Valladolid filed a Petition for certiorari
with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 52364, praying for a
modification of the Order of December 26, 1979 of the Deputy
Minister of Labor so as to grant him backwages. This Court
resolved. on February 4, 1980, to give due course to the
petition, and required the parties to submit simultaneous
memoranda.
On March 12, 1980, JRM also filed a petition for certiorari with
this Court assailing that same Order. This Court gave due
course to the petition and consolidated the same with G.R.
No. 52364. Thereafter, the parties filed their respective
memoranda.
The non-award of backwages is the only issue being raised
by Valladolid claiming that the Orders in question are contrary
to law and evidence, and were issued arbitrarily and
capriciously with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction.
JRM, on the other hand, assails the said Orders on the
following grounds:
I
That respondent Deputy Minister of Labor committed grave
abuse of discretion when in his questioned order in effect
sustained the finding of respondent Regional Director that
there is no evidence to support the dismissal of private
respondent.
II
That respondent Deputy Minister Amado Inciong and
Regional Director Francisco Estrella committed grave abuse
of discretion when they arbitrarily failed to consider in their
respective orders under review, established jurisprudence.
III
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 92
That respondent Regional Director committed grave abuse of
discretion when he held that preventive suspension is
equivalent to dismissal.
IV
That the order of respondent Hon. Amado Inciong was a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment when it failed
to state the facts and conclusion of law upon which it is based.
V Dismissal. This shows that Valladolid was indeed refused
That respondent Regional Director Francisco Estrella acted in
excess of his jurisdiction when, without any statutory authority
or transcending beyond his jurisdiction, he absolutely
disregarded procedural requirement in the hearing of the
present controversy, thus depriving petitioner of its right to due
process.
Valladolid, in his affidavit dated March 29, 1979, denied
having committed any breach of trust. 9 In corroboration, he
presented the affidavits of Mr. Manuel Yu dated March 20,
1979 and March 29, 1979, wherein the latter stated that
Valladolid was "one of Copacabana's most hard-working and
efficient employees;" that Valladolid's work is "mere routinary
collection and clerical in nature which do not involve trust (or)
confidential business or trade secrets which he may 'divulge'
to other companies." 10
On this issue, the Regional Director ruled that "there is no
evidence on record that Valladolid furnished copies of
receivables or divulged confidential business matters to Mr.
Manuel Yu and the 'Tropicana People' including the
P500,000.00 'entrapment scheme.'"
That finding is not supported by the records. The affidavits
attached to petitioner's position paper adequately show that
JRM did not act on mere suspicion but on the contrary, acted
prudently when it first transferred Valladolid from switchboard
operator where he could eavesdrop on telephone
conversations, to a less crucial position of clerk-collector. But
even in the latter capacity, JRM's fears were confirmed as
shown by the entrapment scheme. Manuel Yu's certification
as to Valladolid's trustworthiness cannot be given much
weight not only because it was disproved by the entrapment
contrived but more so because even Manuel Yu himself
refused to employ him at Tropicana when Daniel Yu had
suggested that Tropicana absorb Valladolid because JRM
had lost confidence in the latter. And although Manuel Yu, who
owns 15% of the equity holding of Copacabana, and being a
member of the Board of Directors of JRM had a right to know
the business standing of said establishment, there is basis to
believe that he would not have been able to pinpoint the
particular "disbursement" of P500,000.00, if the same had not
been leaked out to him.
Loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an
employee. Proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's
misconduct is not required, it being sufficient that there is
some basis for the same or that the employer has reasonable
ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the
misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy
of the trust and confidence demanded of his position. 11
However, as this was Valladolid's first offense, as found by the
Regional Director, dismissal from the service is too harsh a
punishment, considering that he had not been previously
admonished, warned or suspended for any misdemeanor.
Besides as clerk-collector, he need not be given access to
facts relative to the business of Copacabana, which, if
divulged to Tropicana would be to the former's prejudice.
Moreover, we find basis for the finding of the Regional Director
that Valladolid was terminated without prior clearance. J.R.M.
sent a memorandum to Valladolid on February 24, 1979
advising him of his preventive suspension effective February
26, 1979 pending approval of the application for clearance to
dismiss him. The clearance application was filed on February
28, 1979. However, even prior to that date, or on February 22,
1979, Valladolid had already filed a complaint for Illegal
admittance on February 16, 1979 when he reported back to
work, so that he was practically dismissed before he was
formally notified of his suspension leading to his dismissal, in
violation of the requirement of Section 3, Rule XIV, Book V,
Rules & Regulation Implementing the Labor Code. 12 And as
provided in Section 2 of the same Rule, any dismissal without
prior clearance shall be "conclusively presumed to be
termination of employment without a just cause."
JRM cannot claim that it was deprived of due process
considering that applications for clearance have to be
summarily investigated and a decision required to be rendered
within ten (10) days from the filing of the opposition 13 As this
Court had occasion to hold there is no violation of due process
where the Regional Director merely required the submission
of position papers and resolved the case summarily thereafter.
14
Nor is the questioned Order of the Deputy Minister of Labor
violative of Section 9, Article X of the Constitution, which
requires a statement of the facts and the conclusions of law
upon which it is based. That prescription applies to decisions
of Courts of record. The Ministry of Labor is an administrative
body with quasi-judicial functions. Section 5, Rule XIII, Book
V, Ibid, states that proceedings in the NLRC shall be non-
litigious and summary in nature without regard to legal
technicalities obtaining in courts of law. As the Deputy Minister
was in full accord with the findings of fact and the conclusions
of law drawn from those facts by the Regional Director, there
was no necessity of discussing anew the issues raised
therein.
JRM admits that Valladolid requested for leave for 5 days from
December 30, 1978, and thereafter for 15 days, but denies
that he notified the company of his absences subsequent to
this. The Regional Director ruled that the absences of
Valladolid were unauthorized but did not amount to gross
neglect of duty or abandonment of work which requires
deliberate refusal to resume employment or a clear showing
in terms of specific circumstances that the worker does not
intend to report for work. We agree. But as Valladolid had
been AWOL, no error was committed by respondent Regional
Director in ordering his reinstatement without backwages. 16
WHEREFORE, both Petitions for certiorari are hereby denied.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 93
G.R. No. 78648 January 24, 1989
RAFAEL N. NUNAL, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND MUNICIPALITY OF
ISABELA, BASILAN, respondents.
Romulo D. Plagata for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
For resolution is petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the
Minute Resolution of this Court of 11 May 1988 dismissing the
Petition for certiorari "for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently
show that the public respondent had committed grave abuse
of discretion in holding, among others, that the compromise
agreement of the parties is not enforceable against the
Municipality of Isabela, the latter not having been impleaded
as an indispensable party in the case.
In the present Motion, petitioner contends:
1. The decision does not clearly and distinctly express the
facts and the law on which it is based;
2. The Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, is bound by the
compromise agreement; and
3. Public respondent "Commission on Audit (COA, for short)
gravely abused its discretion in denying the lawful claim for
separation pay by your petitioner." (Motion for
Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p. 67)
The facts disclose that on 24 February 1986 petitioner was
appointed as Municipal Administrator of Isabela, Basilan. On
1 February 1980 he was administratively charged and
dismissed from the service for dishonesty, misconduct and for
lack of confidence. On appeal, the Merit Systems Board
exonerated petitioner and reinstated him to his position as
Municipal Administrator on 8 May 1980.
On 29 January 1981 petitioner was again dismissed for lack
of confidence by then Municipal Mayor Alvin Dans under
Administrative Order No. 54, Series of 1981. Upon denial of
his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner filed Case No. 43, a
suit for mandamus and Damages with Preliminary Injunction
against the Municipal Mayor, the Municipal Treasurer, and the
Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, before the then Court
of First Instance in Basilan Province, Branch 1, praying for
reinstatement "with full backwages and other rights inherent
in the position." He also filed Case No. 45 with the same Court
seeking that he and his wife be paid their back salaries from 1
February 1980 to 31 May 1980 pursuant to the Decision of the
Merit Systems Board on 16 February 1981.
On 20 February 1984, during the pendency of the said case,
the Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, abolished the
subject position in its Resolution No. 902, Series of 1984, and
Ordinance No. 336, pursuant to the provisions of the Local
Government Code.
On 5 December 1984, petitioner and his wife, on the one
hand, and on the other, Mayor Dans in his capacity both as
Municipal Mayor and as Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Isabela, Basilan, the Municipal Treasurer and the
Provincial Fiscal (p. 4, Reply To Comment of COA), entered
into a Compromise Agreement stipulating, among others, that:
l. The respondents shall pay petitioner Rafael Nunal all back
salaries and other emoluments due him by reason of his
employment as Municipal Administrator of Isabela, Basilan,
covering the period from January 1, 1980 to August 15, 1984,
together with accumulated vacation/sick leaves, mid-year and
Christmas bonuses in 1982 and 1983, and separation pay
under the Local Government Code, which are reflected in the
computation hereto attached and made an integral part
hereof... (p. 13, Rollo)
Under the same Compromise Agreement, petitioner was also
considered as "retired" upon receipt of the monetary
considerations mentioned therein.
On 12 December 1984, the Court approved the Compromise
Agreement.
On 1 April 1985, petitioner collected his retirement benefits
although, concededly, no provision for the same had been
included in the Compromise Agreement (Petition, p. 6; Rollo,
P. 9).
On 17 September 1985, petitioner filed his claim for
separation pay in the amount of P54,092.50 to which he is
allegedly entitled due to the abolition of the position of
Municipal Administrator, which separation pay is provided for
by the Local Government Code (B.P. 337, Section 76).
On 6 January 1986 the Municipal treasurer forwarded
petitioner's claim to the Provincial Auditor of Basilan. On 11
January, 1986, in a First Indorsement, the Provincial Auditor
opined that the claim was legal and proper but payment
thereof was made subject to availability of funds and the ruling
of the Regional Office of the Commission on Audit, Region IX,
Zamboanga City.
On 12 February 1986, in a 2nd Indorsement, the Regional
Director of the Commission on Audit, Region IX, Zamboanga
City, reversed the Provincial Auditor of Basilan and denied
petitioner's claim for separation pay. Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration was forwarded to the Commission on Audit
(COA), Central Office, Quezon City.
On 13 October 1986 the COA Central Office, in its Decision
No. 388, not only denied petitioner's claim for separation pay
but also disallowed the other payments made to petitioner. It
held:.
Premises considered, and it appearing that Mr. Nunal has
been paid back salaries and other emoluments in the total
amount of P90,362.96 pursuant to the Compromise
Agreement, supra, this Commission hereby directs that any
and all payments made to Mr. Nunal corresponding to the
period when he was no longer in the government service
should be disallowed in audit without prejudice to his right of
recourse against the officials personally liable for his unlawful
dismissal. (pp. 15-16, Rollo)
Thus, this recourse by petitioner alleging grave abuse of
discretion by COA, which Petition we had previously
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 94
dismissed in our Resolution of 11 May 1988 as heretofore
adverted to.
It appearing, however, that the Compromise agreement was
duly signed by Mayor Alvin Dans as Mayor and as Presiding
Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, by the Municipal
Treasurer, and by the Provincial Fiscal as their lawyer (Motion
for Reconsideration, p. 3); that the case was one for
reinstatement and backwages; and following the ruling of this
Court in Gementiza vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. Nos. L-41717-
33, 113 SCRA 477, April 12, 1982), the Municipality of Isabela
should be deemed as impleaded in this case, it being apparent
that the officials concerned had been sued in their official
capacity.
It should be noted that before the Court below, respondents
sued petitioner Mayor alone. However, respondents, too,
prayed for a Writ of mandamus to compel petitioner Mayor to
reinstate them with back salaries and damages.
Respondents, therefore, actually intended to sue petitioner in
his official capacity. Failure to implead the Municipality and
other municipal authorities should not deter this Court, in the
interests of justice and equity, from including them herein as
respondents. (at p. 488)
The Compromise Agreement, therefore, must be held binding
on the Municipality of Isabela, which was not, in any way,
deprived of its day in Court (Gabutas vs. Castellanes, L-
17323, 14 SCRA 376, June 23, 1965). Thus, the payments to
petitioner of the sums of P68,389.25 as back salaries,
P21,387.71 as total accumulated vacation/sick leaves,
P772.75 as Christmas bonus, and the back salaries of Mrs.
Nanie B. Nunal in the sum of P3,096.00, have to be upheld. It
likewise appears that retirement benefits bad also been
collected by petitioner on 1 April 1985.
In respect, however, of the separation pay claimed by
petitioner, we uphold the ruling of the COA reading in part:
Anent the second issue, this Commission believes and so
holds that the instant claim for separation pay in addition to
the retirement benefits earlier received by claimant is bereft of
any legal basis. Culled from the records is the fact that Mr.
Nunal was dismissed from the service on January 29, 1981
and has not been reinstated to the service until his position of
Municipal Administrator of Isabela was abolished. In other
words, he was no longer in, or had already been separated
from, the service when the said position was abolished.
Evidently then, his separation from the service was not
attributable to the abolition of the position but was due to his
dismissal and, therefore, Section 76 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
337 which provides —
'Section 76.-Abolition of Position. When the position of an
official or employee under the civil service is abolished by law
or ordinance, the official or employee so affected shall be
reinstated in another vacant position without diminution of
salary. Should such position not be available, the official or
employee affected shall be granted a separation pay
equivalent to one month salary for every year of service over
and above the monetary privileges granted to officials and
employees under existing law.' cannot be validly invoked as
legal basis for the claim for separation pay. Moreover, the fact
remains that as earlier seen Mr. Nunal has already been paid
his retirement benefits under the existing retirement law. His
entitlement, therefore, to separation pay under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 is offensive to the general policy of the
government prohibiting payment of double retirement benefits
to an employee. (p. 4, COA Decision No. 388; p. 15, Rollo)
To grant double gratuity is unwarranted (See Cajiuat, et al. vs.
Mathay, Sr., G.R. No. L-39743, 124 SCRA 710, September
24, 1983).
It may be that the matter of separation pay was included in the
Compromise Agreement. Nonetheless, it could not be granted
outright but still had to be claimed and passed in audit, and
has been aptly denied by COA. And although petitioner did file
suit against the Municipality for reinstatement, it does not
follow that he was not effectively dismissed such that he could
still be considered an incumbent whose position had been
abolished. A dismissed employee can be considered as not
having left his office only upon reinstatement and should be
given a comparable position and compensation at the time of
reinstatement (Cristobal vs. Melchor, No. L-43203, 101 SCRA
857, December 29, 1980).
Finally, a word on petitioner's contention that the Resolution
of this Court under date of 11 May 1988 is not in accordance
with Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any Court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the Court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the legal basis therefor.
In the first place, our "Resolution" of 11 May 1988 was not a
"Decision" within the meaning of the Constitutional
requirement. This mandate is applicable only in cases
"submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and after the
filing of Briefs or Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the
case may be. It is not applicable to an Order or Resolution
refusing due course to a Petition for Certiorari. In the second
place, the assailed Resolution does state the legal basis for
the dismissal of the Petition and thus complies with the
Constitutional provision. (Tayamura, et al., vs. IAC, et al., G.R.
No. 76355, May 21, 1987 [en banc]; see also Que vs. People,
G.R. Nos. L-75217-18, 154 SCRA 160, September 21, 1987).
It may be added that the Writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65
of the Rules of Court is a prerogative Writ, never demandable
as a matter of right, "never issued except in the exercise of
judicial discretion." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 3d Rev. [8th
ed.]; Francisco, The Revised Rules, 1972 ed., Vol. IV- B, pp.
4546, citing 14 C.J.S., 121-122).
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of this Court of 11 May 1988
is hereby PARTIALLY RECONSIDERED in that the
disallowance by respondent Commission on Audit of the
amounts ordered paid by the Court of First Instance of
Basilan, Branch 1, in its Decision dated 12 December 1984, is
hereby SET ASIDE, but its disallowance of petitioner's claim
for separation pay of P54,092.50, is hereby SUSTAINED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 95
[G.R. Nos. 110817-22. June 13, 1997]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. MARCELINO A. BUGARIN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated February 11,
1993, which the Regional Trial Court, Branch 97 of Quezon
City rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-28785 to 86 and
Q-92-31157 to 31160, finding accused-appellant Marcelino
Bugarin guilty of four counts of consummated rape and one
count of attempted rape and sentencing him as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as charged of multiple (3 Counts) rape and
one count of attempted rape, and in accordance with Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code sentences him to prison terms
as follows:
1) For each of the four counts of the above rape, reclusion
perpetua.
2) For the attempted rape, two (2) years and four (4) months
in the minimum penalty to four (4) years in the maximum
period and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary damages of
P50,000.00 to deter sexual crimes of the sort committed by
accused.
SO ORDERED.
The complainant, Maryjane Bugarin, is the daughter of
accused-appellant. On February 22, 1992, accompanied by
her mother, Regina Bugarin, and her maternal aunt, Nena
Padecio, she complained to the Central Police District
Command that she had been repeatedly raped by accused-
appellant. In her sworn statement she related how, on nine
different occasions between November 1989 and January 17,
1992, her father entered the common sleeping area of their
house in Payatas, Quezon City and, after holding her knees
and spreading her legs, succeeded in inserting his penis into
her vagina and kissed her breasts. She claimed that, on
January 17, 1992, her father molested her by kissing her
vagina and that only by repeatedly kicking him did he desist
from molesting her any further.
Complainant was examined on the same date by Emmanuel
I. Aranas, PNP Medico-Legal Officer, who found that she was
in non-virgin state physically.[2] On February 25, 1992, she
returned to the police station to file formal charges against her
father. The case was referred to the Office of the Quezon City
Prosecutor which found probable cause and accordingly filed
charges for consummated rape and attempted rape by means
of force and intimidation committed on December 23, 1991
and January 17, 1992 against accused-appellant Marcelino
Bugarin. No bail was recommended considering that the
evidence of guilt of the respondent is strong. The cases were
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-28785 and Q-92-
28786 and raffled to Branch 88 of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court.
On May 7, 1992, four more charges for rape by means of force
and intimidation committed on November 1989, May 1990,
June 1990, and March 14, 1991 were filed against accused-
appellant. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-31157 to
31160, the additional cases were raffled to Branch 97 of the
same court. These cases were eventually consolidated and
assigned to Branch 88.
The informations in the six cases alleged as follows:
Crim. Case No. 92-31157
That on or about the month of June 1990 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, wilfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the undersigned MARY JANE BUGARIN
y ASUNCION, a minor, 15 years of age, without her consent
and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
The crime was attended by the aggravating circumstance of
relationship.
Crim. Case No. 92-31158
That on or about the month of November, 1989 in Quezon
City, Philippines, the said accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, wilfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with the undersigned MARY JANE
BUGARIN y ASUNCION without her consent and against her
will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
The crime was attended by the aggravating circumstance of
relationship.
Crim. Case No. 92-31159
That on or about the 14th day of March, 1991 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, wilfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN
y ASUNCION, a minor, 15 years of age, without her consent
and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
The crime was attended by the aggravating circumstance of
relationship.
Crim. Case No. 92-31160
That on or about the month of May 1990 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN
y ASUNCION, a minor, 15 years of age, without her consent
and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
The crime was attended by the aggravating circumstance of
relationship.
Crim. Case No. 92-28785
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1992, in Quezon
City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
designs and by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the
commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts, by then
and there kissing the nipples and the vagina of the
undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN Y ASUNCION, a minor,
and about to lay on top of her, all against her will, however,
the said accused did not perform all the acts of execution
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 96
which would have produced the crime of Rape by reason of
some causes other than his own spontaneous desistance,
that is, undersigned complainant push him away, to the
damage and prejudice of the undersigned in such amount as
may be awarded to her under the provisions of the New Civil
Code.
Crim. Case No. 92-28786
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1991, in Quezon
City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
designs and by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with the undersigned MARYJANE BUGARIN Y
ASUNCION, a minor, without her consent and against her will,
to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be
awarded to her under the provisions of the New Civil Code.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty in
each case, after which trial ensued. Under questioning by the
prosecutor, Maryjane Bugarin narrated how her father
sexually assaulted her in their familys common sleeping area
while no one was at home and threatened her if she told
anyone about what happened.
Accused-appellant denied the charges against him. He
claimed to be God fearing and morally upright and that his
wife, Regina Bugarin, must have induced their daughter to file
the complaints against him because his wife blamed him for
financially neglecting their family since 1989.
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented Regina Bugarin who
testified that a good mother would not expose her child to
humiliation just to get back at her husband. She further
claimed that her daughter, who had been raised properly and
taught to be honest, could not have fabricated the charges
against the accused-appellant.
In a two-page decision, promulgated on February 11, 1993,
the trial court, after giving a summary of the testimonies of the
complainant and accused-appellant, laconically ruled:
The issue is simple. Is the private complainant credible in her
story of how she was raped? The answer of this Court is an
undoubtful and a definite yes.
Accused-appellant questions the trial courts decision on the
ground that: (1) the testimony of Maryjane Bugarin is not
credible; (2) the elements of force and intimidation had not
been proved; and (3) the decision of the trial court does not
state the facts and law upon which it was based.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General, representing the
prosecution, contends that complainant, who was only 15
years old when she reported the crime, was not likely to
concoct charges against her father and that the moral
ascendancy of the father over her took the place of force and
intimidation in rape.
We take up first accused-appellants charge that the decision
of the trial court does not state the grounds therefor. Indeed,
the Constitution provides in part in Art. VIII, 14 that No
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based. This requirement is reiterated and implemented by
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides in Rule
120, 2:
Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgment. - The judgment must
be written in the official language, personally and directly
prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain
clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or
admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment
is based.
If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed
by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there are
any; (b) the participation of the accused in the commission of
the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory
after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and
(d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to
be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there
is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a
separate action has been reserved or waived.
In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the
act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the
judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the
accused in favor of the offended party.
The decision of the trial court falls short of this requirement in
at least three respects. First, it does not contain an evaluation
of the evidence of the parties and a discussion of the legal
questions involved. It does not explain why the trial court
considered the complainants testimony credible despite the
fact that, as accused-appellant points out, complainant could
not remember the time of the day when she was allegedly
raped. It does not explain why accused-appellants licking of
complainants genital constituted attempted rape and not
another crime.Second, the complainant testified that she had
been raped five times, to wit, in November 1989, on December
24, 1989, in June 1990, on March 14, 1991, and on December
23, 1991, and that once, on January 17, 1992, she was
molested by her father who licked her private part, for which
reason six informations were filed against him, but the
decision found the accused-appellant guilty of only four counts
of rape (which the trial court erroneously said three counts)
and one count of attempted rape, without explaining whether
accused-appellant was being acquitted of one charge of rape.
Third, the decision is so carelessly prepared that it finds the
accused-appellant guilty of three counts of consummated
rape but sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each of the four counts of . . . rape.
Maryjane claimed she had been raped on December 24,
1989, but the information in Criminal Case No. Q-92-31160 is
for rape allegedly committed in May 1990. It must be for this
reason that the trial court convicted accused-appellant of only
four counts of rape, instead of five. But the trial court should
have explained so, if this was really the reason, and expressly
acquitted the accused-appellant of the charge under this
information.
The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing
and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which they are based serves many functions. It is
intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the
reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them
appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the findings of
facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees.
More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties
that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the
processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against
the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding by
ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the
Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 97

prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property Q- When you say inside me, what do you mean?
of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the
power of reason for sustained public confidence in the A- His sex organ entered my what, I am fertile.
justness of his decision. The decision of the trial court in this
case disrespects the judicial function.
Q- What do you mean by what?
We would normally remand this case to the trial court for
compliance with the constitutional requirement for decisions. A- My sex organ, sir.
But this case has been pending for sometime and further
delay can be avoided if the Court simply reviews the whole Q- What did you do when your father tried to put his sex organ
evidence. After all, the records of the trial court contain the to your sex organ?
transcript of stenographic notes, the complainants sworn
statement dated February 22, 1992, the resolution of the A- I was trying to push his body away from me, and I said to
prosecutor, and the statement of the arresting officer, on the him, father, I dont like it, ayoko po.
basis of which the Court may properly decide the case.[3] For
this reason the Court has decided to review this case despite
the failure of the trial court to make detailed findings of facts Q- Despite your pleas, what happened next?
and a statement of the reasons underlying its decision.
A- He still continued what he is doing, and when I fainted, he
Now it is settled that when the complainant in a rape case, suddenly moved back.
more so if she is a minor,[4] testifies that she has been raped,
she says, in effect, all that is necessary to prove the Q- After he moved back, what transpired afterwards?
commission of the crime.[5] Care must be taken, however,
that her testimony is credible for a conviction to be justified
A- He went out and I was left crying.
based on her testimony alone.[6] In this case, Maryjane
Bugarin testified on November 25, 1992[7] as follows:
Q- After this first incident, were there any other similar incident
which happened, if any?
Q- On November 1989, was your father residing with you or
was he living with you?
A- There are, sir, but I cant recall when.
A- Yes, sir.
Q- How many times more or less?
Q- Now, on November, 1989 do you remember any unusual
incident that happened, if any? A- Around four (4) times.

A- Yes, sir, when he entered the room. Q- After November 1989?

Q- When you say he, are you referring to Marcelino Bugarin? A- Including November 1989.

A- Yes, sir. Q- How about on December 24, 1989, do you remember

where you were?
Q- If Marcelino Bugarin is present today, would you be able to
identify him? A- Yes, sir. I was in our house.

A- Yes, sir. (witness is pointing to a man wearing a green t-
shirt who answers by the name Marcelino Bugarin when
asked by the Court).
Q- On November 1989, you were mentioning that he, referring
to the accused, entered your room, what happened?
Q- Do you remember any unusual or extraordinary incident
that happened on December 24, 1989?
A- Yes, sir. It is the same thing that he did to me.
Q- Please explain what the same thing he do to you?

A- (witness crying) When he entered the room, he embraced A- He embraced and kissed me on my cheek, my neck and
me and touched the different parts of my body and he also my breast.
informed me that when I grow up, I would not become
innocent.
Q- What happened next?

Q- What do you mean by those words that he told you that

A- He was spreading my legs.
when you grow up you would not be innocent?

Q- Then, after spreading your legs, what did the accused do?
A- So that when I grow up I will know what he will be doing.

A- He let his sex organ touched my sex organ.

Q- What did he do?

Q- After that, what happened next?

A- He touched my knees and spread them out and then
holding my breast and he put his sex organ inside me.
A- I cried again.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 98
Q- When you cried again, what did your father do, if any?
A- His face became scaring.
Q- Now, after December 24, 1989 incident, do you remember
where you were sometime in June 1990?
A- I was in our house.
Q- Specifically, in June of 1990, do you remember any
unusual incident that happened?
A- The same thing happened, over and over.
Q- What do you mean by the same thing happened, over and
over?
A- He would embraced me and then kissed me and touched
my breast and kissed my nipples.
Q- And, besides in embracing, kissing and kissing your
nipples, what else did your father do on June 1990?
A- He kissed also my sex organ.
Q- Beside kissing your sex organ, what else did he do, if any?
A- He placed inside my sex organ his sex organ.
Q- In March 14, 1991, where were you?
A- I was also in our house.
Q- Do you remember what happened, if any, On March 14,
1991?
A- Thats it again, I was in the room and again he embraced
me made me lie down then kiss my sex organ and then, he
placed again his sex organ inside my sex organ.
Q- How about December 23, 1991, do you remember where
you were?
A- I was also in the house.
Q- What happened?
A- I was lying down and he lied there beside me and told me
to accede to his desire.
Q- What do you mean to accede to his desire?
A- He wanted to use me again.
Q- Then, he actually used you?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- Now, on January 17, 1992, do you remember where you
were?
A- I was also in our house.
Q- Would you kindly tell what happened in your house on this
day?
A- He licked my sex organ.
Q- After that, what did he do next?
A- He was threatening me.
Q- What did you do when he threatened you?
A- I was so afraid. (witness is crying)
Q- What did the accused to after threatening you?
A- He was doing nothing. He was just walking beside me.
Q- What happened after you saw him walking just beside you
on that date?
A- None, sir. I was just crying.
The accused-appellant claims that Maryjanes testimony
contains inconsistencies which indicate that the charges
against him were fabricated. He points to the failure of
complainant on cross-examination to state in some instances
the exact date and time she was allegedly raped, and to the
fact that it took complainant two years before reporting the
incidents and that the prosecution did not present the medico-
legal officer who examined the complainant. Accused-
appellant also claims that no evidence was adduced to prove
that the rape was committed by force and intimidation.
The failure of the complainant to state in some cases the exact
date and time of the commission of rape is a minor matter and
can be expected when a witness is recounting the details of a
humiliating experience which are painful and difficult to recall
in open court and in the presence of other people.[8] Indeed,
this Court has ruled that complainants failure to recall some
details of the crime, instead of suggesting prevarication,
precisely indicates spontaneity and is to be expected from a
witness who is of tender age and unaccustomed to court
proceedings.
Besides, the date of the commission of the rape is not an
essential element of the crime.[9] The precise time of the
crime has no substantial bearing on its commission,[10]
especially since in this case the date and time of the
commission of the crime is not material to the accused-
appellants defense. Indeed, accused-appellants contention is
only that he could not have raped his daughter in the common
bedroom at nighttime because the place where they sleep is
shut off from the rest of their house by a curtain.
Suffice it to state that lust is no respecter of time and place.[11]
Our cases record instances of rape committed inside family
dwellings when other occupants are asleep.[12] In the case at
bar, Maryjane testified that the accused-appellant was able to
rape her by sending out her siblings to play with their
neighbors children, and while her mother was at work from 3
p.m. to 11 p.m. Complainant explained her apparent inability
to recall the exact dates of the assaults upon her, thus:
Q- Madam witness, you mentioned that you were raped
sometime November 1989, June 1990, December 24, 1989,
March 14, 1991, December 23, 1991, how come that you
knew very well the date as December 24, March 14,
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 99
December 23; or rather, how come that your complaint is only
sometime in the early part of 1991?
A- I remember because that was closed to the birthday of my
brother.
Q- How about March 14, how come you knew very well that
you were molested by your father?
A- Because at that time, our class will almost end and we were
given clearances.
Q- What day is your last school day?
A- I cannot remember, sir.
Q- Is it usual that you knew very well March 14, and you do
not know very well your last day of your school day?
A- Because March 14 is our clearance.
Neither does the delay in making a criminal accusation impair
the credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily
explained.[13] In People v. Coloma,[14] where the
complainant was also only 13 years old when first molested
by her father, the Court adverted to the fathers moral and
physical control over the young complainant in explaining the
delay of eight years before the complaint against her father
was made. In this case, Maryjane must have been
overwhelmed by fear and confusion, and shocked that her
own father had defiled her. After all, she had been very close
to him. She also testified that she was afraid to tell her mother
because the latter might be angered, so that she finally
confided to her aunt. Indeed, a survey conducted by the
University of the Philippines Center for Womens Studies
showed that victims of rape committed by their fathers took
much longer in reporting the incidents to the authorities than
did other victims. Many factors account for this difference: the
fact that the father lives with the victim and constantly exerts
moral authority over her, the threat he might make against her,
the victims fear of her mother and other relatives.
Nor is it entirely true that no evidence of force and intimidation
had been adduced during the trial. Maryjane testified that she
tried to resist her fathers advances but, on several occasions,
she was overpowered by him. She was embraced and thus
prevented from escaping.[15] At other times she was
intimidated by menacing looks cast on her[16] and by threats
of harm.[17] Indeed, even if there was no violence or force
employed against her, the moral influence of accused-
appellant over the complainant sufficed to make the crime
rape.[18]
Nor is a medical examination an indispensable element in
prosecutions for rape.[19] That the prosecution did not present
the medico-legal officer is, therefore, not an obstacle to a
finding of guilt in this case.
We think the evidence in this case proves beyond all
reasonable doubt that Maryjane had been raped on four
occasions by accused-appellant: November 1989, June 1990,
March 14, 1991, and December 23, 1991. Complainant has
no motive to incriminate her father. To the contrary, she
testified that she was close to him. The absence of a motive
lends greater credence to her testimony.[20] Neither does her
mother have any reason to falsely accuse Marcelino Bugarin.
Regina Bugarin suspected her husband of having an affair
with her sister in 1980 and confronted him, but she continued
to live with him. This fact makes it unlikely that she would use
her daughter to destroy her husband more than ten years
later. A mother would not expose her child to public trial, if the
charges she makes are not true.[21]
We find no evidence, however, to find accused-appellant
guilty of the charge in Criminal Case No. Q-92-31160 for
alleged rape committed in May 1990. There is no evidence to
prove that accused-appellant raped complainant on that date.
Her testimony is to the effect that she was raped on another
date, December 24, 1989. But accused-appellant cannot be
convicted for this as no complaint was formally filed regarding
it. Accused-appellant must accordingly be acquitted of the
charge in Criminal Case No. Q-92-31160.
Nor do we think that accused-appellant is guilty of attempted
rape committed on January 17, 1992 as the trial court held.
Maryjane testified:
Q- Now, on January 17, 1992, do you remember where you
were?
A- I was also in our house.
Q- Would you kindly tell what happened in your house on this
day?
A- He licked my sex organ.
Q- After that, what did he do next?
A- He was threatening me.
Q- What did you do when he threatened you?
A- I was so afraid. (witness is crying)
Q- What did the accused to after threatening you?
A- He was doing nothing. He was just walking beside me.
Q- What happened after you saw him walking just beside you
on that date?
A- None, sir. I was just crying.
The intent to commit rape is not apparent from the act
described. It cannot be inferred from this act (licking
complainants genital) alone that his intention was to have
sexual intercourse with her because it has not been shown
that he had at least placed himself on top of the
complainant.[22] The act imputed to him cannot be considered
a preparatory act to sexual intercourse.[23] Accused-
appellant is instead guilty of acts of lasciviousness. It can at
least be inferred from his act of kissing the genital of the
complainant that he was moved by lewd designs.[24]
Although relationship, as an aggravating circumstance, is
alleged only in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-31157 to 31160, this
circumstance was nonetheless proved during the trial
inCriminal Case No. Q-92-28785 and, therefore, should also
be appreciated in that case to justify the imposition of the
penalty in its maximum period.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 11, 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is SET ASIDE and
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 100

another one is RENDERED finding accused-appellant

Marcelino Bugarin GUILTY of four counts of consummated
rape in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-92-28786, Q-92-31157, Q-92-
31158, and Q-92-31159 and SENTENCED to reclusion
perpetua and ORDERED to INDEMNIFY the complainant
Maryjane Bugarin in the amount of P30,000.00 in damages for
each count of rape committed; and of acts of lasciviousness
in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28785, for which he is
SENTENCED to suffer imprisonment from 6 months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to six 6 years of prision correccional, as
maximum.

In Criminal Case No. Q-92-31160, accused-appellant is

hereby ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Torres, Jr., JJ.,

concur.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 101
G.R. No. 104874 December 14, 1993
DANILO HERNANDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Marcelo Y. Hernandez for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for People of the Philippines.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 05877, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, FINDING the decision appealed from to be in
accordance with law and evidence, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED except as to Criminal Case No. 21-87 where, for
reasons above discussed, the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED (Rollo, p. 33).
CA-G.R. CR No. 05877 was an appeal by petitioner from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cavite City in
Criminal Cases Nos. 21-87 to 29-87, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds Danilo
Hernandez guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the following
cases: Crim. Case No. 21-87, for Estafa and he is hereby
ordered sentenced to an indeterminate prison term from
Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
minimum to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum and to pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in
the amount of P150,000.00 corresponding to the value of
jewelries embezzled and unreturned and to pay the costs;
Crim. Case No. 22-87, for Estafa, he is hereby ordered
sentenced for an indeterminate prison term of Twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum to
Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal. as maximum and to
pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in the amount of
P100,000.00 for the value of the jewelries embezzled and to
pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 23-87, Violation of BP 22, he is
hereby sentenced to eight (8) months of prision correccional
and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 25-87, for Estafa, he is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from
Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
minimum to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum and to pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in
the amount of P250,000.00 for the value of the jewelries
embezzled and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 26-87, for
Viol. of BP 22, he is hereby sentenced to eight (8) months of
prision correccional and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 27-
87, for Estafa, he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term of from Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as minimum to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the offended party
Remedios de Leon in the amount of P280,000.00 for the value
of jewelries embezzled and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No.
28-87, for Estafa, he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term of from twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as minimum to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the offended party
Remedios de Leon in the amount of P100,000.00 value of the
jewelries embezzled and to pay the costs; Crim. case No. 29-
87, for Viol. of BP 22, he is hereby sentenced to eight (8)
months of prision correccional, and to pay the costs (Rollo, pp.
49-50).
It appears that sometime in August 1986, petitioner was
introduced to Remedios de Leon by his aunt, as one engaged
in the business of buying and selling jewelry (TSN, March 17,
1987, pp. 18, 20).
In their first transaction, petitioner paid in cash the several
pieces of jewelry which he bought from de Leon. In their
subsequent dealings, petitioner either paid in cash or by way
of postdated checks (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 22-23). On
one occasion, petitioner issued post-dated checks with the
aggregate amount of P275,000.00. These checks bounced.
However, upon notice of dishonor by the drawee banks
concerned, petitioner paid de Leon cash in exchange for the
dishonored checks. Some checks were likewise exchanged
with cash even prior to their due date (TSN, March 17, 1987,
pp. 33, 37).
Several days before October 20, 1986, petitioner told de Leon
that he was interested in buying some more pieces of jewelry
(TSN, March 17, 1987, p. 60). On that date, at around 10:00
A.M., petitioner, together with his common-law wife,
Rosemarie Rodriguez, and two other companions, went to the
house of de Leon in Cavite City (TSN, March 17, 1987, p. 70).
Petitioner selected a pair of 2-carat diamond earrings worth
P150,000.00 for which he issued BPI Check No. 798246
payable to "cash" in the said amount and post-dated it to
October 26, 1986. The amount of the check was filled in by
Rosemarie Rodriguez and petitioner affixed his signature as
drawer (TSN, March 17, 1987, p. 69).
Petitioner and Rodriguez returned to de Leon's house at about
7:00 P.M. and bought one choker with 20 diamond stones and
one bracelet with 16 diamond stones, for which he issued BPI
Check No. 798247 payable to "cash" in the amount of
P250,000.00 and postdated it to October 27, 1986. Petitioner
specifically instructed de Leon to give him one week to confer
with his buyer before de Leon negotiates the check. The check
was also prepared by Rodriguez and signed by petitioner
(TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 73-79).
In the evening of October 22, 1986, petitioner again went to
the house of de Leon and bought one heart-shaped diamond
set. In payment thereof, he issued BPI Check No. 798248
payable to "cash" in the amount of P280,000.00 and post-
dated it to November 9, 1986 (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 84-
89).
On October 23, 1986, petitioner made a long-distance call to
de Leon and inquired whether she still had jewelry for sale.
When she said that she did, petitioner made an appointment
with her. Petitioner arrived at de Leon's house at around 2:30
P.M. The two went to a restaurant, where petitioner selected
a set of earrings and a ring, each piece with a 1-carat diamond
(TSN, March 31, 1987, pp. 15-16). In payment for the set,
petitioner issued to de Leon BPI Check No. 798250 payable
to "cash" in the amount of P100,000.00 and dated that same
day (October 23, 1992). Petitioner told de Leon that the check
was funded and that she could even withdraw the amount on
that day. De Leon did not encash the check for the bank was
closed (TSN, March 31, 1987, pp. 16, 19).
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 102
In the evening of October 24, 1986, petitioner with Rodriguez
went to de Leon's house and bought a 5-carat diamond piece.
In payment thereof, petitioner indorsed to de Leon ASB Check
No. 245964 in the amount of P150,000.00 post-dated to
November 10, 1986 and issued by one Enrique Araneta (TSN,
March 31, 1987, pp. 21-26).
BPI Checks Nos. 798246, 798247 and 798250 were drawn
against insufficient funds, while BPI Check no. 798248 and
ASB Check No. 245964 were drawn against a closed account.
Petitioner was charged in nine informations with estafa and
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges
(Rollo, pp. 16-17).
After a joint trial, petitioner was convicted of the nine charges
in a joint decision.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the conviction of petitioner
was affirmed as to Criminal Cases nos. 22-87, 23-87, 24-87,
25-87, 26-87, 27-87, 28-87 and 29-87, and reversed as to
Criminal Case No. 21-87.
In this petition, petitioner claims that his conviction of nine
distinct offenses subject of nine separate informations in a
single judgment is reversible error, This contention is
untenable.
The case of United States v. Tanjuatco, 1 Phil. 116, relied
upon by petitioner, is distinguishable from the instant case. In
Tanjuatco, we held that the trial court improperly rendered a
single judgment for two offenses in one of the two criminal
cases, in the absence of a consolidation of the two cases. In
the case at bench, the trial court rendered a judgment for each
of the nine separate informations, albeit in the same decision.
We further stated in Tanjuatco that the trial court violated "an
essential right of the accused, inasmuch as he is entitled,
although accused of two offenses, to a trial in each of the two
cases upon the proofs adduced in each individual case, and
upon the allegations set forth in each information. It is not
permissible to take into account or consider in one case the
facts proved in the other, and vice versa" (at pp. 117-118).
The trial of the nine criminal cases was conducted jointly
without any objection from petitioner. Even had he signified
his opposition to the joint trail, such opposition would have
been unavailing. A consolidation of trails, at the court's
discretion, is allowed in "charges for offenses founded on the
same facts, or forming part of a series of offenses of similar
character" (1985 Rules on Criminal procedure, Rule 119, Sec.
14).
Petitioner also complains that while he assigned eight errors,
the Court of Appeals did not make a complete findings of fact
as to the last two assigned errors (Rollo, pp. 11-12).
In the last two assigned errors, petitioner claims that the trial
court erred:
VII
IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 21-87
TO 29-87 NOTWITHSTANDING ABSENCE OF
INCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND PRESENCE OF
NUMEROUS PROOFS NEGATING THE SOUNDNESS OF
SUCH VERDICT.
VIII
IN PRONOUNCING THE ACCUSED, THROUGH A SINGLE
JUDGMENT, GUILTY OF ALL THE NINE DISTINCT
OFFENSES COVERED BY THE NINE SEPARATE
INFORMATIONS SUBJECT MATTER OF CRIMINAL CASES
NOS. 21-87 TO 29-87, INCLUSIVE (Rollo, p. 56).
Obviously, the Court of Appeals did not deem it necessary to
make a separate findings of fact for said assigned errors,
because they were just the necessary consequences of the
previous, assigned errors.
Petitioner next questions: (i) as violative of the constitutional
mandate that decisions shall contain the facts and the law on
which they are based (1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, sec. 14,
par. 1), the decision of the Court of Appeals which merely
adopted the statement of facts of the Solicitor general in the
appellee's brief, and (ii) as violative of the constitutional
mandate requiring that any denial of a motion for
reconsideration must state the legal basis thereof (1987
Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2), the denial of his motion
of reconsideration on the basis of a comparison of said motion
with the "comment thereon" (Rollo, pp. 10-12).
In its decision the Court of Appeals merely stated: "The facts
of the case as summarized in the Appellee's Brief are as
follows: " and the quoted in full the statement of facts of the
Solicitor General (Rollo, p. 20). According to petitioner, the
Court of Appeals did not make its own "independent judicial
opinion" by such act of adopting the statement of facts made
by the advance party (Rollo, p. 11).
What the Court of Appeals, in effect, said was that it found the
facts as presented by the Solicitor General as supported by
the evidence. The constitutional mandate only requires that
the decision should state the facts on which it is based. There
is no proscription made in the briefs or memoranda of the
parties, instead of rewriting the same in its own words.
Precisely briefs or memoranda are required in order to aid the
courts in the writing of decisions.
We note that aside from adopting the statement of facts of the
Solicitor General, the Court of Appeals also made findings of
facts in the course of its discussion of the assignment of
errors.
As to the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the Court of
Appeals stated in its Resolution dated March 30, 1992:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused-
appellant of the decision dated December 13, 1991 and the
comment thereon of the Solicitor General, the Court finds no
cogent reason that could justify a modification or reversal of
the decision sought to be reconsidered.
Accordingly, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit (Rollo, p. 35).
The denial, therefore, was based on the ground that the Court
of Appeals did not find any "cogent reason that could justify a
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 103

modification or reversal of the decision sought to be
reconsidered."
Petitioner claims that the decision of the trial court is not
supported by the evidence, which is contrary to the findings of
the Court of Appeals that said decision is "in accordance with
law and the evidence" (Rollo, p. 12). He points out that the
appellate court should not have believed the trial court's
conclusion that "the sole testimony of the offended party
would have sufficed to sustain her assertions (Rollo, p. 47).
He claims that self-serving declarations of a party favorable to
himself are not admissible and that none of the alleged
witnesses to the transactions were presented.
The common objection known as "self-serving" is not correct
because almost all testimonies are self-serving. The proper
basis for objection is "hearsay" (Wenke, Making and Meeting
Objections, 69).
Petitioner fails to take into account the distinction between
self-serving statements and testimonies made in court. Self-
serving statements are those made by a party out of court
advocating his own interest; they do not include a party's
testimony as a witness in court (National Development Co. v.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, 19 SCRA 861
[1967]).
The trial court based the civil indemnity on the actual price of
the jewelry as agreed upon by petitioner and de Leon at the
time of the transactions and this is reflected by the face value
of the checks.
Petitioner further contends that the trial court erred in
admitting the checks in evidence without the prosecution first
proving that his signature on the checks were authentic (Rollo,
pp. 13-14). If petitioner claims that his signatures on the
checks were forged, the burden is on him to prove such fact.
He who alleges must prove his allegations.
In the trial court, petitioner presented a certification issued by
the San Juan Police Station to the effect that he reported as
lost several blank checks, to wit: BPI Checks Nos. 798246,
798247, 798248, 798249, and 798250, and AB Check No.
245964. We agree with the trial court when it gave little weight
to the certification. Like the trial court, we wonder why
petitioner never filed a criminal case against de Leon, if said
checks were really stolen.
Lastly, petitioner contends that because "the amounts
covered by the checks were deposited by the offended party
in her savings account with the Prudential Bank, it becomes
the liability of the bank by its acceptance to pay for the
amounts of the checks" (Rollo, pp. 14-15).

Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the
adverse party is not given the opportunity for cross-
examination, and their admission would encourage fabrication
of testimony. This cannot be said of a party's testimony in
court made under oath, with full opportunity on the part of the
opposing party for cross-examination.
The case of Banco de Oro v. Equitable Banking Corporation,
157 SCRA 188 (1988) cited by petitioner as authority, dealt
with the negligence of a collecting bank which facilitated the
payment by the drawee bank of the value of a check with a
forged endorsement and signature of the payee. No such
issue is involved in the case at bench.

It is not true that none of the alleged witnesses to the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the
transactions was presented in court (Rollo, p. 13). Yolanda Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs de oficio.
Dela Rosa, an eye-witness to some of the transactions,
testified for the prosecution. Assuming that Dela Rosa was not SO ORDERED.
presented as a witness, the testimony of de Leon sufficed to
sustain the conviction of petitioner. The conviction of an
accused may be on the basis of the testimony of a single Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
witness (People v. Rumeral, 200 SCRA 194 [1991]). In
determining the value and credibility of evidence, witnesses
are to be weighed, not counted (People v. Villalobos, 209
SCRA 304 [1992] ).

Petitioner also contends that while he was condemned by the

trial court to pay civil indemnity, no evidence was actually
presented in court to prove the existence, ownership and
worth of the pieces of jewelry other than the checks (Rollo, p.
14).

The existence of the jewelry was established by de Leon

herself, who testified that petitioner even selected the pieces
of jewelry before buying them.

As to the ownership of the jewelry, we held in People v. Dy,

109 SCRA 400 [1981] that:

Ownership is not a necessary element of the crime of estafa,

. . . In estafa, the person prejudiced or then immediate victim
of the fraud need not be the owner of the goods. This, Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "Any person who
shall defraud another (it does say 'owner') by any means
mentioned herein below shall be punished . . . ." All that is
necessary is that the loss should have fallen on someone
other than the perpetrators of the crime. . . ." (at p. 408).
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 104
[G.R. No. 132428. October 24, 2000]
GEORGE YAO, petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, George Yao (hereafter
YAO) assails the 25 April 1995 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16893 which dismissed his appeal
and ordered the remand of the records of the case to the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 52, Caloocan* City (hereafter
MeTC) for execution. YAO was convicted by said MeTC for
unfair competition.
YAOs legal dilemma commenced in June 1990 when the
Philippine Electrical Manufacturing Company (hereafter
PEMCO) noticed the proliferation locally of General Electric
(GE) lamp starters. As the only local subsidiary of GE-USA,
PEMCO knew that it was a highly unlikely market situation
considering that no GE starter was locally manufactured or
imported since 1983.PEMCO commissioned Gardsmarks,
Inc. to conduct a market survey. Gardsmarks, Inc., thru its
trademark specialist, Martin Remandaman, discovered that
thirty (30) commercial establishments sold GE starters. All
these establishments pointed to Tradeway Commercial
Corporation (hereafter TCC) as their source. Remandaman
was able to purchase from TCC fifty (50) pieces of fluorescent
lamp starters with the GE logo and design. Assessing that
these products were counterfeit, PEMCO applied for the
issuance of a search warrant. This was issued by the MeTC,
Branch 49, Caloocan City. Eight boxes, each containing
15,630 starters, were thereafter seized from the TCC
warehouse in Caloocan City.
Indicted before the MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City for unfair
competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code were
YAO, who was TCCs President and General Manager, and
Alfredo Roxas, a member of TCCs Board of Directors. The
indictment[1] charged YAO and Roxas of having mutually and
in conspiracy sold fluorescent lamp starters which have the
General Electric (GE) logo, design and containers, making
them appear as genuine GE fluorescent lamp starters; and
inducing the public to believe them as such, when they were
in fact counterfeit. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. C-155713.
Both accused pleaded not guilty. At the trial, the prosecution
presented evidence tending to establish the foregoing
narration of facts. Further, the State presented witnesses Atty.
Hofilena of the Castillo Laman Tan and Pantaleon Law Offices
who underwent a familiarization seminar from PEMCO in 1990
on how to distinguish a genuine GE starter from a counterfeit,
and Allan de la Cruz, PEMCOs marketing manager. Both
described a genuine GE starter as having a stenciled silk-
screen printing which includes the GE logo... back to back
around the starter, a drumlike glowbulb and a
condenser/capacitor shaped like an M&M candy with the
numbers .006." They then compared and examined random
samples of the seized starters with the genuine GE products.
They concluded that the seized starters did not possess the
full design complement of a GE original. They also observed
that some of the seized starters did not have capacitors or if
they possessed capacitors, these were not shaped like M&M.
Still others merely had sticker jackets with prints of the GE
logo. Mr. de la Cruz added that only Hankuk Stars of Korea
manufactured GE starters and if these were imported by
PEMCO, they would cost P7.00 each locally. As TCCs starters
cost P1.60 each, the witnesses agreed that the glaring
differences in the packaging, design and costs indisputably
proved that TCCs GE starters were counterfeit.
The defense presented YAO as its lone witness. YAO
admitted that as general manager, he has overall supervision
of the daily operation of the company. As such, he has the
final word on the particular brands of products that TCC would
purchase and in turn sold. He also admitted that TCC is not
an accredited distributor of GE starters. However, he
disclaimed liability for the crime charged since (1) he had no
knowledge or information that the GE starters supplied to TCC
were fake; (2) he had not attended any seminar that helped
him determine which TCC products were counterfeit; (3) he
had no participation in the manufacture, branding, stenciling
of the GE names or logo in the starters; (4) TCCs suppliers of
the starters delivered the same already branded and boxed;
and (5) he only discussed with the suppliers matters regarding
pricing and peak-volume items.
In its 13-page 20 October 1993 decision,[2] the MeTC
acquitted Roxas but convicted YAO. In acquitting Roxas, the
trial court declared that the prosecution failed to prove that he
was still one of the Board of Directors at the time the goods
were seized. It anchored its conviction of YAO on the
following: (1) YAOs admission that he knew that the starters
were not part of GEs line products when he applied with
PEMCO for TCCs accreditation as distributor; (2) the
prosecutions evidence (Exhibit G-7), a delivery receipt dated
25 May 1989 issued by Country Supplier Center, on which a
TCC personnel noted that the 2000 starters delivered were
GE starters despite the statement therein that they were China
starters; this fact gave rise to a presumption that the TCC
personnel knew of the anomaly and that YAO as general
manager and overall supervisor knew and perpetrated the
deception of the public; (3) the fact that no genuine GE starter
could be sold from 1986 whether locally manufactured or
imported or at the very least in such large commercial quantity
as those seized from TCC; and (4) presence of the elements
of unfair competition.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
For the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused, Alfredo Roxas, of Unfair Competition under Article
189 (1) of the Revised Penal Code ... i.e., to prove that he was
Chairman of the Board of the Tradeway Commercial
Corporation on October 10, 1990, as well as to have him
identified in open court during the trial, he is acquitted of the
same.
But because the prosecution proved the guilt of the other
accused, George Yao, beyond reasonable doubt as principal
under the said Article 189 (1) for Unfair Competition, he is
convicted of the same. In the absence of any aggravating or
mitigating circumstances alleged/proven, and considering the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is
sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and twenty-one
(21) days of arresto mayor to a maximum of one (1) year and
five (5) months of prision correccional.
This case was prosecuted by the law offices of Castillo Laman
Tan and Pantaleon for ... PEMCO ... Considering that no
document was submitted by the private complainant to show
how the claim ofP300,000 for consequential damages was
reached and/or computed, the court is not in a position to
make a pronouncement on the whole amount. However, the
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 105
offender, George Yao, is directed to pay PEMCO the amount
of P20,000 by way of consequential damages under Article
2202 of the New Civil Code, and to pay the law offices of
Castillo, Laman Tan and Pantaleon the amount of another
P20,000.00 as PEMCOs attorneys fees under Article 2208
(11) of the same.
This decision should have been promulgated in open court on
July 28, 1993 but the promulgation was reset for August 31,
1993 in view of the absence of parties; it was again re-set for
today.
Promulgated this 20th day of October, 1993 in Kalookan City,
Philippines.[3]
YAO filed a motion for reconsideration, which the MeTC
denied in its order[4] of 7 March 1994.
YAO appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
(RTC). The appeal was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-
47255(94) and was assigned to Branch 121 of the court.
On 24 May 1994, Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of
Branch 121 issued an order[5] directing the parties to file their
respective memoranda.
On 4 July 1994 YAO filed his Appeal Memorandum.[6]
Without waiting for the Memorandum on Appeal of the
prosecution, which was filed only on 20 August 1994,[7] Judge
Adoracion Angeles rendered on 27 July 1994 a one-page
Decision[8] which affirmed in toto the MeTC decision. In so
doing, she merely quoted the dispositive portion of the MeTC
and stated that [a]after going over the evidence on record, the
Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the
Metropolitan Trial Court.
YAO filed a motion for reconsideration[9] and assailed the
decision as violative of Section 2, Rule 20 of the Rules of
Court.[10] In its order[11] of 28 September 1994, the RTC
denied the motion for reconsideration as devoid of merit and
reiterated that the findings of the trial court are entitled to great
weight on appeal and should not be disturbed on appeal
unless for strong and cogent reasons.
On 4 October 1994, YAO appealed to the Court of Appeals by
filing a notice of appeal.[12]
The appealed case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 16893.
In its Resolution[13] of 28 February 1995, the Court of Appeals
granted YAO an extension of twenty (20) days from 10
February or until 12 March 1995 within which to file the
Appellants Brief. However, on 25 April 1995 the Court of
Appeals promulgated a Resolution[14] declaring that [t]he
decision rendered on July 27, 1994 by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 121, has long become final and executory and
ordering the records of the case remanded to said court for
the proper execution of judgment. The pertinent portion of the
Resolution reads:
In Our resolution, dated February 28, 1995, accused-
appellant was granted an extension of twenty (20) days from
February 10, 1995, or until March 12, 1995 within which to file
appellants brief.
To date, no appellants brief has been filed.
From the Manifestation, filed on March 24, 1995, by City
Prosecutor Gabriel N. dela Cruz, Kalookan City, it would
appear that:
xxx
2. George Yao received a copy of the RTCs decision on
August 16, 1994, and filed a motion for reconsideration on
August 30, 1994. On October 3, 1994, George Yao received
a copy of the RTCs order, dated September 28, 1994, denying
his motion for reconsideration.
3. On October 4, 1994, George Yao filed a notice of appeal by
registered mail.
We will assume from the said Manifestation that the decision
of the RTC and the order denying YAOs motion for
reconsideration were sent to and received by YAOs counsel.
Proceeding from said assumption, Yao had fifteen (15) days
from August 16, 1994 to elevate his case to this Court. On
August 30, 1994, or fourteen (14) days thereafter, Yao filed a
motion for reconsideration. When he received the Order
denying his aforesaid motion on October 3, 1994, he had one
more day left to elevate his case to this Court by the proper
mode of appeal, which is by petition for review. Yao, however,
on October 4, 1994, filed a notice of appeal by registered mail
informing the RTC that he is appealing his conviction to the
Court of Appeals. By then, the fifteen (15) day period had
already elapsed.
That notwithstanding, the Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch
121, transmitted to this Court the entire records of the case,
thru a transmittal letter, dated October 13, 1994, and received
by the Criminal Section of this Court on October 28, 1994.
YAOs counsel, on February 20, 1995, filed with this Court, a
motion for extension of period to file brief for accused-
appellant which was granted in Our resolution mentioned in
the opening paragraph of this resolution.
Petitions for review shall be filed within the period to appeal.
This period has already elapsed even when Yao filed a notice
of appeal by registered mail, with the RTC of Kalookan City.
Worse, the notice of appeal is procedurally infirm.
YAO filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment
contending that the 25 April 1995 resolution did not specifically
dismiss the appeal, for which reason, there was no
judgmenton which an entry of judgment could be issued. He
also argued that the attendant procedural infirmities in the
appeal, if any, were cured with the issuance of the 28
February 1995 resolution granting him twenty (20) days from
10 February 1995 or until 12 March 1995 within which to file
an appellants brief and in compliance thereto, consequently
filed his appellants brief on 2 March 1995.[15]
In its Resolution[16] of 26 January 1998, the Court of Appeals
denied the Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Judgment
for lack of merit. It considered the 25 April 1995 resolution as
having in effect dismissed the appeal, [hence] the Entry of
Judgment issued on May 26, 1995... was proper.
In this petition for review on certiorari, YAO reiterates the
arguments he raised in his Urgent Motion to Set Aside the
Entry of Judgment of the Court of Appeals, thus: (1) that the
entry of judgment was improvidently issued in the absence of
a final resolution specifically dismissing the appeal; (2) the
procedural infirmity in the appeal, if any, has been cured; and
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 106
(3) the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying him (YAO) due
process of law.
In support of his first argument, YAO cites Section 1, Rule 11
of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, thus:
SEC. 1. Entry of Judgment. -- Unless a motion for
reconsideration is filed or an appeal is taken to the Supreme
Court, judgments and final resolutions of the Court of Appeals
shall be entered upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days after
notice to parties.
YAO claims that the 25 April 1995 resolution of the Court of
Appeals was not a judgment on his appeal nor was it a final
resolution contemplated in the Internal Rules since it did not
specifically dismiss his appeal. A fortiori, the entry of judgment
was improvidently issued for lack of legal basis.
YAO also repeats his argument that any procedural infirmity
in the appeal was cured when the RTC gave due course to
the appeal, elevated the records to the Court of Appeals which
in turn issued on 13 December 1994 a notice to file his
Appellants Brief and granted him until 12 March 1995 within
which to file the appellants brief.
Finally, YAO asserts that he was denied due process
considering that (1) none of the elements of unfair competition
are present in this case; (2) he filed his appeal to the Court of
Appeals within the reglementary period; and (3)
notwithstanding his filing of a notice of appeal (instead of a
petition for review), it was a mere procedural lapse, a
technicality which should not bar the determination of the case
based on intrinsic merits. YAO then invokes the plethora of
jurisprudence wherein the Supreme Court in the exercise of
equity jurisdiction decided to disregard technicalities; decided
[the case] on merits and not on technicalities; found manifest
in the petition strong considerations of substantial justice
necessitating the relaxing of the stringent application of
technical rules, or heeded petitioners cry for justice because
the basic merits of the case warrant so, as where the petition
embodies justifying circumstances; discerned not to sacrifice
justice to technicality; discovered that the application of res
judicata and estoppel by judgment amount to a denial of
justice and or a bar to a vindication of a legitimate
grievance.[17]
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that
the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit. It maintains
that although the 25 April 1995 resolution did not specifically
state that the appeal was being dismissed, the intent and
import are clear and unequivocable. It asserts that the appeal
was obviously dismissed because the RTC decision has long
become final and executory. YAO failed to challenge the RTC
decision, within the reglementary period, by filing a petition for
review of the same with the Court of appeals pursuant to
Section 1 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Instead, he filed an
ordinary appeal by way of a notice of appeal. Hence, the
period to file the correct procedural remedy had lapsed.
There is no dispute that YAO availed of the wrong procedural
remedy in assailing the RTC decision. It is clear from the
records that YAO received a copy of the adverse RTC
judgment on 16 August 1994. He has fifteen (15) days or until
31 August 1994 within which to file either a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. Fourteen (14) days thereafter or on 30 August 1994,
YAO opted to file a motion for reconsideration the pendency
of which tolled the running of the period. He received a copy
of the RTCs order denying the motion for reconsideration on
3 October 1994. He had therefore, only one day left, 4 October
1994 as the last day, within which to file with the Court of
Appeals a petition for review.[18]However, on said date, YAO
filed a notice of appeal. He palpably availed of the wrong
mode of appeal. And since he never instituted the correct one,
he lost it.
The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent
right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory origin and, therefore,
available only if granted or provided by statute.[19] Since the
right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process,
it may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
the provisions of law.[20] Corollarily, its requirements must be
strictly complied with.
That an appeal must be perfected in the manner and within
the period fixed by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional.[21] Non-compliance with such legal
requirements is fatal,[22]for it renders the decision sought to
be appealed final and executory,[23] with the end result that
no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the
decision.[24]
In the light of these procedural precepts, YAOs petition
appears to be patently without merit and does not deserve a
second look. Hence, the reasons he enumerated to persuade
this Court to grant his petition and reinstate his appeal are
obviously frivolous if not downright trivial. They need not even
be discussed here.
In the normal and natural course of events, we should dismiss
the petition outright, if not for an important detail which augurs
well for YAO and would grant him a reprieve in his legal battle.
The decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of YAO
palpably transgressed Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which states:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based.
xxx
Let us quote in full the RTC judgment:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 52, Kalookan City, in Crim. Case No. C-155713,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
xxx
But because the prosecution proved the guilt of the other
accused, George Yao; beyond reasonable doubt as principal
under the said Article 189 (1) for Unfair Competition, he is
convicted of the same. In the absence of any aggravating or
mitigating circumstances alleged/proven, and considering the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is
sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and twenty-one
(21) days of arresto mayor to a maximum of one (1) year and
five (5) months of prision correccional.
xxx
After going over the evidence on record, the Court finds no
cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Metropolitan Trial
Court.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 107
WHEREFORE, this Court affirms in toto the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court dated October 20, 1993.
SO ORDERED.
That is all there is to it.
We have sustained decisions of lower courts as having
substantially or sufficiently complied with the constitutional
injunction notwithstanding the laconic and terse manner in
which they were written and even if there (was left) much to
be desired in terms of (their) clarity, coherence and
comprehensibility provided that they eventually set out the
facts and the law on which they were based,[25] as when they
stated the legal qualifications of the offense constituted by the
facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the participation of
the accused, the penalty imposed and the civil liability;[26] or
discussed the facts comprising the elements of the offense
that was charged in the information, and accordingly rendered
a verdict and imposed the corresponding penalty;[27] or
quoted the facts narrated in the prosecutions memorandum
but made their own findings and assessment of evidence,
before finally agreeing with the prosecutions evaluation of the
case.[28]
We have also sanctioned the use of memorandum
decisions,[29] a specie of succinctly written decisions by
appellate courts in accordance with the provisions of Section
40, B.P. Blg. 129[30] on the grounds of expediency,
practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts. We
have also declared that memorandum decisions comply with
the constitutional mandate.[31]
In Francisco v. Permskul,[32] however, we laid down the
conditions for the of validity of memorandum decisions, thus:
The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate
the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower
court only by remote reference, which is to say that the
challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to
the person reading the memorandum decision. For the
incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for
direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which
must be contained in a statement attached to the said
decision. In other words, the memorandum decision
authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually
embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower
court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part
of the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that
no study was made of the decision of the lower court and that
its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination
of the facts and the law on which it is based. The proximity at
least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an
examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also
understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin
with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of
incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.
The Court finds necessary to emphasize that the
memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it
become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an
additional condition for the validity that this kind of decision
may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the
main accepted by both parties and easily determinable by the
judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that
will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The
memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations
only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is
obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time
needed to dismiss it.
xxx
Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the
requirements herein set forth both as to the form prescribed
and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation
will summon the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14
of the Constitution and strike down the flawed judgment as a
lawless disobedience.
Tested against these standards, we find that the RTC decision
at bar miserably failed to meet them and, therefore, fell short
of the constitutional injunction. The RTC decision is brief
indeed, but it is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its
content and trite in its form. It achieved nothing and attempted
at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts which
could easily be done. Its inadequacy speaks for itself.
We cannot even consider or affirm said RTC decision as a
memorandum decision because it failed to comply with the
measures of validity laid down in Francisco v. Permskul. It
merely affirmed in toto the MeTC decision without saying
more. A decision or resolution, especially one resolving an
appeal, should directly meet the issues for resolution;
otherwise, the appeal would be pointless.[33]
We therefore reiterate our admonition in Nicos Industrial
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[34] in that while we conceded
that brevity in the writing of decisions is an admirable trait, it
should not and cannot be substituted for substance; and again
in Francisco v. Permskul,[35] where we cautioned that
expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot excuse
non-compliance with the constitutional requirements.
This is not to discourage the lower courts to write abbreviated
and concise decisions, but never at the expense of scholarly
analysis, and more significantly, of justice and fair play, lest
the fears expressed by Justice Feria as the ponente in
Romero v. Court of Appeals[36] come true, i.e., if an appellate
court failed to provide the appeal the attention it rightfully
deserved, said court deprived the appellant of due process
since he was not accorded a fair opportunity to be heard by a
fair and responsible magistrate. This situation becomes more
ominous in criminal cases, as in this case, where not only
property rights are at stake but also the liberty if not the life of
a human being.
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component
of due process and fair play.[37] It is likewise demanded by
the due process clause of the Constitution.[38] The parties to
a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that
judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave
it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The
losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal
to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the
decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly
and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based
leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is
precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to
pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher
tribunal.[39] More than that, the requirement is an assurance
to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so
through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 108

safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him ASIDE and the 27 July 1994 decision of the Regional Trial
from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the Court, Branch 121 of Kalookan City rendered in its appellate
purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the jurisdiction is NULLIFIED. The records are hereby remanded
sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty to said Regional Trial Court for further proceedings and for the
or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend rendition of judgment in accordance with the mandate of
on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
justness of his decision.[40]
No costs.
Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower
courts and even of the Court of Appeals whose careless SO ORDERED.
disregard of the constitutional behest exposed their
sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their magisterial
responsibilities but likewise to their avowed fealty to the Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Constitution.
Kapunan, J., on leave.
Thus, we nullified or deemed to have failed to comply with
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, a decision,
resolution or order which: contained no analysis of the
evidence of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in
reaching its conclusions; contained nothing more than a
summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of both
parties;[41] convicted the accused of libel but failed to cite any
legal authority or principle to support conclusions that the
letter in question was libelous;[42] consisted merely of one (1)
paragraph with mostly sweeping generalizations and failed to
support its conclusion of parricide;[43] consisted of five (5)
pages, three (3) pages of which were quotations from the
labor arbiters decision including the dispositive portion and
barely a page (two [2] short paragraphs of two [2] sentences
each) of its own discussion or reasonings[44]; was merely
based on the findings of another court sans transcript of
stenographic notes;[45] or failed to explain the factual and
legal bases for the award of moral damages.[46]

In the same vein do we strike down as a nullity the RTC

decision in question.

In sum, we agree with YAO that he was denied due process

but not on the grounds he ardently invoked but on the reasons
already extensively discussed above. While he indeed
resorted to the wrong mode of appeal and his right to appeal
is statutory, it is still an essential part of the judicial system that
courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party
of the prerogative, but instead afford every party-litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.[47]

In the interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the

most mandatory character in terms of compliance, may be
relaxed.[48] In other words, if strict adherence to the letter of
the law would result in absurdity and manifest injustice[49] or
where the merit of a partys cause is apparent and outweighs
consideration of non-compliance with certain formal
requirements,[50]procedural rules should definitely be
liberally construed. A party-litigant is to be given the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense
rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on
mere technicalities.[51] We therefore withhold legal
approbation on the RTC decision at bar for its palpable failure
to comply with the constitutional and legal mandates thereby
denying YAO of his day in court. We also remind all
magistrates to heed the demand of Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution. It is their solemn and paramount duty to
uphold the Constitution and the principles enshrined therein,
lest they be lost in the nitty-gritty of their everyday judicial
work.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition in this

case is GRANTED. The questioned 25 April 1995 resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16893 is hereby SET
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 109
[A.M. No. RTJ-96-1338. September 5, 1997]
ENGINEER FERNANDO S. DIZON, complainant, vs.
JUDGE LILIA C. LOPEZ, Regional Trial Court, Branch 109,
Pasay City, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint charging Judge Lilia C. Lopez of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City, with violation of
the Constitution, serious misconduct, inefficiency, and
falsification in connection with her decision in Criminal Case
No. 91-0716 entitled People of the Philippines v. Engineer
Fernando S. Dizon.
It appears that on April 22, 1993, judgment was rendered,
convicting complainant of falsification of private document.
The promulgation of the judgment consisted of reading the
dispositive portion of the decision sentencing him to
imprisonment, without serving a copy of the decision on him.
The accused and his counsel were told to return in a few days
for their copy of the decision, but although petitioner and his
father by turns went to the court to obtain a copy of the
decision they were not able to do so. To protect his right,
complainant filed a partial motion for reconsideration on May
5, 1993, expressly reserving his right to submit a more
elaborate one upon receipt of the decision. The hearing of the
motion for reconsideration was scheduled on May 12, 1993,
but the case was not called as complainants counsel was told
that the decision had not yet been finished. On November 29,
1994, complainant filed an Omnibus Motion to Annul
Promulgation of Sentence and to Dismiss the case. On
December 16, 1994, the date set for hearing the motion,
complainant was served a copy of the decision, dated April
22, 1993, the dispositive portion of which states:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused
Fernando Dizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Falsification of Private Document as defined and penalized
under Art. 172, par. 2 in relation to Art. 171 par. 2 and 4 thereof
and hereby sentences him to imprisonment of Two (2) Years,
Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Six (6) Years and a fine
of P5,000.00.
Complainant alleges that the failure of respondent judge to
furnish him a copy of the decision until almost one year and
eight months after the promulgation of its dispositive portion
on April 22, 1993 constitutes a violation of Art. VIII, 14 of the
Constitution which prohibits courts from rendering decisions
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
law on which they are based and 15 of the same Art. VIII,
which provides that in all cases lower courts must render their
decisions within three months from the date of their
submission. He alleges further that he was denied the right to
a speedy trial in violation of Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution
and that Judge Lopez falsified her decision by antedating it
and including therein, as additional penalty, a fine of
P5,000.00.
On December 26, 1994, complainant filed another motion for
reconsideration after receiving a copy of the full decision of
the court. On January 3, 1995, he moved to disqualify
respondent from hearing the motions for reconsideration
which he had filed. Respondent judge responded by
voluntarily inhibiting herself from further consideration of the
case and ordered it forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of
Court for re-raffle. The case was eventually assigned to Judge
Manuel F. Dumatol of Branch 113 of the Pasay City RTC.
Judge Lopez claims that on April 22, 1993, when the judgment
was promulgated with the reading of the dispositive portion,
her decision was already prepared, although to prevent
leakage in the process of preparing it, she withheld its
dispositive portion until the day of its promulgation.
Respondent judge states that after the dispositive portion had
been read to complainant, respondent gave it to Ma. Cleotilde
Paulo (Social Worker II, presently OIC of Branch 109) for
typing and incorporation into the text of the decision. The court
found complainant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
falsification of private document under Art. 172, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code. Respondent states that the delay in
furnishing complainant with a copy of the decision was
unintentional.
Respondent judge referred to difficulties she had in preparing
her decision and to a series of personal problems which
contributed to this delay in the release of her decision, to wit:
she has only two (2) stenographers to attend to daily trials in
her court, making it necessary for her to make use of the
Social Worker assigned to her to type her decisions. During
the period January to December 1993 she had to dispose of
285 cases, apart from the fact that there was an unusually big
number of criminal, civil, and land registration cases as well
as special proceedings filed in her court which required the
holding of hearings in the mornings and in the afternoons.
During the same period, she went through some personal
tragedies. She lost her niece, Gloria Lopez Roque, whom she
had raised from childhood, due to a hospital accident. This
was followed by the death on March 1, 1992 of her mother,
Margarita Lopez, who had been under respondents care for
the past eight years after suffering a stroke. On September
17, 1993, respondents father died of diabetes, renal failure,
pneumonia, and cardiac arrest.Respondent was the one who
single-handedly brought them in and out of the hospital
because all her able-bodied relatives are abroad. Respondent
herself was found to be suffering from diabetes and
hypertension, necessitating her treatment and leave of
absence from September 27, 1994 to December 12, 1994, in
addition to her other leaves of absence. Aside from these,
respondents family suffered financial reverses because of
estafa committed against them.
On February 19, 1996, Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo
P. Abesamis submitted a memorandum, finding the charge of
violation of the Constitution to be without merit. He called
attention to the written decision of respondent judge, which,
albeit delivered to complainant late, nonetheless states the
facts and law on which it is based. He likewise finds the charge
of serious misconduct and falsification to be without basis in
view of the absence of malice. However, he finds the charge
of inefficiency to be well founded on the basis of respondents
failure to furnish complainant or his counsel a copy of the
decision within a reasonable time after its promulgation.
Hence, the Deputy Court Administrator believes that Judge
Lopez should be given admonition for her negligence, but
recommends that the other charges against her for violation
of the Constitution, serious misconduct, and falsification be
dismissed for lack of merit.
The Court finds that respondent violated Art. VIII, 15(1) of the
Constitution which provides:
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and,
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 110
lower collegiate courts and three months for all other lower
courts.
Although respondent judge promulgated her decision within
three months of the submission of the case for decision, the
fact is that only the dispositive portion was read at such
promulgation. She claims that on April 22, 1993 the text of her
decision, containing her findings and discussion of
complainants liability, had already been prepared although it
had to be put in final form by incorporating the dispositive
portion. However, the fact is that it took a year and eight
months more before this was done and a copy of the complete
decision furnished the complainant on December 16, 1994.
Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
1. Judgment defined. - The term judgment as used in this Rule
means the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty
or is not guilty of the offense charged, and the imposition of
the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by law on the
accused.
2. Form and contents of judgment. - The judgment must be
written in the official language, personally and directly
prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain
clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or
admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment
is based.
6. Promulgation of judgment. - The judgment is promulgated
by reading the same in the presence of the accused and any
judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the
conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative.
When the judge is absent or outside of the province or city,
the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
It is clear that merely reading the dispositive portion of the
decision to the accused is not sufficient. It is the judgment that
must be read to him, stating the facts and the law on which
such judgment is based. Since this was done only on
December 16, 1994 when a copy of the complete decision
was served on complainant, it is obvious that the respondent
failed to render her decision within three months as required
by Art. VIII, 15 of the Constitution.
If indeed all that had to be done after the dispositive portion
had been read in open court on April 22, 1993 was to
incorporate it in the text of the decision allegedly then already
prepared, it is difficult to see why it took respondent judge one
year and eight more months before she was able to do so.
Respondent claims that she was prevented from putting out
her decision by a series of personal and other problems which
leads the Court to believe that when she promulgated her
sentence she had not finished the preparation of the entire
decision. At all events, she could have applied for extension
of time to decide the case and put off the promulgation of
judgment until she had finished it.
What respondent did in this case was to render what is known
as a sin perjuicio judgment, which is a judgment without a
statement of the facts in support of its conclusion to be later
supplemented by the final judgment.[1] That is why, in answer
to complainants charge that the dispositive portion of the
judgment read to him did not impose a fine, respondent
contends that the addition of the fine of P5,000.00 was within
her power to do even if no such fine had been included in the
oral sentence given on April 22, 1993. As respondent judge
states, because the decision was not complete it could be
modified and cites in support of her contention the case of
Abay, Sr. v. Garcia.[2] Respondent only succeeds in showing
that the judgment promulgated on April 22, 1993 was a sin
perjuicio judgment which was incomplete and needed a
statement of the facts and law upon which the judgment was
based. As early as 1923, this Court already expressed its
disapproval of the practice of rendering sin perjuicio
judgments, what with all the uncertainties entailed because of
the implied reservation that it is subject to modification when
the decision is finally rendered.[3] This Court has expressed
approval of the practice of some judges of withholding the
dispositive portion from their opinions until the very last
moment of promulgation of their judgment in order to prevent
leakage,[4] but that refers to the preparation of their decision,
not its promulgation. What must be promulgated must be the
complete decision. There would be no more reason to keep
the dispositive portion a secret at the stage of promulgation of
judgment.
However, the Court finds the other charges against
respondent to be without merit.
First, the claim that complainant was deprived of his right to a
speedy trial by reason of respondents failure to furnish him
with a copy of the decision until after one year and eight
months is without basis. It appears that despite the destruction
of records by fire in the Pasay City Hall on January 18, 1992
the parties were required to submit simultaneously their
memoranda on August 18, 1992. The delay, if any, was not
such vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay[5] as to
justify finding a denial of the right to a speedy trial. The fact is
that the reading of the sentence on April 22, 1993, albeit not
in compliance with the requirement for promulgation of
judgments, nonetheless put an end to trial.
Second, the delay in furnishing complainant a copy of the
complete decision did not prejudice his right to appeal or file a
motion for reconsideration. It is true that an accused must be
given a copy of the decision in order to apprise him of the basis
of such decision so that he can intelligently prepare his appeal
or motion for reconsideration. However, in accordance with
the ruling in Director of Lands v. Sanz,[6] complainants period
to appeal or file a motion for reconsideration did not begin to
run until after he actually received a copy of the judgment on
December 16, 1994. He therefore suffered no prejudice. If at
all, complainant suffered from the anxiety to refute a
conviction which he could not do for lack of a statement of the
basis of the conviction.
Nonetheless, certain factors mitigate respondent judges
culpability. Except for this incident, respondents record of
public service as legal officer and agent of the National Bureau
of Investigation, as State Prosecutor, and later Senior State
Prosecutor, of the Department of Justice for 17 years and as
Regional Trial Judge for more than 13 years now is unmarred
by malfeasance, misfeasance or wrongdoing. This is the first
time she is required to answer an administrative complaint
against her. Her failure to decide the case of complainant was
brought about by factors not within her control, to wit, lack of
stenographers and unusually big number of cases; and her
personal loss as a result of the death of her niece and both
her parents, financial reverses of the family, and poor health
as a result of diabetes and hypertension.
In Mangulabnan v. Tecson,[7] a joint decision in two criminal
cases was rendered by respondent judge on February 24,
1978, six months and eight days from submission of the case,
and a copy was delivered to complainant on September 28,
1979, over 19 months after rendition of the decision. Two
complaints were filed for violation of the constitutional
provision requiring submitted cases to be decided by lower
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 111

courts within three months and for violation of complainants On September 13, 1985, the High Court of Malaya
right to a speedy trial. Respondent judge blamed the delay in (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in favor of the
deciding the cases on the fact that his clerks had misfiled the petitioner and against the private respondent which is also
records. As to the delay in furnishing complainant with a copy designated therein as the "2nd Defendant. "
of the decision, the judge attributed this to the mistake of his
clerk who did not think complainant was entitled to receive the The judgment reads in full:
same. The judge was reprimanded. The reason for the delay
in that case was even less excusable than the difficulties
experienced by respondent Judge Lopez, i.e., deaths in SUIT NO. C638 of 1983
respondents family, her own poor state of health, financial
reverses suffered by her family, and the volume of work done Between
within the period in question, which somewhat mitigate her
liability. The Court believes that a similar penalty would be Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad Plaintiffs
appropriate.

And
In view of the foregoing, respondent is hereby
REPRIMANDED with WARNING that repetition of the same
acts complained of will be dealt with more severely. 1. Asiavest -CDCP Sdn. Bhd. Defendant

SO ORDERED. 2. Construction & Development Corporation of the Philippines

Romero, Puno, and Torres, Jr. JJ., concur.

Regalado, J., (Chairman), on leave.
G.R. No. 110263 July 20, 2001
ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.
DELEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1
of the Court of Appeals dated May 19,1993 in CA-G.R. CY No.
35871 affirming the Decision2 dated October 14,1991 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 168 in
Civil Case No. 56368 which dismissed the complaint of
petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad for the
enforcement of the money of the judgment of the High Court
of Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur against private respondent
Philippine National Construction Corporation.1âwphi1.nêt
The petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a
corporation organized under the laws of Malaysia while private
respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation is a
corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine
laws.
It appears that sometime in 1983, petitioner initiated a suit for
collection against private respondent, then known as
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines,
before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur entitled
"Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v. Asiavest CDCP
Sdn. Bhd. and Construction and Development Corporation of
the Philippines."3
JUDGMENT
The 2nd Defendant having entered appearance herein and
the Court having under Order 14, rule 3 ordered that judgment
as hereinafter provided be entered for the Plaintiffs against the
2nd Defendant.
IT IS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that the 2nd defendant do pay
the Plaintiffs the sum of $5, 108,290.23 (Ringgit Five million
one hundred and eight thousand two hundred and ninety and
Sen twenty-three) together with interest at the rate of 12% per
annum on
(i) the sum of $2,586,866.91 from the 2nd day of March 1983
to the date of payment; and
(ii) the sum of $2,521,423.32 from the 11th day of March 1983
to the date of payment; and $350.00 (Ringgit Three Hundred
and Fifty) costs.
Dated the 13th day of September, 1985.
Senior Assistant Registrar, High Court, Kuala Lumpur
This Judgment is filed by Messrs. Skrine & Co., 3rd Floor,
Straits Trading Building, No.4, Leboh Pasar, Besar, Kuala
Lumpur, Solicitors for the Plaintiffs abovenamed.
(VP/Ong/81194.7/83)4
On the same day, September 13, 1985, the High Court of
Malaya issued an Order directing the private respondent (also
designated therein as the "2nd Defendant") to pay petitioner
interest on the sums covered by the said Judgment, thus:
SUIT NO. C638 of 1983
Between

Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad Plaintiffs
bond it had put up in favor of private respondent to guarantee
the completion of the Felda Project and the nonpayment of the
And
loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the
completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By Pass; Project.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 112
1. Asiavest -CDCP Sdn. Bhd. Defendants
2. Construction & Development Corporation of the Philippines
BEFORE THE SENIOR ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
CIK SUSILA S. PARAM THIS 13th DAY OF SEPTEMBER
1985 IN CHAMBERS
ORDER
Upon the application of Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M)
Berhad, the Plaintiffs in this action AND UPON READINGthe
Summons in Chambers dated the 16th day of August, 1984
and the Affidavit of Lee Foong Mee affirmed on the 14th day
of August 1984 both filed herein AND UPON HEARING Mr. T.
Thomas of Counsel for the Plaintiffs and Mr. Khaw Chay Tee
of Counsel for the 2nd Defendant abovenamed on the 26th
day of December 1984 IT WAS ORDERED that the Plaintiffs
be at liberty to sign final judgment against the 2nd Defendant
for the sum of $5,108,290.23 AND IT WAS ORDERED that
the 2nd Defendant do pay the Plaintiffs the costs of suit at
$350.00 AND IT WAS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiffs
be at liberty to apply for payment of interest AND upon the
application of the Plaintiffs for payment of interest coming on
for hearing on the 1st day of August in the presence of Mr.
Palpanaban Devarajoo of Counsel for the Plaintiffs and Mr.
Khaw Chay Tee of Counsel for the 2nd Defendant above-
named AND UPON HEARING Counsel as aforesaid BY
CONSENT IT WAS ORDERED that the 2nd Defendant do pay
the Plaintiffs interest at a rate to be assessed AND the same
coming on for assessment this day in the presence of Mr.
Palpanaban Devarajoo of Counsel for the Plaintiffs and Mr.
Khaw Chay Tee of Counsel for the 2nd Defendant AND UPON
HEARING Counsel as aforesaid BY CONSENT IT IS
ORDERED that the 2nd Defendant do pay the Plaintiffs
interest at the rate of 12% per annum on:
(i) the sum of $2,586,866.91 from the 2nd day of March 1983
to the date of payment; and
(ii) the sum Of $2,521,423.32 from the 11th day of March 1983
to the date of Payment.
Dated the 13th day of September,1985.
Senior Assistant Registrar, High Court, Kuala Lumpur.5
Following unsuccessful attempts6 to secure payment from
private respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated on
September 5, 1988 the complaint before Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce the judgment of the High
Court of Malaya.7
Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a
Motion to Dismiss filed on October 5, 1988, contending that
the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya should be
denied recognition or enforcement since on in face, it is tainted
with want of jurisdiction, want of notice to private respondent,
collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or
fact.8 Dismissal was, however, denied by the trial court
considering that the grounds relied upon are not the proper
grounds in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Revised
Rules of Court. 9
On May 22, 1989, private respondent filed its Answer with
Compulsory Counter claim's10 and therein raised the grounds
it brought up in its motion to dismiss. In its Reply filed11 on
June 8, 1989, the petitioner contended that the High Court of
Malaya acquired jurisdiction over the Person of private
respondent by its voluntary submission the court's jurisdiction
through its appointed counsel, Mr. Khay Chay Tee.
Furthermore, private respondent's counsel waived any and all
objections to the High Court's jurisdiction in a pleading filed
before the court.
In due time, the trial court rendered its Decision dated October
14, 1991 dismissing petitioner's complaint. Petitioner
interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, but the
appellate court dismissed the same and affirmed the decision
of the trial court in a Decision dated May 19, 1993.
Hence, the instant Petition which is anchored on two (2)
assigned errors,12 to wit:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
MALAYSIAN COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER PNCC, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
(a) THE FOREIGN COURT HAD SERVED SUMMONS ON
PNCC AT ITS MALAYSlA OFFICE, AND (b) PNCC ITSELF
APPEARED BY COUNSEL IN THE CASE BEFORE THAT
COURT.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT TO (SIC) THE
MALAYSIAN COURT JUDGMENT.
Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign
is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country;13 however, the
rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have
established a usage among civilized states by which final
judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are
reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain
conditions that may vary in different countries.14
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign
tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties
and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as
it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for
a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction;
that the trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted,
following due citation or voluntary appearance of the
defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to
secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is
nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system
of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the
judgment.15
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the
country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the
basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the
giving of due notice in the foreign forum Under Section
50(b),16 Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the
governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the
trial court and respondent appellate court, a judgment, against
a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction
to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 113
evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In addition,
under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a
court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the
presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its
jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign
judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is
tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.
In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the
existence of the money judgment of the High Court of Malaya
by the evidence it offered. Vinayak Prabhakar Pradhan,
presented as petitioner's sole witness, testified to the effect
that he is in active practice of the law profession in
Malaysia;17 that he was connected with Skrine and Company
as Legal Assistant up to 1981;18 that private respondent, then
known as Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines, was sued by his client, Asiavest Merchant
Bankers (M) Berhad, in Kuala Lumpur;19that the writ of
summons were served on March 17, 1983 at the registered
office of private respondent and on March 21, 1983 on Cora
S. Deala, a financial planning officer of private respondent for
Southeast Asia operations;20that upon the filing of the case,
Messrs. Allen and Gledhill, Advocates and Solicitors, with
address at 24th Floor, UMBC Building, Jalan Sulaiman, Kuala
Lumpur, entered their conditional appearance for private
respondent questioning the regularity of the service of the writ
of summons but subsequently withdrew the same when it
realized that the writ was properly served;21 that because
private respondent failed to file a statement of defense within
two (2) weeks, petitioner filed an application for summary
judgment and submitted affidavits and documentary evidence
in support of its claim;22 that the matter was then heard before
the High Court of Kuala Lumpur in a series of dates where
private respondent was represented by counsel; 23 and that
the end result of all these proceedings is the judgment sought
to be enforced.
In addition to the said testimonial evidence, petitioner offered
the following documentary evidence:
(a) A certified and authenticated copy of the Judgment
promulgated by the Malaysian High Court dated September
13, 1985 directing private respondent to pay petitioner the
sum of $5,108,290.23 Malaysian Ringgit plus interests from
March 1983 until fully paid;24
(b) A certified and authenticated copy of the Order dated
September 13,1985 issued by the Malaysian High Court in
Civil Suit No. C638 of 1983;25
(c) Computation of principal and interest due as of January 31,
1990 on the amount adjudged payable to petitioner by private
respondent;26
(d) Letter and Statement of Account of petitioner's counsel in
Malaysia indicating the costs for prosecuting and
implementing the Malaysian High Court's Judgment;27
(e) Letters between petitioner's Malaysian counsel, Skrine and
Co., and its local counsel, Sycip Salazar Law Offices, relative
to institution of the action in the Philippines;28
(f) Billing Memorandum of Sycip Salazar Law Offices dated
January 2, 1990 showing attorney's fees paid by and due from
petitioner; 29
(g) Statement of Claim, Writ of Summons and Affidavit of
Service of such writ in petitioner's suit against private
respondent before the Malaysian High Court;30
(h) Memorandum of Conditional Appearance dated March 28,
1983 filed by counsel for private respondent with the
Malaysian High Court;31
(i) Summons in Chambers and Affidavit of Khaw Chay Tee,
cotmsel for private respondent, submitted during the
proceedings before the Malaysian High Court;32
(j) Record of the Court's Proceedings in Civil Case No. C638
of 1983.33
(k) Petitioner 's verified Application for Summary Judgment
dated August 14, 1984;34 and
(l) Letter dated November 6, 1985 from petitioner's Malaysian
Counsel to private respondent's counsel in Malaysia.35
Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the
existence and authenticity of the foreign judgment, said
foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden
then fell upon the party who disputes its validity, herein private
respondent, to prove otherwise.
Private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden
that fell upon it - to prove by clear and convincing evidence
the grounds which it relied upon to prevent enforcement of the
Malaysian High Court judgment, namely, (a) that jurisdiction
was not acquired by the Malaysian Court over the person of
private respondent due to alleged improper service of
summons upon private respondent and the alleged lack of
authority of its counsel to appear and represent private
respondent in the suit; (b) the foreign judgment is allegedly
tainted by evident collusion, fraud and clear mistake of fact or
law; and (c) not only were the requisites for enforcement or
recognition allegedly not complied with but also that the
Malaysian judgment is allegedly contrary to the Constitutional
prescription that the "every decision must state the facts and
law on which it is based."36
Private respondent relied solely on the testimony of its two (2)
witnesses, namely, Mr. Alfredo. Calupitan, an accountant of
private respondent, and Virginia Abelardo, Executive
Secretary and a member of the staff of the Corporate
Secretariat Section of the Corporate Legal Division, of private
respondent, both of whom failed to shed light and amplify its
defense or claim for non-enforcement of the foreign judgment
against it.
Mr. Calupitan's testimony centered on the following: that from
January to December 1982 he was assigned in Malaysia as
Project Comptroller of the Pahang Project Package A and B
for road construction under the joint venture of private
respondent and Asiavest Holdings;37 that under the joint
venture, Asiavest Holdings would handle the financial aspect
of the project, which is fifty-one percent (51 %) while private
respondent would handle the technical aspect of the project,
or forty-nine percent (49%);38 and, that Cora Deala was not
authorized to receive summons for and in behalf of the private
respondent.39 Ms. Abelardo's testimony, on the other hand,
focused on the following: that there was no board resolution
authorizing Allen and Gledhill to admit all the claims of
petitioner in the suit brought before the High Court of
Malaya,40 though on cross-examination she admitted that
Allen and Gledhill were the retained lawyers of private
respondent in Malaysia. 41
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 114
The foregoing reasons or grounds relied upon by private
respondent in preventing enforcement and recognition of the
Malaysian judgment primarily refer to matters of remedy and
procedure taken by the Malaysian High Court relative to the
suit for collection initiated by petitioner. Needless to stress, the
recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not
necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the
courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered
differs from that of the courts of the country in which the
judgment is relied on.42 Ultimately, matters of remedy and
procedure such as those relating to the service of summons
or court process upon the defendant, the authority of counsel
to appear and represent a defendant and the formal
requirements in a decision are governed by the lex fori or the
internal law of the forum,43 i.e., the law of Malaysia in this
case.
In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the
judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the
service of court process on private respondent as well as other
matters raised by it. As to what the Malaysian procedural law
is, remains a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken
judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any
other fact. Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official
publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof.
It was then incumbent upon private respondent to present
evidence as to what that Malaysian procedural law is and to
show that under it, the assailed service of summons upon a
financial officer of a corporation, as alleged by it, is invalid. It
did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity
of service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered
by the High Court of Malaya must stand.44
On the matter of alleged lack of authority of the law firm of
Allen and Gledhill to represent private respondent, not only did
the private respondent's witnesses admit that the said law firm
of Allen and Gledhill were its counsels in its transactions in
Malaysia,45 but of greater significance is the fact that
petitioner offered in evidence relevant Malaysian
jurisprudence46 to the effect that (a) it is not necessary under
Malaysian law for counsel appearing before the Malaysian
High Court to submit a special power of attorney authorizing
him to represent a client before said court, (b) that counsel
appearing before the Malaysian High Court has full authority
to compromise the suit, and (c) that counsel appearing before
the Malaysian High Court need not comply with certain pre-
requisites as required under Philippine law to appear and
compromise judgments on behalf of their clients before said
court.47
Furthermore, there is no basis for or truth to the appellate
court's conclusion that the conditional appearance of private
respondent's counsel who was allegedly not authorized to
appear and represent, cannot be considered as voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the High Court of Malaya,
inasmuch as said conditional appearance was not premised
on the alleged lack of authority of said counsel but the
conditional appearance was entered to question the regularity
of the service of the writ of summons. Such conditional
appearance was in fact subsequently withdrawn when
counsel realized that the writ was properly served.48
On the ground that collusion, fraud and, clear mistake of fact
and law tainted the judgment of the High Court of Malaya, no
clear evidence of the same was adduced or shown. The facts
which the trial court found "intriguing" amounted to mere
conjectures and specious observations. The trial court's
finding on the absence of judgment against Asiavest-CDCP
Sdn. Bhd. is contradicted by evidence on record that recovery
was also sought against Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. but the
same was found insolvent.49 Furthermore, even when the
foreign judgment is based on the drafts prepared by counsel
for the successful party, such is not per se indicative of
collusion or fraud. Fraud to hinder the enforcement within the
jurisdiction of a foreign judgment must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud
based on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where
judgment is rendered,50 or that which would go to the
jurisdiction of the court or would deprive the party against
whom judgment is rendered a chance to defend the action to
which he has a meritorious defense.51 Intrinsic fraud is one
which goes to the very existence of the cause of action is
deemed already adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate
against the recognition or enforcement of the foreign
judgment.52 Evidence is wanting on the alleged extrinsic
fraud. Hence, such unsubstantiated allegation cannot give
rise to liability therein.
Lastly, there is no merit to the argument that the foreign
judgment is not enforceable in view of the absence of any
statement of facts and law upon which the award in favor of
the petitioner was based. As aforestated, the lex fori or the
internal law of the forum governs matters of remedy and
procedure.53 Considering that under the procedural rules of
the High Court of Malaya, a valid judgment may be rendered
even without stating in the judgment every fact and law upon
which the judgment is based, then the same must be accorded
respect and the courts in the jurisdiction cannot invalidate the
judgment of the foreign court simply because our rules provide
otherwise.
All in all, private respondent had the ultimate duty to
demonstrate the alleged invalidity of such foreign judgment,
being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the High
Court of Malaya. But instead of doing so, private respondent
merely argued, to which the trial court agreed, that the burden
lay upon petitioner to prove the validity of the money
judgment. Such is clearly erroneous and would render
meaningless the presumption of validity accorded a foreign
judgment were the party seeking to enforce it be required to
first establish its validity.54
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 19,1993 in CA-
G.R CY No. 35871 sustaining the Decision dated October 14,
1991 in Civil Case No. 56368 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 168 denying the enforcement of the Judgment
dated September 13, 1985 of the High Court of Malaya in
Kuala Lumpur is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another in
its stead is hereby rendered ORDERINGprivate respondent
Philippine National Construction Corporation to pay petitioner
Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad the amounts
adjudged in the said foreign Judgment, subject of the said
case.
Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 115
[A. M. No. 00-8-05-SC. November 28, 2001]
RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE THE
SANDIGANBAYAN.
RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
Submitted to the Court for consideration is a resolution of the
Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(hereafter, the IBP) recommending an inquiry into the causes
of delays in the resolution of incidents and motions and in the
decision of cases pending before the Sandiganbayan.
The Antecedents
On July 31, 2000, the IBP, through its National President,
Arthur D. Lim, transmitted to the Court a Resolution[1]
addressing the problem of delays in cases pending before the
Sandiganbayan (hereafter, the Resolution).[2] We quote the
Resolution in full:[3]
WHEREAS, Section 16, Article III of the Constitution
guarantees that, [a]ll persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies,
WHEREAS, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers mandates that [a] lawyer shall exert
every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice;
WHEREAS, it is the duty of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to undertake measures to assist in the speedy
disposition of cases pending before the various courts and
tribunals;
WHEREAS, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines has received
numerous complaints from its members about serious delays
in the decision of cases and in the resolution of motions and
other pending incidents before the different divisions of the
Sandiganbayan;
WHEREAS, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 10-94
requires all Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts to
submit to the Supreme Court a bi-annual report indicating the
title of the case, its date of filing, the date of pre-trial in civil
cases and arraignment in criminal cases, the date of initial
trial, the date of last hearing and the date that the case is
submitted for decision, and to post, in a conspicuous place
within its premises, a monthly list of cases submitted for
decision;
WHEREAS, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 10-94
has not been made applicable to the Sandiganbayan;
WHEREAS, considering that the Sandiganbayan is also a trial
court, the requirements imposed upon trial courts by Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 10-94 should also be
imposed upon the Sandiganbayan;
NOW, THEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines hereby
resolves as follows:
1. To recommend to the Supreme Court that Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 10-94 be made applicable to the
Sandiganbayan in regard cases over which the
Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction; and
2. To recommend to the Supreme Court an inquiry into the
causes of delay in the resolution of incidents and motions and
in the decision of cases before the Sandiganbayan for the
purpose of enacting measures intended at avoiding such
delays.
Done in Los Baos, Laguna, this 29th day of July, 2000.
On August 8, 2000, the Court required Sandiganbayan
Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena to comment on the
letter of the IBP and to submit a list of all Sandiganbayan
cases pending decision, or with motion for reconsideration
pending resolution, indicating the dates they were deemed
submitted for decision or resolution.[4]
On September 27, 2000, complying with the order, Presiding
Justice Francis E. Garchitorena submitted a report[5]
(hereafter, the compliance) admitting a number of cases
submitted for decision and motion for reconsideration pending
resolution before its divisions. We quote:
Cases Submitted W/ Motions For
For Decision Reconsideration
1st Division 341 None
2nd Division 5 None
3rd Division 12 None
4th Division 5 None
5th Division 52 1
Total 415[6]
Thus, the Sandiganbayan has a total of four hundred fifteen
(415) cases for decision remaining undecided long beyond the
reglementary period to decide, with one case submitted as
early as May 24, 1990,[7] and motion for reconsideration
which has remained unresolved over thirty days from
submission.[8]
On October 20, 2000, Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
Francis E. Garchitorena submitted a schedule of cases
submitted for decision, the schedule indicating the number of
detained prisoners, of which there are (were) none.[9]
On October 26, 2000, the IBP submitted its reply to the
compliance stating: First, that it was not in a position to
comment on the accuracy of the compliance; nonetheless, it
showed that there was much to be desired with regard to the
expeditious disposition of cases, particularly in the
Sandiganbayans First Division, where cases submitted for
decision since 1990 remained unresolved. Second, the
compliance did not include pending motions, and it is a fact
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 116
that motions not resolved over a long period of time would
suspend and delay the disposition of a case. Third, since the
Sandiganbayan is a trial court, it is required to submit the
same reports required of Regional Trial Courts. Fourth, the
Constitution[10]states that, all lower collegiate courts must
decide or resolve cases or matters before it within twelve (12)
months from date of submission; however, the
Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is required to resolve and
decide cases within a reduced period of three (3) months like
regional trial courts, or at the most, six (6) months from date
of submission.[11]
On November 21, 2000, the Court resolved to direct then
Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo (hereafter, the OCA)
to conduct a judicial audit of the Sandiganbayan, especially
on the cases subject of this administrative matter, and to
submit a report thereon not later than 31 December 2000.[12]
On December 4, 2000, in a letter addressed to the Chief
Justice, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena admitted
that the First Division of the Sandiganbayan[13] has a backlog
of cases; that one case[14] alone made the backlog of the
First Division so large, involving 156 cases but the same has
been set for promulgation of decision on December 8, 2000,
which would reduce the backlog by at least fifty percent
(50%).[15]
On January 26, 2001, the Court Administrator submitted a
memorandum to the Court[16] stating that the causes of delay
in the disposition of cases before the Sandiganbayan are:[17]
(1) Failure of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to submit
reinvestigation report despite the lapse of several years;
(2) Filing of numerous incidents such as Motion to Dismiss,
Motion to Quash, Demurrer to Evidence, etc. that remain
unresolved for years;
(3) Suspension of proceedings because of a pending petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court;
(4) Cases remain unacted upon or have no further settings
despite the lapse of considerable length of time; and
(5) Unloading of cases already submitted for decision even if
the ponente is still in service.
We consider ex mero motu the Resolution of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) as an administrative complaint
against Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena for serious
delays in the decision of cases and in the resolution of motions
and other pending incidents before the different divisions of
the Sandiganbayan, amounting to incompetence, inefficiency,
gross neglect of duty and misconduct in office.
We find no need to conduct a formal investigation of the
charges in view of the admission of Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena in his compliance of October 20, 2000, that there
are indeed hundreds of cases pending decision beyond the
reglementary period of ninety (90) days from their submission.
In one case, he not only admitted the delay in deciding the
case but took sole responsibility for such inaction for more
than ten (10) years that constrained this Court to grant
mandamus to dismiss the case against an accused to give
substance and meaning to his constitutional right to speedy
trial.[18]
The Issues
The issues presented are the following: (1) What is the
reglementary period within which the Sandiganbayan must
decide/resolve cases falling within its jurisdiction? (2) Are
there cases submitted for decision remaining undecided by
the Sandiganbayan or any of its divisions beyond the afore-
stated reglementary period? (3) Is Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 1094 applicable to the
Sandiganbayan?[19]
The Courts Ruling
We resolve the issues presented in seriatim.
1. Period To Decide/Resolve Cases.-- There are two views.
The first view is that from the time a case is submitted for
decision or resolution, the Sandiganbayan has twelve (12)
months to decide or resolve it.[20] The second view is that as
a court with trial function, the Sandiganbayan has three (3)
months to decide the case from the date of submission for
decision.[21]
Article VIII, Section 15 (1) and (2), of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
"Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of
this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-
four months from date of submission to the Supreme Court,
and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for
all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower
courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision
or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief or
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court
itself.[22]
The above provision does not apply to the Sandiganbayan.
The provision refers to regular courts of lower collegiate level
that in the present hierarchy applies only to the Court of
Appeals.[23]
The Sandiganbayan is a special court of the same level as the
Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a
court of justice,[24] with functions of a trial court.[25]
Thus, the Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special
one.[26] The Sandiganbayan was originally empowered to
promulgate its own rules of procedure.[27] However, on March
30, 1995, Congress repealed the Sandiganbayans power to
promulgate its own rules of procedure[28] and instead
prescribed that the Rules of Court promulgated by the
Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed
with the Sandiganbayan.[29]
Special courts are judicial tribunals exercising limited
jurisdiction over particular or specialized categories of actions.
They are the Court of Tax Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and
the Sharia Courts.[30]
Under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
In his report, the Court Administrator would distinguish
between cases which the Sandiganbayan has cognizance of
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 117

in its original jurisdiction,[31] and cases which fall within the According to the compliance submitted by the
appellate jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[32] The Court Sandiganbayan, three hundred and forty one (341) cases
Administrator posits that since in the first class of cases, the were submitted for decision but were undecided as of
Sandiganbayan acts more as a trial court, then for that September 15, 2000. A number of the cases were submitted
classification of cases, the three (3) month reglementary for decision as far back as more than ten (10) years ago. As
period applies. For the second class of cases, the of September 15, 2000, the following cases[43] had not been
Sandiganbayan has the twelve-month reglementary period for decided:[44]
collegiate courts.[33] We do not agree.
First Division
The law creating the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606[34] is
clear on this issue.[35] It provides: Case Title Case No. Date Submitted for
Decision
Sec. 6. Maximum period for termination of cases As far as
practicable, the trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan once (1) People v. Paares 12127 May 24, 1990
commenced shall be continuous until terminated and the
judgment shall be rendered within three (3) months from the
date the case was submitted for decision. (2) People v. Gabriel Duero 11999 December 11,
1990
On September 18, 1984, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its
own rules,[36] thus:[37] (3) People v. RhizaMonterozo 133533 December 14,
1990
Sec. 3 Maximum Period to Decide Cases The judgment or
final order of a division of the Sandiganbayan shall be (4) People v. Zenon R. Perez 13353 January 7, 1991
rendered within three (3) months from the date the case was
submitted for decision(underscoring ours). (5) People v. Bernardo B. Dayao, Jr. 12305-12306
February 7, 1991
Given the clarity of the rule that does not distinguish, we hold
that the three (3) month period, not the twelve (12) month (6) People v. Melquiades Ribo 13521 May 7, 1991
period, to decide cases applies to the Sandiganbayan.
Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan presently sitting in five (5) (7) People v. Carlos Benitez 12102 June 19, 1991
divisions,[38] functions as a trial court. The term trial is used
in its broad sense, meaning, it allows introduction of evidence
by the parties in the cases before it.[39]The Sandiganbayan, (8) People v. Salvador P. Nopre, et. al. 11156-11160
in original cases within its jurisdiction, conducts trials, has the August 9, 1991
discretion to weigh the evidence of the parties, admit the
evidence it regards as credible and reject that which they (9) People v. Delfina A. Letegio 12289 August 28,
consider perjurious or fabricated.[40] 1991

Compliance with its Own Rules (10) People v. Rodolfo A. Lasquite 13618 August 28,
1991
In Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) v. Court of Appeals,[41] the Court faulted the (11) People v. Potenciana Evangelista 13679-13680
DARAB for violating its own rules of procedure. We reasoned September 3, 1991
that the DARAB does not have unfettered discretion to
suspend its own rules. We stated that the DARAB should have
(12) People v. Ramon N. Guico, Jr. et. al 16516
set the example of observance of orderly procedure.
December 2, 1991
Otherwise, it would render its own Revised Rules of
Procedure uncertain and whose permanence would be
dependent upon the instability of its own whims and caprices. (13) People v. Ruperto N. Solares 16239 January 10,
1992
Similarly, in Cabagnot v. Comelec,[42] this Court held that the
Commission on Elections ought to be the first one to observe (14) People v. Socorro Alto 13708 March 9, 1992
its own Rules. Its departure from its own rules constitutes
arrogance of power tantamount to abuse. Such inconsistency (15) People v. TomasBaguio 130151 March 11, 1992
denigrates public trust in its objectivity and dependability. The
Court reminded the Comelec to be more judicious in its
(16) People v. Felipa D. de Veyra 13672 April 13, 1992
actions and decisions and avoid imprudent volte-face moves
that undermine the public's faith and confidence in it.
(17) People v. Felicidad Tabang 12139 July 23, 1992
The ratio decidendi in the afore-cited cases applies mutatis
mutandis to the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan ought to (18) People v. Jose S.Buguia 14227 September 9,
be the first to observe its own rules. It cannot suspend its rules, 1992
or except a case from its operation.
(19) People v. Eleno T. Regidor, et al. 13689-13695
2. Undecided Cases Beyond the Reglementary Period.-- We January 6, 1993
find that the Sandiganbayan has several cases undecided
beyond the reglementary period set by the statutes and its (20) People v. Serafin Unilongo 14411 February 2,
own rules, some as long as more than ten (10) years ago. 1993
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 118

(21) People v. Manuel Parale, et al. 15168 June 21, 1993 (45) People v. Engr.Antonio B. Laguador 14195 March
31, 1997
(22) People v. Robert P. Wa-acon 14375 June 21, 1993
(46) People v. Paterno C. Belcia, Jr. 16583-16585 March
(23) People v. Linda J. Necessito 13668 July 13, 1993 31, 1997

(24) People v. Simon Flores 16946 August 4, 1993 (47) People v. SPO3Serafin V. Reyes 21608 March
31, 1997
(25) People v. Alejandro F. Buccat 14986 August 31,
1993 (48) People v. MayorSamuel F. Bueser, et al.
22195-22196 March 31, 1997
(26) People v. IrmaCollera Monge 15301 March 9, 1994
(49) People v. Romeo C. Monteclaro 14223 May 6,
1997
(27) People v. Melencio F. Ilajas 9977 May 10, 1994
(50) People v. Rodolfo E.Aguinaldo 20948-20949
(28) People v.Buenaventura Q.Sindac, et al. 13747-13748 October 17, 1997
August 19, 1994
(51) People v. Aniceto M. Sobrepea 23324 October 27,
(29) People v. Jesus A. Bravo 17514 August 24, 1997
1994
(52) People v. Marietta T. Caugma, et al. 17001
(30) People v. Raul S. Tello 15006 November 15, November 26, 1997
1994
(53) People v. MayorMeliton Geronimo, et al. 19708
(31) People v. Celso N. Jacinto 14975 January 10, February 23, 1998
1995
(54) People v. Fernando Miguel, et al. 17600 April 7,
(32) People v. MayorAntonio Abad Santos, et al. 17670 1998
January 24, 1995
(55) People v. Rogelio A. Aniversario 17601 April 7,
(33) People v. Lamberto R. Te 20588 February 14, 1998
1995
(56) People v. Corazon Gammad Leao 9812-9967
(34) People v. AleFrancisco 21020 July 18, 1995 May 8, 1998

(35) People v. Dir. Felix R. Gonzales, et al. 13563 July (57) People v. Teresita S. Lazaro 17901 June 8, 1998
25, 1995
(58) People v. Brig. Gen. Raymundo Jarque, et al. 20688
(36) People v. MayorAdelina Gabatan, et al. 14324 October 19, 1998
January 3, 1996
(59) People v. Pros. Filotea Estorninos 23509
(37) People v. Victoria Posadas-Adona 17202 October 19, 1998
January 4, 1996
(60) People v. Orlando Mina 19534-19545
(38) People v. Roberto Estanislao Chang, et al. 16854 October 20, 1998
January 22, 1996
(61) People v. Vice Gov. Milagros A. Balgos 23042
(39) People v. Godofredo Yambao, et al. 16927-16928 October 20, 1998
March 13, 1996
(62) People v. Ceferino Paredes, Jr., et al. 18857
(40) People v. Honesto G. Encina 13171 April 26, 1996 November 17, 1998

(41) People v. Pablito Rodriguez 13971 May 10, 1996 (63) People v. Brig. Gen. Rayundo Jarque, et al. 18696
January 15, 1999
(42) People v. Leandro A. Suller 17759 June 28, 1996
(64) People v. MayorAgustin R. Escao, Jr. 23336
(43) People v. Trinidad M. Valdez 16695 August 26, January 15, 1999
1996
(65) People v. MayorEdgar V. Teves, et al. 23374
(44) People v. Vivencio B. Patagoc 19651 January 27, January 15, 1999
1997
(66) People v. C/Supt. Alfonso T. Clemente, et al. 22832
January 29, 1999
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 119

(67) People v. Dominica Santos 19059-19063 (4)People v. Alfredo Sarmiento, et al. 24407-24408
February 18, 1999 August 11, 2000

(68) People v. Edith G. Tico 23273 April 20, 1999 Third Division**

(69) People v. Sec.Hilarion J. Ramiro, et al. 23511 Case Title Case No. Date Submitted for
August 6, 1999 Decision

(70) People v. Timoteo A. Garcia, et al. 24042-24098 (1) People v. Sergia Zoleta A/R # 016 November 16,
August 6, 1999 1999

(71) People v. Mayor Jeceju L. Manaay 24402 (2) People v. Manuel Solon Y Tenchaves A/R # 029
August 6, 1999 December 9, 1999

(72) People v. Dir.Rosalinda Majarais, et al. 24355 (3) People v. Eliseo L. Ruiz 13861-13863 April 6,
August 18, 1999 2000

(73) People v. Victor S. Limlingan 24281 August 13, (4) People v. Manuel R. Galvez, et al. 13889
1999 September 30, 1999

(74) People v. Nestor S. Castillo, et al. 24631 (5) People v. Tolentino Mendoza, et al. 16756
August 31, 1999 August 28, 1999

(75) People v. Apolinar Candelaria 22145 September 6, (6) People v. Rodrigo Villas 19563 April 6, 2000
1999
(7) People v. Ernesto Vargas 19574 April 6, 2000
(76) People v. Bernardo Billote Resoso 19773-19779
October 11, 1999 (8) People v. Ernesto, Vargas, et al. 20053 April 6, 2000

(77) People v. Atty.Alfredo Fordan Rellora, et al. (9) People v. Marcelo T.Abrenica, et al. 23522 July 6,
24433-24434 October 11, 1999 2000

(78) People v. Faustino Balacuit 98 December 22, (10) People v. Florencio Garay, et al. 25657 May 5,
1999 2000

(79) People v. MayorBernardino Alcaria, Jr., et al. Fourth Division***

23418-23423 January 6, 2000
Case Title Case No. Date Submitted for
(80) People v. Joel R.Lachica, et al. 24319-24329 Decision
January 6, 2000
(1) People v. Jaime Alos, et Al. 17664 August 31,
(81) People v. JoseMicabalo, et al. 24531-24534 April 1999
27, 2000
(2) People v. Antonio R. De Vera 23366 November 26,
(82) People v. MayorEduardo Alarilla 23069 May 1999
29, 2000
(3) People v. Aurora Mantele 24841-42 May 9,
(83) People v. Pros. Nilo M. Sarsaba, et al. 23323 May 2000
29, 2000
(4) People v. Olegario Clarin, Jr., et al. 25198 July
(84) People v. Philip G. Zamora 24150 May 29, 2000 12, 2000

Second Division* Fifth Division****

Case Title Case No. Date Submitted for Case Title Case No. Date Submitted for
Decision Decision

(1) People v. Marcelino Cordova, et al. 18435 (1) People v. Nestor A. Pablo 13344 January 16,
August 11, 2000 1998

(2) People v. Benjamin T.Damian 22858 August 11, (2) People v. Hernand D.Dabalus, et al. 14397
2000 January 13, 1999

(3)People v. Lino L. Labis, et al. 22398 July 18, 2000 (3) People v. Eduardo Pilapil 16672 March 23, 2000
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 120

(4) People v. P/Sgt. Nazario Marifosque 17030 April (26) People v. Mayor Walfrido A. Siasico 23427
16, 1998 January 16, 1998

(5) People v. Ignacio B. Bueno 17055 September 12, The Sandiganbayan is a special court created in an effort
1995 to maintain honesty and efficiency in the bureaucracy,
weed out misfits and undesirables in the government and
(6) People v. Corazon G. Garlit 17072 March 31, 1997 eventually stamp out graft and corruption.45 We have held
consistently that a delay of three (3) years in deciding a single
case is inexcusably long.46 We can not accept the excuses of
(7) People v. Mayor RufoPabelonia, et al. 17538 Presiding Justice Sandiganbayan Francis E. Garchitorena
November 14, 1995 that the court was reorganized in 1997; that the new justices
had to undergo an orientation and that the Sandiganbayan
(8) People v. Enrique B. Lenon, et al. 17617 March relocated to its present premises which required the packing
13, 1996 and crating of records; and that some boxes were still
unopened.47
(9) People v. Constancio Bonite, et al. 17618-17619
May 1, 1995 We likewise find unacceptable Presiding Justice
Garchitorenas excuse that one case alone48 comprises more
(10) People v. Jesus Villanueva 17884 January 9, 1996 that fifty percent (50%) of the First Divisions backlog and that
the same has been set for promulgation on December 8,
2000.49 As we said, a delay in a single case cannot be
(11) People v. Ricardo T.Liwanag, et al. 18008 March tolerated, para muestra, basta un boton. (for an example, one
9, 1998 button suffices). It is admitted that there are several other
cases submitted for decision as far back as ten (10) years ago
(12) People v. Ma. Lourdes L. Falcon 18036 that have remained undecided by the First Division, of which
January 18, 1995 Justice Garchitorena is presiding justice and chairman.
Indeed, there is even one case, which is a simple motion to
withdraw the information filed by the prosecutor. This has
(13) People v. Luis D. Montero, et al. 18684 July
remained unresolved for more than seven (7) years (since
24, 1998
1994).50 The compliance submitted by the Sandiganbayan
presiding justice incriminates him. The memorandum
(14) People v. Roel D. Morales 18699 December 22, submitted by the Court Administrator likewise testifies to the
1995 unacceptable situation in the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, there is
a disparity in the reports submitted by the Sandiganbayan
(15) People v. Diosdado T. Gulle 18759 October 18, presiding justice and the OCA. According to the Court
1995 Administrator, the cases submitted for decision that were still
pending promulgation51 before the five divisions of the
Sandiganbayan are:52
(16) People v. Benjamin Sapitula, et al. 18785
August 31, 1995
First Division
(17) People v. Danilo R. Santos, et al. 18932
November 4, 1997 Case Number Date Submitted

(18) People v. Pat. DaniloMaraon 19039 May 24, 1995 Criminal Cases

(19) People v. Romeo Cabando, et al. 19378-19379 1. 11156 8/9/91

May 27, 1996
2. 11157 8/9/91
(20) People v. SPO2 Rodolfo Burbos 19593 July 6,
1998 3. 11158 8/9/91

(21) People v. Guillermo M. Viray, et al. 19614 4. 11159 8/9/91

August 31, 1998
5. 11160 8/9/91
(22) People v. Mayor Bonifacio Balahay 20427
November 5, 1999
6. 11999 12/10/90

(23) People v. Enrique Sy, et al. 20487 December 17,

7. 12102 7/1/91
1998

8. 12127 2/12/90
(24) People v. PO2 Manuel L. Bien 20648-20649 March
31, 1998
9. 12139 6/10/92
(25) People v. Felipe L. Laodenio 23066 September 28,
1999 10. 12289 8/28/91

11. 12305 2/7/91

FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 121

12. 12306 2/7/91 43. 15006 11/19/94

13. 13015 3/2/92 44. 15168 3/25/93

14. 13171 11/16/95 45. 15301 3/16/94

15. 13353 10/6/90 46. 16239 12/26/91

16. 13521 12/12/99 47. 16516 11/19/91

17. 13563 7/4/95 48. 16583 8/13/96

18. 13618 7/14/91 49. 16584 8/13/96

19. 13668 6/13/93 50. 16585 8/13/96

20. 13672 3/5/92 51. 16695 8/15/96

21. 13679 8/6/91 52. 16854 1/15/96

22. 13680 8/6/91 53. 16927 12/17/95

23. 13689 11/14/92 54. 16928 12/17/95

24. 13690 11/14/92 55. 16946 8/4/93

25. 13691 11/14/92 56. 17001 9/4/97

26. 13692 11/14/92 57. 17278 5/2/94

27. 13693 11/14/92 58. 17447 9/6/94

28. 13694 11/14/92 59. 17448 9/6/94

29. 13695 11/14/92 60. 17514 8/19/94

30. 13708 3/9/92 61. 17600 8/30/97

31. 13747 8/19/94 62. 17601 8/30/97

32. 13748 8/19/94 63. 17670 11/25/94

33. 13971 3/12/95 64. 17759 6/25/96

34. 14223 3/7/97 65. 17901 5/28/98

35. 14227 9/5/92 66. 18283 2/21/95

36. 14230 11/30/90 67. 18696 8/9/98

37. 14287 7/3/94 68. 18857 10/21/98

38. 14324 11/5/95 69. 19059 2/11/99

39. 14375 5/22/95 70. 19060 2/11/99

40. 14411 1/24/93 71. 19061 2/11/99

41. 14975 9/29/94 72. 19062 2/11/99

42. 14986 12/11/92 73. 19063 2/11/99

FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 122

74. 19534 9/2/98 105. 23422 10/15/99

75. 19535 9/2/98 106. 23423 10/15/99

76. 19651 11/15/96 107. 23509 9/5/98

77. 19708 8/25/98 108. 23511 4/23/99

78. 19773 5/21/99 109. 23540 10/15/99

79. 19774 5/21/99 110. 24042 4/28/99

80. 19775 5/21/99 111. 24043 4/28/99

81. 19976 5/21/99 112. 24044 4/28/99

82. 19977 5/21/99 113. 24045 4/28/99

83. 19978 5/21/99 114. 24046 4/28/99

84. 19979 5/21/99 115. 24047 4/28/99

85. 20588 2/14/95 116. 24048 4/28/99

86. 20688 7/9/98 117. 24049 4/28/99

87. 20948 10/9/97 118. 24050 4/28/99

88. 20949 10/9/97 119. 24051 4/28/99

89. 21020 7/4/95 120. 24052 4/28/99

90. 22145 7/7/99 121. 24053 4/28/99

91. 22195 6/14/96 122. 24054 4/28/99

92. 22196 6/14/96 123. 24055 4/28/99

93. 22832 10/21/98 124. 24056 4/28/99

94. 23042 8/27/98 125. 24057 4/28/99

95. 23146 11/13/00 126. 24058 4/28/99

96. 23273 4/19/99 127. 24059 4/28/99

97. 23323 3/23/00 128. 24060 4/28/99

98. 23324 8/3/97 129. 24061 4/28/99

99. 23336 9/4/97 130. 24062 4/28/99

100. 23374 12/17/98 131. 24063 4/28/99

101. 23418 10/15/99 132. 24064 4/28/99

102. 23419 10/15/99 133. 24065 4/28/99

103. 23420 10/15/99 134. 24066 4/28/99

104. 23421 10/15/99 135. 24067 4/28/99

FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 123

136. 24068 4/28/99 167. 24150 1/31/00

137. 24069 4/28/99 168. 24236 2/14/00

138. 24070 4/28/99 169. 24237 2/14/00

139. 24071 4/28/99 170. 24281 5/9/99

140. 24072 4/28/99 171. 24319 11/4/99

141. 24073 4/28/99 172. 24320 11/4/99

142. 24074 4/28/99 173. 24321 11/4/99

143. 24075 4/28/99 174. 24322 11/4/99

144. 24076 4/28/99 175. 24323 11/4/99

145. 24077 4/28/99 176. 24324 11/4/99

146. 24078 4/28/99 177. 24325 11/4/99

147. 24079 4/28/99 178. 24326 11/4/99

148. 24080 4/28/99 179. 24327 11/4/99

149. 24081 4/28/99 180. 24328 11/4/99

150. 24082 4/28/99 181. 24329 11/4/99

151. 24083 4/28/99 182. 24339 10/20/00

152. 24084 4/28/99 183. 24355 2/18/99

153. 24085 4/28/99 184. 24395 7/13/99

154. 24086 4/28/99 185. 24402 6/17/99

155. 24087 4/28/99 186. 24433 9/6/99

156. 24088 4/28/99 187. 24434 9/6/99

157. 24089 4/28/99 188. 24531 12/16/99

158. 24090 4/28/99 189. 24532 12/16/99

159. 24091 4/28/99 190. 24533 12/16/99

160. 24092 4/28/99 191. 24534 12/16/99

161. 24093 4/28/99 192. 24631 8/9/99

162. 24094 4/28/99 193. 24768 7/8/00

163. 24095 4/28/99 194. 6672 7/11/90

164. 24096 4/28/99 195. 9977 5/10/94

165. 24097 4/28/99 Civil Case

166. 24098 4/28/99 1. 0112 1/11/92

FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 124

2. 0116 10/16/91 27. 13828 8/30/00

3. 0156 3/14/97 28. 13829 8/30/00

Second Division 29. 13830 8/30/00

Case No. Date Submitted 30. 13831 8/30/00

Criminal Case 31. 13832 8/30/00

1. 19542 4/16/99 32. 18965 11/30/00

2. 19004 9/10/96 33. 19848 3/28/96

3. 22934 10/14/00 34. 20765 8/30/96

4. 20483 8/28/96 35. 20816 3/11/98

5. 20484 8/28/96 36. 19692 8/27/00

6. 23529 10/23/00 37. 19693 8/27/00

7. 23530 10/23/00 38. 19694 8/27/00

8. 23338 12/2/99 39. 19695 8/27/00

9. 18786 11/28/00 40. 19696 8/27/00

10. 19686 07/2/97 41. 19697 8/27/00

11. 184403 12/4/98 42. 19698 8/27/00

12. 184404 12/4/98 43. 19699 8/27/00

13. 184405 12/4/98 44. 19700 8/27/00

14. 184406 12/4/98 45. 19701 8/27/00

15. 184407 12/4/98 46. 19702 8/27/00

16. 184408 12/4/98 47. 19703 8/27/00

17. 184409 12/4/98 48. 19704 8/27/00

18. 184410 12/4/98 49. 19705 8/27/00

19. 184411 12/4/98 50. 19706 8/27/00

20. 184412 12/4/98 51. 19707 8/27/00

21. 184413 12/4/98 52. 23262 10/11/00

22. 184414 12/4/98 53. AR#035 12/9/00

23. 184415 12/4/98 54. 24994 8/17/00

24. 184416 12/4/98 55. 21097 12/13/00

25. 184417 12/4/98 56. 20660 12/20/00

26. 13827 8/30/00 57. 23111 11/27/00

FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 125

58. 24407 7/27/00 23. 19563 4/6/00

59. 24408 7/27/00 24. 19574 4/6/00

60. 18435 3/21/00 25. 19622 4/6/00

61. 22858 8/4/00 26. 19623 4/6/00

62. 22976 5/4/99 27. 19624 4/6/00

Civil Case 28. 20053 4/6/00

1. 0171 7/10/00 29. 20054 4/6/00

Third Division 30. 20271 12/18/00

Case Number Date Submitted 31. 22143 12/18/00

1.SCA/005 12/18/00 32. 23014 9/23/00

2.A/R 016 8/5/99 33. 23522 7/6/00

3.A/R 029 10/2/00 34. 23699 3/22/00

4.487 4/8/98 35. 23700 3/22/00

5.488 4/8/98 36. 23701 3/22/00

6.489 4/8/98 37. 23802 9/10/00

7.490 4/8/98 38. 23803 9/10/00

8.491 4/8/98 39. 24153 12/18/00

9.11794 6/10/00 40. 24697 9/10/00

10.13861 4/6/00 41. 24698 9/10/00

11. 13862 4/6/00 42. 24741 12/7/00

12. 13863 4/6/00 43. 24779 10/28/00

13. 13889 3/25/99 44. 24780 10/28/00

14. 16756 8/25/99 45. 24781 10/28/00

15. 17532 12/11/00 46. 25657 5/5/00

16. 18867 10/5/00 Fourth Division

17. 18868 10/5/00 Case No. Date Submitted

18. 18869 10/5/00 1. 11960 09/21/98

19. 18870 10/5/00 2.17664 01/29/98

20. 18871 10/5/00 3.13036 02/22/99

21. 18872 10/5/00 4.13037 02/22/99

22. 19182 4/6/00 5.13593 05/21/96

FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 126

6.13594 05/21/96 37. 20475 07/07/00

7.13757 03/21/97 38. 20476 07/07/00

8.14380 02/14/95 39. 20664 06/29/96

9.16809 03/26/00 40. 20685 02/18/00

10.17015 06/06/94 41. 20828 09/13/00

11.17016 06/06/94 42. 21093 08/07/99

12.17140 06/13/96 43. 21131 08/04/96

13.17141 06/13/96 44. 21778 09/29/97

14.17209 12/27/96 45. 21779 09/29/97

15.17805 02/15/00 46. 21780 09/29/97

16.17806 02/15/00 47. 22891 03/02/00

17.17809 02/15/00 48. 22892 03/02/00

18. 17856 04/02/00 49. 23007 05/24/99

19. 18005 05/07/96 50. 23058 04/27/00

20. 18006 05/07/96 51. 23059 04/27/00

21. 18257 09/22/97 52. 23060 04/27/00

22. 18894 11/17/00 53. 23061 04/27/00

23. 18895 11/17/00 54. 23062 04/27/00

24. 18896 11/17/00 55. 23366 03/28/99

25. 18900 10/28/00 56. 23415 05/25/00

26. 18935 06/16/00 57. 23534 12/15/00

27. 18936 06/16/00 58. 23708 09/27/00

28. 18937 06/16/00 59. 24447 09/18/00

29. 19567 05/21/96 60. 24448 09/18/00

30. 20338 05/19/97 61. 24464 07/26/00

31. 20469 07/07/00 62. 24465 07/26/00

32. 20470 07/07/00 63. 24742 10/10/00

33. 20471 07/07/00 64. 24841 03/22/00

34. 20472 07/07/00 65. 24842 03/22/00

35. 20473 07/07/00 66. 24851 10/29/00

36. 20474 07/07/00 67. 25198 05/31/00

FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 127

68. 25389 09/26/00 26. 23450 9/16/00

69. 25543 12/27/00 27. 23515 1/29/00

70. 25658 07/28/00 28. 24155 11/30/00

Fifth Division 29. 24379 8/27/00

Case Number Date Submitted 30. 24759 5/5/00

Criminal Cases 31. 24858 12/28/00

1. 14397 1/4/99 We find that Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena

failed to devise an efficient recording and filing system to
2. 16672 2/13/00 enable him to monitor the flow of cases and to manage
their speedy and timely disposition. This is his duty on
which he failed.53
3. 17030 2/19/98
Memorandum of the Court Administrator
4. 17826 12/9/00
On November 14, 2001, the Court required the Office of the
5. 17827 12/9/00 Court Administrator54 to update its report.55

6. 18478 8/21/00 On November 16, 2001, OCA Consultant Pedro A. Ramirez

(Justice, Court of Appeals, Retired) submitted a compliance
7. 18684 5/29/98 report with the Courts order. The compliance report shows
that to this day, several cases that were reported pending by
8. 18880 12/6/00 the Sandiganbayan on September 26, 2000, and likewise
reported undecided by the OCA on January 26, 2001, have
not been decided/resolved. We quote the compliance
9. 19510 12/4/00 report:56

10. 19511 12/4/00 First Division

11. 19512 12/4/00 Case Number Date Submitted Ponente

Assigned Reason for Not Deciding Case
12. 19593 6/5/98
194. 11999 12/10/90 Garchitorena Under
13. 19614 7/31/98 study, submitted before the reorganization

14. 19668 7/26/98 195. 12102 7/1/91 Garchitorena Under

study, submitted before the reorganization
15. 20194 1/8/01
196. 12127 2/12/90 Not reported;
unaccounted for by Sandiganbayan report
16. 20427 11/3/99

197. 12139 6/10/92 Castaneda*

17. 20648 1/4/98

Under studysubmitted before the reorganization

18. 20649 1/4/98

198. 12289 8/28/91 Castaneda Under

19. 20694 3/11/98
studysubmitted before the reorganization

20. 21882 8/12/00

199. 12305-06 2/7/91 Castaneda Under
studysubmitted before the reorganization
21. 22184 12/16/00
200. 13015 3/2/92 Garchitorena Under
22. 22873 12/4/99 studysubmitted before the reorganization

23. 22926 11/13/00 201. 13171 11/16/95 Castaneda Under

studysubmitted before the reorganization
24. 23066 8/16/99
202. 13353 10/6/90 Garchitorena Under
25. 23319 9/30/00 studysubmitted before the reorganization
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 128

203. 13521 12/12/99 Garchitorena Under 224. 15301 3/16/94 Castaneda Under study
studysubmitted before the reorganization submitted before the reorganization

204. 13563 7/4/95 Garchitorena Under 225. 16239 12/26/91 Castaneda Under study
studysubmitted before the reorganization submitted before the reorganization

205. 13618 7/14/91 Castaneda Under 226. 16516 11/19/91 Castaneda Under study
studysubmitted before the reorganization submitted before the reorganization

206. 13668 6/13/93 Castaneda Under 227. 16583-85 8/13/96 Castaneda Under study
studysubmitted before the reorganization submitted before the reorganization

207. 13672 3/5/92 Castaneda Under 228. 16695 8/15/96 Castaneda Under study
studysubmitted before the reorganization submitted before the reorganization

208. 13679-80 8/6/91 Castaneda Under 229. 16854 1/15/96 Castaneda Under study
studysubmitted before the reorganization submitted before the reorganization

209. 13689-95 11/14/92 Castaneda Under 230. 16927-28 12/17/95 Castaneda Under study
studysubmitted before the reorganization submitted before the reorganization

210. 13708 3/9/92 Castaneda Under 231. 16946 8/4/93 Castaneda Under study
studysubmitted before the reorganization submitted before the reorganization

211. 13747-48 8/19/94 Castaneda Under 232. 17001 9/4/97 Not yet assigned
studysubmitted before the reorganization
233. 17278 5/2/94 Death of accused is
212. 13971 3/12/95 Castaneda Under unconfirmed and dismissal of the case was held in abeyance.
studysubmitted before the reorganization (Ong, J.)

213. 14223 3/7/97 Death of accused is 234. 17600 8/30/97 Not yet assigned
unconfirmed and dismissal of the case was held in abeyance.
(Ong, J.)* 235. 17601 8/30/97 Not yet assigned

236. 17759 6/25/96 Ong Decided and set for

214. 14227 9/5/92 Castaneda Under study promulgation
submitted before the reorganization
237. 17901 5/28/98 Not yet assigned
215. 14230 11/30/90 Castaneda Under study
submitted before the reorganization
238. 18696 8/9/98 Not yet assigned
216. 14287 7/3/94 Castaneda Under study
submitted before the reorganization 239. 18857 10/21/98 Not yet assigned

217. 14324 11/5/95 Castaneda Under study 240. 19059-63 2/11/99 Not yet assigned
submitted before the reorganization
241. 19534-35 9/2/98 Not yet assigned
218. 14375 5/22/95 Castaneda Under study
submitted before the reorganization 242. 19708 8/25/98 Not yet assigned

219. 14411 1/24/93 Garchitorena Under study 243. 19773-79 5/21/99 Not yet assigned
submitted before the reorganization
244. 20688 7/9/98 Not yet assigned
220. 14975 9/29/94 Castaneda Under study
submitted before the reorganization 245. 20948 10/9/97 Not reported;
unaccounted for by Sandiganbayan report
221. 14986 12/11/92 Castaneda Under study
submitted before the reorganization 246. 20949 10/9/97 Not reported;
unaccounted for by Sandiganbayan report
222. 15006 11/19/94 Castaneda Under study
submitted before the reorganization 247. 21020 7/4/95 Ong Set for Promulgation on
November 27, 2001
223. 15168 3/25/93 Castaneda Under study
submitted before the reorganization 248. 22145 7/7/99 Not yet assigned
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 129

249. 22195-96 6/14/96 Castaneda Under study, 277. 0112 1/11/92 Not reported;
submitted before the reorganization unaccounted for by Sandiganbayan report

250. 22832 10/21/98 Not yet assigned 278. 0116 10/16/91 Not reported;
unaccounted for by Sandiganbayan report
251. 23042 8/27/98 Not yet assigned
279. 0156 3/14/97 Not reported;
252. 23146 11/13/00 Not yet assigned unaccounted for by Sandiganbayan report

253. 23273 4/19/99 Not yet assigned Summary/Tally

254. 23323 3/23/00 Not yet assigned Cases Assigned to Garchitorena, PJ. 9

255. 23324 8/3/97 Not yet assigned Cases Assigned to Castaneda, J. 42

256. 23336 9/4/97 Not yet assigned Cases Assigned to Ong, J. 5

257. 23374 12/17/98 Not yet assigned Cases not yet assigned 73

258. 23418-23 10/15/99 Not yet assigned Cases not accounted for or reported 9

259. 23509 9/5/98 Not yet assigned __________

260. 23511 4/23/99 Not yet assigned Total 138

261. 23540 10/15/99 Not yet assigned Second Division

262. 24042-98 4/28/99 Ong Set for Promulgation on Case Number Date Submitted Ponente Assigned
November 27, 2001 Reason for Not Deciding Case

263. 24150 1/31/00 Not yet assigned 63. 19542 4/16/99 For retaking of testimony due to
incomplete TSN
264. 24236-37 2/14/00 Not yet assigned
64. 13827-32 8/30/00 Victorino For promulgation
265. 24281 5/9/99 Not yet assigned
65. 18965 11/30/00 For retaking of testimony due to
incomplete TSN
266. 24319-29 11/4/99 Not yet assigned
Third Division
267.24319-29 11/4/99 Not reported;
unaccounted for by Sandiganbayan report
Case Number Date Submitted Ponente Assigned
Reason for Not Deciding Case
268. 24355 2/18/99 Not yet assigned
47. SCA/005 12/18/00 Ilarde --
269.24395 7/13/99 Not reported;
unaccounted for by Sandiganbayan report
48. A/R 029 10/2/00 Illarde
270. 24402 6/17/99 Not yet assigned
49. 487-491 4/8/98 With pending demurrer to
evidence, submitted, 01/26/01 re Submitted, 03/20/01
271. 24433-34 9/6/99 Not yet assigned
50. 11794 6/10/00 De Castro --
272. 24531-34 12/16/99 Not yet assigned
51. 17532 12/11/00 Ilarde --
273. 24631 8/9/99 Not yet assigned
52. 18867-72 10/5/00 Pending trial per order dated
274. 24768 7/8/00 Not yet assigned 08/17/00

275. 6672 7/11/90 Garchitorena Under Study, 53. 19182 4/6/00 Unloaded to the 5th Division,
before the reorganization 10/13/97

276. 9977 5/10/94 Garchitorena Under Study, 54. 19563 4/6/00 No Assignment --
before the reorganization
55. 19574 4/6/00 No Assignment --
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 130

56. 19622-24 4/6/00 Unloaded to the 5th Division, 32. 14397 1/4/99 Badoy, Jr. Inherited
10/13/97 case/lack of personnel

57. 20053-54 4/6/00 Not with the 3rd Division 33. 16672 2/13/00 Badoy, Jr. Inherited
case/lack of personnel
58. 20271 12/18/00 Illarde --
34. 17030 2/19/98 Badoy, Jr. Inherited
59. 22143 12/18/00 De Castro -- case/lack of personnel

60. 23014 9/23/00 De Castro -- 35. 18478 8/21/00 Estrada Inherited case/lack of
personnel
61. 23699-701 3/22/00 Ilarde --
36. 18684 5/29/98 Badoy, Jr. Inherited
case/lack of personnel
62. 23802-03 9/10/00 No Assignment --
37. 18880 12/6/00 Badoy, Jr. Inherited
63. 24153 12/18/00 No Assignment -- case/lack of personnel

64. 24697-98 9/10/00 Ilarde -- 38. 19510-12 12/4/00 Estrada Inherited case/lack of
personnel
65. 24741 12/7/00 De Castro --
39. 19593 6/5/98 Badoy, Jr. Inherited
66. 24779-81 10/28/00 No Assignment -- case/lack of personnel

67. 25657 5/5/00 With Defense pending motion for 40. 19614 7/31/98 Badoy, Jr. Inherited
the re-examination of the Information and the parties case/lack of personnel
affidavits, etc. Order dated 08/31/01
41. 20194 1/8/01 Chico-Nazario Complicated
Summary/Tally Issues

Cases Assigned to Illarde, J. 9 42. 20427 11/3/99 Badoy, Jr. Inherited

case/lack of personnel
Cases Assigned to De Castro, J. 4
43. 20648-49 1/4/98 Badoy, Jr. Inherited
Cases not yet assigned 8 case/lack of personnel

Others 18 44. 20694 3/11/98 Estrada Inherited case/lack of

personnel

____________
45. 22926 11/13/00 No report, Unaccounted for by the
Sandiganbayan report
Total 39
46. 23066 8/16/99 Badoy, Jr. Inherited
Fourth Division** case/lack of personnel

Case Number Date Submitted Ponente Assigned 47. 24155 11/30/00 Estrada Not yet due
Reason for Not Deciding Case
48. 24379 8/27/00 Estrada Draft decision released
71. 11960 09/21/98 Draft of decision penned by J. 7/31/01
Nario in view of the dissenting opinion of one Justice was
referred to a Division of five (5) composed of Nario, Palattao,
Ferrer, Badoy, Jr. and De Castro, JJ.

72. 16809 03/26/00 Palattao -- Summary/Tally

73. 23058-62 04/27/00 Nario -- Cases Assigned to Badoy, J. *** 11

74. 25389 09/26/00 Nario -- Cases Assigned to Estrada, J. 7

Fifth Division Cases Assigned to Chico-Nazario, J. 1

Case Number Date Submitted Ponente Assigned No report/Unaccounted For 1

Reason for Not Deciding Case
_________
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 131

Total 20
3. Applicability of SC Adm. Circular No. 10-94.-- Supreme
Court Circular No. 10-94 applies to the Sandiganbayan.
Administrative Circular 10-9457 directs all trial judges to make
a physical inventory of the cases in their dockets. The docket
inventory procedure is as follows:58
a. Every trial judge shall submit not later than the last week of
February and the last week of August of each year a tabulation
of all pending cases which shall indicate on a horizontal
column the following data:
case and initialled the last page thereof, and I certify that the
results of the inventory are correctly reflected in the above
tabulation.
_________.
_____________________ Presiding Judge
Given the rationale behind the Administrative Circular, we hold
that it is applicable to the Sandiganbayan with respect to
cases within its original and appellate jurisdiction.
Mora Decidendi

1. Title of the case We reiterate the admonition we issued in our resolution of

October 10, 2000:59
2. Date of Filing
This Court has consistently impressed upon judges
3. Date arraignment in criminal cases of Pre-trial in civil cases (which includes justices) to decide cases promptly and
and expeditiously on the principle that justice delayed is
justice denied. Decision making is the primordial and
4. Date of initial trial most important duty of the member of the bench.60
Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch.
Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency61 that
5. Date of last hearing warrants disciplinary sanction, including fine,62 suspension63
and even dismissal.64 The rule particularly applies to justices
6. Date submitted for Decision of the Sandiganbayan. Delays in the disposition of cases
erode the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary,
b. The tabulation shall end with a certification by the trial judge lower its standards, and bring it into disrepute.65 Delays
that he/she has personally undertaken an inventory of the cannot be sanctioned or tolerated especially in the anti-graft
pending cases in his/her court; that he/she has examined court, the showcase of the nations determination to succeed
each case record and initialled the last page thereof. The in its war against graft (underscoring ours).
judge shall indicate in his/her certification the date when
inventory was conducted. In Yuchengco v. Republic,66 we urged the Sandiganbayan to
promptly administer justice. We stated that the
c. The Tabulation and Certification shall be in the following Sandiganbayan has the inherent power to amend and control
form. its processes and orders to make them conformable to law
and justice. The Sandiganbayan as the nations anti-graft court
must be the first to avert opportunities for graft, uphold the
Docket Inventory for the Period right of all persons to a speedy disposition of their cases and
avert the precipitate loss of their rights.
January __ to June ___, ___/July
Practice of Unloading Cases
To December ___, ___
According to the memorandum submitted by the OCA, there
(Indicate Period) is a practice in the first and third divisions of the
Sandiganbayan of unloading cases to other divisions despite
the fact that these cases have been submitted for decision
Court and Station ________
before them. We cite relevant portions of the memorandum:67

Presiding Judge ________

Cases Submitted for Decision When Unloaded to the Fourth
Division
Title of Case Date Filed Pretrial/
Case No. Title of the Case Division where case
Arraignment Initial Hearing Date of Last Hearing originated Date Submitted for
Date submitted for Decision
Decision

1) 17015 PP vs. Raul Zapatos 3rd 06/06/94

2) 17016 PP vs. Raul Zapatos 3rd 06/06/94

CERTIFICATION:
3) 14380 PP vs. Francisco Ramoran 3rd 02/14/95

I hereby certify that on (Date/Dates___), I personally

4) 18005 PP vs. Panfilo Bongcac 3rd 05/07/96
conducted a physical inventory of pending cases in the docket
of this court, that I personally examined the records of each
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 132

5) 18006 PP vs. Panfilo Bongcac 3rd 05/07/96 15. 17567 2/24/93

6) 13593 PP vs. Dominador Meninguito 3rd 16. 17598 8/3/94

05/30/96
17. 17617 3/28/96
7) 13594 PP vs. Dominador Meninguito 3rd
05/30/96 18. 17618 4/6/95

8) 19567 PP vs. Dominador Meninguito 3rd 19. 17619 4/6/95

05/30/96
20. 17640 6/12/95
9) 17140 PP vs. Jose Caf, et. al. 3rd 06/13/96
21. 17661 12/15/94
10) 17141 PP vs. Jose Caf, et. al. 3rd
06/13/96
22. 17666 8/25/97
11) 20064 PP vs. Ben dela Pena 3rd
07/01/96 23. 17884 11/12/95

12) 21131 PP vs. Rufino Mamanguin 3rd 24. 17902 4/16/95

08/05/96
25. 18008 9/15/97
13) 17209 PP vs. Isidro Catapang 3rd
12/27/96 26. 18423 1/15/96

14) 13757 PP vs. Catalino Daganzo 3rd 27. 18687 9/30/94

03/21/97
28. 18759 10/12/95
15) 18257 PP vs. Zenaida Sazon 1st
09/22/97 29. 18785 7/13/95

Cases Submitted for Decision When Unloaded to the Fifth 30. 18932 4/20/97
Division

31. 18988 10/25/95

Case Number Date Submitted

32. 18999 12/21/95

1. 10264 12/22/90

33. 19039 5/6/95

2. 13344 5/14/97

34. 19378 4/17/96

3. 16223 4/25/94

35. 19379 4/17/96

4. 16574 5/30/95

36. 19679 10/5/95

5. 16760 5/25/95

37. 19712 2/18/95

6. 16810 1/23/96

38. 19907 6/22/95

7. 17018 7/20/94

39. 20487 12/14/96

8. 17055 7/5/95

40. 20624 7/15/95

9. 17139 4/24/94

41. 23427 7/25/97

10. 17162 2/23/95

We suggest a review of the practice of unloading cases

11. 17193 3/8/94 that greatly contributes to the backlog of undecided
cases. When a case has been heard and tried before a
12. 17426 2/12/94 division of the Sandiganbayan, it is ideal that the same division
and no other must decide it as far as practicable.
13. 17480 3/22/94
We further note that several cases which were earlier reported
14. 17538 11/20/95 as undecided by the Sandiganbayan and the OCA have been
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 133

decided since the reports of September 26, 2000 and January 20483-20484 July 26, 1995 April 6, 2001
26, 2001.Nonetheless, the delay in deciding these cases is Victorino
patent and merits reprobation. According to the compliance
report submitted by the OCA on November 16, 2001, there are 20660 December 20, 2000 August 2, 2001
several cases decided way beyond the reglementary period Legaspi
prescribed by law, even assuming without granting, a
reglementary period of twelve months from the time a case is
submitted for decision.68 20765 August 30, 1996 February 23, 2001
Victorino
In a case brought before this Court, Presiding Justice
Garchitorena admitted fault and that the fault is exclusively his 20816 March 11, 1998 January 25, 2001 Victorino
own, in failing to decide the case, though submitted for
decision as early as June 20, 1990.69 This case was not even 21097 December 13, 2000 June 15, 2001
included among pending cases in the Sandiganbayan report Victorino
of September 26, 2000.
22858 August 11, 2000 January 31, 2001 Victorino
The following cases were decided, though beyond the
prescribed period: 22934 October 14, 2000 February 15, 2001
Sandoval
First Division
22976 May 4, 1999 March 1, 2001 Sandoval
Case Number Submitted for Decision Date of
Promulgation Ponente 23111 November 27, 2000 March 14, 2001
Sandoval
14195 March 31, 1997 November 10, 2000 Ong
23262 October 11, 2000 May 16, 2001 Victorino
21608 March 31, 1997 November 15, 2000 Ong
23338 December 2, 1999 December 14, 2000
20588 February 14, 1998 January 12, 2001 Ong Sandoval

19651 November 15, 1996 January 26, 2001 Ong 23529-23530 October 23, 2000 March 28, 2001
Victorino
17670 November 25, 1994 January 26, 2001 Ong
24407-24408 August 11, 2000 January 24, 2001
17447-48 September 6, 1994 February 22, Legaspi
2001 Ong
24994 August 17, 2000 May 30, 2001 Sandoval
18283 February 21, 1995 February 23, 2001
Ong AR#035 December 9, 2000 August 28, 2001
Legaspi
17514 August 19, 1994 April 24, 2001 Ong
Third Division
Second Division
Case Number Submitted for Decision Date of
Case Number Submitted for Decision Date of Promulgation Ponente
Promulgation Ponente
A/R 016 November 16, 1999 January 26, 2001 Ilarde
18403-18417 December 4, 1998 February 2,
2001 Victorino 13861-13863 April 6, 2000 December 22, 2000
Del Rosario
18435 August 11, 2000 March 26, 2001 Victorino
13889 September 30, 1999 May 10, 2001 Ilarde
18786 November 28, 2000 March 28, 2001
Legaspi 16756 August 28, 1999 December 11, 2000 Del
Rosario
19004 September 10, 1996 March 16, 2001
Victorino 23522 July 6, 2000 January 12, 2001 Del Rosario

19692-19707 August 27, 2000 February 26, 2001 Fourth Division

Sandoval
Case Number Submitted for Decision Date of
19848 March 28, 1996 January 29, 2001 Victorino Promulgation Ponente

17664 August 31, 1999 June 1, 2000 Pallatao

FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 134

17016 June 6, 1994 March 27, 2001 Ferrer 23366 November 26, 1999 October 29, 2001 Ferrer

17140-41 June 13, 1996 February 6, 2001 Nario 23415 May 25, 2000 May 28, 2001 Palattao

17209 December 27, 1996 April 30, 2001 Ferrer 23534 December 15, 2000 February 28, 2001
Palattao
17805-09; 17814 February 15, 2000 October 10,
2001 Palattao 23708 September 27, 2000 September 10, 2001
Nario
17856 April 2, 2000 June 25, 2001 Palattao
24464-65 July 26, 2000 June 26, 2001 Nario
18005-06 May 7, 1996 May 18, 2001 Ferrer
24742 October 10, 2000 March 22, 2001 Ferrer
18257 September 22, 1997 July 26, 2001 Ferrer
24841-42 May 9, 2000 March 7, 2001 Ferrer
18894-96 November 17, 2000 March 20, 2001
Palattao 25198 July 12, 2000 February 6, 2001 Nario

18900 October 28, 2000 March 23, 2001 Ferrer 25543 December 27, 2000 February 26, 2001
Palattao
18935-37 June 16, 2000 January 18, 2001
Palattao 25658 July 28, 2000 July 20, 2001 Palattao

19567 May 21, 1996 January 15, 2001 Ferrer 24447-48 September 18, 2000 December 7,
2001 Palattao
20338 May 19, 1997 February 9, 2001 Ferrer
Fifth Division
20469 July 7, 2000 June 25, 2001 Palattao
Case Number Submitted for Decision Date of
13036-37 February 22, 1999 February 28, Promulgation Ponente
2001 Ferrer
17826-17827 December 9, 2000 March 28, 2001
13593-94 May 21, 1996 January 15, 2001 Ferrer Chico-Nazario

20470-76 July 7, 2000 June 25, 2001 19668 July 26, 1998 February 9, 2001 Badoy, Jr.
Palattao
21882 August 12, 2000 July 25, 2001 Chico- Nazario
20664 June 29, 1996 February 20, 2001 Ferrer
22184 December 16, 2000 May 21, 2001 Chico-
20685 February 18, 2000 March 2, 2001 Nazario
Palattao
22873 December 4, 1999 May 31, 2001 Chico-
20828 September 13, 2000 October 8, 2001 Nazario
Palattao
23319 September 30, 2000 April 23, 2001 Chico-
21093 August 7, 1999 January 15, 2001 Palattao Nazario

21131 August 4, 1996 February 13, 2001 Ferrer 23450 September 16, 2000 March 16, 2001 Chico-
Nazario
21778-80 September 29, 1997 June 21, 2001
Ferrer 23515 January 29, 2000 May 28, 2001 Cortez-Estrada

22891-92 March 2, 2000 December 13, 2000 24759 May 5, 2000 July 10, 2001 Cortez-Estrada
Ferrer
24858 December 28, 2000 May 31, 2001 Chico-
23007 May 24, 1999 March 14, 2000 Ferrer Nazario

13757 March 21, 1997 July 2, 2001 Ferrer Relief of Presiding Justice

14380 February 14, 1995 April 23, 2001 Ferrer At this juncture, the Court cites the case of Canson v.
Garchitorena.70 In that case, we admonished respondent
Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena. General Jewel F.
17015 June 6, 1994 March 27, 2001 Ferrer Canson, Police Chief Superintendent, National Capital Region
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 135
Command Director, complained of deliberate delayed action
of the Presiding Justice on the transfer of Criminal Cases Nos.
23047-23057 to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
depriving complainant of his right to a just and speedy trial.
Due to a finding of lack of bad faith on the part of respondent
justice, we issued only a warning. However, the dispositive
portion of the decision cautioned respondent justice that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.71
Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena sits as the
Chairman, First Division, with a backlog of cases pending
decision. At least seventy-three cases have been unassigned
for the writing of the extended opinion, though submitted for
decision. It may be the thinking of the Presiding Justice,
Sandiganbayan that an unassigned case is not counted in its
backlog of undecided cases. This is not correct. It is the duty
of the Presiding Justice and the Chairmen of divisions to
assign the ponente as soon as the case is declared submitted
for decision, if not earlier. If he fails to make the assignment,
he shall be deemed to be the ponente.
The Constitution provides that a case shall be deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of
Court or by the court itself.72 In Administrative Circular No.
28, dated July 3, 1989, the Supreme Court provided that A
case is considered submitted for decision upon the admission
of the evidence of the parties at the termination of the trial.
The ninety (90) days period for deciding the case shall
commence to run from submission of the case for decision
without memoranda; in case the court requires or allows its
filing, the case shall be considered submitted for decision
upon the filing of the last memorandum or the expiration of the
period to do so, whichever is earlier. Lack of transcript of
stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason to interrupt or
suspend the period for deciding the case unless the case was
previously heard by another judge not the deciding judge in
which case the latter shall have the full period of ninety (90)
days from the completion of the transcripts within which to
decide the same.73 The designation of a ponente to a case is
not a difficult administrative task.
Administrative sanctions must be imposed. Mora reprobatur in
lege.74 Again, we reiterate the principle that decision-making
is the most important of all judicial functions and
responsibilities.75 In this area, Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena, as the ponente assigned to the cases submitted
for decision/resolution long ago, some as far back as more
than ten (10) years ago, has been remiss constituting gross
neglect of duty and inefficiency.76 As we said in Canson,77
unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a case amounts to
a denial of justice, bringing the Sandiganbayan into disrepute,
eroding the public faith and confidence in the judiciary.78
Consequently, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena
should be relieved of all trial and administrative work as
Presiding Justice and as Chairman, First Division so that he
can devote himself full timeto decision-making until his
backlog is cleared. He shall finish this assignment not later
than six (6) months from the promulgation of this resolution.
We have, in cases where trial court judges failed to decide
even a single case within the ninety (90) day period, imposed
a fine ranging from five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to the
equivalent of their one months salary.79 According to the
report of the Sandiganbayan, as of September 26, 2000, there
were three hundred forty one (341) cases submitted for
decision before its first division headed by the Presiding
Justice. In the memorandum of the OCA, there were one
hundred ninety eight (198) cases reported submitted for
decision before the First Division.80 Even in the updated
report, there are one hundred thirty eight (138) cases still
undecided in the First Division.
In fact, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena admitted
that he has a backlog.81 He claimed that one (1) case alone
comprises fifty percent (50%) of the backlog. We find this
claim exaggerated. We cannot accept that a backlog of three
hundred forty one (341) cases in the First Division could be
eliminated by the resolution of a single consolidated case of
one hundred fifty six (156) counts. A consolidated case is
considered only as one case. The cases referred to were
consolidated as Criminal Case Nos. 9812-9967, People v.
Corazon Gammad-Leao, decided on December 8, 2000.
What about the one hundred eighty five (185) cases that
unfortunately remained undecided to this date? Worse, the
motion for reconsideration of the decision in said cases,
submitted as of January 11, 2001, has not been resolved to
this date.82 The First Division has only thirty (30) days from
submission to resolve the same. It is now ten (10) months from
submission. The expediente and the motion were transmitted
to the ponente, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena, on
that date, but to this day the case remains unresolved.83
Unfortunately, even other divisions of the Sandiganbayan may
be following his example.84
In the first report of the Court Administrator, he indicated a
total of one hundred ninety five (195) criminal cases and three
(3) civil cases, or a total of one hundred ninety eight (198)
cases submitted for decision as of December 21, 2000.85
Almost a year later, as of November 16, 2001, there are still
one hundred thirty eight (138) cases undecided submitted
long ago. For almost one year, not one case was
decided/resolved by the Presiding Justice himself.86
Directive
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court resolves:
(1) To IMPOSE on Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena
a fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), for inefficiency
and gross neglect of duty.
(2) Effective December 1, 2001, to RELIEVE Presiding Justice
Francis E. Garchitorena of his powers, functions and duties as
the Presiding Justice, Sandiganbayan, and from presiding
over the trial of cases as a justice and Chairman, First
Division, so that he may DEVOTE himself exclusively to
DECISION WRITING, until the backlog of cases assigned to
him as well as cases not assigned to any ponente, of which
he shall be deemed the ponente in the First Division, are
finally decided. There shall be no unloading of cases to other
divisions, or to the First Division inter se.
In the interim, Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, as
the most senior associate justice, shall TAKE OVER and
exercise the powers, functions, and duties of the office of the
Presiding Justice, Sandiganbayan, until further orders from
this Court.
(3) To DIRECT Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena and
the associate justices of the Sandiganbayan to decide/resolve
the undecided cases submitted for decision as of this date,
within three (3) months from their submission, and to resolve
motions for new trial or reconsiderations and petitions for
review within thirty (30) days from their submission. With
respect to the backlog of cases, as hereinabove enumerated,
the Sandiganbayan shall decide/resolve all pending cases
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 136

including incidents therein within six (6) months from notice of

this resolution.

(4) To ORDER the Sandiganbayan to comply with Supreme

Court Administrative Circular 10-94, effective immediately.

(5) To DIRECT the Sandiganbayan en banc to adopt not later

than December 31, 2001 internal rules to govern the allotment
of cases among the divisions, the rotation of justices among
them and other matters leading to the internal operation of the
court, and thereafter to submit the said internal rules to the
Supreme Court for its approval.87

This directive is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,

Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

De Leon, Jr., J., see dissenting and concurring opinion.

Buena, J., on official leave.

FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 137
[A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA. March 27, 2001]
In Re: Derogatory news Items Charging Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria with Interference on
Behalf of a Suspected Drug Queen:
Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria,
respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Men and Women of the courts must conduct themselves with
honor, probity, fairness, prudence and discretion. Magistrates
of justice must always be fair and impartial. They should avoid
not only acts of impropriety, but all appearances of
impropriety. Their influence in society must be consciously
and conscientiously exercised with utmost prudence and
discretion. For, theirs is the assigned role of preserving the
independence, impartiality and integrity of the Judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a judge to
"refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of
litigation or dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency."[1] The slightest form of interference
cannot be countenanced. Once a judge uses his influence to
derail or interfere in the regular course of a legal or judicial
proceeding for the benefit of one or any of the parties therein,
public confidence in the judicial system is diminished, if not
totally eroded.
Such is this administrative charge triggered by newspaper
accounts which appeared on the 21 July 2000 issues of The
Manila Standard, The Manila Times, Malaya, The Philippine
Daily Inquirer and Today. The national dailies collectively
reported that Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G.
Demetria tried to intercede on behalf of suspected Chinese
drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, alias Sze Yuk Lai, who went in and
out of prison to play in a Manila casino.[2]
That same day, 21 July 2000, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., issued a Memorandum to Justice Demetria directing him
to comment on the derogatory allegations in the news
items.[3] On 24 July 2000, Justice Demetria submitted his
Compliance. Subsequently, Chief State Prosecutor (CSP)
Jovencito R. Zuo, who disclosed to the media the name
of Justice Demetria, and State Prosecutor (SP) Pablo C.
Formaran III, a member of the Task Force on Anti-
Narcotics Cases of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
prosecuting the case of the suspected Chinese drug
queen, filed their respective Comments on the
Compliance of Justice Demetria.[4]
On 8 August 2000, the Court En Banc ordered an investigation
and designated Mme. Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino as
Investigator and Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo as
Prosecutor. An investigation then commenced on 22 August
2000 and continued until 16 November 2000.
The Prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely, CSP
Zuo, SP Formaran III, Agnes P. Tuason, secretary of SP
Formaran, III, and Jose H. Afalla, an employee from the Office
of Asst. CSP (ACSP) Leonardo Guiyab, Jr. The defense on
the other hand presented ten (10) witnesses: respondent
Justice Demetria, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor (ACSP)
Severino Gana, Jr., Senior State Prosecutor (SSP) Romeo
Daosos, Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk Lai, MTC Judge Orlando
Siapno, Peter Young, Atty. Reinerio Paas, lawyer of Go Teng
Kok, Danilo J. Mijares, bodyguard of Go Teng Kok, and Luisito
Artiaga, official of the Philippine Amateur Track and Field
Association (PATAFA).
The facts as borne out by the evidence presented by the
prosecution are quite clear. In an Information dated 9
December 1998, SP Formaran III charged Yu Yuk Lai,
together with her supposed nephew, a certain Kenneth
Monceda y Sy alias William Sy, before the RTC of Manila, Br.
18,[5] with violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, RA 6425, as
amended, for "conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with deliberate intent and without
authority of law x x x (to) willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell and deliver to a poseur-buyer three (3)
kilograms, more or less, of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), which is a regulated drug."[6]
Accused of non-bailable offense, both Yu Yuk Lai and
Kenneth Monceda were held at the detention cell of the PNP
Narcotics Group in Camp Crame, Quezon City. On 25 June
1999, accused Yu Yuk Lai filed a Petition for Bail on the
ground that the evidence of her guilt was not strong.
On 10 November 1999, upon receiving information that the
accused, especially Yu Yuk Lai, had been seen regularly
playing in the casinos of Heritage Hotel and the Holiday Inn
Pavilion, SP Formaran III filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Transfer the Detention of the Accused to the City Jail.[7] On
the same day, Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr., granted the
motion and ordered the immediate transfer of the two (2)
accused to the Manila City Jail.[8]
On 18 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., concluded that
"the evidence standing alone and unrebutted, is strong
and sufficient to warrant conviction of the two accused
for the crime charged" and denied the petition for bail of
accused Yu Yuk Lai for lack of merit.[9] Consequently, both
accused filed a Joint Motion for Inhibition arguing that the trial
court's actuations "do not inspire the belief that its decision
would be just and impartial."[10] On 28 January 2000, Judge
Laguio, Jr., believing that the joint motion was utterly without
merit but considering the gravity of the offense and for the
peace of mind of the accused, inhibited himself.[11]
The case was re-raffled to Branch 53, presided by Judge
Angel V. Colet. Accused Yu Yuk Lai then filed a Motion to
Order the Confinement of the Accused in a Hospital. Before
Judge Colet could resolve the motion, the case was handled
by the Branch's Pairing Judge Manuel T. Muro.
On 15 May 2000 Judge Muro granted accused Yu Yuk Lai's
motion and allowed her to be confined at the Manila Doctors
Hospital for a period not exceeding seven (7) days,[12]
contrary to the recommendation of Dr. Jose Estrada Rosal,
Chief of the Health Services of the Manila City Jail, that Yu
Yuk Lai be confined at the Philippine General Hospital.[13]
On 5 June 2000 Judge Muro granted Yu Yuk Lai's Urgent
Motion for Extension of Medical Confinement "for a period of
one (1) month, or until such time that she is fit to be discharged
from the said hospital."[14] On 7 July 2000 Judge Muro also
granted Yu Yuk Lai's Motion for Leave of Court to File
Demurrer to Evidence with Motion to Admit Demurrer to
Evidence.[15] Soon, rumors circulated in the Manila City Hall
that Judge Muro was partial towards accused Yu Yuk Lai.
The rumors did not end there, On 6 July 2000 unidentified
employees of the RTC Manila calling themselves
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 138
"CONCERNED COURT EMPLOYEES" wrote the Secretary
of Justice, copy furnished the Chief State Prosecutor, the
Ombudsman, and Judge Muro. The letter alleged that Judge
Muro ordered the hospitalization of Yu Yuk Lai "even if she
(was) not sick and there (was) already a rumor circulating
around the City Hall, that the notorious Judge had given the
go signal to the counsel of the accused to file the Motion to
Quash, which (would) be granted for a consideration of
millions of pesos and the contact person (was) allegedly the
daughter of the Judge, who is an employee in the said
branch."[16]
Accordingly on 14 July 2000, SP Formaran III filed a Motion
for Inhibition praying that Judge Muro inhibit himself
"from further handling this case and/or from resolving the
demurrer to evidence filed by the accused Yu Yuk Lai as
well as any other pending incidents therein."[17]
On 16 July 2000, at around 7:30 o'clock in the morning, while
she was supposed to be confined at the Manila Doctors
Hospital, accused Yu Yuk Lai was arrested inside the VIP
room of the Casino Filipino at the Holiday Inn Pavilion, Manila,
while playing baccarat, She was unescorted at the time of her
arrest.
On 18 July 2000, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, the Motion for
Inhibition of Judge Muro was heard and submitted for
resolution. Later, at around 11:30 o'clock, when SP Formaran
III arrived in his office from the hearing, he was informed by
his secretary, Agnes Tuason, that the staff of Court of Appeals
Justice Demetrio Demetria had called earlier and said that the
Justice wanted to speak with him. The caller requested for a
return call. As requested, SP Formaran III immediately
returned the call of Justice Demetria but the Justice had
already gone out for lunch.
Later in the afternoon, between 1:30 and 2:00 o'clock, Justice
Demetria, PATAFA President Go Teng Kok and Atty. Reinerio
Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok and a close friend of Justice
Demetria, went to the office of SP Formaran III in the DOJ
which SP Formaran III shares with SP Albert Fonacier.
Apparently, Justice Demetria was not familiar with SP
Formaran III as he greeted SP Fonacier "Kamusta ka,
Prosecutor Formaran?"[18]
Soon the visitors were seated. Go Teng Kok immediately
pleaded with SP Formaran III to withdraw his motion to inhibit
Judge Muro as this would purportedly delay the resolution of
the case. Go Teng Kok also expressed his apprehension that
if Judge Muro would inhibit, a new judge might convict his
friend, accused Yu Yuk Lai, who was then already receiving
bad publicity.
Justice Demetria then asked about the status of the case. SP
Formaran III informed the Justice that a motion for inhibition
has been submitted for resolution, one basis of which was the
unsigned letter of the concerned court employees. Justice
Demetria opined that it was a bit dangerous to anchor the
inhibition of a judge on an unsigned, anonymous letter. The
Justice then advised Go Teng Kok who was becoming
persistent to "keep his cool" and asked SP Formaran III if he
could do something to help Go Teng Kok. Apparently, prior to
18 July 2000, Go Teng Kok had already been asking SP
Formaran III to go slow in prosecuting accused Yu Yuk
Lai.[19] SP Formaran III at first politely declined the request.
But later, "just to put an end to (the) conversation,"[20] he told
them that he would bring the matter to CSP Zuo. "Iyon pala,"
Justice Demetria replied. The Justice then stood up, bade
good bye and left. Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok followed
closely behind.[21]
Thereafter, SP Formaran III went to see CSP Zuo and
informed the latter of what had transpired. CSP Zuo replied,
"No way!" SP Formaran III also told ACSP Guiyab, Jr., who
gave the same reply.[22]
At around 3:00 o'clock that same afternoon, CSP Zuo
received a call from Justice Demetria who requested him to
instruct SP Formaran III to withdraw the motion for inhibition
of Judge Muro so that the Judge could already issue an order.
"Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na
iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman
makagawa na ng Order si Judge Muro," Justice Demetria was
quoted as saying.[23] Politely, CSP Zuo said that he would
see what he could do. Tingnan ko po kung ano ang
magagawa ko."[24]
On 20 July 2000, The Philippine Daily Inquirer reported that a
"Supreme Court Justice x x x and an outspoken sports person
and leader"[25] had been exerting "undue pressure" on the
DOJ to go slow in prosecuting re-arrested drug queen Yu Yuk
Lai. That same afternoon, the names of Justice Demetria and
Mr. Go Teng Kok were disclosed to the media to clear the
name of the Supreme Court justices who might have been
affected by the erroneous news report. The following day, 21
July 2000, several newspapers named Justice Demetria and
Go Teng Kok as "drug lawyers."
Also on 20 July 2000 the DOJ received a Copy of an Order
dated 19 July 200 of Judge Muro inhibiting himself from further
hearing the case of Yu Yuk Lai and Kenneth Monceda.[26]
Respondent Justice Demetria, for his part, vehemently denied
having interceded for Yu Yuk Lai. While he admitted that he
indeed visited the DOJ on 18 July 2000, he went there to "visit
old friends" and his meeting Go Teng Kok whom he did not
know until that time was purely accidental. Expectedly, Atty.
Paas and Go Teng Kok corroborated the claim of respondent
Justice.
Justice Demetria explained that he merely requested SP
Formaran III "to do something to help Go Teng Kok about the
case" without ever specifying the kind of "help" that he
requested. He averred that it was purely on the basis of
erroneous impression and conjecture on the part of SP
Formaran III that he impliedly asked him to withdraw the
motion "because that is what Mr. Go Teng Kok was appealing
and requesting."[27] Respondent claimed that the "help" he
was requesting could well be "within legal bounds or line of
duty."
Justice Demetria claimed that if ever he said anything else
during the discussion between Go Teng Kok and SP
Formaran III, such was not a form of intervention. He only
admonished Go Teng Kok "to cool it" when the discussion
between the prosecutor and Go Teng Kok became heated.
While he asked about the status of the case this, he said,
demonstrated his lack of knowledge about the case and
bolstered his claim that he could not have possibly interceded
for Yu Yuk Lai.
Respondent Justice likewise argued that the bases of his
identification by CSP Zuo as the Justice exerting undue
pressure on the DOJ were all hearsay. Respondent submited
that CSP Zuo based his identification from a newspaper
account, from the statement of his secretary that it was he
(Justice Demetria) who was on the other end of the telephone
and from SP Formaran III when the latter consulted the Chief
State Prosecutor about the visit of the Justice and Go Teng
Kok impliedly asking him to withdraw the motion.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 139
In defense of respondent Justice, Atty. Paas stated that it was
actually he, not Justice Demetria, who later called up CSP Zuo
to inquire about the latter's decision regarding the withdrawal
of the motion to inhibit since SP Formaran III had earlier told
Go Teng Kok that the matter would be taken up with his
superiors.
In fine, respondent Justice Demetria maintains that it is
inconceivable for him to ask SP Formaran III whom he just
met for the first time to do something for Go Teng Kok whom
he claims he just likewise met for the first time. Neither did he
know Yu Yuk Lai, a claim Yu Yuk Lai herself corroborated. It
would be unthinkable for him to intercede in behalf of
someone he did not know. Indeed respondent Justice
asserted that his meeting Go Teng Kok on 18 July 2000 at the
DOJ was purely coincidence, if not accidental.
So, did respondent Justice Demetria really intercede in behalf
of suspected drug queen Yu Yuk Lai?
Investigating Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino believes so. In
her Report dated 5 January 2001, she found respondent
Justice Demetria "guilty of violating Rule 2.04, Canon 2, Code
of Judicial Conduct" and recommended that "appropriate
disciplinary action be taken against him by this Honorable
Court."[28]
Only rightly so. The evidence is clear, if not overwhelming, and
damning. Thus, even the Senate Committee on Justice and
Human Rights, after a hearing, found that "there was a
conspiracy to commit the following offenses on the part of CA
Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria and PATAFA President
Go Teng Kok and Miss Yu Yuk Lai: obstruction of justice
punishable under PD No.1829 and Article 3(a) of RA 3019, or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."[29]
While Justice Demetria vehemently denied interfering with the
criminal case, his denial cannot stand against the positive
assertions of CSP Zuo and SP Formaran III,[30] which are
consistent with natural human experience. To accept the
testimony of the defense witnesses that it was Atty. Paas who
telephoned CSP Zuo, and not Justice Demetria, and that the
"help" the respondent Justice was requesting SP Formaran III
was something "within legal bounds or line of duty" other than
the withdrawal of the motion is to strain too far one's
imagination.
The testimony of CSP Zuo is plainly unambiguous and
indubitably consistent with the other facts and circumstances
surrounding the case -
CSP Zuo: As far as I could recall Justice Demetria said,
"Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na
iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman
makagawa ng Order si Judge Muro."[31]
In his discussion with Go Teng Kok and Justice Demetria, SP
Formaran III said that he would consult his superiors regarding
the proposal to withdraw the motion. The timely telephone call
to CSP Zuo was thus a logical follow-up. And no one could
have made the call except respondent Justice since it is not
uncommon for anyone to believe that CSP Zuo would
recognize the voice of respondent Justice who was CSP Zuo's
former superior in the DOJ. Thus, the confident utterance
"[p]akisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na
iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman
makagawa ng Order si Judge Muro" could not have come from
anyone else but from respondent Justice who had moral
ascendancy over CSP Zuo, he being a Justice of the Court of
Appeals and a former Undersecretary and at one time Acting
Secretary of the DOJ.
Even the requested "help" for Go Teng Kok, whom respondent
Justice claims he did not know and met only that time, could
not have meant any other assistance but the withdrawal of the
motion to inhibit Judge Muro. True, Justice Demetria never
categorically asked SP Formaran III to withdraw his Motion.
But when respondent Justice Demetria asked the state
prosecutor at that particular time "to do something x x x to help
Mr. Go Teng Kok," the latter was pleading for the withdrawal
of the motion, and nothing else. That was the only form of
"help" that Go Teng Kok wanted. The subtle pressure exerted
simply pointed to one particular act. Thus, subsequently
respondent Justice called CSP Zuo to ask for just that - the
withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge Muro.
Justice Demetria also claimed that he, together with Atty.
Paas, went to the DOJ, first, to see Secretary Artemio Tuquero
and seek assistance in the appointment of Atty. Paas to the
Court of Appeals, and second, to "visit old friends,"[32] and
that the meeting with Go Teng Kok was purely accidental. But
respondent Justice never mentioned in his earlier Compliance
to the Memorandum of the Chief Justice that his primary
purpose in going to the DOJ was to see Sec. Tuquero, and
since Sec. Tuquero was not in, he instead decided to see
some officials/prosecutors whom he had not visited for a long
time.
We find this assertion difficult to accept. For, even his very
own witnesses belied his alibi. ACSP Gaa, Jr. testified and
confirmed that Justice Demetria only said "hi."[33] SSP
Daosos, denied seeing him and claimed that it was only Atty.
Paas who peeped into his room.[34] Suspiciously, it was really
in the office of SP Formaran III, whom respondent Justice
Demetria did not know, where Justice Demetria, Atty. Paas
and Go Teng Kok decided to "stay a while."[35]
Thus, as found by Mme. Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, the
Investigating Justice, Justice Demetria and company could
not have been there to exchange pleasantries with SPs
Formaran III and Fonacier since they were not acquainted with
each other. Prior to this incident, Justice Demetria did not
personally know either SP Formaran III or SP Fonacier, a fact
corroborated by respondent himself.[36]
All of these contradict and belie respondent Justice Demetria's
earlier Compliance to the Memorandum of the Chief Justice
that "[b]ecause Prosecutor Formaran is also a friend, we
decided to drop by his office x x x (and) I stayed a while."[37]
As pointed out by the Investigating Justice, respondent Justice
was there "to join forces with Go Teng Kok in arguing for the
withdrawal of Formaran's Motion for Inhibition of Judge Muro,
which was the real purpose of their visit to SP Formaran and
to the DOJ. The uncanny coincidence in the timing of Justice
Demetria's visit to SP Formaran's office, and that of Go Teng
Kok, could not have been 'accidental' but pre-arranged."[38]
And, "visiting old friends" only came as an afterthought. The
circumstances simply show that Justice Demetria and Atty.
Paas, together with Go Teng Kok, did not go to the DOJ to
see Sec. Tuquero, but to visit, if not "pressure," CSP Zuo and
SP Formaran III.
Justice Demetria also claimed that it is inconceivable for him
to help Yu Yuk Lai and Go Teng Kok, both of whom he did not
personally know, and more unthinkable that he would be
asking help from SP Formaran III whom he had just met for
the first time.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 140

The argument cannot be sustained. It is admitted that

respondent is a very close friend of Atty. Paas, lawyer of Go
Teng Kok. And, it is not necessary that respondent Justice
Demetria be acquainted with Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk Lai or SP
Formaran III for him to intercede in behalf of the accused. It is
enough that he is a close friend of the lawyer of Go Teng Kok,
who has been helping the accused, and that he wields
influence as a former DOJ Undersecretary and later, Acting
Secretary, and now, a Justice of the Court of Appeals.

In sum, we find the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses

convincing and trustworthy, as compared to those of the
defense which do not only defy natural human experience but
are also riddled with major inconsistencies which create well-
founded and overriding doubts.

The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an

office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed
with the heavy burden of responsibility. His at all times must
be characterized with propriety and must be above
suspicion.[39] His must be free of even a whiff of impropriety,
not only with respect to the performance of his judicial duties,
but also his behavior outside the courtroom and as a private
individual.

Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed to

live up to this expectation. Through his indiscretions, Justice
Demetria did not only make a mockery of his high office, but
also caused incalculable damage to the entire Judiciary. The
mere mention of his name in the national newspapers,
allegedly lawyering for a suspected drug queen and interfering
with her prosecution, seriously undermined the integrity of the
entire Judiciary.

Although every office in the government service is a public

trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the
Judiciary.[40] High ethical principles and a sense of propriety
should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in
the Judiciary so indispensable in an orderly society cannot be
preserved.[41] There is simply no place in the Judiciary for
those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial
conduct and integrity.[42]

WHEREFORE, we sustain the findings of the Investigating

Justice and hold Justice Demetrio G. Demetria GUILTY of
violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is
ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and with prejudice to his appointment or
reappointment to any government office, agency or
instrumentality, including any government owned or controlled
corporation or institution.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,

Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ.,
concur.

Puno, J., abroad on official business.

FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 141
RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M.
VASQUEZ, JR. ON CA-G.R. SP NO. 103692 [Antonio
Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.]
A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA
PER CURIAM:
The Judiciary, which is acclaimed as the firmest pillar of our
democratic institutions, is vested by the Constitution with the
power to settle disputes between parties and to determine
their rights and obligations under the law. For judicial
decisions, which form part of the law of the land, to be credible
instruments in the peaceful and democratic resolution of
conflicts, our courts must be perceived to be and, in fact be,
impartial, independent, competent and just. To accomplish
this end, it is imperative that members of the Judiciary from its
highest magistrates to its humblest employees adhere to the
strictest code of ethics and the highest standards of propriety
and decorum. Indeed, it is unfortunate that one of the countrys
second highest courts, the Court of Appeals, should be
presently embroiled in scandal and controversy. It is this
Courts bounden duty to determine the culpability or innocence
of the members of the Judiciary involved in the said
controversy and to discipline any one whose conduct has
failed to conform to the canons of judicial ethics, which uphold
integrity, independence, impartiality, competence and
propriety in the performance of official functions.
The present administrative matter arose from the Letter dated
August 1, 2008 of Court of Appeals Presiding Justice Conrado
M. Vasquez, Jr. (Presiding Justice Vasquez), referring to this
Court for appropriate action the much publicized dispute and
charges of impropriety among the justices of the Court of
Appeals (CA) involved in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 entitled
Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, et al.
To assist in its investigation of this sensitive matter, the Court
in its Resolution dated August 4, 2008 constituted a three-
person panel (the Panel of Investigators) composed of retired
Justices of the Court; namely, Mme. Justice Carolina Grio-
Aquino as Chairperson, Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero
and Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. as Members. The Panel
of Investigators was tasked to investigate the (a) alleged
improprieties of the actions of the Justices of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio V. Rosete, et al.
v. SEC, et al.); and (b) alleged rejected offer or solicitation of
bribe disclosed respectively by Mr. Justice Jose Sabio and Mr.
Francis de Borja.
A narration of relevant events and facts, as found by the
Investigating Panel, follows:
On April 15, 2008, Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (Justice
Reyes), then Chairperson of the Ninth Division of the CA, filed
an application for leave from May 15, 2008 to June 5, 2008.[1]
In Office Order No. 149-08-CMV dated May 14, 2008 issued
by Presiding Justice Vasquez, Justice Jose C. Mendoza
(Justice Mendoza) was designated by the Raffle Committee
as Acting Chairman of the Ninth Division during the absence
of Justice Reyes. Apart from his duties as regular senior
member of the Fifth Division, Justice Mendoza was authorized
to act on all cases submitted to the Ninth Division for final
resolution and/or appropriate action, except ponencia, from
May 15, 2008 to June 5, 2008 or until Justice Reyes reports
back for duty. The said office order likewise applied to the
other Division(s) where Justice Reyes had participated or took
part as regular member or in an acting capacity.[2]
On May 29, 2008, Antonio V. Rosete, Manuel M. Lopez,
Felipe B. Alfonso, Jesus P. Francisco, Christian S. Monsod,
Elpidio L. Ibaez, and Francis Giles B. Puno, as officers,
directors and/or representatives of the Manila Electric
Company (hereinafter to be collectively referred to as
Meralco), filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO)
against the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
Commissioner Jesus Enrique G. Martinez, Commissioner
Hubert B. Guevarra, and the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS). [3] Aside from the application for immediate
issuance of a TRO, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction that should thereafter be declared
permanent, as well as a declaration of nullity of the cease and
desist and show cause orders issued by the SEC through
Commissioner Martinez. The petition was received by the CA
at 10:49 a.m. on May 29, 2008 and docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 103692.
On the same day, petitioners simultaneously filed at 10:48
a.m. an urgent motion for a special raffle. Presiding Justice
Vasquez granted the motion in a handwritten note on the face
of the urgent motion,[4] and CA-G.R. No. 103692 was raffled
to Justice Vicente Q. Roxas (Justice Roxas).[5] At 3:10 p.m.,
the Office of Presiding Justice Vasquez received a letter from
Atty. Estrella C. Elamparo (Atty. Elamparo), Chief Legal
Counsel of the GSIS, requesting the re-raffling of the case in
the presence of the parties in the interest of transparency and
fairness.[6] At 4:10 p.m. on that day, the GSIS filed an ex-
parte motion to defer action on any incident in the petition
pending the resolution of their motion for the re-raffle of the
case.[7]
Atty. Elamparo, accompanied by Atty. Orlando P. Polinar, also
of the GSIS Law Office, personally filed the urgent motion to
defer action on the petition pending the resolution of their
motion to re-raffle the case. Since the receiving clerk of the
Court of Appeals could not assure them that the motion would
be transmitted to the Court of Appeals Division, Attys.
Elamparo and Polinar allegedly went to the office of Justice
Roxas for the sole purpose of personally furnishing him a copy
of the motion.[8] They initially talked to a male clerk who
referred them to one of the lawyers, who, however, told them
that it was not possible for them to personally hand a copy of
the motion to Justice Roxas. Thus, Attys. Elamparo and
Polinar left a copy of the motion to the staff but no one wanted
to sign and acknowledge receipt of the copy.[9]
On May 30, 2008, Justice Reyes filed an application for the
extension of his leave until June 6, 2008.[10] In the meantime,
Justice Mendoza, who had been designated to replace Justice
Reyes during the latters absence, informed Justice Roxas
through a letter that he (Justice Mendoza) was inhibiting from
the case on the ground that he used to be a lawyer of the
Meralco.[11] Hence, in an Emergency Request for Raffle,
Justice Roxas informed the Raffle Committee about the
inhibition.[12]
Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (Justice Sabio) was assigned as
Acting Chairman of the Ninth Division by raffle, in lieu of
Justice Mendoza.[13] At 11:30 a.m., the office of Justice
Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal (Justice Dimaranan-Vidal) received a
notice of emergency deliberation with the new Acting
Chairman of the Special Ninth Division, apparently sent by
Justice Roxas, stating that her presence and that of Justice
Sabio, Jr. were indispensable on account of the national
interest involved in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.[14]
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 142
Meanwhile, Atty. Elamparo received a telephone call from
somebody who did not identify herself but (who) said that she
had important information regarding the Meralco case. The
unidentified caller told Atty. Elamparo that a TRO was already
being prepared and that certain Meralco lawyers had in fact
been talking to Justice Roxas. The caller warned Atty.
Elamparo against Justice Roxas who had administrative
cases and was very notorious, but when prodded, the caller
would not disclose more details.[15]
At about 1:30 p.m. also on May 30, 2008, Justice Sabio
received a telephone call in his chambers from his older
brother, Chairman Camilo Sabio (Chairman Sabio) of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).[16]
Chairman Sabio informed his brother that he (Justice Sabio)
had been named the third member of the division to which the
MERALCO-GSIS case had been raffled. Justice Sabio was
surprised as he had not yet been officially informed about the
matter. Chairman Sabio likewise informed him that a TRO had
been prepared. Chairman Sabio then tried to convince Justice
Sabio of the rightness of the stand of the GSIS and the SEC,
and asked his brother to help the GSIS, which represents the
interest of the poor people. Justice Sabio told his brother that
he would vote according to [his] conscience and that the most
that he could do was to have the issuance of the TRO and the
injunctive relief scheduled for oral arguments, at which the
respondents must be able to convince him that the TRO
indeed had no legal basis.
In his signed testimony,[17] which he read before the Panel of
Investigators, Chairman Sabio narrated the circumstances of
this call to his brother on May 30, 2008. It appears to have
been prompted by a call from a member of the Board of
Trustees of GSIS. To quote from Chairman Sabios testimony:
Last May 30, 2008 I was in Davao City Airport with my wife,
Marlene, waiting for our 1:25 P.M. PAL flight to Manila. xxx
xxx xxx.
As we were boarding, I received a call from Atty. Jesus I.
Santos, a Member of the Board of Trustees of GSIS. We had
known each other and had become friends since before
Martial Law because as Chief Counsel of the Federation of
Free Farmers (FFF) we were opposing counsel in various
cases in Bulacan.
Attorney Santos informed me that the dispute between the
GSIS and MERALCO was now in the Court of Appeals; and,
that as a matter of fact, my brother, Justice Sabio, was chair
of the Division to which the case had been assigned. Being a
Trustee, Attorney Santos requested me to help. I readily
welcomed the request for help and thanked him. There was
no mystery about his having known of the results of the raffle
because the lawyers are notified thereof and are present
thereat. As a Trustee, Attorney Santos should be concerned
and involved. As such it is his duty to seek assistance for the
GSIS where he could legitimately find it. He was right in
seeking my assistance
I was aware of the controversy between the GSIS and
MERALCO. In essence this was in fact a controversy between
the long suffering public and the mighty financially and
politically controlling owners of MERALCO. MERALCO is not
only a public utility but also a monopoly. Fortunately, GSIS
had taken up the cudgels for the long suffering public, who are
at the mercy of MERALCO.
x x x x x x x x x.
Immediately, I tried to contact Justice Sabio. But due to the
noise I could not hear him. So I waited until we would arrive in
Manila.
As we were leaving the Airport, I again got in touch with
Justice Sabio. After, he confirmed that he was in fact in the
Division to which the petition of MERALCO had been raffled.
I impressed upon him the character and essence of the
controversy. I asked him to help GSIS if the legal situation
permitted. He said he would decide according to his
conscience. I said: of course.
x x x x x x x x x.
On the same day, May 30, 2008, GSIS filed an urgent ex-parte
motion to inhibit Justice Roxas from CA-G.R. No. SP
103692.[18] The Special Cases Section of the Court of
Appeals received a copy of the motion at 11:58 a.m.[19]
Claiming that the TRO was issued to pre-empt the hearing
scheduled in the afternoon of that day before the SEC, the
GSIS Law Office, through Atty. Marcial C. Pimentel, Jr., set
forth its reason for the motion for inhibition as follows:
3. Unfortunately, reports have reached respondent GSIS that
the Honorable ponente has been in contact with certain
lawyers of MERALCO and has in fact already prepared a draft
resolution granting the TRO without affording respondents
even a summary hearing. The records of this case was (sic),
per information, immediately transmitted to the Honorable
ponente upon his instructions. The worries of the respondent
were exacerbated when it learned that there are supposedly
two administrative cases pending against the Honorable
ponente, both of which involve allegations of bias and
prejudice.
It turned out, however, that at that time, Justice Roxas had not
yet been officially notified by the Raffle Committee that the
case was raffled to him.[20] Moreover, contrary to the
allegation of Atty. Elamparo that the raffle was rigged, Justice
Roxas had no hand in the raffle proceeding, which was
handled by the Division chaired by Justice Mariano del Castillo
with the use of a fool-proof Las Vegas tambiolo, like the lotto
machine.[21]
Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Sabio, for the
latters signature, the TRO which he had prepared, already
signed by himself and Justice Dimaranan-Vidal. Convinced of
the urgency of the TRO, Justice Sabio signed it on condition
that the case will be set for oral arguments.
Thus, at 2:08 p.m. on May 30, 2008,[22] the Special Ninth
Division composed of Justices Sabio, Roxas, and Dimaranan-
Vidal, issued the Resolution granting the TRO prayed for by
the petitioners and directing the respondents to file their
respective comments (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition
within ten days from notice, with the petitioners given five days
from receipt of that comment within which to file their reply.
The Special Ninth Division also set the hearing on the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
for 10:00 a.m. on June 23 and 24, 2008. In the same
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 143
Resolution, parties were directed to file their respective
memorandum of authorities in connection with the application
for a writ of preliminary injunction together with their
comments/reply. After the parties had filed their memorandum
of authorities relative to the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, the prayer for the said writ would be considered
submitted for resolution forty five (45) days from promulgation
of this Resolution. The SEC received a copy of the Resolution
at 4:03 p.m. on that day.[23]
For Justice Roxas, the issuance of the TRO was an implied
denial of the motion for inhibition filed against him. There was
no need to put in writing the action on the motion for
inhibition.[24]
At 3:00 p.m., the Special Cases Section of the Court of
Appeals received the Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary
Restraining Order and To Hold Its Enforcement in Abeyance
filed by the GSIS.[25] Justice Roxas did not act on the Urgent
Motion because he did not consider it meritorious.[26]
On May 31, 2008, Justice Sabio received a cellular phone call
from Mr. Francis De Borja (Mr. De Borja), a person he had lost
contact with for almost a year already.[27] Mr. De Borja
greeted him with: Mabuhay ka, Justice. When Justice Sabio,
Jr. asked Mr. De Borja why he said that, Mr. De Borja told him
that the Makati Business Club was happy with his having
signed the TRO, to which Justice Sabio retorted, I voted
according to my conscience.
On June 5, 2008, the GSIS Law Office received a letter dated
June 2, 2008 of Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. informing GSIS
Chief Legal Counsel, Atty. Elamparo, that the Court of
Appeals could not grant her request for the re-raffling of CA-
G.R. SP No. 103692 in the presence of the parties in the
interest of transparency and fairness, as the case had been
raffled in accordance with the procedure under the IRCA.[28]
On June 10, 2008, Justice B. L. Reyes reported back to
work.[29]
On June 11, 2008, at 3:50 p.m.,[30] the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), appearing for the SEC, filed a manifestation
and motion praying for the admission of the comment (to the
petition) attached thereto, as well as the advance and
additional copies of the memorandum of authorities.
On June 12, 2008, at 4:53 p.m., the GSIS filed its
comment/opposition to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
103692,[31] as well as its memorandum of authorities.
On June 16, 2008, the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Teresita
Custodio (Atty. Custodio), delivered to Justice Reyes the
cartilla of the Meralco case, and informed him that a hearing
on the prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction had
been scheduled at 10:00 a.m. on June 23 and 24, 2008.[32]
However, on the same day, the Division Clerk of Court came
back to retrieve the cartilla upon instructions of Justice Sabio.
Justice Reyes instructed his staff to return the cartilla and
when he asked the Division Clerk of Court why she was
retrieving it, she said that Justice Sabio demanded that it be
returned back to him. Personally affronted by the domineering
and superior stance of Justice Sabio, Justice Reyes read and
re-read Secs. 1, 2(d) & 5, Rule VI (Process of Adjudication)
until he was satisfied that he should sit as Division Chairman
in the Meralco case.[33]
On either June 17 or 18, 2008, Justice Sabio requested the
rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 from Justice Roxas so that
he could study the case before the hearing.[34]Justice Roxas
asked him whether Justice Reyes would preside over the
hearing. Justice Sabio explained the reason why he, not
Justice Reyes, should preside. Justice Roxas promised to
instruct the Division Clerk of Court to send the rollo over to
Justice Sabio. The next day, the Division Clerk of Court told
Justice Sabio that the rollo was with Justice Reyes. When the
rollo was eventually transmitted to Justice Sabio, the Division
Clerk of Court asked him whether the rollo should be with
Justice Reyes. Justice Sabio explained why the rollo should
be with him.
On June 18, 2008, petitioners filed a motion for an extension
of five days or until June 23, 2008 within which to file their
consolidated memoranda of authorities and reply to the
comment of the SEC.[35]
On June 19, 2008, MERALCO filed an ex-parte manifestation
together with their reply to the comment of the GSIS.[36]
Meanwhile, Justice B. L. Reyes asked Atty. Custodio to report
on what transpired between her and Justice Sabio when she
returned the cartilla. Teary-eyed, Atty. Custodio begged off
from making a report.[37]
Justice Reyes decided to consult the Presiding Justice to
avoid an ugly confrontation with the Justices on the highly
politicized case involving giants of the Philippine society. He
explained to the Presiding Justice his understanding of the
relevant IRCA rules and the actual practice in similar
situations in the past. The Presiding Justice promised to talk
with Justice Sabio and, for the sake of transparency and future
reference, Justice Reyes requested permission to write an
inquiry on the matter.[38]
On the same day, Justice Reyes wrote Presiding Justice
Vasquez a letter[39] calling the attention of Justice Edgardo
P. Cruz (Justice Cruz), Chairperson of the Committee on
Rules, to the dilemma as to who between him and Justice
Sabio should receive CA-G.R. SP No. 103692. Justice Reyes
posed these questions before the Presiding Justice:
Will the case remain with Justice Jose Sabio, Jr. as Acting
Chairman of the Special 9th Division and who participated in
the initial Resolution of the case?
Will the case revert to the regular 9th Division with the
undersigned as Chairman?
For Justice Reyes, the dilemma was engendered by this
provision of Section 2 of Rule VI of the IRCA:
(2) When, in an original action or petition for review, any of
these actions or proceedings, namely: (1) giving due course;
(2) granting writ of preliminary injunction; (3) granting new trial;
and (4) granting execution pending appeal have been taken,
the case shall remain with the Justice to whom the case is
assigned for study and report and the Justices who
participated therein, regardless of their transfer to other
Divisions in the same station.
The hearing on the application for preliminary injunction
having been scheduled for June 23 and 24, 2008, Justice
Reyes considered it necessary that the issues be resolved
before that date. Moreover, the referral of the controversy to
the Presiding Justice would give him sufficient time to
seriously study the case before the hearing.[40]
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 144
On June 20, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez referred the
letter of Justice Reyes to Justice Cruz, Chairperson of the
Committee on Rules, noting some urgency involved as the
hearing of the case is on Monday, June 23, 2008.[41]
On that same day, Justice Cruz wrote Justice Reyes a
letter[42] quoting Section 2 (d), Rule VI of the IRCA and
stating that the [i]ssuance of a TRO is not among the
instances where the Justices who participated in the case
shall remain therein. Hence, Justice Cruz opined that
[n]otwithstanding the issuance of the TRO (not writ of
preliminary injunction), the case reverted to the regular
Chairman (Justice Reyes) of the Ninth Division upon his
return. Justice Reyes received a copy of the letter of Justice
Cruz in the afternoon of that day.[43]
During the hearings of this case, Justice Cruz explained his
opinion before the Panel. He opined that the motion to lift the
TRO is not a motion for reconsideration because Rule 52 of
the Rules of Court states that a motion for reconsideration
may be filed with respect to a decision or a final resolution. A
TRO is not a final resolution but an interlocutory order.
Moreover, since the subject of the hearing on June 23, 2008
was on the application for preliminary injunction, Justice Sabio
had no right to participate in the hearing because as an Acting
Chairman, his authority was only to act on the motion to lift the
TRO. Under the IRCA, the position of Justice Sabio invoked
the exception to the general rule in the IRCA. However, the
settled principle is to construe a rule strictly against the
exception. The participation of Justice Sabio in the hearing on
June 23, 2008 was a passport to participation in the decision-
making process, in violation of the IRCA.[44]
Justice Reyes having consulted with him, the Presiding
Justice referred the matter to Justice Sabio who in turn, opined
that a temporary restraining order is part of the injunctive relief
or at least its initial action such that he should be the one to
chair the Division. [45] In his office after that consultation with
the Presiding Justice, Justice Reyes found that the Division
Clerk of Court had given him a copy of the cartilla just in case
he would preside over the hearing. In the evening, the
Presiding Justice called up Justice Reyes to inform him that
Justice Sabio insisted that he would preside over the hearing
of the case, and that the opinion of Justice Cruz, who was
junior to Justice Sabio was no better than his own opinion.[46]
It turned out that, upon receipt of a copy of the letter of Justice
Cruz, Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice by telephone
that he disagreed with the opinion of Justice Cruz because he
did not sign in an official capacity as Chairman of the Rules
Committee, but in his personal capacity and hence, the
opinion of Justice Sabio was as good as his, as in fact I
(Justice Sabio, Jr.) am even more senior than he.[47] Justice
Sabio told the Presiding Justice that he smelled something
fishy about the move to transfer the case to the Ninth Division
especially because Justice Reyes did not inform him about it
despite the fact that they were seated together on three
occasions.
Justice Sabio smelled something fishy because a couple or so
weeks ago, he attended a Chairpersons meeting regarding
the leakage of the ponencia of Justice Bato, with Justice
Reyes as Chairperson and Justice Jose Mendoza as senior
member. The meeting was called because prior to the
promulgation of the decision of Justice Bato, the losing party
already filed a motion for the inhibition of the ponente.
According to Justice Sabio information on the decision could
not have been leaked by Justice Bato but by a member of the
Division.[48]
The Presiding Justice did not do anything anymore to prevent
an unpalatable situation at the scheduled June 23, 2008
hearing, notwithstanding the conflicting opinions of Justices
Reyes and Sabio. The personal view of the Presiding Justice
was at the time with Justice Cruz but Justice Sabio had a
different interpretation. Neither did the Presiding Justice
suggest that the Rules Committee be convened because the
Committee then had only two members. He felt that it would
be better if Justices Reyes and Sabio could settle it between
themselves. The Presiding Justice was seeing the Justices
practically everyday because he did not want these things to
blow up. However, neither did it enter the mind of the
Presiding Justice that the hearing on June 23 could be reset.
Had he known that there was a motion to inhibit Justice
Roxas, he would have changed his position that it should be
the Sabio group.[49]
Also on June 20, 2008, the GSIS requested permission to
conduct a power-point presentation during the hearing.[50]
Likewise the SEC, through the OSG prayed that it be allowed
the use of Microsoft Powerpoint Application at the June 23 and
24, 2008 hearings.[51] Justice Roxas did not act on the
motions.
On June 21, 2008, Justice Sabio came to know that it was the
Division chaired by Justice Reyes that would handle the case
on account of the opinion of Justice Cruz.[52]
In the morning of June 23, 2008, Justice Sabio consulted with
Justice Martin Villarama, Jr. (Justice Villarama) who advised
him, in no uncertain terms, that his stand was correct and that
he should remain in the case.[53] Justice Villarama said that
the case should remain with the Special Ninth Division
regardless of the transfer of the ponente to the Eighth Division
because of the pending motion to lift TRO, which the Special
Ninth Division should resolve following the general rule that
when a decision or resolution is rendered by a division, a
motion for reconsideration thereof should be acted upon by all
the Members of that division, whether regular or special, which
participated in the rendition of the decision or resolution,
except in case of death, retirement or resignation of such
Member.[54]
That morning, Justice Roxas also consulted Justice Villarama.
The latter told the former that since there was a motion to lift
the TRO, Justice Roxas should first rule on the motion. He
also advised Justice Roxas to inhibit himself from the case, as
there might be a problem (mag-inhibit ka baka magka-
problema). Justice Roxas told Justice Villarama that he would
follow his suggestion.[55]
Justice Reyes also went to the office of Justice Villarama to
tell him of his strong conviction that the issuance of a TRO is
not among the instances provided in Sec. 2 (d), Rule VI when
the case shall remain with those Justices who participated in
the case regardless of their transfer to other division(s).
Justice Villarama told Justice Reyes that per his
understanding and interpretation of said provision, x x x the
case should remain with the Special Ninth Division.[56]
At 9:50 a.m., the Office of the Division Clerk of Court called
Justice Reyes to inform him that the parties and their counsels
were already in the hearing room. Justice Reyes informed the
caller that he could not preside as Justice Sabio had
apparently hardened his position and he wanted to avoid an
ugly spectacle. His name plate was displayed in the hearing
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 145
room but Justice Sabio moved to another hearing room.[57]
Allegedly, the removal of the nameplate of Justice Reyes was
the talk of the Court of Appeals for weeks.[58]
Villaraza Cruz Marcelo and Angangco entered its appearance
as counsel for Meralco.[59] At the hearing, Justice Sabio
presided with Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal in
attendance. Justice Roxas, the ponente, did not ask a single
question.[60] Not one of the Justices in attendance brought up
the motion for inhibition filed by the GSIS against Justice
Roxas.[61] In open court, the parties in CA-G.R. SP No.
103692 agreed to submit, within 15 days, simultaneous
memoranda on the injunctive relief prayed for by the
petitioners, after which the application for preliminary
injunction would be deemed submitted for resolution.[62]
On June 25, 2008, or about two days after the separate
conversations of Justice Villaram with Justices Sabio and
Reyes, the Presiding Justice also consulted Justice Villarama
about the letter-queries of Justices Roxas and Reyes on which
Division should resolve the matter of injunctive relief or issue
the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.[63]
The Presiding Justice issued Office Order No. 196-08-CMV
reconstituting the Committee on Rules and designating
Justice Cruz as the Chairperson, with Justices Rebecca De
Guia-Salvador, Reyes, Hakim Abdulwahid, and Noel G. Tijam,
as members.[64] The Committee on Rules was tasked to
propose amendments to the IRCA on or before August 15,
2008 for submission and adoption of the Court en banc. (The
office order was later amended by Office Order No. 196-08-
CMV on August 4, 2008 to include as members Justices Mario
L. Guaria III, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Teresita Dy-Liacco
Flores.[65]) The Rules Committee used to be composed of
only three members, namely: Justices Cruz, Abdulwahid, and
Roberto Barrios, now deceased, as members, with Justice
Cruz as chairperson.[66]
It was also on June 25, 2008 that Presiding Justice Vasquez
issued Office Order No. 200-08-CMV stating that, in view of
the retirement of Justices Enrique Lanzanas, Lucenito N.
Tagle, Agustin S. Dizon, and Rodrigo Cosico, and the
appointments of Justices Ruben C. Ayson and Edgardo L.
delos Santos, the Divisions would have a new composition
effective July 4, 2008.[67] Under that office order, Justice
Sabio became the Chairman of the Sixth Division, with Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal as a member. Justice Reyes became the
Chairman of the Eighth Division, with Justices Roxas and
Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. (Justice Bruselas) as members.
On June 29, 2008, Justice Reyes went on official leave of
absence to use a business class airplane ticket to Sydney,
Australia that he had won in an APT Golf Tournament in
January 2008. He was still on official leave when the
reorganization of the Court of Appeals took place on July 4,
2008.[68]
On July 1, 2008, Justice Roxas told Justice Sabio that he did
not attend the Access to Courts (sic) summit on June 30 and
July 1, 2008 at the Court of Appeals Auditorium because he
was busy with the Meralco case. Justice Sabio was taken
aback because at that time the parties had not yet submitted
their memoranda.[69]
That same afternoon, Mr. De Borja again called up Justice
Sabio, seeking to meet with him for an important matter.
Because Justice Sabio had 6-8 p.m. classes at the Ateneo
Law School, they agreed to meet after his classes but not for
long because his wife and his daughter, Atty. Silvia Jo Sabio
who is an Attorney VI in the Office of the Chief Justice,[70]
would be waiting for him.[71] According to Justice Sabio, the
conversation at that meeting with Francis de Borja went as
follows:
17. By the time my class was finished at 8 pm, Mr. De Borja
was already waiting for me at the Lobby Lounge of the 3rd
Floor of the Ateneo Law School. His first words to me were:
Alam mo Justice kung sino ang kasama ko sa kotse? Si
Manolo Lopez. Then he said: Noong tinatawagan kita at sinabi
kong Mabuhay ka Justice, si Manolo Lopez ang katabi ko
noon. Nasa Amerika siya, kaya ako na lang ang pumunta dito
para makiusap sa yo. Alam mo, itong kaso na ito is a matter
of life and death for the Lopezes. And alam mo naman what
the Marcoses did to them, which is being done now by the
Arroyos.
At that point he mentioned the impasse between Justice
Bienvenido Reyes and myself. He said: Alam naming may
problema kayo ni Justice Reyes tungkol sa chairmanship.
I was surprised how he came to know about it, as this
was an internal matter of the Court of Appeals which only
happened fairly recently and many associate justices of the
CA were not even aware of this. Just the same, I explained
my stand and why I could not relinquish the chairmanship to
Justice Reyes.
He then replied: Alam mo, Justice ang opinion dito ni
Nonong Cruz ay i-challenge ang stand mo. Kaya lang,
mayroon namang nagsabi na it might become messy.
Then he bragged to me: Ako din ang responsible sa pag-
recommend at pag-hire ng Villaraza Law Firm.
Then he explained that he was there to offer me a win-
win situation.
He said: Justice, mayroon kaming P10 million. Ready.
Just give way to Justice Reyes.
Then I said: Bakit ganun. Nakasisiguro sila sa kanya, sa
akin hindi?
He said: Mas komportable lang sila sa kanya.
At that point, I was shocked that he had a very low regard
for me. He was treating me like there was a price on my
person. I could not describe my feelings. I was stunned. But
at the same time, hindi ko rin magawang bastusin siya
because I had known him since 1993 and this was the first
time that he had ever treated me like this, or shown that he
believed I could be bought.
So I just told him: Francis, I cannot in conscience agree
to that.
His answer was: Sabi ko nga sa kanila, mahirap ka
talaga papayag. Kasi may anak iyang Opus Dei. Numerary
pa.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 146
At this point, I just wanted to leave, so I told him I could
not stay long. I told him my wife and lawyer daughter were
waiting.
Even then, he was already insistent. His parting words
before I left were: Just think about it, Justice.[72]
At that time, Mr. De Borja was carrying a sealed brown paper
bag, which he was handling as if something important was
inside. However, Justice Sabio did not know if the bag
contained P10 million.[73]
In his car, Justice Sabio told his wife and his daughter, Silvia
Jo, about the offer of Mr. De Borja for Meralco.[74]
In his affidavit submitted to the Panel of Investigators, Mr. De
Borja describes himself as a businessman, a deal maker, and
project packager. On July 1, 2008, he invited Justice Sabio for
dinner to touch base and for chismis about the MERALCO-
GSIS case. As the latter would have evening classes at the
Ateneo Law School, and his wife and daughter would be
waiting in their car after his classes, they just agreed to meet
at the lobby-lounge of the School. What Mr. De Borja knew
about the MERALCO case allegedly came from news reports
but he was interested in the news because he is a confirmed
free-enterpriser. Moreover, De Borja thought that there was
[n]othing like hearing things directly from the horses
mouth.[75]
When Mr. De Borja and Justice Sabio met, Mr. De Borja
averred he was indeed carrying a bag, not an expensive
looking luggage. After parking his car at the Rockwell
basement, he took the escalator, intending to walk out of the
mall. On his way, he passed by the Kenneth Cole shop and,
since it was still early, he looked in and saw a T-shirt he liked.
He bought the T-shirt, which he brought before the Panel of
Investigators in the grey Kenneth Cole Reaction bag. The
photographs of the bag and the T-shirt costing P1,650.00 are
marked Exhibits A-De Borja and A-1-De Borja and attached to
the rollo of A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, while the photograph of the
receipt issued by the Kenneth Cole Boutique, marked as
Exhibit A-2-De Borja, shows that the purchase was made on
July 1, 2008 at 19:47. He stressed the bag did not contain P10
million.
Before the Panel, Justice Sabio claimed that the bag Mr. De
Borja brought during the hearing was not the bag that Mr. De
Borja was carrying when Justice Sabio saw him on July 1,
2008. What Mr. De Borja allegedly brought with him to the
lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School was a brown bag with
paper handle about 2/3 (of the Kenneth Cole bag) in size.
Justice Sabio was told by the Panel that it could be the subject
of rebuttal evidence but he did not present such evidence.
According to Mr. De Borja, Manolo Lopez (Mr. Lopez), the
owner of MERALCO whose wife was a member of Marthas
Vineyard just like Mr. De Borjas wife, was also an
acquaintance of Mr. De Borja at the Ateneo grade school. Mr.
Lopez did not ask him (Mr. De Borja) to contact Justice Sabio.
At a party where Mr. De Borja met Mr. Lopez, Mr. De Borja
informed him that he knew Justice Sabio but Mr. Lopez did not
say anything.
Mr. De Borja denied having offered P10 million to Justice
Sabio. Instead, he claimed that Justice Sabio informed him
that the government has offered him (Justice Sabio) money
and a promotion to the Supreme Court to favor GSIS. When
Mr. De Borja asked what would it take for Justice Sabio to
resist the governments offer, Justice Sabio allegedly replied:
Fifty Million.[76] He alleged that it was Justice Sabio who
called up after that July 1, 2008 meeting to feel his reaction to
the P50 million solicitation. Justice Sabio asked him: O, ano,
kumusta, ano ang nangyayari.
Mr. De Borja admitted having given P300,000 to Justice
Sabio, some 15 years ago, as a balato because he came to
value the friendship of Justice Sabio that developed while the
latter was helping the Roa family in a business transaction.
Mr. De Borja earned more than P25 million although he
received only P3 million as down payment out of the sale of
100 hectares of the Roa property. He gave the balato of 10%
of the P3 million to Justice Sabio in cash at the Roa-owned
bank in Cagayan de Oro. Since the Roas had a lot of legal
problems, Justice Sabio rendered advice and consultation at
the time that he was an RTC judge in Cagayan de Oro. After
the promotion of Justice Sabio to the Court of Appeals, Mr. De
Borja invited him for dinner. They would see each other at get-
togethers of the Roas with whom Mr. De Borja is related, even
at a gathering in the house of Mr. De Borjas mother.[77]
On July 2, 2008, Justice Sabio that informed Presiding Justice
Vasquez that he (Justice Sabio) was offered a bribe (which he
rejected) to have him ousted from the Meralco case. The news
allegedly shocked the Presiding Justice. Justice Sabio also
went to Justice Villarama who was both shocked and amused.
Justice Sabio. did not tell them who the offeror was. However,
a day or two later, Justice Sabio found out that Mr. De Borja
had called their mutual friend, Mrs. Evelyn Clavano, who was
also shocked that Mr. De Borja had the gall to ask her to
convince Justice Sabio to accept the bribe.[78]
Although Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice that the offer
of P10 million to a Justice was, in the words of Justice Sabio,
bastusan na ito, and he knew that bribing a Justice is a
criminal act, the Presiding Justice did nothing because he
could not advise a fellow Justice on what to do the Justice
would know what he should do. Neither did he think of
consulting Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal on the
chairmanship impasse.[79]
On July 3, 2008, to stop Mr. De Borja from pestering him with
phone calls and text messages, Justice Sabio called up Mr.
De Borja who told him: Mabuti naman Justice tumawag ka,
kasi malapit na ang deadline ng submission ng memorandum.
Pinag-isipan mo bang mabuti ang offer namin? Kasi sayang
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 147

din kung di mo tatanggapin, Kasi kahit aabot itong kaso sa

Supreme Court, matatalo ka din. Sayang lang yung P10
million. Baka sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo. Shocked by what
he heard, Justice Sabio said No. Since Mr. De Borja did not
seem to understand why he kept saying No, Justice Sabio
explained to him: If I accept that, my conscience will bother
me forever. How can I face my wife and two daughters? One
a lawyer and the other a Numerary member of Opus Dei? And
besides, how can I reconcile my being a member of PHILJAs
Ethics and Judicial Conduct Department; being a lecturer of
the MCLE; and being a pre-bar reviewer of the Ateneo Law
School on Legal and Judicial Ethics? Mr. De Borja retorted:
Wala naman kaming pinapagawa sa iyo na illegal, eh. Then
he added: You know Justice, after two or three weeks,
makakalimutan na ito ng mga tao. Meron naman diyang mga
Atenista na tumatanggap. Justice Sabio said: I dont know
about them, but I am different. Mr. De Borja then said: Well, if
you will not accept, we will be forced to look for other ways.
To this, Justice Sabio said: But they will have to contend with
me. In parting, Mr. De Borja said: Justice, no matter what,
saludo talaga ako sa iyo.
Mr. De Borja admitted that Justice Sabio called him up, but
denied the above conversation with Justice Sabio.
Since July 4, 2008, Justice Bruselas alleged that he acted on
all the ponencias of Justices Reyes and Roxas, just as they
had acted on his ponencias.[86]
On July 7, 2008, the GSIS filed its memorandum.
On or about July 8, 2008, Atty. Silvia Sabio, to help her father,
sought the advice of Atty. Jose Midas Marquez (Atty.
Marquez) regarding the bribery attempt. Atty. Marquez
advised that Justice Sabio should write the Chief Justice about
the incident, detailing not only the bribery attempt but all that
has transpired relative to the chairmanship issue. Atty. Silvia
Sabio immediately called her father and relayed Atty.
Marquezs advice. Later that date, Justice Sabio handed his
daughter, Silvia, a handwritten letter for her to deliver to the
Chief Justice.[87] The handwritten letter, in essence,
requested permission for Justice Sabio to unburden himself
before the Chief Justice on the Meralco case.[88]

At around 2:30 p.m., Justice Reyes went to see Justice Sabio.

On July 4, 2008, the reorganization of the Court of Appeals
became effective and brought Justices Reyes, Roxas and
Bruselas to the Eighth Division. Justice Reyes went to see the
Presiding Justice about the urgent motion for him to assume
the chairmanship of the Division, which shows on its face that
the Urgent Motion dated July 10, 2008 was received by the
Court of Appeals at 2:08 p.m. on July 10, 2008 and by Atty.
Teresita C. Custodio on July 9, 2008. Justice Reyes
expressed to the Presiding Justice his apprehension that
should he fail to assume the chairmanship, he would face
administrative liability for nonfeasance or dereliction of duty.
The Presiding Justice suggested that the respondents in the
case be required to comment on the Urgent Motion in a
resolution to be issued by the former 9th Division of Justice
J.L. Sabio, Jr. since to allow the new Division of Justice B.L.
Reyes to issue the resolution x x x would render moot and
academic the same motion. Justice Reyes agreed and told the
Presiding Justice that he would be sending over the records
to him so that the Presiding Justice could place a note thereon
as to what had been agreed upon. However, the records of
the case did not reach the Presiding Justice.[80]
The conversation between them, as recalled by Justice Sabio,
was as follows:
As soon as he came in, I said: Why did you stab me
behind my back? He said, Why, what did I do? I asked him
Why is it that you have to resort to that strategy of seeking the
opinion of Ed Cruz, in his personal capacity, when we could
have discussed the matter with the PJ?
I reminded him that we were seated three times near
each other on different occasions only recently and he never
mentioned to me about the plan to oust me.
He said: Perhaps that was my fault. I should have talked
to you.
I told him, that all the while I thought we were friends.
Why did you have to do these things behind my back and not
discuss the matter with me face to face?

Then he said it just came about due to the urgent motion;

that he was afraid Meralco would take action against him for
nonfeasance for not doing his job.
For Justice Roxas, the July 4, 2008 reorganization was
mandatory and the Meralco case followed him as its ponente
It was then that I said: Are you aware that I was offered
to the Eighth Division. By the reorganization, Justice Sabio
10M for me to give way to you?
was moved from the disbanded Special Ninth Division to the
Sixth Division, as the reorganization did not spare any
Justice.[81] Moreover, the IRCA does not require that the I further asked him the following: In the first place, how
Justices that issued a TRO be the same Justices that will was the Meralco emissary able to know that there was an
render the decision.[82] This is because the TRO does not impasse between you and me when that was supposed to be
appear in Section 2 (d), Rule VII of the IRCA. Accordingly, only an internal matter?
the issuance of a preliminary injunction could be an exception
to the July 4, 2008 reorganization of the CA.[83] He believes → If you will now insist on assuming the chairmanship after I
the IRCA does not require that the Justices who heard the told you of the 10Million offer, what will I think of you?
case should also decide it because the CA is a court of record
and Justices may rely on the transcript of stenographic
→ Are you a Trojan horse? Can you blame me if I think you
notes.[84] And so, once the three Justices have signed the
are part of this whole scheme or shenanigan?
decision, the ponente has the pressing duty to promulgate the
decision.[85]
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 148
→ Does not the timing alone stink of corruption? After they
failed to convince me of their offer, now they will use you to
oust me? Is it because they are certain of your loyalty and they
are uncertain with mine?
→ And why did they file this stupid urgent motion to assume?
In my nine years in this court, I have never seen such an
animal as this. This is a cowardly act, and whoever advised
this stupid motion is also stupid. Why do you have to dignify
such a foolish motion? They should file a motion for me to
inhibit or recuse myself.
→ Why is it that Meralco actively participated in the hearing
on the 23rd and never raised any question on the alleged
irregularity of my having presided over the hearing?
→ Why do you insist on assuming the case? Are you not
aware that several days after the issuance of the TRO,
respondents filed a motion for inhibition of Justice Vicente
Roxas and a motion to lift the TRO. Who then had the right to
resolve such motion?
→ Under the circumstances, anong iisipin ko sa yo? Ano ang
tingin ko ngayon sa iyo?
His feeble answer was: you. He then said he did not
know of those pending motions. (Incidentally, these motions
were never resolved.) He also said, wala talaga akong interest
dito kundi ayaw ko lang ma charge ng non-feasance for failing
to do my duty.
I answered him: Malayo yung non-feasance. Hindi ito
nonfeasance. I taught the subject for many years and this is
not one of them.
So I told him, I have made my decision on the matter.
Bahala ka na. Then I stood up to show him to the door. He
was silent after that and before he left, he put his arm around
me.
For his part, Justice Reyes kept on repeating: Wala talaga ako
dito, wala akong interest kung di yun lang hindi ako ma non-
feasance. Justice Sabio thought otherwise.
Meanwhile, Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal the final decision on the MERALCO case
bearing his signature, which he gave to Justice Dimaranan-
Vidal for concurrence/dissent. According to Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal, Justice Roxas explained to her the rationale
for his conclusion. Justice Roxas went out for a while and
returned with an expensive looking travelling bag from where
he pulled out the purported final decision. Before the close of
office hours, Justice Roxas returned to the chambers of
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal to check if he (Justice Roxas) had
signed his decision. When she replied that yes, he had signed
it, Justice Roxas said he would pick it up the next day.[89]
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed the decision notwithstanding
that on July 8, 2008 the Court of Appeals had been
reorganized because she believed that the Special Ninth
Division was still existing on account of its having issued the
TRO.[90] She also concurred with the portion of the decision
recommending administrative sanctions against the GSIS
lawyers because she believed the OSG or the OGCC should
have appeared for the GSIS.[91]
Also late that day, Justice Villarama told Justice Sabio that he
had advised Justice Reyes to lay off the case and allow
Justice Sabio to continue and to resolve the urgent motion for
Justice Reyes to assume the chairmanship. Justice Villarama
recalled that Justice Reyes repeatedly said: Wala talaga ako
dito Jun, Wala akong personal interest dito.
After a careful and judicious study of the more than 56-page
decision of Justice Roxas, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed it.
True to his word, Justice Roxas personally picked up the
decision that day purportedly for the action of the Acting
Chairman, Justice Sabio, who was then on leave of absence
until July 11, 200.[92] Notwithstanding the fact that the parties
had not submitted their respective memoranda, Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal signed the convincing ponencia, including
three copies of the signature page, because Justice Roxas
was insistent of the urgency of the signing of the decision due
to the impending lapse of the TRO on July 29, 2008.[93]
Justice Sabio thought otherwise.[94]
However, Justice Roxas denied that the decision he gave to
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was the final decision. He denied
that he gave it to her for her signature. He said it was only for
her to read because she asked to read it. He said it was a
mere draft as everything was unofficial there was no rollo or
logbook with it, it was not placed in an envelope, and it did not
have the special seal of Justice Roxas. It allegedly was thrown
in the garbage can.
On July 9, 2008, the OSG filed the memorandum for the SEC.
On July 10, 2008, Meralco filed an urgent motion praying that
Justice Reyes assume the chairmanship of the Division,[95]
alleging the reasons for the urgent motion as follows:
5. At the scheduled oral arguments on 23 June 2008 in the
instant case, the parties were first directed to one of the
Hearing Rooms of the Court of Appeals. At the said room, the
name plate of Justice Reyes was already placed on the table
for the justices. Thus, petitioners were of the impression that
the leave of absence of Justice Reyes was over and that he
would be presiding over the oral arguments as Chairman of
the Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.
6. However, when the parties were directed to transfer to
another Room of the Court of Appeals for the oral arguments
in the instant case, petitioners saw that the name plates on
the table for the justices included that of Justice Sabio, Jr.,
together with that (sic) of Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-
Vidal. Thereafter, Justice Sabio presided over the oral
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 149
arguments as Chairman of the Special Ninth Division of the
Honorable Court. Petitioners were, thus, of the impression that
the regular Chairman of the Ninth Division, Justice Reyes, was
still on temporary leave of absence.
7. Subsequently, it has come to the attention of the petitioners
that Justice Reyes has already returned from his temporary
leave of absence and has resumed his duties as Chairman of
the Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.
8. Under the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, Justice
Sabio, Jr. should now refrain from acting as the chairman of
the Division hearing the instant case as he is already
disqualified from acting as such upon the return of Justice
Reyes.
8.1. With due respect, Justice Reyes cannot shirk from his
bounden judicial responsibility of performing his duties and
functions as Chairman of the Ninth Division of the Honorable
Court.
8.2. Specifically, under Section 3 (d), Rule IV of the 2002
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, a case can remain with
the justices who participated therein only when any of the
following actions have been taken: (a) giving due course; (b)
granting of a writ of preliminary injunction; (c) granting of a
new trial; or (d) granting of execution pending appeal:
x x x x x x x x x.
9. None of the foregoing instances apply with respect to
Justice Sabio, Jr.s continuing hold on the case. Although
Justice Sabio, Jr. was one of the Justices who issued the
temporary restraining order in favour of the petitioners in the
instant case, this circumstance is not among the grounds as
above-quoted, when a justice of the Court of Appeals may
remain in the Division.
10. As above-quoted, the rule is categorical that it is not the
grant of a temporary restraining order but rather the grant of a
writ of preliminary injunction that sanctions a justices
remaining with the Division. Thus, the continued participation
of Justice Sabio, Jr., in the instant case, considering the clear
Rules of the Honorable Court, is not only irregular but may
lead one to conclude that he is exhibiting undue interest in the
instant case.
On this day, Justice Reyes reported back to work after his trip
to Australia.[96]
On July 11, 2008, Justice Sabio was on leave when Justice
Roxas called him up for a meeting to discuss the case. Justice
Sabio told him that he needed ample time to read the
memoranda of the parties. Justice Roxas promised to send to
Justice Sabio the memoranda immediately.[97]
At 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes received from the Eighth Division
Clerk of Court a copy of Meralcos Urgent Motion for him to
assume the chairmanship of the Ninth Division.
On Monday, July 14, 2008 at the flag ceremony, Justice Sabio
requested Justice Roxas to meet with him as he had by then
read the memoranda of the parties. Justice Roxas initially
agreed to the meeting but he later informed Justice Sabio that
he had another matter to attend to; neither was he available
in the afternoon. Justice Roxas had become scarce. Justice
Sabio learned that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was also looking
for Justice Roxas.[98]
Justice Sabio prepared a resolution on the motion for the
reconsideration of the TRO and informed Justices Roxas and
Dimaranan-Vidal that he wanted to discuss it with them. The
resolution he prepared never saw light.[99]
At 10 a.m., Justice Roxas, with his messenger, brought the
rollo of CA G.R. SP No. 103692 to Justice Reyes, and told the
latter that he and Justice Bruselas would be coming over to
deliberate on the case. Ten minutes later, the Eighth Division
deliberated on the case.[100] After a cursory examination of
the rollo, Justice Reyes found that the decision had been
signed by Justices Roxas and Bruselas but Justice Reyes
asked for more time to study the case.[101]
A transcript of the Final Deliberation on July 14, 2008 is
attached to page 1926 of Volume III of the rollo of CA-G.R. SP
No. 103692 and marked as Exh. 2- Roxas on page 279 of the
rollo of A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA. According to Justice Roxas, it
was he who prepared the transcript from memory to lend
credence to the certification of Justice Reyes at the end of the
decision pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the
Constitution.[102] Justice Reyes denied having seen it or
having authorized its transcription. Justice Bruselas did not
sign any transcript of the deliberation as he was not aware that
a transcript was being taken. There was no stenographer
present, as only the three of them, Justices Reyes, Roxas,
and Bruselas were present at the deliberation. Neither was
there a recording machine. Justice Roxas admittedly prepared
the transcript from memory.[103]
The statement attributed to Justice Reyes in the transcript that
there were previous deliberations were really meetings, which
they had twice, in the office of Justice Reyes, according to
Justice Roxas.[104]
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 150
On July 15, 2008, when she felt that the timing was right, Atty.
Silvia Sabio testified that she handed her fathers letter to the
Chief Justice through his private secretary, Ms. Jasmin
Mateo.[105] A few days later, however, Presiding Justice
Vasquez told Justice Sabio that the Chief Justice would no
longer meet with him, as the Presiding Justice had apprised
the Chief Justice about the matter.[106]
According to Justice Reyes, at 2:00 p.m. that day, the Office
of the Presiding Justice informed him that Justice Sabio was
waiting for him in his office. As soon as Justice Reyes was
seated, Justice Sabio berated him and accused him of
orchestrating matters. Justice Sabio told him that an emissary
of MERALCO had offered him P10 million to drop off the case,
hence, he asked that if he was offered that much, how much
could have been offered to the principals?[107]
On July 17, 2008, Justice Reyes went back to the office of the
Presiding Justice and informed him of the episode in the office
of Justice Sabio. He also went to ask Justice Villarama for his
opinion as to who was the rightful claimant to the
chairmanship of the Division that should decide the Meralco
case. Justice Villarama allegedly replied that they were both
correct.
On July 18, 2008, at the pre-launching meeting for the CA-
CMIS, Justice Villarama had a brief chat with Justice Bruselas.
The former told the latter that both Justices Sabio and Reyes
are correct in the sense that one (1) [of] them can properly
assume chairmanship either under the exception provided in
Sec. 2 (d), Rule VI of the 2002 IRCA depending on the final
disposition of the prayer for injunctive relief, or pursuant to the
general rule enshrined in Sec. 7 (b), Rule VI.[108]
On July 21, 2008, Justice Roxas personally filed with the
Presiding Justice[109] an Interpleader Petition[110] praying
that Presiding Justice Vasquez decide which division
Chairman (Justice Sabios Former Special 9th Division or
Justice B. L. Reyes 8th Division) should sign the Preliminary
Injunction or Decision.[111] Justice Roxas averred that [t]he
impasse between two Chairmen from two Divisions has to be
resolved much earlier than July 30, 2008 because July 30,
2008 is the expiration date of the TRO issued by the Special
9th Division (signed by Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., Justice
Vicente Q. Roxas [ponente] and Justice Myrna Dimaranan-
Vidal). He opined that the two Chairpersons differed in the
interpretation of Sections 1 and 2 (d) in relation to Section 5 of
Rule VI on Process of Adjudication of the Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals (IRCA).[112] His stand was that the IRCA
should be strictly applied because [w]hen the provisions are
clear, there is no room for interpretation.
Justice Roxas endorsed his Interpleader Petition to Justice
Reyes for his signature or dissent to the finalized MERALCO
Decision, which had been in Justice Reyes possession since
July 14, 2008.[113] He also gave the rollo of the case to
Justice Reyes.[114]
Presiding Justice Vasquez allegedly told Justice Roxas that
as Presiding Justice, he had no authority to rule on the
Interpleader Petition, which is not an administrative concern
over which the Presiding Justice must intervene.
Nevertheless, to avoid further discussion, the Presiding
Justice told Justice Roxas that he would study the matter.[115]
On July 22, 2008, Justice Reyes wrote the Presiding Justice
a letter on what was discussed between us last 17 July 2008
at around 3:30 p.m.[116] Apparently the Presiding Justice had
suggested to endorse the case and have the Special Ninth
Division direct the respondents to file their simultaneous
comments on the petitioners Urgent Motion (For Honorable
BIENVENIDO L. REYES to Assume Chairmanship of the
Division in the Instant Case) dated 10 July 2008.
Justice Reyes expressed doubts that the suggestion was most
prudent, as the dispute revolves around the correct
interpretation of the IRCA. He believed that since the question
was purely internal, the CA should not seek enlightenment
from the litigants for it would only be construed against its
competence. He shared Justice Cruzs and Roxas
interpretation of the IRCA. Hence, he urged the Presiding
Justice to decide the matter; otherwise, he would interpret the
rules according to his best lights and act accordingly.
On July 23, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez asked for the
rollo of CA G. R. No. SP No. 103692 so he could properly
submit the requested opinion. It was then that he came across
the unresolved motion praying for the inhibition of Justice
Roxas and the pending urgent motion to lift the TRO or to hold
its enforcement in abeyance. The Presiding Justice
considered the latter as a motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution issuing the TRO.[117]
Meanwhile, at noon of that day, as Justice Reyes had not yet
received any reaction from the Presiding Justice, he signed
the decision as well as the Certification. It was promulgated
on the same day.
The decision was promulgated without waiting for the
Presiding Justices opinion on whether it was the Eighth or
Special Ninth Division that should decide the case. Justice
Roxas alleged that he did not expect the Presiding Justice to
answer or resolve the matter anyway.
On July 24, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez issued his reply
to Justice Reyes letter and Justice Roxas Interpleader-
Petition. The Presiding Justice claimed having doubts on
whether he possessed the authority to decide the subject
conflict simply because under the IRCA, the Presiding Justice
has control and supervision only over administrative affairs of
the Court. The controversy was certainly not an administrative
matter but Section 11 of Rule VIII of the IRCA provides that
the Presiding Justice has the authority to act on any matter
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 151
not covered by the Rules although such action should be
reported to the Court en banc.
The Presiding Justice expressed in his letter the view that the
(Special Ninth) Division that issued the temporary restraining
order should continue resolving the injunctive prayer in the
petition because it was the Division that issued the Resolution
granting the TRO and setting the hearing on the application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, aside from
the fact that the parties did not contest the authority of Justice
Sabio as Division Chairman at the time, although Justice
Reyes had reported back to work. Moreover, the motion for
inhibition and the urgent motion to lift the TRO have a bearing
on the application of Section 2 of Rule VI of the IRCA,
especially because Section 7 (b) of Rule VI[118] points to the
retention of the case by the Special Ninth Division.
Furthermore, the new Division headed by Justice Reyes may
not be allowed to resolve the pending incidents because two
of its members, Justices Reyes and Bruselas did not
participate in the hearing on June 23, 2008. He did not believe
that Justice Reyes would be charged with dereliction of duty
should he not assume the chairmanship. The Presiding
Justice ended his letter with the hope that the matter would be
laid to rest and that whoever would be dissatisfied with its
outcome may elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
At 2:00 p.m. that day, Justice Sabio informed the Presiding
Justice that a decision had been promulgated in the Meralco
case the previous day. The Presiding Justice was surprised
because Justices Roxas and Reyes had asked him to resolve
the impasse on the Division chairmanship. Upon inquiry, the
Presiding Justice found that the decision had indeed been
promulgated at 4:10 p.m. on July 23, 2008.[119]
It was also on July 24, 2008 that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal
received a call from Justice Sabio, informing her that Meralco
had offered him a bribe of P10 million in exchange for his
voluntary stepping out from the Meralco case in order to give
way to Justice B. L. Reyes, and that the decision in the
Meralco case had been promulgated by the Eighth
Division.[120] Shocked that Justice Roxas did not inform her
as a matter of judicial courtesy of the scrapping of the decision
which she signed on July 8, 2008, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal
wrote a letter to the Presiding Justice dated July 24,
2008,[121] bringing to his attention the apparent and obvious
irregularities in the handing of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692, and
complaining about Justice Roxas lack of judicial courtesy in
discarding for reasons she would not know, his purported final
Decision that he had asked her to sign and which she signed
after a judicious study of the records and rollo thereof. Justice
Roxas gave the lame excuse that he had to incorporate
therein some ten pages which he forgot to include in his
Decision.
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed surprise and
consternation when she learned on even date that a Decision
in the case had been promulgated on July 23, 2008 by the
Eighth Division chaired by Justice Reyes, with Justices Roxas
and Bruselas as members. She said:
My deepest regret is that the undersigned who already signed
the supposed final draft of the Decision in the instant case
which bears the signature of the ponente, was not even
informed by the latter as a judicial courtesy at least, of the
hurried easing out of the undersigned from the case. This
inevitably posed even to an unprejudiced mind the following
questions: under what basis was the case suddenly
transferred to the 8th Division and why is it that neither the
undersigned nor the Acting Chairman Justice SABIO, of the
Special 9th Division not consulted thereof? and, foremost,
what happened to the Decision which the undersigned signed
after devoting her precious time and effort in carefully and
laboriously examining the voluminous records and rollo of the
case?
Sad to say the circumstance obtaining herein constitute a
flagrant violation of the provision of Canon 5 particularly
Sections 2 and 3 thereof of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary (A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC).
On July 25, 2008, Justice Bruselas wrote the Presiding Justice
a letter,[122] which was prompted by a disturbing telephone
call he received from Justice Sabio in the morning of July 24,
2008. Justice Sabio informed Justice Bruselas that, after the
injunction hearing on June 23, 2008, Meralco offered him P10
Million to either favor them or yield the chair to Justice Reyes.
Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas that he had informed the
Presiding Justice of the bribery incident and that he was
disgusted over the turn of events because he should have
remained chair of the Special 9th Division that issued the TRO
on the case. Justice Bruselas informed Justice Sabio that it
was the first time that he heard of the matter and that he had
participated in the deliberation on the case and concurred with
the ponencia of Justice Roxas without such information ever
being taken up. Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas that he
would not leave the matter as it is because he would bring it
up in the open, to media, etc. Justice Sabio asked Justice
Bruselas that if P10M was offered to him, how much would
have been offered to the others.
Troubled by the information, Justice Bruselas went to the
Presiding Justice where Justice Dimaranan-Vidal, who had
received the same call from Justice Sabio, joined them. After
that meeting with the Presiding Justice, Justice Bruselas
called up Justice Reyes who confirmed that he had heard
about the bribe offer but that he did not reveal the same to
Justice Bruselas as it escaped his mind. The effort of Justice
Bruselas to get in touch with Justice Roxas proved futile.
Allegedly prompted by the manner by which the decision x x x
was arrived at, and how the decision was promulgated, and
that unless an immediate and thorough investigation thereon
be undertaken by the Court of Appeals, both the individual and
institutional integrity of the justices and of the Court of Appeals
would undoubtedly be tarnished, Justice Sabio wrote on July
26, 2008 a letter[123] to the Presiding Justice, which
precipitated the present investigation.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 152
On July 28, 2008, the Philippine Daily Inquirer carried an
account of the letter of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal to the
Presiding Justice, without her knowing how her confidential
letter to the Presiding Justice leaked out.[124]
Before Justice Bruselas delivered his letter to the Presiding
Justice, he received a copy of the letter of Justice Sabio and,
through a telephone call, reiterated his full agreement with his
desired investigation.
The Presiding Justice called the Court of Appeals to an
emergency en banc session at 10:00 a.m. on July 31, 2008 at
the Session Hall to elicit the reaction of the Court and on the
possible effect on the decision rendered. The session was
also called in order that the predicament experienced in CA-
G.R. SP No. 103692 could be deliberated upon by the
Committee on Rules with a view to amending the IRCA on the
reorganization of the Court of Appeals. The Executive Justices
of Cebu and Cagayan de Oro, Justices Antonio L. Villamor
and Romulo V. Borja, respectively, were instructed to attend
the en banc session to report to the other Justices in their
stations what transpired at the session, and to collect the
personal reaction, comment or view of the Justices on the
matter.[125]
In its closed door en banc session on July 31, 2008, after a
torrid discussion of all the issues, the Court of Appeals
decided, as follows:
(1) Refer the propriety of the actions of the Justices concerned
to the Supreme Court, through the Office of the Court
Administrator;
(2) Leave the matter regarding the validity of the decision
rendered in the above-entitled case to the parties for them to
take whatever legal steps they may deem appropriate in the
usual course of procedure; and
(3) Refer the conflict in the interpretation of our Internal Rules
to the Committee on Rules of the Court of Appeals in order to
prevent the recurrence of a similar situation.[126]
After the en banc session, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal
expressed in a letter for the Presiding Justice[127] her strong
reaction to the paper of Justice Roxas falsely imputing to her
grandstanding before the media or resorting to media-
recourse instead of just filing an administrative complaint
before the Supreme Court, and taking exception to the equally
outrageous, revolting and baseless accusation that she is
allegedly clinging to the case. She asserted that she never
leaked a copy of her letter to the Philippine Daily Inquirer, as
her letter was only intended to bring to the attention of the
Presiding Justice the impropriety done by Justice Roxas in the
MERALCO case that resulted in her having been eased out of
the case notwithstanding that she carefully and judiciously
examined the ponencia with more than 50 pages, after
devoting her precious time to such study, and affixing her
concurrence thereto. Justice Dimaranan-Vidal reiterated her
prayer for an investigation of the matter.
Meanwhile, on that day, Mr. De Borja, executed an affidavit
admitting that he was the businessman referred to by Justice
Sabio, Jr. in his letter to Presiding Justice Vasquez. Mr. De
Borja publicly claimed having learned from the news that
Justice Sabio was one of the justices in the case arising from
the order of the SEC to nullify the proxies issued in favor of
the MERALCO management. He also alleged that Justice
Sabio told him about the blandishments coming from the
government side, that he was being offered a promotion to the
Supreme Court and money to favor the GSIS position. Mr. De
Borja asked Justice Sabio, Jr., What would it take for you to
resist the governments offer? and that the response of Justice
Sabio, Jr. was Fifty Million.
Justice Sabio asked permission from the Presiding Justice to
hold a press conference the next day on account of the
publicized affidavit of Mr. De Borja. The Presiding Justice told
Justice Sabio that this is a matter of self-defense on his part,
hence, the Presiding Justice cannot stop him from doing so.
Justice Sabio issued a signed statement as an initial response
to the affidavit of Mr. De Borja, vehemently denying that Mr.
De Borja asked him what it would take for him to inhibit from
the case, and that he never asked for money from him.[128]
On August 1, 2008, Justice Sabio called the press conference
to read a signed statement entitled My Reaction to Mr. Francis
De Borjas Affidavit dated July 31, 2008 on the Meralco-SEC
Case.
Expressing anger at the filthy lie of Mr. De Borja, Justice Sabio
decided to narrate almost word for word his conversations with
Mr. De Borja.
In an affidavit dated August 1, 2008, which Evelyn
Clavano[129] executed in Davao City, she stated that -
Francis de Borja requested me if I have the cell phone number
of Justice Jose L. Sabio Jr. He related that because he was
very close to the Lopezes of Meralco, he wanted to call him
regarding his possible inhibition in a certain Meralco case,
wherein he was designated as a substitute member of the
division vice a justice who was temporarily on leave by reason
of sickness. He further said that the Lopezes desire that the
same Justice, with whom the Lopezes are more comfortable,
to sit in the division.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 153
So, I gave Francis de Borja the cell phone number of Justice
Jose. L. Sabio, Jr. through business card.
x x x x x x x x x.
On August 4, 2008, the Supreme Court constituted the Panel
of Investigators to investigate (1) alleged improprieties of the
actions of the Justices of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 103692 (Antonio V. Rosete, et al. v. SEC, et al.) and (2)
the alleged rejected offer or solicitation of bribe disclosed
respectively by Mr. Justice Jose Sabio and Mr. Francis de
Borja.
The Panel of Investigators held hearings from August 8 to 23,
2008. Affidavits were submitted to the Panel to serve as the
parties direct testimonies upon which they were cross-
examined by the Panel and the other parties.
On September 4, 2008, the Panel of Investigators submitted
its Report of even date to the Court en banc.
According to the Report, the investigation has revealed
irregularities and improprieties committed by the Court of
Appeals Justices in connection with the MERALCO case, CA-
G.R. SP No. 103692, which are detrimental to the proper
administration of justice and damaging to the institutional
integrity, independence and public respect for the
Judiciary.[130]
Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Vicente
Q. Roxas
Justice Roxas inexcusably failed to act on a number of
motions of the parties prior to the promulgation of the
Decision.
As found by the Panel of Investigators, several motions were
not resolved or acted upon by Justice Roxas. These were
enumerated in the Report as follows:
(a) The Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Defer Action on
any Incident of the Petition Pending Resolution of Re-Raffle
filed by GSIS on May 29, 2008 soon after this case was filed
on that date (Rollo, pp. 185-186).
b) GSIS Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Inhibit Justice Roxas,
which was filed on May 30, 2008. As the motion raised a
prejudicial question, Justice Roxas should have resolved it
before issuing the TRO sought by Meralco, but he never did
(Rollo, pp. 220-223).
(c) GSIS Motion to Lift TRO which was filed on May 30, 2008
(Rollo, pp. 187-210)
(d) GSIS Motion filed on June 18, 2008, praying that it be
allowed to use Power point at the hearing on June 23, 2008 .
On June 20, 2008, the SEC filed a similar motion. Both
motions were not acted upon by Justice Roxas (Rollo, pp.
593-621,)
(e) Meralcos Motion for Extension of Time to file their
Consolidated Memorandum of Authorities and Reply to
Repondent SECs Comment filed on June 25, 2008 (Rollo, pp.
981- 987).
(f) Meralcos Urgent Motion for Honorable Justice Bienvenido
L. Reyes to Assume Chairmanship of the Division in the
Instant Case, which was filed on July 10, 2008 (Rollo, pp.
1262-1274).[131] (emphasis supplied)
We agree with the Panel of Investigators that by ignoring or
refusing to act on the motion for his inhibition, Justice Roxas
violated Rule V, Section 3, third paragraph of the IRCA, which
provides that he should resolve such motion in writing with
copies furnished the other members of the Division, the
Presiding Justice, the Raffle Committee, and the Division
Clerk of Court. The pertinent portion of the said provision
states:
Sec. 3. Motion to Inhibit a Division or a Justice. x x x
xxx
A motion for voluntary inhibition of a Justice shall be acted
upon by him alone in writing, copy furnished the other
members of the Division, the Presiding Justice, the Raffle
Committee and the Division Clerk of Court.
This Court cannot agree with Justice Roxas proposition that
the issuance of the TRO constitutes an implied denial of the
motion to inhibit since under IRCA the obligation of the Justice
to act on such a motion is mandatory.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 154
Furthermore, the Court finds well-taken the Panels finding that
Justice Roxas failure to act on the other motions of the parties
violated Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the 1989 Code of Judicial
Conduct (which applies in a suppletory manner to the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary)
providing that:
Rule 3.05. A judge shall dispose of the courts business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
Even Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
mandates that [j]udges shall perform all judicial duties,
including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly
and with reasonable promptness. Thus, it has become well-
settled in jurisprudence that even just undue delay in the
resolving pending motions or incidents within the
reglamentary period fixed by law is not excusable and
constitutes gross inefficiency.[132] With more reason, this
Court finds suspicious and reprehensible the failure of Justice
Roxas to act at all on pending motions and incidents in CA-
G.R. SP No. 103692.
This is in fact not the first time that Justice Roxas has been
cited administratively for failure to resolve pending incidents
in cases assigned to him. In Orocio v. Roxas, A.M. Nos. 07-
115-CA-J and CA-08-46-J, this Court imposed a P15,000 fine
on Justice Roxas for unwarranted delay in resolving two
motions for reconsideration in another case and sternly
warned him that future commission any act of impropriety will
be dealt with more severely.
Justice Roxas is guilty of gross dishonesty.
Apart from Justice Roxas inexcusable inaction on pending
incidents in the Meralco case, the Panel of Investigators found
that he had been dishonest and untruthful in relation to the
said case. The Court adopts the following findings of the
Panel:
2. Justice Roxas was dishonest and untruthful.
(a) Justice Roxas admitted that the Transcript of Final
Decision, which is supposed to be a transcript of the
deliberation on July 14, 2008 of the Eighth Division on the final
decision in the Meralco case was not a true transcript of the
minutes of the meeting, but purely a transcript from memory
because no notes were taken, no stenographer was present,
and no tape recorder was used. It was in fact a drama which
he composed from my recollection to comply with Sec. 9, Rule
VI of the IRCA which requires that minutes of the meeting, i.e.,
deliberation, shall be kept. The so-called transcript is a
fabrication designed to deceive that there had been
compliance when actually there was none -- with the
prerequisite of the IRCA that consultation and/or deliberation
among the members of the Division must precede the drafting
of a decision.
(b) The statement in the transcript that it was a recap from our
previous deliberations was another falsehood because there
had been no previous deliberations.
(c) The reference in the transcript to a Final Report of Justice
Roxas was also false for Justice Roxas admittedly did not
submit a report as ponente, as required by Sec. 9, Rule VI of
the IRCA, for deliberation by the Eighth Division on July 14,
2008. The Final Report which he submitted was admittedly the
decision itself which he and Justice Bruselas, Jr. had already
signed. The Final Report was merely the title of the page that
served as the cover of the decision. Hence, Justice B.L. Reyes
supposed closing statement in the transcript that -- We have
covered every angle of the Final Report of Justice Roxas
extensively is also false. Justice B.L. Reyes testified at the
investigation that he had not seen the transcript until the copy
in the rollo was shown to him by Justice Callejo, Sr. during his
cross-examination of Justice B. L. Reyes on August 26, 2008.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Justice Roxas testimony that when he brought the Meralco
decision to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal on July 8, 2008, it was
only a draft for her to read, because she asked if she may read
it, not for her to sign it, is completely false. This testimony was
labelled by Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as a lie, and she called
Justice Roxas a liar, because she did not ask to borrow the
decision for her reading pleasure, but Justice Roxas
personally brought it to her office for her to sign as a member
of the Special Ninth Division. After poring over it the whole
night, she signed it, as well as three (3) additional signature
pages which were to be attached to three (3) other copies of
the decision.[133]
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the fabrications and falsehoods that Justice Roxas
blithely proferred to the Panel in explanation/justification of his
questioned handling of the Meralco case demonstrated that
he lacks the qualification of integrity and honesty expected of
a magistrate and a member of the appellate court.
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, dishonesty is
considered a serious offense that may warrant the penalty of
dismissal from the service. Under the Rule IV, Section 52 of
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, dishonesty is likewise considered a grave offense
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 155
and warrants the penalty of dismissal even for the first offense.
In the past, the Court has had the occasion to rule that:
dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses
warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon the
commission of the first offense. On numerous occasions, the
Court did not hesitate to impose such extreme punishment on
employees found guilty of these offenses.
Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the
extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and
perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the
government service. Dishonesty has no place in the
judiciary.[134]
Justice Roxas showed a lack of courtesy and respect for his
colleagues in the Court of Appeals.
The Panel of Investigators reported on this matter in this wise:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Justice Roxas was thoughtlessly disrespectful to a
colleague and a lady at that, when he unceremoniously
discarded, shredded, and burned the decision that Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal had signed, because he allegedly forgot that
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal and Justice Sabio, Jr. had already
been reorganized out of the Special Ninth Division as of July
4, 2008, hence, out of the Meralco case. Out of courtesy, he
should have explained to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal the reason
why he was not promulgating the decision which she had
signed.
The truth, it seems, is that Justice Roxas, who had consulted
Justice Villarama, Jr. on which Division should decide the
Meralco case, may have been convinced that it should be the
Special Ninth Division. That is why he brought his decision to
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature. However,
somehow, somewhere, during the night, while Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal was patiently poring over his decision,
Justice Roxas was persuaded to bring his decision to the
Eighth Division (to which he and Justice B.L. Reyes belong
after the July 4, 2008 reorganization of the Court), it may have
dawned on him that if the case remained in the Special Ninth
Division, Justice Sabio, Jr. might dissent, requiring the
Presiding Justice to constitute a special division of five. If he
(Justice Roxas) should fail to obtain a majority of the Division
on his side, he would lose his ponencia; someone else would
become the ponente (perhaps Justice Sabio, Jr.). That may
be the reason why he junked Justices Sabio, Jr. and
Dimaranan-Vidal (even if the latter concurred with his
decision) because he was unsure of Justice Sabio, Jr. He
chose to cast his lot with his companions in the Eighth Division
-- Justices B. L. Reyes and Bruselas, Jr. -- with whom he and
Meralco were comfortable.
(g) J. Roxas was disrespectful to Presiding Justice Vasquez,
Jr. whose ruling on his Interpleader Petition he sought on July
21, 2008, but he promulgated the Meralco decision two (2)
days later, on July 23, 2008, without waiting for Presiding
Justice Vasquez, Jr.s ruling which came out on July 24, 2008,
only three (3) days after the Interpleader Petition was filed by
him, and two (2) days after Justice B.L. Reyes also reiterated
in writing his request for Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. to
resolve the same chairmanship issue raised in the
Interpleader. Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. was embarrassed
and humiliated by Justices B.L. Reyes and Roxas lack of
courtesy and respect for his position as head of the Court.
xxx xxx xxx
There is an old adage which says to gain respect one must
learn to give it. If judges and justices are expected to treat
litigants, counsels and subordinates with respect and fairness,
with more reason, that judges and justices should give their
fellow magistrates the courtesy and professional regard due
to them as their colleagues in the Judiciary. Thus, in Canon 5,
Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are
expected to carry out judicial duties with appropriate
consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses,
lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without
differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the
proper performance of such duties.
This Court cannot view lightly the discourteous manner that
Justice Roxas, in his apparent haste to promulgate his
decision in the Meralco case, treated his colleagues in the
Court of Appeals. It behooves the Court to remind all
magistrates that their high office demands compliance with the
most exacting standards of propriety and decorum.
Justice Roxas questionable handling of the Meralco case
demonstrates his undue interest therein.
In the Report, the Panel of Investigators observed that Justice
Roxas in fact began drafting his decision even prior to the
submission of the parties memoranda. As discussed in the
Report:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Although the parties were given 15 days after the hearing
on June 23, 2008, or up to July 8, 2008, to simultaneously
submit their memoranda and memoranda of authorities, and
actually submitted:
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 156
On July 7, 2008 GSISs 39 page- memorandum
On July 9, 2008 SECs 62 page-memorandum
On July 10, 2008 MERALCOs 555 page- memorandum (by
messenger) with memorandum of authorities
Justice Roxas prepared the decision before the parties had
filed their memoranda in the case and submitted it to Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature on July 8, 2008. His rush to
judgment was indicative of undue interest and unseemly
haste, according to J.Romero.
He cheated the parties counsel of the time, effort, and energy
that they invested in the preparation of their ponderous
memoranda which, as it turned out, neither he nor the other
members of the Eighth Division bothered to read before
signing his decision. He made a mockery of his own order for
the parties to submit memoranda, and rendered their
compliance a futile exercise.
xxx xxx xxx
(underscoring supplied)
We agree with Mme. Justice Romeros observation that the
rush to judgment (even before the filing of the parties
memoranda) was indicative of Justice Roxas undue interest
and unseemly haste, especially when taken together with
other circumstances. This inexplicable haste in resolving the
case on the merits is likewise apparent in Justice Roxas failure
to resolve the several pending incidents and instead jumping
ahead to deciding the case on the merits; his rushing of
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal into signing his draft Decision on July
8, 2008 when the parties memoranda have not yet all been
filed with the CA; his precipitate transfer of the case to the
Eighth Division for promulgation of decision, without notice to
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal of the Special Ninth Division who had
already signed his draft Decision and despite the unresolved
Chairmanship dispute between Justice Reyes and Justice
Sabio which he (Justice Roxas) even submitted to the
Presiding Justice for appropriate action, just a few days before
the promulgation.
We reiterate here that as the visible representation of the law
and justice, judges are expected to conduct themselves in a
manner that would enhance respect and confidence of the
people in the judicial system. The New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges
must not only maintain their independence, integrity and
impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of
impropriety or partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in
the judiciary. This standard applies not only to the decision
itself, but also to the process by which the decision is
made.[135] This Court will not hesitate to sanction with the
highest penalty magistrates who exhibit manifest undue
interest in their assigned cases.[136]
In sum, this Court finds that Justice Roxas multiple violations
of the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct constitute grave
misconduct, compounded by dishonesty, undue interest and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which
warrant his DISMISSAL from the service.
Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Jose L.
Sabio, Jr.
In the Report, the Panel found that Justice Sabio likewise
committed improprieties in relation to the Meralco case.
The circumstances of the telephone call of Chairman Sabio to
his brother Justice Sabio showed that Justice Sabio failed to
uphold the standard of independence and propriety expected
of him as a magistrate of the appellate court.
In his testimony before the Panel, Chairman Sabio admits that
he called up Justice Sabio on May 30, 2008 from Davao City,
in response to a resquest for help from a member of the Board
of Trustees of Meralco. Notwithstanding the fact that
Chairman Sabio called to relay to Justice Sabio the rightness
of the GSIS cause and asked him to help GSIS and that
Justice Sabio allegedly told his brother that he would act in
accordance with his conscience, the same still constituted a
violation of Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for lawyers, which provides that:
A lawyer shall x x x refrain from any impropriety which tends
to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the Court.
As they were both members of the Bar, it is incomprehensible
to this Court how the brothers can justify their improper
conversation regarding the Meralco case. As the Panel
observed in its Report:
Ironically, both of them found nothing wrong with brother
Camilos effort to influence his younger brothers action in the
Meralco case, because both believe that our Filipino culture
allows brother-to-brother conversation, even if the purpose of
one is to influence the other, provided the latter does not agree
to do something illegal.[137]
For the Panel, Justice Sabio violated Sections 1, 4, and 5,
Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, which provide that
Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function
independently x x x free from extraneous influence,
inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect,
from any quarter or for any reason.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 157
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other
relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The
prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance
the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to
convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge.
Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate
connections with, and influence by, the executive and
legislative branches of government, but must also appear to
be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.
In the Investigators mind, although Justice Sabio signed the
TRO in favour of Meralco contrary to his brothers advice,
Justice Sabios unusual interest in holding on to the Meralco
case, seemed to indicate that he may have been actually
influenced by his brother to help GSIS. In arriving at this
conclusion, the Panel noted the following circumstances: (1)
Justice Sabio adamantly refused to yield the chairmanship of
the Special Ninth Division although the regular chairman,
Justice Reyes had returned to duty on June 10, 2008; and, (2)
Justice Sabio officiously prepared and signed a resolution (a
chore for the ponente Justice V. Roxas to perform), requiring
the GSIS and the SEC to comment on Meralcos Motion for
Justice B. Reyes to Assume the Chairmanship of the 9th
Division, which he probably intended to delay the decision on
the preliminary injunction beyond the life of the TRO to the
prejudice of Meralco and the advantage of the GSIS.
Based on the facts on record, the Court is wary of declaring
that Justice Sabio had been influenced by his brother by
speculating that he would have favored GSIS had he been a
part of the division which rendered the decision in the Meralco
case. However, we do find that it was improper for Justice
Sabio to hold on to the chairmanship of the Ninth Division the
despite the return of Justice Reyes, when Justice Sabios
designation as acting chairman was clearly only for the
duration of Justice Reyes leave of absence. We likewise note
with disfavor his stubborn insistence on his own interpretation
of the IRCA and hostile, dismissive attitude towards equally
well-reasoned positions of his colleagues on the proper
interpretation of their rules. Such conduct on the part of
Justice Sabio did nothing to aid in the swift and amicable
resolution of his dispute with Justice Reyes but rather fanned
the flames of resentment between them. We deem this sort of
behavior unbecoming for a magistrate of his stature.
Justice Sabios conversations with Mr. De Borja were improper
and indiscreet.
On this matter, the Court accepts the following findings in the
Report:
Knowing the nature of De Borjas profession, Justice Sabio, Jr.
should have been wary of the former. He should have
foreseen that De Borja had the Meralco case on his mind
when he called Justice Sabio, Jr. True enough, De Borja
mentioned the Meralco case and congratulated Justice Sabio,
Jr. for having signed the TRO in favour of Meralco.
But that was not the last time Justice Sabio, Jr. would hear
from De Borja. A month later, after Justice Sabio, Jr. had
presided at the hearing of Meralcos prayer for preliminary
injunction on June 23, 2008, and the case was ripening for
decision or resolution, De Borja again called up Justice Sabio,
Jr. and asked to meet him over dinner to chit chat about the
Meralco case.
Instead of telling off De Borja that he could not, and would not,
talk about the Meralco case, Justice Sabio, Jr. agreed to meet
De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School after
his evening class in Legal Ethics in said school.
Justice Sabio Jr.s action of discussing the Meralco case with
De Borja was highly inappropriate and indiscreet. First, in talks
with his brother; the second time in conversation with De
Borja, Justice Sabio, Jr. broke the shield of confidentiality that
covers the disposition of cases in the Court in order to
preserve and protect the integrity and independence of the
Court itself. He ignored the injunction in Canon 1, Section 8 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
that: Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of
judicial conduct (and discretion) in order to reinforce public
confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to the
maintenance of judicial independence.
It was during that meeting with De Borja in the lobby-lounge
of the Ateneo Law School, that De Borja allegedly offered him
P10 million, in behalf of Meralco, to step out of the case and
allow Justice Bienvenido Reyes to assume the chairmanship
of the Special Ninth Division because Meralco was not
comfortable with him (Justice Sabio, Jr.). He rejected the bribe
offer because he could not in conscience accept it.
Justice Sabio, Jr. was allegedly shocked and insulted that De
Borja would think that he (Justice Sabio, Jr.) could be bribed
or bought. The Panel is, however, honestly perplexed why in
spite of his outraged respectability, Justice Sabio, Jr. called up
De Borja two (2) days later (on July 3, 2008), to tell De Borja
to stop pestering him with his calls. The Panel is nonplussed
because, normally, a person who has been insulted would
never want to see, much less speak again, to the person who
had disrespected him. He could have just shut off his cell
phone to De Borjas calls. De Borja denied that he reiterated
his offer of P10 million to Justice Sabio, Jr. He denied saying
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 158
that even if the case should go up to the Supreme Court, GSIS
would still lose, hence, saying lang yung P10 million; baka
sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo. He testified that his reply to
Justice Sabio, Jr.s call was deadma or indifference. Justice
Sabio, Jr. blamed that call of his to a lapse in judgment on his
part.
Be that as it may, the Investigating Panel finds more credible
Justice Sabio, Jr.s story about De Borjas P10 million-bribe-
offer on behalf of Meralco, than De Borjas denial that he made
such an offer. Why does the Panel believe him, and not De
Borja?
First, because Justice Sabio, Jr. verbally reported the rejected
bribe offer to CA Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.
the next day a fact admitted by Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.
Second, even though Justice Sabio, Jr. did not mention the
bribe-offerors name in both his verbal and written reports to
Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr., De Borja identified himself to
the media as the person alluded to.
Third, De Borjas allegation, that Justice Sabio, Jr. wanted P50
million, not P10 million, is not believable, for, if Justice Sabio,
Jr. quoted P50 million as his price, he would not have reported
the P10 million bribe offer to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.
He would have waited for Meralcos reply to his counter-
offer.[138]
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the Court agrees with the Panel that the allegation of
solicitation on the part of Justice Sabio is not credible.
Nevertheless, the continued communications between Justice
Sabio and Mr. De Borja even after the latters rejected bribery
attempt is highly inappropriate and shows poor judgment on
the part of Justice Sabio who should have acted in
preservation of the dignity of his judicial office and the
institution to which he belongs.
Premises considered, this Court is of the view that Justice
Sabios indiscreet and imprudent conversations regarding the
Meralco case with his brother and Mr. De Borja and his
actuations in the chairmanship dispute with Justice Reyes
constitute simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a
justice of the Court of Appeals which warrant the penalty of
two (2) months suspension without pay.
Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice
Bienvenido L. Reyes.
As previously discussed, Justice Reyes appealed to Presiding
Justice Vazquez in a letter dated July 22, 2008, reiterating his
(Justice Reyes) request that the Presiding Justice render an
opinion which Division of the Court of Appeals the Eighth
Division with him as chairman, or the Special Ninth Division
chaired by Justice Sabio should resolve the Meralco case.
This was in conjunction with an Interpleader filed by Justice
Roxas on the same issue with the Presiding Justice. Yet,
despite the fact that the Presiding Justice informed Justices
Reyes and Roxas that he would study the matter, Justices
Reyes and Justice Roxas, together with Justice Bruselas,
promulgated the decision in the Meralco case on July 23,
2008. Justice Reyes and Justice Roxas did not withdraw their
request for a ruling nor did either of them advise the Presiding
Justice beforehand of their intention to proceed with the
resolution of the Meralco case. Thus, when the Presiding
Justice issued his ruling on the chairmanship dispute on July
24, 2008, he was unaware of the promulgation of the Meralco
decision on July 23, 2008, under the aegis of Justice Reyes
Eighth Division. As found by the Panel, Presiding Justice
Vasquez, Jr. was completely taken aback when he learned
about it on July 24, 2008, the same day that he issued his
opinion on the chairmanship issue which by then had become
functus oficio. He felt belittled and humiliated by the
discourtesy of the two justices to him.
It bears repeating here that under Canon 5, Section 3 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are mandated to show
the appropriate consideration and respect for their colleagues
in the Judiciary.
Thus, we adopt the finding of the Panel on this point and find
Justice Reyes guilty of simple misconduct, which is mitigated
by the fact that he repeatedly asked Presiding Justice
Vasquez to act on his request to rule on the conflicting
interpretation of the IRCA. However, Justice Reyes should be
reprimanded for taking part in the decision of the subject case
without awaiting the ruling of the Presiding Justice.
Findings regarding the conduct of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-
Vidal
The Court finds well-taken and adopts the findings of the
Panel of Investigators, to wit:
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal deviated from the IRCA when she
allowed herself to be rushed by Justice Roxas to sign the
Meralco decision on July 8, 2008, without reading the parties
memoranda and without the deliberation among members of
the Division required by the IRCA. She knew that the TRO
would not expire until July 30, 2008 some three (3) weeks
away from July 8, 2008 yet she allowed herself to believe
Justice Roxas misrepresentation that signing the decision was
urgent. Her compliance with certain dissembling practices of
other justices of the Court, in violation of the IRCA, showed
weakness and lack of independence on her part.[139]
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 159
The following sections of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct are instructive in this regard:
SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function
independently on the basis of their assessment of the facts
and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the
law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure,
threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for
any reason.
SEC. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be
independent from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions
which the judge is obliged to make independently.
Allowing a fellow justice to induce her to deviate from
established procedure constitutes conduct unbecoming a
justice for which Justice Dimaranan-Vidal should be
ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of
her judicial duties.
Findings regarding the conduct of Presiding Justice Conrado
M. Vasquez
It is the view of the Panel of Investigators that Presiding
Justice Vasquez failed to provide the leadership expected of
him as head of the Court of Appeals. The following quote from
the Report summarizes the perceived lapses on the part of the
Presiding Justice:
Clearly, Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. had been indecisive in
dealing with the turmoil arising from the Meralco case. He
vacillated and temporized on resolving the impasse between
Justice Sabio, Jr. and Justice B. L. Reyes over the
chairmanship of the Division that should hear and decide the
Meralco case. He failed to take action on the reported bribe-
offer by Meralco to J. Sabio, Jr. He hesitated to assert his
leadership of the Court even when the parties repeatedly
urged him to lay down the rule for them to follow. Was he
hampered by the fact that he has relatives two daughters
employed in the GSIS, and a sister who is a consultant
thereof? He pleaded lack of authority. Was he not aware then,
or did he discover too late, that under Section 11, Rule VIII of
the IRCA, he is in fact authorized to act on any matter involving
the Court and its members? That Rule provides:
Sec. 11. x xx the Presiding Justice or any one acting in his
place is authorized to act on any matter not covered by these
Rules. Such action shall, however, be reported to the Court
en banc.
He should have convened the Court en banc as soon as the
alleged bribery attempt on Justice Sabio, Jr. was reported to
him, for it was an attempt to corrupt a member of the Court,
calling for the protection and preservation of the integrity of
the judicial processes of the Court, hence, an administrative
matter cognizable by the Court en banc. Section 5 (c), Rule I
of the IRCA, provides:
Sec. 5. Matters cognizable by the Court en banc.- The Court
en banc
shall, inter alia:
(a) xxx
(b) Adopt uniform administrative measures,
procedures, and policies for the protection and preservation of
the integrity of the judicial processes, x x x.
Presiding Justice Vasquez admitted his lapses in
judgment.[140]
In the light of the foregoing observations of the Panel, this
Court is of the view that much of the trouble now being faced
by the Court of Appeals could have been averted by timely,
judicious and decisive action on the part of the Presiding
Justice. Certainly, this unpleasant and trying episode in failure
to act in the early part of his tenure as Presiding Justice has
indelibly impressed upon him what is required of him as leader
of the second highest court in the land. Nevertheless,
Presiding Justice Vasquez is hereby severely reprimanded for
his failure to act promptly and decisively on the controversy as
required of him by the IRCA.
Findings regarding other personalities involved in the Meralco
case
Although the Presiding Justice in his letter dated August 1,
2008 only referred to this Court the propriety of the actions of
the Justices concerned in the Meralco case, we cannot simply
turn a blind eye to the facts brought to light during the
investigation that relate to potential liabilities of other
personalities in the Meralco case.
With respect to Chairman Sabio, this Court has the power to
discipline members of the Bar and his attempt to influence a
member of the Judiciary, his brother at that, should be referred
to the Bar Confidant for appropriate action.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 160

With respect to Mr. De Borja, the present investigation has

given this Court reason to believe that Mr. De Borja may be
criminally liable for his attempt to bribe a magistrate of the
Court of Appeals. This matter should be referred to the
Department of Justice for appropriate action.
(5) Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal is found guilty
of conduct unbecoming a Justice of the Court of Appeals and
is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the discharge of
her judicial duties.

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, this per

curiam decision was reached after deliberation of the Court en (6) PCGG Chairman Camilo L. Sabios act to influence the
banc. At the outset, the offer of three (3) members of the Court judgment of a member of the Judiciary in a pending case is
to recuse themselves was denied by the Court. Except for two hereby referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate action;
members of the Court who were allowed to inhibit themselves
from the case, the Justices voted as follows: Twelve Justices
voted for the dismissal from service of Associate Justice
Vicente Q. Roxas and one (1) voted for his suspension from
the service for six (6) months. Ten (10) Justices voted for two (7) Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.s charge against Mr. Francis R.
(2) month suspension from service without pay of Associate De Borja for attempted bribery of a member of the Judiciary is
Justice Jose L. Sabio, one (1) voted for six-month suspension, hereby referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate
one (1) for reprimand only as he should be credited for being action.
a whistle blower and one (1) for his dismissal from the service.
Eight (8) Justices voted to reprimand Associate Justice
Bienvenido L. Reyes and five (5) for his suspension from the
service for one (1) month. As to the rest, the voting was
unanimous. This Decision shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES as follows: SO ORDERED.

(1) Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas is found guilty of

multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, grave misconduct, dishonesty, undue interest and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and is
DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE of all
benefits, except accrued leave credits if any, with prejudice to
his re-employment in any branch or service of the government
including government-owned and controlled corporations;

(2) Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. is found guilty of

simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the
Court of Appeals and is SUSPENDED for two (2) months
without pay, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;

(3) Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. is SEVERELY

REPRIMANDED for his failure to act promptly and decisively
in order to avert the incidents that damaged the image of the
Court of Appeals, with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;

(4) Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes is found guilty of

simple misconduct with mitigating circumstance and is
REPRIMANDED, with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 161
G.R. No. L-35377-78 July 31, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CAMILO PILOTIN, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, ISIDRO PUGAL
and ERNING ABANO, defendants-appellants.
RESOLUTION
AQUINO, J.:
Vincent Crisologo through counsel filed a verified motion
praying for the transfer to the New Bilibid Prisons or,
alternatively, to Camps Crame, Aguinaldo or Olivas, of the
place of trial of Criminal Case No. 3949 of the municipal
court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein he, as sole defendant,
is charged with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions.
As justificatory ground, he alleged that his life would be in
jeopardy if he were to be confined in the Vigan municipal
jail during the trial because there are many political
enemies of the Crisologo family in that vicinity; some of
the adherents of the Crisologos had in fact been
murdered in Ilocos Sur, and his father, Congressman
Floro Crisologo, was shot to death while hearing mass at
the Vigan cathedral.
Bluntly, he affirmed that inside that jail he would be a sitting
duck for a gunwielder or grenade-thrower who wants to
assassinate him. He could even be lynched or shot to death
on the specious pretext that he was trying to escape.
Asked to comment on the motion, the Provincial Fiscal of
Ilocos Sur signified his conformity to the transfer of the venue
of the trial to the New Bilibid Prisons.
Section 5(4), Article X of the Constitution expressly empowers
this Court to "order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid
a miscarriage of justice". Here, what is involved is not merely
a miscarriage of justice but the personal safety of movant
Crisologo, the accused. It would be absurd to compel him to
undergo trial in a place where his life would be imperilled.
Present hostile sentiment against the accused at the place of
trial is a justification for transfer of venue (See State vs. Siers,
136 S. E. 503, 103, W. Va. 30; 22 C.J.S. 310).1äwphï1.ñët
We find Crisologo's motion to be meritorious. The change of
venue involves not merely the change of the place of hearing
but also the transfer of the expediente of Criminal Case No.
3949 to another court. According to Crisologo's motion, the
alleged evidence against him is in the custody of the
authorities at Camp Crame, Quezon City. The transfer of
Criminal Case No. 3949 to the City Court of Quezon City and
the holding of the trial at Camp Crame appear to be the most
convenient arrangement.
WHEREFORE, the municipal court of Vigan is directed to
transfer the record of Criminal Case No. 3949 to the City Court
of Quezon City where it should be re-docketed and raffled to
any Judge thereof. The case may be tried at Camp Crame.
The usual precautions and security measures should be
adopted in bringing defendant Crisologo to Camp Crame on
the occasion of the hearing.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-41313 November 6, 1975
ALIPIO MONDIGUING and ANDRES DUNUAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO MEN ABAD, as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Ifugao; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
MARIANO PACTIW, alias Bugbug; DULMOG ABLUYEN
and ANGELINA ABLUYEN, respondents..
R E S O L U T I O N.
AQUINO, J.:
Alipio Mondiguing and Andres Dunuan are two of the ten
defendants accused of double murder, frustrated murder and
attempted murder in Criminal Case No. 140 of the Court of
First Instance of Ifugao Province (People vs. George Bayucca
et al.). That case was filed in connection with an ambuscade
which was perpetuated on July 23, 1970 at Baag, Banaue,
Ifugao. As a result of that incident, Governor Gualberto
Lumauig of Ifugao was wounded and his executive assistant
and his driver were killed. Up to this time the accused in that
case have not been arraigned. .
On September 4, 1975 Mondiguing and Dunuan filed in this
Court a petition to transfer the venue of the case to Baguio
City or Quezon City. They claimed that they could not expect
a fair and impartial trial in Lagawe, Ifugao because Judge
Francisco Men Abad of the Court of First Instance of that
province is a protege' of Governor Lumauig and his brother,
former Congressman Romulo Lumauig, and because their
witnesses would be afraid to testify for fear of harassment and
reprisals. The petitioners further claimed that, as may be
inferred from previous incidents recounted in the petition, their
lives and the lives of their witnesses and lawyers would be in
grave danger in Ifugao because of the tensions and
antagonisms spawned by the case and the political rivalry
between the Lumauig and Mondiguing factions. (The
accused, George Bayucca was killed on October 28, 1970 and
Alipio Mondiguing resigned as mayor of Banaue and took
refuge in Baguio City). .
The Acting Solicitor General interposed no objection to the
change of venue but he invited the Court's attention to the
suggestion of Governor Lumauig that the case may be
transferred to the proper court in Isabela in view of its
proximity to Ifugao. .
Respondent Judge Francisco Men Abad in his comment
disputed the correctness or truth of the grounds relied upon
for the change of venue and prayed that the petition be
dismissed. He said that, if there would be bias on his part, he
would be biased in favor of the People of the Philippines. He
said that the crime charged was not "committed personally
against" Governor Lumauig. That statement is not correct
since the governor is one of the victims mentioned in the
information. .
Judge Abad revealed that petitioner Dunuan sent to the court
a letter dated August 30, 1975 wherein he declined the
services of Atty. Jose W. Diokno (who filed the instant petition
for transfer of venue). In view of that disclosure, the petition
herein should be regarded as having been filed only by Alipio
Mondiguing. .
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 162
The fact is that this Court in Paredes vs. Abad, L-36927-28,
April 15, 1974, 56 SCRA 522, 534, disqualified Judge Abad
from trying the electoral protests filed by Crescencio Paredes
and Venancio Uyan against Gualberto Lumauig and John
Langbayan. In that case it was alleged that Judge Abad was
a political leader of Governor Lumauig and was recommended
to his present position by the Lumauig brothers. .
The issue is whether Mondiguing's plea for a change of venue
is justified. A change of the place of trial in criminal cases
should not be granted for whimsical or flimsy reasons. "The
interests of the public require that, to secure the best results
and effects in the punishment of crime, it is necessary to
prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place, as near
as may be, where he committed his crime" (Manila Railroad
Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523, 562). .
This Court is invested with the prerogative of ordering "a
change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice" (Sec. 5[4], Art. X of the Constitution). It "possesses
inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and
disposition of a case pending in a Court of First Instance be
transferred to another Court of First Instance within the same
district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand,
and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a
trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case
would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a
miscarriage of justice" (People vs. Gutierrez, L-32282-83,
November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 172, 185). .
A change of venue was ordered by this Court in a case where
it was shown that the accused might be liquidated by his
enemies in the place where the trial was originally scheduled
to be held (People vs. Pilotin Vincent Crisologo, movant, L-
3537778, July 31, 1975).
After a careful consideration of the circumstances recited in
Mondiguing's petition to support his request for a change of
the place of trial, we have reached the conclusion that his
petition is meritorious. .
In the interest of a fair and impartial trial and to avoid a
miscarriage of justice and considering that his life would be in
danger if he were to be tried in Lagawe, Ifugao, he should be
tried by the Circuit Criminal Court in the City of Baguio. .
The other relief sought by Mondiguing, which is that he be
transferred from the Philippine Constabulary headquarters at
Lagawe, Ifugao to Camp Crame should be submitted for the
consideration of the Circuit Criminal Court. .
WHEREFORE, the petition of Alipio Mondiguing for the
transfer of the venue of Criminal Case No. 140 of the Court of
First Instance of Ifugao is granted. The said case should be
transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial
District so that it may be heard in Baguio City. .
SO ORDERED. .
Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and
Martin, JJ., concur.
Fernando J., is on leave.
G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17, 1981
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR PABLO SOLA, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER
FRANCISCO (ECOT) GARCIA, RICARDO (CADOY)
GARCIA, JOSE BETHOVEN (ATSONG) CABRAL,
CAPTAIN FLORENDO BALISCAO, JOHN, PETER,
OSCAR, OMAR, JACK, RICHARD, JAMES, DONALD,
WILLIAM, ROBERT, HOMER, JESSIE, ANDY, PAUL, all
surnamed DOES respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The power of this Tribunal, constitutionally mandated, 1 to
order a change of venue to avoid any miscarriage of justice as
well as the procedure ordained in the implementation of the
right to bail 2 are involved in this petition which, even if not so
denominated, partakes of the nature of a certiorari. It must
have been the zeal of private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and
Renecio Espiritu, 3 no doubt under the conviction that there
was no time to lose, that must have led them to devote less
than that full measure of attention to certain fundamentals.
They ignored the principle that the responsibility for the
conduct of the prosecution is with the public officials
concerned. Nonetheless, the importance of the questions
raised, the need for a change of venue and the cancellation of
the bail bonds, necessitated that further action be taken.
Accordingly, in a resolution dated February 12, 1981, one day
after the filing of the petition, the Court required the comment
of the Solicitor General as well as of the private respondents,
4the accused in six pending criminal cases before the Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
On March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza. 5 It opened with this preliminary
statement: "The present petition was filed by the private
prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 1700-1706, People v.
Pablo Sola, et al., pending trial before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental. Rightly, any petition before this
Honorable Court on behalf of the People of the Philippines
can, under the law, be instituted only by the Solicitor General.
The assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors that they
are instituting the action 'subject to the control and supervision
of the Fiscal' will not, therefore, improve their legal standing."
6 Nonetheless, it did not press the legal point but instead
adopted "the two-pronged trusts of the petition: 1. the setting
aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of
Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya,
granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases mentioned
above, and 2. the petition for a change of venue or place of
trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. 7
The facts were therein narrated thus: "On September 15,
1980, acting on the evidence presented by the Philippine
Constabulary commander at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental,
the Court of First Instance of that province issued a search
warrant for the search and seizure of tile deceased bodies of
seven persons believed in the possession of the accused
Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental. * * * On September 16, 1980 armed with the above
warrant, elements of the of the 332nd PC/INP Company
proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield
yielded two common graves containing the bodies of
Fernando Fernandez, Mateo Olimpos, Alfredo Perez,
Custodio Juanica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie Callet and
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 163
Bienvenido Emperado. On September 23 and October 1,
1980, the PC provincial commander of Negros Occidental filed
seven (7) separate complaints for murder against the accused
Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, Ricardo Garcia, Jose Bethoven
Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14) other persons of
unknown names. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases
No. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140 of the
Municipal Court of Kabankalan. After due preliminary
examination of the complainant's witnesses and his other
evidence, the municipal court found probable cause against
the accused. It thus issued an order for their a. rest. However,
without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the
evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted
them the right to post bail for their temporary release. The
accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, and Jose Bethoven
Cabral availed themselves of this right and have since been
released from detention. In a parallel development. the
witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of
their fears that if the trial is held at the Court of First Instance
branch in Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from
Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of
the accused are officials with power and influence in
Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. In addition,
most of the accused remained at large. Indeed, there have
been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the
families of the witnesses." 8 The facts alleged argue strongly
for the remedies sought, namely a change of venue and the
cancellation of the bail bonds.
On the very next day, March 15, 1981, this Court issued the
following resolution: "The Court Resolved to: (a) [Note] the
comment of the Solicitor General on the urgent petition for
change of venue and cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the
plea of the petition, namely, (1) the setting aside, by certiorari,
of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided
over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused
in Criminal Cases Nos. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139
and 4140, all entitled "People of the Philippines v. Mayor
Pablo Sola. et al."; (2) the petition for a change of venue or
place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage
of Justice; (b) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal
cases to Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental at Bacolod City, presided by Executive Judge
Alfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge Ostervaldo
Emilia of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental,
Branch VI at Himamaylan has an approved leave of absence
covering the period from January 12 to March 12, 1981 due to
a mild attack of cerebral thrombosis and that the said Branch
V is the nearest court station to Himamaylan: and (c) [Await]
the comment of respondents on the petition to cancel bail,
without prejudice to the public officials concerned taking the
necessary measures to assure the safety of the witnesses of
the prosecution." 9 Thus, the issue of a change of venue has
become moot and academic. The comments respectively
submitted by respondent Florendo Baliscao on March 5, 1981,
respondent Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981 and
respondent Pablo Sola on March 16, 1981, dealt solely with
the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Such
comments were considered as answers, with the case
thereafter deemed submitted for decision.
The sole remaining issue of the cancellation of the bail bonds
of respondents, there being a failure to abide by the basic
requirement that the prosecution be heard in a case where the
accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to bail being
granted, must be decided in favor of petitioner. The bail bonds
must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of
Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing. So we rule.
1. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the question of
transferring the place of trial, in this case, from Himamaylan to
Bacolod City. The Constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme
Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid
a miscarriage of justice." 10 The Constitutional Convention of
1971 wisely incorporated the ruling in the landmark decision
of People v. Gutierrez, 11 where Justice J. B. L. Reyes as
ponente vigorously and categorically affirmed: "In the
particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to
proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at
liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the
judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which
courts have been established." 12 Why a change of venue is
imperative was made clear in the Comment of the Solicitor
General. Thus: "The exercise by this Honorable Court of its
above constitutional power in this case will be appropriate.
The witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They are
afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan
during any of the days of trial. Because of qqqts fear, they may
either refuse to testify or testimony falsely to save their lives.
13 Respondent Florendo Baliscao was not averse to such
transfer, but his preference is for a court anywhere in Metro
Manila. 14 Respondent Francisco Garcia confined his
comment to the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds.
Respondent Pablo Sola made clear that he had "no objection
to the transfer. 15 It may be added that there may be cases
where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals,
be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the
effect it has on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial
aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind.
In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of
venue. As a matter of fact, there need not be a petition of this
character filed before this Court. Such a plea could have been
done administratively. In this particular case, however, there
is justification for the procedure followed in view of the fact that
along with the change of venue, the cancellation of the bail
bonds was also sought.
2. Equally so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than
justified. Bail was granted to the accused in the Order of the
Municipal Court without hearing the prosecution That is to
disregard the authoritative doctrine enunciated in People v.
San Diego. 16 As pointed out by Justice Capistrano, speaking
for the Court: "The question presented before us is, whether
the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process. The
answer is in the affirmative. We are of the considered opinion
that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in
custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary
proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution
must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable
time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the
court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal
case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution
should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a
violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court
granting bail should be considered void on that ground." 17
These words of Justice Cardozo come to mind: "The law, as
we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant
charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the
essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so
fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial
that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will
be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the
pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the
accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness
must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to
keep the balance true." 18 This norm which is of the very
essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires
that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that
there is strong evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as
asserted herein, that the questions asked by the municipal
judge before bail was granted could be characterized as
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 164

searching. That fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional

character. 19

WHEREFORE, the assailed order of Judge Rafael Gasataya

granting bail to private respondents is nullified, set aside, and
declared to be without force and effect. Executive Judge
Alfonso Baguio of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, to whose sala the cases had been transferred by
virtue of the resolution of this Court of March 5, 1981, is
directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of private
respondents, with the prosecution being duly heard on the
question of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
respondents is strong. This decision is immediately executory.
No costs.

Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez,

Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera JJ., concur.

Barredo and Abad Santos, JJ., are on leave.

FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 165
G.R. No. 79690-707 February 1, 1989
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as
Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution,
respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 February 1, 1989
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and acting as
Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution,
respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
We have examined carefully the lengthy and vigorously
written Motion for Reconsideration dated October 18, 1988
filed by counsel for respondent Raul M. Gonzalez, relating to
the per curiam Resolution of the Court dated October 7, 1988.
We have reviewed once more the Court's extended per
curiam Resolution, in the light of the argument adduced in the
Motion for Reconsideration, but must conclude that we find no
sufficient basis for modifying the conclusions and rulings
embodied in that Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration
sets forth copious quotations and references to foreign texts
which, however, whatever else they may depict, do not reflect
the law in this jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in some
measure, some of the conclusions reached in the per curiam
Resolution, addressing in the process some of the "Ten (10)
Legal Points for Reconsideration," made in the Motion for
Reconsideration.
1. In respondent's point A, it is claimed that it was error for this
Court "to charge respondent [with] indirect contempt and
convict him of direct contempt."
In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court concluded
that "respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court
in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the
court and member of the bar." The Court did not use the
phrase "in facie curiae" as a technical equivalent of "direct
contempt," though we are aware that courts in the United
States have sometimes used that phrase in speaking of "direct
contempts' as "contempts in the face of the courts." Rather,
the court sought to convey that it regarded the contumacious
acts or statements (which were made both in a pleading filed
before the Court and in statements given to the media) and
the misconduct of respondent Gonzalez as serious acts
flaunted in the face of the Court and constituting a frontal
assault upon the integrity of the Court and, through the Court,
the entire judicial system. What the Court would stress is that
it required respondent, in its Resolution dated 2 May 1988, to
explain "why he should not be punished for contempt of court
and/or subjected to administrative sanctions" and in respect
of which, respondent was heard and given the most ample
opportunity to present all defenses, arguments and evidence
that he wanted to present for the consideration of this Court.
The Court did not summarily impose punishment upon the
respondent which it could have done under Section 1 of Rule
71 of the Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to consider
respondent's acts as constituting "direct contempt."
2. In his point C, respondent's counsel argues that it was "error
for this Court to charge respondent under Rule 139 (b) and
not 139 of the Revised Rules of Court."
In its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule 139 (b)
of the Revised Rules of Court pointing out that:
[R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is
not mandatory upon the Supreme Court such reference to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is
certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule
139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the
charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court.
The above statement was made by the Court in response to
respondent's motion for referral of this case either to the
Solicitor General or to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
under Rule 139 (b). Otherwise, there would have been no
need to refer to Rule 139 (b). It is thus only necessary to point
out that under the old rule, Rule 139, referral to the Solicitor
General was similarly not an exclusive procedure and was not
the only course of action open to the Supreme Court. It is well
to recall that under Section 1 (entitled "Motion or complaint")
of Rule 139, "Proceedings for the removal or suspension of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court, (1) on its own
motion, or (2) upon the complaint under oath of another in
writing" (Parentheses supplied). The procedure described in
Sections 2 et seq. of Rule 139 is the procedure provided for
suspension or disbarment proceedings initiated upon sworn
complaint of another person, rather than a procedure required
for proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court on its own
motion. It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would
initiate motu proprio proceedings for which it did not find
probable cause to proceed against an attorney. Thus, there is
no need to refer a case to the Solicitor General, which referral
is made "for investigation to determine if there is sufficient
ground to proceed with the prosecution of the respondent"
(Section 3, Rule 139), where the Court itself has initiated
against the respondent. The Court may, of course, refer a
case to the Solicitor General if it feels that, in a particular case,
further factual investigation is needed. In the present case, as
pointed out in the per curiam Resolution of the Court (page
18), there was "no need for further investigation of facts in the
present case for it [was] not substantially disputed by
respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain
statements attributed to him" and that "in any case,
respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present his
defense: his defense is not that he did not make the
statements ascribed to him but that those statements give rise
to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of
his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be
resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the
Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such
issues."
In this connection, we note that the quotation in page 7 of the
Motion for Reconsideration is from a dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Black in Green v. United State. 1 It may be pointed out
that the majority in Green v. United States, through Mr. Justice
Harlan, held, among other things, that: Federal courts do not
lack power to impose sentences in excess of one year for
criminal contempt; that criminal contempts are not subject to
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 166
jury trial as a matter of constitutional right; nor does the (US)
Constitution require that contempt subject to prison terms of
more than one year be based on grand jury indictments.
In his concurring opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter said:
Whatever the conflicting views of scholars in construing more
or less dubious manuscripts of the Fourteenth Century, what
is indisputable is that from the foundation of the United States
the constitutionality of the power to punish for contempt
without the intervention of a jury has not been doubted. The
First Judiciary Act conferred such a power on the federal
courts in the very act of their establishment, 1 State 73, 83,
and of the Judiciary Committee of eight that reported the bill
to the Senate, five member including the chairman, Senator,
later to be Chief Justice, Ellsworth, had been delegates to the
Constitutional Convention (Oliver Ellsworth, Chairman,
William Paterson, Caleb Strong, Ricard Basett, William Few.
1 Annals of Cong 17). In the First Congress itself no less than
nineteen member including Madison who contemporaneously
introduced the Bill of Rights, had been delegates to the
Convention. And when an abuse under this power manifested
itself, and led Congress to define more explicitly the summary
power vested in the courts, it did not remotely deny the
existence of the power but merely defined the conditions for
its exercise more clearly, in an Act "declaratory of the law
concerning contempts of court." Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 4 Stat
487.
xxxxxxxxx
Nor has the constitutionality of the power been doubted by this
Court throughout its existence . In at least two score cases in
this Court, not to mention the vast mass of decisions in the
lower federal courts, the power to punish summarily has been
accepted without question. ... 2
To say that a judge who punishes a contemnor judges his own
cause, is simplistic at best. The judge who finds himself
compelled to exercise the power to punish for contempt does
so not really to avenge a wrong inflicted upon his own person;
rather he upholds and vindicates the authority, dignity and
integrity of the judicial institution and its claim to respectful
behaviour on the part of all persons who appears before it,
and most especially from those who are officers of the court.
3. In his point D, respondent counsel urges that it is error "for
this Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the
"clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt
charges."
The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of
"visible tendency," it was, more modestly, simply paraphrasing
Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which
penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."
The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by
respondent's counsel is not a magic incantation which
dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis and
judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free
speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a defendant
the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of impending
apocalypse. The clear and present danger" doctrine has been
an accepted method for marking out the appropriate limits of
freedom of speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is
not, however, the only test which has been recognized and
applied by courts. In Logunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, 3 this
Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera said:
...The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupies a
preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties" (Philippine
Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 191 [1963]. It is not,
however, without limitations. As held in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:
"From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it
would appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation.
No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and
of the press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude
however, a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not
an absolute. It would be too much to insist that all times and
under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and
unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for
recognition."
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger
rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible
limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which
includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television
and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests test" (Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando on the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed.,
p. 79). The principle "requires a court to take conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable
in a given situation or type of situation (Separate Opinion of
the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, supra, p. 899). (Emphasis Supplied) 4
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the
"balancing-of-interest test," we believe that the statements
here made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and
were made in such a manner and under such circumstances,
as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. This
conclusion was implicit in the per curiam Resolution of
October 7, 1988. It is important to point out that the
"substantive evil" which the Supreme Court has a right and a
duty to prevent does not, in the instant case, relate to threats
of physical disorder or overt violence or similar disruptions of
public order. 5 What is here at stake is the authority of the
Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil"
consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing
of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil
of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the
destruction of the standards of professional conduct required
from members of the bar and officers of the courts. The
"substantive evil" here involved, in other words, is not as
palpable as a threat of public disorder or rioting but is certainly
no less deleterious and more far reaching in its implications
for society.
4. In his point H, respondent's counsel argues that it is error
"for this Court to hold that intent is irrelevant in charges of
misconduct." What the Court actually said on this point was:
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and
denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the respondent are
irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or
misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to
disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and acts. It
is, upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out that the
respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and
exhibited no repentance (Resolution, p. 7; footnotes omitted).
The actual subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant
because such subjectivities (understood as pyschological
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 167

phenomena) cannot be ascertained and reached by the

processes of this Court. Human intent can only be shown
derivatively and implied from an examination of acts and
statements. Thus, what the Court was saying was that
respondent's disclaimer of an intent to attack and denigrate
the Court, cannot prevail over the plain import of what he did
say and do. Respondent cannot negate the clear import of his
acts and statements by simply pleading a secret intent or state
of mind incompatible with those acts or statements. It is
scarcely open to dispute that, e.g., one accused of homicide
cannot successfully deny his criminal intent by simply
asserting that while he may have inserted a knife between the
victim's ribs, he actually acted from high motives and kind
feelings for the latter.

5 In his point 1, respondent's counsel argues that it is error

"for this Court to punish respondent for contempt of court for
out of court publications."

Respondent's counsel asks this Court to follow what he

presents as alleged modern trends in the United Kingdom and
in the United States concerning the law of contempt. We are,
however, unable to regard the texts that he cites as binding or
persuasive in our jurisdiction. The Court went to some length
to document the state of our case law on this matter in its per
curiam Resolution. There is nothing in the circumstances of
this case that would suggest to this Court that that case law,
which has been followed for at least half a century or so, ought
to be reversed.

6. In his point J, respondent's counsel pleads that the

imposition of indefinite suspension from the practice of law
constitutes "cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment". The
Court finds it difficult to consider this a substantial
constitutional argument. The indefiniteness of the
respondent's suspension, far from being "cruel" or "degrading"
or "inhuman," has the effect of placing, as it were, the key to
the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his
own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving respondent
the chance to purge himself in his own good time of his
contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such
misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and
demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the
exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from every
member of the bar and officer of the courts.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion for

Reconsideration for lack of merit. The denial is FINAL.

The Court also NOTED the Ex-Parte Manifestation and

Motion, dated October 25, 1988 and the Supplemental
Manifestation, dated October 27, 1988, filed by respondent

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,

Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 168
Resolution March 18, 1954
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of
Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and
Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so
much public interest and concern as Republic Act No.
972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953."
Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in
order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be
deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all
subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject."
(Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering
the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held
since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the
examination papers were graded, this court passed and
admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an
average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70
per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953,
the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those
reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious
of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note
to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained
averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to
the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the
passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced
the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per
cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views
of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven
members of the court subscribed to and submitted written
comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the
President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto.
Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the
members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on
the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on
June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which
incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as
follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR
EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section
fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the
Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general
average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July
fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August
nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one
per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar
examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations;
seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar
examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty
per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe
the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine
Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any
exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as
one and included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-
five per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July
fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to
have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or
grades shall be included in computing the passing general
average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar
candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its
provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their
examination papers were still pending also invoked the
aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are
also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of
their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To
avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed
the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not
they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the
court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to
be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No.
972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all
concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete
list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this
decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of
Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as
Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the
law, the following statistical data are set forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited
by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified as
follows:
1946 (August) 206 121 18
1946 (November) 477 228 43
1947 749 340 0
1948 899 409 11
1949 1,218 532 164
1950 1,316 893 26
1951 2,068 879 196
1952 2,738 1,033 426
1953 2,555 968 284
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 169
TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168
Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent
examination, and only 586 have filed either motions for
admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere
motions for reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to
be benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These
candidates had each taken from two to five different
examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any of
them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different
subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they
would be sufficient to reach the passing average as provided
for by Republic Act No. 972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this
Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed
petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to
1951 had individually presented motions for reconsideration
which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of
1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which
are still pending because they could be favorably affected by
Republic Act No. 972, — although as has been already stated,
this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their
grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching
effects on the practice of the legal profession and the
administration of justice, and because some doubts have
been expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing of
the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is
constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the
brilliant assistance of the members of the bar who have amply
argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which
the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs.
E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and
Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law,
and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor
General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando,
Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario,
Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman
Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for
petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R.
Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera,
Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in
this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted
almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the
matter. The question has been the object of intense
deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after
the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was
assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as
possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author,
to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from
insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill,
its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing
grade is the tremendous handicap which students during the
years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to
overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and
the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law
soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946
to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in addition
604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094),
because they suffered from "insufficiency of reading
materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest
because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had
inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as
was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid
examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession
adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as
legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An
adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the
practice of law that should be developed constantly and
maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the
protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve
officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to
dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a
serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was
an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly
exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of
this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available
to the public during those years and private enterprises had
also published them in monthly magazines and annual
digests. The Official Gazette had been published
continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have
entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some
even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed
locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports
began to be published since 1946, which continued to be
supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are
facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has
to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the
point of view of applicable principles, but the resolution of the
question would have been easier had an identical case of
similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we
daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon
legal history, from which has been directly derived the judicial
system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress
of the United States, and which we have preserved and
attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial
history of more than half a century? From the citations of those
defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity
of a similar law had been sustained, while those against its
validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE
646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion
of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR
1061), of Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the
President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and
which the postponement of the contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in
other countries had been promulgated, the judiciary
immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not
within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed
law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined
carefully the case that has been cited to us as a favorable
precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the
Court of Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the
Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 170
be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a
statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College
promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the
Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the
state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time
provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public
trust. All votes for either of them for any elective office except
that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the
people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of
appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of
twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who
possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability,
shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this
State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the
constitutional precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of
appointing them had previously rested with the judges, and
this was the principal appointing power which they possessed.
The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in
which this power had been exercised, and with the restrictions
which the judges had imposed upon admission to practice
before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was
aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision"
expecting the admission of attorneys, in this particular section
of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with
the object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative
of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any
portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme
Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of the word
`admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the
admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means
to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily
implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of
determining whether the applicant possesses the requisite
qualifications to entitle him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the
validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision
seems to indicate that it provided that the possession of a
diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring
the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal
qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for
admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote
the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or
accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with
the Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals said of the
object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent.
Columbia College being an institution of established
reputation, and having a law department under the charge of
able professors, the students in which department were not
only subjected to a formal examination by the law committee
of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study before
being entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature
evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this examination,
together with the preliminary study required by the act, as fully
equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary
examination by the court; and as rendering the latter
examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study
was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning
and ability of the applicant, and for the mere purpose of
substituting the examination by the law committee of the
college for that of the court. It could have had no other object,
and hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions.
We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to
dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the
Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate
an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire
as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting
a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act
admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma
competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the
applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as
a modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in
connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself
in order to determine the present condition of the law on the
subject. (p.89)
xxx xxx xxx
The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction
over the question of admission, that has simply prescribed
what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that
question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of
Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please note only
the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate
of Columbia College who failed in the bar examinations be
admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of
Cooper, has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the
question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not
decree the admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the
Philippines are entirely different on the matter of admission of
the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been disputably a judicial function and
responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and
zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have
been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which
certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering
the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal,
alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court
regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment
and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative
function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable.
The function requires (1) previously established rules and
principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present,
affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles;
in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it
becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if
previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same
individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 171
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has
been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and
reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious
study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of State
vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a
legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to
practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this
decision we quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without
parallel in the history of the English speaking people so far as
we have been able to ascertain. There has been much
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to
prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has
been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of
admission has always been regarded as a judicial function.
This act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law,
and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of legislative
power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a
Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the
prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are
legislative in character, the Legislature is acting within its
constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes such
qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications
which in its judgment will serve the purpose of legitimate
legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other
and further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or
exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments
are distinct, independent, and coordinate branches of the
government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of
sovereignty which properly belongs to its department. Neither
department should so act as to embarrass the other in the
discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme
and thought of the people setting upon the form of government
under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525;
Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p.
445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for the
plane upon which the administration of justice is maintained.
Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By committing a
portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department
of our state government, under 42a scheme which it was
supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment or
interference by any other department of government, the
courts cannot escape responsibility fir the manner in which the
powers of sovereignty thus committed to the judicial
department are exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate
relationship. The bar is an attache of the courts. The quality of
justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree
upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring
scandal and reproach to the administration of justice and bring
the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe
supervision over their bars, at least in the English speaking
countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than
six centuries prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the
courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament
since the Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of
determining who should be admitted to the practice of law,
which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6
Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all
titles." If the courts and judicial power be regarded as an entity,
the power to determine who should be admitted to practice
law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to
isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a
part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element
of the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a
power belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a
sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent,
and coordinate branch of the government. They took this
institution along with the power traditionally exercise to
determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is
no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an
intent that this traditional power of the judicial department
should in any manner be subject to legislative control.
Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our
constitution was to make the three great departments of
government separate and independent of one another. The
idea that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial
department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for
attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of
making the judicial independent of the legislative department,
and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of
express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may
legislate with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is
incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to
protect the public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a
standard of qualifications required of attorneys at law in order
that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do
not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class
from which the court must make its selection. Such legislative
qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications
beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional
qualifications deemed necessary by the course of the proper
administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative
power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed
by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at
law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of
appointment. It is quite likely true that the legislature may
exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of
a legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh
unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of
law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey
(In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our
investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to
practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the
court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How.
9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366;
Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs.
Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs.
Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20
Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been
perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so
generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney
to practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this
on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any
one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that
the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely
judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the
qualifications may reside. (p. 451)
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 172
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the Senate of
that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to
interpretation of the laws that there be members of the bar of
sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral
character. This arises from the need of enlightened assistance
to the honest, and restraining authority over the knavish,
litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected
from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity
for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in
People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162
N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a
privilege burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar
"for something more than private gain." He becomes an
"officer of the court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the
court is due "whenever justice would be imperiled if
cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at law the
judicial department of government would be hampered in the
performance of its duties. That has been the history of
attorneys under the common law, both in this country and
England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost
without exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition
to that end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking
judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made
open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its
records. The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial
department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of
its powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an
inherent power of such a department of government ultimately
to determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to
practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect
itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient
learning, and those not possessing good moral character.
Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex
parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been
well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts,
that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is
qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and
counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed."
(p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition
to secure license to practice the legal profession by virtue of a
law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366,
the court, holding the test oath for attorneys to be
unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office
as follows: "They are officers of the court, admitted as such by
its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal
learning and fair private character. It has always been the
general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an
examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the
admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to
which they, respectively, belong for, three years preceding
their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the
possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement
of counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that
their private and professional character is fair. The order of
admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess
the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and
are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein.
From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and are
responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their
office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for
misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the
court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte
Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a
mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and
has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the
court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application
of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys
and Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the
court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to
proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment
may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter,
in performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged
in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-
651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception
conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function,
and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this
point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the
exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court. — Re
Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial
function, and is an inherent power of the court. — A.C.
Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See
Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to
bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the
functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the
government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the
judicial departments is that it is the province of the legislature
to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of
transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action,
while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with
reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist
at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction
is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by
legislative action or by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded
by either of the other departments of the government. — 16
C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the
courts by requiring of them construction of the law according
to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by
settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new
trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what
particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial
inquiry. — Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar
examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per
cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be
admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not
a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting
the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court
certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable
reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the
legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any
attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a
clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in
question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to
repeal, alter or supplement the rule promulgated by this
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 173
Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is
no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution
provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade
and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are
hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court,
subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify
the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter,
or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec.
13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on
Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning
the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and
responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to
reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has
not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing
over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may
repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this
Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law
and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court.
The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not
signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of
this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter.
The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may
admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law,
or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its
power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing
rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a
better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power
does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit,
suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise
the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to
promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the practice
of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and
supplement them may and should be exercised with the
respect that each owes to the other, giving careful
consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each
department requires. These powers have existed together for
centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious
delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should
examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar
respond to the demands which public interest requires of a
Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal,
amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it
may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent
responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice
and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession,
should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for
the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these
reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its
traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and
reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers
which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not
repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in
attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the
increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of
justice.
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our
criterion. Guariña took examination and failed by a few points
to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law
provided that one who had been appointed to the position of
Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a
previous examination. The Government appointed Guariña
and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province.
This tribunal refused to give his license without previous
examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the
applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar, without
taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds
the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as
follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered
One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the
Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and
orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the
United States and are in good and regular standing as
members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this code; Provided, That any person who, prior to
the passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have
held, under the authority of the United States, the position of
justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First
Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land
Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of
Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney
General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney
General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city
attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial
fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for
the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the
courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon
motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact
to the satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion
this appellant took, and failed to pass the prescribed
examination. The report of the examining board, dated March
23, 1907, shows that he received an average of only 71 per
cent in the various branches of legal learning upon which he
was examined, thus falling four points short of the required
percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance
of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this
affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the
required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when
he presented his former application for admission to the bar,
we should grant him license to practice law in the courts of
these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his
failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now
"possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and
ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited
statute the applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted to the
bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion
before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof
that he has held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of
the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the
object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in
enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute,
and in view of the context generally and especially of the fact
that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 174
of the original Act which specifically provides for the admission
of certain candidates without examination. It is contented that
this mandatory construction is imperatively required in order
to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to
the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the
Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No.
136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by
the commission and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress
would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that
under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word
"may," as used in the above citation from Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining
or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to that
extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and
authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were
appointed to the positions enumerated, and with particular
emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to
the bar under the provisions of this statute have been
considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such
appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the
qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we had
reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing
attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively
appears that the applicant was not and never had been
practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the
date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further
affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required
qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to
the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that
occasion, we do not think that his appointment to the office of
provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession
of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We
conclude therefore that this application for license to practice
in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the
examination he fell only four points short of the necessary
grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also
of the fact that since that time he has held the responsible
office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and
presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the
performance of the duties of that office that the Chief
Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine
Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service
by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we
would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No.
1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination
prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory
evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will
be given him by a committee of the court upon his application
therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do,
to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations
prescribed by general rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license
for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and
the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the
minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon,
has been found also to suffer from the fatal defect of being a
class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a
classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899
required of the Supreme Court, until December 31 of that year,
to grant license for the practice of law to those students who
began studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for
two years and presented a diploma issued by a school of law,
or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an
examination, or to those who had studied for three years if
they commenced their studies after the aforementioned date.
The Supreme Court declared that this law was
unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The
Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of
this state by virtue of diplomas from law schools issued to the
applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899,
under which the application is made, is entitled "An act to
amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in
relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28,
1884, in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it
appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the
section of the following: "And every application for a license
who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard
to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant
commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law
school or college, shall be granted a license under this act
notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules". — In
re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch
of which is that up to December 31, 1899, this court shall grant
a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every
diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly
organized under the laws of this state, whose regular course
of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the
student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and
showing that the student began the study of law prior to
November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of
good moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that
any student who has studied law for two years in a law office,
or part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid
law school," and whose course of study began prior to
November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory
examination by the examining board in the branches now
required by the rules of this court. If the right to admission
exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed,
confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons
named therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for
their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is
clearly a special legislation, prohibited by the constitution, and
invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit
attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the
administration of justice, and could prescribe the character of
evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive
of the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law,
it could only be done by a general law, persons or classes of
persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is a
privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an
officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to appear
for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and
creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 175
arrest on civil process while attending court. The law
conferring such privileges must be general in its operation. No
doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that
purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing
classes in general, and has some reasonable relation to the
end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a
reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation to
the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People,
147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E.
454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill
acquired by experience, may furnish a basis for classification
(Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place
where such physician has resided and practiced his
profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary
discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State
vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature
undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the
profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must have
some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in
such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons
who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This
class is subdivided into two classes — First, those presenting
diplomas issued by any law school of this state before
December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law for
the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a
law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted
upon examination in the subjects specified in the present rules
of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to
be no limit of time for making application for admission. As to
both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed with,
and as between the two different conditions and limits of time
are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school,
but a diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of
course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can
there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness
of persons to practice law resting upon the mere date of
November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification.
Plainly not. Those who began the study of law November 4th
could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as
those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the
proviso need spend only two years in study, while those who
commenced the next day must spend three years, although
they would complete two years before the time limit. The one
who commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to
be admitted without examination before December 31, 1899,
and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the
other the prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma
is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any
natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought,
and none is suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of
bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-
648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240
N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by law to reinstate
Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards
to its aspect of being a class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted
that the legislature has power to prescribe ultimately and
definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and
license those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not
be exercised in the manner here attempted. That power must
be exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike
and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of
the Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to
pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent.
vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L.
Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the
United States to follow any lawful calling, business or
profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as
are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition."
This right may in many respects be considered as a
distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all
vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may
be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of
study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The
interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in
them — that is, the right to continue their prosecution — is
often of great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily
taken from them, any more than their real or personal property
can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of
government that all similarly situated and possessing equal
qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes
regulating the practice of medicine, requiring medications to
establish the possession on the part of the application of his
proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice,
have been challenged, and courts have seriously considered
whether the exemption from such examinations of those
practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law
rendered such law unconstitutional because of infringement
upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C.
643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs.
Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom,
122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon
him the right to practice law and to constitute him an officer of
this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is
not material that he had once established his right to practice
law and that one time he possessed the requisite learning and
other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no
matter affect the power of the Legislature to select from the
great body of the public an individual upon whom it would
confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424)
commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the practice of law
without examination, all who had served in the military or naval
forces of the United States during the World War and received
a honorable discharge therefrom and who (were disabled
therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress
approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act,
1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent
thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This Act
was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated
the quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In re
Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W.
179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable
is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities
that a classification to be valid must rest upon material
differences between the person included in it and those
excluded and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial
distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the
constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and
real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial
ones. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class
of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference
between the situation of that class and other individuals to
which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on
which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such
a difference between the situation and circumstances of all the
members of the class and the situation and circumstances of
all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the
discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 176
for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in
their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it
operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial
reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not
generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade
below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a general
average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to
1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those
will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955,
will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath
of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules
require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has
been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the
nature indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this
classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then
the classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the
years before, with the general average indicated, were not
included because the Tribunal has no record of the
unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not
justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful
candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954,
1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said
years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this
Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not
signify that no one concerned may prove by some other
means his right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared
unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is argued that
it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What
does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949
were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to
the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average
of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent;
in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948,
70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953,
those who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the
Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules,
by reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently
justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during
those years were all that could be objected to or criticized.
Now, it is desired to undo what had been done — cancel the
license that was issued to those who did not obtain the
prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law
clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves
what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress
lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent
obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as
sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack
of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured,
and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the
disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954
and 1955, increasing each year the general average by one
per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to
the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best
proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not
the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court,
by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what
the Tribunal should have done during those years according
to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power
exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules,
which continue in force. What was done was to stop or
suspend them. And this power is not included in what the
Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within
the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the
judiciary, to which such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of
examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of this
system is that it does not take into account that the laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate finally
receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws
and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in
this manner his usefulness. The system that the said law
prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this
country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages.
In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not
expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946
to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system
for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article
VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2
completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is
obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first,
because they are not within the legislative powers of Congress
to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second,
because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms
that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their
purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic
principles. As has already been seen, the contested law
suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that
Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void,
and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to
wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates
who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it
admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as
was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It
decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates,
depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they
are at present already prepared to become members of the
Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to
reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest
encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the
Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution
of this Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without
having examined their respective examination papers, and
although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said
resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court
and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it
directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative
power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission
to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they
ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its
promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the
practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as
minimum norms towards that end in the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the
Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily
performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy
administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and
inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the
ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue
in the practice of law according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of
candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts which
are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission
to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 177

pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class Number of candidates whose grades were raised
legislation. 12

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title 73'S 6
of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being
inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is 72'S 6
void.
Number of candidates who passed 85
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of
article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said
part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in Number of candidates who failed 121
those years, shall continue in force.
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972
RESOLUTION 18

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and Percentage of success (per cent) 41.62
availing of the magnificent and impassioned discussion of the
contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of Percentage of failure (per cent) 58.74
the debate among the members of the Court, and after
hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved Passing grade (per cent) 72
colleagues who since the beginning have announced their
decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of
the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and November, 1946
resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the
authority of the same: Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946,
except Hon. Jose Teodoro who was substituted by Atty.
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 Honesto K. Bausan.
referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of
article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void Number of candidates 481
and without force and effect.
Number of candidates whose grades were raised
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of 19
article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to the
approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid
(72 per cent and above 73 per cent ---
and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10,
article VII of the Constitution.
Minutes of March 31, 1947)
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the
candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 Number of candidates who passed 249
inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per Number of candidates who failed 228
cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any
subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972
filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has
43
become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe
the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the
date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered. Percentage of success (per cent) 52.20

Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Percentage of failure (per cent) 47.80
Reyes, JJ., concur.
Passing grade
ANNEX I
(By resolution of the Court). (per cent) 72
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
October, 1947
A resume‚ of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations
of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows: Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon.
Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon
August, 19461 Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa, Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon.
Emilio Peña, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado,
Members.
Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof.
Gerardo Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin
Ramirez, Atty. Crispin Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Number of candidates 749
Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez Cardenas, and Hon.
Bienvenido A. Tan, members. Number of candidates whose grades were raised
43
Number of candidates 206
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 178

70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per cent 1 Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Federico Agrava,
Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty.
Emeterio Barcelon, Members.
69 per cent 40
Number of candidates 1,218
68 per cent 2
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's)
Number of candidates who passed 409 55

Number of candidates who failed 340 Number of candidates who passed 686

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 Number of candidates who failed 532
972
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972
Percentage of success (per cent) 54.59 164

Percentage of failure (per cent) 45.41 Percentage of success (per cent) 56.28

Passing grade (per cent) 69 Percentage of failure (per cent) 43.72

(by resolution of the Court). Passing grade (per cent) 74

Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and (by resolution of the Court).
68.1 per cent respectively, the Court found out that they were
not benefited at all by the bonus of 12 points given by the August, 1950
Examiner in Civil Law.
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon.
August, 1948 Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P.
Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta,
Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Francisco A. Delgado, Hon.
Chairman Hon. Luis P. Torres, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.
Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Macario
Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael Amparo, Atty. Number of candidates 1,316
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.
Number of candidates whose grades were raised
Number of candidates 899 38

Number of candidates whose grades were raised (The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by
64 recommendation and authority

71's 29 of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).

70's 35 Number of candidates who passed 432

Number of candidates who passed 490 Number of candidates who failed 894

Number of candidates who failed 409 Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972
26
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972
11 Percentage of success (per cent) 32.14

Percentage of success (per cent) 62.40 Percentage of failure (per cent) 67.86

Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.60 Passing grade (per cent) 75

Passing grade (per cent) 70 August, 1951

(by resolution of the Court).
August, 1949
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon.
Fernando Jugo, Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty. Salvador
Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon.
Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim,
Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz,
Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Members.
Number of candidates 2,068
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 179

Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) Percentage of failure (per cent) 38.96
112
Passing grade (per cent) 75
Number of candidates who passed 1,189
A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic
Number of candidates who failed 879 Act No. 972, grouped by the years in which they took the bar
examinations, with annotations as to who had presented
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 motions for reconsideration which were denied (MRD), and
196 who filed mere motions for reconsideration without invoking
said law, which are still pending, follows:
Percentage of success (per cent) 57.49
PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW
Percentage of failure (per cent) 42.51
Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol.
Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen. Av.
Passing grade (per cent) 75
MRD- 1. Agunod, Filemon L. 66 71 61
August, 1952 76 80 83 73 75 71.4

Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. MRD- 2. Cunanan, Albino 76 72 74 75
Pastor M. Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. Francisco 70 70 65 72 71.45
Ortigas, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso
Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr.,
Members. MRD- 3. Mejia, Flaviano V. 64 64 65 68
83 74 68 80 69.85
Number of candidates 2,738
1948
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's)
163 MRD- 4. Orlina, Soledad R. 71 68 66
75 63 75 70 88 69.9
Number of candidates who passed 1,705
MRD- 5. Vivero, Antonio Lu. 75 73 73
65 63 66 65 80 69.95
Number of candidates who failed 1,033
MRD- 6. Gatchalian, Salud 72 66 71 75
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 78 68 65 50 69.65
426
1949
Percentage of success (per cent) 62.27
7. Abaya, Jesus A. 69 79 75 75
Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.73 71 89 55 75 70.8

Passing grade (per cent) 75 MRD- 8. Advincula, David D. 76 80 62

86 81 72 60 65 70.5
August, 1953
9. Agraviador, Alfredo L. 63 85 70
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. 77 80 81 65 80 71.8
Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco
Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. 10. Alacar, Pascual C. 61 63 83
Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Mariano L. de la 79 71 85 65 80 72.05
Rosa, Members.
11. Amog, Pedro M. 75 66 76 78
Number of candidates 2,555 81 74 55 85 72.2

Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 12. Apolinario, Miguel S. 75 84 78
100 78 70 70 60 75 71.95

Number of candidates who passed 1,570 13. Aquino, Maximo G. 82 77 71

77 76 77 60 75 73.15
Number of candidates who failed 986
14. Asinas, Candido D. 75 83 69
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 80 81 83 55 85 72.65
284
15. Baldivino, Jose B. 75 65 72 82
Percentage of success (per cent) 61.04 82 69 60 80 71.95
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 180

16. Balintona, Bernardo 75 80 64 37. Garcia, Freidrich M. 76 80 66

78 74 67 65 70 70 75 72 70 60 75 69.7

17. Banawa, Angel L. 78 70 70 75 38. Garcia, Julian L. 64 77 68 82

81 83 60 60 72.3 89 77 65 75 72.15

18. Bandala, Anacleto A. 66 80 66 39. Garcia, Leon Mo. 77 86 71 80

71 93 72 55 70 69.6 60 82 65 75 71.85

19. Bandon, Alawadin L. 74 79 69 40. Garcia, Pedro V. 76 82 73 81

77 91 73 60 80 73.35 74 83 60 85 73.6

20. Baquero, Benjamin 76 79 64 41. Garcia, Santiago C. 62 91 79

77 85 72 65 75 72.5 75 72 75 65 80 71.8

21. Blanco, Jose 75 75 70 75 42. Genoves, Pedro 75 83 70 78

77 76 60 90 72.5 87 76 55 80 72.7

22. Buenaluz, Victoriano T. 75 71 72 43. Gonzales, Amado P. 75 71 71

78 67 82 60 75 70.85 75 86 75 60 75 72.65

23. Canda, Benjamin S. 75 72 75 44. Guia, Odon R. de 77 76 66 81

82 76 77 65 75 73.55 74 76 60 75 70.9

24. Canon, Guillermo 77 86 67 88 45. Fernandez, Simeon 62 68 71

75 69 70 85 73.9 80 74 90 65 75 70.85

25. Carlos, Estela S. 75 81 81 79 46. Jakosalem, Filoteo 82 83 73

72 73 65 70 73.8 82 61 87 65 70 73.6

26. Cerezo, Gregorio O. 69 76 76 47. Jesus, Felipe D. de 75 83 67

79 71 80 55 80 70.4 79 78 85 60 75 72.45

27. Clarin, Manuel L. 75 82 76 81 48. Jocom, Jacobo M. 77 77 74

73 69 70 75 73.95 77 74 64 55 85 70.65

28. Claudo, Conrado O. 76 62 78 49. Juares, Nicolas 77 84 56 76

77 73 72 60 70 71.4 73 82 60 85 70

29. Condevillamar, Antonio V. 68 65 74 50. Kalalang, Remigio 65 75 74

80 85 75 60 75 71.65 80 70 70 65 85 70.3

MRD- 30. Cornejo, Crisanto R. 72 75 51. Layumas, Vicente L. 67 84 65

69 82 83 79 65 80 75 89 66 60 80 70.3
73.4
52. Leyson, Amancio F. 69 83 75
31. Corona, Olvido D. 68 76 73 81 76 81 75 65 75 73.15
81 72 60 75 71.15
53. Libanan, Marcelino 71 83 61
32. Dizon, Marcial C. 76 86 69 83 77 80 81 65 85 71.75
75 74 65 80 73.1
54. Lim, Jose E. 77 77 72 76
33. Enriquez, Agustin P. 75 77 70 72 64 65 70 71.15
81 81 77 65 80 73.75
55. Lim, Jose F. 70 75 62 83
34. Espiritu, Irineo E. 80 88 69 75 80 71 65 80 70.4
76 77 65 75 73.8
56. Linao, Mariano M. 66 84 76
35. Fernandez, Macario J. 63 82 76 78 80 75 60 75 71.75
75 81 84 65 75 72.95
57. Lopez, Angelo P. 67 81 75 72
36. Gallardo, Amando C. 78 79 67 79 81 55 80 71
77 76 75 60 65 70.95
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 181

58. Lopez, Eliezar M. 77 75 60 75 79. Rodil, Francisco C. 68 69 70

77 85 60 75 70.7 81 76 75 65 75 70.75

59. Lopez, Nicanor S. 72 71 70 78 80. Rodriguez, Mariano I. 80 75 69

77 84 60 75 71.55 80 72 80 65 80 73.35

60. Manoleto, Proceso D. 72 70 65 81. Romero, Crispulo P. 78 75 66

78 81 90 60 80 71.95 77 76 83 65 75 72.85

61. Mancao, Alfredo P. 67 64 71 82. Saez, Porfirio D. 75 75 72 81

83 76 76 65 80 70.95 69 77 60 75 71

62. Manera, Mariano A. 75 78 75 83. Saliguma, Crisogono D. 79 79 74

75 68 79 60 65 71 78 69 65 65 70 71.8

63. Mercado, Arsenio N. 67 64 71 84. Samano, Fortunato A. 75 84 72

83 76 76 65 80 70.95 77 70 82 60 75 71.9

64. Miranda, Benjamin G. 76 81 67 85. Santos, Faustina C. 71 68 68

82 74 77 65 80 72.55 76 75 85 55 75 69.5

65. Manad, Andres B. 77 75 68 86. Santos, Josefina R. 68 69 76

82 69 72 65 75 71.15 71 77 82 65 75 72.3

1948 87. Seludo, Ananias G. 75 80 69

79 77 82 65 75 73.25
66. Orosco, Casimiro P. 72 84 69
81 70 82 65 75 71.9 88. Semilia, Rafael I. 68 85 55 83
89 79 65 80 71.25
67. Padua, Manuel C. 76 76 68
80 79 79 50 75 70.1 89. Telan, Gaudencio 77 79 70 75
70 75 60 75 70.85
68. Palang, Basilio S. 71 75 82 71
55 87 55 75 69.6 90. Tesorero, Leocadio T. 75 71 63
75 82 62 65 63 69.65
69. Palma, Cuadrato 62 75 69 93
80 79 55 80 69.5 91. Torre, Valentin S. de la 85 81 71
76 69 65 55 70 70.4
70. Pañganiban, Jose V. 67 83 61
81 91 74 60 75 70.6 92. Torres, Ariston L. 78 71 72 81
61 84 55 85 70.4
71. Pareja, Felipe 66 71 75 81
67 74 60 70 68.75 93. Veyra, Zosimo C. de 70 75 71
79 65 80 65 80 70.65
72. Patalinjug, Eriberto 73 77 78
73 78 71 55 75 71.25 94. Viado, Jose 67 70 74 75
75 90 55 80 70.7
73. Paulin, Jose C. 66 69 71 77
83 82 65 75 72.1 95. Villacarlos, Delfin A. 73 87 71
82 69 70 75 85 73.85
74. Pido, Serafin C. 72 78 63 80
71 85 70 80 72.05 96. Villamil, Leonor S. 73 81 76
86 86 73 55 85 73.6
75. Pimentel, Luis P. 77 75 76 81
76 68 55 80 71.6 97. Zabala, Amando A. 76 70 67
75 76 76 60 75 70.6
76. Plantilla, Rodrigo C. 72 78 68
89 79 81 65 85 73.55 1950

77. Regalario, Benito B. 72 80 64 MRD-98. Cruz, Filomeno de la 70 71

80 75 81 55 80 69.55 78 81 76 72 64 96
73.4
78. Robis, Casto P. 62 77 74 73
68 80 70 80 70.9
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 182

99. Española, Pablo S. 71 78 55 119. Biason, Sixto F. 73 82 67 65

76 85 69 65 93 70.2 66 72 77 68 71.25

100. Foronda, Clarencio J. 60 78 68 MRD-120. Briñas, Isagani A. 71 69 74

79 84 88 62 93 71.9 70 76 52 79 72 71.95

101. Hechanova, Vicente 59 76 75 121. Buela, Arcadio P. 72 77 61 70

75 69 68 75 96 71.3 71 58 79 71 69.75

MRD-102. Peñalosa, Osias R. 80 78 122. Cabilao, Leonardo S. 73 50 75

61 76 61 77 66 85 75 75 60 71 79 71.25
70.2
123. Cabrera, Ireneo M. 75 66 70
103. Sarmiento, Floro A. 65 86 63 65 72 81 70 79 72.4
82 89 72 60 72 70.15
124. Cacacho, Emilio V.
MRD-104. Torre, Catalino P. 75 85 68
78 69 67 65 69 70.25
125. Calilung, Soledad C. 64 73 73
105. Ungson, Fernando S. 61 87 75 80 73 57 75 59 69.65
70 57 85 83 82 72.8
MRD-126. Calimlim, Jose B. 64 73 73
1951 80 73 57 75 59 69.65

106. Abasolo, Romulo 77 70 64 65 127. Calimlim, Pedro B. 66 82 69

76 70 76 64 71.7 60 69 52 83 75 70

107. Adeva, Daniel G. 75 59 74 65 128. Camello, Sotero H. 70 77 63

69 51 78 67 70.4 65 75 66 84 64 71.55

108. Aguilar, Vicente Z. 73 63 68 129. Campos, Juan A. 71 88 70 75

75 70 69 75 75 71.25 64 69 71 62 70.15

109. Amodia, Juan T. 75 76 66 75 130. Castillo, Antonio del 78 78 70

76 60 77 76 72.35 60 79 67 69 76 72.65

MRD-110. Añosa, Pablo S. 76 78 63 MRD-131. Castillo, Dominador Ad. 75 61

75 74 61 75 79 71.6 72 75 74 71 67 66
71.1
111. Antiola, Anastacio R. 68 76 75
70 71 70 81 66 73.05 MRD-132. Castro, Jesus B. 72 86 72
75 65 75 76 71 72.85
112. Aquino, S. Rey A. 70 71 71 60
74 62 76 77 71.1 133. Casuga, Bienvenido B. 75 72 72
70 69 61 75 60 70.95
113. Atienza, Manuel G. 71 78 68
80 86 51 82 75 73.85 134. Cabangbang, Santiago B. 77 67 61
80 73 59 83 76 72.2
114. Avanceña, Alfonso 71 71 65
75 70 72 78 80 71.8 135. Cruz, Federico S. 69 74 75 75
68 65 76 70 71.65
MRD-115. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 73
75 70 72 65 75 76 136. Dacanay, Eufemio P. 70 73 62
73.25 75 72 69 85 71 72.05

116. Barinaga, Jeremias L. 68 69 73 137. Deysolong, Felisberto 66 62 72

70 74 50 80 79 71.2 75 70 62 83 62 70.85

MRD-117. Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 60 MRD-138. Dimaano, Jr., Jose N. 78 79

67 55 74 63 77 62 63 75 73 75 81 59
70.25 73.5

MRD-118. Benitez, Tomas P. 67 75 139. Espinosa, Domingo L. 78 63 58

75 60 73 72 75 78 70 70 67 87 63 71.6
72.2
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 183

MRD-140. Farol, Evencia C. 80 78 66 MRD-161. Magsino, Encarnacion 77 66

75 81 72 62 73 72.25 70 70 76 71 75 61
72.75
141. Felix, Conrado S. 71 71 75 65
70 58 75 69 70.75 MRD-162. Maligaya, Demetrio M. 70 61
75 65 75 50 91 51
142. Fernan, Pablo L. 67 88 66 85 72.3
73 68 78 75 72.35
163. Manio, Gregorio 67 67 69 80
143. Gandioco, Salvador G. 64 58 66 71 67 75 75 70.65
65 76 70 89 75 72.1
164. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 82 60
144. Gastardo, Crispin B. 70 69 68 60 69 70 68 72 62.05
75 78 66 86 72 73.9
MRD-165. Marcial, Meynardo R. 66 75
145. Genson, Angelo B. 75 57 73 74 70 75 67 81 75
65 67 54 78 56 69.55 73.15

146. Guiani, Guinald M. 68 60 75 166. Martin, Benjamin S. 68 72 63

65 74 67 75 77 71.5 75 69 63 84 62 70.1

147. Guina, Graciano P. 66 69 67 MRD-167. Monterroyo, Catalina S. 70 80

60 78 52 83 61 69.6 75 80 76 66 82 51
73.95
MRD-148. Homeres, Praxedes P. 74 74
75 75 71 69 75 71 MRD-168. Montero, Leodegario C. 73 67
73.35 66 80 81 65 81 75
73.75
149. Ibarra, Venancio M. 60 75 74
70 74 70 80 75 71.9 169. Monzon, Candido T. 70 72 74
75 67 70 77 69 72.05
150. Imperial, Monico L. 72 78 75
75 72 56 82 77 73.7 170. Natividad, Alberto M. 73 79 68
65 73 69 75 79 72.2
MRD-151. Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 71 70
63 85 71 60 85 53 MRD-171. Navallo, Capistrano C. 70 72
70.85 68 85 81 66 71 74
72.1
152. Inandan, Fortunato C. 77 77 67
53 73 75 79 57 72.5 172. Nisce, Camilo Z. 66 66 75 65
79 68 85 62 73.5
153. Jimenez, Florencio C. 75 70 70
75 72 61 75 78 72.05 MRD-173. Ocampo, Antonio F. de 75 81
76 65 74 67 75 69
73.75
154. Kintanar, Woodrow M. 70 83 72
65 76 73 75 69 72.95
174. Olaviar, Jose O. 72 70 69 55
66 70 77 75 70.5
155. Languido, Cesar V. 63 71 63
85 70 61 85 79 70.55
MRD-175. Perez, Cesario Z. 75 76 66
80 72 63 82 69 72.95
156. Lavilles, Cesar L. 61 89 75 55
73 63 75 78 70.55
176. Pogado, Causin O. 70 66 65
70 75 64 75 70 69.95
157. Llenos, Francisco U. 64 70 65
60 72 65 92 75 71.75
177. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 75 73 62
65 78 59 75 66 70.2
158. Leon, Marcelo D. de 63 73 60
85 75 75 90 70 72.75
178. Recinto, Ireneo I. 73 76 68 75
74 68 80 53 72.3
159. Llanto, Priscilla 72 68 60 65
76 67 84 68 71.35
MRD-179. Redor, Francisco K. 62 77
73 75 69 64 76 69
160. Machachor, Oscar 68 59 78 70
70 67 57 75 75 70.15
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 184

MRD-180. Regis, Deogracias A. 76 74 201. Villagonzalo, Job R. 78 67 74

68 65 65 65 88 75 65 72 51 69 71 70.25
73.35
202. Villarama, Jr., Pedro 75 74 75
181. Rigor, Estelita C. 67 78 61 80 55 75 66 67 75 71.45
71 77 79 65 70.9
1952
MRD-182. Rimorin-Gordo, Estela 70 72
62 60 88 66 67 79 203. Abacon, Pablo 75 72 78 81
70.15 78 72 64 55 72.7

183. Rosario, Prisco del 70 64 70 MRP-204. Abad, Agapito 73 76 73

70 72 73 85 57 72.65 85 75 63 62 75 70.95

184. Rosario, Vicente D. del 75 91 65 MRP-205. Abella, Ludovico B. 70 81

75 68 68 79 62 72.2 76 81 70 66 77 58
72.7
185. Saavedra, Felipe 73 80 63 75
76 73 68 62 70.35 MRP-206. Abellera, Geronimo F. 75 79
79 87 76 51 63 70
186. Salazar, Alfredo N. 66 72 73 71.7
75 67 68 77 69 70.85
MRP-207. Abenojar, Agapito N. 71 72
187. Salem, Romulo R. 77 81 72 78 84 70 75 69 70
65 73 60 76 75 73 72.9

188. Foz, Julita A. 75 72 75 75 208. Alandy, Doroteo R. 64 83 93

65 70 76 64 72.5 91 68 59 60 60 71.2

189. Santa Ana, Candido T. 77 69 65 209. Alano, Fabian T. 70 83 61 83

75 81 75 70 75 73 72 87 72 70 71.9

190. Santos, Aquilino 72 66 69 65 MRP-210. Alcantara, Pablo V. 71 79

68 70 81 71 71.7 80 81 73 70 72 62
73.65
191. Santos, Valeriano V. 76 72 75
75 68 62 76 79 73.1 211. Arcangel, Agustin Ag. 75 85 71
73 76 65 68 65 71.85
192. Suico, Samuel 73 79 72 75
71 59 84 65 73.3 212. Acosta, Dionisio N. 75 81 78
87 56 65 77 70 72.8
193. Suson, Teodorico 74 68 66 80
66 59 79 67 70.35 MRP-213. Abinguna, Agapito C. 66 85
80 84 75 58 76 75
194. Tado, Florentino P. 64 76 67 73.65
65 76 72 76 53 69.7
214. Adove, Nehemias C. 76 86 78
195. Tapayan, Domingo A. 69 72 69 77 66 78 69 62 73.55
70 76 73 82 79 73.75
215. Adrias, Inocencio C. 75 83 61
MRD-196. Tiausas, Miguel V. 67 60 88 76 67 79 75 73.4
71 75 79 67 84 60
72.7 216. Aglugub, Andres R. 75 83 73
88 72 62 72 62 72.65
197. Torres, Carlos P. 68 71 71 70
70 63 82 71 71.6 217. Andrada, Mariano L. 76 85 66
87 63 77 75 77 73.
198. Tria, Hipolito 69 72 75 60
69 54 78 66 70.05 MRP-218. Almeda, Serafin V. 72 72
75 81 61 67 73 65
199. Velasco, Avelino A. 65 72 75 70.75
75 71 67 78 76 72.1
219. Almonte-Peralta, Felicidad 73 71 72
200. Villa, Francisco C. 65 80 73 91 75 67 65 53 70.7
75 68 79 65 75 70.2
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 185

MRP-220. Amodia, Juan T. 75 79 68 MRP-240. Bejec, Conceso D. 79 80

85 62 64 75 78 71.4 73 82 63 77 75 50
73.15
MRP-221. Antonio, Felino A. 71 76 81
83 79 52 72 70 73.3 MRP-241. Beltran, Gervasio M. 72 75
81 73 75 57 75 80
MRP-222. Antonio, Jose S. 75 92 90 73.95
68 65 64 68 60 73.75
MRP-242. Benaojan, Robustiano O. 74 84
223. Añonuevo, Ramos B. 71 87 78 77 84 75 63 68 62
81 64 63 74 76 72.7 72.85

224. Aquino, S. Rey A. 67 77 57 78 MRP-243. Beriña, Roger C. 70 80 79

69 70 69 80 67.7 79 68 72 64 78 71.85

225. Arteche, Filomeno D. 78 83 50 MRP-244. Bihis, Marcelo M. 75 86 65

89 76 77 70 70 70.8 92 64 64 84 75 73.45

MRP-226. Arribas, Isaac M. 75 78 70 MRP-245. Binaoro, Vicente M. 73 69

81 73 70 67 78 72.2 78 83 73 59 70 82
72.75
MRP-227. Azucena, Ceferino D. 72 67
78 89 72 67 77 65 MRP-246. Bobila, Rosalio B. 76 86 76
73.95 83 68 59 71 78 73.05

228. Atienza, Ricardo 72 87 70 79 247. Buenafe, Avelina R. 78 80 75

66 55 75 75 70.85 75 70 55 72 80 72.75

229. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 78 89 248. Bueno, Anastacio F. 73 78 71

75 70 54 66 75 73.3 78 71 67 71 60 71.15

MRP-230. Baclig, Cayetano S. 77 84 249. Borres, Maximino L. 67 85 62

83 80 69 70 61 65 91 72 63 76 80 70.9
73
MRP-250. Cabegin, Cesar V. 72 71
231. Balcita, Oscar C. 75 77 79 90 76 75 74 70 71 60
64 60 67 50 70.65 72.2

232. Barilea, Dominador Z. 71 67 82 MRP-251. Cabello, Melecio F. 72 78

77 64 61 65 80 70.5 78 89 58 70 67 71
70.5
MRP-233. Banta, Jose Y. 75 80 77
81 75 63 71 75 73.95 MRP-252. Cabrera, Irineo M. 79 88
53 91 71 85 75 76
73.3
MRP-234. Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 70
67 80 67 65 70 81
70.7 253. Cabreros, Paulino N. 71 79 83
84 60 62 71 50 70.85
235. Batucan, Jose M. 66 76 78 88
62 76 67 78 71.2 254. Calayag, Florentino R. 69 79 66
88 69 75 68 76 70.6
236. Bautista, Atilano C. 70 82 84
85 58 61 71 62 71.25 MRP-255. Calzada, Cesar de la 76 72
80 67 62 71 66 62
70.85
237. Bautista, Celso J. 71 68 63 87
80 67 80 70 72.75
256. Canabal, Isabel 70 82 81 77
78 51 75 75 73.7
238. Belderon, Jose 76 81 76 92
70 66 67 62 72.65
MRP-257. Cabugao, Pablo N. 76 87
69 80 58 64 78 75
MRP-239. Belo, Victor B. 76 77 64 71.8
73 75 71 76 76 72.85
258. Calañgi, Mateo C. 73 93 71
87 70 66 69 62 71.8
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 186

259. Canda, Benjamin S. 72 71 77 MRP-279. Cornejo, Crisanto R. 68 87

90 62 75 66 82 71.95 78 86 79 50 80 60
73.7
260. Cantoria, Eulogio 71 80 71 89
70 55 72 75 71 MRP-280. Cruz, Raymundo 75 81 79
85 72 57 68 75 72.95
261. Capacio, Jr., Conrado 67 78 71
90 65 75 72 60 70.65 MRP-281. Cunanan, Jose C. 78 92
63 83 76 72 68 65
262. Capitulo, Alejandro P. 75 70 53 72.4
87 78 63 76 91 71.2
282. Cunanan, Salvador F. 70 82 64
MRP-263. Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo 75 93 92 67 75 73 76 71.45
81 76 64 75 68 56
73.15 283. Cimafranca, Agustin B. 71 76 76
80 70 71 75 71 73.35
MRP-264. Caluya, Arsenio V. 75 86
70 87 77 52 77 82 284. Crisol, Getulio R. 70 91 78 85
73.9 68 55 71 50 70.8

MRP-265. Campanilla, Mariano B. 80 75 MRP-285. Dusi, Felicisimo R. 76 82

78 77 73 71 63 76 69 82 66 62 80 71
73.65 72.85

MRP-266. Campos, Juan A. 66 85 83 MRP-286. Datu, Alfredo J. 70 75 72

84 67 61 80 57 73.25 86 80 55 68 79 71.5

267. Cardoso, Angelita G. 78 71 73 287. Dacuma, Luis B. 71 67 87 83

76 79 56 69 60 71.8 71 50 65 70 71.25

268. Cartagena, Herminio R. 71 72 65 MRP-288. Degamo, Pedro R. 73 80

89 64 73 80 70 71.65 82 74 80 67 67 57
73.65
MRP-269. Castro, Daniel T. 65 75 77
76 85 60 75 69 73.15 289. Delgado, Vicente N. 70 84 82
84 77 52 73 50 72.65
270. Cauntay, Gaudencio V. 70 78 72
73 77 69 64 80 71.2 MRP-290. Diolazo, Ernesto A. 75 83
86 73 54 54 75 75
271. Castro, Pedro L. de 70 68 69 72.25
87 76 75 72 70 73.35
291. Dionisio, Jr., Guillermo 73 84 64
272. Cerio, Juan A. 75 82 75 86 89 71 78 75 66 72.8
60 54 76 75 71.75
MRP-292. Dichoso, Alberto M. 71 77
273. Colorado, Alfonso R. 68 75 80 71 81 69 75 80 70
74 77 66 67 80 72.6 73.65

274. Chavez, Doroteo M. 73 65 79 MRP-293. Dipasupil, Claudio R. 70 76

84 73 69 66 84 73.1 82 73 79 70 72 56
73.9
275. Chavez, Honorato A. 77 76 79
86 74 53 71 75 73.65 MRP-294. Delgado, Abner 75 84 63
67 64 60 70 72 68.35
MRP-276. Cobangbang, Orlando B. 69 81
74 82 76 61 78 80 MRP-295. Domingo, Dominador T. 70 69
73.85 81 82 68 63 71 75
72.2
277. Cortez, Armando R. 78 60 88
86 60 66 69 64 73.1 296. Ducusin, Agapito B. 70 78 53
88 75 77 62 76 68.05
278. Crisostomo, Jesus L. 76 87 74
76 62 55 76 66 71.45 MRP-297. Duque, Antonio S. 75 77
78 86 76 72 64 75
73.9
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 187

298. Duque, Castulo 75 80 73 83 MRP-317. Fuente, Jose S. de la 76 88

66 67 65 66 70.65 72 74 60 71 79 79
73.55
299. Ebbah, Percival B. 70 80 85
76 66 63 76 75 73.95 318. Fohmantes, Nazario S. 72 79 71
77 68 61 76 60 70.9
300. Edisa, Sulpicio 65 77 75 89
75 62 75 65 72 MRP-319. Fuggan, Lorenzo B. 76 81
74 69 71 71 73 60
301. Edradan, Rosa C. 70 75 84 84 72.85
71 59 69 86 73.4
320. Gabuya, Jesus S. 70 83 82 83
MRP-302. Enage, Jacinto N. 66 70 88 70 63 75 65 73.75
93 72 67 65 75 73.2
321. Galang, Victor N. 69 83 84 76
MRP-303. Encarnacion, Alfonso B. 75 86 70 57 71 60 71.95
73 81 63 77 69 75
72.65 322. Gaerlan, Manuel L. 73 87 77
90 67 61 72 75 73.15
304. Encarnacion, Cesar 65 78 58
68 66 64 75 78 67.1 323. Galem, Nestor R. 72 79 86 78
60 61 75 70 73.05
305. Estoista, Agustin A. 78 76 74
86 58 67 70 76 71.7 324. Gallardo, Jose Pe B. 75 88 75
75 63 70 70 65 71.85
MRP-306. Fabros, Jose B. 66 75 80
82 80 71 67 70 73.05 MRP-325. Gallos, Cirilo B. 70 78 84
91 80 51 65 70 72.85
MRP-307. Fajardo, Balbino P. 77 69
82 83 65 60 75 75 326. Galindo, Eulalio D. 70 89 87
73.9 65 78 71 62 62 73.4

308. Fajardo, Genaro P. 70 79 77 327. Galman, Patrocinio G. 72 72 80

79 79 50 73 75 72.5 85 71 56 70 53 71.15

309. Evangelista, Felicidad P. 75 75 72 328. Gamalinda, Carlos S. 76 79 81

87 63 63 77 70 72.15 86 67 63 69 55 72.55

310. Familara, Raymundo Z. 68 75 87 329. Gamboa, Antonio G. 71 67 70

83 64 65 68 65 71.85 72 76 60 75 68 70.95

311. Fariñas, Dionisio 70 78 89 66 330. Gannod, Jose A. 69 80 75 81

65 75 70 50 72.75 68 62 73 68 71.25

312. Favila, Hilario B. 71 84 74 70 MRP-331. Garcia, Matias N. 67 78 74

75 67 73 59 72.2 90 79 59 76 65 72.8

MRP-313. Feliciano, Alberto I. 71 69 MRP-332. Ganete, Carmelo 75 87 77

70 85 69 81 72 70 82 74 57 68 81 73.3
72.25
333. Gilbang, Gaudioso R. 75 67 80
MRP-314. Fernando, Lope F. 73 77 82 67 57 64 70 70.5
86 79 70 76 64 50
73 334. Gofredo, Claro C. 68 78 72 86
78 52 70 76 70.9
MRP-315. Flores, Dionisio S. 78 72
77 83 67 60 68 73 335. Gomez, Jose S. 71 76 71 81
72.05 76 63 69 62 70.85

MRP-316. Fortich, Benjamin B. 70 82 MRP-336. Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V. 68 93

70 70 78 65 64 75 85 78 64 69 70 54
70.35 72.35
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 188

MRP-337. Gonzales, Rafael C. 77 75 MRP-356. Jose, Nestor L. 78 61 64

71 89 55 70 70 60 73 68 76 64 80 69.7
70.05
357. La Q, Jose M. 75 71 75 72
MRP-338. Gracia, Eulalia L. de 66 68 70 67 81 59 73.5
90 84 77 59 69 65
73.3 358. Leon, Brigido C. de 67 75 78
91 78 51 72 80 72.55
339. Grageda, Jose M. A. 70 85 72
67 70 60 73 73 70.75 359. Leones, Constante B. 68 81 79
84 73 60 77 60 73
340. Guzman, Juan de 75 86 69 84
64 79 75 76 73.6 360. Liboro, Horacio T. 72 69 80 87
73 62 70 61 72.4
MRP-341. Guzman, Mateo de 76 79
79 73 72 69 68 80 361. Llanera, Cesar L. 77 81 80 78
73.9 64 59 75 63 73

342. Guzman, Salvador B. 71 61 74 362. Lomontod, Jose P. 75 76 69

72 61 66 78 75 70.75 70 73 76 74 75 73.2

343. Guzman, Salvador T. de 75 84 64 363. Luna, Lucito 70 75 69 83

81 74 61 78 58 71.75 59 53 74 75 68.4

344. Habelito, Geronimo E. 71 76 71 MRP-364. Luz, Lauro L. 76 90 78

87 73 60 67 55 69.65 88 64 58 75 77 73.95

345. Hedriana, Naterno G. 75 68 84 MRP-365. Macasaet, Tomas S. 73 81

76 66 58 76 60 72.9 72 83 66 75 72 70
72.5
346. Hernandez, Quintin B. 67 75 72
81 72 72 66 76 70.6 366. Magbiray, Godofredo V. 80 67 84
76 70 62 65 68 73.05
1952
367. Majarais, Rodolfo P. 70 62 64
347. Homeres, Agustin R. 73 84 65 82 88 75 71 79 72.85
86 70 77 63 76 70.7
MRP-368. Makabenta, Eduardo 75 90
348. Ines, Leonilo F. 65 88 71 88 77 83 59 71 72 78
77 73 61 70 70.55 73.3

349. Jamer, Alipio S. 68 75 83 89 MRP-369. Malapit, Justiniano S. 74 83

80 61 65 50 72 74 89 58 60 72 76
71.1
MRP-350. Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 75 65
68 85 76 70 83 54 370. Maloles, Iluminado M. 70 87 73
73.8 76 77 50 76 76 72.3

MRP-351. Jardinico, Jr., Emilio 73 86 371. Maniquis, Daniel R. 75 80 73

72 78 82 67 67 64 91 69 71 65 70 72.1
72.8
372. Maraña, Arsenio 65 79 60 72
MRP-352. Jaen, Justiniano F. 76 75 73 51 75 86 67.9
78 84 71 66 70 77
73.85 373. Marasigan, Napoleon 75 71 83
75 69 62 69 70 72.75
353. Jaring, Antonio S. 72 77 79 70
72 57 71 50 70.75 MRP-374. Marco, Jaime P. 75 67 74
76 64 75 75 57 71.9
MRP-354. Javier, Aquilino M. 75 84
79 78 77 61 66 66 MRP-375. Martir, Osmundo P. 70 86
73.05 76 78 72 71 75 53
72.95
355. Jomuad, Francisco 75 75 72
88 78 58 76 43 72.4
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 189

MRP-376. Masancay, Amando E. 73 87 394. Nono, Pacifico G. 67 77 78 67

75 77 72 50 78 80 75 59 71 76 71.35
73.2
MRP-395. Nuval, Manuel R. 78 72 67
MRP-377. Mati-ong, Ignacio T. 62 87 90 72 68 78 67 73.65
72 79 73 76 69 77
71.3 396. Ocampo, Augusto 75 90 77
72 69 55 65 67 60.7
378. Mara, Guillermo L. 70 78 78
89 75 67 66 65 72.35 397. Oliveros, Amado A. 72 75 68
72 84 50 75 79 71.9
MRP-379. Mercado, Felipe A. 73 77
82 82 78 52 69 85 398. Opiña, Jr., Pedro 76 77 74 67
73.9 73 66 68 70 71.85

MRP-380. Miculob, Eugenio P. 70 82 MRP-399. Olaviar, Jose O. 70 62 85

73 86 77 52 79 65 81 74 50 68 79 71.8
72.8
MRP-400. Olandesca, Per O. 70 91
381. Mison, Rafael M. Jr., 79 78 73 76 87 72 66 70 79
75 71 68 69 53 71.95 73.45

MRP-382. Monponbanua, Antonio D. 79 79 401. Orden, Apolonio J. 72 65 84

68 88 64 78 69 83 86 66 50 72 68 71.45
73.1
402. Ortiz, Melencio T. 71 75 78 81
MRP-383. Montero, Leodegario C. 72 89 66 67 70 78 72.1
69 89 70 68 70 75
72.15
MRP-403. Pablo, Fedelino S. 72 64
76 86 72 61 76 75
384. Morada, Servillano S. 75 76 67 72.95
71 65 66 75 76 70.9
404. Pacifico, Vicente V. 76 79 69
385. Mocorro, Generoso 78 84 78 80 76 52 72 80 71.95
84 60 73 68 70 73
MRP-405. Paderna, Perfecto D. 75 69
MRP-386. Mosquera, Estanislao L. 75 78 72 75 78 58 75 70
75 85 72 55 77 66 72.6
73.15
406. Padlan, Crispin M. 71 66 76
387. Motus, Rodentor P. 80 78 70 79 68 67 74 66 71.65
94 72 75 70 57 73.75
407. Padilla, Jose C. 70 65 67 82
388. Macario, Pedro R. 70 67 74 78 75 78 75 73.3
86 78 63 72 66 72.15
408. Padilla, Jr., Estanislao E. 71 88 78
MRP-389. Nadela, Geredion T. 72 64 86 59 75 78 50 72.95
64 81 73 50 75 75
69.15
MRP-409. Palma, Bartolome 67 81 80
82 71 75 69 75 73.25
MRP-390. Nazareno, Romeo P. 67 70
71 76 76 79 75 57
72.05 MRP-410. Papa, Angel A. 75 72 85
85 77 59 63 71 73.45
391. Nieto, Benedicto S. 69 79 77
77 72 62 76 76 72.9 MRP-411. Parayno, Mario V. 71 88
74 89 69 66 76 73
73.65
MRP-392. Noguera, Raymundo 71 86
81 80 73 56 72 70
73.15 412. Pariña, Santos L. 70 87 85 77
64 67 63 76 71.85
MRP-393. Nodado, Domiciano R. 70 70
69 73 57 37 64 72 MRP-413. Pasion, Anastacio 63 80
63.6 68 81 82 79 76 58
72.55
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 190

414. Pastrana, Rizal R. 69 76 71 MRP-434. Rayos, Victor S. 75 86 79

76 68 63 77 83 71.65 91 71 67 67 70 73.9

MRP-415. Paulin, Jose O. 70 66 80 435. Revilla, Mariano S. 75 78 81

87 75 50 65 80 70.9 90 70 54 69 81 73.35

MRP-416. Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C. 79 87 436. Reyes, Abdon L. 72 64 81 78

73 83 69 71 68 65 76 73 69 53 72.85
73.2
437. Reyes, Domingo B. 72 87 78
417. Peña, Jesus 75 75 75 62 83 72 75 62 70 72.7
75 70 60 66 70.4
438. Reyes, Francisco M. 75 85 84
418. Perez, Toribio R. 71 64 81 92 68 75 71 68 50 73.9
69 58 67 70 71.25
439. Reyes, Lozano M. 80 57 78
419. Pestaño, Melquiades 77 81 74 79 78 65 64 79 73.35
87 59 68 76 75 73.2
MRP-440. Reyes, Oscar R. 75 75 82
MRP-420. Pido, Serafin C. 77 81 72 82 76 64 68 60 73.65
82 69 71 60 75 71.15
441. Rigonan, Cesar V. 71 85 65
421. Pinlac, Filemon 67 76 74 86 86 75 70 76 70 72.7
65 79 65 72 70.55
442. Rivera, Honorio 71 56 70 90
422. Poblete, Celso B. 72 79 82 76 71 65 75 71 71.2
66 64 74 50 72.15
MRP-443. Rivero, Buenaventura A. 72 88
MRP-423. Piza, Luz 68 70 75 72 94 68 73 66 80
87 74 67 64 75 70.8 72.6

424. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 80 81 MRP-444. Robles, Enrique 75 77 75

69 72 53 67 70 71.05 77 82 64 69 70 73.7

425. Quetulio, Josefina D. 75 90 60 445. Rodriguez, Orestes Arellano 76 75

93 64 78 76 83 72.9 76 63 69 77 65 78
72.25
MRP-426. Quipanes, Melchor V. 69 88
79 82 65 62 71 66 446. Roldan, Jose V. 67 80 79 83
71.55 73 71 75 70 73.9

MRP-427. Quietson, Bayani R. 73 75 447. Rosario, Adelaida R. del 80 75 65

76 77 70 81 71 53 70 68 72 80 70 73.15
72.85
448. Rosario, Restituto F. del 75 75 79
428. Racho, Macario D. 68 75 81 90 68 65 66 63 72.1
82 78 53 66 54 70.55
MRP-449. Sabelino, Conrado S. 71 81
429. Ramirez, Sabas P. 71 80 73 69 75 77 71 75 70
87 62 62 75 80 71.65 72.95

MRP-430. Raffiñan, Jose A. 80 83 79 450. San Juan, Damaso 77 86 72

79 62 72 68 65 73.25 89 59 76 65 72 71.6

MRP-431. Ramos, Patricio S. 75 87 451. Sañiel, Felix L. 72 93 76 80

76 75 72 72 61 75 67 75 66 62 72.1
72.25
452. Samaniego, Jesus B. 75 80 76
MRP-432. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 78 84 72 60 67 68 70 70.6
76 90 48 75 80 65
73.45 MRP-453. Sandoval, Emmanuel M. 75 83
70 83 77 67 77 60
MRP-433. Raro, Celso 75 81 76 73.95
67 75 77 55 77 71.4
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 191

MRP-454. Sanidad, Emmanuel Q. 71 75 MRP-473. Tolentino, Jesus C. 75 89

81 90 62 64 76 68 63 84 85 73 73 50
72.95 73.4

455. Santiago, Jr., Cristobal 75 76 84 474. Torrijas, Alfredo A. 77 66 67

93 63 65 59 70 71.8 83 68 75 71 63 71.3

456. Santillan, Juanito Ll. 76 89 83 MRP-475. Tobias, Artemio M. 69 58

83 63 58 65 52 71.25 74 81 71 55 65 57
67.55
MRP-457. Santos, Rodolfo C. 75 75
78 82 73 76 66 70 MRP-476. Trillana, Jr., Apolonio 76 86
73.7 76 86 70 68 75 50
73.8
MRP-458. Santos, Ruperto M. 67 54
69 76 63 64 71 60 MRP-477. Trinidad, Manuel O. 66 91
66.75 83 75 63 66 67 65
70.8
MRP-459. Santos, Aquilino C. 72 71
73 79 73 79 71 85 478. Trinidad, Pedro O. 66 78 78
73.8 85 78 51 64 75 70.8

MRP-460. Santos, Rufino A. 75 81 79 MRP-479. Udarbe, Flavio J. 80 82 77

85 74 72 66 54 73.3 82 67 56 68 75 72.6

461. Suanding, Bantas 75 67 67 92 480. Umali, Osmundo C. 68 75 81

79 59 76 76 73.1 80 71 69 68 60 71.7

MRP-462. Sulit, Feliz M. 76 79 76 481. Umayam, Juanito C. 77 75 87

78 72 75 68 67 73.5 85 56 56 66 60 71

463. Songco, Felicisimo G. 70 68 82 MRP-482. Usita, Gelacio U. 75 72 75

84 60 69 76 65 73.35 74 73 76 71 70 73.55

464. Soriano, Aniceto S. 64 79 77 483. Valino, Francisco M. 72 81 80

80 80 53 70 65 70.7 84 62 78 71 75 73.7

465. Suarez, Pablo D. 73 85 70 87 484. Varela, Dominador M. 67 75 81

76 70 64 70 71.9 86 72 57 81 70 73.85

MRP-466. Sybico, Jesus L. 79 70 70 485. Vega, Macairog L. de 78 62 79

72 75 75 72 60 73.05 87 70 70 71 65 73.8

467. Tabaque, Benjamin R. 69 68 77 MRP-486. Velasco, Emmanuel D. 71 80

79 74 68 72 60 71.85 74 85 60 66 76 76
71.85
MRP-468. Tan Kiang, Clarita 81 79
72 80 62 75 73 80 487. Velez, Maria E. 73 70 89 80
73.95 56 50 72 67 71.05

MRP-469. Tando, Amado T. 71 82 78 MRP-488. Venal, Artemio V. 78 91 58

83 71 61 71 60 72 67 76 55 75 73 73.65

470. Tasico, Severo E. 71 69 75 89 489. Venus, Conrado B. 69 81 74

70 75 67 63 71.65 85 62 66 72 77 77.05

471. Tiburcio, Ismael P. 73 82 72 MRP-490. Verzosa, Federico B. 75 79

93 76 57 68 54 71.15 72 88 76 68 74 59
73.7
MRP-472. Tiongson, Federico T. 70 70
76 84 77 75 75 50 MRP-491. Villafuerte, Eduardo V. 75 83
73.45 70 76 64 64 75 65
71.2
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 192

MRP-492. Villanueva, Cecilio C. 75 85 1953 57 74 68 68 76 52

79 88 66 77 67 70 71 76 66.7
73.95
3. Blanco, Jose B.
493. Villar, Custodio R. 73 69 70
88 76 66 69 50 70.75
MRD-1949 75 75 70 75 77
MRP-494. Villaseñor, Leonidas F. 80 85 76 60 90 72.15
67 77 62 75 76 73
73.15 1951 64 71 58 65 68 70
75 71 66.95
495. Viterbo, Jose H. 80 77 65 93
70 65 65 65 70.65 4. Condeno, Mateo

496. Yaranon, Pedro 70 77 76 85

72 50 75 75 71.85 1950 71 80 62 75 75 81
55 92 69.3
MRP-497. Yasay, Mariano R. 75 75
72 76 63 77 70 60 1951 70 60 61 65 77 64
71.1 67 81 67.85

MRP-498. Ygay, Venancio M. 73 80 5. Ducusin, Agapito B.

83 84 62 59 72 77
72.65
MRD-1949 69 70 76 73 76
499. Yulo, Jr., Teodoro 73 82 78 75 71 55 60 68.65
60 81 75 75 73.95
1950 60 71 55 67 67 75
500. Zamora, Alberto 70 65 76 79 56 89 68.1
62 77 69 82 71.3
6. Garcia, Manuel N.
501. Rigonan, Felipe C. 70 79 69
89 76 62 71 64 71.2
MRD-1949 60 70 82 79 70
A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their 69 60 80 69.25
grades in subjects passed in previous examinations, showing
the years in which they took the examinations together with
their grades and averages, and those who had filed motions 1950 57 65 51 69 54 85
for reconsideration which were denied, indicated by the initials 56 84 60.3
MRD, follows:
7. Luna, Lucito A.
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 72

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. 1946 63 53 69 76 75 76

Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen. Av. 57 69 66.55

1. Amao, Sulpicio M. 1952 70 75 69 83 59 53

74 75 68.4

1946 68 67 76 76 73 73 8. Maraña, Arsenio s.

49 50 66.5

1950 59 80 67 77 62 80 1949 72 68 68 75 75 72
71 57 67.4 60 75 69.35

2. Baldo, Olegario Ga. 1952 65 79 60 72 73 51

75 86 67.9

1951 65 76 58 55 59 63 9. Montano, Manuel M.

75 72 64.9

1952 65 68 75 84 72 59 1951 61 60 58 60 70 63
73 57 69.75 75 64 64.8
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 193

1952 70 77 65 79 66 52 MRD-1949 67 56 69 75 72
70 50 66.4 77 60 75 68

1953 78 64 66 68 81 50 1951 70 59 55 60 68 57
71 78 70.65 78 67 65.8

10. Peña, Jesus S. 16. Santos, Constantino

1950 25 75 45 75 45 52 1952 62 76 54 82 72 77
46 71 46.2 66 65 66.65

1951 70 77 65 79 66 52 1953 73 71 70 65 78 64
70 50 66.4 65 78 70.4

1952 75 75 75 62 75 70 17. Santos, Salvador H.

60 66 70.4

11. Placido, Sr., Isidro 1951 60 64 55 70 68 52

70 75 62.85

1950 68 78 70 75 69 70 1952 75 64 70 81 76 55
58 69 67.75 61 75 69.1

1951 65 62 75 60 73 57 1953 70 71 79 65 72 54
75 71 66.8 66 80 70

12. Rementizo, Filemon S. 18. Sevilla, Macario C.

1949 65 75 72 75 60 75 MRD-1948 50 64 76 66 66
55 85 66.65 69 60 52 63.1

1951 68 57 48 60 91 66 MRD-1949 47 66 78 64 71
55 75 64.05 86 65 85 68

1952 68 53 68 67 58 56 1950 35 65 40 75 63 57
75 64 65.7 27 49 45

13. Amao, Sulpicio M. MRD-1951 68 59 72 55 69

65 75 75 69.3

1952 67 80 51 69 69 77 1953 70 73 74 70 81 56
73 53 66.35 69 71 71.05

1953 65 67 78 74 75 62 Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some

69 80 70.9 candidates--85 in all--presented motions for reconsideration
of their grades, others invoked the provisions of Republic Act
14. Rodulfa, Juan T. No. 972. A list of those candidates separating those who filed
mere motions for reconsideration (56) from those who invoked
the aforesaid Republic act, is as follows:
1951 67 60 70 65 68 56
75 66 67.75 1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION

1952 70 71 67 78 67 75 Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol.

71 70 70.1 Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen. Av.

15. Sanchez, Juan J. 1. Acenas, Calixto R. 73 70 68

62 82 51 67 77 73.45

1948 39 69 82 75 76 72 2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75

55 50 63.5 85 87 54 71 80 72.8

3. Alejandro, Exequiel 67 72 71
75 80 76 75 77 73.4
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 194

4. Andres, Gregorio M. 70 73 86 25. Ilejay, Abraham I. 77 70 76 77

58 79 50 71 78 72.7 81 62 70 68 73.7

5. Arnaiz, Antonio E. 66 80 76 26. Leon, Benjamin La. De 66 66 75

58 79 68 77 81 73.4 70 77 55 71 82 70.35

6. Asis, Floriano U. de 66 78 75 27. Lugtu, Felipe L. 62 70 78 65

81 77 55 73 69 71.25 78 56 69 81 69.9

7. Bacaiso, Celestino M. 71 65 76 28. Lukman, Abdul-Hamid 76 64 67

68 76 50 75 70 70.95 69 73 59 73 75 70.45

8. Bala, Florencio F. 64 82 47 70 29. Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G. 77 76 68

82 58 75 82 67 68 71 51 75 78 70.85

9. Baldo, Olegario A. 57 74 68 30. Maloles, Julius G. 77 71 60 71

68 76 52 71 76 66.7 79 62 68 72 69.75

10. Barrios, Benjamin O. 65 71 76 31. Mandi, Santiago P. 65 76 70

75 80 62 83 73 73.95 61 79 68 75 72 71.1

11. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 32. Margete, Rufino C. 70 76 66

91 76 61 74 78 73.35 75 85 73 71 75 72.75

12. Burgos, Dominador C. 72 80 89 33. Melocoton, Nestorio B. 70 81 73

61 66 37 69 68 70.05 78 83 52 72 75 72.35

13. Cariño, Eldo J. 79 81 60 75 34. Molina, Manuel C. 75 78 70

74 74 76 74 73 61 75 63 66 85 70.95

14. Casar, Dimapuro 67 73 84 79 35. Muñoz, Mariano A. 75 80 86

77 61 71 74 73.35 67 74 57 68 76 73.75

15. Castañeda, Gregorio 70 73 80 36. Navarro, Buenaventura M. 80 75 65

71 75 70 73 78 73.95 75 83 55 73 79 73

16. Estrellado, Benjamin R. 67 79 64 37. Nodado, Domiciano R. 60 67 67

73 82 62 71 74 70.2 50 70 50 56 75 61.7

17. Fabunan, Edilberto C. 70 72 68 38. Papas, Sisenando B. 65 62 71

69 77 60 76 74 71.1 61 70 56 66 67 66

18. Feril, Domingo B. 75 71 84 65 39. Pagulayan-Sy, Fernando 63 75 71

70 60 65 70 71.6 62 83 67 70 72 70.4

19. Fernandez, Alejandro G. 65 75 87 40. Padula, Benjamin C. 70 77 54

80 81 63 61 80 72.8 62 74 78 75 68 69.05

20. Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss) 76 80 86 41. Pasno, Enrique M. 78 72 66

77 64 74 66 69 73.9 54 71 58 72 78 69.85

21. Garcia, Rafael B. 70 86 70 75 42. Peña, Jr., Narciso 70 95 81 78

73 63 73 75 71.65 67 66 67 73 72.55

22. Gracia, Miguel L. de 73 68 75 43. Peralta, Rodolfo P. 70 70 52

59 80 51 72 71 71 81 68 63 59 69 63.7

23. Gungon, Armando G. 68 76 76 44. Pigar, Leopoldo R. 76 75 78

84 77 57 77 83 73.6 61 72 72 71 79 73.75

24. Gutierrez, Antonio S. 68 77 66 45. Publico, Paciano L. 68 69 76

70 72 59 71 74 69.1 76 70 59 74 67 70.6
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 195

46. Radaza, Leovigildo 75 78 76 9. Fernandez, Alejandro Q. 65 75 87

61 77 50 71 86 72.2 80 81 63 61 80 72.8

47. Ramos, Bernardo M. 64 62 75 10. Fernandez, Luis N. 70 75 77

93 81 52 66 80 70.1 75 78 67 72 73 73.35

48. Rabaino, Andres D. 68 72 75 11. Figueroa, Alfredo A. 70 75 87

73 78 55 69 76 70.65 78 75 50 68 68 72.3

49. Ravanera, Oscar N. 70 77 80 12. Formilleza, Pedro 65 75 89 68

71 82 62 69 78 73.6 83 51 70 75 73.25

50. Renovilla, Jose M. 65 75 80 13. Garcia, Manuel M. 69 68 83

68 79 52 62 78 69.5 83 73 62 62 70 71

51. Sabaot, Solomon B. 69 73 80 14. Grospe, Vicente E. 68 75 78

69 82 69 69 79 73.85 66 79 61 69 82 71.6

52. Sumaway, Ricardo S. 66 76 69 15. Galema, Nestor R. (1952) 72 79 86

76 74 56 72 68 69.1 78 60 61 75 70 73.05

53. Torrefiel, Sofronio O. 70 77 74 16. Jacobo, Rafael F. 76 76 75 74

75 73 50 68 72 69.55 76 50 72 76 72.3

54. Vera, Federico V. de 60 61 47 17. Macalindong, Reinerio L. 67 77 79

77 69 50 67 77 60.9 79 74 72 68 77 72.75

55. Viray, Venancio Bustos 65 67 67 18. Mangubat, Antonio M. 70 70 78

52 73 64 71 65 67.15 61 80 74 62 70 71.45

56. Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss) 63 70 56 19. Montano, Manuel M. 78 64 66

75 68 54 70 77 64.5 68 81 50 71 78 70.65

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972 20. Plomantes, Marcos 73 67 74

58 68 70 76 71 71.6
Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol.
Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen. Av. 21. Ramos, Eugenio R. 70 80 76
67 72 69 72 79 72.6
1. Ala, Narciso 70 71 73 59
73 74 81 77 73.5 22. Reyes, Juan R. 71 73 77 76
81 59 72 74 73.2
2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75
85 87 54 71 80 72.8 23. Reyes, Santiago R. 65 78 83
60 76 75 70 70 72.9
3. Arellano, Antonio L. 74 66 73
60 78 63 78 72 72.9 24. Rivera, Eulogio J. 65 67 78 74
75 62 69 80 70.9
4. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71
91 76 61 74 78 73.35 25. Santos, Constantino P. 73 71 70
65 78 64 65 78 70.4
5. Calautit, Celestino R. 71 78 84
75 75 61 68 72 73.2 26. Santos, Salvador H. 70 71 79
65 72 54 66 80 70
6. Casuncad, Sulvio P. 61 73 82
69 81 68 71 84 73.05 27. Sevilla, Macario C. 70 73 74
70 81 56 69 71 71.05
7. Enriquez, Pelagio y Concepcion 84 69
76 75 82 50 58 79 28. Villavicencio, Jose A. 78 75 70
72.05 67 69 77 64 77 73.2

8. Estonina, Severino 80 74 64 29. Viray, Ruperto G. 76 73 76 73

89 81 56 68 82 72.4 80 58 68 83 73.25
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 196
There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604
directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490
candidates who have not presented any petition, they
reach a total of 1,094.
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per
cent the passing general average in the bar examination of
august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per
cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed
75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those who
obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the introduction
in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which
was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule
127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of
attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession. The
amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those
referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us. The
proposed amendment is as follows:
SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate
may be deemed to have passed the examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average of
70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any
subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects
shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per
cent; Land Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent;
Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent;
Political Law, 10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent;
Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent;
Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful candidates shall not
be required to take another examination in any subject in
which they have obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher
and such rating shall be taken into account in
determining their general average in any subsequent
examinations: Provided, however, That if the candidate
fails to get a general average of 70 per cent in his third
examination, he shall lose the benefit of having already
passed some subjects and shall be required to the
examination in all the subjects.
SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. —
Any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70
per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent
in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or
who has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission
to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before
the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.
(Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to
the matter before us being:
It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar
examinations should be compelled to repeat even those
subjects which they have previously passed. This is not
the case in any other government examination. The Rules of
Court have therefore been amended in this measure to give a
candidate due credit for any subject which he has previously
passed with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May
3, 1951, the President requested the comments of this
Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed
by seven Justices while three chose to refrain from making
any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that
interests us, the Court said:
The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of
this amendment provides that if a bar candidate obtains 70 per
cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the
examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his
next examination. This is a sort of passing the Bar
Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three
subjects at a time. The trouble with this proposed system is
that although it makes it easier and more convenient for the
candidate because he may in an examination prepare himself
on only one or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by
the time that he has passed the last required subjects, which
may be several years away from the time that he reviewed
and passed the firs subjects, he shall have forgotten the
principles and theories contained in those subjects and
remembers only those of the one or two subjects that he had
last reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because
there is nothing in the law which requires a candidate to
continue taking the Bar examinations every year in
succession. The only condition imposed is that a candidate,
on this plan, must pass the examination in no more that three
installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or number
of years intervening between each examination taken. This
would defeat the object and the requirements of the law and
the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a
person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed
that he possesses the knowledge and proficiency in the law
and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar
examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal
profession and adequately render the legal service required
by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the
candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any
five subjects eight years ago, another three subjects one year
later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe
that the present system of requiring a candidate to obtain a
passing general average with no grade in any subject below
50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one
to be all around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at
the time of admission to the practice of law.
xxx xxx xxx
We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of
Rule 127. This amendment provides that any application who
has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects
without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any
examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be
allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of
office. In other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less
than 70 per cent in any examination since the year 1946
without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their
non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they
failed to obtain a passing general average in any of those
years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only
prospective but retroactive in its effects.
We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding
amendment that we are not exactly in favor of reducing the
passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to
govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such
reduction retroactive, we have serious legal doubts. We
should not lose sight of the fact that after every bar
examinations, the Supreme Court passes the corresponding
resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have
obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting
and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who
have failed. The present amendment would have the effect of
repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's
resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who
may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but less
than the general passing average fixed for that year. It is clear
that this question involves legal implications, and this phase
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 197
of the amendment if finally enacted into law might have to go
thru a legal test. As one member of the Court remarked during
the discussion, when a court renders a decision or promulgate
a resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with a
certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment
or even repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final
decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the
sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.
Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact
that members of the bar are officers of the courts, including
the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the
Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit,
competent and qualified to be its officer. Conversely, when it
refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who
in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general average
of 70 per cent but less than that required for that year in order
to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered
and declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and
qualified to be its officer. The present amendment giving
retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average
runs counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme
Court and practically and in effect says that a candidate not
accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer
because he was unprepared, undeserving and unqualified,
nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted and allowed
by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this is
another important aspect of the question to be carefully and
seriously considered.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the
following:
I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill,
namely, to elevate the standard of the legal profession and
maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by
admitting to practice precisely a special class who have failed
in the bar examination, Moreover, the bill contains provisions
to which I find serious fundamental objections.
Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing
below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after
the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and
subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This provision
constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically
one group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in
the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.
The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final
resolutions of the Supreme Court made in accordance with
the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar
examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding
resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have
obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and
denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have
failed. The provision under consideration would have the
effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and
rejecting the petitions of those who may have failed to obtain
the passing average fixed for that year. Said provision also
sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally
obliged to grant a similar privilege to those who have failed in
the examinations for admission to other professions such as
medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public
accountancy.
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the
Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote of each House
as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution.
Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It reads as
follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR
EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14,
Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who
obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 Bar
examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72
per cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954
bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations
without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any
subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar;
Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing general average
shall be restored in all succeeding examinations; and
Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact
one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and
included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per
cent in any subject in any bar examination after July 4, 1945
shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects
and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the
passing general average that said candidate may obtain in
any subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.
With the following explanatory note:
This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President
and to afford another opportunity to those who feel themselves
discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to 1951 when
those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination
but were arbitrarily not so considered by altering its previous
decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court has been
altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In
order to cure the apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades
and to give satisfaction to all parties concerned, it is proposed
in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for
passing the bar examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar
examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71 per
cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar
examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar examination, 74 per
cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the
condition that the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a
grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the
standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the tremendous
handicap which students during the years immediately after
the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the
insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the
preparation of students who took up law soon after the
liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the preparation of our
students as well as the available reading materials will be
under normal conditions, if not improved from those years
preceding the last world war.
In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our
Supreme Court assumed the supervision as well as the
administration of the study of law which was objected to by the
President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 198
The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among
his objections that the bill would admit to the practice of law "a
special class who failed in the bar examination". He
considered the bill a class legislation. This contention,
however, is not, in good conscience, correct because
Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court
have already established as precedent by making as low as
69 per cent the passing mark of those who took the Bar
examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who this bill
should be enacted, considered themselves as having passed
the bar examination on the strength of the established
precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the
insurmountable difficulties and handicaps which they were
unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent cannot
or could not have been altered, constitutionally, by the
Supreme Court, without giving due consideration to the rights
already accrued or vested in the bar candidates who took the
examination when the precedent was not yet altered, or in
effect, was still enforced and without being inconsistent with
the principles of their previous resolutions.
If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple
curative act or corrective statute which Congress has the
power to enact. The requirement of a "valid classification" as
against class legislation, is very expressed in the following
American Jurisprudence:
A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to
the class, all who possess a common disability, attribute, or
classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial
differentiation between those included in the class and those
it leaves untouched. When a class is accepted by the Court
as "natural" it cannot be again split and then have the
dissevered factions of the original unit designated with
different rules established for each. (Fountain Park Co. vs.
Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).
Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides
brings new conditions which must be cared for by new laws.
Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a class.
If so, the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes
the condition affect only a few. If so, the correcting statute may
be as narrow as the mischief. The constitution does not
prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them
when there are special evils with which the general laws are
incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain
the special form. . . . The problem in the last analysis is one of
legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion conceded to
the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be
revision by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431).
(1932)
This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which
always retroacts to the extent of the care of correction only as
in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated
from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.
For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly
recommended.
(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID
Senator
Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by
Congress as above transcribed. The President again asked
the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive
Secretary, Manila, with the information that, with respect to
Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the
same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by
Congress in May, 1951, contained in the first indorsement of
the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant
Executive Secretary.
(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS
The President allowed the period within which the bill should
be signed to pass without vetoing it, by virtue of which it
became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution)
numbered 972 (many times erroneously cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election
year, and that both the President and the author of the Bill
were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost
in the polls.
Separate Opinions
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always
been, the exclusive privilege of this Court, because lawyers
are members of the Court and only this Court should be
allowed to determine admission thereto in the interest of the
principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is
judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This
power should be distinguished from the power to promulgate
rules which regulate admission. It is only this power (to
promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the
Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion
to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of
examination, the qualifications of applicants, the passing
grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power. But
the power to determine when a candidate has made or has
not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely
with this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the
judicial function, and lies beyond the scope of the
congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that
candidates who obtain a general average of 72 per cent in
1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be
considered as having passed the examination, is to mean
exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It
is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different
years with grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning
is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the Court's
judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable
as discriminatory. Why should those taking the examinations
in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a
lower passing grade, while those taking earlier or later are
not?
I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because
it is not embraced within the rule-making power of Congress,
because it is an undue interference with the power of this
Court to admit members thereof, and because it is
discriminatory.
PARAS, C.J., dissenting:
Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar
candidate "may be deemed to have passed his examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 199
per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any
subject.' This passing mark has always been adhered to, with
certain exception presently to be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946,
the original list of successful candidates included only those
who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon
motion for reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with
general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were raised
to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the
examinations of November, 1946 the list first released
containing the names of successful candidates covered only
those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more;
but, upon motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a
general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by
resolution of March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the
original list of successful candidates those having a general
average of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per cent were
included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar
candidates had been released, and on motion for
reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69
per cent were allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948.
With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948, in
addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all
those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more,
irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective
of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were
allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the
year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing
average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this
amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an amendment
of section 14 of Rule 127.
Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent
to 1948, whose general averages mostly ranged from 69 to 73
per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the
precedents set by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but said
motions were uniformly denied.
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where
law deans and professors, practising attorneys, presidents of
bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued
lengthily pro or con, approved a bill providing, among others,
for the reduction of the passing general average from 75 per
cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held
after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the President mainly
in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla,
Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the
Congress passed another bill similar to the previous bill
vetoed by the President, with the important difference that in
the later bill the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the study
of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as
new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the bar examiners
before the holding of the examination, and (4) the equal
division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid
by bar applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was
allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the
President by merely not signing it within the required period;
and in doing so the President gave due respect to the will of
the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to repass
the bill first vetoed by him.
Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained
a general average of 70 per cent in any examinations after
July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar
examinations; 72 per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per
cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955
bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per cent
in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also provides
that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in
any subject in any examination after July 4, 1946, shall be
deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such
grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing in
any subsequent examinations.
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations
previous to the approval of Republic Act No. 972 and failed to
obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court
mass or separate petitions, praying that they be admitted to
the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the
allegation that they have obtained the general averages
prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953,
this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said petitions,
and members of the bar, especially authorized
representatives of bar associations, were invited to argue or
submit memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for
said hearing being that some doubt had "been expressed on
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it
affects past bar examinations and the matter" involved "a new
question of public interest."
All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to
regulate the admission to the practice of law is inherently
judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed
by the Constitution which in Article VII, section 13, provides as
follows:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantive right. The existing laws on
pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as
statutes and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power
of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The
Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement
the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and
the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court
has the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission
to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal,
alter or supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary
to see that the power of the Supreme Court and the Congress
to regulate the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in
so far as it covers bar examinations held prior to its approval,
is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final resolutions
of the Supreme Court refusing to admit to the practice of law
the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative
encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion this view
is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of
bar candidates do not have the finality of decisions in
justiciable cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain
periods after which they become executory and unalterable.
Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for
reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any give year, are subject
to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period
within which the motion were filed, and this has been the
practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar
examinations and admission to the practice of law may be
deemed as a judicial function only because said matters
happen to be entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules
of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no judicial function
involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the word,
because bar examinations and the admission to the practice
of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect opposing litigants.
It is no more than the function of other examining boards. In
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 200

the second place, retroactive laws are not prohibited by the
Constitution, except only when they would be ex post facto,
would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or
would deny due process and equal protection of the law.
Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto
enactment, does not impair any obligation and contract or
vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due process
and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere
curative statute intended to correct certain obvious
inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of different
passing general averages in certain years.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946,
are being discriminated against, because we no longer have
any record of those who might have failed before the war,
apart from the circumstance that 75 per cent had always been
the passing mark during said period. It may also be that there
are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those
benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter
of classification, the reasonableness must be determined by
the legislative body. It is proper to recall that the Congress
held public hearings, and we can fairly suppose that the
classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative
judgment derived from the facts and circumstances then
brought out.
As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon
the judgment of this Court by the Legislative Department, it is
sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is
one expressly sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides,
interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by the
Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants
that have already been vested or acquired in virtue of
decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose of
creating appearances of separation and equality among the
three branches of the Government. Republic Act No. 972 has
not produced a case involving two parties and decided by the
Court in favor of one and against the other. Needless to say,
the statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing bar
candidates who had obtained the general average prescribed
by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be objectionable and
unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those
who have been admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose
general average is below 80 per cent, will not be allowed to
practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right
already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court,
namely, the bar admission of those whose general averages
were from 75 to 79 per cent.
bar examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations.
Anyway, we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law,
since this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the
legislators. This Court in many instances had doubted the
propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has consistently
refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.
To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited
under Republic Act 972 is against public interest, is to assume
that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to
the general public was not considered by the Congress. As
already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we are
bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the
members of this Court, to their oath of office, had taken all the
circumstances into account before passing the Act. On the
question of public interest I may observe that the Congress,
representing the people who elected them, should be more
qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept
Republic Act No. 972 as an expression of the will of the people
through their duly elected representatives.
I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the
Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent power to repeal,
alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the
admission to the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or
capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not
do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a
democracy, where we can and should only hope that the right
men are put in the right places in our Government.
Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is
constitutional and should therefore be given effect in its
entirety.

Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the

exercise of its rule-making power conferred by the
Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of
Rule 127 by reducing the passing average to 70 per cent,
effective several years before the date of the resolution.
Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all
candidates who obtained a general average of 69 per cent or
more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general
average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether they
filed petitions for reconsideration, it in effect amended section
14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the examinations
held in August 1947 and August 1948, said section (fixing the
general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force.
In stands to reason, if we are to admit that the Supreme Court
and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the
admission to the practice of law, that the latter may validly
pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general average.

Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it

is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, since this Court had
already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 201
[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L.
RANA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess
the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal
profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater
importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of
law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar
candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he
passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those
who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-
taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre
(complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of
law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member
of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001
at the Philippine International Convention Center. However,
the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of
Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him.
Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date
but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of
law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that
respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal
Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate.
Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the
MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading,
respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf
of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the
pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that
respondent is a municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate.
As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel
for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice
mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter
engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that
respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the
proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing
respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from
signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges
against him. In the same resolution, the Court required
respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his
specific assistance to represent him before the MBEC.
Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice
Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law.
Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He
explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a
lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11
May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date.
He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of
Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-
Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the
complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant
is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for
mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be
allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents
Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his
appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific
assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May
2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent
signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When
respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC,
complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1)
respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was
an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents
Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative
case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of
the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the
MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The
minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent
actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise
found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings
even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The
OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious
doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The
OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of
law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law.
The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied
admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to
cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he
appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government
employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his
resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was
authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 202
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC
that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law and thus does not deserve admission to the
Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001.
However, the records show that respondent appeared as
counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before
respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled
Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes
in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May
2001, respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the
first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that
he was the undersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself
wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty.
Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the
MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao
also retained respondent as her counsel. On the same date,
14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin
L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the
legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party.
Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he
was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty
Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-
PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for
Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for
the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for
mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers
oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law
without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court
elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law,incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do
the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind
of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262,
263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law
means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts
which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of
service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when
he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed
various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly
supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he
was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right
but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified.The exercise of this privilege presupposes
possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer
of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to
practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The
practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from
one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person
seeking admission had practiced law without a license.[5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict.
In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar
examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll
of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing
law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e)
of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of
court.[7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations
and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the
Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer.
The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that
two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by
this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.[9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that
the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a
private client in any court or administrative body since
respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as
constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11
May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and
presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent
stated that he was resigning effective upon your
acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents
resignation effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the evidence
does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel
for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to
represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar
bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent
nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED
admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 203
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of
Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No.
MDD-1)
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing
attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1
(In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of
Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President
Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for
consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section
24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following
June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or
causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action
it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the
Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's
name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken
shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the
Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to
comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he
submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his
refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and
the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on
March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After
the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda
in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was
thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's
pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence
conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular
features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the
Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the
Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2,
Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to
the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's
name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24,
Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of
the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10
of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the
provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such
payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the
name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in
the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an
official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the
Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now
appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys
of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the
following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated
Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors
shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above
provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in
the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and
that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of
the said organization to which he is admittedly personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule
and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and
effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the
Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the
justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative
body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court
relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably
come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to
regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such
practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the
legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues
raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
"Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for
the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta,
et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all
these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on
January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous
pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study
of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the
authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained
in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 204
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the
Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which
every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar
is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar
is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out
the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official
national body of which all lawyers are required to be
members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the
requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the
effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon
proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline
or disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously
dictated by overriding considerations of public interest
and public welfare to such an extent as more than
constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that
integration imposes upon the personal interests and
personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation
directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and
universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power
over an important profession. The practice of law is not a
vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not
only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to
the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most
important functions of the State — the administration of justice
— as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being
clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must
submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the
extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme
Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression
"affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to
the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291
U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397
5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court
to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of
the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal
is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in
enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the
Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973,
and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the
constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through
Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were
prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and
motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public
necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may
interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31
Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est
supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this
fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals
are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs.
Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State
to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all
individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the
constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power
to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973
Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro.
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act,
the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it
shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without
the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely
to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting
the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes
indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the
Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the
admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal
profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said
profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are)
subject to the power of the body politic to require him to
conform to such regulations as might be established by the
proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of
interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to
submit himself to such reasonable interference and
regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an
interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already
fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however,
we now concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court
is without power to compel him to become a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court
Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional
right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our
answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate. 6
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 205

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of
which he is not already a member. He became a member of
the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member.
8 justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected
is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order
to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality
of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the
lawyers.9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense
compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of
the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the
provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution
that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and
duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article
X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the
respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession
to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the
penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property
without due process and hence infringes on one of his
constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property
right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to
consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of
the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the
Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to
practise law before the courts of this country should be and is
a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to
impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may
be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,
sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The
power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers
does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is
a power which is inherent in this court as a court —
appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of
the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative
likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations
no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task
to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar,
particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave
responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to
uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession
and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The
very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will
not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973
Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power
to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar
... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of
the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is
indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of
Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor
illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous
sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon
should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby
ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz
Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a

property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow
to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of
Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and
their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the
report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 206

A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989 association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce,
and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes,
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 and the officious intervention of certain public officials to
ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the
PHILIPPINES. IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme
Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the
Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP
PER CURIAM: officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.

In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on June 3, 1989 at the
Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC), the
following were elected by the House of Delegates (composed
of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and proclaimed
as officers:
NAME POSITION
It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself
(i.e. the voting and the canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989)
which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec," headed by
Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals, was
unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be
above board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device
safeguards to prevent tampering with, and marking of, the
ballots.

Atty. Violeta Drilon President What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the
reported electioneering and extravagance that characterized
Atty. Bella Tiro Executive Vice-President the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president
of the IBP.

Atty. Salvador Lao Chairman, House of Delegates

I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo Secretary, House of Delegates

Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon
Election" (Manila Standard, Sunday, June 17, 1989), Luis
Atty. Teodoro Quicoy Treasurer, House of Delegates Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar"
(Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The Disintegrating Bar"
Atty. Oscar Badelles Sergeant at Arms, House of (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an article,
Delegates entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989),
and the editorial, entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe
(June 8, 1989), were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying
Atty. Justiniano Cortes Governor & Vice-President for
and pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by
Northern Luzon
the three principal candidates: Attys. Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo
Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart,
Atty. Ciriaco Atienza Governor & Vice-President for soul, money and influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates."
Central Luzon
Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals
Atty. Mario Jalandoni Governor & Vice-President for who felt at a disadvantage because Atty. Drilon allegedly used
Metro Manila PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext
of distributing Bigay Puso donations, and she had the added
Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon Governor & Vice-President for advantage of having regional directors and labor arbiters of
Southern Luzon the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been
granted leaves of absence by her husband, the Labor
Secretary) campaigning for her. Jurado's informants alleged
Atty. Teodoro Almine Governor & Vice-President for
that there was rampant vote-buying by some members of the
Bicolandia
U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's fraternity), as
well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion,
Atty. Porfirio Siyangco Governor & Vice-President for Cruz, Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is
Eastern Visayas employed, and that government positions were promised to
others by the office of the Labor Secretary.
Atty. Ricardo Teruel Governor & Vice-President for
Western Visayas Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and,
in addition, mentioned "talk of personnel of the Department of
Atty. Gladys Tiongco Governor & Vice-President for Labor, especially conciliators and employers, notably Chinese
Eastern Mindanao Filipinos, giving aid and comfort to her (Atty. Drilon's)
candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush
hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined
Atty. Simeon Datumanong Governor & Vice-President for continuously, womened and subjected to endless haggling
Western Mindanao over the price of their votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged from
Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the election, some
The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of twelve to twenty votes which were believed crucial,
office on July 4,1989, before the Supreme Court en banc. appreciated to P50,000."
However,disturbed by the widespread reports received by
some members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top
or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments official of the judiciary allegedly involved himself in IBP politics
published in the columns of some newspapers about the on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they
intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, plotted their election strategy in a room of the PICC (the
led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 207
Philippine International Convention Center where the
convention/election were held) during a recess x x x."
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed
Mauricio's reports with some embellishments.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.
Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc
resolution dated June 15, 1989, directed the outgoing and
incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors, the
principal officers and Chairman of the House of Delegates to
appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock
p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the
aforementioned reports and to recommend, for the
consideration of the Court, appropriate approaches to the
problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to the
fundamental principles of the IBP.
In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic
postulate of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), heavily
stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of
existence, is that the IBP shall be non-political in character
and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the
choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the
House of Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or
regional, or chapter. The fundamental assumption was that
officers, delegates and governors would be chosen on the
basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to
serve."
The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply
disturbed to note that in connection with the election of
members of the Board of Governors and of the House of
Delegates, there is a widespread belief, based on reports
carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth,
that there was extensive and intensive campaigning by
candidates for IBP positions as well as expenditure of
considerable sums of money by candidates, including vote-
buying, direct or indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP
President Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the dialogue,
upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel and advice. The
meeting between the Court en banc on the one hand, and the
outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the other, was an
informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a
formal inquiry to determine whether the prohibited acts and
activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed
before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior
Associate Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman, and
Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco,
Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, as
members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty.
Daniel Martinez, acted as the committee's Recording
Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in
response to subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light on
the conduct of the elections. The managers of three five-star
hotels the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn
where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo)
allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they
billeted their supporters were summoned. The officer of the
Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport Office were
called to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP
presidential candidate and the members of her slate used
PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign
to win the votes of delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials
were called to testify on the charge that some candidates gave
free air fares to delegates to the convention. Officials of the
Labor Department were also called to enable the Court to
ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials openly
campaigned or worked for the election of Atty. Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus
Bigornia and Emil Jurado were subpoenaed to determine the
nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP
elections. Their stories were based, they said, on letters,
phone calls and personal interviews with persons who claimed
to have knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the
Press Freedom Law, refused to identify.
The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving,
and analyzing and assessing evidence given by such persons
as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of
the relevant facts; and the Court, after deliberating thereon,
has Resolved to accept and adopt the same.
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-
LAWS.
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly
non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, thus:
"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar is strictly
non-political, and every activity tending to impair this basic
feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized
accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-
judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible
for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated
Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or
employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of
any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of
candidacy for any elective public office or accepts
appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory
office in the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof. "'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited
acts relative to IBP elections:
SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. —
The following acts and practices relative to election are
prohibited, whether committed by a candidate for any elective
office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member, directly
or indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or through
another person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign
material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material
other than a statement of the biodata of a candidate on not
more than one page of a legal-size sheet of paper; or causing
distribution of such statement to be done by persons other
than those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding
an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the
Government or any political subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof;
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 208
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of
candidates, as well as the advertisement thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to
withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate, (1)
payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member;
(2) giving of food, drink, entertainment, transportation or any
article of value, or any similar consideration to any person; or
(3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made,
offered or promised to any person."
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for
violations of the above rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or
commission of any of the prohibited acts and practices defined
in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices relative to
elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a
ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal
from office if elected, without prejudice to the imposition of
sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the By-laws of
the Integrated Bar.
At the formal investigation which was conducted by the
investigating committee, the following violations were
established:
(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the
candidates for president, executive vice-president, the officers
of candidate the House of Delegates and Board of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and
Paculdo began travelling around the country to solicit the
votes of delegates as early as April 1989. Upon the invitation
of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July 13,1989, p. 4),
they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in Cotabato
in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City,
Pampanga, and in Baguio City (during the conference of
chapter presidents of Northern Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p.
113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47) where they
announced their candidacies and met the chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking
the help of IBP chapter officers, soliciting their votes, and
securing their written endorsements. He personally hand-
carried nomination forms and requested the chapter
presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms to
formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP
President. He started campaigning and distributing the
nomination forms in March 1989 after the chapter elections
which determined the membership of the House of Delegates
composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June 29,
1989, pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He
submitted photocopies of his nomination forms which read:
"Nomination Form
I Join in Nominating RAMON M. NISCE as
National President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
______________ _______________
Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre
P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V. Posadas,
Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos,
Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L. Ibarra, Jose
M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C.
Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J.
Arbolado Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B.
Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano
Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco,
Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas,
Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar
C. Fernandez, Ricardo B. Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto
Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio
G. Nalapo Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and
Manuel S. Person.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel
based on the commitments he had obtained (t.s.n., June 29,
1989, pp. 82-85). Unfortunately, despite those formal
commitments, he obtained only 14 votes in the election (t.s.n.,
June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that. some of
those who had committed their votes to him were
"manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or remunerated" (t.s.n.,
June 29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4,
1989, pp. 100-1 04).
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.
The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-
Crudo and Exhibit C-2-Crudo) show that Secretary Fulgencio
S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of Environment & Natural
Resources (DENR) borrowed a plane from the Philippine
National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for
Regional Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio
Tria. The plane manifest (Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta
Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant Secretary for Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys
Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of the
passengers were IBP candidates.
Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane.
She said that she was informed by Atty. Tiu about the
availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-
president in the Drilon ticket, testified that sometime in May
1989 he failed to obtain booking from the Philippine Airlines
for the projected trip of his group to Bicol. He went to the
DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client. While
at the DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was
going on an official business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio
Factoran and that he would be taking a PNB plane. As
Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity brother, he asked if
he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a ride on the
plane to Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in
going to Bicol was to assess their chances in the IBP
elections. The Drilon company talked with the IBP chapter
presidents in Daet, Naga, and Legaspi, and asked for their
support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).
Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a
PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her group. He recalled that on
May 23,1989, DENR Secretary Factoran instructed him to go
to Bicol to monitor certain regional development projects there
and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit the region in
the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity
brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity)
went to the DENR office and requested the Secretary
(Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be allowed to hitch a ride on the
plane. Assistant Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 209
which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong, Gladys
Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic Airport bound for
Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group had
lunch with Atty. Vicente Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president
(t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted
having formed their own slates for the election of IBP national
officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of — himself for President;
Bella D. Tiro, for Executive Vice-President; and for Governors:
Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez
(Central Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni (Greater Manila),
Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C.
Almine, Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas),
Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat
(Western Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern
Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President,
Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice President, Salvador Lao for
Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for Governors:
Basil Rupisan (Northern 'Luzon), Acong Atienza (Central
Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern
Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo
(Eastern Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys
Tiongco (Eastern Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western
Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor
B. Sansano Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio L. Nalapo
Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario Valderrama,
Candido P. Balbin Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar G. Viola,
Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban,
Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and
alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some
delegates to the convention. He mentioned Oscar Badelles to
whom he gave four round-trip tickets (worth about P10,000)
from Iligan City to Manila and back. Badelles was a voting
delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written commitment
from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce)
"sigurado na 'yan, h'wag mo nang papirmahin." Badelles won
as sergeant-at-arms, not in Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets,
but he Badelles said that he did not use them, because if he
did, he would be committed to Nisce, and he Badelles did not
want to be committed (t.s.n., July 4,1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his
candidate, and another ticket to Mrs. Linda Lim of
Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine Airlines showed that
Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr. (Exh.
D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica
(Exh. D-2-Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica),
Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3- Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas
(Exh. D-3-Calica).
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's
candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as Secretary
of the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p. 161).
(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks,
entertainment to delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and
three suites at the Holiday Inn, which served as his
headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his staff
(mostly ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three suites were
to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar
Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for
the hotel bills of his delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a room
cost P990 per day with breakfast.
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn
were: Emesto C. Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan Judge Alfonso
Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar, Benedicto
Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio Cribe
Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem
Arbolado, Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco,
Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy Manito Lucero, Fred
Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco
Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio
Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano
Neri, Guerrero Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza,
Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, Dennis Rendon, Judge
Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo Bella Tiro,
Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza,
Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge
Jaime Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito
Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven Zach, and Benjamin
Padon.
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that
Atty. Paculdo booked 52 (not 24) rooms, including the
presidential suite, which was used as the Secretariat. The
group bookings were made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo, the wife
of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total
sum of P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the
rooms.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at
the Philippine Plaza Hotel where her campaign manager, Atty.
Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites.
According to Ms. Villanueva, Philippine Plaza banquet and
conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta signed
with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP
c/o Atty. Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza,
recalled that it was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who first came to
book rooms for the IBP delegates. She suggested that he
obtain a group (or discounted) rate. He gave her the name of
Atty. Callanta who would make the arrangements with her. Mr.
Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for
the rooms, food, and beverages consumed by the Drilon
group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney
Daniel Martinez's last telephone conversation with Ms.
Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding account of
P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40
rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He made a downpayment of
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 210
P123,000. His "working sheet' showed that the following
persons contributed for that down payment:
(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office) P 25,000
(b) Antonio Carpio 20,000
(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office) 10,000
(d) Jay Castro 10,000
(e) Danny Deen 20,000
(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office) 10,000
(g) Alfonso Reyno 20,000
(h) Cosme Rossel 15,300
(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)
Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have
been contributing money every time the IBP embarks on a
project. This time, they contributed so that their partners or
associates could attend the legal aid seminar and the IBP
convention too.
Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta
had billeted her delegates at the Philippine Plaza. She
allegedly did not also know in whose name the room she
occupied was registered. But she did ask for a room where
she could rest during the convention. She admitted, however,
that she paid for her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta,
through Atty. Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3,1989).
The following were listed as having occupied the rooms
reserved by Atty. Callanta at the Philippine Plaza: Violeta
Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A.
Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong, Callanta,
Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores,
Silao Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel
Pecson, Sixto Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag,
Oscar Badelles, Antonio Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor
Atienza, Gil Batula Array Corot, Dimakuta Corot Romeo
Fortes Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo Deen,
Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad
Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica,
Luis Formilleza, Felix Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano,
Araneta, Renato Callanta.
Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which
he is a senior partner, gave P25,000 to Callanta for rooms at
the Philippine Plaza so that some members of his law firm
could campaign for the Drilon group (t.s.n. July 5,1989, pp.
7678) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention.
Most of the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of
Secretary Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma Rho
Fraternity). He admitted being sympathetic to the candidacy
of Atty. Drilon and the members of her slate, two of whom Jose
Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong — are Sigma Rhoans.
They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her
husband being a sigma rhoan.
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room
for the members of his own firm who attended the legal aid
seminar and the convention. He made the reservation through
Atty. Callanta to whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6,1989,
pp. 30-34).
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the
convention, by soliciting the votes of delegates he knew, like
Atty. Albacite his former teacher (but the latter was already
committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy Fortes, a classmate of
his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 22,
29, 39).
(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.
Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered
into a contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of 29 rooms plus
one (1) seventh-floor room. He made a downpayment of
P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 58) on April 20, 1989, and
P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon
Jacinto, the sales department manager, credit manager, and
reservation manager, respectively of the Hyatt, testified that
Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28,
1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto G-Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved
rooms for those who committed themselves to his candidacy.
The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis
Habanel B. Batula, John E. Asuncion, Reynaldo Cortes,
Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din, Antonio
Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin, Serrano Balot,
Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin
Reymundo P. Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo,
Dominador Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan,
Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo Fermin, C.
Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre
Tejada.
(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or
against a candidate while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-
judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government' (Sec. 14[c],
Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano E. Benedicto II, Assistant
Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, testified
that he took a leave of absence from his office to attend the
IBP convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the
Drilon group admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to
Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a member of the
Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked about the significance of
Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the
husband of Mrs. Drilon being my boss, the significance there
is that the husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho."
He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He
talked to her immediate circle which included Art Tiu, Tony
Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin,
and Boy Reyno. They assessed the progress of the campaign,
and measured the strengths and weaknesses of the other
groups The group had sessions as early as the later part of
May.
Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary
Benedicto toted up a bill of P23,110 during the 2-day IBP
convention/election. A total of 113 phone calls (amounting to
Pl,356) were recorded as emanating from his room.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 211
Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the
names of Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco (candidate for
Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy Wong (candidate for
Governor, Metro Manila). These two rooms served as the
"action center' or "war room" where campaign strategies were
discussed before and during the convention. It was in these
rooms where the supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys.
Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the Quasha and the ACCRA
lawyers met to plot their moves.
(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number
(Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has
heard of candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers who
promised to vote for or support them, but she has no way of
ascertaining whether it was a candidate who paid the
delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are issued
in the name of the member for whom payment is made (t.s.n.
June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments
in March, April, May during any election year. This year, the
collections increased by P100,000 over that of last year (a
non-election year from Pl,413,425 to Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June
28, 1989, p. 25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more
than one page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-
Laws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty.
Paculdo caused to be distributed his bio-data and copies of a
leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen as, the lists of his slate.
Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed their tickets and
bio-data.
The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to
P20,000. They were printed by his own printing shop.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by
persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at
the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his
campaign materials on the convention floor. Atty. Carpio noted
that there were more campaign materials distributed at the
convention site this year than in previous years. The election
was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39).
Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP
Rizal Chapter, and a candidate for chairman of the House of
Delegates on Nisce's ticket, testified that campaign materials
were distributed during the convention by girls and by lawyers.
He saw members of the ACCRA law firm campaigning for Atty.
Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).
(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or
to vote for or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo
Capulong, urged him to withdraw his candidacy for chairman
of the House of Delegates and to run as vice-chairman in Violy
Drilon's slate, but he declined (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 137,
149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces
Hotel in Baguio and president of the Baguio-Benguet IBP
Chapter, recalled that in the third week of May 1989, after the
Tripartite meet of the Department of Labor & Employment at
the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met Atty.
Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys.
Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon solicited her
(Atty. Agunos') vote and invited her to stay at the Philippine
Plaza where a room would be available for her. Atty. Paculdo
also tried to enlist her support during the chapter presidents'
meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the Northern
Luzon region (t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial
Magsino, who had earlier committed his vote to Nisce
changed his mind when he was offered a judgeship (This
statement, however, is admittedly hearsay). When Nisce
confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied
that there was such an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio
G. Nalapo an IBP candidate who also withdrew.
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race
and refused to be nominated (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104).
Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce's candidate for Governor
became Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p.
104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in
Cotabato City, Court Administrator Tiro went around saying, "I
am not campaigning, but my wife is a candidate." Nisce said
that the presidents of several IBP chapters informed him that
labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n. June
29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who
allegedly campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for
governor of the Western Visayas, expressed his
disappointment over the IBP elections because some
delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He testified
that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was
met by an assistant regional director of the DOLE who offered
to bring him to the Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer.
During the legal aid seminar, Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer
to the Philippine Plaza where a room had been reserved for
him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 102-
106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he
already knew that the three candidates had their headquarters
in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the
Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the Hyatt. He knew about this
because a week before the elections, representatives of Atty.
Drilon went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned
Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied
by Atty. Julve the Assistant Regional Director of the
Department of Labor in Dumaguete City. These two, he said,
offered to give him two PAL tickets and accommodations at
the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-104). But he
declined the offer because he was already committed to Atty.
Nisce.
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May
31, 1989, a businessman, Henry Dy, approached him to
convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that
he was already committed to Nisce.
He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because
he and his two companions (Atty. Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto)
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 212
had earlier bought their own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4,
1989, p. 101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED BY
THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000
during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this amount, the
Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter
president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar
Association is a voluntary bar association composed of
Quezon City lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his
trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra,
Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp.
9-14).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to
P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses for his
campaign which began several months before the June
3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for
some delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of
Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her campaign rang up
over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid
P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed
by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of
P302,197.30 at convention's end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in
which the principal candidates for the national positions
in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign
preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated
Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the
idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined
in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three
principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-
star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The
Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the
delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit
the votes of the chapter presidents who comprise the 120-
member House of Delegates that elects the national
officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets,
slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective
positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon,
Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of written
commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to
be filled up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for
delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the
presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon
and some members of her ticket to enable them to
"assess their chances" among the chapter presidents in
the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of
tickets and bio-data of the candidates which in the case
of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000;
the employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and
lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their campaign materials
on the convention floor on the day of the election; the
giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to
Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to
meet delegates at the airport and escort them to the
Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets
and hotel accommodations to delegates (and some
families who accompanied them) in exchange for their
support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing
them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another for
some rumored consideration; all these practices made a
political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole
election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that
election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also
the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all
lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and
uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to
"promote respect for law and legal processes" and to
abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02,
Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for
law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are
supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful
practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP
formulated for their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the
presidency of the association detracted from the dignity of the
legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being
bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not uphold the
honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the
evasions, denials and outright prevarications that tainted the
statements of the witnesses, including tome of the candidates,
during the initial hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding
committee was created. The subsequent investigation
conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties
had been less than candid with the Court and seem to have
conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold
vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed
during the campaign.
CONCLUSIONS.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the
provision in the 1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII) providing
for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7)
members among whom is "a representative of the Integrated
Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for
appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the
reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so
much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power"
erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have
caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon
the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of
the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval
with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-
political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely
eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the
organization which, as the recently concluded elections
revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously
diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the
practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court
hereby ORDERS:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they
are hereby annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by
the House of Delegates (approved by this Court in its
resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the
following national officers:
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 213

(a) the officers of the House of Delegates; 9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:

(b) the IBP president; and
(c) the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or
repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said
By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and
Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors
(composed of the governors of the nine [91 IBP regions) from
among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original
IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic
succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency
upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was
abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar
Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive
Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office of
president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect
an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The
position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among
the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president
may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a
succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency
among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed;
whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice-
President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from
among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable,
on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-
President for their respective regions. There shall also be a
Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be
appointed by the President with the consent of the Board.
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least
one (1) month before the national convention the delegates
from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the
choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among
the chapters in the region.
10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe
following provision as part of the first paragraph:
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general
membership shall be held prior to any election in an election
year.
11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of
Article VI should be as they are hereby deleted.
All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment
by the Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar
Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby
repealed or modified.
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held
in the nine (9) IBP regions within three (3) months, after the
promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty
(30) days thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the
IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among themselves
the IBP national president and executive vice-president. In
these special elections, the candidates in the election of the
national officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in
Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets
and Single Slates," as well as those identified in this
Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities
attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may not
present themselves as candidate for any position.
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be
appointed by the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The
Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are without
prejudice to its adoption in due time of such further and other
measures as are warranted in the premises.

6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as SO ORDERED.

follows:

(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP

shall be the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the
House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-
at-Arms shall be appointed by the President with the consent
of the House of Delegates.'

7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of

Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer and
Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby
repealed

8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated Bar

of the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors
consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as
delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the
representation basis of one (1) Governor for each region to be
elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that
region only. The position of Governor should be rotated
among the different Chapters in the region.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 214
G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II
of the City Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR.,
FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO,
JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN,
JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON
AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO
TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, and
RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice, Respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon
the validity of any executive or legislative act in an appropriate
cases, has to resolve the crucial issue of the constitutionality
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the
Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes." The task of judicial review, aptly characterized as
exacting and delicate, is never more so than when a conceded
legislative power, that of judicial reorganization, 1 may
possibly collide with the time-honored principle of the
independence of the judiciary 2 as protected and safeguarded
by this constitutional provision: "The Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during
good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.
The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges
of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members,
order their dismissal." 3 For the assailed legislation mandates
that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of
Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of
the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless
appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would
be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the
termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a
suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security
of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and
disregarded,
That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding,
erroneously entitled Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for
Prohibition 4 considered by this Court as an action for
prohibited petition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of
the Budget, respondent Chairman of the Commission on
Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any
action implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners 5
sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of good faith in
its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President his authority to fix the
compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges
thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when
the reorganization shall be deemed completed. In the very
comprehensive and scholarly Answer of Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza, 6 it was pointed out that there is no valid
justification for the attack on the constitutionality of this statute,
it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the
Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the
allegations of absence of good faith as well as the attack on
the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and
devoid of any support in law. A Supplemental Answer was
likewise filed on October 8, 1981, followed by a Reply of
petitioners on October 13. After the hearing in the morning and
afternoon of October 15, in which not only petitioners and
respondents were heard through counsel but also the amici
curiae, 7 and thereafter submission of the minutes of the
proceeding on the debate on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this
petition was deemed submitted for decision.
The importance of the crucial question raised called for
intensive and rigorous study of all the legal aspects of the
case. After such exhaustive deliberation in several sessions,
the exchange of views being supplemented by memoranda
from the members of the Court, it is our opinion and so hold
that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.
1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is
easily resolved. As far as Judge de la Llana is concerned, he
certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel's
opinion in People v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The unchallenged rule is
that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement." 9 The other petitioners as members of the bar
and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid of
"any personal and substantial interest" on the matter. There is
relevance to this excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino,
Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 10 "Then there is the attack
on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most what they
consider a public right and not protecting their rights as
individuals. This is to conjure the specter of the public right
dogma as an inhibition to parties intent on keeping public
officials staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so
well put by Jaffe: 'The protection of private rights is an
essential constituent of public interest and, conversely,
without a well-ordered state there could be no enforcement of
private rights. Private and public interests are, both in
substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the totality of
the legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have convincingly
shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue
has been amply demonstrated. There would be a retreat from
the liberal approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works, foreshadowed by the very decision of People v. Vera
where the doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act
differently now. I do not think we are prepared to take that
step. Respondents, however, would hark back to the
American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham
with their claim that what petitioners possess 'is an interest
which is shared in common by other people and is
comparatively so minute and indeterminate as to afford any
basis and assurance that the judicial process can act on it.'
That is to speak in the language of a bygone era even in the
United States. For as Chief Justice Warren clearly pointed out
in the later case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not
breached has definitely been lowered." 11
2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack
of good faith does manifest violence to the facts. Petitioners
should have exercised greater care in informing themselves
as to its antecedents. They had laid themselves open to the
accusation of reckless disregard for the truth, On August 7,
1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization
was organized. 12 This Executive Order was later amended
by Executive Order No. 619-A., dated September 5 of that
year. It clearly specified the task assigned to it: "1. The
Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization of the
Judiciary which shall be submitted within seventy (70) days
from August 7, 1980 to provide the President sufficient options
for the reorganization of the entire Judiciary which shall
embrace all lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, the
Courts of First Instance, the City and Municipal Courts, and all
Special Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan." 13 On
October 17, 1980, a Report was submitted by such Committee
on Judicial Reorganization. It began with this paragraph: "The
Committee on Judicial Reorganization has the honor to submit
the following Report. It expresses at the outset its appreciation
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 215
for the opportunity accorded it to study ways and means for
what today is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the
restructuring of the judicial system. There are problems, both
grave and pressing, that call for remedial measures. The felt
necessities of the time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes, admit
of no delay, for if no step be taken and at the earliest
opportunity, it is not too much to say that the people's faith in
the administration of justice could be shaken. It is imperative
that there be a greater efficiency in the disposition of cases
and that litigants, especially those of modest means — much
more so, the poorest and the humblest — can vindicate their
rights in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. The
rectitude and the fairness in the way the courts operate must
be manifest to all members of the community and particularly
to those whose interests are affected by the exercise of their
functions. It is to that task that the Committee addresses itself
and hopes that the plans submitted could be a starting point
for an institutional reform in the Philippine judiciary. The
experience of the Supreme Court, which since 1973 has been
empowered to supervise inferior courts, from the Court of
Appeals to the municipal courts, has proven that reliance on
improved court management as well as training of judges for
more efficient administration does not suffice. I hence, to
repeat, there is need for a major reform in the judicial so stem
it is worth noting that it will be the first of its kind since the
Judiciary Act became effective on June 16, 1901." 14 I t went
to say: "I t does not admit of doubt that the last two decades
of this century are likely to be attended with problems of even
greater complexity and delicacy. New social interests are
pressing for recognition in the courts. Groups long inarticulate,
primarily those economically underprivileged, have found
legal spokesmen and are asserting grievances previously
ignored. Fortunately, the judicially has not proved inattentive.
Its task has thus become even more formidable. For so much
grist is added to the mills of justice. Moreover, they are
likewise to be quite novel. The need for an innovative
approach is thus apparent. The national leadership, as is well-
known, has been constantly on the search for solutions that
will prove to be both acceptable and satisfactory. Only thus
may there be continued national progress." 15 After which
comes: "To be less abstract, the thrust is on development.
That has been repeatedly stressed — and rightly so. All efforts
are geared to its realization. Nor, unlike in the past, was it to b
"considered as simply the movement towards economic
progress and growth measured in terms of sustained
increases in per capita income and Gross National Product
(GNP). 16 For the New Society, its implication goes further
than economic advance, extending to "the sharing, or more
appropriately, the democratization of social and economic
opportunities, the substantiation of the true meaning of social
justice." 17 This process of modernization and change
compels the government to extend its field of activity and its
scope of operations. The efforts towards reducing the gap
between the wealthy and the poor elements in the nation call
for more regulatory legislation. That way the social justice and
protection to labor mandates of the Constitution could be
effectively implemented." 18 There is likelihood then "that
some measures deemed inimical by interests adversely
affected would be challenged in court on grounds of validity.
Even if the question does not go that far, suits may be filed
concerning their interpretation and application. ... There could
be pleas for injunction or restraining orders. Lack of success
of such moves would not, even so, result in their prompt final
disposition. Thus delay in the execution of the policies
embodied in law could thus be reasonably expected. That is
not conducive to progress in development." 19 For, as
mentioned in such Report, equally of vital concern is the
problem of clogged dockets, which "as is well known, is one
of the utmost gravity. Notwithstanding the most determined
efforts exerted by the Supreme Court, through the leadership
of both retired Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and the late
Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, from the time supervision of
the courts was vested in it under the 1973 Constitution, the
trend towards more and more cases has continued." 20 It is
understandable why. With the accelerated economic
development, the growth of population, the increasing
urbanization, and other similar factors, the judiciary is called
upon much oftener to resolve controversies. Thus confronted
with what appears to be a crisis situation that calls for a
remedy, the Batasang Pambansa had no choice. It had to act,
before the ailment became even worse. Time was of the
essence, and yet it did not hesitate to be duly mindful, as it
ought to be, of the extent of its coverage before enacting
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional
reforms," characterized in the Report as "both pressing and
urgent." 21 It is worth noting, likewise, as therein pointed out,
that a major reorganization of such scope, if it were to take
place, would be the most thorough after four generations. 22
The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act generations .
enacted in June of 1901, 23 amended in a significant way,
only twice previous to the Commonwealth. There was, of
course, the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1935, originally
composed "of a Presiding Judge and ten appellate Judges,
who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines,
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the
National Assembly, 24 It could "sit en banc, but it may sit in
two divisions, one of six and another of five Judges, to transact
business, and the two divisions may sit at the same time." 25
Two years after the establishment of independence of the
Republic of the Philippines, the Judiciary Act of 1948 26 was
passed. It continued the existing system of regular inferior
courts, namely, the Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance,
27 the Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts, and the
Justice of the Peace Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts
and Municipal Courts. The membership of the Court of
Appeals has been continuously increased. 28 Under a 1978
Presidential Decree, there would be forty-five members, a
Presiding Justice and forty-four Associate Justices, with
fifteen divisions. 29 Special courts were likewise created. The
first was the Court of Tax Appeals in 1954, 30 next came the
Court of Agrarian Relations in 1955, 31 and then in the same
year a Court of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations for Manila
in 1955, 32 subsequently followed by the creation of two other
such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. 33 In 1967,
Circuit Criminal Courts were established, with the Judges
having the same qualifications, rank, compensation, and
privileges as judges of Courts of First Instance. 34
4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42,
which later became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
was introduced. After setting forth the background as above
narrated, its Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to the
President's instructions, this proposed legislation has been
drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with
particular attention to certain objectives of the reorganization,
to wit, the attainment of more efficiency in disposal of cases,
a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures
which do not tend to the proper meeting out of justice. In
consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the governmental
and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that some
options set forth in the Report be not availed of. Instead of the
proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the intermediate
appellate court merely to appellate adjudication, the
preference has been opted to increase rather than diminish its
jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively assist the
Supreme Court. This preference has been translated into one
of the innovations in the proposed Bill." 35 In accordance with
the parliamentary procedure, the Bill was sponsored by the
Chairman of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and
Good Government to which it was referred. Thereafter,
Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 216
to the Batasang Pambansa recommending the approval with
some amendments. In the sponsorship speech of Minister
Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the Presidential
Committee on Judicial Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17,
1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization
submitted its report to the President which contained the
'Proposed Guidelines for Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill
No. 42 was drafted substantially in accordance with the
options presented by these guidelines. Some options set forth
in the aforesaid report were not availed of upon consultation
with and upon consensus of the government and
parliamentary leadership. Moreover, some amendments to
the bill were adopted by the Committee on Justice, Human
Rights and Good Government, to which The bill was referred,
following the public hearings on the bill held in December of
1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the
distinguished members of the bench and the bar who had
submitted written proposals, suggestions, and position papers
on the bill upon the invitation of the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government." 36 Stress was laid by
the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would,
firstly, result in the attainment of more efficiency in the
disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of
justice dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary
consequence of the easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the
structural changes introduced in the bill, together with the
reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of
procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the
exigencies of the present day Philippine society, and
hopefully, of the foreseeable future." 37 it may be observed
that the volume containing the minutes of the proceedings of
the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted
to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable
time and effort as well as exhaustive study before the act was
signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With such a
background, it becomes quite manifest how lacking in factual
basis is the allegation that its enactment is tainted by the vice
of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and undeniable is
the good faith that characterized its enactment from its
inception to the affixing of the Presidential signature.
5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of
an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in
good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38reiterated such a
doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents, to be
without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the
service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their
offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It
is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither
removal nor separation of the incumbents. ... And, of course,
if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have
ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we
pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that
the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal
of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the
abolition must be made in good faith." 39 The above excerpt
was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial
Governor, 40 two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine
having preceded it. 41 As with the offices in the other
branches of the government, so it is with the judiciary. The test
remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element
is conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even
more apparent. The concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in
Zandueta v. De la Costa 42 cannot be any clearer. This is a
quo warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that he,
and not respondent, was entitled to he office of judge of the
Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. There
was a Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936, 43 a year after the
inauguration of the Commonwealth, amending the
Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction
known as the Courts of First Instance Prior to such statute,
petitioner was the incumbent of such branch. Thereafter, he
received an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth
Judicial District, under the new legislation. Unfortunately for
him, the Commission on Appointments of then National
Assembly disapproved the same, with respondent being
appointed in his place. He contested the validity of the Act
insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his position
This Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His petition was
dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Nonetheless, the
separate concurrence of Justice Laurel in the result reached,
to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the standard of good
faith to preclude any doubt as to the abolition of an inferior
court, with due recognition of the security of tenure guarantee.
Thus: " I am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in
so far as it reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the
Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new district
comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is
valid and constitutional. This conclusion flows from the
fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish
courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may
reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby
necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section 2,
Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly
the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts, subject to certain limitations in the case of
the Supreme Court. It is admitted that section 9 of the same
article of the Constitution provides for the security of tenure of
all the judges. The principles embodied in these two sections
of the same article of the Constitution must be coordinated
and harmonized. A mere enunciation of a principle will not
decide actual cases and controversies of every sort. (Justice
Holmes in Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed;
937)" 44 justice Laurel continued: "I am not insensible to the
argument that the National Assembly may abuse its power
and move deliberately to defeat the constitutional provision
guaranteeing security of tenure to all judges, But, is this the
case? One need not share the view of Story, Miller and Tucker
on the one hand, or the opinion of Cooley, Watson and
Baldwin on the other, to realize that the application of a legal
or constitutional principle is necessarily factual and
circumstantial and that fixity of principle is the rigidity of the
dead and the unprogressive. I do say, and emphatically,
however, that cases may arise where the violation of the
constitutional provision regarding security of tenure is
palpable and plain, and that legislative power of
reorganization may be sought to cloak an unconstitutional and
evil purpose. When a case of that kind arises, it will be the
time to make the hammer fall and heavily. But not until then. I
am satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed, the
purpose was the fulfillment of what was considered a great
public need by the legislative department and that
Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not enacted purposely to
affect adversely the tenure of judges or of any particular judge.
Under these circumstances, I am for sustaining the power of
the legislative department under the Constitution. To be sure,
there was greater necessity for reorganization consequent
upon the establishment of the new government than at the
time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were approved by the defunct
Philippine Legislature, and although in the case of these two
Acts there was an express provision providing for the vacation
by the judges of their offices whereas in the case of
Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its
silence, this doubt should be resolved in favor of the valid
exercise of the legislative power." 45
6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-
cited opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta, reference was
made to Act No. 2347 46 on the reorganization of the Courts
of First Instance and to Act No. 4007 47 on the reorganization
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 217
of all branches of the government, including the courts of first
instance. In both of them, the then Courts of First Instance
were replaced by new courts with the same appellation. As
Justice Laurel pointed out, there was no question as to the fact
of abolition. He was equally categorical as to Commonwealth
Act No. 145, where also the system of the courts of first
instance was provided for expressly. It was pointed out by
Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new district
of the same court is valid and constitutional. such conclusion
flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the legislature
may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and
therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise
thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions."
48 The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate
court, 49 regional trial courts, 50 metropolitan trial courts of
the national capital region, 51 and other metropolitan trial
courts, 52 municipal trial courts in cities, 53 as well as in
municipalities, 54 and municipal circuit trial courts. 55 There
is even less reason then to doubt the fact that existing inferior
courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the
establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate
response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for
solution. Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to
the appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was for the
Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals only with the
question of power. It bears mentioning that in Brillo v. Eñage
56 this Court, in an unanimous opinion penned by the late
Justice Diokno, citing Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La
segunda question que el recurrrido plantea es que la Carta de
Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido
abolido el cargo, entonces ha quedado extinguido el derecho
de recurente a ocuparlo y a cobrar el salario correspodiente.
Mc Culley vs. State, 46 LRA, 567. El derecho de un juez de
desempenarlo hasta los 70 años de edad o se incapacite no
priva al Congreso de su facultad de abolir, fusionar o
reorganizar juzgados no constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless,
such well-established principle was not held applicable to the
situation there obtaining, the Charter of Tacloban City creating
a city court in place of the former justice of the peace court.
Thus: "Pero en el caso de autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no
ha sido abolido. Solo se le ha cambiado el nombre con el
cambio de forma del gobierno local." 58 The present case is
anything but that. Petitioners did not and could not prove that
the challenged statute was not within the bounds of legislative
authority.
7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The
implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly a
task incumbent on the Executive, may give rise, however, to
questions affecting a judiciary that should be kept
independent. The all-embracing scope of the assailed
legislation as far as all inferior courts from the Courts of
Appeals to municipal courts are concerned, with the exception
solely of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals 59
gave rise, and understandably so, to misgivings as to its effect
on such cherished Ideal. The first paragraph of the section on
the transitory provision reads: "The provisions of this Act shall
be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive
Order to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals,
the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of
Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and
the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function as
presently constituted and organized, until the completion of
the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the
President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be
deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof
shall cease to hold the office." 60 There is all the more reason
then why this Court has no choice but to inquire further into
the allegation by petitioners that the security of tenure
provision, an assurance of a judiciary free from extraneous
influences, is thereby reduced to a barren form of words. The
amended Constitution adheres even more clearly to the long-
established tradition of a strong executive that antedated the
1935 Charter. As noted in the work of former Vice-Governor
Hayden, a noted political scientist, President Claro M. Recto
of the 1934 Convention, in his closing address, in stressing
such a concept, categorically spoke of providing "an executive
power which, subject to the fiscalization of the Assembly, and
of public opinion, will not only know how to govern, but will
actually govern, with a firm and steady hand, unembarrassed
by vexatious interferences by other departments, or by unholy
alliances with this and that social group." 61 The above
excerpt was cited with approval by Justice Laurel in Planas v.
Gil. 62 Moreover, under the 1981 Amendments, it may be
affirmed that once again the principle of separation of powers,
to quote from the same jurist as ponente in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 "obtains not through express provision but by
actual division." 64 The president, under Article VII, shall be
the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of the
Philippines." 65Moreover, it is equally therein expressly
provided that all the powers he possessed under the 1935
Constitution are once again vested in him unless the Batasang
Pambansa provides otherwise." 66 Article VII of the 1935
Constitution speaks categorically: "The Executive power shall
be vested in a President of the Philippines." 67 As originally
framed, the 1973 Constitution created the position of
President as the "symbolic head of state." 68 In addition, there
was a provision for a Prime Minister as the head of
government exercising the executive power with the
assistance of the Cabinet 69 Clearly, a modified parliamentary
system was established. In the light of the 1981 amendments
though, this Court in Free Telephone Workers Union v.
Minister of Labor 70 could state: "The adoption of certain
aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended
Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential
character." 71 The retention, however, of the position of the
Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a majority of the members of
which shall come from the regional representatives of the
Batasang Pambansa and the creation of an Executive
Committee composed of the Prime Minister as Chairman and
not more than fourteen other members at least half of whom
shall be members of the Batasang Pambansa, clearly indicate
the evolving nature of the system of government that is now
operative. 72 What is equally apparent is that the strongest
ties bind the executive and legislative departments. It is
likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its
full authority to enact whatever legislation may be necessary
to carry out national policy as usually formulated in a caucus
of the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun
v. Labang 73 it was stressed that with the provision
transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision
over the Judiciary, there is a greater need "to preserve
unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at
present, where to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion
between the executive and the legislative branches." 74
8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition
of the existing inferior courts collides with the security of
tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under
Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar
provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as
far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise
administratively inferior courts. 75 Moreover, this Court is em
powered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote
of at least eight members, order their dismissal." 76 Thus it
possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the
Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such
power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from
termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can
be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there
is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 218
with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in
that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question
of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished,
the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction
exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a
member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed
legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted
principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be
consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest
consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a
failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court
does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is
involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not
have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of
deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue.
Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to
the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That
remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly
belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and
tested ways of judicial power, Rather what is sought to be
achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded
power of reorganizing tulle inferior courts, the power of
removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is
ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free
from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily
discernidble except to those predisposed to view it with
distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in
accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of
alternatives between one which would save and another
which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.
78 There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the
Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid
any constitutional taint must be applied Nuñez v.
Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated last January, has this
relevant excerpt: "It is true that other Sections of the Decree
could have been so worded as to avoid any constitutional
objection. As of now, however, no ruling is called for. The view
is given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion
of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree
from the direct fate of invalidity, they must be construed in
such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on the powers
vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition
too plain to be committed. It commends itself for approval."
80Nor would such a step be unprecedented. The Presidential
Decree constituting Municipal Courts into Municipal Circuit
Courts, specifically provides: "The Supreme Court shall carry
out the provisions of this Decree through implementing orders,
on a province-to-province basis." 81 It is true there is no such
provision in this Act, but the spirit that informs it should not be
ignored in the Executive Order contemplated under its Section
44. 82 Thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most
rigorous test of constitutionality. 83
9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is
called upon to reconcile or harmonize constitutional
provisions. To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is
expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior
courts and in the process to abolish existing ones. As noted in
the preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their
occupants, as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is
hardly distinguishable from the practical standpoint from
removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It is of the
essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is
precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded
competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under
the constitutional system we have adopted that this Court
cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation.
As Justice Laurel put it so well in the previously cited Angara
decision, while in the main, "the Constitution has blocked out
with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government, the overlapping and interlacing of functions and
duties between the several departments, however, sometimes
makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the
other begins." 84 It is well to recall another classic utterance
from the same jurist, even more emphatic in its affirmation of
such a view, moreover buttressed by one of those insights for
which Holmes was so famous "The classical separation of
government powers, whether viewed in the light of the political
philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu or of the
postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative
theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in
interdependence than in independence and separation of
powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of
Philippine origin, we cannot lay down 'with mathematical
precision and divide the branches into water-tight
compartments' not only because 'the great ordinances of the
Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and
white but also because 'even the more specific of them are
found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one
extreme to the other.'" 85 This too from Justice Tuazon,
likewise expressing with force and clarity why the need for
reconciliation or balancing is well-nigh unavodiable under the
fundamental principle of separation of powers: "The
constitutional structure is a complicated system, and
overlappings of governmental functions are recognized,
unavoidable, and inherent necessities of governmental
coordination." 86 In the same way that the academe has noted
the existence in constitutional litigation of right versus right,
there are instances, and this is one of them, where, without
this attempt at harmonizing the provisions in question, there
could be a case of power against power. That we should
avoid.
10. There are other objections raised but they pose no
difficulty. Petitioners would characterize as an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of
authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of the
Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more careful
reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to
have cautioned them against raising such an issue. The
language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned
provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices,
Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal
Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive
such receive such compensation and allowances as may be
authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in
Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1597." 87 The existence of a standard is thus clear. The basic
postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that
it is the legislative body which is entrusted with the
competence to make laws and to alter and repeal them, the
test being the completeness of the statue in all its terms and
provisions when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: 88
"To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature
itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete
abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be
carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 219
may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-
delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does
not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from
the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole." 89
The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and
legislative departments under the amended Constitution
assure that the framing of policies as well as their
implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude,
and efficiency. There is accuracy, therefore, to this
observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision:
"There is accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to
administrative and executive agencies the adoption of such
means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative
purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-respected legal
scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as 1947, could speak of
delegation as the 'dynamo of modern government.'" 90 He
warned against a "restrictive approach" which could be "a
deterrent factor to much-needed legislation." 91 Further on
this point from the same opinion" "The spectre of the non-
delegation concept need not haunt, therefore, party caucuses,
cabinet sessions or legislative chambers." 92 Another
objection based on the absence in the statue of what
petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame limitation" is
equally bereft of merit. They ignore the categorical language
of this provision: "The Supreme Court shall submit to the
President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity
of this act, a staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant
to this Act which shall be the basis of the implementing order
to be issued by the President in accordance with the
immediately succeeding section." 93 The first sentence of the
next section is even more categorical: "The provisions of this
Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an
Executive Order to be issued by the President." 94 Certainly
petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the President is
insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws
be faithfully executed. 95 In the meanwhile, the existing
inferior courts affected continue functioning as before, "until
the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as
declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said
courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the
incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." 96 There is no
ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus automatically
abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear need be
entertained by incumbents whose length of service, quality of
performance, and clean record justify their being named
anew, 97 in legal contemplation without any interruption in the
continuity of their service. 98 It is equally reasonable to
assume that from the ranks of lawyers, either in the
government service, private practice, or law professors will
come the new appointees. In the event that in certain cases a
little more time is necessary in the appraisal of whether or not
certain incumbents deserve reappointment, it is not from their
standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of
the good faith that will characterize its implementation by the
Executive. There is pertinence to this observation of Justice
Holmes that even acceptance of the generalization that courts
ordinarily should not supply omissions in a law, a
generalization qualified as earlier shown by the principle that
to save a statute that could be done, "there is no canon
against using common sense in construing laws as saying
what they obviously mean." 99 Where then is the
unconstitutional flaw
11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on
September 8, 1981, petitioners sought to have the writer of
this opinion and Justices Ramon C. Aquino and Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera disqualified because the first-named was
the chairman and the other two, members of the Committee
on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion was
denied. It was made clear then and there that not one of the
three members of the Court had any hand in the framing or in
the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not
consulted. They did not testify. The challenged legislation is
entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body. 100
Their work was limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to
submitting alternative plan for reorganization. That is more in
the nature of scholarly studies. That the undertook. There
could be no possible objection to such activity. Ever since
1973, this Tribunal has had administrative supervision over
interior courts. It has had the opportunity to inform itself as to
the way judicial business is conducted and how it may be
improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the
recollection of the writer of this opinion that either the then
Chairman or members of the Committee on Justice of the then
Senate of the Philippines 101 consulted members of the Court
in drafting proposed legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not
inappropriate to cite this excerpt from an article in the 1975
Supreme Court Review: "In the twentieth century the Chief
Justice of the United States has played a leading part in
judicial reform. A variety of conditions have been responsible
for the development of this role, and foremost among them
has been the creation of explicit institutional structures
designed to facilitate reform." 102 Also: "Thus the Chief
Justice cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement in
judicial reform at the federal level and, to the extent issues of
judicial federalism arise, at the state level as well." 103
12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime
that it is the people who are endowed with rights, to secure
which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through
public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or
impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise not for their own
benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not
speak in the language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public
trust." 104 That is more than a moral adjuration It is a legal
imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights.
It does so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill
his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint
that the security of tenure provision to assure judicial
independence is to be viewed. It is an added guarantee that
justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any
fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments
then are even more likely to be inspired solely by their
knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free
from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives.
The independence of which they are assured is impressed
with a significance transcending that of a purely personal right.
As thus viewed, it is not solely for their welfare. The
challenged legislation Thus subject d to the most rigorous
scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack of due care and
circumspection, it allow the erosion of that Ideal so firmly
embedded in the national consciousness There is this farther
thought to consider. independence in thought and action
necessarily is rooted in one's mind and heart. As emphasized
by former Chief Justice Paras in Ocampo v. Secretary of
Justice, 105 there is no surer guarantee of judicial
independence than the God-given character and fitness of
those appointed to the Bench. The judges may be guaranteed
a fixed tenure of office during good behavior, but if they are of
such stuff as allows them to be subservient to one
administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of one
litigant after another, the independence of the judiciary will be
nothing more than a myth or an empty Ideal. Our judges, we
are confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or
in spite of the power of Congress — we do not say unlimited
but as herein exercised — to reorganize inferior courts." 106
That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law jurists, who
at the cost of his office made clear that he would not just
blindly obey the King's order but "will do what becomes [him]
as a judge." So it was pointed out in the first leading case
stressing the independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v.
Mariano, 107 The ponencia of Justice Malcolm Identified good
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 220

judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of law,

who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are
permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by
outside influence, and who are independent and self-
respecting human units in a judicial system equal and
coordinate to the other two departments of government." 108
There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to
annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended with
deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It
does not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing
inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary
unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn
duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there
be any fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise
be of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot
be denied that an independent and efficient judiciary is
something to the credit of any administration. Well and truly
has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation
of powers assumes, and justifiably so, that the three
departments are as one in their determination to pursue the
Ideals and aspirations and to fulfilling the hopes of the
sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution. There is
wisdom as well as validity to this pronouncement of Justice
Malcolm in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation
Company, 109 a decision promulgated almost half a century
ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of
constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any
other department or the government, so should it as strictly
confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or
by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act." 110 To that
basic postulate underlying our constitutional system, this
Court remains committed.

WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa

Blg. 129 not having been shown, this petition is dismissed. No
costs.

Makasiar and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., concur in the result.

FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 221
G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G.
ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the
respondents, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents), duly
opposed2 by the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco
I. Chavez (petitioner).
By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the
unexpected departure of former Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of petitioner,
as his potential successor. In his initiatory pleading,
petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether the first
paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
allows more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the
JBC; and 2] if the practice of having two (2) representatives
from each House of Congress with one (1) vote each is
sanctioned by the Constitution.
On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject
decision, disposing the same in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current
numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only
one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its
proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution.
This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2012, following respondents’ motion for
reconsideration and with due regard to Senate Resolution
Nos. 111,3 112,4 113,5 and 114,6 the Court set the subject
motion for oral arguments on August 2, 2012.7 On August 3,
2012, the Court discussed the merits of the arguments and
agreed, in the meantime, to suspend the effects of the second
paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012
Decision which decreed that it was immediately executory.
The decretal portion of the August 3, 2012 Resolution8 reads:
WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their
respective MEMORANDA within ten (10) days from notice.
Until further orders, the Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect
of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the
Court’s July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads: "This disposition
is immediately executory."9
Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and respondents
filed their respective memoranda.10
Brief Statement of the Antecedents
In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the
Philippine Republic, the exercise of appointing members of
the Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the
executive and legislative branches of the government. Like
their progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos
Constitution11 and the 1935 Constitution12vested the power
to appoint the members of the Judiciary in the President,
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
It was during these times that the country became witness to
the deplorable practice of aspirants seeking confirmation of
their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with
the members of the legislative body.13
Then, under the 1973 Constitution,14 with the fusion of the
executive and legislative powers in one body, the appointment
of judges and justices ceased to be subject of scrutiny by
another body. The power became exclusive and absolute to
the Executive, subject only to the condition that the appointees
must have all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications.
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to
the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan
activities,15 the members of the Constitutional Commission
saw it wise to create a separate, competent and independent
body to recommend nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the
stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, and called it
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The Framers carefully
worded Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this
wise:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the
Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members,
a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of
the private sector.
From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress
designated one (1) representative to sit in the JBC to act as
one of the ex-officio members.16 Pursuant to the
constitutional provision that Congress is entitled to one (1)
representative, each House sent a representative to the JBC,
not together, but alternately or by rotation.
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was
substantially altered.1âwphi1 An eighth member was added
to the JBC as the two (2) representatives from Congress
began sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with each having
one-half (1/2) of a vote.17
In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives
from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full
vote each.18 It has been the situation since then.
Grounds relied upon by Respondents
Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court
reconsider its decision and dismiss the petition on the
following grounds: 1] that allowing only one representative
from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity considering
its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the Framers to make
the proper adjustment when there was a shift from
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 222
unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3] that two
representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention
of the Framers to insulate the JBC from political partisanship;
and 4] that the rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-
member composition would provide a solution should there be
a stalemate is not exactly correct.
While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in
amplification of the third and fourth grounds listed by
respondents, still, it finds itself unable to reverse the assailed
decision on the principal issues covered by the first and
second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the conclusion
arrived at, with respect to the first and second grounds, carries
greater bearing in the final resolution of this case.
As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss
them jointly.
Ruling of the Court
The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino
people by which the fundamental powers of government
are established, limited and defined and by which those
powers are distributed among the several departments
for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the
body politic.19 The Framers reposed their wisdom and vision
on one suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the
principles and the framework upon which government and
society were to operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the
constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on the basic
postulate that the Framers mean what they say. The language
used in the Constitution must be taken to have been
deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every word
employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its
deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate against
disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly
says, according to its text, compels acceptance and bars
modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it.
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of
plain oversight in order to justify constitutional construction. As
stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the
singular letter "a" to describe "representative of Congress,"
the Filipino people through the Framers intended that
Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the
intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its other
provisions.
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several
provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift
to bicameralism. One example is Section 4, Article VII, which
provides that a tie in the presidential election shall be broken
"by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately."20 Another is Section 8 thereof
which requires the nominee to replace the Vice-President to
be confirmed "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses
of the Congress, voting separately."21 Similarly, under
Section 18, the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked
or continued by the Congress, voting separately, by a vote of
at least a majority of all its Members."22 In all these
provisions, the bicameral nature of Congress was recognized
and, clearly, the corresponding adjustments were made as to
how a matter would be handled and voted upon by its two
Houses.
Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section
8, Article VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to their decision to shift
to a bicameral form of the legislature, is not persuasive
enough. Respondents cannot just lean on plain oversight to
justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very clear that the
Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on
congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in
the exercise of its primary function – to legislate. JBC was
created to support the executive power to appoint, and
Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a
contributory non-legislative function.
The underlying reason for such a limited participation can
easily be discerned. Congress has two (2) Houses. The need
to recognize the existence and the role of each House is
essential considering that the Constitution employs precise
language in laying down the functions which particular House
plays, regardless of whether the two Houses consummate an
official act by voting jointly or separately. Whether in the
exercise of its legislative23 or its non-legislative functions
such as inter alia, the power of appropriation,24 the
declaration of an existence of a state of war,25 canvassing of
electoral returns for the President and Vice-President,26 and
impeachment,27 the dichotomy of each House must be
acknowledged and recognized considering the interplay
between these two Houses. In all these instances, each
House is constitutionally granted with powers and functions
peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to 1) its
relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance
with the principle of checks and balances, as to the other
branches of government.
In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction
between the two Houses in their participation in the JBC. No
mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial
officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the Framers
arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular
members, three (3) representatives from the major branches
of government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman
(representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of
Justice (representing the Executive Department), and a
representative of the Congress (representing the Legislative
Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so providing,
the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not
because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in
reverence to it as a major branch of government.
On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A.
Datumanong, from the Second District of Maguindanao,
submitted his well-considered position28 to then Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno:
I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one
representative of Congress in the JBC in accordance with
Article VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution x x x.
The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does
not need any further interpretation. Perhaps, it is apt to
mention that the oft-repeated doctrine that "construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them."
Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the
Council, with one vote each, is to negate the principle of
equality among the three branches of government which is
enshrined in the Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition that the
Council should adopt the rule of single representation of
Congress in the JBC in order to respect and give the right
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 223
meaning to the above-quoted provision of the Constitution.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A.
Quisumbing, also a JBC Consultant, submitted to the Chief
Justice and ex-officio JBC Chairman his opinion,29 which
reads:
8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations
above: the creation of the JBC is intended to curtail the
influence of politics in Congress in the appointment of judges,
and the understanding is that seven (7) persons will compose
the JBC. As such, the interpretation of two votes for Congress
runs counter to the intendment of the framers. Such
interpretation actually gives Congress more influence in the
appointment of judges. Also, two votes for Congress would
increase the number of JBC members to eight, which could
lead to voting deadlock by reason of even-numbered
membership, and a clear violation of 7 enumerated members
in the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In an undated position paper,30 then Secretary of Justice
Agnes VST Devanadera opined:
As can be gleaned from the above constitutional provision, the
JBC is composed of seven (7) representatives coming from
different sectors. From the enumeration it is patent that each
category of members pertained to a single individual only.
Thus, while we do not lose sight of the bicameral nature of our
legislative department, it is beyond dispute that Art. VIII,
Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution is explicit and specific
that "Congress" shall have only "xxx a representative." Thus,
two (2) representatives from Congress would increase the
number of JBC members to eight (8), a number beyond what
the Constitution has contemplated. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by retired
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, a former JBC consultant,
is worth reiterating.31 Thus:
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission
reveals that the composition of the JBC reflects the
Commission’s desire "to have in the Council a representation
for the major elements of the community." xxx The ex-officio
members of the Council consist of representatives from the
three main branches of government while the regular
members are composed of various stakeholders in the
judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1)
was to treat each ex-officio member as representing one co-
equal branch of government. xxx Thus, the JBC was designed
to have seven voting members with the three ex-officio
members having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.
xxx
No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of
Congress in the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its
legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers
under Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress, in relation to
the executive and judicial branches of government, is
constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in the
matter of its representative in the JBC. On the other hand, the
exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires the
Senate and the House of Representatives to coordinate and
act as distinct bodies in furtherance of Congress’ role under
our constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies and, in fact,
necessitates the separateness of the two Houses of Congress
as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when
Congress interacts with the other two co-equal branches of
government.
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three
governmental branches to assign the same weight to
considerations that any of its representatives may have
regarding aspiring nominees to the judiciary. The
representatives of the Senate and the House of
Representatives act as such for one branch and should not
have any more quantitative influence as the other branches in
the exercise of prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the three.
Sound reason and principle of equality among the three
branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and
underscoring supplied]
The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of
the House of Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is,
thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress,
whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives, is
constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress.
It may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an
absurdity.
From this score stems the conclusion that the lone
representative of Congress is entitled to one full vote. This
pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of splitting
the said vote into half (1/2), between two representatives of
Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned practice cause
disorder in the voting process, it is clearly against the essence
of what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic and
reasonable is the rule that what cannot be legally done directly
cannot be done indirectly. To permit or tolerate the splitting of
one vote into two or more is clearly a constitutional
circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the Court.
Succinctly put, when the Constitution envisioned one member
of Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to presume that
this representation carries with him one full vote.
It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President,
in effect, has more influence over the JBC simply because all
of the regular members of the JBC are his appointees. The
principle of checks and balances is still safeguarded because
the appointment of all the regular members of the JBC is
subject to a stringent process of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, which is composed of
members of Congress.
Respondents’ contention that the current irregular
composition of the JBC should be accepted, simply because
it was only questioned for the first time through the present
action, deserves scant consideration. Well-settled is the rule
that acts done in violation of the Constitution no matter how
frequent, usual or notorious cannot develop or gain
acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or laches, because
once an act is considered as an infringement of the
Constitution it is void from the very beginning and cannot be
the source of any power or authority.
It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general
rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office;
it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule,
however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative
facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality
are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential
in the interest of fair play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated
in Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation:32
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 224

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general which reads, "This disposition is immediately executory," is
rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies hereby LIFTED.
the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the
existence of a statute prior to a determination of SO ORDERED.
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality
will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the
invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a
declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in
double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a
municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.33

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception

applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its
finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the
JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.

Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the

Constitution which was ratified by the direct action of the
Filipino people, it cannot correct what respondents perceive
as a mistake in its mandate. Neither can the Court, in the
exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the Constitution,
read into the law something that is contrary to its express
provisions and justify the same as correcting a perceived
inadvertence. To do so would otherwise sanction the Court
action of making amendment to the Constitution through a
judicial pronouncement.

In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative

omission. According to the rule of casus omissus "a case
omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted."34 "The principle
proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular person,
object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under its
power of interpretation supply the omission even though the
omission may have resulted from inadvertence or because the
case in question was not foreseen or contemplated."36 "The
Court cannot supply what it thinks the legislature would have
supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as that
would be judicial legislation."37

Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another

member by judicial construction.

The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the
Court tasked to guard the Constitution against usurpation. The
Court remains steadfast in confining its powers in the sphere
granted by the Constitution itself. Judicial activism should
never be allowed to become judicial exuberance.38 In cases
like this, no amount of practical logic or convenience can
convince the Court to perform either an excision or an
insertion that will change the manifest intent of the Framers.
To broaden the scope of congressional representation in the
JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter which
was not included in the provision as enacted. True to its
constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor
constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all of
situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed
solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court
declines.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by

respondents is hereby DENIED.

The suspension of the effects of the second paragraph of the

dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision of the Court,
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 225
G.R. No. 213181 August 19, 2014
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA Petitioner,
vs.
CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Once again, the Couii is faced with a controversy involving the
acts of an independent body, which is considered as a
constitutional innovation the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). It
is not the first time that the Court is called upon to settle legal
questions surrounding the JBC's exercise of its constitutional
mandate. In De Castro v. JBC,1 the Court laid to rest issues
such as the duty of the JBC to recommend prospective
nominees for the position of Chief Justice vis-à-vis the
appointing power of the President, the period within which the
same may be exercised, and the ban on midnight
appointments as set forth in the Constitution. In Chavez v.
JBC,2 the Court provided an extensive discourse on
constitutional intent as to the JBC’s composition and
membership.
This time, however, the selection and nomination process
actually undertaken by the JBC is being challenged for being
constitutionally infirm. The heart of the debate lies not only on
the very soundness and validity of the application of JBC rules
but also the extent of its discretionary power. More
significantly, this case of first impression impugns the end-
result of its acts - the shortlistfrom which the President
appoints a deserving addition to the Highest Tribunal of the
land.
To add yet another feature of noveltyto this case, a member
of the Court, no less than the Chief Justice herself, was being
impleaded as party respondent.
The Facts
The present case finds its genesis from the compulsory
retirement of Associate Justice Roberto Abad (Associate
Justice Abad) last May 22, 2014. Before his retirement, on
March 6, 2014, in accordance with its rules,3 the JBC
announced the opening for application or recommendation for
the said vacated position.
On March 14, 2014, the JBC received a letter from Dean
Danilo Concepcion of the University of the Philippines
nominating petitioner Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza),
incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic, for the said
position. Upon acceptance of the nomination, Jardeleza was
included in the names of candidates, as well as in the
schedule of public interviews. On May 29, 2014, Jardeleza
was interviewed by the JBC.
It appears from the averments in the petition that on June 16
and 17, 2014, Jardeleza received telephone callsfrom former
Court of Appeals Associate Justice and incumbent JBC
member, Aurora Santiago Lagman (Justice Lagman), who
informed him that during the meetings held on June 5 and 16,
2014, Chief Justice and JBC ex-officioChairperson, Maria
Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno),manifested that
she would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-0094 against
him. Jardeleza was then directed to "make himself available"
before the JBC on June 30, 2014, during which he would be
informed of the objections to his integrity.
Consequently, Jardeleza filed a letter-petition (letter-petition)5
praying that the Court, in the exercise of itsconstitutional
power of supervision over the JBC, issue an order: 1) directing
the JBC to give him at least five (5) working days written notice
of any hearing of the JBC to which he would be summoned;
and the said notice to contain the sworn specifications of the
charges against him by his oppositors, the sworn statements
of supporting witnesses, if any, and copies of documents in
support of the charges; and notice and sworn statements shall
be made part of the public record of the JBC; 2) allowing him
to cross-examine his oppositors and supporting witnesses, if
any, and the cross-examination to be conducted in public,
under the same conditions that attend the publicinterviews
held for all applicants; 3) directing the JBC to reset the hearing
scheduled on June 30, 2014 to another date; and 4) directing
the JBC to disallow Chief Justice Sereno from participating in
the voting on June 30,2014 or at any adjournment thereof
where such vote would be taken for the nominees for the
position vacated by Associate Justice Abad.
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, sansJardeleza,
incumbent Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Associate
Justice Carpio) appeared as a resource person to shed light
on a classified legal memorandum (legal memorandum) that
would clarify the objection to Jardeleza’s integrity as posed by
Chief Justice Sereno. According to the JBC, Chief Justice
Sereno questioned Jardeleza’s ability to discharge the duties
of his office as shown in a confidential legal memorandum
over his handling of an international arbitration case for the
government.
Later, Jardeleza was directed to one of the Court’s ante-rooms
where Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima
(Secretary De Lima) informed him that Associate Justice
Carpio appeared before the JBC and disclosed confidential
information which, to Chief Justice Sereno, characterized his
integrity as dubious. After the briefing, Jardeleza was
summoned by the JBC at around 2:00o’clock in the afternoon.
Jardeleza alleged that he was asked by Chief Justice Sereno
if he wanted to defend himself against the integrity issues
raised against him. He answered that he would defend himself
provided that due process would be observed. Jardeleza
specifically demanded that Chief Justice Sereno execute a
sworn statement specifying her objectionsand that he be
afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public hearing. He
requested that the same directive should also be imposed on
Associate Justice Carpio. As claimed by the JBC,
Representative Niel G. Tupas Jr. also manifested that he
wanted to hear for himself Jardeleza’s explanation on the
matter. Jardeleza, however, refused as he would not be lulled
intowaiving his rights. Jardeleza then put into record a written
statement6 expressing his views on the situation and
requested the JBC to defer its meeting considering that the
Court en banc would meet the next day to act on his pending
letter-petition. At this juncture, Jardeleza was excused.
Later in the afternoon of the sameday, and apparently denying
Jardeleza’s request for deferment of the proceedings, the JBC
continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the
nominees to be included in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC
releasedthe subject shortlist of four (4) nominees which
included: Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. with six (6) votes, Jose C.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 226
Reyes, Jr. with six (6) votes, Maria Gracia M. Pulido Tan with
five (5) votes, and Reynaldo B. Daway with four (4) votes.7
As mentioned in the petition, a newspaper article was later
published in the online portal of the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
stating that the Court’s Spokesman, Atty. Theodore Te,
revealed that there were actually five (5) nominees who made
it to the JBC shortlist, but one (1) nominee could not be
included because of the invocation of Rule 10, Section 2 of
the JBC rules.
In its July 8, 2014 Resolution, the Court noted Jardeleza’s
letterpetition in view of the transmittal of the JBC list of
nominees to the Office of the President, "without prejudice to
any remedy available in law and the rules that petitioner may
still wish to pursue."8 The said resolution was accompanied
by an extensive Dissenting Opinion penned by Associate
Justice Arturo D. Brion,9 expressing his respectful
disagreement as to the position taken by the majority.
The Petition
Perceptibly based on the aforementioned resolution’s
declaration as to his availment of a remedy in law, Jardeleza
filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), seeking to compel the
JBC to include him in the list ofnominees for Supreme Court
Associate Justice viceAssociate Justice Abad, on the grounds
that the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno acted in grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of
votes to qualify for the position.
Notably, Jardeleza’s petition decries that despite the obvious
urgency of his earlier letter-petition and its concomitant filing
on June 25, 2014, the same was raffled only on July 1, 2014
or a day after the controversial JBC meeting. By the time that
his letter-petition was scheduled for deliberation by the Court
en bancon July 8, 2014, the disputedshortlist had already
been transmitted to the Office of the President. He
attributedthis belated action on his letter-petition to Chief
Justice Sereno, whose action on such matters, especially
those impressed withurgency, was discretionary.
An in-depth perusal of Jardeleza’s petition would reveal that
his resort to judicial intervention hinges on the alleged illegality
of his exclusion from the shortlist due to: 1) the deprivation of
his constitutional right to due process; and 2) the JBC’s
erroneous application, if not direct violation, of its own rules.
Suffice it to say, Jardelezadirectly ascribes the supposed
violation of his constitutional rights tothe acts of Chief Justice
Sereno in raising objections against his integrity and the
manner by which the JBC addressed this challenge to his
application, resulting in his arbitrary exclusion from the list of
nominees.
Jardeleza’s Position
For a better understanding of the above postulates proffered
in the petition, the Court hereunder succinctlysummarizes
Jardeleza’s arguments, as follows:
A. Chief Justice Sereno and the JBC violated Jardeleza’s right
to due process in the events leading up to and during the vote
on the shortlist last June 30, 2014. When accusations against
his integrity were made twice, ex parte, by Chief Justice
Sereno, without informing him of the nature and cause thereof
and without affording him an opportunity to be heard,
Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process. In turn, the
JBC violated his right to due process when he was simply
ordered to make himself available on the June 30, 2014
meeting and was told that the objections to his integrity would
be made known to him on the same day. Apart from mere
verbal notice (by way of a telephone call) of the invocation of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against his application and not
on the accusations against him per se, he was deprived of an
opportunity to mount a proper defense against it. Not only did
the JBC fail to ventilate questions on his integrity during his
public interview, he was also divested of his rights as an
applicant under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 4, JBC-009, to wit:
Section 3. Testimony of parties. – The Council may receive
written opposition to an applicant on the ground of his moral
fitness and, at its discretion, the Council may receive the
testimony of the oppositor at a hearing conducted for the
purpose, with due notice to the applicant who shall be allowed
to cross-examine the oppositor and to offer countervailing
evidence.
Section 4. Anonymous Complaints. – Anonymous complaints
against an applicant shall not be given due course, unless
there appears on its face a probable cause sufficient to
engender belief that the allegations may be true. In the latter
case, the Council may direct a discreet investigation or require
the applicant to comment thereon in writing or during the
interview.
His lack of knowledge as to the identity of his accusers (except
for yet again, the verbalinformation conveyed to him that
Associate Justice Carpio testified against him) and as to the
nature of the very accusations against him caused him to
suffer from the arbitrary action by the JBC and Chief Justice
Sereno. The latter gravely abused her discretion when she
acted as prosecutor, witness and judge,thereby violating the
very essence of fair play and the Constitution itself. In his
words: "the sui generis nature of JBC proceedings does not
authorize the Chief Justice to assume these roles, nor does it
dispense with the need to honor petitioner’s right to due
process."10
B. The JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in excluding
Jardeleza from the shortlist of nominees, in violation of its own
rules. The "unanimity requirement" provided under Section 2,
Rule10 of JBC-009 does not find application when a member
of the JBC raises an objection to an applicant’s integrity. Here,
the lone objector constituted a part of the membership of the
body set to vote. The lone objector could be completely
capable oftaking hostage the entire voting process by the
mere expediency of raising an objection. Chief Justice
Sereno’s interpretation of the rule would allow a situation
where all thata member has to do to veto other votes,
including majority votes, would be to object to the qualification
of a candidate, without need for factual basis.
C. Having secured the sufficient number of votes, it was
ministerial on the part of the JBC to include Jardeleza in the
subject shortlist.Section 1, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides that
a nomination for appointment to a judicial position requires the
affirmative vote of at least a majority of all members of the
JBC. The JBC cannot disregard its own rules. Considering
that Jardeleza was able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes,
the only conclusion is that a majority of the members of the
JBC found him to be qualified for the position of Associate
Justice.
D. The unlawful exclusion ofthe petitioner from the subject
shortlist impairs the President’s constitutional power to
appoint.Jardeleza’s exclusion from the shortlist has unlawfully
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 227
narrowed the President’s choices. Simply put, the President
would be constrained to choose from among four (4)
nominees, when five (5) applicants rightfully qualified for the
position. This limits the President to appoint a member of the
Court from a list generated through a process tainted with
patent constitutional violations and disregard for rules of
justice and fair play. Until these constitutional infirmities are
remedied, the petitioner has the right to prevent the
appointment of an Associate Justice viceAssociate Justice
Abad.
Comment of the JBC
On August 11, 2014, the JBC filed its comment contending
that Jardeleza’s petition lacked proceduraland substantive
bases that would warrant favorable action by the Court. For
the JBC, certiorariis only available against a tribunal, a board
or an officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions.11
The JBC, in its exercise of its mandate to recommend
appointees to the Judiciary, does not exercise any of these
functions. In a pending case,12 Jardeleza himself, as one of
the lawyers for the government, argued in this wise:
Certioraricannot issue against the JBC in the implementation
of its policies.
In the same vein, the remedy of mandamusis incorrect.
Mandamus does not lie to compel a discretionary act. For it to
prosper, a petition for mandamus must, among other things,
show that the petitioner has a clear legal right to the act
demanded. In Jardeleza’s case, there is no legal right to be
included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies.
Possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications
for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legally
demand that one’s name be included in the list of candidates
for a judicial vacancy. One’s inclusion in the shortlist is strictly
within the discretion of the JBC.
Anent the substantive issues, the JBC mainly denied that
Jardeleza was deprived of due process. The JBC reiterated
that Justice Lagman, on behalf of the JBC en banc, called
Jardeleza and informed him that Chief Justice Sereno would
be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 due to a question
on his integrity based on the way he handled a very important
case for the government. Jardeleza and Justice Lagman
spoke briefly about the case and his general explanation on
how he handled the same. Secretary De Lima likewise
informed him about the content of the impending objection
against his application. On these occasions, Jardeleza agreed
to explain himself. Come the June 30, 2014 meeting, however,
Jardeleza refused to shed light on the allegations against
him,as he chose to deliver a statement, which, in essence,
requested that his accuser and her witnesses file sworn
statements so that he would know of the allegations against
him, that he be allowed to cross-examine the witnesses;and
that the procedure be done on record and in public.
In other words, Jardeleza was given ample opportunity to be
heard and to enlighten each member of the JBC on the issues
raised against him prior to the voting process. His request for
a sworn statement and opportunity to cross-examine is not
supported by a demandable right. The JBC is not a fact-finding
body. Neitheris it a court nor a quasi-judicial agency. The
members are notconcerned with the determination of his guilt
or innocence of the accusations against him. Besides,
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 10,JBC-009 are merely directory as
shown by the use of the word "may." Even the conduct of a
hearing to determine the veracity of an opposition is
discretionary on the JBC. Ordinarily, if there are other ways of
ascertaining the truth or falsity of an allegation or opposition,
the JBC would not call a hearing in order to avoid undue delay
of the selection process. Each member of the JBC relies on
his or her own appreciation of the circumstances and
qualifications of applicants.
The JBC then proceeded to defend adherence to its standing
rules. As a general rule, an applicant is included in the shortlist
when he or she obtains an affirmative vote of at least a
majority of all the members of the JBC. When Section 2, Rule
10 of JBC-009,however, is invoked because an applicant’s
integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is required. Thus,
when Chief Justice Sereno invoked the saidprovision,
Jardeleza needed the affirmative vote of all the JBC members
tobe included in the shortlist. In the process, Chief Justice
Sereno’s vote against Jardeleza was not counted. Even then,
he needed the votes of the five(5) remaining members. He
only got four (4) affirmative votes. As a result,he was not
included in the shortlist. Applicant Reynaldo B. Daway, who
gotfour (4) affirmative votes, was included in the shortlist
because his integrity was not challenged. As to him, the
"majority rule" was considered applicable.
Lastly, the JBC rued that Jardeleza sued the respondents in
his capacity as Solicitor General. Despiteclaiming a prefatory
appearance in propria persona, all pleadings filed with the
Court were signed in his official capacity. In effect, he sued
the respondents to pursue a purely private interest while
retaining the office of the Solicitor General. By suing the very
parties he was tasked by law to defend, Jardeleza knowingly
placed himself in a situation where his personal interests
collided against his public duties, in clear violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and Code of Professional
Ethics. Moreover, the respondents are all public officials being
sued in their official capacity. By retaining his title as Solicitor
General, and suing in the said capacity, Jardeleza filed a suit
against his own clients, being the legal defender of the
government and its officers. This runs contrary to the fiduciary
relationship sharedby a lawyer and his client.
In opposition to Jardeleza’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO,
the JBC called to mind the constitutional period within which a
vacancy in the Court must be filled. As things now stand, the
President has until August 20, 2014 to exercise his
appointment power which cannot be restrained by a TRO or
an injunctive suit.
Comment of the Executive Secretary
In his Comment, Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa Jr.
(Executive Secretary)raised the possible unconstitutionality of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, particularly the imposition ofa
higher voting threshold in cases where the integrity of an
applicant is challenged. It is his position that the subject JBC
rule impairs the body’s collegial character, which essentially
operates on the basis of majority rule. The application of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 gives rise to a situation where
all that a member needs to do, in order to disqualify an
applicant who may well have already obtained a majority vote,
is to object to his integrity. In effect, a member who invokes
the said provision is given a veto powerthat undermines the
equal and full participation of the other members in the
nomination process. A lone objector may then override the will
ofthe majority, rendering illusory, the collegial nature of the
JBC and the very purpose for which it was created— to shield
the appointment process from political maneuvering. Further,
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 may beviolative of due process
for it does not allow an applicant any meaningful opportunity
to refute the challenges to his integrity. While other provisions
of the JBC rules provide mechanisms enabling an applicant to
comment on an opposition filed against him, the subject rule
does not afford the same opportunity. In this case, Jardeleza’s
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 228
allegations as to the events which transpired on June 30, 2014
obviously show that he was neither informed ofthe
accusations against him nor given the chance to muster a
defense thereto.
The Executive Secretary then offered a supposition: granting
that the subject provision is held to be constitutional, the
"unanimity rule" would only be operative when the objector is
not a member of the JBC. It is only in this scenario where the
voting ofthe body would not be rendered inconsequential. In
the event that a JBC member raised the objection, what
should have been applied is the general rule of a majority vote,
where any JBC member retains their respective reservations
to an application with a negative vote. Corollary thereto, the
unconstitutionality of the said rule would necessitate the
inclusion of Jardeleza in the shortlist submitted to the
President.
Other pleadings
On August 12, 2014, Jardeleza was given the chance to refute
the allegations of the JBC in its Comment. He submitted his
Reply thereto on August 15, 2014. A few hours thereafter,
orbarely ten minutes prior to the closing of business, the Court
received the Supplemental Comment-Reply of the JBC, this
time with the attached minutes of the proceedings that led to
the filing of the petition,and a detailed "Statementof the Chief
Justice on the Integrity Objection."13 Obviously, Jardeleza’s
Reply consisted only of his arguments against the JBC’s
original Comment, as it was filed prior to the filing of the
Supplemental Comment-Reply.
At the late stage of the case, two motions to admit comments-
inintervention/oppositions-in-intervention were filed. One was
by Atty. Purificacion S. Bartolome-Bernabe, purportedly the
President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Bulacan
Chapter. This pleading echoed the position of the JBC.14
The other one was filed by Atty. Reynaldo A. Cortes,
purportedly a former President of the IBP Baguio-Benguet
Chapter and former Governor of the IBP-Northern Luzon. It
was coupled with a complaint for disbarment against
Jardeleza primarily for violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for representing conflicting interests.15
Both motions for intervention weredenied considering that
time was of the essence and their motions were merely
reiterative of the positions of the JBC and were perceived to
be dilatory. The complaint for disbarment, however, was re-
docketed as a separate administrative case.
The Issues
Amidst a myriad of issues submitted by the parties, most of
which are interrelated such that the resolution of one issue
would necessarily affect the conclusion as to the others, the
Court opts to narrow down the questions to the very source of
the discord - the correct application of Section 2, Rule 10 JBC-
009 and its effects, if any, on the substantive rights of
applicants.
The Court is not unmindful of the fact that a facial scrutiny of
the petition does not directly raise the unconstitutionality of the
subject JBC rule. Instead, it bewails the unconstitutional
effects of its application. It is only from the comment of the
Executive Secretary where the possible unconstitutionality of
the rulewas brought to the fore. Despite this milieu, a practical
approach dictatesthat the Court must confront the source of
the bleeding from which the gaping wound presented to the
Court suffers.
The issues for resolution are:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN ASSUME
JURISDICTION AND GIVE DUECOURSE TO THE
SUBJECT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS
(WITH APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER).
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUES RAISED AGAINST
JARDELEZA BEFIT "QUESTIONS OR CHALLENGES ON
INTEGRITY" AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER SECTION 2,
RULE 10 OF JBC-009.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS
AVAILABLE IN THE COURSE OF JBC PROCEEDINGS IN
CASES WHERE AN OBJECTION OR OPPOSITION TO AN
APPLICATION IS RAISED.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER JARDELEZA MAY BE
INCLUDED IN THE SHORTLIST OF NOMINEES
SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT.
The Court’s Ruling
I – Procedural Issue: The Court has constitutional bases to
assume jurisdiction over the case
A - The Court’s Power of Supervision over the JBC
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the
creation of the JBC. The Court was given supervisory
authority over it. Section 8 reads:
Section 8.
A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Courtcomposed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of
the private sector. [Emphasis supplied]
As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the
definition and scope of supervision. It is the power of
oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties.It ensures that the laws and the rules
governing the conduct of a government entity are observed
and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are
followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor
do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the
rules are not observed, they may order the work done or
redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not
prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 229
no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules
are followed.16
Based on this, the supervisory authority of the Court over the
JBC covers the overseeing of compliance with its rules. In this
case, Jardeleza’s principal allegations in his petition merit the
exercise of this supervisory authority.
B- Availability of the Remedy of Mandamus
The Court agrees with the JBC that a writ of mandamus is not
available. "Mandamuslies to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the
performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamuswill not issue
to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer
where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and
duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in
which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be
exercised and not that of the court.17 There is no question
that the JBC’s duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not
becompelled to do something.
C- Availability of the Remedy of Certiorari
Respondent JBC opposed the petition for certiorarion the
ground that it does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Under Section 1 of Rule 65, a writ of certiorariis
directed against a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
function. "Judicial functions are exercised by a body or officer
clothed with authority to determine what the law is and what
the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in
controversy. Quasijudicial function is a term that applies to the
action or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies
given the authority to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from
them as a basis for their official action using discretion of a
judicial nature."18 It asserts that in the performance of its
function of recommending appointees for the judiciary, the
JBC does not exercise judicial or quasijudicial functions.
Hence, the resort tosuch remedy to question its actions is
improper.
In this case, Jardeleza cries that although he earned a
qualifying number of votes in the JBC, it was negated by the
invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity in violation of his
right to due process guaranteed not only by the Constitution
but by the Council’s own rules. For said reason, the Court is
of the position that it can exercise the expanded judicial power
of review vestedupon it by the 1987 Constitution. Thus:
Article VIII.
Section 1. The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
It has been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a
proper remedy to question the act of any branch or
instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
by any branch orinstrumentality of the government, even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions.19
In a case like this, where constitutional bearings are too
blatant to ignore, the Court does not find passivity as an
alternative. The impassemust be overcome.
II – Substantial Issues
Examining the Unanimity Rule of the JBC in cases where an
applicant’s integrity is challenged
The purpose of the JBC’s existence is indubitably rooted in
the categorical constitutional declaration that"[a] member of
the judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence." To ensure the fulfillment
of these standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC
has been tasked toscreen aspiring judges and justices,
among others, making certain that the nominees submitted to
the President are all qualified and suitably best for
appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is
shieldedfrom the possibility of extending judicial appointment
to the undeserving and mediocre and, more importantly, to the
ineligible or disqualified.
In the performance of this sacred duty, the JBC itself admits,
as stated in the "whereas clauses" of JBC-009, that
qualifications such as "competence, integrity, probity and
independence are not easily determinable as they are
developed and nurtured through the years." Additionally, "it is
not possible or advisable to lay down iron-clad rules to
determine the fitness of those who aspire to become a Justice,
Judge, Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman." Given this
realistic situation, there is a need "to promote stability and
uniformity in JBC’s guiding precepts and principles." A set of
uniform criteria had to be established in the ascertainment of
"whether one meets the minimum constitutional qualifications
and possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of him"
and his office. Likewise for the sake oftransparency of its
proceedings, the JBC had put these criteria in writing, now in
the form of JBC-009. True enough, guidelines have been set
inthe determination of competence,"20 "probity and
independence,"21"soundness of physical and mental
condition,22 and "integrity."23
As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized
evidence of qualification laid down in JBC-009, "integrity" is
closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to an
applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility,
irreproachableconduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical
standards. That is why proof of an applicant’s reputation may
be shown in certifications or testimonials from reputable
government officials and non-governmental organizations and
clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation,
and the police, among others. In fact, the JBC may even
conduct a discreet background check and receive feedback
from the public on the integrity, reputation and character of the
applicant, the merits of which shall be verifiedand checked. As
a qualification, the term is taken to refer to a virtue, such that,
"integrity is the quality of person’s character."24
The foregoing premise then begets the question: Does Rule
2, Section 10 of JBC-009, in imposing the "unanimity rule,"
contemplate a doubt on the moral character of an applicant?
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides:
SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant
is challenged. - In every case where the integrity of an
applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for nomination is
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 230
raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of all the Members
of the Council must be obtained for the favorable
consideration of his nomination.
A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits
the rule that a higher voting requirement is absolute in cases
where the integrity of an applicant is questioned. Simply put,
when an integrity question arises, the voting requirement for
his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post becomes
"unanimous" instead of the "majority vote" required in the
preceding section.25 Considering that JBC-009 employs the
term "integrity" as an essential qualification for appointment,
and its doubtful existence in a person merits a higher hurdle
to surpass, that is, the unanimous vote of all the members of
the JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that "integrity" as
used in the rules must be interpreted uniformly. Hence,
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions only a situation
where an applicant’s moral fitness is challenged. It follows
then that the "unanimity rule" only comes into operation when
the moral character of a person is put in issue. It finds no
application where the question is essentially unrelated to an
applicant’s moral uprightness.
Examining the "questions of integrity" made against Jardeleza
The Court will now examine the propriety of applying Section
2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to Jardeleza’s case.
The minutes of the JBC meetings, attached to the
Supplemental Comment-Reply, reveal that during the June
30, 2014 meeting, not only the question on his actuations in
the handling of a case was called for explanation by the Chief
Justice, but two other grounds as well tending to show his lack
of integrity: a supposed extra-marital affair in the past and
alleged acts of insider trading.26
Against this factual backdrop, the Court notes that the initial
or original invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was
grounded on Jardeleza’s "inability to discharge the duties of
his office" as shown in a legal memorandum related to
Jardeleza’s manner of representing the government in a legal
dispute. The records bear that the "unanimity rule" was initially
invoked by Chief Justice Sereno during the JBC meeting held
on June 5, 2014, where she expressed her position that
Jardeleza did not possess the integrity required tobe a
member of the Court.27 In the same meeting, the Chief
Justice shared withthe other JBC members the details of
Jardeleza’s chosen manner of framing the government’s
position in a case and how this could have been detrimental
to the national interest.
In the JBC’s original comment, the details of the Chief
Justice’s claim against Jardeleza’s integrity were couched in
general terms. The particulars thereof were only supplied to
the Court in the JBC’s Supplemental Comment-Reply.
Apparently, the JBC acceded to Jardeleza’s demand to make
the accusations against him public. At the outset, the JBC
declined to raise the fine points of the integrity question in its
original Comment due to its significant bearing on the
country’s foreign relations and national security. At any rate,
the Court restrains itself from delving into the details thereof
in this disposition. The confidential nature of the document
cited therein, which requires the observance of utmost
prudence, preclude a discussion that may possibly affect the
country’s position in a pending dispute.
Be that as it may, the Court has to resolve the standing
questions: Does the original invocation of Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-009 involve a question on Jardeleza’s integrity?
Doeshis adoption of a specific legal strategy in the handling of
a case bring forth a relevant and logical challenge against his
moral character? Does the "unanimity rule" apply in cases
where the main point of contention is the professional
judgment sans charges or implications of immoral or corrupt
behavior?
The Court answers these questions in the negative.
While Chief Justice Sereno claims that the invocation of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was not borne out ofa mere
variance of legal opinion but by an "act of disloyalty"
committed by Jardeleza in the handling of a case, the fact
remains that the basis for her invocation of the rule was the
"disagreement" in legal strategy as expressed by a group of
international lawyers. The approach taken by Jardeleza in that
case was opposed to that preferred by the legal team. For said
reason, criticism was hurled against his "integrity." The
invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity traces its roots
to the exercise ofhis discretion as a lawyer and nothing else.
No connection was established linking his choice of a legal
strategy to a treacherous intent to trounce upon the country’s
interests or to betray the Constitution.
Verily, disagreement in legal opinion is but a normal, if not an
essential form of, interaction among members of the legal
community. A lawyer has complete discretion on whatlegal
strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him28provided that
he lives up tohis duty to serve his client with competence and
diligence, and that he exert his best efforts to protect the
interests of his client within the bounds of the law.
Consonantly, a lawyer is not an insurer of victory for clients he
represents. An infallible grasp of legal principles and
technique by a lawyer is a utopian ideal. Stripped of a clear
showing of gross neglect, iniquity, or immoral purpose, a
strategy of a legal mind remains a legal tactic acceptable to
some and deplorable to others. It has no direct bearing on his
moral choices.
As shown in the minutes, the other JBC members expressed
their reservations on whether the ground invoked by Chief
Justice Sereno could be classified as a "question of integrity"
under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009.29 These reservations
were evidently sourced from the factthat there was no clear
indication that the tactic was a "brainchild" of Jardeleza, as it
might have been a collective idea by the legal team which
initially sought a different manner of presenting the country’s
arguments, and there was no showing either of a corrupt
purpose on his part.30 Even Chief Justice Sereno was not
certain that Jardeleza’s acts were urged by politicking or lured
by extraneous promises.31Besides, the President, who has
the final say on the conduct of the country’s advocacy in the
case, has given no signs that Jardeleza’s action constituted
disloyalty or a betrayal of the country’s trust and interest.
While this point does notentail that only the President may
challenge Jardeleza’s doubtful integrity, itis commonsensical
to assume that he is in the best position to suspect a
treacherous agenda. The records are bereft of any information
that indicatesthis suspicion. In fact, the Comment of the
Executive Secretary expressly prayed for Jardeleza’s
inclusion in the disputed shortlist.
The Court notes the zeal shown by the Chief Justice regarding
international cases, given her participation in the PIATCO
case and the Belgian Dredging case. Her efforts inthe
determination of Jardeleza’s professional background, while
commendable, have not produced a patent demonstration of
a connection betweenthe act complained of and his integrity
as a person. Nonetheless, the Court cannot consider her
invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as conformably
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 231
within the contemplation of the rule. To fall under Section 2,
Rule 10 of JBC-009, there must be a showing that the act
complained of is, at the least, linked to the moral character of
the person and not to his judgment as a professional. What
this disposition perceives, therefore, is the inapplicability of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to the original ground of its
invocation.
As previously mentioned, Chief Justice Sereno raised the
issues of Jardeleza’s alleged extra-marital affair and acts of
insider-trading for the first time onlyduring the June 30, 2014
meeting of the JBC. As can be gleaned from the minutes of
the June 30, 2014 meeting, the inclusion of these issues had
its origin from newspaper reports that the Chief Justice might
raise issues of "immorality" against Jardeleza.32 The Chief
Justice then deduced that the "immorality" issue referred to by
the media might have been the incidents that could have
transpired when Jardeleza was still the General Counsel of
San Miguel Corporation. She stated that inasmuch as the JBC
had the duty to "take every possible step to verify the
qualification of the applicants," it might as well be clarified.33
Do these issues fall within the purview of "questions on
integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009? The Court
nods in assent. These are valid issues.
This acquiescence is consistent with the Court’s discussion
supra. Unlike the first ground which centered onJardeleza’s
stance on the tactical approach in pursuing the case for the
government, the claims of an illicit relationship and acts of
insider trading bear a candid relation to his moral character.
Jurisprudence34 is replete with cases where a lawyer’s
deliberate participation in extra-marital affairs was considered
as a disgraceful stain on one’s ethical and moral principles.
The bottom line is that a lawyer who engages in extra-marital
affairs is deemed to have failed to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency which every member of the
Judiciary is expected to observe. In fact, even relationships
which have never gone physical or intimate could still be
subject to charges of immorality, when a lawyer, who is
married, admits to having a relationship which was more than
professional, more than acquaintanceship, more than
friendly.35 As the Court has held: Immorality has not been
confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct
inconsistentwith rectitude, or indicative of corruption,
indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant,
or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions
of respectable members of the communityand an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public
welfare.36 Moral character is not a subjective term but one
that corresponds to objective reality.37 To have a good moral
character, a person must have the personal characteristic
ofbeing good. It is not enough that he or she has a good
reputation, that is, the opinion generally entertained about a
person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public
in the place where she is known.38 Hence, lawyers are at all
times subject to the watchful public eye and community
approbation.39
The element of "willingness" to linger in indelicate
relationships imputes a weakness in one’s values, self-control
and on the whole, sense of honor, not only because it is a bold
disregard of the sanctity of marriage and of the law, but
because it erodes the public’s confidence in the Judiciary. This
is no longer a matter of an honest lapse in judgment but a
dissolute exhibition of disrespect toward sacredvows taken
before God and the law.
On the other hand, insider trading is an offense that assaults
the integrity of our vital securities market.40Manipulative
devices and deceptive practices, including insider trading,
throw a monkey wrench right into the heart of the securities
industry. Whensomeone trades inthe market with unfair
advantage in the form of highly valuable secret inside
information, all other participants are defrauded. All of the
mechanisms become worthless. Given enough of stock
marketscandals coupled with the related loss of faith in the
market, such abuses could presage a severe drain of capital.
And investors would eventuallyfeel more secure with their
money invested elsewhere.41 In its barest essence, insider
trading involves the trading of securities based on knowledge
of material information not disclosed to the public at the time.
Clearly, an allegation of insider trading involves the propensity
of a person toengage in fraudulent activities that may speak
of his moral character.
These two issues can be properly categorized as "questions
on integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009. They fall
within the ambit of "questions on integrity." Hence, the
"unanimity rule" may come into operation as the subject
provision is worded.
The Availability of Due Process in the
Proceedings of the JBC
In advocacy of his position, Jardeleza argues that: 1] he
should have been informed of the accusations against him in
writing; 2] he was not furnished the basis of the accusations,
that is, "a very confidential legal memorandum that clarifies
the integrityobjection"; 3] instead of heeding his request for an
opportunity to defend himself, the JBC considered his refusal
to explain, during the June 30, 2014 meeting, as a waiver of
his right to answer the unspecified allegations; 4] the voting of
the JBC was railroaded; and 5] the alleged "discretionary"
nature of Sections 3 and 4 of JBC-009 is negated by the
subsequent effectivity of JBC-010, Section 1(2) of which
provides for a 10-day period from the publication of the list of
candidates within which any complaint or opposition against a
candidate may be filed with the JBC Secretary; 6] Section 2 of
JBC-010 requires complaints and oppositions to be in writing
and under oath, copies of which shall be furnished the
candidate in order for him to file his comment within five (5)
days from receipt thereof; and 7] Sections 3 to 6 of JBC-010
prescribe a logical, reasonable and sequential series of steps
in securing a candidate’s right to due process.
The JBC counters these by insisting that it is not obliged to
afford Jardeleza the right to a hearing in the fulfillment of its
duty to recommend. The JBC, as a body, is not required by
law to hold hearings on the qualifications of the nominees. The
process by which an objection is made based on Section 2,
Rule 10 of JBC-009 is not judicial, quasi-judicial, or fact-
finding, for it does not aim to determine guilt or innocence akin
to a criminal or administrative offense but toascertain the
fitness of an applicant vis-à-vis the requirements for the
position. Being sui generis, the proceedings of the JBC do not
confer the rights insisted upon by Jardeleza. He may not exact
the application of rules of procedure which are, at the most,
discretionary or optional. Finally, Jardeleza refused to shed
light on the objections against him. During the June 30, 2014
meeting, he did not address the issues, but instead chose
totread on his view that the Chief Justice had unjustifiably
become his accuser, prosecutor and judge.
The crux of the issue is on the availability of the right to due
process in JBC proceedings. After a tedious review of the
parties’ respective arguments, the Court concludes that the
right to due process is available and thereby demandable asa
matter of right.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 232
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature
of JBC proceedings. Indeed, they are distinct from criminal
proceedings where the finding of guilt or innocence of the
accused is sine qua non. The JBC’s constitutional duty to
recommend qualified nominees to the President cannot be
compared to the duty of the courts of law to determine the
commission of an offense and ascribe the same to an
accused, consistent with established rules on evidence. Even
the quantum ofevidence required in criminal cases is far from
the discretion accorded to the JBC.
The Court, however, could not accept, lock, stock and barrel,
the argument that an applicant’s access tothe rights afforded
under the due process clause is discretionary on the part of
the JBC. While the facets of criminal42 and administrative43
due process are not strictly applicable to JBC proceedings,
their peculiarity is insufficient to justify the conclusion that due
process is not demandable.
In JBC proceedings, an aspiring judge or justice justifies his
qualifications for the office when he presents proof of his
scholastic records, work experience and laudable citations.
His goal is to establish that he is qualified for the office applied
for. The JBC then takes every possible step to verify an
applicant's trackrecord for the purpose ofdetermining whether
or not he is qualified for nomination. It ascertains the factors
which entitle an applicant to become a part of the roster from
which the President appoints.
The fact that a proceeding is sui generisand is impressed with
discretion, however, does not automatically denigrate an
applicant’s entitlement to due process. It is well-established in
jurisprudence that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers
are sui generisin that they are neither purely civil nor purely
criminal; they involve investigations by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers, not the trial of an action or a
suit.44 Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to accountfor his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession
of members who, by their misconduct, have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In
such posture, there can be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.45 On the whole, disciplinary
proceedings are actually aimed to verifyand finally determine,
if a lawyer charged is still qualifiedto benefit from the rights
and privileges that membership in the legal profession evoke.
Notwithstanding being "a class of itsown," the right to be heard
and to explain one’s self is availing. The Court subscribes to
the view that in cases where an objection to an applicant’s
qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither
negates nor renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of JBC
torecommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its
discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence
to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the
exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently
denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to
protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of
the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making
an unsound and capriciousassessment of information brought
before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of
evidence in its assessment of an objection against an
applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person
challenged complies with the dictates of fairness for the only
test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of
soundness.
A more pragmatic take on the matter of due process in JBC
proceedings also compels the Court to examine its current
rules. The pleadings of the parties mentioned two: 1] JBC-009
and 2] JBC-010. The former provides the following provisions
pertinent to this case:
SECTION 1. Evidence of integrity. - The Council shall take
every possible step to verify the applicant's record of and
reputation for honesty, integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable
conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. For
this purpose, the applicant shall submit to the Council
certifications or testimonials thereof from reputable
government officials and non-governmental organizations,
and clearances from the courts, National Bureau of
Investigation, police, and from such other agencies as the
Council may require.
SECTION 2. Background check. - The Council mayorder a
discreet background check on the integrity, reputation and
character of the applicant, and receive feedback thereon from
the public, which it shall check or verify to validate the merits
thereof.
SECTION 3. Testimony of parties.- The Council may receive
written opposition to an applicant on groundof his moral fitness
and, at its discretion, the Council mayreceive the testimony of
the oppositor at a hearing conducted for the purpose, with due
notice to the applicant who shall be allowed to cross-examine
the oppositor and to offer countervailing evidence.
SECTION 4. Anonymous complaints. - Anonymous
complaints against an applicant shall not begiven due course,
unless there appears on its face a probable cause sufficient to
engender belief that the allegations may be true. In the latter
case, the Council may either direct a discreet investigation or
require the applicant to comment thereon in writing or during
the interview. [Emphases Supplied]
While the "unanimity rule" invoked against him is found in
JBC-009, Jardeleza urges the Court to hold that the
subsequent rule, JBC-010,46 squarely applies to his case.
Entitled asa "Rule to Further Promote Public Awareness of
and Accessibility to the Proceedings of the Judicial and Bar
Council," JBC-010 recognizes the needfor transparency and
public awareness of JBC proceedings. In pursuance thereof,
JBC-010 was crafted in this wise:
SECTION 1. The Judicial and Bar Council shall deliberate to
determine who of the candidates meet prima facie the
qualifications for the positionunder consideration. For this
purpose, it shall prepare a long list of candidates who prima
facieappear to have all the qualifications.
The Secretary of the Council shall then cause to be published
in two (2) newspapers of general circulation a notice of the
long list of candidates in alphabetical order.
The notice shall inform the public that any complaint or
opposition against a candidate may be filed with the Secretary
within ten (10) days thereof.
SECTION 2.The complaint or opposition shall be in writing,
under oath and in ten (10) legible copies, together with its
supporting annexes. It shall strictly relate to the qualifications
of the candidate or lack thereof, as provided for in the
Constitution, statutes, and the Rules of the Judicial and Bar
Council, as well as resolutions or regulations promulgated by
it.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 233
The Secretary of the Council shallfurnish the candidate a copy
of the complaint or opposition against him. The candidate shall
have five (5) days from receipt thereof within which to file his
comment to the complaint or opposition, if he so desires.
SECTION 3.The Judicial and Bar Council shall fix a date when
it shall meet in executive session to consider the qualification
of the long list of candidates and the complaint or opposition
against them, if any. The Council may, on its own, conduct a
discreet investigation of the background of the candidates.
On the basis of its evaluationof the qualification of the
candidates, the Council shall prepare the shorter list of
candidates whom it desires to interview for its further
consideration.
SECTION 4.The Secretary of the Council shall again cause to
be published the dates of the interview of candidates in the
shorter list in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. It shall
likewise be posted in the websites of the Supreme Court and
the Judicial and Bar Council.
The candidates, as well as their oppositors, shall be
separately notified of the dateand place of the interview.
SECTION 5.The interviews shall be conducted in public.
During the interview, only the members ofthe Council can ask
questions to the candidate. Among other things, the candidate
can be made to explain the complaint or opposition against
him.
SECTION 6. After the interviews, the Judicial and Bar Council
shall again meet in executive session for the final deliberation
on the short list of candidates which shall be sent to the Office
of the President as a basis for the exercise of the Presidential
power of appointment. [Emphases supplied]
Anent the interpretation of these existing rules, the JBC
contends that Sections 3 and 4, Rule 10 of JBC-009 are
merely directory in nature as can be gleaned from the use of
the word "may." Thus, the conduct of a hearing under Rule 4
of JBC-009 is permissive and/or discretionary on the part of
the JBC. Even the conduct of a hearing to determine the
veracity of an opposition is discretionary for there are ways,
besides a hearing, to ascertain the truth or falsity of
allegations. Succinctly, this argument suggests that the JBC
has the discretion to hold or not to hold a hearing when an
objection to an applicant’s integrity is raised and that it may
resort to other means to accomplish its objective.
Nevertheless, JBC adds, "what is mandatory, however, is that
if the JBC, in its discretion, receives a testimony of an
oppositor in a hearing, due notice shall be given to the
applicant and that shall be allowed to cross-examine the
oppositor."47 Again, the Court neither intends to strip the JBC
of its discretion to recommend nominees nor proposes thatthe
JBC conduct a full-blown trial when objections to an
application are submitted. Still, it is unsound to say that, all
together, the observance of due process is a part of JBC’s
discretion when an opposition to an application is made of
record. While it may so rely on "other means" such as
character clearances, testimonials, and discreet investigation
to aid it in forming a judgment of an applicant’s qualifications,
the Court cannot accept a situation where JBC is given a full
rein on the application of a fundamental right whenever a
person’s integrity is put to question. In such cases, an attack
on the person of the applicant necessitates his right to explain
himself.
The JBC’s own rules convince the Court to arrive at this
conclusion. The subsequent issuance of JBC-010
unmistakably projects the JBC’s deference to the grave import
of the right of the applicant to be informed and corollary
thereto, the right to be heard. The provisions of JBC-010, per
se, provide that: any complaint or opposition against a
candidate may be filed with the Secretary within ten (10) days
thereof; the complaint or opposition shall be in writing, under
oath and in ten (10) legible copies; the Secretary of the
Council shall furnish the candidate a copy of the complaint or
opposition against him; the candidate shall have five (5) days
from receipt thereof within which to file his comment to the
complaint or opposition, if he so desires; and the candidate
can be made to explain the complaint or opposition against
him.
The Court may not close its eyes to the existence of JBC-010
which, under the rules of statutory construction,bears great
weight in that: 1] it covers "any" complaint or opposition; 2] it
employs the mandatory term, "shall"; and 3] most importantly,
it speaks of the very essence of due process. While JBC-010
does not articulate a procedure that entails a trialtype hearing,
it affords an applicant, who faces "any complaint or
opposition," the right to answer the accusations against him.
This constitutes the minimum requirements of due process.
Application to Jardeleza’s Case
Nearing the ultimate conclusion of this case, the Court is
behooved to rule on whether Jardeleza was deprived of his
right to due process in the events leading up to, and during,
the vote on the shortlist last June 30, 2014.
The JBC gives great weight and substance to the fact that it
gave Jardeleza the opportunity to answer the allegations
against him. It underscores the fact that Jardeleza was asked
to attend the June 30, 2014 meeting so that he could shed
light on the issues thrown at him. During the said meeting,
Chief Justice Sereno informed him that in connection with his
candidacy for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court, the Council would like to propound questions on the
following issues raised against him: 1] his actuations in
handling an international arbitration case not compatible with
public interest;48 2] reports on his extra-marital affair in SMC;
and 3] alleged insider trading which led to the "show cause"
order from the Philippine Stock Exchange.49
As Jardeleza himself admitted, he declined to answer or to
explain his side, as he would not want to be "lulled into waiving
his rights." Instead, he manifested that his statement be put
on record and informed the Council of the then pendency of
his letter-petition with the Court en banc. When Chief Justice
Sereno informed Jardeleza that the Council would want to
hear from him on the three (3) issues against him,Jardeleza
reasoned out that this was precisely the issue. He found it
irregular that he was not being given the opportunity to be
heard per the JBC rules.He asserted that a candidate must be
given the opportunity to respond to the charges against him.
He urged the Chief Justice to step down from her pedestal and
translate the objections in writing. Towards the end of the
meeting, the Chief Justice said that both Jardeleza’s written
and oral statements would be made part of the record. After
Jardeleza was excused from the conference, Justice Lagman
suggested that the voting be deferred, but the Chief Justice
ruled that the Council had already completed the process
required for the voting to proceed.
After careful calibration of the case, the Court has reached the
determination that the application of the "unanimity rule" on
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 234
integrity resulted in Jardeleza’s deprivation of his right to due
process.
As threshed out beforehand, due process, as a constitutional
precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-
type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is
notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to
explain or defend himself.50 Even as Jardeleza was verbally
informed of the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009
against him and was later asked to explain himself during the
meeting, these circumstances still cannot expunge an
immense perplexity that lingers in the mind of the Court. What
is to become of the procedure laid down in JBC-010 if the
same would be treated with indifference and disregard? To
repeat, as its wording provides, any complaint or opposition
against a candidate may be filed with the Secretary withinten
(10) days from the publication of the notice and a list of
candidates. Surely, this notice is all the more conspicuous to
JBC members. Granting ex argumenti, that the 10-day
period51 is only applicable to the public, excluding the JBC
members themselves, this does not discount the fact that the
invocation of the first ground in the June 5, 2014 meeting
would have raised procedural issues. To be fair, several
members of the Council expressed their concern and desire
to hear out Jardeleza but the application of JBC-010 did not
form part of the agenda then. It was only during the next
meeting on June 16, 2014, that the Council agreed to invite
Jardeleza, by telephone, to a meeting that would be held on
the same day when a resource person would shed light on the
matter.
Assuming again that the classified nature of the ground
impelled the Council to resort to oral notice instead of
furnishing Jardeleza a written opposition, why did the JBC not
take into account its authority to summon Jardeleza in
confidence at an earlier time? Is not the Council empowered
to "take every possible step to verify the qualification of the
applicants?" It would not be amiss to state, at this point, that
the confidential legal memorandum used in the invocation
ofthe "unanimity rule" was actually addressed to Jardeleza, in
his capacity as Solicitor General. Safe to assume is his
knowledge of the privileged nature thereof and the
consequences of its indiscriminate release to the public. Had
he been privately informed of the allegations against him
based on the document and had he been ordered to respond
thereto in the same manner, Jardeleza’s right to be informed
and to explain himself would have been satisfied.
What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was
the circumstance of requiring Jardeleza to appear before the
Council and to instantaneously provide those who are willing
to listen an intelligent defense. Was he given the opportunity
to do so? The answer is yes, in the context of his physical
presence during the meeting. Was he given a reasonable
chance to muster a defense? No, because he was merely
asked to appear in a meeting where he would be, right then
and there, subjected to an inquiry. It would all be too well to
remember that the allegations of his extra-marital affair and
acts of insider trading sprung up only during the June 30, 2014
meeting. While the said issues became the object of the JBC
discussion on June 16, 2014, Jardeleza was not given the
idea that he should prepare to affirm or deny his past behavior.
These circumstances preclude the very idea of due process
in which the right to explain oneself is given, not to ensnare by
surprise, but toprovide the person a reasonable opportunity
and sufficient time to intelligently muster his response.
Otherwise, the occasion becomes anidle and futile exercise.
Needless to state, Jardeleza’s grievance is not an imagined
slight but a real rebuff of his right to be informed of the charges
against him and his right to answer the same with
vigorouscontention and active participation in the proceedings
which would ultimately decide his aspiration to become a
magistrate of this Court.
Consequences
To write finisto this controversy and in view of the realistic and
practical fruition of the Court’s findings, the Court now
declares its position on whether or not Jardeleza may be
included in the shortlist, just in time when the period to appoint
a member of the Court is about to end.
The conclusion of the Court is hinged on the following pivotal
points:
1. There was a misapplication of the "unanimity rule" under
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as to Jardeleza’s legal strategy
in handling a case for the government.
2. While Jardeleza’s alleged extra-marital affair and acts of
insider trading fall within the contemplation of a "question on
integrity" and would have warranted the application of the
"unanimity rule," he was notafforded due process in its
application.
3. The JBC, as the sole body empowered to evaluate
applications for judicial posts, exercises full discretion on its
power to recommend nomineesto the President. The sui
generischaracter of JBC proceedings, however, is not a
blanket authority to disregard the due process under JBC-010.
4. Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process when,
contrary to the JBC rules, he was neither formally informed of
the questions on his integrity nor was provided a reasonable
opportunity to prepare his defense.
With the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule that
Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted
to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice
Abad. This consequence arose not from the
unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se,
but from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure
and the basic tenets of due process. By no means does the
Court intend to strike down the "unanimity rule" as it reflects
the JBC’s policy and, therefore, wisdom in its selection of
nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a blind eye on
the palpable defects in its implementation and the ensuing
treatment that Jardeleza received before the Council. True,
Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does
not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the
minimum requirements of due process.
In criminal and administrative cases, the violation of a party’s
right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which
cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the
denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a
decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction.52 This rule may well be applied to the current
situation for an opposing view submits to an undue relaxation
of the Bill of Rights. To this, the Court shall not concede. Asthe
branch of government tasked to guarantee that the protection
of due process is available to an individual in proper cases,
the Court finds the subject shortlist as tainted with a vice that
it is assigned to guard against. Indeed, the invocation of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 must be deemed to have never
come into operation in light of its erroneous application on the
original ground against Jardeleza’s integrity. At the risk of
being repetitive, the Court upholds the JBC’s discretion in the
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 235

selection of nominees, but its application of the "unanimity
rule" must be applied in conjunction with Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-010 being invoked by Jardeleza. Having been able to
secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion left to
propound is that a majority of the members of the JBC,
nonetheless, found Jardeleza to be qualified for the position
of Associate Justice and this grants him a rightful spot in the
shortlist submitted to the President. Need to Revisit JBC’s
Internal Rules
The Court further DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council
REVIEW, and ADOPT, rules relevant to the observance of
due process in its proceedings, particularly JBC-009 and JBC-
010, subject to the approval of the Court.
This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY. Immediately
notify the Office of the President of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

In the Court’s study of the petition,the comments and the

applicable rules of the JBC, the Court is of the view that the
rules leave much to be desired and should be reviewed and
revised. It appears that the provision on the "unanimity rule" is
vagueand unfair and, therefore, can be misused or abused
resulting in the deprivation of an applicant’s right to due
process.

Primarily, the invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity is

effectively a veto power over the collective will of a majority.
This should be clarified. Any assertion by a member
aftervoting seems to be unfair because it effectively gives him
or her a veto power over the collective votes of the other
members in view of the unanimous requirement. While an
oppositor-member can recuse himself orherself, still the
probability of annulling the majority vote ofthe Council is quite
high.

Second, integrity as a ground has not been defined. While the

initial impression is that it refers to the moral fiber of a
candidate, it can be, as it has been, used to mean other things.
Infact, the minutes of the JBC meetings n this case reflect the
lack of consensus among the members as to its precise
definition. Not having been defined or described, it is vague,
nebulous and confusing. It must be distinctly specified and
delineated.

Third, it should explicitly provide who can invoke it as a ground

against a candidate. Should it be invoked only by an outsider
as construed by the respondent Executive Secretary or also
by a member?

Fourth, while the JBC vetting proceedings is "sui generis" and

need not be formal or trial type, they must meet the minimum
requirements of due process. As always, an applicant should
be given a reasonable opportunity and time to be heard on the
charges against him or her, if there are any.

At any rate, it is up to the JBC to fine-tune the rules

considering the peculiar nature of its function. It need not be
stressed that the rules to be adopted should be fair,
reasonable, unambiguous and consistent with the minimum
requirements of due process.

One final note.

The Court disclaims that Jardeleza's inclusion in the shortlist

is an endorsement of his appointment as a member of the
Court.1âwphi1 In deference to the Constitution and his
wisdom in the exercise of his appointing power, the President
remains the ultimate judge of a candidate's worthiness.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is

hereby declared that Solicitor General Francis I-I. Jardeleza is
deemed INCLUDED in the shortlist submitted to the President
for consideration as an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court vice Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 236
G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC,
COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN, COMPOSTELA VALLEY
PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL,
Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly
came to this Court via a Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus,
and Certiorari, and Declaratory Relief1 under Rules 65 and 63
of the Rules of Court, respectively, with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, to assail the policy of the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC), requiring five years of service as judges of
first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to
second-level courts, on the ground that it is unconstitutional,
and was issued with grave abuse of discretion.awlibrary
The Facts
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley
Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. On September
27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge
in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31,
Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6,
Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur.
In a letter2 dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of
Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed the
petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for
the said stations. On the same date, the petitioner sent a
letter, through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his
non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants and
protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the
prejudicature examination.
The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer,
through a letter3 dated February 3, 2014, that his protest and
reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc. However,
its decision not to include his name in the list of applicants was
upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the
chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among others,
incumbent judges who have served in their current position for
at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge
only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. This
caused the petitioner to take recourse to this Court.
In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already
prescribed the qualifications of an RTC judge, and the JBC
could add no more; (2) the JBC's five-year requirement
violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Constitution; and (3) the JBC's five-year requirement violates
the constitutional provision on Social Justice and Human
Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner
also asserted that the requirement of the Prejudicature
Program mandated by Section 104 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
85575 should not be merely directory and should be fully
implemented. He further alleged that he has all the
qualifications for the position prescribed by the Constitution
and by Congress, since he has already complied with the
requirement of 10 years of practice of law.
In compliance with the Court's Resolution6 dated April 22,
2014, the JBC7 and the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG)8separately submitted their Comments. Summing up
the arguments of the JBC and the OSG, they essentially
stated that the petition is procedurally infirm and that the
assailed policy does not violate the equal protection and due
process clauses. They posited that: (1) the writ of certiorari
and prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from
performing its principal function under the Constitution to
recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is
not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function; (2)
the remedy of mandamus and declaratory relief will not lie
because the petitioner has no clear legal right that needs to
be protected; (3) the equal protection clause is not violated
because the classification of lower court judges who have
served at least five years and those who have served less
than five years is valid as it is performance and experience
based; and (4) there is no violation of due process as the
policy is merely internal in nature.awlibrary
The Issue
The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC
requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts
before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is
constitutional.
Ruling of the Court
Procedural Issues:
Before resolving the substantive issues, the Court considers it
necessary to first determine whether or not the action for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and declaratory relief
commenced by the petitioner was proper.
One. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable.
"The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for
determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the
special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are
governed by Rule 65."9 As discussed in the case of Maria
Carolina P. Araullo, etc., et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino
III, etc., et al.,10 this Court explained that:awlibrary
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari
and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach,
and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 237
or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain
any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is
expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of
Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive
officials.11 (Citation omitted)
In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the
scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and
screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or
quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any
performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However,
since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the
policy that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and
incidental to the exercise of the JBC's constitutional mandate,
a determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.
Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this
case by virtue of the Court's power of supervision over the
JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of supervision is
the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the
rules governing the conduct of a government entity are
observed and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that
rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such
rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace
them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work
done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may
not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They
have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the
rules are followed.12
Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court
over the JBC is to see to it that the JBC complies with its own
rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are
being attacked, then the Court, through its supervisory
authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the
matter and ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules.
Two. The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the
petitioner in assailing JBC's policy. The petitioner insisted that
mandamus is proper because his right was violated when he
was not included in the list of candidates for the RTC courts
he applied for. He said that his non-inclusion in the list of
candidates for these stations has caused him direct injury.
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the
applicant should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the
respondent to perform the act required.13The petitioner bears
the burden to show that there is such a clear legal right to the
performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty
on the part of the respondent to perform the act. The remedy
of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an
officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.14
Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a
ministerial act are mutually exclusive.
The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the
exercise of discretion or to compel a course of conduct, which,
it quickly seems to us, was what the petitioner would have the
JBC do in his favor. The function of the JBC to select and
recommend nominees for vacant judicial positions is
discretionary, not ministerial. Moreso, the petitioner cannot
claim any legal right to be included in the list of nominees for
judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and
statutory qualifications for appointment to the judiciary may
not be used to legally demand that one's name be included in
the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in
the list of the candidates depends on the discretion of the JBC,
thus:awlibrary
The fact that an individual possesses the constitutional and
statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary does
not create an entitlement or expectation that his or her name
be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. By
submitting an application or accepting a recommendation, one
submits to the authority of the JBC to subject the former to the
search, screening, and selection process, and to use its
discretion in deciding whether or not one should be included
in the list. Indeed, assuming that if one has the legal right to
be included in the list of candidates simply because he or she
possesses the constitutional and statutory qualifications, then
the application process would then be reduced to a mere
mechanical function of the JBC; and the search, screening,
and selection process would not only be unnecessary, but
also improper. However, this is clearly not the constitutional
intent. One's inclusion in the list of candidates is subject to the
discretion of the JBC over the selection of nominees for a
particular judicial post. Such candidate's inclusion is not,
therefore, a legally demandable right, but simply a privilege
the conferment of which is subject to the JBC's sound
discretion.
Moreover, petitioner is essentially seeking a promotional
appointment, that is, a promotion from a first-level court to a
second level court. There is no law, however, that grants him
the right to a promotion to second-level courts.15 (Emphasis
in the original)
Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge
is not properly compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it
involves the exercise of sound discretion by the JBC.
Three. The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An
action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person
interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an
executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief
sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and
determination of the validity of the written instrument and the
judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 238
thereunder."16 "[T]he purpose of the action is to secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc., for their guidance
in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues
arising from its alleged breach."17
In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve
an unsound policy. Rather, the petition specifically sought a
judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be
included in the list of applicants although he failed to meet
JBC's five-year requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates
that no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution
to be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial
positions. The opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a
mere privilege, and not a judicially enforceable right that may
be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion in the list of
candidates, which is one of the incidents of such appointment,
is not a right either. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any right
that could have been affected by the assailed policy.
Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because
this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for
declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.18
The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to
Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
R.A.No. 7691.20
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the
JBC and in the exercise of its expanded judicial power, the
Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition. But in
any event, even if the Court will set aside procedural
infirmities, the instant petition should still be
dismissed.awlibrary
Substantive Issues
As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated
to recommend appointees to the judiciary and only those
nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the
President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in
the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great
responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it
determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial
bench. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the
qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not
preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and
procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its
mandate.
The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are
necessary and incidental to the JBC's principal function of
choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the
judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the
Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process that
the JBC shall follow in determining applicants' qualifications.
In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to
set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every
vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum
qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every
position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily
requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is
most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient
but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.
JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply
to fill up judicial vacancies in order to promote an effective and
efficient administration of justice. Given this pragmatic
situation, the JBC had to establish a set of uniform criteria in
order to ascertain whether an applicant meets the minimum
constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities
expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-
year requirement policy applied by JBC to the petitioner's case
is necessary and incidental to the function conferred by the
Constitution to the JBC.
Equal Protection
There is no question that JBC employs standards to have a
rational basis to screen applicants who cannot be all
accommodated and appointed to a vacancy in the judiciary, to
determine who is best qualified among the applicants, and not
to discriminate against any particular individual or class.
The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not
require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality
among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a law
neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect
class, the classification stands as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government
end.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude
classification of individuals who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is
reasonable and not arbitrary."22 "The mere fact that the
legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not
violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification
of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality
in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid."23
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed policy, the
JBC merely exercised its discretion in accordance with the
constitutional requirement and its rules that a member of the
Judiciary must be of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence.24"To ensure the fulfillment of these standards
in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to
screen aspiring judges and justices, among others, making
certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all
qualified and suitably best for appointment. In this way, the
appointing process itself is shielded from the possibility of
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 239
extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and
mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or
disqualified."25
Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing
recommended appointees does not constitute a violation of
the equal protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate
when it employs number of years of service to screen and
differentiate applicants from the competition. The number of
years of service provides a relevant basis to determine proven
competence which may be measured by experience, among
other factors. The difference in treatment between lower court
judges who have served at least five years and those who
have served less than five years, on the other hand, was
rationalized by JBC as follows:awlibrary
Formulating policies which streamline the selection process
falls squarely under the purview of the JBC. No other
constitutional body is bestowed with the mandate and
competency to set criteria for applicants that refer to the more
general categories of probity, integrity and independence.
The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a
second-level court, which is five years experience as judge of
a first-level court, is a direct adherence to the qualities
prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a premium on many
years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one
of the stringent constitutional standards requiring that a
member of the judiciary be of "proven competence." In
determining competence, the JBC considers, among other
qualifications, experience and performance.
Based on the JBC's collective judgment, those who have been
judges of first-level courts for five (5) years are better qualified
for promotion to second-level courts. It deems length of
experience as a judge as indicative of conversance with the
law and court procedure. Five years is considered as a
sufficient span of time for one to acquire professional skills for
the next level court, declog the dockets, put in place improved
procedures and an efficient case management system, adjust
to the work environment, and gain extensive experience in the
judicial process.
A five-year stint in the Judiciary can also provide evidence of
the integrity, probity, and independence of judges seeking
promotion. To merit JBC's nomination for their promotion, they
must have had a "record of, and reputation for, honesty,
integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to
sound moral and ethical standards." Likewise, their decisions
must be reflective of the soundness of their judgment,
courage, rectitude, cold neutrality and strength of character.
Hence, for the purpose of determining whether judges are
worthy of promotion to the next level court, it would be
premature or difficult to assess their merit if they have had less
than one year of service on the bench.26 (Citations omitted
and emphasis in the original)
At any rate, five years of service as a lower court judge is not
the only factor that determines the selection of candidates for
RTC judge to be appointed by the President. Persons with this
qualification are neither automatically selected nor do they
automatically become nominees. The applicants are chosen
based on an array of factors and are evaluated based on their
individual merits. Thus, it cannot be said that the questioned
policy was arbitrary, capricious, or made without any basis.
Clearly, the classification created by the challenged policy
satisfies the rational basis test. The foregoing shows that
substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges
with five year experience and those with less than five years
of experience, like the petitioner, and the classification
enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to
its legitimate purpose. The Court, thus, rules that the
questioned policy does not infringe on the equal protection
clause as it is based on reasonable classification intended to
gauge the proven competence of the applicants. Therefore,
the said policy is valid and constitutional.
Due Process
The petitioner averred that the assailed policy violates
procedural due process for lack of publication and non-
submission to the University of the Philippines Law Center
Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR). The
petitioner said that the assailed policy will affect all applying
judges, thus, the said policy should have been published.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the assailed JBC policy
need not be filed in the ONAR because the publication
requirement in the ONAR is confined to issuances of
administrative agencies under the Executive branch of the
government.27 Since the JBC is a body under the supervision
of the Supreme Court,28 it is not covered by the publication
requirements of the Administrative Code.
Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of
service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify
as applicants to second-level courts should have been
published. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in
order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are
intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding
force and effect. There are, however, several exceptions to
the requirement of publication, such as interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature, which regulate
only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters
of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning
the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in
the performance of their duties.29
Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the
administrative rules and regulations exempted from the
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 240
publication requirement. The assailed policy involves a
qualification standard by which the JBC shall determine
proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal
regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect only
the members of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection
process involves a call to lawyers who meet the qualifications
in the Constitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to
apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a natural
consequence thereof that potential applicants be informed of
the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they would
be able to prepare for and comply with them.
The Court also noted the fact that in JBC-009, otherwise
known as the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, the JBC
had put its criteria in writing and listed the guidelines in
determining competence, independence, integrity and probity.
Section 1, Paragraph 1 of Rule 9 expressly provides that
applicants for the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan,
should, as a general rule, have at least five years of
experience as an RTC judge, thus:awlibrary
RULE 9 - SPECIAL GUIDELINES FOR NOMINATION TO A
VACANCY IN THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
SANDIGANBAYAN
Section 1. Additional criteria for nomination to the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. - In addition to the foregoing
guidelines the Council should consider the following in
evaluating the merits of applicants for a vacancy in the Court
of Appeals and Sandiganbayan:
1. As a general rule, he must have at least five years of
experience as a judge of Regional Trial Court, except when
he has in his favor outstanding credentials, as evidenced by,
inter alia, impressive scholastic or educational record and
performance in the Bar examinations, excellent reputation for
honesty, integrity, probity and independence of mind; at least
very satisfactory performance rating for three (3) years
preceding the filing of his application for nomination; and
excellent potentials for appellate judgeship.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
The express declaration of these guidelines in JBC-009, which
have been duly published on the website of the JBC and in a
newspaper of general circulation suggests that the JBC is
aware that these are not mere internal rules, but are rules
implementing the Constitution that should be published. Thus,
if the JBC were so-minded to add special guidelines for
determining competence of applicants for RTC judges, then it
could and should have amended its rules and published the
same. This, the JBC did not do as JBC-009 and its
amendatory rule do not have special guidelines for applicants
to the RTC.
Moreover, jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a
statute should be published. Thus, by analogy, publication is
also required for the five-year requirement because it seeks to
implement a constitutional provision requiring proven
competence from members of the judiciary.
Nonetheless, the JBC's failure to publish the assailed policy
has not prejudiced the petitioner's private interest. At the risk
of being repetitive, the petitioner has no legal right to be
included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies since the
possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for
appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legally
demand that one's name be included in the list of candidates
for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the shortlist is strictly
within the discretion of the JBC.30
As to the issue that the JBC failed or refused to implement the
completion of the prejudicature program as a requirement for
appointment or promotion in the judiciary under R.A. No.
8557, this ground of the petition, being unsubstantiated, was
unfounded. Clearly, it cannot be said that JBC unlawfully
neglects the performance of a duty enjoined by law.
Finally, the petitioner argued but failed to establish that the
assailed policy violates the constitutional provision under
social justice and human rights for equal opportunity of
employment. The OSG explained:awlibrary
[T]he questioned policy does not violate equality of
employment opportunities. The constitutional provision does
not call for appointment to the Judiciary of all who might, for
any number of reasons, wish to apply. As with all professions,
it is regulated by the State. The office of a judge is no ordinary
office. It is imbued with public interest and is central in the
administration of justice x x x. Applicants who meet the
constitutional and legal qualifications must vie and withstand
the competition and rigorous screening and selection process.
They must submit themselves to the selection criteria,
processes and discretion of respondent JBC, which has the
constitutional mandate of screening and selecting candidates
whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the
President. So long as a fair opportunity is available for all
applicants who are evaluated on the basis of their individual
merits and abilities, the questioned policy cannot be struck
down as unconstitutional.31 (Citations omitted)
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the petitioner has not
established a clear legal right to justify the issuance of a
preliminary injunction. The petitioner has merely filed an
application with the JBC for the position of RTC judge, and he
has no clear legal right to be nominated for that office nor to
be selected and included in the list to be submitted to the
President which is subject to the discretion of the JBC. The
JBC has the power to determine who shall be recommended
to the judicial post. To be included in the list of applicants is a
privilege as one can only be chosen under existing criteria
imposed by the JBC itself. As such, prospective applicants,
including the petitioner, cannot claim any demandable right to
take part in it if they fail to meet these criteria. Hence, in the
absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of an injunctive
writ is not justified.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 241

As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching

for, screening, and selecting applicants relative to
recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC has the
authority to determine how best to perform such constitutional
mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the JBC issues various
policies setting forth the guidelines to be observed in the
evaluation of applicants, and formulates rules and guidelines
in order to ensure that the rules are updated to respond to
existing circumstances. Its discretion is freed from legislative,
executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the JBC is
shielded from any outside pressure and improper influence.
Limiting qualified applicants in this case to those judges with
five years of experience was an exercise of discretion by the
JBC. The potential applicants, however, should have been
informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so that
they could properly prepare for and comply with them. Hence,
unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the
Court will refrain from interfering with the exercise of JBC's
powers, and will respect the initiative and independence
inherent in the latter.cralawred

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

DISMISSED. The Court, however, DIRECTS that the Judicial
and Bar Council comply with the publication requirement of (1)
the assailed policy requiring five years of experience as
judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant
to the Regional Trial Court, and (2) other special guidelines
that the Judicial and Bar Council is or will be implementing.

SO ORDERED.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 242
February 21, 2017
G.R. No. 224302
HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, HON. REYNALDO A.
ALHAMBRA, HON. DANILO S. CRUZ, HON. BENJAMIN T.
POZON, HON. SALVADOR V. TIMBANG, JR., and the
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
(IBP),Petitioners
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C.
AQUINO III, HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, HON. MICHAEL FREDERICK L. MUSNGI, HON.
MA. GERALDINE FAITH A. ECONG, HON. DANILO S.
SANDOVAL, HON. WILHELMINA B. JORGE-WAGAN,
HON. ROSANA FE ROMERO-MAGLAYA, HON.
MERIANTHE PACITA M. ZURAEK, HON. ELMO M.
ALAMEDA, and HON. VICTORIA C. FERNANDEZ-
BERNARDO, Respondents
RESOLUTION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
In its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the Court En Banc
held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DISMISSES
the instant Petition for Quo Warranto and Certiorari and
Prohibition for lack of merit. The Court DECLARES the
clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the appointments of respondents
Associate Justices Michael Frederick L. Musngi and
Geraldine Faith A. Econg, together with the four other newly-
appointed Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, as
VALID. The Court further DENIES the Motion for Intervention
of the Judicial and Bar Council in the present Petition, but
ORDERS the Clerk of Court En Banc to docket as a separate
administrative matter the new rules and practices of the
Judicial and Bar Council which the Court took cognizance of
in the preceding discussion as Item No. 2: the deletion or non-
inclusion in JBC No. 2016-1, or the Revised Rules of the
Judicial and Bar Council, of Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009; and
Item No. 3: the removal of incumbent Senior Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court as consultants of the Judicial
and Bar Council, referred to in pages 3 5 to 40 of this Decision.
The Court finally DIRECTS the Judicial and Bar Council to file
its comment on said Item Nos. 2 and 3 within thirty (30) days
from notice.1
I Otherwise, the President can choose whom he pleases, and
THE JBC MOTIONS
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) successively filed a Motion
for Reconsideration (with Motion for the Inhibition of the
Ponente) on December 27, 2016 and a Motion for
Reconsideration-in-Intervention (Of the Decision dated 29
November 2016) on February 6, 2017.
At the outset, the Court notes the revelation of the JBC in its
Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention that it is not taking
any position in this particular case on President Aquino's
appointments to the six newly-created positions of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The Court quotes the
relevant portions from the Motion, as follows:
The immediate concern of the JBC is this Court's
pronouncement that the former's act of submitting six lists for
six vacancies was unconstitutional. Whether the President
can cross-reach into the lists is not the primary concern of the
JBC in this particular case. At another time, perhaps, it may
take a position. But not in this particular situation involving the
newly created positions in the Sandiganbayan in view of the
lack of agreement by the JBC Members on that issue.
What the President did with the lists, for the purpose of this
particular dispute alone as far as the JBC is concerned, was
the President's exclusive domain.2
Nonetheless, the JBC did not categorically withdraw the
arguments raised in its previous Motions, and even reiterated
and further discussed said arguments, and raised additional
points in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention.
Hence, the Court is still constrained to address said
arguments in this Resolution.
In its Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion for Inhibition of
the Ponente) the JBC argues as follows: (a) Its Motion for
Intervention was timely filed on November 26, 2016, three
days before the promulgation of the Decision in the instant
case; (b) The JBC has a legal interest in this case, and its
intervention would not have unduly delayed or prejudiced the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties; (c) Even
assuming that the Motion for Intervention suffers procedural
infirmities, said Motion should have been granted for a
complete resolution of the case and to afford the JBC due
process; and (d) Unless its Motion for Intervention is granted
by the Court, the JBC is not bound by the questioned Decision
because the JBC was neither a party litigant nor impleaded as
a party in the case, the JBC was deprived of due process, the
assailed Decision is a judgment in personam and not a
judgment in rem, and a decision rendered in violation of a
party's right to due process is void for lack of jurisdiction.
On the merits of the case, the JBC asserts that in submitting
six short lists for six vacancies, it was only acting in
accordance with the clear and unambiguous mandate of
Article VIII, Section 93 of the 1987 Constitution for the JBC to
submit a list for every vacancy. Considering its independence
as a constitutional body, the JBC has the discretion and
wisdom to perform its mandate in any manner as long as it is
consistent with the Constitution. According to the JBC, its new
practice of "clustering," in fact, is more in accord with the
purpose of the JBC to rid the appointment process to the
Judiciary from political pressure as the President has to
choose only from the nominees for one particular vacancy.
thereby completely disregard the purpose for the creation of
the JBC. The JBC clarifies that it numbered the vacancies, not
to influence the order of precedence, but for practical reasons,
i.e., to distinguish one list from the others and to avoid
confusion. The JBC also points out that the acts invoked
against the JBC are based on practice or custom, but
"practice, no matter how long continued, cannot give rise to
any vested right." The JBC, as a constitutional body, enjoys
independence, and as such, it may change its practice from
time to time in accordance with its wisdom.
Lastly, the JBC moves for the inhibition of the ponente of the
assailed Decision based on Canon 3, Section 5 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary.4 The JBC
alleges that the ponente, as consultant of the JBC from 2014
to 2016, had personal knowledge of the voting procedures and
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 243
format of the short lists, which are the subject matters of this
case. The ponente was even present as consultant during the
meeting on October 26, 2015 when the JBC voted upon the
candidates for the six new positions of Associate Justice of
the Sandiganbayan created under Republic Act No. 10660.
The JBC then expresses its puzzlement over the ponente 's
participation in the present proceedings, espousing a position
contrary to that of the JBC. The JBC questions why it was only
in her Decision in the instant case did the ponente raise her
disagreement with the JBC as to the clustering of nominees
for each of the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice. The JBC further quoted portions of the
assailed Decision that it claims bespoke of the ponente 's
"already-arrived-at" conclusion as to the alleged ill acts and
intentions of the JBC. Hence, the JBC submits that such
formed inference will not lend to an even-handed
consideration by the ponente should she continue to
participate in the case.
Ultimately, the JBC prays:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully prayed that
the DECISION dated 29 November 2016 be reconsidered and
set aside and a new one be issued granting the Motion for
Intervention of the JBC.
It is likewise prayed that the ponente inhibit herself from
further participating in this case and that the JBC be granted
such other reliefs as are just and equitable under the
premises.5
The JBC subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration-in-
Intervention (Of the Decision dated 29 November 2016),
praying at the very beginning that it be deemed as sufficient
remedy for the technical deficiency of its Motion for
Intervention (i.e., failure to attach the pleading-in-intervention)
and as Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the denial
of its Motion for Intervention.
The JBC, in its latest Motion, insists on its legal interest, injury,
and standing to intervene in the present case, as well as on
the timeliness of its Motion for Intervention.
The JBC proffers several reasons for not immediately seeking
to intervene in the instant case despite admitting that it
received copies of the appointments of the six Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices from the Office of the President (OP) on
January 25, 2016, to wit: (a) Even as its individual Members
harbored doubts as to the validity of the appointments of
respondents Michael Frederick L. Musngi (Musngi) and
Geraldine Faith A. Econg (Econg) as Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices, the JBC agreed as a body in an executive
session that it would stay neutral and not take any legal
position on the constitutionality of said appointments since it
"did not have any legal interest in the offices of Associate
Justices of the Sandiganbayan"; (b) None of the parties
prayed that the act of clustering by the JBC be declared
unconstitutional; and (c) The JBC believed that the Court
would apply the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the
discharge by the JBC of its official functions and if the Court
would have been inclined to delve into the validity of the act of
clustering by the JBC, it would order the JBC to comment on
the matter.
The JBC impugns the significance accorded by the ponente
to the fact that Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
(Sereno), Chairperson of the JBC, administered the oath of
office of respondent Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice on January 25, 2016. Chief Justice Serena's act
should not be taken against the JBC because, the JBC
reasons, Chief Justice Sereno only chairs the JBC, but she is
not the JBC, and the administration of the oath of office was a
purely ministerial act.
The JBC likewise disputes the ponente 's observation that
clustering is a totally new practice of the JBC. The JBC avers
that even before Chief Justice Sereno's Chairmanship, the
JBC has generally followed the rule of one short list for every
vacancy in all first and second level trial courts. The JBC has
followed the "one list for every vacancy" rule even for
appellate courts since 2013. The JBC even recalls that it
submitted on August 17, 2015 to then President Benigno
Simeon C. Aquino III (Aquino) four separate short lists for four
vacancies in the Court of Appeals; and present during the JBC
deliberations were the ponente and Supreme Court Associate
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Velasco) as consultants,
who neither made any comment on the preparation of the
short lists.
On the merits of the Petition, the JBC maintains that it did not
exceed its authority and, in fact, it only faithfully complied with
the literal language of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987
Constitution, when it prepared six short lists for the six
vacancies in the Sandiganbayan. It cites the cases of Atong
Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections6and Ocampo v.
Enriquez,7 wherein the Court allegedly adopted the textualist
approach of constitutional interpretation.
The JBC renounces any duty to increase the chances of
appointment of every candidate it adjudged to have met the
minimum qualifications. It asserts that while there might have
been favorable experiences with the past practice of
submitting long consolidated short lists, past practices cannot
be used as a source of rights and obligations to override the
duty of the JBC to observe a straightforward application of the
Constitution.
The JBC posits that clustering is a matter of legal and
operational necessity for the JBC and the only safe standard
operating procedure for making short lists. It presents different
scenarios which demonstrate the need for clustering, viz., (a)
There are two different sets of applicants for the vacancies;
(b) There is a change in the JBC composition during the
interval in the deliberations on the vacancies as the House of
Representatives and the Senate alternately occupy the ex
officio seat for the Legislature; (c) The applicant informs the
JBC of his/her preference for assignment in the Cebu Station
or Cagayan de Oro Station of the Court of Appeals because
of the location or the desire to avoid mingling with certain
personalities; (d) The multiple vacancies in newly-opened first
and second level trial courts; and (e) The dockets to be
inherited in the appellate court are overwhelming so the JBC
chooses nominees for those particular posts with more years
of service as against those near retirement.
To the JBC, it seems that the Court was in a hurry to
promulgate its Decision on November 29, 2016, which struck
down the practice of clustering by the JBC. The JBC supposes
that it was in anticipation of the vacancies in the Court as a
result of the retirements of Supreme Court Associate Justices
Jose P. Perez (Perez) and Arturo D. Brion (Brion) on
December 14, 2016 and December 29, 2016, respectively.
The JBC then claims that it had no choice but to submit two
separate short lists for said vacancies in the Court because
there were two sets of applicants for the same, i.e., there were
14 applicants for the seat vacated by Justice Perez and 17
applicants for the seat vacated by Justice Brion.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 244
The JBC further contends that since each vacancy creates
discrete and possibly unique situations, there can be no
general rule against clustering. Submitting separate,
independent short lists for each vacancy is the only way for
the JBC to observe the constitutional standards of (a) one list
for every vacancy, and (b) choosing candidates of
competence, independence, probity, and integrity for every
such vacancy.
It is also the asseveration of the JBC that it did not encroach
on the President's power to appoint members of the Judiciary.
The JBC alleges that its individual Members gave several
reasons why there was an apparent indication of seniority
assignments in the six short lists for the six vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, particularly: (a) The JBC
can best perform its job by indicating who are stronger
candidates by giving higher priority to those in the lower-
numbered list; (b) The indication could head off the confusion
encountered in Re: Seniority Among the Four Most Recent
Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices of the
Court of Appeals;8 and (c) The numbering of the lists from
16th to 21st had nothing to do with seniority in the
Sandiganbayan, but was only an ordinal designation of the
cluster to which the candidates were included.
The JBC ends with a reiteration of the need for the ponente to
inhibit herself from the instant case as she appears to harbor
hostility possibly arising from the termination of her JBC
consultancy.
The prayer of the JBC in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-
Intervention reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully prayed that
JBC's Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, Motion for
Intervention and Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for
Inhibition of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro of the
JBC be granted and/or given due course and that:
1. the Court's pronouncements in the Decision dated 29
November 2016 with respect to the JBC's submission of six
shortlists of nominees to the Sandiganbayan be modified to
reflect that the JBC is deemed to have followed Section 9,
Article VIII of the Constitution in its practice of submitting one
shortlist of nominees for every vacancy, including in
submitting on 28 October 2015 six lists to former President
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III for the six vacancies of the
Sandiganbayan, or for the Court to be completely silent on the
matter; and
2. the Court delete the treatment as a separate administrative
matter of the alleged new rules and practices of the JBC,
particularly the following: (1) the deletion or non-inclusion of
Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009 in JBC No. 2016-1, or the
Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council; and (2) the
removal of incumbent Senior Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court as consultants of the JBC, referred to in pages
35 to 40 of the Decision. And as a consequence, the Court
excuse the JBC from filing the required comment on the said
matters.9
II
THE RULING OF THE COURT
There is no legal or factual basis for the
ponente to inhibit herself from the instant
case.
The Motion for Inhibition of the Ponente filed by the JBC is
denied.
The present Motion for Inhibition has failed to comply with
Rule 8, Section 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court,10 which requires that "[a] motion for inhibition must be
in writing and under oath and shall state the grounds therefor."
Yet, even if technical rules are relaxed herein, there is still no
valid ground for the inhibition of the ponente.
There is no ground11 for the mandatory inhibition of the
ponente from the case at bar.
The ponente has absolutely no personal interest in this case.
The ponente is not a counsel, partner, or member of a law firm
that is or was the counsel in the case; the ponente or her
spouse, parent, or child has no pecuniary interest in the case;
and the ponente is not related to any of the parties in the case
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to an
attorney or any member of a law firm who is counsel of record
in the case within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity.
The ponente is also not privy to any proceeding in which the
JBC discussed and decided to adopt the unprecedented
method of clustering the nominees for the six simultaneous
vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into six
separate short lists, one for every vacancy. The ponente does
not know when, how, and why the JBC adopted the clustering
method of nomination for appellate courts and even the
Supreme Court.
With due respect to Chief Justice Sereno, it appears that when
the JBC would deliberate on highly contentious, sensitive, and
important issues, it was her policy as Chairperson of the JBC
to hold executive sessions, which excluded the Supreme
Court consultants. At the JBC meeting held on October 26,
2015, Chief Justice Sereno immediately mentioned at the
beginning of the deliberations "that, as the Council had always
done in the past when there are multiple vacancies, the voting
would be on a per vacancy basis."12 Chief Justice Sereno
went on to state that the manner of voting had already been
explained to the two ex officio members of the JBC who were
not present during the meeting, namely, Senator Aquilino L.
Pimentel III (Pimentel) and then Department of Justice (DOJ)
Secretary ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. Caguioa (Caguioa).13
Then the JBC immediately proceeded with the voting of
nominees. This ponente was not consulted before the JBC
decision to cluster nominees was arrived at and, therefore,
she did not have the opportunity to study and submit her
recommendation to the JBC on the clustering of nominees.
It is evident that prior to the meeting on October 26, 2015, the
JBC had already reached an agreement on the procedure it
would follow in voting for nominees, i.e., the clustering of the
nominees into six separate short lists, with one short list for
each of the six newly-created positions of Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice. That Senator Pimentel and DOJ Secretary
Caguioa, who were not present at the meeting on October 26,
2015, were informed beforehand of the clustering of nominees
only proves that the JBC had already agreed upon the
clustering of nominees prior to the said meeting.
Notably, Chief Justice Sereno inaccurately claimed at the very
start of the deliberations that the JBC had been voting on a
per vacancy basis "as the Council had always done," giving
the impression that the JBC was merely following established
procedure, when in truth, the clustering of nominees for
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 245
simultaneous or closely successive vacancies in a collegiate
court was a new practice only adopted by the JBC under her
Chairmanship. In the Decision dated November 29, 2016,
examples were already cited how, in previous years, the JBC
submitted just one short list for simultaneous or closely
successive vacancies in collegiate courts, including the
Supreme Court, which will again be presented hereunder.
As previously mentioned, it is the practice of the JBC to hold
executive sessions when taking up sensitive matters. The
ponente and Associate Justice Velasco, incumbent Justices
of the Supreme Court and then JBC consultants, as well as
other JBC consultants, were excluded from such executive
sessions. Consequently, the ponente and Associate Justice
Velasco were unable to participate in and were kept in the
dark on JBC proceedings/decisions, particularly, on matters
involving the nomination of candidates for vacancies in the
appellate courts and the Supreme Court. The matter of the
nomination to the Supreme Court of now Supreme Court
Associate Justice FRANCIS H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), which
became the subject matter of Jardeleza v. Sereno,14 was
taken up by the JBC in such an executive session. This
ponente also does not know when and why the JBC deleted
from JBC No. 2016-1, "The Revised Rules of the Judicial and
Bar Council," what was Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009, the
former JBC Rules, which gave due weight and regard to the
recommendees of the Supreme Court for vacancies in the
Court. The amendment of the JBC Rules could have been
decided upon by the JBC when the ponente and Associate
Justice Velasco were already relieved by Chief Justice Sereno
of their duties as consultants of the JBC. The JBC could have
similarly taken up and decided upon the clustering of
nominees for the six vacant posts of Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice during one of its executive sessions prior to
October 26, 2015.
Hence, even though the ponente and the other JBC
consultants were admittedly present during the meeting on
October 26, 2015, the clustering of the nominees· for the six
simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
was already fait accompli. Questions as to why and how the
JBC came to agree on the clustering of nominees were no
longer on the table for discussion during the said meeting. As
the minutes of the meeting on October 26, 2015 bear out, the
JBC proceedings focused on the voting of nominees. It is
stressed that the crucial issue in the present case pertains to
the clustering of nominees and not the nomination and
qualifications of any of the nominees. This ponente only had
the opportunity to express her opinion on the issue of the
clustering of nominees for simultaneous and closely
successive vacancies in collegiate courts in her ponencia in
the instant case. As a Member of the Supreme Court, the
ponente is duty-bound to render an opinion on a matter that
has grave constitutional implications.
Neither is there any basis for the ponente 's voluntary
inhibition from the case at bar. Other than the bare allegations
of the JBC, there is no clear and convincing evidence of the
ponente 's purported bias and prejudice, sufficient to
overcome the presumption that she had rendered her assailed
ponencia in the regular performance of her official and sacred
duty of dispensing justice according to law and evidence and
without fear or favor. Significant herein is the following
disquisition of the Court on voluntary inhibition of judges in
Gochan v. Gochan,15 which is just as applicable to Supreme
Court Justices:
In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and
prejudice, to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary
inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and convincing
evidence. Bare allegations of their partiality will not suffice. It
cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred
oaths of office of magistrates, requiring them to administer
justice fairly and equitably - both to the poor and the rich, the
weak and the strong, the lonely and the well-connected.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Furthermore, it appears from the admitted lack of consensus
on the part of the JBC Members as to the validity of the
clustering shows that the conclusion reached by the ponente
did not arise from personal hostility but from her objective
evaluation of the adverse constitutional implications of the
clustering of the nominees for the vacant posts of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. It is unfortunate that the
JBC stooped so low in casting aspersion on the person of this
ponente instead of focusing on sound legal arguments to
support its position. There is absolutely no factual basis for the
uncalled for and unfair imputation of the JBC that the ponente
harbors personal hostility against the JBC presumably due to
her removal as consultant. The ponente 's removal as
consultant was the decision of Chief Justice Sereno, not the
JBC. The ponente does not bear any personal grudge or
resentment against the JBC for her removal as consultant.
The ponente does not view Chief Justice Sereno's move as
particularly directed against her as Associate Justice Velasco
had been similarly removed as JBC consultant. The ponente
has never been influenced by personal motive in deciding
cases. The ponente, instead, perceives the removal of
incumbent Supreme Court Justices as consultants of the JBC
as an affront against the Supreme Court itself as an institution,
since the evident intention of such move was to keep the
Supreme Court in the dark on the changes in rules and
practices subsequently adopted by the JBC, which, to the
mind of this ponente, may adversely affect the exercise of the
supervisory authority over the JBC vested upon the Supreme
Court by the Constitution.
All the basic issues raised in the Petition
had been thoroughly passed upon by the
Court in its Decision dated November 29,
2016 and the JBC already expressed its
disinterest to question President Aquino's
"cross-reaching" in his appointment of the
six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
Even if the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Reconsideration-in-Intervention of the JBC, praying for the
grant of its Motion for Intervention and the reversal of the
Decision dated November 29, 2016, are admitted into the
records of this case and the issues raised and arguments
adduced in the said two Motions are considered, there is no
cogent reason to reverse the Decision dated November 29,
2016, particularly, in view of the admission of the JBC of the
lack of unanimity among the JBC members on the issue
involving the clustering of nominees for the six simultaneous
vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice and their
disinterest to question the "cross-reaching" or non-
observance by President Aquino of such clustering.
Hence, the Court will no longer belabor the issue that only
three JBC Members signed the Motion for Intervention and
Motion for Reconsideration and only four JBC Members
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 246

signed the Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, as well merits of the case fail to persuade the Court to reconsider its
as the fact that Chief Justice Sereno, as Chairperson of the Decision dated November 29, 2016.
JBC, did not sign the three Motions.
a. The clustering of nominees for the
To determine the legal personality of the signatories to file the
JBC Motions, the Court has accorded particular significance six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan
to who among the JBC Members signed the Motions and to
Chief Justice Sereno's act of administering the oath of office
to three of the newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate by the JBC impaired the President's
Justices, including respondent Econg, in resolving the
pending Motions of the JBC. However, in its Motion for power to appoint members of the
Reconsideration-in-Intervention, the JBC now reveals that not
all of its Members agree on the official position to take in the Judiciary and to determine the
case of President Aquino's appointment of the six new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. Thus, the position of the
JBC on the clustering of the nominees for the six simultaneous seniority of the newly-appointed
vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice rests on
shaky legal ground. Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.

The JBC takes exception as to why the Court allowed the Noteworthy is the fact that the Court unanimously voted that
Petition at bar even when it did not strictly comply with the in this case of six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan
rules, as it was filed beyond the 60-day period for filing a Associate Justice, the JBC acted beyond its constitutional
petition for certiorari. The Court, in its Decision dated mandate in clustering the nominees into six separate short
November 29, 2016, gave consideration to petitioners' lists and President Aquino did not commit grave abuse of
assertion that they had to secure first official copies of the six discretion in disregarding the said clustering.
short lists before they were able to confirm that President
Aquino, in appointing the six new Sandiganbayan Associate
The JBC invokes its independence, discretion, and wisdom,
Justices, actually disregarded the clustering of nominees into
and maintains that it deemed it wiser and more in accord with
six separate short lists. While the Court is hard-pressed to
Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution to cluster the
extend the same consideration to the JBC which made no
nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for
immediate effort to explain its failure to timely question or
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into six separate short lists.
challenge the appointments of respondents Econg and
The independence and discretion of the JBC, however, is not
Musngi as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices whether before
without limits. It cannot impair the President's power to appoint
the OP or the courts, the Court will nevertheless now allow the
members of the Judiciary and his statutory power to determine
JBC intervention by considering the issues raised and
the seniority of the newly-appointed Sandiganbayan
arguments adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Associate Justices. The Court cannot sustain the strained
Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention of the JBC in the
interpretation of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution
interest of substantial justice.
espoused by the JBC, which ultimately curtailed the
President's appointing power.
Incidentally, it should be mentioned that the JBC reproaches
the Court for supposedly hurrying the promulgation of its
In its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the Court ruled that
Decision on November 29, 2016 in anticipation of the
the clustering impinged upon the President's appointing power
impending vacancies in the Supreme Court due to the
in the following ways: The President's option for every
retirements of Associate Justices Perez and Brion in
vacancy was limited to the five to seven nominees in each
December 2016. On the contrary, it appears that it was the
cluster. Once the President had appointed a nominee from
JBC which hurriedly proceeded with the two separate
one cluster, then he was proscribed from considering the other
publications on August 4, 2016 and August 18, 2016 of the
nominees in the same cluster for the other vacancies. All the
opening of the application for the aforesaid vacancies,
nominees applied for and were found to be qualified for
respectively, which was contrary to previous practice, even
appointment to any of the vacant Associate Justice positions
while the issue of clustering was set to be decided by the
in the Sandiganbayan, but the JBC failed to explain why one
Court. Moreover, a scrutiny of the process the Petition went
nominee should be considered for appointment to the position
through before its promulgation negates any haste on the part
assigned to one specific cluster only. Correspondingly, the
of the Court. Bear in mind that the Petition at bar was filed on
nominees' chance for appointment was restricted to the
May 1 7, 2016 and petitioners' Reply, the last pleading allowed
consideration of the one cluster in which they were included,
by the Court in this case, was filed on August 3, 2016. The
even though they applied and were found to be qualified for
draftponencia was calendared in the agenda of the Supreme
all the vacancies. Moreover, by designating the numerical
Court en bane, called again, and deliberated upon several
order of the vacancies, the JBC established the seniority or
times before it was actually voted upon on November 29,
order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate
2016. Indeed, it appears that it was the JBC which rushed to
Justices, a power which the law (Section 1, paragraph 3 of
release the separate short lists of nominees for the said
Presidential Decree No. 160616), rules (Rule II, Section 1 (b)
Supreme Court vacancies despite knowing the pendency of
of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan17), and
the instant Petition and its own filing of a Motion for
jurisprudence (Re: Seniority Among the Four Most Recent
Intervention herein on November 28, 2016. The JBC went
Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices of the
ahead with the release of separate short lists of nominees for
Court of Appeals18), vest exclusively upon the President.
the posts of Supreme Court Associate Justice vice retired
Associate Justices Perez and Brion on December 2, 2016 and
December 9, 2016, respectively. b. Clustering can be used as a device to

Even if the Court allows the intervention of the JBC, as it will favor or prejudice a qualified
now do in the case at bar, the arguments of the JBC on the
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 247
nominee.
The JBC avers that it has no duty to increase the chances of
appointment of every candidate it has adjudged to have met
the minimum qualifications for a judicial post. The Court does
not impose upon the JBC such duty, it only requires that the
JBC gives all qualified nominees fair and equal opportunity to
be appointed. The clustering by the JBC of nominees for
simultaneous or closely successive vacancies in collegiate
courts can actually be a device to favor or prejudice a
particular nominee. A favored nominee can be included in a
cluster with no other strong contender to ensure his/her
appointment; or conversely, a nominee can be placed in a
cluster with many strong contenders to minimize his/her
chances of appointment.
Without casting aspersion or insinuating ulterior motive on the
part of the JBC - which would only be highly speculative on
the part of the Court - hereunder are different scenarios, using
the very same circumstances and nominees in this case, to
illustrate how clustering could be used to favor or prejudice a
particular nominee and subtly influence President Aquino's
appointing power, had President Aquino faithfully observed
the clustering.
The six nominees actually appointed by President Aquino as
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices were the following:
VACANCY IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN PERSON
APPOINTED SHORT LISTED FOR FORMER
POSITION HELD
16th Associate Justice Michael Frederick L. Musngi
21st Associate Justice Undersecretary for
Special Concerns/ Chief of Staff of the Executive Secretary,
OP, for 5 years
17th Associate Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz 19th Associate
Justice Undersecretary, Office of the Executive Secretary,
OP, for 4-1/2 years
18th Associate Justice Geraldine Faith A. Econg 21st
Associate Justice Former Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Cebu, for 6 years Chief of Office, Philippine Mediation Center
(PMC) Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA)
19th Associate Justice Maria Theresa V. Mendoza-
Arcega 17th Associate Justice Judge, RTC, Malolos
Bulacan, for 10 years
20th Associate Justice Karl B. Miranda 20th Associate
Justice Assistant Solicitor General, Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), for 15 years
21st Associate Justice Zaldy V. Trespeses 18th
Associate Justice Judicial Staff Head, Office of the Chief
Justice (OCJ), Supreme Court, for 2 years
It would be safe to say that all the aforementioned six
nominees were strong contenders. If all six nominees were
placed in the same cluster, then only one of them would have
been actually appointed as Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
and the other five could no longer be considered for the still
unfilled vacancies. If then Atty. Zaldy V. Trespeses
(Trespeses), Judicial Staff Head, OCJ, was included in the
cluster with respondent Econg, PHILJA Chief of Office for
PMC, and respondent Musngi, Undersecretary for Special
Concerns and Chief of Staff of the Executive Secretary, OP,
then he would have lesser chance of being appointed as he
would have to vie for a single vacancy with two other strong
contenders; and only one of the three would have been
appointed. Evidently, the appointments to the six
simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
would have been different by simply jumbling the clusters of
nominees. Even if we go back in history, had the JBC
clustered the nominees for the posts vacated by Supreme
Court Associate Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing
(Quisumbing) and Minita V. Chico-Nazario (Chico-Nazario),
and if Associate Justices Perez and Jose Catral Mendoza
(Mendoza) were together in the same cluster, then only one
of them would have been appointed. Also, had the JBC
clustered the nominees for the vacancies resulting from the
retirements of Supreme Court Associate Justices Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura (Nachura) and Conchita Carpio Morales
(Carpio Morales), and if Associate Justices Bienvenido L.
Reyes (Reyes) and ESTELA M. Perlas-Bernabe (Perlas-
Bernabe) were together in the same cluster, then the
appointment of one of them would have already excluded the
other.
c. There are no objective criteria,
standards, or guidelines for the
clustering of nominees by the JBC.
The problem is that the JBC has so far failed to present a legal,
objective, and rational basis for determining which nominee
shall be included in a cluster. Simply saying that it is the result
of the deliberation and voting by the JBC for every vacancy is
unsatisfactory. A review of the voting patterns by the JBC
Members for the six simultaneous vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice only raises more questions
and doubts than answers. It would seem, to the casual
observer, that the Chief Justice and the four regular JBC
Members exercised block voting most of the time. Out of the
89 candidates for the six vacancies, there were a total of 3 7
qualified nominees spread across six separate short lists. Out
of the 37 qualified nominees, the Chief Justice and the four
regular JBC Members coincidentally voted for the same 28
nominees in precisely the same clusters, only varying by just
one vote for the other nine nominees.
It is also interesting to note that all the nominees were listed
only once in just one cluster, and all the nominees
subsequently appointed as Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
were distributed among the different clusters, except only for
respondents Econg and Musngi. Was this by chance or was
there already an agreement among the Chief Justice and the
regular JBC Members to limit the nomination of a candidate to
a specific cluster for one specific vacancy, thus, excluding the
same candidate from again being nominated in a different
cluster for another vacancy? It is understandable that the
Chief Justice and the four regular JBC Members would agree
on whom to nominate because their nominations were based
on the qualifications of the candidates. What is difficult to
comprehend is how they determined the distribution of the
nominees to the different clusters in the absence of any
criteria or standard to be observed in the clustering of
nominees. This was never explained by the JBC in any of its
Motions even when the issue of clustering is vital to this case.
Resultantly, the Court also asks why were respondents Econg
and Musngi nominated in a single cluster? And why was then
Atty. Trespeses not included in the same cluster as
respondents Econg and Musngi, or the clusters of then
Undersecretary Reynaldo P. Cruz, RTC Judge Maria Theresa
V. Mendoza-Arcega, or Assistant Solicitor General Karl B.
Miranda? Furthermore, what criteria was used when Chief
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 248
Justice Sereno and the other four regular JBC Members voted
for then Atty. Trespeses for only one particular cluster, i.e., for
the 18th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and nowhere
else? Atty. Trespeses did not receive any vote in the other
clusters except for the lone vote for him of an ex officio JBC
Member for the vacancy for the 21st Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice.
The Court emphasizes that the requirements and
qualifications, as well as the powers, duties, and
responsibilities are the same for all vacant posts in a collegiate
court, such as the Sandiganbayan; and if an individual is found
to be qualified for one vacancy, then he/she is found to be
qualified for all the other vacancies - there are no distinctions
among the vacant posts. It is improbable that the nominees
expressed their desire to be appointed to only a specific
vacant position and not the other vacant positions in the same
collegiate court, when neither the Constitution nor the law
provides a specific designation or distinctive description for
each vacant position in the collegiate court. The JBC did not
cite any cogent reason in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-
Intervention for assigning a nominee to a particular
cluster/vacancy. The Court highlights that without objective
criteria, standards, or guidelines in determining which
nominees are to be included in which cluster, the clustering of
nominees for specific vacant posts seems to be at the very
least, totally arbitrary. The lack of such criteria, standards, or
guidelines may open the clustering to manipulation to favor or
prejudice a qualified nominee.
d. There is technically no clustering of
nominees for first and second level
trial courts.
The Court further points out that its Decision dated November
29, 2016 only discussed vacancies in collegiate courts. The
constant referral by the JBC to separate short lists of
nominees for vacant judgeship posts in first and second level
trial courts as proof of previous clustering is inapt. The
separate short lists in such situations are technically not
clustering as the vacancies happened and were announced at
different times and candidates applied for specific vacancies,
based on the inherent differences in the location and
jurisdiction of the trial courts, as well as the qualifications of
nominees to the same, hence, justifying a separate short list
for each vacant post.
e. While clustering of nominees was
observed in the nominations for
vacancies in the Court of Appeals in
2015, it escaped scrutiny as the
appointments to said vacancies were
not challenged before the Court.
As an example of previous clustering in a collegiate court, the
JBC attached to its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention
a transmittal letter dated August 1 7, 2015 of the JBC
addressed to President Aquino, which divided the nominees
into four clusters for the four vacancies for Court of Appeals
Associate Justice. The JBC contends that during the
deliberations on said nominations, the ponente and Supreme
Court Associate Justice Velasco were both present as JBC
consultants but did not raise any objection.
While it may be true that the JBC already observed clustering
in 2015, it is still considered a relatively new practice, adopted
only under Chief Justice Sereno's Chairmanship of the JBC.
The clustering then escaped scrutiny as no party questioned
the appointments to the said vacancies. The view of the
consultants was also not solicited or requested by the JBC.
The Court now observes that the vacancies for Court of
Appeals Associate Justice in 2015 were not all simultaneous
or closely successive, most of which occurring months apart,
specifically, vice the late Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias
who passed away on November 20, 2014; vice retired
Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, who opted for
early retirement effective on January 31, 2015; vice Associate
Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, who compulsorily retired on
June 12, 2015; and vice Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican
who compulsorily retired on July 4, 2015. Even so, the JBC
published a single announcement for all four vacancies on
March 15, 2015, with the same deadlines for submission of
applications and supporting documents. This is in stark
contrast to the two-week interval between the compulsory
retirements of Supreme Court Associate Justices Perez and
Brion on December 14, 2016 and December 29, 2016,
respectively, for which the JBC still made separate
publications, required submission of separate applications,
separately processed the applications, and submitted
separate short lists. Additionally, it is noteworthy that the
nominations for the four vacant posts of Court of Appeals
Associate Justice were contained in a single letter dated
August 1 7, 2015, addressed to President Aquino, through
then Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., whereas in
the case of the Sandiganbayan, the JBC submitted six
separate letters, all dated October 26, 2015, transmitting one
short list for each of the six vacancies. The separate letters of
transmittal further reinforce the intention of the JBC to prevent
the President from "cross-reaching" or disregarding the
clustering of nominees for the six vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice and, thus, unduly limit the
President's exercise of his power to appoint members of the
Judiciary.
f. The separate short lists for the
current vacancies in the Supreme
Court are not in issue in this case,
but has been brought up by the JBC
in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-
Intervention.
The Court takes the occasion herein to clarify that the
application of its ruling in the Decision dated November 29,
2017 to the situation involving closely successive vacancies
in a collegiate court may be properly addressed in an actual
case which squarely raises the issue. It also bears to stress
that the current vacancies in the Supreme Court as a result of
the compulsory retirements of Associate Justices Perez and
Brion are not in issue in this case, but has been brought to the
fore by the JBC itself in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-
Intervention. Therefore, the Court will refrain from making any
pronouncements on the separate short lists of nominees
submitted by the JBC to President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
(Duterte) on December 2, 2016 and December 9, 2016 so as
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 249
not to preempt the President's decision on how to treat the
separate short lists of nominees for the two current vacancies
in the Supreme Court. The Court will only address the
statements made by the JBC in relation to said short lists by
reciting some relevant historical facts relating to the filling-up
of previous vacancies in the Supreme Court.
The JBC avers that it had no choice but to submit separate
short lists of nominees to President Duterte for the vacancies
for Supreme Court Associate Justice vice Associate Justices
Perez and Brion, who retired on December 14, 2016 and
December 29, 2016, respectively, because there were
different sets of applicants for each, with 14 applicants for the
seat vacated by Associate Justice Perez and 17 applicants for
the seat vacated by Associate Justice Brion. The situation is
the own doing of the JBC, as the JBC announced the
expected vacancies left by the compulsory retirements of
Associate Justices Perez and Brion, which were merely two
weeks apart, through two separately paid publications on
August 4, 2016 and August 18, 2016, respectively, in
newspapers of general circulation; invited the filing of separate
applications for the vacancies with different deadlines; and
separately processed the applications of candidates to the
said vacancies. The JBC would inevitably end up with two
different sets of nominees, one set for the position vacated by
Justice Perez and another set for that vacated by Justice
Brion, notwithstanding that the JBC undeniably found all
nominees in both sets to be qualified to be appointed as
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, as they all garnered
at least four votes.
There had been no similar problems in the past because the
JBC jointly announced simultaneous or closely successive
vacancies in the Supreme Court in a single publication, invited
the filing by a candidate of a single application for all the
vacancies on the same deadline, jointly processed all
applications, and submitted a single list of qualified nominees
to the President, thus, resulting in a simple, inexpensive, and
efficient process of nomination. Such was the case when the
JBC announced the two vacancies for Supreme Court
Associate Justice following the retirements of Associate
Justices Quisumbing and Chico-Nazario in 2009. Pertinent
portions of the JBC publication are reproduced below:
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announces the opening,
for application or recommendation, of the: two (2) forthcoming
vacant positions of ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT vice Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing and
Hon. Minita V. Chico-Nazario, who will compulsorily retire on
6 November and 5 December 2009, respectively, x x x
Applications or recommendation for the two (2) positions in
the Supreme Court must be submitted not later than 28
September 2009 (Monday) x x x to the JBC Secretariat, 2nd
Flr. Centennial Bldg., Supreme Court, Padre Faura St., Manila
(Tel. No. 552-9512; Fax No. 552-9607; email address jbc
_supreme court@yahoo.com.ph or jbc@sc.judiciary.gov.ph).
Applicants or recommendees must submit six (6) copies of the
following:
x x xx
The JBC, then headed by Supreme Court Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, submitted to President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (Macapagal-Arroyo) a single short list dated November
29, 2009 with a total of six nominees for the two vacancies for
Supreme Court Associate Justice, from which, President
Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Associate Justices Perez and
Mendoza.
The JBC again announced the two vacancies for Supreme
Court Associate Justice due to the retirements of Associate
Justices Nachura and Carpio Morales, thus:
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announces the opening,
for application or recommendation, of the following positions:
1. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT (vice
Hon. Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura and Hon. Conchita Carpio
Morales, who will compulsorily retire on 13 and 19 June 2011,
respectively);
x x xx
Applications or recommendations for vacancies in nos. 1-3
must be filed on or before 28 March 2011 (Monday) x x x to
the JBC Secretariat, 2nd Flr. Centennial Bldg., Supreme
Court, Padre Faura St., Manila (Tel. No. 552-9512; Fax No.
552-9598; email address jbcsupremecourt@yahoo.com.ph.
Those who applied before these vacancies were declared
open must manifest in writing their interest on or before the
said deadline. In case of recommendations, the
recommendees must signify their acceptance either in the
recommendation letter itself or in a separate document.
New applicants or recommendees for positions in the
appellate courts must submit the following on or before 4 April
2011 (Monday) x x x:
x x xx
The single short list dated June 21, 2011, submitted by the
JBC, under the Chairmanship of Supreme Court Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona, presented, for President Aquino's
consideration, six nominees for the two vacant posts of
Supreme Court Associate Justice, with President Aquino
subsequently appointing Associate Justices Reyes and
Perlas-Bernabe.
How the new procedure adopted by the JBC of submitting two
separate lists of nominees will also affect the seniority of the
two Supreme Court Associate Justices to be appointed to the
current vacancies is another issue that may arise because of
the new JBC procedure. Unlike the present two separate lists
of nominees specifying the vacant post to which they are
short-listed for appointment, the short list of nominees
submitted by the JBC before did not identify to which of the
vacant positions, when there are more than one existing
vacancies, a qualified candidate is nominated to as there was
only one list of nominees for all vacancies submitted to the
President. Correspondingly, the appointment papers issued
by the President, as in the cases of Supreme Court Associate
Justices Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, did
not specify the particular vacant post to which each of them
was appointed. The appointment papers of the afore-named
Supreme Court Associate Justices were all similarly worded
as follows:
Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, you are hereby
appointed ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT.
By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the
performance of the duties and functions of the office,
furnishing this Office and the Civil Service Commission with
copies of your Oath of Office.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 250
As earlier stated, the Court makes no ruling on the above-
mentioned divergence between the procedures in the
nomination for existing vacancies in the Supreme Court
followed by the JBC before and by the present JBC as it may
be premature to do so and may prejudge whatever action
President Duterte may take on the two separate short lists of
nominees for the current Supreme Court vacancies which
were submitted by the JBC.
g. The designation by the JBC of
numbers to the vacant
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
posts encroached on the President's
power to determine the seniority of
the justices appointed to the said court.
The JBC contends in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-
Intervention that its individual members have different reasons
for designating numbers to the vacant Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice posts. The varying reason/s of each
individual JBC Members raises the concern whether they
each fully appreciated the constitutional and legal
consequences of their act, i.e., that it encroached on the
power, solely vested in the President, to determine the
seniority of the justices appointed to a collegiate court. Each
of the six short lists submitted by the JBC to President Aquino
explicitly stated that the nominees were for the Sixteenth
(16th), Seventeenth (17th), Eighteenth (18th), Nineteenth
(19th), Twentieth (20th), and Twenty-First (2 Pt)
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, respectively; and on the
faces of said short lists, it could only mean that President
Aquino was to make the appointments in the order of seniority
pre-determined by the JBC, and that nominees who applied
for any of the vacant positions, requiring the same
qualifications, were deemed to be qualified to be considered
for appointment only to the one vacant position to which
his/her cluster was specifically assigned. Whatever the
intentions of the individual JBC Members were, they cannot
go against what has been clearly established by law,19
rules,20 and jurisprudence.21 In its Decision dated November
29, 2016, the Court already adjudged that:
Evidently, based on law, rules, and jurisprudence, the
numerical order of the Sandiganbayan Associate Justices
cannot be determined until their actual appointment by the
President.
It also bears to point out that part of the President's power to
appoint members of a collegiate court, such as the
Sandiganbayan, is the power to determine the seniority or
order of preference of such newly appointed members by
controlling the date and order of issuance of said members'
appointment or commission papers. By already designating
the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC would be
establishing the seniority or order of preference of the new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices even before their
appointment by the President and, thus, unduly arrogating
unto itself a vital part of the President's power of
appointment.22
It is also not clear to the Court how, as the JBC avowed in its
Motion for Reconsideration, the clustering of nominees for
simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts into separate
short lists can rid the appointment process to the Judiciary of
political pressure; or conversely, how the previous practice of
submitting a single list of nominees to the President for
simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts, requiring the
same qualifications, made the appointment process more
susceptible to political pressure. The 1987 Constitution itself,
by creating the JBC and requiring that the President can only
appoint judges and Justices from the nominees submitted by
the JBC, already sets in place the mechanism to protect the
appointment process from political pressure. By arbitrarily
clustering the nominees for appointment to the six
simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
into separate short lists, the JBC influenced the appointment
process and encroached on the President's power to appoint
members of the Judiciary and determine seniority in the said
court, beyond its mandate under the 1987 Constitution. As the
Court pronounced in its Decision dated November 29, 2016,
the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict
or limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's
prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth
appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount.
As long as in the end, the President appoints someone
nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid, and he, not
the JBC, determines the seniority of appointees to a collegiate
court.
Finally, the JBC maintains that it is not bound by the Decision
dated November 29, 2016 of the Court in this case on the
ground that it is not a party herein. The JBC prays in its Motion
for Reconsideration and Motion for Reconsideration-in-
Intervention, among other reliefs and remedies, for the Court
to reverse its ruling in the Decision dated November 29, 2016
denying the Motion for Intervention of the JBC in the present
case. However, the Court has now practically allowed the
intervention of the JBC in this case, by taking into
consideration the issues raised and arguments adduced in its
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Reconsideration-
in-Intervention, but which the Court found to be unmeritorious.
To recapitulate, the Petition at bar challenged President
Aquino's appointment of respondents Econg and Musngi as
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, which disregarded the
clustering by the JBC of the nominees for the six simultaneous
vacancies in said collegiate court into six separate short lists.
The Court ultimately decreed in its Decision dated November
29, 2016 that:
President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to
appoint members of the Judiciary when he disregarded the
clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for the
vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. President Aquino merely
maintained the well-established practice, consistent with the
paramount Presidential constitutional prerogative, to appoint
the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the 37
qualified nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list. This does
not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution
which requires the President to appoint from a list of at least
three nominees submitted by the JBC for every vacancy. To
meet the minimum requirement under said constitutional
provision of three nominees per vacancy, there should at least
be 18 nominees from the JBC for the six vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; but the minimum
requirement was even exceeded herein because the JBC
submitted for the President's consideration a total of 37
qualified nominees. All the six newly appointed
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices met the requirement of
nomination by the JBC under Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987
Constitution. Hence, the appointments of respondents Musngi
and Econg, as well as the other four new Sandiganbayan
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I ACJUCO NOV 11, 2017 251

Associate Justices, are valid and do not suffer from any

constitutional infirmity.23

The declaration of the Court that the clustering of nominees

by the JBC for the simultaneous vacancies that occurred by
the creation of six new positions of Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan is unconstitutional was only incidental to its
ruling that President Aquino is not bound by such clustering in
making his appointments to the vacant Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice posts. Other than said declaration, the Court
did not require the JBC to do or to refrain from doing
something insofar as the issue of clustering of the nominees
to the then six vacant posts of Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice was concerned.

As for the other new rules and practices adopted by the JBC
which the Court has taken cognizance of and docketed as a
separate administrative matter (viz., Item No. 2: the deletion
or non-inclusion in JBC No. 2016-1, or the Revised Rules of
the Judicial and Bar Council, of Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009;
and Item No. 3: the removal of incumbent Senior Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court as consultants of the Judicial
and Bar Council, referred to in pages 45 to 51 of the Decision
dated November 29, 2016), the JBC is actually being given
the opportunity to submit its comment and be heard on the
same. The administrative matter was already raffled to
another ponente, thus, any incident concerning the same
should be consolidated in the said administrative matter.

Regarding the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice

Caguioa, it must be pointed out that he has conceded that the
President did not commit an unconstitutional act in
"disregarding the clustering done by the JBC" when he chose
Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan "outside" of the
"clustered" lists provided by the JBC.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, except for its

motion/prayer for intervention, which the Court has now
granted, the Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion for the
Inhibition of the Ponente) and the Motion for Reconsideration-
in-Intervention (Of the Decision dated 29 November 2016) of
the Judicial and Bar Council are DENIED for lack of merit.

Nota bene: The Court has agreed not to issue a ruling herein
on the separate short lists of nominees submitted by the
Judicial and Bar Council to President Rodrigo Roa Duterte for
the present vacancies in the Supreme Court resulting from the
compulsory retirements of Associate Justices Jose P. Perez
and Arturo D. Brion because these were not in issue nor
deliberated upon in this case, and in order not to preempt the
decision the President may take on the said separate short
lists in the exercise of his power to appoint members of the
Judiciary under the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.