RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M.
Meralco-GSIS case because the IRCA provides that cases shall
VASQUEZ, JR. ON CA-G.R. SP NO. 103692[Antonio Rosete,
et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.] A.M.
No. 08-8-11-CA
Facts:
An application for leave was filed by Justice Bienvenido L.
Reyes, then Chairperson of the Ninth Division of the Court of
Appeals (CA) from May 15, 2008 to June 5, 2008.
The Raffle Committee designated Justice Jose C. Mendoza as
Acting Chairman of the Ninth Division during the absence of
Justice Reyes authorizing him not only to perform his regular
duties as regular senior member of the Fifth Division but also “to
act on all cases submitted to the Ninth Division for final
resolution and/or appropriate action, except ponencia until
Justice Reyes reports back for duty.
On May 29, 2008, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), Commissioner Jesus G.
Enriquez, Commissioner Hubert B. Guevarra, and the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) was filed with
the CA by the representatives of the Manila Electric Company
(Meralco).
The case was raffled to Justice Vicente Q. Roxas. However,
when it was re-raffled as an answer to the petition of GSIS, it
was raffled to Justice Reyes, who was still on leave.
Justice Mendoza, who had been designated to replace Justice
Reyes, inhibited from the case on the ground that he used to be
a lawyer of the Meralco resulting in the assignment of Justice
Jose L.Sabio, Jr. as Acting Chairman of the Ninth Division by
raffle.Justice Sabio received a telephone call from his older
brother, Chairman Camilo Sabio of the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) informing Justice Sabio that he
had been named the “third member” of the division to which the
MERALCO-GSIS case had been raffled.
Chairman Sabio then tried to convince Justice Sabio “of the
rightness of the stand of the GSIS and the SEC,” and asked his
brother to help the GSIS, which “represents the interest of the
poor people.” Justice Sabio told his brother that he would “vote
according to [his] conscience.”
A temporary restraining order (TRO) was brought to the office
of Justice Sabio by Justice Roxas, who prepared andalready
signed the same together with Justice Dimaranan- Vidal, for the
latter’s signature. Justice Sabio then signed said TRO after
having been convinced of the urgency of the TRO. On that same
day, Justice Sabio received a phonecall from Mr. Francis De
Borja, a person he had lost contact with for almost a year, who
greeted him with “Mabuhayka, Justice” and told Justice Sabio
that the Makati Business Club was happy with his having signed
the TRO.
On June 10, 2008, Justice Reyes reported back to work. Days
before the hearing, Justice Sabio requested the rollo for the case
from Justice Roxas.
Justice Roxas asked him whether Justice Reyes would
preside over the hearing but Justice Sabio insisted that he,
not Justice Reyes, should preside. Justice Reyes consulted
the Presiding Justice Vasquez on who should preside the
remain with the Justice to whom the case is assigned for study
and report and the Justices who participated therein, regardless
of their transfer to other Divisions only when in an original action
or petition for review, any of the following actions or proceedings
have taken place: (1) giving due course; (2) granting writ of
preliminary injunction; (3) granting new trial; and (4) granting
execution pending appeal.
Justice Vasquez referred the matter to Justice Cruz,
Chairperson of the Committee on Rules. Justice Cruz stated that
the “issuance of a TRO is not among the instances where the
Justices who participated in the case shall remain therein. In the
opinion of Justice Cruz, the case should be presided by Justice
Reyes.
However, Justice Sabio insisted that he should be the one to
preside over the hearing of the case for Justice Reyes’ authority
to preside the said case is only an opinion of Justice Cruz. On
the day of the hearing, Justice Reyes was about to preside the
said hearing. However, Justice Sabio hardened his position and
he presided said hearing with Justice Roxas and Dimaranan-
Vidal. Consequently, Justice Sabio received a call again from
Mr. De Borja to meet with him for an important matter.
Theparties agreed to meet at the Ateneo Law School. During the
meeting, Justice Sabio was offered a bribe of P10million coming
from the Lopezes. However, Justice Sabio turned down said
offer. Despite Justice Sabio’s refusal to accept the bribe offer,
Mr. De Borja continued on calling and texting Justice Sabio,
prompting Justice Sabio to callMr. De Borja to ask him to
stop.Presiding Justice Vasquez issued Office Order No. 200-08-
CMV stating that, in view of the retirement of JusticesEnrique
Lanzanas, Lucenito N. Tagle, Agustin S. Dizon, and Rodrigo
Cosico, and the appointments of JusticesRuben C. Ayson and
Edgardo L. delos Santos, the Divisions would have a new
composition effective July 4,2008. Under that office order,
Justice Sabio became the Chairman of the Sixth Division, with
Justice Dimaranan-Vidalas a member. Justice Reyes became
the Chairman of the Eighth Division, with Justices Roxas and
Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. (“Justice Bruselas”) as members.
Notwithstanding the fact of the re-organization of the Court of
Appeals, Justice Roxas brought to the office of
JusticeDimaranan- Vidal “the final decision on the MERALCO
case” bearing his signature, which he gave to Justice
Dimaranan- Vidal for “concurrence/dissent.” According to
Justice Dimaranan -Vidal, Justice Roxas explained to her the
“rationale for his conclusion.” Justice Roxas went out for a while
and returned “with an expensive looking travelling bag” from
where he pulled out the “purported final decision.” Before the
close of office hours, Justice Roxas returned to the chambers of
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal to check if he (Justice Roxas) had
signed his decision. When she replied that yes, he had signed
it, Justice Roxas said he would pick it up the next day.
Subsequently , Justice Roxas, with his messenger, brought the
rollo of the MERALCO case to Justice Reyes, and told the latter
that he and Justice Bruselas would be coming over to deliberate
on the case. Ten minutes later, the Eighth Division deliberated
on the case. After a cursory examination of the rollo, Justice
Reyes found that the decision had been signed by Justices
Roxas and Bruselas but Justice Reyes asked for more time to
study the case.
A transcript of the “Final Deliberation” on
the said meeting was attached. According to Justice Roxas, it
was he who prepared the transcript from memory to “lend
credence” to the certification of Justice Reyes at the end of the
decision pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution.
Justice Reyes denied having seen it or having authorized
itstranscription. Justice Bruselas did not sign any transcript of
the deliberation as he was not aware that a transcript wasbeing
taken. There was no stenographer present, as only the three of
them, Justices Reyes, Roxas, and Bruselaswere present at the
deliberation. Neither was there a recording machine. Justice
Roxas admittedly prepared the transcript “from memory
The said decision by Justice Reyes upon endorsement of
Justice Roxas was made even when the Presiding Justice’s
opinion on whether the Eight or the Special Ninth Division would
decide the case was still pending. To assist in the investigation
of this sensitive matter, the Supreme Court in its Resolution
constituted a three-person panel composed of retired Justices
of the Court; namely, Mme. Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino as
Chairperson, Mme.Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero and Mr.
Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. as Members. The Panel of
Investigators was tasked to investigate the (a) alleged
improprieties of the actions of the said Justices of the Court of
Appeals; and (b)alleged rejected offer or solicitation of bribe
disclosed respectively by Mr. Justice Jose Sabio and Mr. Francis
de Borja.
colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground,
immaterial to the proper performance of suchduties.”
This Court cannot view lightly the discourteous manner that
Justice Roxas, in his apparent haste to promulgate his decision
in the Meralco case, treated his colleagues in the Court of
Appeals. It behooves the Court to remind all magistrates that
their high office demands compliance with the most exacting
standards of propriety and decorum. Justice Sabio likewise
committed improprieties in relation to the Meralco case more
specifically when he had his conversation with his brother, a
chairman of the PCGG, and to Mr. De Borja. Justice Sabio
violated Sections 1, 4,and 5, Canon 1 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which provide that
-Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function
independently x x x free from extraneous influence, inducement,
pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any
quarter or for any reason.xxx xxx xxxSec. 4. Judges shall not
allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be
used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are
in a special position to influence the judge. Sec. 5. Judges shall
not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and
influence by, the executive and

Issue:

Whether or not Justices Roxas, Sabio and Dimaranan-Vidal

violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Held:

YES. On the case of Justice Roxas, he was found by the

Supreme Court guilty of gross dishonesty. He also failed to act
ona number of motions of the parties prior to the promulgation
of the Decision. His failure to act on the other motions of the
parties violated Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the 1989 Code of Judicial
Conduct providing that: “Rule 3.05. -

A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and

decide cases within the required periods." Even Section 5,
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that
"[j]udges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery
of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
promptness." Thus, it has become well-settled in jurisprudence
that even just undue delay in the resolving pending motions or
incidents within the reglementary period fixed by law is not
excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. Justice Roxas also
showed lack of courtesy and respect for his colleagues in the
Court of Appeals when he failed to explain to Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal the reason why he was not promulgating the
decision which she signed and when he prompted Justice
Reyes to decide the case without waiting for the opinion of the
presiding justice on who should decide the case. There is an old
adage which says to gain respect one must learn to give it. If
judges and justices are expected totreat litigants, counsels and
subordinates with respect and fairness, with more reason, that
judges and justices should give their fellow magistrates the
courtesy and professional regard due to them as their
colleagues in the Judiciary. Thus, in Canon 5, Section 3 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct judges are expected to “carry out
judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons,
such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial
Zaldivar Vs. Sandiganbayan Case Digest

170 SCRA 1 Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the
"balancing-of-interest test," the Court held that the statements
G.R. No. 79690-707 made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were
made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to
February 1, 1989
transcend the permissible limits of free speech. What is here at
Facts: The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and
Court stopping the respondent from investigating graft cases prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the obstruction
involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the
since the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, respondent’s avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial
powers as Tanodbayan have been superseded by the creation system of a country and the destruction of the standards of
of the Office of the Ombudsman, he however becomes the professional conduct required from members of the bar and
Special Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct an officers of the courts, which has some implications to the society.
investigation and file cases only when so authorized by the
Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the
respondent wherein he included statements which were
unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court. This include: (a)That
he had been approached twice by a leading member of the court
and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard
on him; (b) That he "was approached and asked to refrain from
investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the
Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and (c) that
in several instances, the undersigned respondent was called
over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked
to dismiss the cases against two Members of the Court."
Statements of the respondent saying that the SC’s order
'"heightens the people's apprehension over the justice system in
this country, especially because the people have been thinking
that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free” was
publicized in leading newspapers.

Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in

writing why he should not be punished for contempt of court for
making such public statements reported in the media.
Respondent then sought to get some members of the Court to
inhibit themselves in the resolution of the Zaldivar case for
alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect
asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the
Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on responsibility for
this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the
ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this
Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him
impartially and fairly. The Court found respondent guilty of
contempt of court and indefinitely suspended from the practice
of law. Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his freedom of
speech. Counsel for respondent urges that it is error "for this
Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear
and present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt charges."

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom

of speech/expression. NONE

Held: There was no violation. The Court did not purport to

announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was simply
paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules
of Court which penalizes a variety of contumacious
conduct including: "any improper conduct tending, directly
or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice."
IN RE CUNANAN laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum
norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court
FACTS: on who can practice law; and
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class
Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the legislation.
Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and
including 1955.” As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could
not muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law
Section 1 provided the following passing marks: was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not
revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission
to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall
1946-1951………………70% within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify
rules of admission to the practice of law.

1952 …………………….71%

1953……………………..72%

1954……………………..73%

1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower

than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained

a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to have already
passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in
the computation of the general average in subsequent bar
examinations.”

ISSUE: Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect

of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the
Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar
examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an
indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial
passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared

unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in
force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was
based under the following reasons:

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who
flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation
due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War
II;

The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the

court on the petitions of the said candidates;

The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary

prerogative to determine who may be admitted to practice
of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to
repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules
AGUIRRE VS RANA
EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]
Facts:
Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations. Before the scheduled mass oath-taking,
complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took
the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the
Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a
lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in an election.
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that
respondent is a municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As
such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a
client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice
mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the latter engaging
respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed
the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning
vice mayoralty candidate.
Issue: Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the
Philippine Bar
Ruling: the Court held that “practice of law” means any activity,
in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in
the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually
performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to
practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the
use of legal knowledge or skill.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right
but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character
with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity,
legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust
since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does
not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be
withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations,
if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a
license.
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and
took the lawyer’s oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of
Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact
that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial.
Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and
his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
IN RE: EDILLON
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed
practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name
of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal
to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule
of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article
III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP,
payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay
the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being
compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer
in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he
is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the
rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above
provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void
and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion
to pay his membership fee to the IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every
lawyer must be a member of as distinguished from bar
associations in which membership is merely optional and
voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a
reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules
of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in
violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar
integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated
Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to
further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality
of professional legal services, may require the cost of the
regulatory program – the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power
of the State. The right to practice law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory
measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore,
the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their
regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the
Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989
ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
A. M. No. 491October 6, 1989
FACTS: In the election of the national officers of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine
International Convention Center, the newly-elected officers were
set to take their oath of office on July 4, 1989 before the
Supreme Court en banc . However, disturbed by the
widespread reports received by some members of the Court
from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the
proceedings and the adverse comments published in the
columns of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering
and overspending by the candidates, led by the main
protagonists for the office of president of the association,
namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C.
Drilon, the alleged use of government planes, and the officious
intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all
of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which
prohibit such activities, the Supreme Court en banc , exercising
its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to
suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire
into the veracity of the reports. Media reports done by
Mr.Jurado, Mr. Mauricio and Mr. Locsin in the newspapers
opened the avenue for investigation on the anomalies in the IBP
Elections.
The following violations are, Prohibited campaigning and
solicitation of votes by the candidates for president, executive
vice-president, the officers or candidates for the House of
Delegates and Board of Governors,
Use of PNB plane in the campaign,
Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and
alternates,
Formation of tickets and single slates,
Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, and
entertainment to delegates
Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon Paying the
dues or other indebtedness of any member (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-
Laws),
Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one
page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws),
Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons
other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the
election(Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws) and
Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote
for or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
The prohibited acts are against the IBP By-Laws more
specifically Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes
the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Sec. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to
elections and Section 12[d] of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions
for violations of the above rules: Any violation of the rules
governing elections or commission of any of the prohibited acts
and practices defined in Section 14 [Prohibited Acts and
Practices Relative to Elections) of the By-laws of the Integrated
Bar shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or
his removal from office if elected, without prejudice to the
imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the
By-laws of the Integrated Bar.
ISSUE: Is the principal candidates for the national positions in
the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the
elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the
principal candidates for the national positions in the Integrated
Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on
June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made
a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar
enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three
principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star
hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt
the better for them to corral and entertain the delegates billeted
therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the chapter
presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates
that elects the national officers and regional governors; the
formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other
elective positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon,
Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of written commitments and
the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the
delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big
hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates; the use of
a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable
them to "assess their chances" among the chapter presidents in
the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and
bio-data of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo
admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment
of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to
distribute their campaign materials on the convention floor on
the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the
Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use
of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort them
to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets
and hotel accommodations to delegates (and some families who
accompanied them) in exchange for their support; the pirating of
some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one
ticket to another for some rumored consideration; all these
practices made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted
the whole election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not
only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the
legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary
of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the
laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal
processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule
1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect
for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are
supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices
and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated
for their observance.
DE LLANA VS ALBA
G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013 a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This,
however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, because no liaison between the two houses exists in the
vs. workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken
to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members
ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents. only.

MENDOZA, J.:

NATURE:

The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a

prior decision rendered July 17, 2012 that JBC’s action of
allowing more than one member of the congress to represent
the JBC to be unconstitutional

FACTS:

In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth

member was added to the JBC as two representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having
one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate
meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the
legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this
petition. it should mean one representative each from both
Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondent
contends that the phrase “ a representative of congress” refers
that both houses of congress should have one representative
each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory
components of “congress” as part of the bicameral system of
legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in
performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution
provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only
with only one representative from congress.

ISSUE:

Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate

and the House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting
members to be unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of
the constitution.

HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that

the phrase “a representative of congress” should be construed
as to having only one representative that would come from either
house, not both. That the framers of the constitution only
intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the legislative.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body

refers to its primary function in government – to legislate. In the
passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of
the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in
Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two
houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing
JARDALEZA VS SERENO
Facts:
Following Justice Abad’s compulsory retirement, the JBC
announced the application or recommendations for the position
left by the Associate Justice. Jardeleza, the incumbent Sol-Gen
at the time, was included in the list of candidates. However, he
was informed through telephone call from some Justices that the
Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno, will be invoking Sec 2, Rule
10 of JBC-009 or the so-called “unanimity rule” against him.
Generally, the rule is that an applicant is included in the shortlist
when s/he obtains affirmative vote of at least a majority of all the
members of the JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009,
however, is invoked because an applicant’s integrity is
challenged, a unanimous vote is required. Jardeleza was then
directed to make himself available on June 30, 2014 before the
JBC during which he would be informed of the objections to his
integrity.
Jardeleza wrote a letter-petition asking the SC to exercise its
supervisory power and direct the JBC to, among others, give
Jardeleza a written notice and sworn written statements of his
oppositors or any documents in the JBC hearings, and to
disallow CJ Sereno from participating in the voting process for
nominees on June 30, 2014.
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, Justice Carpio
appeared and disclosed a confidential information which, to CJ
Sereno, characterized Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious.
Jardeleza demanded that CJ Sereno execute a sworn statement
specifying her objections and that he be afforded the right to
cross-examine her in a public hearing. He also requested
deferment of the JBC proceedings, as the SC en banc has yet
to decide in his letter-petition.
However, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to
vote for the nominees to be included in the shortlist. Thereafter,
the JBC released the shortlist of 4 nominees. It was revealed
later that there were actually 5 nominees who made it to the JBC
shortlist, but 1 nominee could not be included because of the
invocation of the “unanimity rule”..
Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus via Rule 65 with
prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to include him in the list of
nominees on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted
with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having
garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
Issue: W/N the right to due process is demandable as a
matter of right in JBC proceedings
Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it
does not mean that an applicant’s access to the rights afforded
under the due process clause is discretionary on the part of JBC.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature
of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,”
the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing. In
cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is
raised, the observance of due process neither contradicts the
fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is not
an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process.
Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process supports
and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant,
who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded
the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer
understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the
body from making an unsound and capricious assessment of
information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly
apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection
against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the
person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness
because the only test that an exercise of discretion must
surmount is that of soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza
should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the
President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad.
This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 per se, but from the violation by
the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due
process. By no means does the Court intend to strike down the
“unanimity rule” as it reflects the JBC’s policy and, therefore,
wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses
to turn a blind eye on the palpable defects in its implementation
and the ensuing treatment that Jardeleza received before the
Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination,
but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to
observe the minimum requirements of due process.
Issue 1: W/N the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the
case
Yes. Jardeleza’s allegations in his petitions merits the exercise
of the Court’s supervisory authority over the JBC. Under Sec 8,
Art VIII of the Constitution, the JBC shall function under the
supervision of the SC. It follows that such supervisory authority
covers the overseeing of whether the JBC complies with its own
rules or not.
Issue 2: W/N a writ of mandamus is available against the
JBC
No. The JBC’s duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not
be compelled to do something.
Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a
discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to control or review
the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law
imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise
his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required
to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of
the court.
Issue 3: W/N a writ of certiorari under Sec 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is available against the JBC (which is not
exercising quasi-judicial functions)

Yes. Under the expanded jurisdiction or expanded power of

judicial review vested to the SC by the 1987 Constitution, a
petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of
any branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the government,
even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions.
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC,
COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN, COMPOSTELA VALLEY
PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL,
Respondent.
FACTS : The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012
as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley
Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. On September
27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge
in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum
City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad,
Agusan Del Sur In a letter2 dated December 18, 2013, JBC's
Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed the
petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for
the said stations. On the same date, the petitioner sent a letter,
through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-
inclusion in the list of considered applicants and protesting the
inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature
examination. The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive
Officer, through a letter3 dated February 3, 2014, that his protest
and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc.
However, its decision not to include his name in the list of
applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of
opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to,
among others, incumbent judges who have served in their
current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner
has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded
from the list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse to this
Court
ISSUE : WON the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue
to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under
the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary
because the JBC is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial function-NO
HELD : The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable.
"The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for
determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope
of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. In the process of selecting and screening applicants,
the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity
nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or quasi-
judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of
guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner
now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the
JBC's constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on
whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and
enforcing the said policy.
Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this
case by virtue of the Court's power of supervision over the JBC.
Jurisprudence provides that the power of supervision is the
power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties.
Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court
over the JBC is to see to it that the JBC complies with its own
rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are
being attacked, then the Court, through its supervisory authority
over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter and
ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules
The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner
in assailing JBC's policy. It is essential to the issuance of a writ
of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal right
to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the
respondent to perform the act required. The remedy of
mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an
officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.14
Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a
ministerial act are mutually exclusive. Clearly, to be included as
an applicant to second-level judge is not properly compellable
by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound
discretion by the JBC
The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for
declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a
deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose
rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation
or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes
the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written
instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties' rights or
duties thereunder."
In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an
unsound policy. Rather, the petition specifically sought a judicial
declaration that the petitioner has the right to be included in the
list of applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year
requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates that no person
possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be included in
the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The opportunity
of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a
judicially enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any
person
Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because
this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for
declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.18
The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to Section
1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.No.
7691
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC
and in the exercise of its expanded judicial power, the Court
assumes jurisdiction over the present petition. But in any event,
even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities