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An Analysis of Weber's Work on Charisma

Author(s): Thomas E. Dow Jnr.


Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Mar., 1978), pp. 83-93
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science
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Britishioarnal of Soctology Folunle 29 ;Cuzzlber I MarGh If 78

Thomas E. Dow Jnr.

An analysis of Weber's work on charisma

ABSTRACT

The present paper examines Weber's work on charisma from the


original formulation in Economy and Socaety1 to the Enal statement in
the essay on 'Politics as a Vocation'.2 Both the intended meaning of
charisma in the earlier formulation and the uses and limitations of the
new formulation are discussed. The paper concludes with some obser-
vations on the place of charisma in Weber's ethical and intellectual
life.

THE THEORY OF CHARISMA

In Weber's original formulation, charismatic authority is said to exist


when an individual's claim to 'specific gifts of body and mind'3 is ack-
knowledged by others as a valid basis for their participation in an extra-
ordinary programme of action. The leader's authority and programme
are thus specifically 'outside the realm of everyday routine and . . .
[therefore] sharply opposed both to rational ... and to traditional
authority.... Both ... are ... forms of everyday routine control ...
while charismatic authority ... is ... a specifically revolutionary
force'.4 In this sense, 'charisma is self-determined and sets its own
limits'.5 It 'rejects all external order . . . ;6 it 'transforms all values and
breaks all traditional and rational norms....'7 'In its most potent
forms, . . . [it] overturns all notions of sanctity.'8 Instead of respect for
rational rule and tradition, it compels 'the surrender of the faitllful to
the extraordinary and unheard-of, to what is alien to all regulation and
tradition and therefore is viewed as divine . . .'9
In a basic sense, then, charismatic authority represents a pattern of
psychological, social, and economic release: Release from 'traditional
or rational everyday economizing . . . ;10 release from 'custom, law and
tradition' ;1l release from 'all notions of sanctity' ;12 release from 'ordi-
nary worldly attachments and duties of occupational and family life';l3
and release from oneself or one's conscience.
The courage the follower requires to abandon himself, to overcome
the external and internal limits of daily existence (Alltag), is provided
by identification with the charismatic leader, in that the leader, on the
basis of his apparent gifts of body and mind, his lleroism, is perceived as

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84 Thomas E. Dow ffnr.

a model of botll release itself and the apparent power that makes re-
lease possible. It follows, that release and the posver of eharisma are
interrelated if not identical, and tllat the follower is moved to 'eomplete
personal devotion . . .'14 because he sees in the leader forces that exist
within himself, forces that are being freed from the restraint of eon-
vention by the beillg and action of the leader. Accordingly, the follower
obtains 'freedom' from the eommonplace, the ordinary, the recurrent
by surrendering to both the initiatives of the leader and the emotional
eentres of his own being.

The nature of charisma

Weber argues that eestasy as a 'distinetive subjective condition ...


represents . . . charisma . . .'15 As a psychic state associated with charis-
matie 'rebirth' or 'self-deification',l6 ecstasy may be produced by
'alcohol, tobaceo, or other drugs . . ., by music and dance; by sexuality;
or by a combination of all three . . . ;17 that is, by the 'breaking down
[of] inhibitions . . .n18
By linking cllarisma and ecstasy, Weber implies the elemental and
daemonie character of the concept; it represents a state of being beyond
reason and self-control. Thus it applies equally both to Romeo's adora-
tion of Juliet and Othello's rage in the murder of Desdemona. Both
Romeo and Othello are lifted out of themselves by the powerful emo-
tions of joy and rage svhich provoke passionate expression and frenzied
action. It follows that while the difference between these emotions and
the consequences they engender is crucial, it is not a matter that can be
resolved within, or is even relevant to, the state of ecstacy itself. The
eonsequenees of forces released by charisma must be e;aluated by
standards external to the forces themselves. This, it appears, is ^hat
Weber had in mind when he insisted that 'how the quality in question
would ultimately be judged from any ethical, aesthetic, or other such
point of view is naturally entirely indifferent for purposes of defini-
tion'.l9 This indifference (WertfreiAeit) permits us to discover or recog-
nize the ultimate meaning and consequences of charisma, and hence
subsequently to establish its moral or ethical signiEcanee in the light of
our own values.
One must begin with the nature or essence of eharisma; that essenee
is Dionysian. Like the god Dionysus, eharisma 'represents . . . the incar-
nate life-force itself, . . . the thrust of the sap in the tree and the blood
in the veins . .X20 Consequently, extraordinary gifts of body or mind
whicll express or release this power or force are daemonic, in that, as in
the myth of Dionysus, they represent grace or divinity 'divested of
morality . . .'21 Such daemonic force is 'not devilish but the reality of
. . . eareless pcser.22
Accordingly, it is not, as Weber recognizes, to 'ultimate ethical prin-
ciples',23 or to the 'beings . . . concealed "behind" . . . the eharismatic-
ally endowed . . . persons',24 tllat follovers give their allegiance, but to

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An analysis of Weber's work on charisma 85

the power itself. Whoever possesses that power or charisma 'is stronger
even than the god, whom he can compel to do his will'.25 It is the per-
ceived power over demons, death, and Alltag in general that is crucial,
and that power is elemental not ethical. If it is a concealed power at all
then, it is so only in the sense that it is concealed within each of us.
Charisma discovers, expresses, and releases that power; it literally 'revo-
lutionizes men from witllin',26 freeing emotional and instinctual ele-
ments previously repressed by convention.
This pattern is found in fAe Bacchae, where the Maenads on the
mountain are possessed by the charisma of their leader and murder Pen-
theus in a state of ecstatic surrender. While their ecstasy itself is not sub-
ject to judgment, any more than the caprice or carelessness of lightning,
rain, or wind, tlle ethical meaning of its consequences must still be
sought tllrough the application of personal values. That Weber him-
self sought such meaning is evident in his final statement on charisma.
A model for this final formulation, incidentally, may be found in the
actions of the Chorus in The Bacchae, in that 'the Bacchantes of the
Chorus are not possessed'n27 as were those who killed Pentheus. 'A
divinity . . . moves in their words, but less as a chaotic wildness than as
a controlled and passionate conviction.'28 It is this quality of 'controlled
and passionate conviction' which stands at the centre of Weber's formu-
lation in 'Politics as a Vocation'. The intellectual path that led him to
this Snal formulation may be reconstructed as follows.
In the ideal typical model, charisma is presented as an emotional life-
force antithetically related to the routine requirements of daily exist-
ence. Conceptually, it represents 'that part of social life [of human exist-
ence] that remains forever beyond the reach of bureaucratic domina-
tion'.29 In reality, however, its realm is being eroded by the progressive
rationalization of life. Discipline, as the instrument of rationalization,
'inexorably takes over ever-larger areas as the satisfaction of political
and economic needs is increasingly rationalized. This universal phen-
omenon more and more restricts the importance of charisma and of
individually differentiated conduct.'30
Given this trend, or at least Weber's perception of such a trend, it is
perhaps not misleading to suggest that he did celebrate 'charisma as an
"emotional life-force" antagonistic to the dreary construction of the
iron cage'.3l Yet it was not a solution he could accept fully, in that it
replaced the emotional emptiness of bureaucratic conformity with the
irresponsibility of charismatic commitment; that is, it substituted for
passive conformity to convention behaviour 'determined [either] by the
specific affects and states of feeling of the actor',32 or by his uncondit-
ional orientation to the realization of 'absolute values'.33 Both patterns
of course are irrational and irresponsible, in the sense that in neither one
is the actor 'influenced by considerations of the consequences of his
action' .34

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Ellomas E. Dow jfnr.
86

HEART OF DARKNESS35

The Dionysian quality of charisma and its consequ


trated most clearly in a literary model. This exam
literary equivalent of Weber's ideal type, in that
essenee of charisma would be in the absence of non
and what the consequences of eharismatic involve
absence of routinization.
In the character of Kurtz, Chief of the Inner Station, Conrad pro-
vides us with a case study of the nature and consequences of charisma.
To those who followed him, Kurtz was a god. He represented 'the
unprecedented and absolute unique . . .n,36 that which is 'alien to all
regulation and tradition and therefore is viewed as divine ...'37 His
divinity was based on release and the power that makes release possible.
In the Heart of Darkness, the thunder and lightning of his weapons repre-
sents the literal power which releases on the world a force that can only
be considered elemental or daemonic. By accepting IZurts as one who
possesses this power and expresses this force, his followers share in this
power and experience this force within themselves. They achieve free-
dom from the requirements of their own daily existence by surrendering
to the will of Kurtz. His being and his purpose provide an occasiorl for
the breaking down of inhibitions and the realization of ecstasy the sub-
jective state of charisma.
By rejeeting 'as undignified all methodical rational acquisitiorl, in
fact, all rational economic conduct',38 and by freeing himself from the
'worldly attachments and duties of occupational and family life',39
Kurtz creates an independent existence one characterized by !\4arlow
as involving 'no method at all'.40 Yet it is precisely this lack of method,
restraint, and rationality that deEnes charisma and explains both the
loyalty of Kurtz's followers and their 'grief' and 'utter despair' at his
departure.
By allowing himself to be returned to the ship, their god deserts them,
and, in the absence of his being and llis power, his charisma, they must
return to the conventions and restraints of daily existence. Their leader,
on the other hand, must die a victim of the very life-force he released
but eould not control.
The significance of Kurtz's collapse, dissolution, and death is exam-
ined by the narrator, Marlow, who associates Kurtz's downfall with his
lack of restraint. Yet when forced to choose between the charismatic
fire burning unchecked in Kurtz and literally consuming him, and the
meaningless existence of the faithless pilgrims, he chooses Kurtz. The
faithless pilgrims, the manager, the company, must lDe rejected in favour
of life, bllt that life must be lived with restraint lest it become a Chorror'
-the judgment rendered by Kurtz upon 'tlle adventures of his soul on
this earth'.4l Thus 'Kurtz, living outside all nortus, yet knows that they
exist and eondemn him. Implicit in his cry [then] is an admission of

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An analysis of Weber's work on clzarisma 87

what he has evaded, a realization of the insuff1ciency of his total eom-


mitment to himself and of the validity of the standards which eondemn
him.'42 Marlow recognizes that neither Kurtz 'with his abandon, nor
the manager with his getting on in the world',43 has the restraint, the
controlled passion, necessary for genuinely human behaviour. Thus he
anticipates Weber's Enal statement on eharisma, in that the application
of his own values leads Weber inevitably towards a Marlowian rather
than a Kurtzian solution. The specific nature of this solution, which
seeks both to preserve and eontrol the force of charisma, is outlined in
the voeational essays.

THE VOCATIONAL ESSAYS44

At the beginning of his essay on 'Politics as a Vocation' (Politik als


Beruf ), Weber asks: 'What kind of a man must one be if he is to be
allowed to put his lland on the wheel of history ?'45 ( Was fur ein Mensch
man sein muss, um seine Hand in die Speichen des Rades der Geschichte legen zu
durfen.46) He answers his rhetorieal question by indicating tllat the pri-
vilege of power should not be granted to the 'political dilettante', the
'sterilely excited' romantie whose inner bearing is 'devoid of all feeling
of objective responsibility'47 or to the man of great vanity, whose 'need
personally to stand in the foreground'48 is associated with a lack of
objectivity and a eorresponding irresponsibility; or to the 'mere power
politician', who hides his 'inner weakness and impotence' behind a self-
intoxicating worship of power for its own sake.49 Nor should the wheel
of history be placed in the hands of those who 'simply and dully accept
[their political] occupation[s]',50 lacking the faith and passion necessary
for 'genuinely human eonduct',51
Behind these negative earicatures, of 'parvenu-like braggart'52 and
passionless politieal bureaucrat, which all sould tend to reject, lies
Weber's deeper eonviction that political leadership should no longer be
sought in the unmediated charismatic qualities of the past. This position
follows from his admission that unrestrained charismatic release, which
he previously described and extolled in Economy and Societ, is associated
necessarily with an absolute ethic of ultimate ends (gesinnungsethisch)
which 'does not ask for consequences'53 and hence has no interest in
controlling or 'taming'54 the passions which it releases. On the other
hand, Weber argues that the total repression of these passions would
tend also to preclude the kind of responsible leadership henow fanrours.55
I; or Weber, then, neither complete repression nor complete release repre-
serlt 'mature' or 'genuine' human behaviour.56
Accordingly, the sober hero of the essay on 'Politics as a Vocation' is
neither a Kurtz nor a Thomas Ruddenbrooks,57 but rather a dynamic
combination of both. He is to har7e passion (Leidenschaft), a feeling of
responsibility (VerantwortangsgefizAl), and a sense of proportion (Aag-
enmass). But how, XVeber asks, 'can warm passion and a cool sense of

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88 Thomas 15. Dow 5}nr.

proportion be forged together in one and the same soul? Politics [he
observes] is made with the head, not with other parts of the body or
soul. And yet devotion to politics [he concludes], if it ls not to be frivo-
lous intellectual play but rather genuinely human conduct, can be born
and nourished from passion alone.'58
The problem is resolved by suggesting that genuine passion may be
expressed in the service of responsibility and proportion. The passionate
or mature man then, is described by Weber as one who 'is aware of
a responsibility for the consequences of his conduct and really feels
such responsibility with heart and soul. [Such a man] . . . acts by follow-
ing an ethie of responsibility and somewhere he reaches the point where
he says: Here I stand; I can do no other.' (Ich kann nicht anders, hier
stehe ich.59) At this point 'an ethie of ultimate ends [Gesinnungsethik]
and an ethic of responsibility [Verantwortungsethik] are not absolute con-
trasts but rather supplements, which only in unison constitute a genuine
man [echten Menschen] a man who can have the calling for politics'.60
Thus Weber's whole or 'genuine man' represents a synthesis of char-
isma and asceticism. He does not have the total freedom of llis Dionysian
predecessor in the earlier formulation of charisma; yet he is not without
warmth. His soul is 'free' to express itself passionately in defence of an
ethie of responsibility.
If the concerns behind this synthesis are considered, one sees, on the
one hand, that Weber shares Dostoevsky's fear that genuinely human
eonduct will be eliminatedin the 'crystal palace' of modern society,6l but
on the other hand, he is not willing totally to endorse the irrational as a
solution. In the context of political power, he could not accept Dostoev-
sky's view that 'two times two makes five is sometimes . . . a very charm-
ing . . . thing'.62 Actually, when two times two makes five or three or
whatever, as in I984, one is in the presence of arbitrary and irresponsible
power, and it is this arbitrary and irresponsible power that Weber
rejects most clearly in his Enal view of charisma.
Instead of Dostoevsky's equation, Weber would have preferred Win-
ston Smith's conclusion that if 'the freedom to say that two plus two
make four . . . is granted, all else follows'.63 In the sense intended by
Smith, the equation represents what Weber meant by objectivity,
proportion, and passion. In short, it suggests that passionate responsi-
bility for the past, the present, and the future is the primary source of
genuinely human behaviour.

Marlow

A useful literary model of Weber's new charismatic man may be found


in the eharacter of Marlow in Conrad's Heart of Darkness. SpeciScally,
Marlow was able to rise above the mere conventions and prejudices
of his time to consider the ultimate meaning of his conduct. In Weber's
terms, he was aware of a 'responsibility for the consequences of his con-
duet and ... [felt] such responsibility with heart and soul'.64 His

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An analysis of Weber's work on charisma 89

meeting with the Intended, in which he reports Kurtz's last words to


have been her name rather than an exclamation of horror, clearly sug-
gests an ethic of responsibility rather than an ethic of absolute ends.
Moreover, although Marlow admired and defended the daemonic
Kurtz against the faithless pilgrims and weak-eyed devils of the com-
pany, he still recognized that Kurtz was hollow and condemned him
for his lack of restraint. Only Marlow was able to avoid both the dis-
solution of uncontrolled release and the thoughtless and banal cruelty
of irresponsible convention.

ETHICS AND SCIENCE

It follows that Marlow rather than Kurtz would represent the sober and
mature hero of the political essay. Yet the meaning of Weber's solution
is less clear. Does it represent simple advocacy, an arbitrary preference,
a personal value judgment; or is it intended as a 'sociological ethic'?
Close reading of Weber's essay on 'Science as a Vocation' (Wissenschaf
als Beruf) suggests the latter position, in that V9eber clearly uses this
essay to establish an affinity between science and the 'preferred' ethic of
responsibility.
In this essay, Weber admits, indeed insists, that science is not the 'way
to true being, . . . to true art, . . . to true nature, . . . to true God, . . . to
true happiness . . .'; and he agrees with Tolstoi that science cannot tell
us: 'What shall we do and how shall we live?'65 It cannot do this,
Weber argues, because 'the ultimately possible attitudes toward life are
irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never be brought to a final
conclusion'.66 Consequently, 'scientific pleading is meaningless in prin-
ciple because the various splleres of the world stand in irreconcilable
conflict with each other'.67 In light ofthis position, one could argue that
Weber found himself 'the possessor of an albatross-concept of science,
which, like the mariner's bird, left one with no opportunity for rest and,
in an ultimate sense, had no rational meaning at all'.68
In fact, however, Weber found in the limits of science an occasion not
for despair but for 'moral achievement'.69 In the context of divergent
values, he sas science as providing not choice but clarity. That is, 'if
you take such and such a stand [hold such and such a value], then,
according to scientific experience, you have to use such and such a
means to carry out your conviction practically'.70 Similarly, 'if you
want such and such an end, then you must take into the bargain the
subsidiary consequences which according to all experience will occur'.7l
In this way, science can help the individual 'give himself an account of
the ultimate meaning of his own conduct'.72 And because it does this,
Weber argues, science 'stands in the service of "moral" forces; [it] . . .
fulfils the duty of bringing about self-clarification and a sense of respon-
sibility'.73
In short, science makes meaningful choice possible, in the sense that it

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9o Thomas E. Dow Xnr.

allows one to make choices that involve 'accountability to the social and
political forces of one's age'.74 Yet science cannot make these choices for
us; it cannot speak directly of values or good intentions but only of
means and consequences. And for this reason, science is associated with
an ethic of responsibility rather than an ethic of ultimate ends. From
this it seems reasonable to conclude that it was Weber's intention to pro-
vide a form of intellectual legitimation for this ethic and for the new
charismatic leadership that was to follow it.
One can also argue that Weber wished to associate his models of
political and scientific man with a theory of human development.
Specifically, he refers throughout both vocational essays to 'genuinely
human conduct',75 to 'a genuine man',76 to acting 'like a man',77 to
something being worthy of 'man as man',78 to 'a mature man',79 and
then associates these optimal but nonspecific states of personal develop-
ment with the specific characteristics of the Beruf politician or scientist.
This view of personal development is part of a major classical tradition
in Western thought. It also corresponds to contemporary definitions of
personal or political maturity. Davies' argument,80 for example, tllat a
mature man is one who can recognize and accept the consequences of
his own choices and the choices of others as they affect himself and the
polity at large, is the equivalent of the argument advanced by Weber in
the vocational essays. The uses and limitations of tllis or any theory
of human development will be examined more fully later in tllis
paper.

Summary

In the new charismatic model of the vocational essays, Weber specific-


ally condemns the quality of irresponsible release which is inllerent in
all forms of the original charismatic formulation. This condemnation
must then be applied both forwards and backwards in time; that is, to
such manifestations in the past as well as to such possible manifestations
in the future. Of the latter, of course, Weber could know nothing, and
in this respect lle was fortunate. For it was not the new charisma but the
old that was to control Germany in the years after his death; his hopes
for the elimination of charismatic irresponsibility were not realized either
in his time or our own.
What remained after Weber's death was a new definition of charisma.
Yet it was an ambiguous definition, in that by locating charisma Ermly
within the structures of everyday life it removed from it all its extra-
ordinary and distinctive external characteristics. In a sense then, Weber
'advanced what he had earlier discussed as the historical "routinization
of charisma" to the level of a "pure type" of charismatic leadership
. . .'81 This type, however, is revealed only in the heightened passion,
feeling of responsibility, and sense of proportion which distinguishes one
man from another. Yet such distinctions are by their very nature quite
difficult to make. This is not to suggest that the new charismatic model

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An analysis of Weber's work on charisma 9I

is undesirable, or even intellectually indefensible, but only that it pre-


sents great if not insuperable analytical and conceptual difficulties.

THE EVALUATION OF CHARISMA

Weber's analysis of charisma in the vocational essays was both value


free and value relevant, in that he discussed the consequences normally
associated with a charismatic ethic of ultimate eIlds and then judged
these consequences in terms of a value relevant model of personal and
social development. Yet even in the latter case, it can be argued that
the linkage of personal growth and development with choice, respon-
sibility and, by extension, participation is not a mere value judgment.
Rather, it is possible to suggest that it represents a major supposition of
classical democratic theory which has been supported at least inferent-
ially by recent findings.82
Having said this, we are still not prepared to argue that this model of
personal and social development is necessarily conclusive. Indeed,
recognizing the difficulties associated with the evaluation of competing
developmental perspectives, it seems preferable simply to state the
'preferred' position, and to suggest its place in the original charismatic
context. Specifically, if human growth and development are associated
with the opportunity to participate, with the willingness and ability to
choose, and with a readiness to assume responsibility for the conse-
quences of one's choices, it seems clear that on balance these qualities
are not encouraged in noninstitutional charismatic communities.
In short, the requirements of the revolutionary charismatic com-
munity are necessarily at odds with the developmental perspective ad-
vanced by Weber in the vocational essays. It is this conflict that is
behind Weber's rejection of the noninstitutional charismatic commun-
ity. In its place, he sought a new integration of charisma and ascet-
icism. That this synthesis was not achievedin his lifetime may suggest its
essentially romantic or utopian nature. Indeed, to speak seriously of a
genuine path between the lifelessness of everyday convention and the
dissolution of total charismatic release is to speak not primarily of his-
tory but rather of hope the hope that passion in the service of an ethic
of responsibility might yet rescue man from the immaturity and in-
humanity of both unexamined routine and irresponsible release. Weber
held this hope as both a man and a scholar, and, in a period not extern-
ally favourable to its realization, advised his students to 'set to work and
meet the demands ofthe day' in terms of such an ethical commitment.83

Conclusion

In Econo?7ty and Society Weber developed three ideal typical models of


authority: traditional, rational-legal, and charismatlc. Eacll model,
in turn, rested on a different principle of legitimacy; that is, on the
sanctity of the past, or the rationality of law, or the personal grace of a

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92 Thomas E. Dow 31zr.

noninstitutional figure. Thus charisma is introduced as part of a formal


typological system. In this sense, its utility for purposes of definition is
independent of the value one attaches to it. Yet in Weber's value rele-
vant philosophy of history this same charismatic quality clearly serves
as a vehicle of personal freedom in opposition to the progressive bureau-
cratization and rationalization of everyday life. However, Weber ulti-
mately came to reject this unchecked vellicle of freedom. Since it did
not provide an occasion for responsible choice or an opportunity for
personal development, he could not accept it.
Instead, he offered a new synthesis of restraint and release, in which
the grace of charisma was to be guided by an ethic of responsibility.
This ethic, in turn, was found to have an affinity with science, in the
sense that while science cannot choose for us, it can demonstrate to us
that our own choices are in fact responsible. (In the sense intended here,
choices which involve 'accountability to the social and political forces
of one's age'84 are responsible.) It does this by clarifying both the means
necessary to achieve our stated ends and the consequences normally to
be anticipated in connection with these ends.
Finally, in tracing Weber's journey from the charisma of release to
the charisma of passionate responsibility, we see the application of the
path outlined in the vocational essays: After considering the nature of
charisma and the consequences associated with it, and engaging his own
values, Weber 'took a stand' regarding charisma. He then invited his
students at the vocational lectures to undertake a similar journey; that
is, in effect, to investigate in the light of tlleir own ultimate values the
meaning of charisma. And, by extension, we too are invited to Ex the
place of charisma in our own ethical and intellectual universe.

Thomas E. Dow jtnr., A.B., A.M., PH.D.


Professor of Sociotogy
State University of J\ew York
Purchase, Afew York

Notes
I. Max Weber, Economy and Society son and TaIcott Parsons, trans.), edited
(Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, ed.), with an introduction by Talcott Parsons,
New York, Bedminster Press, I968; and New York, Oxford University Press,
Max Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation' in I 947, pp. 36 I-2.
Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds), 5. Weber, I968, Op. cit., p. I I I2.
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, New 6. Weber, I968, Op. Cit., p. I I I5.
York, Oxford University Press, I gs8a. 7. Weber, I968, Op. Cit., p. I I I5.
2. Weber, Igs8a; op. cit.; and Max 8. Weber, I968, Op. Cit., p. I I I 7.
Weber, 'Science as a Vocation' in Hans 9. Weber, I968, Op. Cit., p. I I I5.
Gertll and C. Wright Mills (eds), From IO. Weber, I947, Op. Cit., p. 362.
Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, New I I . Weber, I 968, Op. Cit., p. I I I 7.
York, Oxford University Press, Igs8b. I2. Weber, I968, Op. Cit., p. I I I7.
3. Weber, I968, Op. cit., p. I I I2. I3. Weber, I968, Op. Cit., p. I I I3.
4. Max Weber, The Theory of Social I 4. Weber, I 947, Op. Cit., p. 359.
and Economic Organization (A. M. Hender- I 5. Weber, I 968, Op. Cit., p. 40 I .

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An analysis of Weber's work on charisma
39

6. Weber, I968,0p. cit., p. 535. 48. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. I I6.
I7. Weber, I968,0p. cit., p. 535. 49. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. II6.
I8. Weber, I968,0p. cit., p. 535. 50. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. I28.
I9. Weber, I947,0p. cit., p. 359. 5I. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. I I5.
20. William Arrowsmith, 'Intro- 52. Weber, I gs8a, op. cit., p. I I 6.
duction to the Bacchae' in Grene and 53. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. I20.
Lattimore, The Complete Greek Tragedies,54 Weber, Igs8a, ops cits, ps I I5
Volume IV, Chicago, The University of 55 Weber, I958a, ops cits, ps I I5
Chicago Press, I958,p.537. 56. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. I27.
2I. Ibid., p. 537. 57. Thomas Mann, Buddenbrooks, New
22. Ibid, p. 537s York, Knopf, I967.
23. Weber, I968,0p. cit., p. 467. 58. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. II5.
24. Weber, I968,0p. cit., p. 40I. 59. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. I27.
25. Weber, I968,0p. cit., p. 422. 60. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. I27.
26. Weber, I968,0p. cit., p. III6. 6I. Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from
27. Arrowsmith, op. cit., pp. 539-40. Underground, New York, E. P. Dutton,
28. Arrowsmith, op. cit., p. 540. I 960, p. 3 I .
29. James V. Downton, Jr., Rebel 62. Ibid., p. 30.
Leadership: Commitment and Charisma in 63. theGeorge Orwell, I984, New York,
Revolutionary Process, New York, The TheFreeNew American Library, I949, p. 69.
Press, I973,p.273. 64. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. I27.
30. Weber, I968,0p. cit., p. II56. 65. Weber, I gs8b, op. cit., p. I 43.
3I. Arthur Mitzman, The Iron Cage: 66. Weber, I gs8b, op. cit., p. I 52.
An Historical Interpretation of Max Weber, 67. Weber, Igs8b, op. cit., p. I47.
New York, Knopf, I970,p.304. 68. Mitzman, op. cit., p. 255.
32. Weber, I947,0p. cit., p. II5. 69. Weber, I gs8b, op. cit., p. I 47.
33s Weber, I947,0p. cit., p. II7. 70. Weber, I gs8b, op. cit., p. I 5 I .
34s Weber, I947,0p. cit., p. II7. 7 I . Weber, I gs8b, op. cit., p. I 5 I .
35. Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, 72. Weber, I gs8b, op. cit., p. I 52.
New York, W. W. Norton & Co., I97I. 73 Weber, I 958b, op. cit., p. I 5
36. Weber, I968,0p. cit., p. III7. 74. Mitzman, op. cit., p. 229.
37. Weber, I968,0p. cit., p. III5. 75 Weber, I958a, op. cit., p. I I5.
38. Weber, I968,0p. cit., p. III3. 76. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. I27.
39. Weber, I968,0p. cit., p. III3. 77 Weber, I 958b, op. cit., p. I 55.
40. Conrad, op. cit., p. 63. 78. Weber, I gs8b, op. cit., p. I 37.
4I. Conrad, op. cit., p. 7I. 79. Weber, Igs8a, op. cit., p. I27.
42. Jerome Thale, 'Marlow's quest' in 80. James Davies, Human ;Nature in
R. Kimbrough, Heart of Darkness, New Politics: The Dynamics of Political Behavior,
York, W. W. Norton & Co., I97I, p. New York, John Wiley & Sons, I963,
I80. pp. 324-5
43. Ibid., p. I80. 8I. Mitzman, op. cit., p. 249.
44. Weber, Igs8a and b, op. cit. 82. Peter Bachrach, The Theory of
45s Weber, I958a, ops cits, ps II5s Democratic Elitism: A Critique, Boston,
46. Max Weber, Gesammelte Politische Little, Brown and Company, I 967,
Schriften, Tubingen, J. C. B. Mohr, Pp. 98-9.
I958C,ps533 83. Weber, I gs8b, op. cit., p. I 56.
47s Weber, I958a, op. cit., p. II5. 84. Mitzman, op. cit., p. 229.

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