POLITICAL RIGHTS/ CIVIL RIGHTS

Simon v. Commission on Human Rights

G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994

Principle: They refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
administration of government, e.g., the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right
to petition and, in general the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of
government.

FACTS:

On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the
petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the
resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and ordering said
petitioners to appear before the CHR.

On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and
supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners'
authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil
and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political
rights, but their privilege to engage in business".

On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental
motion to dismiss. And petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated
April 25, 1991.
The Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and preliminary
injunction. Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR
Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al".

ISSUE:

Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the CRH?

HELD:

No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the
CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate,
on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation, involving civil and
political rights".

The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that the
it does not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or
need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an
restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would have
expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ,
for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the
action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.

The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further
proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580.
DUE PROCESS

Smith, Bell & Company (Ltd.), pet vs.

Joaquin Natividad, Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, resp.

40 Phil 163

Principle: Who are protected. Universal in application to all persons, without regard to any
difference in race, color or nationality. Artificial persons are covered by the protection but only
insofar as their property is concerned.

Facts:
Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippine Islands. A majority of its stockholders are British subjects. It is the owner of a motor
vessel known as the Bato built for it in the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more than fifteen tons
gross The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year for the purpose of transporting plaintiff's
merchandise between ports in the Islands. Application was made at Cebu, the home port of the
vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a certificate of Philippine registry. The Collector refused
to issue the certificate, giving as his reason that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd.,
were not citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. The instant action is the
result.

Counsel argues that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal protection of the
laws because it, in effect, prohibits the corporation from owning vessels, and because
classification of corporations based on the citizenship of one or more of their stockholders is
capricious, and that Act No. 2761 deprives the corporation of its property without due process of
law because by the passage of the law company was automatically deprived of every beneficial
attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with the naked title to a boat it could not use .

Issue:

Whether the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the registry
of vessel in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders

Ruling:

Yes. Act No. 2761 provides:

Investigation into character of vessel. — No application for a certificate of Philippine register

shall be approved until the collector of customs is satisfied from an inspection of the vessel that
it is engaged or destined to be engaged in legitimate trade and that it is of domestic ownership as
such ownership is defined in section eleven hundred and seventy-two of this Code.
Certificate of Philippine register. — Upon registration of a vessel of domestic ownership, and of
more than fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be issued for it. If the vessel
is of domestic ownership and of fifteen tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of
Philippine register shall be optional with the owner.

While Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation having alien stockholders, is entitled to the
protection afforded by the due-process of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the
Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to
corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippines
coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious species of class legislation which must always be
condemned, but does fall within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police
power, and so does not offend against the constitutional provision.
Villegas v. Hiu Chiong,
86 SCRA 275

Principle: As to Smith Bell & Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 163. The guarantee extends to aliens
and includes the means of livelihood

Facts:

The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February
22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any person not
a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any
kind of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing an employment
permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes.

Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance.

Issue:

Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.

Held:

It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable aliens
generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation.

While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from
the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or
disapproval of application is regulatory in character, the second part which requires the payment
of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure.

Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human
right of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the
Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted
he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of
livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or
denial of an alien employment permit fee.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION vs. PHILIPPINE
BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.

G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

Principle: The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security
“against
the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small
encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general
principles”

Facts:

Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration

in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for
a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was
confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against
the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to
freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of
their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the
possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers
may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves
to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the
rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the
‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found
guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by
the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.

Issue:

Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA.

Held:

No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over
property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as
supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive,"
permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights
can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil
liberties, the rights to freedom of expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they
are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such
priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."

The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in
relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.”
NUÑEZ V AVERIA
G.R. No. L-38415 June 28, 1974

Principle: Public office is not property; but one unlawfully ousted from it may institute an action
to recover the same, flowing from the de jure officer’s right to office.

FACTS:

Petitioner is the protestant in Election Case No. TM-470 of respondent court contesting the
November 8, 1971 election results in certain precincts for the mayoralty of Tarnate, Cavite on
the ground of fraud, irregularities and corrupt practices. Original protestee was the proclaimed
mayor-elect Edgardo Morales, who was ambushed and killed on February 15, 1974 in a barrio of
Tarnate2 and hence was succeeded by then vice-mayor Rodolfo de Leon who as the incumbent
mayor is now substituted in this action as party respondent.

Respondent court had in its questioned order granted protestee's motion for dismissal of the
election protest on the ground "that this court has lost its jurisdiction to decide this case for the
reason that the same has become moot and academic," citing the President's authority under
General Order No. 3 and Article XVII, section 9 of the 1973 Constitution to remove from office
all incumbent government officials and employees, whether elective or appointive.

Petitioner filed a timely appeal. Upon receipt of respondent's comment the Court resolved to
consider petitioner's petition for review on certiorari as a special civil action and the case
submitted for decision for prompt disposition thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent may succeed the position of Mayoralty.

RULING:

No. Ruling that "(I)t must be emphasized that the `right' of the private respondents to continue in
office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Art. XVII of the New Constitution but
principally from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of
the November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to
their respective positions and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their
functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to
enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional provision," and that "(I)t
is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Art. XVII of the New Constitution, the term of
office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices
under a new term. We are of the opinion that they hold their respective offices still under the
term to which they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite."
The Court further stressed therein that "(T)he Constitutional Convention could not have
intended, as in fact it did not intend, to shield or protect those who had been unduly elected. To
hold that the right of the herein private respondents to the respective offices which they are now
holding, may no longer be subject to question would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval
to what could have been an election victory characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote
buying, or other forms of irregularities prohibited by the Election Code to preserve inviolate the
sanctity of the ballot."

In line with previous precedents involving election cases, this decision shall be immediately
executory upon promulgation hereof. SO ORDERED.
Crespo v Provincial Board

160 SCRA 66

Principle: One’s employment, profession or trade or calling is a property right, and the
wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. Thus, an order of suspension, without
opportunity for hearing, violates property rights

Facts:

Petitioner was the elected Municipal Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, in the local elections of
1967. On 25January 1971, an administrative complaint was filed against him by private
respondent, Pedro T. Wycoco for harassment, abuse of authority and oppression. As required,
petitioner filed a written explanation as to why he should not be dealt with administratively, with
the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, in accordance with Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185.On
15 February 1971, without notifying petitioner or his counsel, public respondent Provincial
Board conducted a hearing of the aforecited administrative case.

During the hearing, private respondent Pedro T. Wycoco was allowed to present evidence,
testimonial and documentary, ex parte, and on the basis of the evidence presented, the
respondent Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 51preventively suspending petitioner from
his office as municipal mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija.In this petition for certiorari, prohibition
and injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside
Resolution No. 51 of public respondent Provincial Board, preventively suspending him from
office and to enjoin public respondent from enforcing and/or implementing the order of
preventive suspension and from proceeding further with the administrative case.

According to petitioner, the order of preventive suspension embodied in Resolution No.51 issued
by the Provincial Board is arbitrary, high-handed, atrocious, shocking and grossly violative of
Section5 of Republic Act No. 5185 which requires a hearing and investigation of the truth or
falsity of charges before preventive suspension is allowed. In issuing the order of preventive
suspension, the respondent Provincial Board, petitioner adds, has grossly violated the
fundamental and elementary principles of due process. On 3 May 1971, this Court issued a
preliminary injunction.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was denied due process?

Held:

Yes. In Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc.6 this Court held: It is a principle in American
jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is well-recognized in this jurisdiction that one's employment,
profession, trade or calling is a "property right and the wrongful interference therewith is an
actionable wrong.

The right is considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional guaranty of due
process of law. Undoubtedly, the order of preventive suspension was issued without giving the
petitioner a chance to be heard. To controvert the claim of petitioner that he was not fully
notified of the scheduled hearing, respondent Provincial Board, in its Memorandum, contends
that "Atty. Bernardo M. Abesamis, counsel for the petitioner mayor made known by a request in
writing, sent to the Secretary of the Provincial Board his desire to be given opportunity to argue
the explanation of the said petitioner mayor at the usual time of the respondent Board's meeting,
but unfortunately, inspire of the time allowed for the counsel for the petitioner mayor to appear
as requested by him, he failed to appeal.

" The contention of the Provincial Board cannot stand alone in the absence of proof or evidence
to support it. Moreover, in the proceedings held on 15 February 1971, nothing therein can be
gathered that, in issuing the assailed order, the written explanation submitted by petitioner was
taken in to account. The assailed order was issued mainly on the basis of the evidence presented
ex parte by respondent Wycoco. In Azul vs. Castro, 9 this Court said: From the earliest inception
of institutional government in our country, the concepts of notice and hearing have been
fundamental. A fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible without the right to
notice and to be board. The emphasis on substantive due process and other recent ramifications
of the due process clause sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or forget that due process
was initially concerned with fair procedure.

Every law student early learns in law school definition submitted by counsel Mr. Webster in
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat. 518) that due process is the equivalent of
law of the land which means "The general law; a law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeding upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial ... that every citizen shall hold his
life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern
society. As porting opportunity to be heard and the rendition of judgment only after a lawful
hearing by a coldly neutral and impartial judge are essential elements of procedural due process.
The petition, however, has become moot and academic. Records do not show that in the last
local elections held on18January 1988, petitioner was elected to any public office.
Republic vs Rosemoor

G.R. No. 149927 March 30, 2004

Principle: A mining license that contravenes a mandatory provision of law under which it is
granted is void. Being a mere privilege, a license does not vest absolute rights in the holder.
Thus, without offending the due process and the non-impairment clauses of the Constitution, it
can be revoked by the State in the public interest.

FACTS:
Dr. Lourdes S. Pascual, Dr. Pedro De la Concha, Alejandro De La Concha, and Rufo De
Guzman, after having been granted permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains
of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high quality
and in commercial quantities in Mount Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain
range.

Having succeeded in discovering said marble deposits, the petitioners applied with the Bureau of
Mines, now Mines and Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of the corresponding license to
exploit said marble deposits. After compliance with numerous required conditions, License No.
33 was issued to them. After respondent Ernesto R. Maceda was appointed Minister
of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners’ License No.33 was
cancelled by him through his letter to Rosemoor Mining and Dev’t Corp.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was due process of law in the revocation of the mining license?

HELD:

There was due process of law in the revocation of the mining license since respondents’ license
may be revoked or rescinded by executive action when the national interest so requires, because
it is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution.

We cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation No. 84 is a bill of attainder; that is, a
legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. “Its declaration that QLP No. 33 is
a patent nullity is certainly not a declaration of guilt. Neither is the cancellation of the license a
punishment within the purview of the constitutional proscription against bills of attainder. Too, there
is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an ex post facto law.
It is settled that an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature.
Proclamation 84, which merely restored the area excluded from the Biak-na-Bato national park
by canceling respondents’ license, is clearly not penal in character. Also at the time President
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84 on March 9, 1987, she was still validly exercising legislative
powers under the Provisional Constitution of 1986. Section 1 of Article II of Proclamation No. 3,
which promulgated the Provisional Constitution, granted her legislative power until a legislature
is elected and convened under a new Constitution. The grant of such power is also explicitly
recognized and provided for in Section 6 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
Pedro vs Provincial Board of Rizal

G. R. No. 34163, September 18, 1931

Principle: As to Republic v. Rosemoor Mining & Development Corporation Mere privileges,

such as the license to operate a cockpit, are not property rights and are revocable at will.

FACTS:

Gregorio Pedro argues for the nullity of Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, approved on
December 29, 1928, by the temporary councillors appointed by the provincial governor of Rizal,
Eligio Naval, on the ground that (1) it impairs the acquired rights of said appellant; (2) it was
enacted on account of prejudice, because it was intended for a special and not a general purpose,
namely to prevent, at any cost, the opening, maintenance, and exploitation of the cockpit of the
said petitioner-appellant; and (3) it provides for special committee composed of persons who
are not members of the council, vested them with powers which of their very nature, cannot be
delegated by said council to that committee.

He further contends that, having obtained the proper permit to maintain, exploit, and open to the
public the cockpit in question, having paid the license fee and fulfilled all the requirements
provided by Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, he has acquired a right which cannot be taken
away from him by Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, which was subsequently approved.

ISSUE:

Whether a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit falls under property
rights which a person may not be deprived of without due process of law

HELD:

No.

The court held: (1) That a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not
property of which the holder may not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere
privilege which may be revoked when the public interests so require; (2) that the work
entrusted by a municipal council to a special sanitary committee to make a study of the sanitary
effects upon the neighborhood of the establishment of a cockpit, is not legislative in character,
but only informational, and may be delegated; and (3) that an ordinance, approved by a
municipal council duly constituted, which suspends the effects of another which had been
enacted to favor the grantee of a cockpit license, is valid and legal.
CHAVEZ V ROMULO
G.R. No. 157036 June 9, 2004

Principle: The license to carry a firearm is neither a property nor a property right. Neither does it
create a vested right. A permit to carry a firearm outside one’s residence may be revoked at any
time. Even if it were a property right, it cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond
the reach of police power.

FACTS:
In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of
the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime
incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the issuance of
Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR).
Petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the “Guidelines
inthe Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence”
(Guidelines)issued by respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., Chief of the Philippine National
Police (PNP).Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been
issued, requested the DILG to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines.
However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition impleading public
respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as Executive Secretary; and Gerry L.
Barias, as Chief of the PNP-Firearms and Explosives Division.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a vested property right.

HELD:

Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.

In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life,
liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person
to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of
Forestry, we ruled that “a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is
granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right.” In a more
emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that:

“Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.”
In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is
evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state
that “the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such
conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of
residence.” Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not
constitute a property right protected under our Constitution.

Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked
any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under
existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his
license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory
conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a
license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property,
immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US
Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: “The correlative power to revoke or
recall a permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is
always revocable.”
THE UNITED STATES v. LUIS TORIBIO

G.R. No. L-5060 January 26, 1910

Principle: Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that
construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the
lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted.

FACTS:

Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the province of
Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered
a carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was
slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the
registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large
cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft purposes for human consumption.

The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the slaughter of large
cattle in the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal treasurer.
Furthermore, he contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he
slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking of property for public use
in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing for the compensation of owners,
and it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of
the enjoyment of their private property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle,
is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.

RULLING:

It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.

The Supreme court Said sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or
causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit
provided for in section 30.

Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that
construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the
lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be
rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the
object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment.

The Supreme Court also said that if they will follow the contention of Toribio it will defeat the
purpose of the law.

The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the invasion of
private property by police regulation can be justified, The Supreme Court think that the
reasonable restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by the provision of the law under
discussion must be held to be authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power.

The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like an epidemic that wiped 70-
100% of the population of carabaos.. The Supreme Court also said that these animals are vested
with public interest for they are fundamental use for the production of crops. These reasons
satisfy the requesites of a valid exercise of police power

The Supreme court finally said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of
eminent domain. The said law does not constitute the taking of caraboes for public purpose; it
just serve as a mere regulation for the consumption of these private properties for the protection
of general welfare and public interest.
Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

G.R. No. 14078, March 07, 1919

Principle: The Supreme Court, conscious of theimplication of religious discrimination in the

term, has given the interpretation that it does not refer to religious belief, but to degree of
civilization.

FACTS:

The provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake
for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Pursuant to the provisions of section
2145 of the revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the vicinities of the townships of
Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of
Dulangan and Rubi’s place in Calapan are directed to take up their habitation on the site of
Tigbao, Naujan Lake.

This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province
of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Mangyanes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the
reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held
under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the
reservation.

ISSUE:

Whether Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person of his liberty of abode and
is therefore unconstitutional

RULING:

No. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due
process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary
servitude. The court further ruled that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate
exertion of the police power and thus constitutional.

Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of
civilization of the. Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed.
To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a
law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit
the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy,
must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.