Molina v Rafferty

April 4, 1918

I. Definition, Concept, and purpose of Statutory Construction

1. Judge Cooley- The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature should be sought
in the words employed to express it, and that when found, it should be made to govern…. If the words of the law
seem to be doubtful import, it may then perhaps become necessary to look beyond them in order to ascertain what
was in the legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what evil, is any, was meant to be redressed;…
2. And where the law was contemporaneously been put upon it, this construction, especially if followed for some
considerable period, is entitled to great respect, as being very probably a true expression of the legislative
purpose, & is not lightly to be overruled, although it isn’t conclusive.

II. Facts:
1. The present case was a rehearing granted to the appellee for a trail court decision on Feb 1, 1918. The petition
was granted and oral argument of the motion was permitted.

2. Jacinto Molina was the owner of various fish ponds in Bulacan. He was required to pay the merchant’s tax
required by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

3. Molina protested that he was an agriculturist and not a merchant and therefore exempt from the taxes imposed
by the Internal Revenue Law upon the gross sales of merchants.

4. Point of contention- Plaintiff contends that the fish produced by him are to be regarded as an “agricultural
product” within the meaning of the term used in paragraph (c) of Section 41 of Act No. 2339 (Now section 1460
of the Administrative Code of 1917), enforced when the disputed tax was levied and that he is exempt from the
percentage tax on merchants’ sales established by section 40 of Act No. 2339.

5. Paragraph (c) of Act No. 2339 sec. 41 reads:

In computing the tax above imposed transactions in the following commodities shall be excluded:
(c) Agricultural products when sold by the producer or owner of the land where grown, whether in their original
state or not

6. In the Trial Court, the Honorable Jose Abreu in a carefully prepared decision ordered defendant to refund the
P71.81 paid by plaintiff as internal-revenue taxes and penalties under protest, with legal interest thereon from
November 26, 1915, the date of such payment under protest.

III. Issue:
1. WON fish produced as were those upon which the tax in question was levied are an agricultural product

IV Decision:
Decision set aside. Judgment of lower court affirmed.

IV. Ruling:
1. Purpose of legislative in establishing the exemption – exempting agricultural products from the tax the farming
industry would be favored and the development of the resources of the country encouraged.

2. As a consequence, it is fairly to be inferred from the statute that the object and purpose of the Legislature was
to levy the tax in question (merchant’s tax) upon all persons engaged in making a profit upon goods produced by
others but to exempt from the tax all persons directly producing goods from the land. Products were grouped
under “agricultural products”.
3. It is also the public interest to encourage the artificial propagation of food. However, if the artificial production
of fish is held not to be included within the exemption of the statute this conclusion must be based upon the
inadequacy of the language used by the Legislature to express its purpose, rather than the assumption that it was
actually intended to exclude producers of artificially grown fish from the benefits conferred upon producers of
other substances brought into the store of national wealth by the arts of husbandry and animal industry.

4. Court held that the ponds where the fish were grown is agricultural land within the definitions set by the Acts
of Congress, the Philippine Commission, and the Mapa vs. Insular Gov’t case.

5. With regard to the question that that the fish artificially grown and fed in a confined area are agricultural
products and therefore exempt, the Court looked deeper. It said that a man might cultivate the surface of a tract of
land patented to him under the mining law, but the products of such soil would not for that reason be any the less
"agricultural products." Conversely, the admission that the land upon which these fishponds are constructed is not
to be classified as mineral or forest land, does not lead of necessity to the conclusion that everything produced
upon them is for that reason alone to be deemed an "agricultural product" within the meaning of the statute under
consideration.

6. Courts and lexicographers are in accord in holding that the term agricultural products is not limited in its
meaning to vegetable growth but includes everything which serves to satisfy human needs which is grown upon
the land, whether it pertains to the vegetable kingdom or to the animal kingdom.

7. Purpose of agriculture – obtain from the land the products to which it is best adapted and through it will yield
the greatest return upon the expenditure of a given amount of labor and capital. This is similar to the process of
enclosing an area for fish production and one of the diets of the products are marine plants rooted at the bottom of
the pond.

8. Another distinction was made between fishermen and the people artificially growing fish in ponds so as to
delineate the scope of the occupation tax. Fishermen were made liable to the occupation tax. The ones growing
fish in ponds were not included.

9. As the present case related to US vs Laxa, the court held that Laxa wasn’t controlling due to evidence that the
fish subsisted solely upon free floating algae in Laxa while in Molina, the fish subsisted through plants which
grow from roots which attach themselves to the bottom of the pond, thereby making Molina’s fish in the real
sense a product of the land!
 BUREAU OF FORESTRY vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENO GALLO
G.R. No. L-37995 August 31, 1987

FACTS: In 1961, Mercedes Diago applied for the registration of 4 parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo
containing an approximate area of 30.5 hectares. She alleged she occupied said parcels of land having bought
them from the estate of the late Jose Ma. Nava who, in his lifetime, had bought the lands in turn from Canuto
Gustilo in 1934. The Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest have sufcient title over the lands applied for, which could be registered under the Torrens
systems, and that they have never been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lands for at least
30 years. The Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that certain portions of the lands, with an area of
approximately 19.4 hectares are mangrove swamps and are within a Timberland Block. In 1965, Filomeno Gallo
purchased the subject parcels of land from Mercedes Diago, and moved to be substituted in place of the latter,
attaching to his motion an Amended Application for Registration of Title. Philippine Fisheries Commission also
moved to substitute petitioner Bureau of Forestry as oppositor, since supervision and control of said portion have
been transferred from the Bureau of Forestry to the PFC. In April 1966, the trial court rendered its decision
ordering the registration of the 4 parcels of land in the name of Filomeno Gallo. It ruled that although the
controverted portion of 19.4 hectares are mangrove and nipa swamps within a Timberland Block, petitioners
failed to submit convincing proof that these lands are more valuable for forestry than for agricultural purposes,
and the presumption is that these are agricultural lands.

ISSUE: WON the classifcation of lands of public domain by the Executive Branch of the Government into
agricultural, forest or mineral can be changed or varied by the court.

HELD: NO Admittedly, the controversial area is within a timberland block classifed and certifed as such by the
Director of Forestry in 1956. The lands are needed for forest purposes and hence they are portions of the public
domain which cannot be the subject of registration proceedings. Clearly therefore the land is public land and there
is no need for the Director of Forestry to submit convincing proofs that the land is more valuable for forest
purposes than for agriculture. As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the classifcation or
reclassifcation of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the
Executive Department and not of the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is
not the court which determines the classifcation of lands of the public domain but the Executive Branch, through
the Ofce of the President. Furthermore, respondents cannot claim to have obtained their title by prescription since
the application fled by them necessarily implied an admission that the portions applied for are part of the public
domain and cannot be acquired by prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. It is a rule of law that
possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
 JOCSON v. COURT OF APPEALS
February 16, 1989 (G.R. No. L-55322)

FACTS:
Emilio Jocon and Alejandra Jocson were husband and wife. The wife died first intestate then the husband
followed. Moises and Agustina are their children. Ernesto Vasquesz is the husband of Agustina.

The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson during his
lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers
almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson
assails these documents and prays that they be declared null and void and the properties subject matter therein be
partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents.

Petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the unliquidated conjugal properties of
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore, cannot validly sell. They say it is conjugal
properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because they were registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson,
married to Alejandra Poblete”.

ISSUE: WON the property registered under the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete” is
conjugal property or exclusive property.

HELD:
Exclusive. Article 60 of the CC proveides that All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The party who invokes
this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. In other
words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption
in favor of conjugal ownership.

It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article 160 he must first
present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra
Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the
properties were registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete” is no proof that the
properties were acquired during the spouses’ coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two
different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing (See
Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was
still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was
described in the certificates of title as married to the latter.

Contrary to petitioner’s position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the properties were exclusively
Emilio Jocson’s, the registered owner. This is so because the words “married to’ preceding “Alejandra Poblete’
are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson. In other words, the import from the certificates of title
is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same having been registered in his name alone, and that he
is married to Alejandra Poblete.
 G.R. No. L-14722 May 25, 1960
IGNACIO MESINA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs
EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, ET AL., defendants.

FACTS:
Plaintiff Mesina claimed to be the owner of a parcel of land located in San Antonio, Nueva, Ecija. She has been in
possession of the subject land openly, publicly and peacefully since 1914. The said lot was subject of registration
proceedings. Surprisingly, the defendant Pineda without knowledge of the Plaintiff was able to procure a
homestead patent in the same court were the registration of property was pending of the same land by the
plaintiff, despite of the fact that defendant had not complied with the requirements of CA 141.

Plaintiff sought to annulled and cancelled the patent issued to defendant and prayed that this registration case
pending in the same court be given due course.

ISSUE:
WON the homestead patent given to defendant Pineda be declared null and void.

RULING:
In view of the fact that plaintiff was able to proved his open, continuous, exclusive possession of the disputed land
for more than thirty years or since 1914 and that lot is at present subject of registration proceeding. Plaintiff is
deemed to have acquired the lot by grant of the state, it follows that the same had ceased to part of the public and
had become private property and therefore beyond the control of the Director of Land.

The homestead patent issued to defendant therefore is null and void and for having it issued through fraud, deceit
and misrepresentation.
DE LOS ANGELES VS SANTOS

In the matter of the application for registration of land. Leonor de los Angeles, et al. vs Isidoro O. Santos, Antonio
Astudillo, et al., the Director of Lands and the Provice of Rizal G.R. No. L-19615 December 24, 1964

Facts: Leonor de los Angeles and seven co-applicants filed an application for registration of title to 12 parcels of
land in Ampid San Mateo Rizal. They alleged that they were “owners pro-indiviso and in fee simple of the
aforesaid land. Subsequently, the Director of Lands filed an opposition stating that the land “is a portion of the
public domain while other private oppositors filed their written opposition claiming they are the lawful owners of
the parcels of land in question for having acquired homestead patents over said lots. A report filed in court by the
Land Registration Commissioner stated that the parcel of land described as Lot 11, applied for in the same case, is
a portion of a previously patented land awarded to one of the oppositors (Julio Hidalgo) and recommended that
the case be dismissed with respect to Lot 11, giving due course, however, to the other lots in the application. The
court required the applicants to show cause why their application should not be dismissed as to Lot 11 to which
the applicants filed an opposition to motion to dismiss. However, the court issued an order dismissing the
application with respect to Lot 11. The applicants filed a motion for reconsideration but were denied, hence, this
appeal. They alleged that the lower court erred in dismissing the application for the registration as regards to Lot
11, over which a homestead patent was issued by the Director of Lands during the pendency of the registration
proceeding.

Issue: Whether a land registration court which has validly acquired jurisdiction over a parcel of land for
registration of title thereto could be divested of said jurisdiction by a subsequent administrative act consisting in
the issuance by the Director of Lands of a homestead patent covering the same parcel of land

Ruling: It is well settled that the Director of Lands’ jurisdiction, administrative supervision and executive
control extend only over lands of the public domain and not to lands already of private ownership. Accordingly, a
homestead patent issued by him over land not of the public domain is a nullity, devoid of force and effect against
the owner. The applicants contended that they were already owner’s pro-indiviso and in fee simple of the
aforesaid land when they applied for registration on November 21, 1959. If they were to successfully prove this
and show their alleged registrable title to the land, it could only result in the finding that when Julio Hidalgo’s
homestead patent was issued over Lot 11 on June 12, 1961 said lot was no longer public. The land registration
court, in that event, would have to order a decree of title issued in applicant’s favour and declare aforesaid
homestead patent a nullity which vested no title in the patentee as against the real owners. Since the existence or
non-existence of applicants’ registrable title to Lot 11 is decisive of the validity or nullity of the homestead
patent issued as aforestated on said lot the court a quo’s jurisdiction in the land registration proceedings could
not have been divested by the homestead patent’s issuance. Further, proceedings for land registration are in
rem whereas those for acquisition of homestead patent are not. A homestead patent, therefore, does not finally
dispose of the public or private character of the land as far as courts upon in rem are concerned. The applicants
should thus be given opportunity to prove registrable title to Lot 11. The case is remanded to the court a quo for
further proceedings.