1

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73

RULE 74 ii. to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the
Summary Settlement of Estate estate, and
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs . — iii. to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such
1. If the decedent left no will and no debts and debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such
2. the heirs are all of age, or persons, in their own right, if they are of lawful age and legal
3. the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized capacity, or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and
for the purpose, qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and
4. the parties may without securing letters of administration, enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to
a. divide the estate among themselves as they see fit them respectively.
i. by means of a public instrument
ii. filed in the office of the register of deeds, and iv. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs
b. should they disagree, they may do so in of the proceedings, and
i. an ordinary action of partition.
c. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate v. all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course thereof
i. by means of an affidavit shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and
ii. filed in the office of the register of deeds.
d. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument vi. the order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall be
or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who recorded in the proper register's office.
adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit
i. shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition
precedent
1. to the filing of the public instrument, or Section 3. Bond to be filed by distributees. —
2. stipulation in the action for partition, or 1. The court, before allowing a partition in accordance with the provisions of the
3. of the affidavit in the office of the register of preceding section,
deeds, 2. may require the distributees,
ii. a bond with the said register of deeds, 3. if property other than real is to be distributed,
iii. in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal 4. to file a bond in an amount to be fixed by court,
property involved as certified to under oath by the parties 5. conditioned for the payment of any just claim
concerned and 6. which may be filed under the next succeeding section.
iv. conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may
be filed under section 4 of this rule. Section 4. Liability of distributees and estate. —
1. If it shall appear at any time within two (2) years after the settlement and
5. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first
letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent. two sections of this rule,
6. The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a 2. that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the nest succeeding participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may compel the
section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for
a. who has not participated therein or the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation.
b. had no notice thereof. 3. that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not
been paid, or
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT 4. that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful
Section 2. Summary settlement of estate of small value. — Whenever participation payable in money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate
1. the gross value of the estate of a deceased person, may,
2. whether he died testate or intestate, a. by order for that purpose,
3. does not exceed 10,000 pesos, and b. after hearing,
i. settle the amount of such debts or lawful
4. that fact is made to appear to the CFI having jurisdiction of the estate participation and
ii. order how much and in what manner each
5. by the petition of an interested person and distributee shall contribute in the payment thereof,
and
6. upon hearing, which shall be held iii. may issue execution, if circumstances require,
1. against the bond provided in the
preceding section or
a. not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months
2. against the real estate belonging to the
deceased, or both.
b. from the date of the last publication of a notice 3. Such bond and such real estate shall
remain charged with a liability to
i. which shall be published once a week for three (3) consecutive creditors, heirs, or other persons for the
weeks full period of two (2) years after such
distribution, notwithstanding any
ii. in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and transfers of real estate that may have
been made.
7. after such other notice to interest persons as the court may direct, the court may Section 5. Period for claim of minor or incapacitated person . — If on the date of the
expiration of the period of two (2) years prescribed in the preceding section the person
a. proceed summarily, authorized to file a claim is any of the ff, he may present his claim within one (1) year
after such disability is removed:
b. without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and without 1. a minor or
delay, 2. mentally incapacitated, or is
3. in prison or
i. to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there be, 4. outside the Philippines,

NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA

2 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73

8. that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful
participation payable in money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate
I. EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE may,
1. Gerilla vs de Figuracion - requisites a. by order for that purpose,
2. Pereira vs CA – What constitutes good reasons to warrant a b. after hearing,
judicial administration of the estate of a deceased person when i. settle the amount of such debts or lawful
the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors participation and
3. Avelino vs CA – can a special proceeding be converted to a ii. order how much and in what manner each
Special Civil action for partition distributee shall contribute in the payment thereof,
4. Teves vs CA – quantum of proof required to question the validity and
of EJS iii. may issue execution, if circumstances require,
5. Hernandez vs Andal – Purpose of registration; protection of 1. against the bond provided in the
creditors and the heirs vs tardy claims. preceding section or
6. Cua vs Vargas – purpose of the publication requirement ; 2. against the real estate belonging to the
publication does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs deceased, or both.
who did not participate or was not notified of the execution of the 3. Such bond and such real estate shall
EJS; procedure outlined is an exparte proceeding. remain charged with a liability to
7. Sampilo vs CA – remedies of an excluded heir creditors, heirs, or other persons for the
8. Alcala vs Pabalan – Effect of EJS full period of two (2) years after such
G.R. No. L-6463 August 12, 1911 distribution, notwithstanding any
DAMASA ALCALA vs. MODESTA PABALAN, PROCOPIO PABALAN, BASILIO transfers of real estate that may have
SALGADO and JUAN BANAY- BANAY been made.
FACTs: 23rd day of April, 1897, Juan Banatin died, leaving a widow (Damasa Alcala), Section 5. Period for claim of minor or incapacitated person . — If on the date of the
the plaintiff herein, and seventeen nieces and nephews, whose names are set out in the expiration of the period of two (2) years prescribed in the preceding section the person
petition; that on the 13th day of June, 1897, the said widow and all of the seventeen authorized to file a claim is any of the ff, he may present his claim within one (1) year
nieces and nephews, except Tranquilina Banatin, entered into a voluntary agreement after such disability is removed:
among themselves for the division "entre ellos," of all of the property left by the said Juan 5. a minor or
Banatin, deceased. 6. mentally incapacitated, or is
7. in prison or
On the 11th day of June, 1910, the plaintiff and appellee presented a petition in the 8. outside the Philippines,
Court of First Instance of the Province of La Laguna, praying that she be appointed
administratrix of the property described in paragraph 4 of her petition. After hearing the
respective parties, the lower court appointed the plaintiff as administratrix of said
property. Excluded Heirs - an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful
participation in the estate may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the
ISSUE: The first assignment of error made by the plaintiff is that "El juzgado erro al manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation.
estimar que la testamentaria del finado Juan Banatin no ha finalizada."
Remedies:
HELD: With reference to this assignment of error, the heirs of Juan Banatin were at 1. file a judicial settlement, after which there will be an appointment of administrator
perfect liberty to divide the estate among themselves, assuming the responsibility of any 2. Recover property based on fraud – 4 years after discovery of fraud
debts which might exist. There is no proof that any debts existed. AFTER THE 3. Demand Partition – imprescriptible
ACTUAL DIVISION OF THE ESTATE AMONG THEMSELVES THEY BECAME 4. Reconveyance of Property
THE ABSOLUTE OWNERS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE ALLOTMENTS AND WERE
TENANTS IN COMMON OF THAT PORTION OF THE PROPERTY WHICH 1. Sampilo vs CA
REMAINED PRO INDIVISO . After the mutual agreement among themselves for the G.R. No. L-10474 February 28, 1958
division of the estate, either actually distributing their respective shares or leaving the BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners, vs.
same undivided, the property in question was no longer the property of the estate of Juan THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA respondent.
Banatin, but the undivided property of the heirs. They were tenant in common of that
portion of the property which remained undivided. As such tenants in common the
majority of them had a right to agree upon the appointment of an administrator of their FACTS: Felisa Sinopera, administrative of the estate of Teodoro Tolete, filed an action
property. (Art. 398, Civil Code.) The property belonged to them. They had a right to to recover from defendants one-half share of the aforesaid parcels of land, which, it is
administer it. alleged belong to the deceased Teodoro Tolete. The latter died intestate in 1945 with 4
parcels of land and as heirs his widow, Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and
The lower court in appointing the plaintiff and appellee as administratrix of the property in nieces. However, his widow, on July 25, 1946, executed the ff documents without any
question, evidently did so upon the theory that the said property was still the property of judicial proceedings,
the estate of Juan Banatin. In this theory the lower court was mistaken. There was 1. an affidavit of self-adjudication registered in the ROD of Pangasinan.
nothing left of the estate of Juan Banatin to be administered. The heirs by mutual 2. deed of sale of all 4 parcels of land in favor of Benny Sampilo for the sum of
agreement had divided the property among themselves. There was no occasion and no P10,000. This sale was also registered . Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold the
reason for the appointment of an administrator by the probate court, and, therefore, the said parcels of land to Honorato Salacup
judgment of the lower court appointing Damasa Alcala as administratrix of the estate of
Juan Banatin for the purpose of administering the property mentioned in paragraph 4 of In March, 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the
the petition, is hereby revoked. estate of Teodoro Tolete, and having secured her appointment as administratrix, brought
the present action on June 20, 1950.
Section 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — Sinopera: the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute the affidavit of
5. If it shall appear at any time within two (2) years after the settlement and adjudication
distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first Sampilo and Salacup: barred by the statute of limitations;
two sections of this rule, CFI: the affidavit of adjudication, the deed of sale are all null and void;
6. that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful CA: reserved to Honorato Salacup the right to claim and secure adjudication in his favor
participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may compel the of whatever portion of said properties may correspond to Leoncia de Leon and also his
settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for right to bring an action for the damages that he may have suffered against Leoncia de
the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. Leon and Benny Sampilo.
7. that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not
been paid, or ISSUE: The Court of Appeals erred in affirming that respondent Felisa Sinopera's right
of action to recover her and her co-heirs' participation to the lands in question had not
prescribed at the time the action to recover was filed.
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
HELD:
It is argued that as the action was instituted almost four years after the affidavit of
adjudication. It was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds Of Pangasinan, the
right of action of the administratrix has prescribed and lapsed because the same was not
brought within the period of two years as Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court,
SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — If it shall appear at any time within two
years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions
of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other has been unduly
deprived of his lawful participation of the such heir or such other person may compel the
settlement estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of
satisfying such lawful participation. . . .
Section 1, which is mentioned in Section 4, reads as follows: xxx
It will be noted that the provision next above-quoted contains two parts, the first referring
to a case in which there are two or more heirs interested in the estate of a deceased
person, and the second in which there is only one heir. The section was taken from
Section 596 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190, as amended by Act No.
2331). Said Section 596 as amended, was as follows:
SEC. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal Proceedings. — Whenever all
the heirs of a person who died intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity and there
are no debts due from the estate, or all the debts have been paid the heirs may, by
agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, and not otherwise, apportion and
divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in court.
We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. In Section 1, it is
required that if there are two or more heirs, both or all of them should take part in the
extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is made more imperative in the old law
(Section 596, Act No. 190) by the addition of the clause "and not otherwise." By the title
of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" indicates the persons to answer for rights
violated by the extrajudicial settlement. On the other hand, it is also significant that no
mention is made expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons who
did not take part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof. There cannot be any
doubt that those who took part or had knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are
bound thereby. As to them the law is clear that if they claim to have been in any manner
deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they
may demand their rights or interest within the period of two years, and both the
distributes and estate would be liable to them for such rights or interest. Evidently, they
are the persons in accordance with the provision, may seek to remedy, the prejudice to
their rights within the two-year period. But as to those who did not take part in the
settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent or of the settlement, there is no
direct or express provision is unreasonable and unjust that they also be required to
assert their claims within the period of two years. To extend the effects of the settlement
to them, to those who did not take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any express
legal provision to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right to due process of
law. In the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, cited by the appellants in this case, we held:
It will be noted that while the law (see. 754) provides that the order of distribution may be
had upon the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the
estate, no provision is made for notice, by publication or otherwise, of such application.
The proceeding, therefore, is to all intents and purposes ex parte. As will be seen our law
is very vague and incomplete; and certainly it cannot be held that a purely ex parte
proceeding, had without notice by personal service or by publication, by which the court
undertakes to distribute the property of deceased persons, can be conclusive upon minor
heirs who are not represented therein.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit,
is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended that such
settlement or distribution would affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the
death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no
mention of such effect is made, either directly or by implication. We have examined the
two cases cited by appellants and there is no similarity at all between the circumstances
on which the ruling therein had been predicated and those of the case at bar.
APPLICABILITY OF THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD. the provisions of Section 4 of
Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the
expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only
(1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and, in addition,
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
3
(2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with,
i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the
extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through
guardians. The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because
not all the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement,
the Court of Appeals having found that the decedent left aside from his
widow, nephews and nieces living at the time of his death.
BUT EVEN IF SECTION 4 OF RULE 74 IS A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, IT IS
STILL UNAVAILING TO THE DEFENDANTS. The action is one based on fraud, as
the widow of the deceased owner of the lands had declared in her affidavit of partition
that the deceased left no nephews or niece, or other heirs except herself. Plaintiff's right
which is based on fraud and which has a period of four years (Section 43, par. 3, Act no.
190; Article 1146, Civil Code), does not appear to have lapsed the action was instituted.
Judicial proceedings where instituted in March, 1950 and these proceedings must have
been instituted soon after the discovery of fraud. In any case, the defendants have the
burden of proof as to their claim of the statute of limitations, which is their defense, and
they have not proved that when the action was instituted, four years had already elapsed
from the date that the interested parties had actual knowledge of the fraud.
NOT INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE Benny Sampilo, is a nephew of
Leoncia de Leon and he had been living with the latter. Both Benny Sampilo and the
heirs of the deceased who are claiming the property are residents of San Manuel,
Pangasinan. It is hard, therefore, to believe that Benny Sampilo did not know the
existence of said heirs, and that he was not aware that they were nephews and nieces,
children of the deceased brothers, of the deceased Teodoro Tolete.
2. Llanera vs Lopos
ELIGIO LLANERA vs. ANA LOPOS, ET AL.,
FACTS: Gorgonio Llanera died single and intestate on October 13, 1942. He left an
estate consisting of the proceeds of an insurance policy amounting to $5,150.00. Upon
the request of Remedios Ayque Altavano who claimed to be a relative of the deceased, a
petition for settlement of his estate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Albayon
January 22, 1948, wherein one Elias Ayque was appointed administrator of the estate.
After hearing, the Court found that the deceased died without parents, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces, but left distant relatives. It was later found out however, that he had a
brother named Zacarias (died 1935) who left a son named Eligio (born 1921). On May
28, 1949, the Court ordered the closure and termination of the proceedings.
It developed later the however that the deceased had a brother by the name of Zacarias
who died on June 19,1935 leaving a son, Eligio, who then filed a motion on September
30, 1954 in said proceedings in order to assert his claim over the property as the sole
heir of the deceased, which motion however he later withdrew because he intended to
file a separate civil action for the vindication of his right in the proper court which he did
on February 21, 1955. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that the venue was
improperly laid and plaintiff's cause of action had already prescribed
RTC:
VENUE Considering that Gorgonio Llanera, at the time of his death was a resident of
Daraga, Albay, it follows that the Court of First Instance of that province should have
exclusive jurisdiction to settle his estate. Any question, therefore, as to who are the
persons who should be presented to and decided by the Court of First Instance of
Albay.".
PRESCRIPTION "The claim of the plaintiff, in the opinion of the Court, was filed out of
time. In summary settlement of the estate of a deceased person, any heir deprived of his
lawful participation therein should file the corresponding petition in the court having
jurisdiction of the estate within two years after the settlement and distribution thereof
(sec. 4, Rule 74, Rules of Court).While the Rules of the Court do not prescribed any time
limit during which an heir deprived of his lawful participation in the state of a person
which was settled in a regular testate or intestate proceeding, Article 1100 of the Civil
Code, however, provides that action for rescission on account of "lesion" shall prescribe
after four years from the time the partition was made. Considering that judicial partition of
the estate of Gorgonio Llanera was made on May 17, 1949, hence plaintiff's action was
commenced beyond the prescriptive period provided by law."
HELD:
RTC presuposes that the instant action is for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Gorgonio Llanera. Such is not the case for his estate has already been settled by the
Court of First Instance of Albay so much so that the proceedings were declared closed
and terminated on May 28, 1949.
4 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
THE PRESENT ACTION IS TO RECOVER THE PROPERTY ILLEGALLY
ADJUDICATED TO THE DEFENDANTS ON THE GROUND OF FRAUD and being
an action in personam the same can be filed either at the residence of any of the
defendants or at the residence of the plaintiff, at the election of the latter(sec. 1, Rule 5).
Plaintiff chose to institute the action in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, where he is
a resident, and so it is incorrect to say that the venue of the present case has been
improperly laid.
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT FOR RESCISSION OF A CONTRACT BASED
ON "LESION" BUT AN ACTION TO RECOVER PROPERTY BASED ON FRAUD
which under our law may be filed within a period of four years from the discovery of the
fraud. (sec. 43 par. 3, Act 190). Since, as alleged in the complaint, fraud was discovered
only in 1953 and the action was brought in 1955, it is clear that plaintiff's action has not
yet prescribed. It is therefore an error to dismiss the complaint based on prescription.
3. Villaluz vs Neme
G.R. No. L-14676 January 31, 1963
CANDIDA VILLALUZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
JUAN NEME and FELICISIMA VILLAFRANCA, defendants-appellees.
FACTS: Maria Rocabo died intestate on February 17, 1937, leaving a parcel of land
granted her under Homestead Patent issued on May 20, 1930, covered by an OCT.
- She left three (3) daughters, named Sinforosa, Patricia and Maria Villaluz
and
- Grandchildren from deceased children
Maria, Patricia and Sinforosa, on September 1, 1939, executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition (Exh. 2) among themselves, to the exclusion and without the knowledge and
consent of their nephews and nieces, the herein plaintiffs-appellants, had new titles
issued in their names after having made representations that they were the only heirs of
their mother. It took multiple sale transactions before plaintiffs-appellants came to know
that the land in the administration of their aunts, Sinforosa, Patricia and Maria, was
already in the possession of the defendants. After attempts of amicable settlement had
failed, the plaintiffs on June 3, 1954, filed a complaint for partition of said land and
recovery of their respective shares on the property and accounting of the fruits thereof.
RTC dismissed the complaint, declaring the defendants the owners of the land described
in the complaint and in the T.C.T. No. 269.
ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial partition only affected the partition of Sinforosa, Patricia
and Maria, surnamed Villaluz, on the land in question and not the participation of the
plaintiffs-appellants, as compulsory heirs of Maria Rocabo? YES
HELD: The contention of the plaintiffs-appellants is meritorious. The decision found to be
an incontrovertible fact that the land in question should be divided among the heirs of the
decedent Sinforosa, Patricia and Maria Villaluz and her grandchildren. Thus, the trial
Court said:
... The settlement of the estate of Maria Rocabo was summarily effected by the
extrajudicial partition executed September 1, 1939, by the three surviving children to the
exclusion of the plaintiffs who were entitled to inherit by representation. By virtue of the
extrajudicial partition, Exhibit 1, the Original Certificate of Title No. 217 in the name of
Maria Rocabo was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 269 was issued in lieu
thereof in favor of Sinforosa Villaluz, Patricia Villaluz and Maria Villaluz on September 6,
1939, to the prejudice of the plaintiffs. . . .
Furthermore, Maria having left no testament or last will, her heirs succeeded to the
possession and ownership of the land in question from the time of her death (Art. 440,
Old Civil Code, Art. 533, New Civil Code; Lubrico v. Arbado, 12 Phil. 391). The deed of
extrajudicial partition (Exh. 2), was fraudulent and vicious, the same having been
executed among the 3 sisters, without including their co-heirs, who had no knowledge of
and consent to the same. The partition, therefore, did not and could not prejudice the
interest and participation of the herein plaintiffs-appellants, and the sale of the land to the
defendants did not and could not also prejudice and effect plaintiffs-appellants' interest
and participation thereon. The cancellation of O.C.T. No. 217 and the issuance of T.C.T.
No. 269, did not likewise prejudice the interest and the participation of the plaintiffs-
appellants. The three sisters could not have sold what did not belong to them. Nemo dat
quod non habet.
NO PRESCRIPTION. The trial court held that under Sec. 4, Rule 73 of the
Rules, the plaintiffs' cause of action had already prescribed. This section,
however, refers only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of the
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
deceased by the heirs who make such partition among themselves in good faith,
believing that they are the only heirs with the right succeed . In the case at bar,
however, the surviving sisters could not have ignored that they had co-heirs, the children
of the 3 brothers who predeceased their mother. Considering that Maria Rocabo died
during the regime of the Spanish Civil Code, the distribution of her properties should be
governed by said Code, wherein it is provided that between co-heirs, the act to demand
the partition of the inheritance does not prescribe. (Art 1965 [Old Civ. Code]; Baysa, et al.
v. Baysa, 53 Off. Gaz., 7282). Verily the 3 living sisters were possessing the property as
administratrices or trustees for and in behalf of the other co-heirs, plaintiffs-appellants
herein, who have the right to vindicate their inheritance, regardless of the lapse of time
(Sevilla v. De los Angeles, L-7745; 51 Off. Gaz., 5590, and case cited therein).
Moreover, the acquisition of the land in question is governed by the Public Land Act No.
141 and the Land Registration Law Act No. 496. And considering that the deed of sale
had not been registered in accordance with the said laws, the same did not constitute a
conveyance which would bind or affect the land, because the registration of a voluntary
sale of land is the operative act that transmits or transfers title (Tuason v. Raymundo, 28
Phil.635).
4. Ancog vs CA – what happens to the share of a minor who took
no part in the partition?
[G.R. No. 112260. June 30, 1997]
JOVITA YAP ANCOG, and GREGORIO YAP, JR., vs. CA, ROSARIO DIEZ, and
CARIDAD YAP,
FACTS: Review for the dismissal of an action for partition of a parcel of land which
petitioners had filed.
The land, with improvements thereon, was formerly the conjugal property of the spouses
Gregorio Yap and Rosario Diez. In 1946, Gregorio Yap died, leaving his wife, private
respondent Rosario Diez, and children, petitioners Jovita Yap Ancog and Gregorio Yap,
Jr., and private respondent Caridad Yap as his heirs.
Rosario Diez submitted an extrajudicial settlement covering the disputed land as a
means of facilitating the approval of her loan application. However, petitioner Gregorio
Yap, Jr., then only 15 years old did not sign the same.
Petitioner Ancog informed her younger brother, petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr., who was
living in Davao, of their mothers plan to sell the land. On June 6, 1985, they filed this
action for partition. Petitioners alleged that the extrajudicial instrument was simulated
and therefore void. They claimed that in signing the instrument they did not really intend
to convey their interests in the property to their mother, but only to enable her to obtain a
loan on the security of the land to cover expenses for Caridads school fees and for
household repairs.
RTC found that the action for partition had already prescribed. The registration of the
land under private respondent Rosario Diezs name amounted to a repudiation of the co-
ownership. Therefore, petitioners had ten (10) years from April 13, 1961 within which to
bring an action to recover their share in the property. While it is true that petitioner
Gregorio Yap, Jr. was a minor at the time the extrajudicial settlement was executed, his
claim, according to the court, was barred by laches.
ISSUE: won petitioner gregorio yap, jr., one of the co-owners of the litigated
property, had lost his rights to the property through prescription or laches.
HELD:
EJS UPHELD, BUT PETITIONER GREGORIO YAP, JR. NOT BARRED BY
LACHES FROM RECOVERING HIS SHARE IN THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION;
IMPLIED TRUST CREATED IN HIS FAVOR
In accordance with Rule 74, 1[9] of the Rules of Court, as he did not take part in the
partition, he is not bound by the settlement.[10] It is uncontroverted that, at the time the
extrajudicial settlement was executed, Gregorio Yap, Jr. was a minor. For this reason, he
was not included or even informed of the partition. Instead, the registration of the land in
Rosario Diezs name created an implied trust in his favor by analogy to Art. 1451 of the
Civil Code, which provides: When land passes by succession to any person and he
causes the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is established by implication
of law for the benefit of the true owner.
This Court has ruled that for prescription to run in favor of the trustee, the trust must be
repudiated by unequivocal acts made known to the cestui que trust and proved by clear
and conclusive evidence. Furthermore, the rule that the prescriptive period should be
counted from the date of issuance of the Torrens certificate of title applies only to the
remedy of reconveyance under the Property Registration Decree.[17] Since the action
brought by petitioner Yap to claim his share was brought shortly after he was informed by
Jovita Ancog of their mothers effort to sell the property, Gregorio Yap, Jr.s claim cannot
be considered barred either by prescription or by laches.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
5. Arenas vs Roces – remedy vs purchasers
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 147468. April 9, 2003]
SPOUSES EDUARDO ARENAS DOMINGO & JOSEFINA CHAVEZ DOMINGO,
petitioners, vs. LILIA MONTINOLA ROCES, CESAR ROBERTO M. ROCES, ANA INES
MAGDALENA ROCES TOLENTINO, LUIS MIGUEL M. ROCES, JOSE ANTONIO M.
ROCES and MARIA VIDA PRESENTACION ROCES, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
The spouses Cesar and Lilia Roces were the owners of two contiguous parcels of land.
On 1962 (GSIS), caused the annotation of an affidavit of adverse claim on the titles
alleging that the spouses have mortgaged the same to it. Subsequently, GSIS wrote a
letter to Cesar Roces demanding the surrender of the owners duplicates of titles. Titles
were subsequently issued in the name of GSIS by a court order.
Cesar Roces died intestate on January 26, 1980. He was survived by his widow, Lilia
Roces, and their children respondents in this case. On July 22, 1992, Reynaldo L.
Montinola, a nephew of Lilia Roces, executed an affidavit of self-adjudication over the
Arayat properties. He alleged that the properties were owned by the spouses Cesar and
Lilia Roces, both of whom died intestate, on September 13, 1987 and June 27, 1989,
respectively; that the properties were acquired during the existence of their marriage; that
the spouses left no heirs except the brother of Lilia Roces, who was his father; that
neither of the spouses left any will nor any debts; and that he was the sole heir of the
Roces spouses.[9]
On January 5, 1993, Montinola filed a petition against GSIS praying for the cancellation
of its title. GSIS failed to produce any document evidencing the alleged real estate
mortgage by Roces of the properties. Hence, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
Montinola, the latter sold the property to Sps Domingo, herein petitioners. TCT Nos. 7299
and 7673 contained the following annotation:
Subject to the provision of Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court with respect to the
inheritance left by the deceased SPS. CESAR ROCES & LILIA MONTINOLA.[14]
When respondents learned of the sale of the property to petitioners, they filed a
complaint against Montinola and petitioners with the RTC of Pasig. They argued that the
affidavit of self-adjudication was fraudulent because Montinola was not an heir of the
Roces spouses and it was not true that Lilia Roces was dead. Therefore, the affidavit of
self-adjudication, as well as the deed of absolute sale, TCT No. 7299, and TCT No. 7673,
all covering the subject property, were null and void.[15]
Petitioners alleged that they were buyers in good faith and that their action was barred by
estoppel and laches.
ISSUE: WON THE ANNOTATION IN THE TITLE REGARDING SEC. 4, RULE 74
IS AN ENCUMBRANCE WHICH DISQUALIFIES PETITIONERS FROM BEING
INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE? YES
HELD:
As stated above, the titles, namely, TCT Nos. 7299 and 7673, contained annotations
which made reference to the provisions of Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, viz:
The foregoing rule clearly covers transfers of real property to any person, as long as the
deprived heir or creditor vindicates his rights within two years from the date of the
settlement and distribution of estate.
CONTRARY TO PETITIONERS CONTENTION, THE EFFECTS OF THIS
PROVISION ARE NOT LIMITED TO THE HEIRS OR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTEES
OF THE ESTATE PROPERTIES, BUT SHALL AFFECT ANY TRANSFEREE OF
THE PROPERTIES.
In David v. Malay,[25] it was held that the buyer of real property the title of which contain
an annotation pursuant to Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court cannot be considered
innocent purchasers for value. In the same vein, the annotation at the back of TCT No.
7299 in this case referring to Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court was sufficient
notice to petitioners of the limitation on Montinolas right to dispose of the property. The
presence of an irregularity which excites or arouses suspicion should prompt the vendee
to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
5
thereof.[26] Purchasers of registered land are bound by the annotations found at the
back of the certificate of title.[27]
Hence, petitioners cannot be considered buyers in good faith and cannot now avoid the
consequences brought about by the application of Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court.
NOT BARRED BY ESTOPPEL/LACHES. In the case at bar, only four months elapsed
from the time respondents discovered Montinolas fraudulent acts, sometime in May
1993, to the time they filed their complaint on September 6, 1993. This relatively short
span of time can hardly be called unreasonable, especially considering that respondents
used this period of time to investigate the transfers of the property.[30] Delay is an
indispensable requisite for a finding of estoppel by laches, but to be barred from bringing
suit on grounds of estoppel and laches, the delay must be lengthy and unreasonable.[31]
No unreasonable delay can be attributed to respondents in this case.
Participating Heir; Remedy
 File a partition case in court within the 2 year period under sec.
4
 Nullify EJS on the ground of vitiated consent/mistake
 Reconveyance based on Fraud
Unpaid /Defrauded Creditor
 Go after the Bond
 If insufficient, Settlement Proceeding
Liability under R74 S1, 4
 ARENAS VS ROCES - The effects of this provision are not
limited to the heirs or original distributees of the estate
properties, but shall affect any transferee of the properties
 TAN VS BENOLIRAO - annotation made pursuant to Section
4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court (Rules) on a certificate of title
covering real property considered an encumbrance on the
property
DELFIN TAN, vs ERLINDA C. BENOLIRAO et al
G.R. No. 153820 October 16, 2009
ISSUE: Is an annotation made pursuant to Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court
(Rules) on a certificate of title covering real property considered an encumbrance on the
property? YES.
HELD: While Tan admits that he refused to pay the balance of the purchase price, he
claims that he had valid reason to do so the sudden appearance of an annotation on the
title pursuant to Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules, which Tan considered an encumbrance
on the property.
We find Tans argument meritorious.
The annotation placed on TCT No. 27335, the new title issued to reflect the extrajudicial
partition of Lamberto Benoliraos estate among his heirs, states: x x x any liability to
credirots (sic), excluded heirs and other persons having right to the property, for a period
of two (2) years, with respect only to the share of Erlinda, Andrew, Romano and Dion, all
surnamed Benolirao [Emphasis supplied.]
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 prescribes the procedure to be followed
1. if within two years after an extrajudicial partition or summary distribution is
made,
2. an heir or other person appears to have been deprived of his lawful
participation in the estate, or
3. some outstanding debts which have not been paid are discovered.
a. When the lawful participation of the heir is NOT payable in
money, because, for instance, he is entitled to a part of the real
property that has been partitioned, there can be no other
procedure than to cancel the partition so made and make a new
division, unless, of course, the heir agrees to be paid the value of his
participation with interest.
b. But in case the lawful participation of the heir consists in his
share in personal property of money left by the decedent , or in
case unpaid debts are discovered within the said period of two
years, the procedure is not to cancel the partition, nor to appoint an
6 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
administrator to re-assemble the assets, as was allowed under the old
Code, but the court, after hearing, shall fix the amount of such debts or
lawful participation in proportion to or to the extent of the assets they
have respectively received and, if circumstances require, it may issue
execution against the real estate belonging to the decedent, or both.
The present procedure is more expedient and less expensive in that it
dispenses with the appointment of an administrator and does not
disturb the possession enjoyed by the distributees.[14] [Emphasis
supplied.]
AN ANNOTATION IS PLACED ON NEW CERTIFICATES OF TITLE ISSUED
PURSUANT TO THE DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF A DECEDENTS
REAL PROPERTIES TO WARN THIRD PERSONS ON THE POSSIBLE
INTERESTS OF EXCLUDED HEIRS OR UNPAID CREDITORS IN THESE
PROPERTIES. The annotation, therefore, creates a legal encumbrance or lien on the
real property in favor of the excluded heirs or creditors. Where a buyer purchases the
real property despite the annotation, he must be ready for the possibility that the title
could be subject to the rights of excluded parties. The CANCELLATION OF THE
SALE would be the logical consequence where: (a) the annotation clearly appears on
the title, warning all would-be buyers; (b) the sale unlawfully interferes with the rights of
heirs; and (c) the rightful heirs bring an action to question the transfer within the two-year
period provided by law.
As we held in Vda. de Francisco v. Carreon:[15]
And Section 4, Rule 74 xxx expressly authorizes the court to give to every heir his lawful
participation in the real estate notwithstanding any transfers of such real estate and to
issue execution thereon. All this implies that, when within the amendatory period the
realty has been alienated, the court in re-dividing it among the heirs has the authority to
direct cancellation of such alienation in the same estate proceedings, whenever it
becomes necessary to do so. To require the institution of a separate action for such
annulment would run counter to the letter of the above rule and the spirit of these
summary settlements. [Emphasis supplied.]
Similarly, in Sps. Domingo v. Roces,[16] we said:
The foregoing rule clearly covers transfers of real property to any person, as long as the
deprived heir or creditor vindicates his rights within two years from the date of the
settlement and distribution of estate. Contrary to petitioners contention, the effects of this
provision are not limited to the heirs or original distributees of the estate properties, but
shall affect any transferee of the properties. [Emphasis supplied.]
Indeed, in David v. Malay,[17] although the title of the property had already been
registered in the name of the third party buyers, we cancelled the sale and ordered the
reconveyance of the property to the estate of the deceased for proper disposal among
his rightful heirs.
By the time Tans obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price arose on May 21,
1993 (on account of the extensions granted by the respondents), a new certificate of title
covering the property had already been issued on March 26, 1993, which contained the
encumbrance on the property; the encumbrance would remain so attached until the
expiration of the two-year period. Clearly, at this time, the vendors could no longer
compel Tan to pay the balance of the purchase since considering they themselves could
not fulfill their obligation to transfer a clean title over the property to Tan.
CONTRACT TO SELL IS NOT RESCINDED BUT TERMINATED
the remedy of rescission under Article 1191 cannot apply to mere contracts to sell. We,
therefore, hold that the contract to sell was terminated when the vendors could no longer
legally compel Tan to pay the balance of the purchase price as a result of the legal
encumbrance which attached to the title of the property. Since Tans refusal to pay was
due to the supervening event of a legal encumbrance on the property and not through his
own fault or negligence, we find and so hold that the forfeiture of Tans down payment
was clearly unwarranted.
II. JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Judicial settlement – where proceedings in court is necessary, and includes the
following:
a. Summary settlement of estate of small value – Whenever the gross value of
the estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does
not exceed P10,000.00, the court may proceed summarily, without the
appointment of an executor or administrator (Sec. 2, Rule 74).
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
b. Testate proceedings – When the decedent left a last will and testament
(Rules 75-79).
c. Intestate proceedings – When the decedent died without a will, or died with a
will but was found invalid and thereafter disallowed (Rule 79).
d. Partition – When there is no will and the parties entitled to the estate would
agree on the project of partition (Rule 69).
COMMON CONCEPTS and PRINCIPLES
 Jurisdiction is based on the gross value of the ESTATE
 MTC – GV of the estate 300k below
 RTC – above
 Value is determined by
1. Real Property – FMV at the time of death
2. Personal Property – add them all up to get the jurisdictional
amount
 The value is determined by the allegations of the petitioner, not the
court;
 It is jurisdictional because failure to pay the filing fees deprives the
court of acquiring jurisdiction over the petition
Limited Jurisdiction [see 2014, page 10]
1. Extrinsic validity of a will and testamentary capacity of the testator
2. If there is no will, and there is a petition for letters of administration,
the court can determine if the petitioner is viable to be an administrator
3. As a general rule, questions of ownership cannot be passed upon.
They are limited to the inventory of the estate – what are to be
included and what are to be excluded. Only provisionally.
4. However, an exception to the provisional nature of such ruling as to
ownership in probate proceedings is found in Hernando vs CA where
the court considered the agreement of the parties as binding upon
them. [see also Garcia vs Belen ]
5. Thus, court cannot also determine whether properties are conjugal or
separate property but as an exception to the general rule, it may pass
upon and decide provisionally.
6. The court can touch upon the issue of filiation for the purpose of
determining the shares of the heirs
7. The issue of the validity of contracts is extraneous to the settlement
proceedings because it happened prior to the death of the decedent,
except in Baretto vs Inc.
8.
1. BERNARDO VS CA –
G.R. No. L-18148 February 28, 1963
Settlement court can determine the properties as conjugal or separate by way of
exception.
ISSUE: WON the probate court in Special Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to determine
the validity of the deed of donation in question and to pass upon the question of title or
ownership of the properties mentioned therein.
HELD: In the case now before us, THE MATTER IN CONTROVERSY IS THE
QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP OF CERTAIN OF THE PROPERTIES INVOLVED
— WHETHER THEY BELONG TO THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OR TO THE
HUSBAND EXCLUSIVELY. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the
probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to
determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are
all parties to the proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented because
of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor
himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may
be affected. It is true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-
husband, but the widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is
this right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that
is being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it
complies with the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners
and the widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator.
Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the probate court, for the purpose of the determination of the question of
ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borne by the admitted facts. On the
contrary, it is undisputed that they were the ones who presented the project of partition
claiming the questioned properties as part of the testator's asset. The respondents, as
representatives or substitutes of the deceased widow opposed the project of partition and
submitted another. As the Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of them must be deemed

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
to have submitted the issue for resolution in the same proceeding. Certainly, the
petitioners can not be heard to insist, as they do, on the approval of their project of
partition and, thus, have the court take it for granted that their theory as to the character
of the properties is correct, entirely without regard to the opposition of the respondents".
In other words, by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed lands
(upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband), petitioners
themselves put in issue the question of ownership of the properties — which is well
within the competence of the probate court — and just because of an opposition thereto,
they can not thereafter withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction
of the court. Certainly, there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the objection
are the ones who set the court in motion.5 They can not be permitted to complain if the
court, after due hearing, adjudges question against them.6
2. LEDESMA VS INTESTATE ESTAE OF PEDROSA
– declaration of nullity and the issue of the character of property is already been
laid.
G.R. No. 102126 March 12, 1993
FACTS: This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing an order dated
24 January 1991 issued by herein respondent presiding judge-designate Bethel
Katalbas-Moscardon of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 51 which
considered the supplemental action for partition (after annulment of the marriage) as
terminated due to the death of one of the spouses (husband) and the pendency of
intestate proceedings over his estate.
Petitioner Angelica Ledesma's marriage to Cipriano Pedrosa was declared a
nullity by the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 51 on 8 February 1984
in Civil Case No. 1446.1 The dispositive portion of the order annulling the marriage also
provided thus:
. . . that the properties acquired by plaintiff Cipriano Pedrosa and defendant
Angelica Ledesma at the time they were living together as common-law
husband and wife is (sic) owned by them as co-owners to be governed by
the provisions on co-ownership of the civil code; that the properties acquired
by plaintiff and defendant after their marriage was solemnized on March 25,
1965, which was annulled by this Court in the above-entitled proceeding,
forms (sic) part of the conjugal partnership and upon dissolution of the
marriage, to be liquidated in accordance with the provision of the civil code.2
Surprisingly it took some time before the next order implementing the above disposition
was issued on 4 May 1989, the pertinent part of which reads:
. . . . It appearing from the records that the court has to verify and determine
the correct inventory of the properties of Cipriano Pedrosa and Angelica
Ledesma, the parties, including the receiver, through their respective
attorneys, are ordered to submit their respective inventory, if one has not
been submitted yet, before June 1, 1989. . . . .3
Pending receipt by the court of the ordered inventory, Cipriano Pedrosa died. A separate
petition for the probate of his last will and testament was filed.4 Nelson Jimena was
named executor and substituted Pedrosa in the partition proceedings (Civil Case No.
1446).
Due to disagreement of the parties on the characterization of the properties, the court in
the partition proceedings ordered (30 March 1990) the submission of comments,
objections and manifestations on the project of partition submitted by the parties. During
a lull in the proceedings, the presiding judge also passed away. On 24 January 1991 the
following now-questioned order was issued by the herein respondent presiding-judge
designate who took over:
It is informed by Atty. Pio Villoso that insofar as the status of this case is concerned, the
plaintiff who has long been dead, was substituted by the administrator, now the plaintiff
Nelson Jimena, and Atty. Vicente Sabornay, as the receiver. Furthermore, the judgment
as to the annulment of the marriage had already been rendered partially by then
Presiding Judge Quirino Abad Santos, Jr., on February 8, 1984. What is being litigated
here by the parties affects the property division to dissolve the partnership. However, the
plaintiff died and an intestate proceeding is now pending before Branch 43 whereby the
said Nelson Jimena was actually the appointed administrator, and who was substituted
as plaintiff in this case.
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
7
With all these informations, and considering the nature of the action, the Court finds the
substitution of the original plaintiff improper, as the defendant herein can pursue her
claim over the properties before the intestate proceedings being instituted. Action for
intervention in order that the judgment in this particular proceeding can be implemented,
can be raised in the intestate Court. Likewise, the appointment of the receiver conflicts
with that of the judicial administrator considering that with the filing of the intestate case,
the properties of the deceased plaintiff are in custodia legis and this Court losses
jurisdiction in determining further the distribution of the properties.
In view of the above, without prejudice to the defendant's right to file as intervenor in the
intestate proceedings with the judgment annulling the marriage, the proceedings
becomes moot and academic with the pendency of the intestate proceeding before
Branch 43. This case is therefore deemed TERMINATED.5
With the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration by the respondent court, this
special civil action was initiated.
Petitioner argues that respondent judge reneged in the performance of a lawful duty
when she refrained from rendering a decision in the partition case (Civil Case No. 1446)
and considered the same closed and terminated, due to the pendency of intestate
proceedings over the deceased husband's estate (Sp. Proc. No. 4159).6 It is likewise
erroneous, petitioner contends, to rule that petitioner's remedy is a motion for
intervention in said intestate proceedings to implement judgment in the marriage-
annulment case, since petitioner has already presented all her evidence in the annulment
case to prove which properties acquired during the marriage pertain to her.
The case of Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals,7 where a similar issue was involved —
the husband having died after the legal separation of the spouses had been finally
decreed but before the actual liquidation of their community of properties — is on point.
The Court therein said:
WE do not find merit in petitioner's submission that the questioned decision had not
become final and executory since the law explicitly and clearly provides for the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute community
of property as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation. Article 106 of the
Civil Code thus reads:
Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the
marriage bonds shall not be severed;
2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of
property shall be dissolved and liquidated, but the offending spouse shall have no right to
any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, without prejudice to the
provisions of Article 176;
xxx xxx xxx
The aforequoted provision mandates the dissolution and liquidation of the property
regime of the spouses upon finality of the decree of legal separation. Such dissolution
and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. This legal effect of the
decree of legal separation ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of,
the judgment decreeing legal separation for the purpose of determining the share of each
spouse in the conjugal assets.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the decision of the trial court dated January 4, 1973 decreeing the legal separation
between then spouses Antonio Macadangdang and Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang
had long become final and executory and the division of the conjugal property in a
"supplemental decision" is a mere incident of the decree of legal separation.
Since We have ruled on the finality of the judgment decreeing the spouses' legal
separation as of January 4, 1973, the remaining issue for Our resolution is the final
disposition of their conjugal partnership of gains which partnership, by reason of the final
decree, had been automatically dissolved. The law (Article 106, 107 of the Civil Code)
clearly spells out the effects of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal property.
The death on November 30, 1979 of herein petitioner who was declared the
guilty spouse by the trial court, before the liquidation of the conjugal property is
effected, poses a new problem which can be resolved simply by the application
8 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
of the rules on intestate succession with respect to the properties of the
deceased petitioner.
Thus, the rules on dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains under
the aforecited provisions of the Civil Code would be applied effective January 4, 1973
when the decree of legal separation became final. Upon the liquidation and distribution
conformably with the law governing the effects of the final decree of legal separation, the
law on intestate succession should take over in the disposition of whatever remaining
properties heave been allocated to petitioner. This procedure involves details which
properly pertain to the lower court.
The properties that may be allocated to the deceased petitioner by virtue of the
liquidation of the conjugal assets, shall be distributed in accordance with the laws of
intestate succession in Special Proceedings No. 134.
The Macadangdang decision involved legal separation but, with equal reason, the
doctrine enunciated therein should be applied to a marriage annulment which is the
situation at bar. The respondent presiding judge is directed to decide the partition
(liquidation) case (Civil Case No. 1446) within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of
this decision to determine which of the properties of the conjugal partnership should be
adjudicated to the husband and the wife. This is but a consequence or incident of its
decision rendered in the same case annulling the marriage. Petitioner's letters to the
Court indicate that she is seventy (70) years of age and the prolonged action for partition
(liquidation) has taken a toll on her resources. Justice and equity demand the disposition
of her case with dispatch. Any properties that may be adjudicated to the deceased
husband Pedrosa can then be distributed in accordance with his last will and testament
in the special proceedings involving his estate (Sp. Proc. No. 4159).
ACCORDINGLY, the respondent Judge's order dated 24 January 1991 considering Civil
Case No. 1446 closed and terminated for being moot and academic is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge or whoever may have succeeded her is ordered to
decide said action for partition (liquidation) within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
decision.
SO ORDERED.
3. PEREIRA VS CA –
no need for appointment of an administratrix as their claims may be properly ventilated in
simple partition proceedings
G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989
Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies
intestate without leaving any debts? May the probate court appoint the surviving
sister of the deceased as the administratrix of the estate of the deceased
instead of the surviving spouse? These are the main questions which need to be
resolved in this case.
Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away on
January 3, 1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was survived by his legitimate
spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita
Pereira Nagac, the herein private respondent.
On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the Regional Trial
Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance of
letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de
Guzman Pereira. 1 In her verified petition, private respondent alleged the following: that
she and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the
deceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left
several properties, namely: death benefits from the Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL
Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
(PESALA) and the Social Security System (SSS), as well as savings deposits with the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at Barangay Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and
finally, that the spouse of the deceased (herein petitioner) had been working in London
as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the
deceased.
On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of
private respondent 2 alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of
administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of
administration relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, appointed private
respondent Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate of Andres de
Guzman Pereira upon a bond posted by her in the amount of Pl,000.00. The trial court
ordered her to take custody of all the real and personal properties of the deceased and to
file an inventory thereof within three months after receipt of the order. 3
Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner brought the case to the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the appointment of private respondent as
administratrix in its decision dated December 15, 1987. 4
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not there exists an estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman
Pereira for purposes of administration; (2) Whether or not a judicial administration
proceeding is necessary where there are no debts left by the decedent; and, (3) Who has
the better right to be appointed as administratrix of the estate of the deceased, the
surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira or the surviving sister Rita Pereira Nagac?
HELD: Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no estate of the
deceased for purposes of administration for the following reasons: firstly, the death
benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and the SSS belong exclusively to her, being the
sole beneficiary and in support of this claim she submitted letter-replies from these
institutions showing that she is the exclusive beneficiary of said death benefits; secondly,
the savings deposits in the name of her deceased husband with the PNB and the PCIB
had been used to defray the funeral expenses as supported by several receipts; and,
finally, the only real property of the deceased has been extrajudicially settled between the
petitioner and the private respondent as the only surviving heirs of the deceased.
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for petitioner to decide what
properties form part of the estate of the deceased and to appropriate them for herself.
She points out that this function is vested in the court in charge of the intestate
proceedings.
Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not belong to the
estate of the deceased on the basis of her bare allegations as aforestated and a handful
of documents. Inasmuch as this Court is not a trier of facts, We cannot order an
unqualified and final exclusion or non-exclusion of the property involved from the estate
of the deceased. 5
The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the
administration proceedings are pending. The trial court is in the best position to receive
evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of the decedent's
estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if
any. 6 The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in
the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly
within the competence of the probate court. However, the court's determination is only
provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action which may be instituted by the parties.7
Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira
for purposes of administration, We nonetheless find the administration proceedings
instituted by private respondent to be unnecessary as contended by petitioner for the
reasons herein below discussed.
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator,
in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case
he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein. 8 An exception to this rule is
established in Section 1 of Rule 74. 9 Under this exception, when all the heirs are of
lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to
partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the
appointment of an administrator.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs
from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations,
if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While
Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or
to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do
so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. 10 It should be noted
that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is
sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition.
Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened
with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. 11
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending
obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the
property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such
case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous
and unnecessary proceedings . 12
Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of a
deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on
the circumstances of each case.
In one case, 13 We said:
Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to the
bulk of the hereditary estate but only in the manner of partition does section 1, Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court apply and that in this case the parties are at loggerheads as to the
corpus of the hereditary estate because respondents succeeded in sequestering some
assets of the intestate. The argument is unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge
has indicated, questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to
the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where such
property is in the hands of one heir.
In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as administrator
is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to
ask for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective could be
achieved in an action for partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of
administration. 14 In still another case, We did not find so powerful a reason the
argument that the appointment of the husband, a usufructuary forced heir of his
deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary in order for him to have legal
capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased mother, since he
may just adduce proof of his being a forced heir in the intestate proceedings of the
latter.15
We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are only two
surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a sister, both of age. The parties admit that
there are no debts of the deceased to be paid. What is at once apparent is that these two
heirs are not in good terms. The only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks
appointment as administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of
the deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are presently in the hands of
petitioner who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this
is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of
the deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not
appear to be substantial especially since the only real property left has been
extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful purpose would only
unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered. In most instances of a
similar nature, 16 the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may
be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors, should there
be any, are protected in any event.
We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration proceedings are
pending was not justified in issuing letters of administration, there being no good reason
for burdening the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs and
expenses of an administration proceeding.
With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the issue of who, as
between the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira and the sister Rita Pereira Nagac,
should be preferred to be appointed as administratrix.
WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor
to Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the administration proceeding dismissed
without prejudice to the right of private respondent to commence a new action for
partition of the property left by Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
4. JIMENEZ VS IAC -
A probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally
G.R. No. 75773 April 17, 1990
FACTS: The marriage of Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson produced
four (4) children, namely: Alberto, Leonardo, Sr., Alejandra and Angeles. During the
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
9
existence of the marriage, Lino Jimenez acquired five (5) parcels of land in Salomague,
Bugallon, Pangasinan.
After the death of Consolacion Ungson, Lino married Genoveva Caolboy with whom he
begot the seven petitioners herein: Tomas, Visitacion, Digno, Antonio, Amadeo, Modesto
and Virginia, all surnamed Jimenez. Lino Jimenez died on August 11, 1951 while
Genoveva Caolboy died on November 21, 1978.
Thereafter, in April 1979, Virginia Jimenez filed a petition before the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 5346, praying
to be appointed as administratrix of the properties of the deceased spouses Lino and
Genoveva. Enumerated in her petition were the supposed heirs of the deceased spouses
which included herein co-petitioners and the four children of Lino Jimenez by
Consolacion Ungson, his previous wife.2
In October, 1979, herein private respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr., son of Leonardo
Jimenez, Sr., filed a motion for the exclusion of his father's name and those of Alberto,
Alejandra, and Angeles from the petition, inasmuch as they are children of the union of
Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson and not of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy
and because they have already received their inheritance consisting of five (5) parcels of
lands in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan.3
On March 23, 1981, petitioner Virginia Jimenez was appointed administrator of the
Intestate Estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy.4 On May 21, 1981, she filed an
inventory of the estate of the spouses Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy wherein she
included the five (5) parcels of land in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan. As a
consequence, Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. moved for the exclusion of these properties from
the inventory on the ground that these had already been adjudicated to Leonardo Sr.,
Alberto, Alejandra and Angeles by their deceased father Lino Jimenez. Private
respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. presented testimonial and documentary evidence in
support of his motion while petitioner Virginia Jimenez, other than cross-examining the
witnesses of Leonardo, presented no evidence of her own, oral or documentary.
PROBATE COURT ordered the exclusion of the five (5) parcels of land from the
inventory on the basis of the evidence of private respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. which
consisted among others of: (1) Tax Declaration showing that the subject properties were
acquired during the conjugal partnership of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson; and,
(2) a Deed of Sale dated May 12, 1964 wherein Genoveva Caolboy stated, that the
subject properties had been adjudicated by Lino Jimenez to his children by a previous
marriage, namely: Alberto, Leonardo, Alejandra and Angeles.5 The motion for
reconsideration of said order was denied on January 26, 1982.6
Petitioner Virginia Jimenez then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari
and prohibition, docketed thereat as CA-G.R. No. SP-13916, seeking the annulment of
the order dated September 29, 1981 as well as the order of January 26, 1982. On
November 18, 1982, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because (1) Genoveva
Caolboy, petitioners' mother, had admitted that the subject parcels of land had been
adjudicated to the children of the previous nuptial; (2) the subject properties could not
have been acquired during the marriage of Lino Jimenez to Genoveva Caolboy because
they were already titled in the name of Lino Jimenez even prior to 1921, long before
Lino's marriage to Genoveva in 1940; (3) the claim of Virginia Jimenez was barred by
prescription because it was only in 1981 when they questioned the adjudication of the
subject properties, more than ten (10) years after Genoveva had admitted such
adjudication in a public document in 1964; and, (4) petitioner Virginia Jimenez was guilty
of laches. This decision became final and executory.7
Two (2) years after, petitioners filed an amended complaint dated December 10, 1984
before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII, docketed thereat as Civil
Case No. 16111, to recover possession/ownership of the subject five (5) parcels of land
as part of the estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy and to order private
respondents to render an accounting of the produce therefrom. Private respondents
moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the action was barred by
prior judgment in CA-G.R. No. SP-13916 dated November 18, 1982 and by prescription
and laches.
However, petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending that (1) the action was
not barred by prior judgment because the probate court had no jurisdiction to determine
with finality the question of ownership of the lots which must be ventilated in a separate
action; and, (2) the action instituted in 1981 was not barred by prescription or laches
because private respondents' forcible acquisition of the subject properties occurred only
after the death of petitioners' mother, Genoveva Caolboy in 1978.
10 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
ISSUE: whether in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate) the lower court has
jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership and whether res judicata exists as to bar
petitioners' present action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the five (5)
parcels of land. In the negative, is the present action for reconveyance barred by
prescription and/or laches?
HELD: Petitioners' present action for recovery of possession and ownership is
appropriately filed because as a general rule, a probate court can only pass upon
questions of title provisionally. Since the probate, court's findings are not conclusive
being prima facie, 10 a separate proceeding is necessary to establish the ownership of
the five (5) parcels of land. 11
The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that
questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of
the property, can only be settled in a separate action. 12
All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered
by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties
and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. 13
It has also been held that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of
ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality.
18 This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as
in the case at bar.
RES JUDICATA 19 DOES NOT EXIST BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCE IN THE
CAUSES OF ACTIONS. Specifically in S.P. No. 5346, the action was for the settlement
of the intestate estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy while Civil Case No.
16111 was an action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the five (5) parcels
of land. Moreover, while admittedly, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V
in S.P. No. 5346 had jurisdiction, the same was merely limited jurisdiction. Any
pronouncement by said court as to title is not conclusive and could still be attacked in a
separate proceeding. Civil Case No. 16111, on the other hand. was lodged before the
Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII in the exercise of the court's general
jurisdiction. It was, in fact, such "separate or ordinary proceedings" contemplated by the
rules for a final determination of the issue of ownership of the disputed properties. To
repeat, since the determination of the question of title to the subject properties in S.P.
5346 was merely provisional, petitioners are not barred from instituting the appropriate
action in Civil Case No. 16111.
Indeed, the grounds relied upon by private respondents in their motion to dismiss do not
appear to be indubitable.1âwphi1 Res judicata has been shown here to be unavailable
and the other grounds of prescription and laches pleaded by private respondents are
seriously disputed. The allegation in the complaint is that the heirs of Leonardo Jimenez,
Sr. (referring to private respondents,) forcibly intruded into and took possession of the
disputed properties only in 1978, after the death of Genoveva Caolboy. Since the action
for reconveyance was instituted in 1984, it would appear that the same has not yet
prescribed or otherwise barred by laches.
There are a number of factual issues raised by petitioners before the lower court which
cannot be resolved without the presentation of evidence at a full-blown trial and which
make the grounds for dismissal dubitable. Among others, the alleged admission made by
petitioners' mother in the deed of sale is vehemently denied, as well as the fact itself of
adjudication, there being no showing that the conjugal partnership of Lino Jimenez and
Consolacion Ungson had been liquidated nor that a judicial or extra-judicial settlement of
the estate of Lino Jimenez was undertaken whereby such adjudication could have been
effected.
The grounds stated in the motion to dismiss not being indubitable, the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 16111.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby
REVERSED. Civil Case No. 16111 is reinstated and the Regional Trial Court of
Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII is directed to proceed in said case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
5. VALERO VS CA
G.R. No. L-39532 July 20, 1979
This is supposedly a case about collation.
FACTS: the spouses, Beatriz Bautista and Jose M. Valero, did not beget any child
during their marriage In 1951 Beatriz adopted Carmen (Carmencita) Bautista. Jose
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
wanted also to adopt her but because, by his first marriage, he had two children named
Flora Valero Vda. de Rodriguez and Rosie Valero Gutierrez. he was disqualified to adopt
Carmen. Jose manifested in the adoption proceeding that he consented to the use by
Carmen of his surname Valero. (See Civil Case No. 12475, Manila CFI; Art. 338[1], Civil
Code and art. 28, Child and Youth Welfare Code.)
On September 18, 1964, Jose M. Valero donated to Carmen B. Valero (who was already
married to Doctor Sergio Rustia) his one-half proindiviso share (apparently his inchoate
share) in two conjugal lots, with the improvements thereon, located at San Lorenzo
Village, Makati, Rizal, with an area of 1,500 square meters. His wife, Beatriz, consented
to the donation. However, the deed of donation was not registered.
On January 13, 1966, Jose M. Valero, who was then seventy-three years old, executed
his last will and testament wherein he enumerated the conjugal properties of himself and
his wife, including the two San Lorenzo Village lots. In that will, he did not mention the
donation. He devised to his wife properties sufficient to constitute her legitime and
bequeathed the remainder to his two children, Mrs. Rodriguez and Mrs. Gutierrez.
About a month later, or on February 15, 1966, the Valero spouses, by means of a deed of
absolute sale, conveyed the San Lorenzo Village lots and the improvements thereon to
Carmen B. Valero-Rustia for the sum of one hundred twenty thousand pesos. The sale
was registered on the following day. Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 163270 and
163271 were issued to the vendee, Mrs. Rustia.
On December 4, 1967 she mortgaged the two lots to the Quezon City Development Bank
as security for a loan of fifty thousand pesos (page 204, Rollo).
Beatriz B. Valero died intestate on September 12, 1972, survived by her husband and
her adopted child. Her estate is pending settlement in Special Proceeding No. 88896 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila. Mrs. Rustia was named administratrix of her
adopted mother's estate.
More than a month later, or on October 18, 1972, Jose M. Valero died testate, survived
by his two children, Mrs. Rodriguez and Mrs. Gutierrez. His will was duly probated in
Special Proceeding No. 88677, also of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Lawyer
Celso F. Unson, the executor, submitted an inventory wherein, following the list of
conjugal assets in the testator's will, the two San Lorenzo Village lots were included as
part of the testate estate.
That inclusion provoked Mrs. Rustia, the adopted child of Mrs. Valero, and Mrs.
Rodriguez and Mrs. Gutierrez, the legitimate children of the testator, Jose M. Valero, to
file (through Mrs. Rustia's lawyer) in the testate proceeding a motion for the exclusion of
the two San Lorenzo Village lots from the testator's inventoried estate.
Adduced as reason for the exclusion is the fact that since February 16, 1966 Mrs. Rustia
has been the registered owner of the lots as shown by two Torrens titles, copies of which
were attached to the motion.
The executor opposed the motion on the ground that the two lots were donated to Mrs.
Rustia and the donation would allegedly involve collation and the donee's title to the lots.
The executor revealed that he was informed by Mrs. Gutierrez and Mrs. Rodriguez
(supposed movants) that the two lots should be included in the inventory. Thus, the issue
of collation was prematurely raised.
The probate court in its order of August 9, 1973 excluded the two lots from the inventory
of the testator's estate but with the understanding "that the same are subject to collation".
On December 4, 1973 or one hundred twelve days after Mrs. Rustia was served with a
copy of that order, she filed a motion for its reconsideration. She insisted that she is the
owner of the two San Lorenzo Village lots as indicated in the Torrens titles. No one
opposed that motion. At the hearing of that motion, Mrs. Rustia's lawyer apprised the
court that the executor informed him over the phone that he was not opposing the
motion.
The probate court in its order of December 14, 1973 ruled that the two lots were
unconditionally excluded from the inventory of Jose M. Valero's estate, meaning "that
they are not subject to collation". That order is the bone of contention in this case.
Mrs. Rodriguez (without being joined by her sister, Mrs. Gutierrez) filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the order of December 14, 1973. She alleged that the two San
Lorenzo Village lots were really conveyed to Mrs. Rustia by way of donation because the
consideration for the sale was allegedly only one-fifth of the true value of the lots. Mrs.
Rodriguez further contended that the order of August 9, 1973 was final in character.
In reply, Mrs. Rustia countered that the prior order was interlocutory and that in 1966 the
true value of the two lots was around P120,000 and that their value increased
considerably in 1973 or 1974. Moreover, the relatively low price of the sale could be
attributed to the fact that Mrs. Rustia and her husband lived with the Valeros and were
taking care of them.
The probate court denied the motion for reconsideration. Mrs. Rodriguez and Mrs.
Gutierrez, in their petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, assailed the probate
court's order declaring that the two lots were not subject to collation.
The Court of Appeals held that the order of exclusion dated August 9, 1973 was
interlocutory and that it could be changed or Modified at anytime during the course of the
administration proceedings.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
It further held that it was immaterial whether the two lots were donated or sold to Mrs.
Rustia as "a mere subterfuge to avoid payment of the donor's and donee's taxes".
According to the Appellate Court, it was immaterial because under article 1061 of the
Civil Code, only compulsory heirs are required to make collation for the determination of
their legitimes and, under section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, only heirs are involved
in questions as to advancement and Mrs. Rustia is not an heir of the testator, Jose M.
Valero (Vda. de Rodriguez vs. Valero Rustia, CA-G. R. No. SP- 02944, August 28, 1974,
per G. S. Santos, Gaviola, Jr. and De Castro, JJ.).
From that decision, an appeal was made to this Court. The appeal was not given due
course. However, upon motion for reconsideration and over Mrs. Rustia's opposition, the
appeal was later allowed.
The appellants' only assignment of error is that the Court of Appeals should have held
that the probate court's order of exclusion dated August 9, 1973 was not interlocutory but
was a final and appealable order valid that the order of December 14, 1973 modifying the
order of August 3 is void.
HELD: We hold that the order of exclusion dated August 9, 1973 was not a final order. It
was interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the San
Lorenzo Village lots. The probate court in the exclusion incident could not determine the
question of title.
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the
title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in
a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties
We hold further that the dictum of the Court of Appeals and the probate court that the two
disputed lots are not subject to collation was a supererogation and was not necessary to
the disposition of the case which merely involved the issue of inclusion in, or exclusion
from, the inventory of the testator's estate. The issue of collation was not yet justifiable at
that early stage of the testate proceeding. It is not necessary to mention in the order of
exclusion the controversial matter of collation.
Whether collation may exist with respect to the two lots and whether Mrs. Rustia's
Torrens titles thereto are indefeasible are matters that may be raised later or may not be
raised at all. How those issues should be resolved, if and when they are raised, need not
be touched upon in the adjudication of this appeal.
The intestate and testate proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the deceased
Valero spouses were consolidated, as ordered by the lower court on November 21, 1974,
so that the conjugal estate of the deceased spouses may be properly liquidated, as
contemplated in section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court and Act No. 3176 (Pages 223
and 235-6, Rollo).
We have examined the expedientes of the two cases. We found that the proceedings
have not yet reached the stage when the question of collation or advancement to an heir
may be raised and decided. The numerous debts of the decedents are still being paid.
The net remainder (remanente liquido) of their conjugal estate has not yet been
determined. On the other hand, up to this time, no separate action has been brought by
the appellants to nullify Mrs. Rustia's Torrens titles to the disputed lots or to show that the
sale was in reality a donation.
In this appeal, it is not proper to pass upon the question of collation and to decide
whether Mrs. Rustia's titles to the disputed lots are questionable. The proceedings below
have not reached the stage of partition and distribution when the legitimes of the
compulsory heirs have to be determined.
WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and the orders of the,
lower court dated August 9 and December 14, 1973, excluding from the inventory of Jose
M. Valeros estate the two San Lorenzo Village lots now registered in the name of
Carmen B. Valero-Rustia, but we delete from that decision and the two orders any ruling
regarding collation which is a matter that may be passed upon by the probate court at the
time when it is seasonably raised by the interested parties, if it is ever raised at all. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
6. PIO BARRETTO VS CA – contract executed with the administrator with the
imprimatur of the probate court may be rescinded and the probate court may pass
upon the contract entered into by administrator and a 3rd person
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated 30 June 1997 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33982, "Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation v.
Hon. Perfecto A. Laguio, et al.," which dismissed the special civil action for certiorari filed
by petitioner, as well as its Resolution dated 14 January 1998 denying reconsideration.
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
11
On 2 October 1984 respondent Honor P. Moslares instituted an action for annulment of
sale with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against the Testate Estate of
Nicolai Drepin represented by its Judicial Administrator Atty. Tomas Trinidad and
petitioner Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation. Moslares alleged that the Deed
of Sale over four (4) parcels of land of the Drepin Estate executed in favor of the Barretto
Realty was null and void on the ground that the same parcels of land had already been
sold to him by the deceased Nicolai Drepin. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
84-27008 and raffled to respondent Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr., RTC-Br. 18, Manila.
On 2 May 1986 the parties, to settle the case, executed a Compromise Agreement
pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder -
1. The Parties agree to sell the Estate, subject matter of the instant case, which is
composed of the following real estate properties, to wit:
a. Three (3) titled properties covered by TCT Nos. 50539, 50540 and 50541[1] of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, with a total area of 80 hectares, more or less,
and
b. Untitled Property, subject matter of (a) Land Registration Case No. 1602 of the
Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila, with an area of 81 hectares, more or less,
subject to the following situations and conditions, to wit:
a. If plaintiff Honor P. Moslares x x x buys the property, he is under obligation, as follows:
1. To reimburse and pay Defendant Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation,
represented by Anthony Que, its capital investment of Three Million Pesos
(P3,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, and
2. To pay the Estate of Nicolai Drepin, represented by the Judicial Administrator, Atty.
Tomas Trinidad, the sum of One Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand (P1,350,000.00)
Pesos, Philippine Currency
b. If defendant Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation, represented by Mr.
Anthony Que x x x continue[s] to buy the property, it shall pay for the interests of plaintiff
Honor P. Moslares:
1. The sum of One Million (P1,000.000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency to plaintiff Honor
P. Moslares personally and
2. Pay to the Estate of Nicolai Drepin, through the Judicial Administrator, Atty. Tomas
Trinidad, the balance of the agreed purchase price subject to negotiation and verification
of payments already made.
2. In the event that plaintiff Honor P. Moslares buys the Estate and pays in full the
amount of Three Million (P3,000,000.00) Philippine Currency to defendant Pio Barretto
Realty Development Corporation, and the full sum of One Million Three Hundred Fifty
Thousand (P1,350,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, to the Estate of Nicolai Drepin,
through Atty. Tomas Trinidad, defendant Pio Barretto shall execute the corresponding
Deed of Conveyance in favor of plaintiff Honor P. Moslares and deliver to him all the titles
and pertinent papers to the Estate.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto hereby sign this Compromise Agreement at
Manila, Philippines, this 2nd day of May 1986 x x x x x x x x x x x x
On 24 July 1986 the trial court rendered a decision approving the Compromise
Agreement.[2] However, subsequent disagreements arose on the question of who bought
the properties first.
It must be noted that the Compromise Agreement merely gave Moslares and Barretto
Realty options to buy the disputed lots thus implicitly recognizing that the one who paid
first had priority in right. Moslares claimed that he bought the lots first on 15 January
1990 by delivering to Atty. Tomas Trinidad two (2) PBCom checks, one (1) in favor of
Barretto Realty for P3 million, and the other, in favor of the Drepin Estate for P1.35
million.
But petitioner Barretto Realty denied receiving the check. Instead, it claimed that it
bought the properties on 7 March 1990 by tendering a Traders Royal Bank Manager's
Check for P1million to Moslares, and a Far East Bank and Trust Company Cashier's
Check for P1 million and a Traders Royal Bank Manager's Check for P350,000.00 to Atty.
12 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
Tomas Trinidad as Judicial Administrator of the Estate. However, Moslares and Atty.
Trinidad refused to accept the checks.
Consequently, Barretto Realty filed a motion before the trial court alleging that it complied
with its monetary obligations under the Compromise Agreement but that its offers of
payment were refused, and prayed that a writ of execution be issued to compel Moslares
and Atty. Trinidad to comply with the Compromise Agreement and that the latter be
directed to turn over the owner's duplicate certificates of title over the lots.
On 10 May 1990[3] Judge Laguio, Jr. ordered that "a writ of execution be issued for the
enforcement of the decision of this Court for the parties to deposit with this Court, thru
the City Treasurer's Office of Manila, their respective monetary obligations under the
compromise agreement that had been executed by them x x x x"
Reacting to the order, Atty. Trinidad for the Estate filed an urgent motion to hold the
execution in abeyance on the ground that there was another case involving the issue of
ownership over subject lots pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City.
Moslares in turn filed a motion for reconsideration while Barretto Realty moved to amend
the order since the lower court did not exactly grant what it prayed for.
On 14 June 1990, ruling on the three (3) motions, Judge Laguio, Jr., issued his Order -
Considering Defendant Judicial Administrator's urgent motion to hold in abeyance x x x
the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, and the Defendant Pio Barretto Realty
Development, Inc.'s opposition to both motions x x x this Court finds the two motions
without merit and are accordingly, denied.
As regards Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc.'s ex-parte motion to amend order x x x
the same is hereby granted and the deputy sheriff of this Court is allowed to deliver to the
parties concerned thru their counsels the bank certified checks mentioned in par. 2 of the
motion (underscoring ours).[4]
On 20 June 1990 Deputy Sheriff Apolonio L. Golfo of the RTC-Br. 18, Manila,
implemented the order by personally delivering the checks issued by Barretto Realty in
favor of Moslares and the Estate to Atty. Pedro S. Ravelo, counsel for Moslares, and to
Atty. Tomas Trinidad, respectively, as recorded in a Sheriff's Return dated 25 June 1990.
[5]
However, on 17 September 1993, or more than three (3) years later, Moslares filed a
Motion for Execution alleging that he bought the lots subject of the Compromise
Agreement on 15 January 1990 and that he paid the amounts specified as payment
therefor. He asked that Barretto Realty be directed to execute a deed of conveyance over
subject lots in his favor. In a Supplement to his motion Moslares contended that the
previous tender of the checks by Barretto Realty did not produce the effect of payment
because checks, according to jurisprudence, were not legal tender.
Respondent Judge granted Moslares' Motion for Execution. Consequently, on 8
November 1993 Barretto Realty was ordered to execute a deed of conveyance over the
subject lots in favor of Moslares.
Aggrieved, Barretto Realty moved for reconsideration alleging that respondent Judge
could no longer grant Moslares' motion since the prior sale of subject lots in its favor had
already been recognized when the court sheriff was directed to deliver, and did in fact
deliver, the checks it issued in payment therefor to Moslares and Atty. Trinidad.
On 7 December 1993 respondent Judge granted the motion of Barretto Realty for
reconsideration and ruled -
Considering the motion for reconsideration and to quash writ of execution filed by
defendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation, Inc., dated 16 November 1993, together with
the plaintiff's comment and/or opposition thereto, dated 18 November 1993, and the
movant's reply to the opposition etc., dated 20 November 1993, this Court finds the
motion well taken. The record shows that on 10 May 1990, a writ of execution was issued
by this Court for the parties to deposit with the Court, thru the City Treasurer's Office of
Manila, their respective monetary obligations under the compromise agreement that they
had executed, and that it was only defendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation Inc. that
had complied therewith, per the return of this Court's deputy sheriff, Apolonio L. Golfo,
dated June 25, 1990. Such being the case, Defendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation
Inc., is the absolute owner of the real properties in question and the issue on such
ownership is now a closed matter.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation Inc.'s motion for
reconsideration etc., dated November 16, 1993, is hereby granted; this Court's order,
dated November 8, 1993, is reconsidered and set aside, and the writ of execution of the
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
same date against Defendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation Inc. is ordered quashed
(underscoring ours).[6]
Within a reglementary period Moslares moved to reconsider insisting that Barretto
Realty's payment by check was not valid because (a) the check was not delivered
personally to him but to his counsel Atty. Pedro Ravelo, (b) the check was not encashed
hence did not produce the effect of payment; and, (c) the check was not legal tender per
judicial pronouncements. Barretto Realty opposed the motion, but to no avail. On 11
February 1994 respondent Judge granted the motion for reconsideration and set aside
his Order of 7 December 1993. Judge Laguio ruled that Barretto Realty's payment
through checks was not valid because "a check is not legal tender and it cannot produce
the effect of payment until it is encashed x x x x the check in question has neither been
negotiated nor encashed by the plaintiff."[7] At the same time, however, Moslares'
alleged payment of P3,000,000.00 on 15 January 1990 intended for Barretto Realty but
delivered to Atty. Tomas Trinidad was likewise decreed as not valid because the latter
was not authorized to accept payment for Barretto Realty.
Invoking interest of justice and equity, respondent Judge resolved to: (a) set aside its
ruling contained in its order of 7 December 1993 that "(d)efendant Pio Barretto Realty
Corporation, Inc., is the absolute owner of the property in question and the issue on such
ownership is now a closed matter;" (b) order the plaintiff (should he desire to exercise his
option to buy the real property in question) to pay defendant Pio Barretto Realty
Corporation, Inc., the sum of P3,000,000.00 within five (5) days from notice thereof by
way of reimbursement of the latter's capital investment; and, (c) order defendant Pio
Barretto Realty Development Corporation, Inc., to pay the plaintiff (in the event the latter
should fail to exercise his said option and the former would want to buy the real property
in question) the sum of P1,000,000.00.
But Moslares failed to exercise his option and pay the amount within the five (5)-day
period granted him. Instead, he filed a Supplemental Motion to Pay praying that he be
given additional seven (7) days within which to do so. Barretto Realty opposed and
invoked par. 3 of the Order of 11 February 1994 granting it the option to buy the lots in
the event that Moslares should fail to pay within the period given him. Barretto Realty
prayed that the P1 million cashier's check still in Moslares' possession be considered as
sufficient compliance with the pertinent provision of the court's order. Later, Barretto
Realty offered to exchange the check with cash. When Moslares did not appear however
at the designated time for payment on 10 March 1994 before the Branch Clerk of Court,
Barretto Realty filed a motion for consignation praying that it be allowed to deposit the
P1,000,000.00 payment with the cashier of the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Respondent Judge however failed to act on the motion as he went on vacation leave. For
reasons which do not clearly appear in the record, Judge Rosalio G. dela Rosa,
Executive Judge of the RTC, Manila, acted on the motion and granted the prayer of
Barretto Realty.[8] Upon the return of respondent Judge Laguio from his vacation,
petitioner Barretto Realty immediately filed a motion for his inhibition on the ground that
he had already lost the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as evident from his "seesaw"
orders in the case. On 28 March 1994 respondent Judge denied the motion for his
inhibition. Moslares for his part moved for reconsideration of Executive Judge dela
Rosa's Order of 10 March 1994.
On 15 April 1994, in a Consolidated Order, respondent Judge Laguio set aside the
questioned order of Executive Judge dela Rosa on the ground that the motion for
consignation should have been referred to the pairing judge of Branch 18, Judge Zenaida
Daguna of Branch 19. Respondent Judge further ruled that the questioned order was
premature since there were pending motions, namely, Moslares' Supplemental Motion to
Pay dated 1 March 1994, and Motion to Deposit dated 9 March 1994 which were both
filed earlier than Barretto Realty's Motion for Consignation which however remained
unresolved.
Respondent Judge Laguio found Moslares' motions meritorious and granted them.
Moslares was thus given a non-extendible grace period of three (3) days within which to
pay the P3,000,000.00 to Barretto Realty. Moslares then deposited the amount with the
Branch Clerk of Court of Br. 18 within two (2) days from receipt of the order of
respondent Judge, and on 25 April 1994 filed a motion for the Clerk of Court to be
authorized to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in his favor.
On 2 May 1994 Barretto Realty filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals
assailing the Orders of respondent Judge dated 28 March 1994 and 15 April 1994 on the
ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Meanwhile, on 12 October 1994 or during the pendency of the petition, respondent
Judge granted Moslares' motion and authorized the Clerk of Court to execute the deed of
conveyance in his favor. The implementation of the order however was enjoined by the

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
Court of Appeals on 9 December 1994 when it issued a writ of preliminary injunction
barring the issuance of the writ until further orders from the court.
In its Petition and Memorandum petitioner specifically alleged that respondent Judge's
Orders of 8 November 1993,[9] 11 February 1994,[10] 15 April 1994,[11] and 12 October
1994[12] were all issued with grave abuse of discretion as the trial court had no more
jurisdiction to issue such orders since the Compromise Agreement of 2 May 1986 which
was the basis of the decision of 24 July 1986 had already been executed and
implemented in its favor way back on 20 June 1990.
Petitioner likewise contended that the Order of 28 March 1994[13] denying petitioner's
motion for inhibition was void because it did not state the legal basis thereof; that
respondent Judge displayed obvious bias and prejudice when he issued "seesaw" orders
in the case; and, that the bias in favor of Moslares was apparent when respondent Judge
granted the former another three (3)-day period within which to pay the P3 million
notwithstanding the fact that Moslares failed to comply with the original five (5)-day
period given him. With respect to Executive Judge dela Rosa's Order of 10 March 1994,
petitioner contended that there was no rule of procedure prohibiting the Executive Judge
from acting on an urgent motion even if the pairing judge of the judge to whom the case
was raffled was present.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It ruled that the denial by respondent Judge
of the motion for his inhibition was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion correctible
by certiorari. Aside from the fact that judges are given a wide latitude of discretion in
determining whether to voluntarily recuse themselves from a case, which is not lightly
interfered with, the appellate court however observed that the orders and resolutions
issued by respondent Judge in the five (5) years he had been presiding over Civil Case
No. 84-27008 indicated that they were not uniformly issued in favor of one or the other
party. As petitioner itself aptly described, respondent Judge's actuations in the case
"seesawed" between the parties.
On the matter of the validity of Judge dela Rosa's Order of 10 March 1994 granting
petitioner's motion for consignation, the Court of Appeals ruled that the order was
precipitate and unauthorized not only because the motion did not comply with the
requisites for litigated motions but also because Judge dela Rosa had no judicial
authority to act on the case. His duties as Executive Judge were purely administrative
and did not include acting on a case assigned to another judge.
With respect to the two (2) writs of execution, one dated 10 May 1990 in favor of
petitioner, and the other dated 11 February 1994 in favor of respondent, the Court of
Appeals ruled -
Lastly, anent the existence of two writs of execution, first one for petitioner and the
second for Moslares which the former has repeatedly cited as capricious and whimsical
exercise of judicial discretion by respondent Judge, the records reveal that on 10 May
1990 a writ of execution was issued in favor of the petitioner upon its motion. For reasons
of its own, petitioner did not pursue its effective and fruitful implementation in accordance
with the decision based on a compromise agreement, spelling out the respective
monetary obligations of petitioner and Moslares. Hence, after the lapse of at least one
year, Moslares filed a motion for execution of the same decision x x x x [I]t cannot be said
that respondent Judge issued two conflicting orders sans any legal basis. What really
happened was that the matter of the first order granting execution in favor of petitioner
was repeatedly put at issue until the order of the court dated 11 February 1994 x x x x
Observedly, the said order was never elevated by petitioner to the appellate courts.
Instead, he agreed with it by filing a "Manifestation and Motion on 01 March 1994 praying
that the P1 Million Cashier's Check still in the possession of Moslares be considered
compliance with paragraph 3 of that order x x x x
On 14 January 1998 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this
petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred (a) in concluding that petitioner did
not pursue the effective and fruitful implementation of the writ of execution dated 10 May
1990 in its favor, (b) in not setting aside Judge Laguio's Orders dated 11 February 1994,
15 April 1994 and 12 October 1994 as patent nullities, and, (c) in disregarding
jurisprudence declaring that cashier's or manager's checks are deemed cash or as good
as the money they represent.
We grant the petition. Final and executory decisions, more so with those already
executed, may no longer be amended except only to correct errors which are clerical in
nature. They become the law of the case and are immutable and unalterable regardless
of any claim of error or incorrectness.[14] Amendments or alterations which substantially
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
13
affect such judgments as well as the entire proceedings held for that purpose are null
and void for lack of jurisdiction.[15] The reason lies in the fact that public policy dictates
that litigations must be terminated at some definite time and that the prevailing party
should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing
party.[16]
It is not disputed, and in fact borne by the records, that petitioner bought the disputed lots
of the Drepin Estate subject matter of the Compromise Agreement ahead of Moslares
and that the checks issued in payment thereof were even personally delivered by the
Deputy Sheriff of the RTC-Br. 18, Manila, upon Order of respondent Judge dated 14 June
1990 after tender was refused by Moslares and the Drepin Estate. Respondent Moslares
never raised the invalidity of the payment through checks either through a motion for
reconsideration or a timely appeal. Hence, with the complete execution and satisfaction
of the Decision dated 24 July 1986 which approved the Compromise Agreement, Civil
Case No. 84-27008 became closed and terminated leaving nothing else to be done by
the trial court with respect thereto.[17] As petitioner correctly contended, the Court of
Appeals erred when it concluded that petitioner did not pursue the fruitful and effective
implementation of the writ of execution in its favor. As already stated petitioner paid for
the lots through the court-sanctioned procedure outlined above. There was no more need
for the Drepin Estate, owner of the lots, to execute a deed of conveyance in petitioner's
favor because it had already done so on 10 October 1980. In fact the disputed lots were
already registered in petitioner's name under TCT Nos. 50539, 50540 and 50541 as a
consequence thereof. That was also why in the penultimate paragraph of the
Compromise Agreement it was provided that in the event respondent Moslares bought
the lots ahead of petitioner Barretto Realty the latter, not the Drepin Estate, was to
execute the corresponding deed of conveyance and deliver all the titles and pertinent
papers to respondent Moslares. There was therefore nothing more to be done by way of
fruitful and effective implementation.
Clearly then respondent Judge Laguio no longer had any jurisdiction whatsoever to act
on, much less grant, the motion for execution and supplement thereto filed by Moslares
on 17 September 1993 or more than three (3) years later, claiming that he had already
bought the lots. The fact that the check paid to him by Barretto Realty was never
encashed should not be invoked against the latter. As already stated, Moslares never
questioned the tender done three (3) years earlier. Besides, while delivery of a check
produces the effect of payment only when it is encashed, the rule is otherwise if the
debtor was prejudiced by the creditor's unreasonable delay in presentment. Acceptance
of a check implies an undertaking of due diligence in presenting it for payment. If no such
presentment was made, the drawer cannot be held liable irrespective of loss or injury
sustained by the payee. Payment will be deemed effected and the obligation for which
the check was given as conditional payment will be discharged.[18]
Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Laguio's Order dated 8 November 1993
which granted private respondent's motion for execution thus nullifying the 1990 sale in
favor of petitioner after he had in effect approved such sale in his Order of 14 June 1990
and after such order had already become final and executory, amounted to an
oppressive exercise of judicial authority, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, for which reason, all further orders stemming therefrom are also null and void
and without effect.[19]
The principle of laches does not attach when the judgment is null and void for want of
jurisdiction.[20] The fact that petitioner invoked par. 3 of the Order of 11 February 1994
praying that its P1,000,000.00 check still in Moslares' possession be considered
sufficient payment of the disputed lots, could not be cited against it. For one thing,
petitioner from the very start had always consistently questioned and assailed the
jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain respondent's motion for execution filed three (3)
years after the case had in fact been executed. Secondly, estoppel being an equitable
doctrine cannot be invoked to perpetuate an injustice.[21]
WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 30
June 1997 and 14 January 1998, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Order of respondent Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio Jr. dated 11 February 1994 in Civil
Case No. 84-27008, setting aside his earlier ruling of 7 December 1993 which had
declared petitioner Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation as the absolute owner
of the real properties in question, and all subsequent proceedings culminating in the
Order of 12 October 1994 authorizing the Clerk of Court, RTC-Manila, to execute a deed
of conveyance over subject properties in favor of respondent Honor P. Moslares, are
declared NULL and VOID for want of jurisdiction.
Consequently, petitioner Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation is declared the
absolute owner of the disputed properties subject matter of the Compromise Agreement
dated 2 May 1986 as fully implemented by the Deputy Sheriff, RTC-Br. 18, Manila,
14 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
pursuant to the final and executory Order dated 14 June 1990 of its Presiding Judge
Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
7. DOROTHEO VS CA –
[G.R. No. 108581. December 8, 1999]
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA,
for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO,
respondents.
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void
in an order that has become final and executory still be given effect? This is the
issue that arose from the following antecedents:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta
Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter.
Sometime in 1977, after Alejandros death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of
Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latters last will
and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandros will to probate.
Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a Motion To
Declare The Will Intrinsically Void. The trial court granted the motion and issued an order,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued declaring Lourdes
Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and
testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors
Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the
late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective estates shall be
liquidated and distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and
other taxes due to the government.[1]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation
since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were
not married to each other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file
appellants brief within the extended period granted.[2] This dismissal became final and
executory on February 3, 1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith
issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued by the
lower court to implement the final and executory Order. Consequently, private
respondents filed several motions including a motion to compel petitioner to surrender to
them the Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering the properties of the late
Alejandro. When petitioner refused to surrender the TCTs, private respondents filed a
motion for cancellation of said titles and for issuance of new titles in their names.
Petitioner opposed the motion.
An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the
final and executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the
issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that the order was merely interlocutory,
hence not final in character. The court added that the dispositive portion of the said Order
even directs the distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses. Private respondents
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991.
Thus, private respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the
two assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990 and February 1, 1991.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed by private
respondents before the Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that in issuing the
two assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to have no jurisdiction because he was
particularly designated to hear the case. Petitioner likewise assails the Order of the Court
of Appeals upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order which declared the
intrinsic invalidity of Alejandros will that was earlier admitted to probate.
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate of the late
Alejandro and to maintain the status quo or lease of the premises thereon to third parties.
[3] Private respondents opposed the motion on the ground that petitioner has no interest
in the estate since she is not the lawful wife of the late Alejandro.
HELD: The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no
longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the
January 30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry
of judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot
reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to
negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a
final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world.[4]
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or
order of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order
allowing the will became final and the question determined by the court in such order can
no longer be raised anew, either in the same proceedings or in a different motion. The
matters of due execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the
character of res judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical questions
in connection therewith being for once and forever closed.[5] Such final order makes the
will conclusive against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due execution.[6]
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of
the will sought to be probated,[7] particularly on three aspects:
1. whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedents last will and testament;
2. compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
3. the testamentary capacity of the testator;[8]
4. and the due execution of the last will and testament.[9]
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was
of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the
will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will
is genuine and not a forgery,[10] that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he
is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will.[11]
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be
raised even after the will has been authenticated.[12] Thus, it does not necessarily follow
that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the
will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs
the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on
succession,[13] the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This
is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision
that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of
finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds
the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party
had the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no
longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes
waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was
aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is
satisfied with the decision or order. As early as 1918, it has been declared that public
policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of
courts must at some point of time fixed by law[14] become final otherwise there will be no
end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium - the very object of which the courts
were constituted was to put an end to controversies.[15] To fulfill this purpose and to do
so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the
slothful.[16] The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may
have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence,[17]
which circumstances do not concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the
will, as she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final
and executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as
the only heirs do not bind those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged
illegitimate son of the testator, the same constitutes res judicata with respect to those
who were parties to the probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters
anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It should be
remembered that forum shopping also occurs when the same issue had already been
resolved adversely by some other court.[18] It is clear from the executory order that the
estates of Alejandro and his spouse should be distributed according to the laws of
intestate succession.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory, hence it can still
be set aside by the trial court. In support thereof, petitioner argues that an order merely
declaring who are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs is entitled cannot be the
basis of execution to require delivery of shares from one person to another particularly
when no project of partition has been filed.[19] The trial court declared in the January 30,
1986 Order that petitioner is not the legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his
three legitimate children (petitioners herein), and at the same time it nullified the will. But
it should be noted that in the same Order, the trial court also said that the estate of the
late spouses be distributed according to the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no
option but to implement that order of intestate distribution and not to reopen and again
re-examine the intrinsic provisions of the same will.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional
rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy.[20] But before there could be testate
distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law
considering that the deceased testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of
his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature
and that no one is presumed to give - Nemo praesumitur donare.[21] No intestate
distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its
extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply
regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to
determine its intrinsic validity that is whether the provisions of the will are valid according
to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was
extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of
intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandros disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal
properties of his late spouse, whom he described as his only beloved wife, is not a valid
reason to reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not
belonging exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of the conjugal regime
cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the properties that were
disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and determined in
the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late spouses estate.
Petitioners motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot considering that
she was not married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
8. LACHENAL VS SALAS –
the court did NOT entertain the issue of ownership. The probate court could not rule upon
the validity of the contract. His son in law is considered as a stranger.
[G.R. No. L-42257. June 14, 1976.]
ILDEFONSO LACHENAL, ELIAS LACHENAL, IRENEA L. SANTOS, FLORA L.
SANCHEZ and NATIVIDAD D. LACHENAL, Petitioners, v. HON. EMILIO V. SALAS,
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, Branch I, and FLAVIANA L.
LEONIO, Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
In the probate court, the executor asked that private respondent, who is one of the
compulsory heirs, and her husband, be required to pay the rentals on a fishing boat,
which was among the properties included in the inventory, and to return the same for
drydocking and repair. Respondent opposed the motion and asked for the exclusion of
said boat from the estate, claiming that she is the owner thereof having bought the same
from, their father. The probate court designated a commissioner to receive evidence
relative to ownership of the boat.
After respondent completed the presentation of her evidence, the executor together with
the other children of the deceased filed in the Court of First Instance a separate action to
recover the boat and back rentals with damages. Thereafter, plaintiffs in said civil case
asked the probate court to exclude the boat from the decedent’s estate on the ground
that the jurisdiction to resolve the question of ownership rests upon the Court of First
Instance.
The probate court denied the motion and held that it has jurisdiction over the issue of
ownership because the heirs had agreed to present their evidence on the point before a
commissioner. Hence, this petition for prohibition and certiorari.
The Supreme Court held that the probate court has no jurisdiction to decide the question
of ownership over the fishing boat as it involved the lessee, who, although, married to
one of the compulsory heirs, is nevertheless a third person with respect to the estate of
the deceased.
Questioned order set aside.
SYLLABUS
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
15
1. COURTS; JURISDICTION; PROBATE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO
PASS UPON QUESTION OF TITLE TO PROPERTY INVOLVING THIRD PERSONS. —
The question of title to a property should be determined in a separate action before the
Court of First Instance , where it affects the lessee who is the decedent’s son-in-law, and
who although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person
with respect to the estate. The administrator may not push him against his will, by
motion, into the administrative proceedings. The general rule is that question as to title to
property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate proceeding but should be
ventilated in a separate action.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROBATE COURT MAY PROVISIONALLY PASS UPON
QUESTION OF TITLE WHERE A PARTY MOVES FOR THE INCLUSION OR
EXCLUSION OF PROPERTY FROM THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATES. — Where a
party in a probate proceeding pray for the inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of
a piece of property , the probate court may provisionally pass upon the question without
prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.
3. ID.; ID.; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE IS A COURT OF GENERAL
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION. — The Court of First Instance is a court of general original
jurisdiction invested with power to take cognizance of all kinds of cases; civil cases,
criminal cases, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization ,
admiralty and insolvency cases.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURAL QUESTION INVOLVING MODE OF
PRACTICE, WAIVABLE. — Whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court
of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a
special court is in reality not a question of jurisdiction over the subject matter, it is in
essence a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be
waived."cralaw virtua1aw library
5. ID.; ID.; PROBATE JURISDICTION INCLUDES ALL MATTERS RELATIVE
TO THE SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS. — Probate
jurisdiction includes all matters relating to the settlement of estates and the probate of
wills of deceased persons (Sec. 599, Act 190), particularly the administration of the
decedent’s estate, the payment of his debts, questions as to collation or advancements
to the heirs, the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, and the partition and distribution
of the estate.
6. SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS; DUTY OF
EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR; ACTIONS FOR CAUSES WHICH MAY SURVIVE
MAY BE COMMENCED AGAINST THE EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR. — For the
recovery or protection of the property of rights of the decedent, an executor or
administrator may bring or defend in the right of the decedent, actions for causes which
survive. Actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the
decedent’s estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an
injury in person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against an executor or
administrator.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; RENTALS; RENTALS DUE THE DECEDENT’S ESTATE MUST
BE COLLECTED IN A SEPARATE ACTION. — Rentals due to decedent’s estate may not
be collected by filing a motion in the testate proceedings because said rentals do not
constitute property in the administrator’s hands and are not thus within the effective
control of the probate court. The proper procedure in collecting such rentals is to file an
independent action so that the right of the estate thereto may be threshed out in a full
dress trials on the merits.
8. ID.; REASONS FOR ADJUDICATING QUESTIONS OF TITLE IN A
SEPARATE ACTION. — Normally, it is expedient and convenient that the question of title
to property, which arises between decedent’s estate and other persons, should be
adjudicated in a separate action because such question requires the presentation of
appropriate pleadings. A resort to the modes of discovery may be necessary so that the
issues may be clearly defined and the trial may be expedited. Those matters can be
effectively accomplished in an ordinary action rather that in the testamentary or intestate
proceedings. The court may also have to resolve ancillary issues as to damages and
counterclaims for money or property. Ultimately, execution has to be issued. The
execution of a judgment is usually made by the Court of First instance in an ordinary
action and not in a special proceedings.
9. ID.; DUTY OF COURT TO ASSIST PARTY LITIGANTS WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY. — Where the controversy over the fishing boat
16 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
concerns members of the same family, the court should endeavor before trial to
persuade the litigants to agree upon some fair compromise.
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
Victorio Lachenal died on November 20, 1969. His testate estate is pending settlement in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch I (Special Proceeding No. 5836). His
son, Ildefonso Lachenal, was named executor of his will. Among the properties included
in the inventory of his estate is a fishing boat called Lachenal VII.
On April 1, 1971 the executor filed in that proceeding a motion to require the spouses
Lope L. Leonio and Flaviana Lachenal Leonio to pay the rentals for the lease of Lachenal
VII and return the boat to Navotas, Rizal for drydocking and repair.
Mrs. Leonio, who was a daughter of the testator, opposed the executor’s motion. She
countered with a motion to exclude fishing boat from the decedent’s estate. She claimed
that she is the owner of the boat because she purchased it from her father in 1967. The
executor opposed the motion for exclusion.
The probate court in its order of January 28, 1972 designated commissioner to receive
the evidence of the parties relative the ownership of the motorboat. Mrs. Leonio had
already finished the presentation of her evidence before the commissioner.
The executor did not present his countervailing evidence. Instead, on July 8, 1975 he
and the testator’s other children named Flora, Elias and Irenea, and the children of a
deceased child filed in the Caloocan City Branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal an
action against the Leonio spouses and the other three children of the testator named
Crispula, Modesto and Esperanza, for the recovery of the motorboat Lachenal VII,
allegedly valued at P150,000, together with back rentals and damages (Civil Case No.
3597).chanrobles law library
It was alleged in the complaint that Victorio Lachenal in 1964 leased the said motorboat
to his son-in-law, Lope L. Leonio, for a monthly rental of P2,000 and that after Victorio’s
death, the executor of his estate demanded from Leonio the return of the boat and the
payment of the back rentals.
On July 20, 1975 the said plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3597 filed in the probate court their
own motion to exclude the said motorboat from the decedent’s estate on the ground that
the, probate court has no jurisdiction to decide the question as to its ownership because
that matter has to be resolved by the Caloocan court where Civil Case No. 3597 is
pending.
The probate court denied that motion. It held that it has jurisdiction over the issue of
ownership because the heirs had agreed to present their evidence on that point before a
commissioner.
It invoked the rule that generally "questions of title to property cannot be passed upon in
testate or intestate proceedings, except when the parties interested are all heirs of the
deceased, in which event it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court the
question as to title to property and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely
pass judgment thereon. The reason is that questions of collation or advancement are
generally inevitably involved therein which are proper matters to be passed upon in the
due course of administration. And it has also been held that with the consent of the
parties, matters affecting property under administration may be taken cognizance of by
the court in the course intestate proceedings provided the interests of third persons are
not prejudiced." (3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, page 473,
citing Alvarez v. Espiritu, L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892, 899; Pascual v.
Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Vda. de Mañalac v. Ocampo, 73 Phil. 661; Cunanan v. Amparo, 80
Phil. 227; Dinglasan v. Ang Chia, 88 Phil. 476; Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501).
On January 5, 1976 the executor and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3597 filed these
special civil actions of prohibition and certiorari against the probate court.
The issue is whether the probate court should be allowed continue the hearing on the
ownership of the fishing boat or whether that question should be left to the determination
of the Caloocan court where the subsequent separate action (now in the pre-trial stage)
for the recovery of the motorboat is pending.
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597
because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leonio, the decedent’s son-in-law, who,
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with
respect to estate. "The administrator may not pull him against his will, by motion, into the
administration proceedings" (De la Cruz v. Camon, 63 O.G. 8704, 16 SCRA 886; De
Paula v. Escay, infra).chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
This case falls under the general rule that questions as to title to property cannot be
passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding but should be ventilated in a separate
action (Ongsingco v. Tan, 97 Phil. 330, 334; Bernardo v. Court. of Appeals, 117 Phil. 385;
Magallanes v. Kayanan, L-31048, January 20, 1976: Recto v. Dela Rosa, L-42799, March
16, 1976).
Where a party in a probate proceeding prays for the inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property, the court may provisionally pass upon the question
without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action (Garcia v. Garcia, 67 Phil.
353: Guinguing v. Abuton, 48 Phil. 144, 147; Junquera v. Borromeo, L-18498, March 30,
1967, 19 SCRA 656; Borromeo v. Canonoy, L-25010. March 30, 1967, 19 SCRA 667).
The Court of First Instance is a court of general original jurisdiction invested with power
to take cognizance of all kinds of cases: civil cases, criminal cases, special proceedings,
land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty insolvency cases (Sec. 39,
Judiciary Law; De Paula v. Escay, 97 Phil. 617, 619; Manalo v. Mariano, L-33850,
January 22, 1976).
Whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (probate
land registration, etc.) is in reality not a question of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It
is in essence a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived"
(Cunanan v. Amparo, supra, page 232; Cf. Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484 re jurisdiction over
the issue).
Probate jurisdiction includes all matters relating to the settlement of estates and the
probate of wills of deceased persons (Sec. 599, Act 190), particularly the administration
of the decedent’s estate, the payment of his debts, questions as to collation or
advancements to the heirs, the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, and the partition
and distribution of the estate (De La Cruz v. Camon, supra).
For the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the decedent, an executor or
administrator may bring or defend in the right of the decedent, actions for causes which
survive. Actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the
decedent’s estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an
injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against an executor or
administrator (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 87, Rules of Court).
In the instant case, the executor, by virtue of section 2 of Rule 87, filed a separate action
in the Caloocan court for the recovery of the fishing boat and back rentals from the
Leonio spouses.
In the De la Cruz case. supra. It was held that rentals allegedly due to the decedent’s
estate may not be collected by the administrator by filing a motion in the testate
proceeding. The said rentals do not constitute property in the administrator’s hands and
are not thus within the effective control of the probate court. The proper procedure in
collating such rentals is to file an independent action in the Court of First Instance so that
the right of the estate thereto may be the threshed out in a full-dress trial on the merits.
The ruling in the De la Cruz case applies with stronger force to this case because here
the executor seeks to recover not only the rentals but also the leased property itself, as
to which the wife of the lessee had asserted adverse title.
Normally, it is expedient and convenient that the question of title to property, which arises
between the decedent’s estate and other persons, should be adjudicated in a separate
action because such a question requires the presentation of appropriate pleadings
(complaint, motion to dismiss, answer, counterclaim and reply). A resort to the modes of
discovery may be necessary so that the issues may be clearly defined and the trial may
be expedited. Those matters can be effectively accomplished in an ordinary action rather
than in the testamentary or intestate proceeding (Mangaliman v. Gonzales, L-21033,
December 28, 1970, 36 SCRA 462).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
The court may also have to resolve ancillary issues as to damages and counterclaims for
money or property. Ultimately execution has to be issued. The execution of a judgment is
usually made by the Court of First Instance in an ordinary action and not in a special
proceeding (See Magallanes v. Kayanan, supra).
In the instant case, inasmuch as the controversy over the fishing boat concerns members
of the same family, the Caloocan court should endeavor before trial to persuade the

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
litigants to agree upon some compromise (Arts. 222 and 2029, Civil Code; Sec. 1[j], Rule
16, Rules of Court).
WHEREFORE, the probate court’s orders of September 17 and October 20, 1975,
asserting its jurisdiction to decide the title to the fishing boat, Lachenal VII, are set aside.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
9. BAYBAYAN VS AQUINO – determination of ownership of the lots is merely
provisional must yield to the outcome of the case by the courts of general
jurisdiction.
G.R. No. L-42678 April 9, 1987
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the Order issued by the respondent
Judge on 4 December 1975, which dismissed, without prejudice, the petitioners'
complaint filed in Civil Case No. 23 1 -R of the then Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, as well as the Order, dated 24 December 1975, which denied petitioners'
motion for the reconsideration of said order.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On 19 January 1960, herein private respondents Norberto Padua, Paulina Padua, Felisa
Padua, Dionisia Orpiano, Laureano Orpiano, Leonardo Orpiano, Josefina Orpiano,
Valentina Orpiano, Servillano Delfin, Gertrudes Delfin, Pastors Delfin Lorenzo Delfin,
Fausta Delfin, Dionisio Oria, Faustina Oria, Amado Oria, and Benjamin Oria, all claiming
to be the nephews and nieces of one Vicente Oria who died intestate sometime in 1945
in Balungao, Pangasinan, filed a petition for the summary settlement of the decedent's
estate, the value of which did not exceed P6,000.00. The petition was filed in the then
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Tayug Branch. The case was docketed therein as
Special Proceeding No. T-300. 1
After due publication and hearing, the probate court issued an order adjudicating the
estate to the heirs of the decedent, who were ordered to submit a project of partition. 2
Sometime in 1971, the case was transferred to the Resales Branch of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan where it was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 24-R.
On 18 September 1974, the probate court confirmed the adjudication earlier made and
ordered Eulalia Evangelista to deliver the respective shares of her co-heirs; to make an
accounting of the produce thereof from 1960; and to deliver said produce to her co-heirs
or pay its equivalent. A writ of execution was subsequently issued pursuant thereto. 3
A writ of possession was also issued sometime thereafter, and the private respondents
were placed in possession of their respective shares. 4 However, when a representative
of the private respondents went to cultivate the portion adjudicated to said private
respondents, he was prevented by Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelista. In view thereof,
the private respondents filed a motion to cite said Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelista in
contempt of court. 5
As a consequence, herein petitioners Pedro Baybayan, Cipriano Evangelists, and the
spouses Bartolome and Consuelo Baybayan, claiming to be the registered owners of the
lots involved, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Rosales
Branch docketed therein as Civil Case No. 231-R, against the Deputy Sheriff and the
herein private respondents, for the quieting of their title, plus damages, and to restrain
said defendants from enforcing the writ of execution issued in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R. 6
Meanwhile, at the hearing of the motion for contempt in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, the
question of the Identity of the lands subject of Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, was brought up, so
that the probate court ordered a relocation survey and commissioned a geodetic
engineer to undertake said survey. After the survey, the commissioner submitted to the
Court a report stating, among others, that the lands which were delivered by the Deputy
Sheriff to the heirs of Vicente Oria, pursuant to the writ of possession issued by the
probate court, are registered in the names of herein petitioners under TCT No. 50269
and TCT No. 50270 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. 7
By reason thereof, the probate court, in an order dated 30 October 1975, dismissed the
contempt charge against Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelists. However, the same court
ordered the petitioners to amend their complaint filed in Civil Case No. 231-R since "it is
necessary that an amended complaint be filed by Pedro Baybayan in order to determine
whether or not the property in question is part of the property under Spec. Proc. No. 24-
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
17
R, inasmuch as it is now the property claimed by him which is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 50269." 8
Pursuant thereto, the herein petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion in Civil Case No. 231-R,
to which was attached an amended complaint wherein some defendants were dropped. 9
The respondent Judge, however, found that the Amended Complaint did not comply with
his order of 30 October 1975 to exclude Lot E and dismissed the case, "without prejudice
on the part of the plaintiffs to file a proper complaint for the recovery of ownership or
possession of the property in controversy which is Lot B in the relocation plan and
formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 23684, now under Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 50269." 10
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, 11 but the motion was
denied on 24 December 1975. 12 Thereupon, they filed with this Court a petition for
certiorari for the review of the orders of the lower court. The Court treated the petition as
a special civil action for certiorari. 13
Counsel for the petitioners, in this petition, contends that the respondent Judge had no
authority under the law, both substantive and procedural, to issue the questioned orders
because the order to amend the complaint was issued in, and in connection with Spec.
Proc. No. 24-R where the herein petitioners are not even parties.
The contention, in our opinion, is not meritorious. While it may be true that the order to
amend the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 231-R was issued in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R,
so that it cannot ordinarily bind the herein petitioners who are not parties in said special
proceedings, it appears, however, that the petitioners voluntarily submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of the probate court, when they filed an Omnibus Motion in Civil Case No.
231-R, wherein they prayed for leave to amend their complaint in accordance with the
order of the probate court of 30 October 1975. They cannot now be allowed belatedly to
adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the respondent trial Judge to
whom they submitted their cause voluntarily. 14
We find, however, that the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in dismissing the complaint filed by the petitioners, for
their alleged failure to amend their complaint to exclude therefrom Lot E which the
respondent Judge found, in his order of 30 October 1975, issued in the probate court, to
be owned by the petitioners Cipriano Evangelists and Consuelo Baybayan. The findings
of the respondent Judge as to the ownership of Lot E after the hearing conducted in
Spec. Proc. No. 24-R do not justify the order to amend the complaint since the
determination of the ownership of the said lot by the respondent Judge presiding over a
court exercising probate jurisdiction is not final or ultimate in nature and is without
prejudice to the right of an interested party to raise the question of ownership in a proper
action. 15
It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long fine of
decisions, that "when questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of
the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property,
not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of
the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of
administrative proceedings. The Court of First Instance, acting, as a probate court, has
no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the Court of
First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a court of first instance." 16
Besides, the order to amend the complaint is vague and hazy and does not specify what
the amendments should be or how the complaint should be amended so that the
petitioners should not be faulted if the amended complaint subsequently filed by them in
Civil Case No. 231-R does not contain the allegations that the respondent Judge would
want to appear therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and a writ issued, setting aside the Orders
issued by the respondent Judge on 7 December 1975 and 24 December 1975, in Civil
Case No. 231-R of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
10. DE BORJA VS DE BORJA – no cause of action in a settlement case and there is
no violation of a right. Moral damages has nothing to do in a settlement.
G.R. No. L-6622 July 31, 1957
Intestate Estate of the deceased MARCELO DE BORJA. CRISANTO DE BORJA,
administrator-appellant, vs.
JUAN DE BORJA, ET AL.,
18 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
The case. — Quintin, Francisco, Crisanta and Juliana, all surnamed de Borja, are
legitimate children of Marcelo de Borja who, upon his demise sometime in 1924 or 1925,
left a considerable amount of property. Intestate proceedings must have followed, and
the pre-war records of the case either burned, lost or destroyed during the last war,
because the record shows that in 1930 Quintin de Borja was already the administrator of
the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja.
In the early part of 1938, Quintin de Borja died and Crisanto de Borja, son of Francisco
de Borja, was appointed and took over as administrator of the Estate. Francisco de
Borja, on the other hand, assumed his duties as executor of the will of Quintin de Borja,
but upon petition of the heirs of said deceased on the ground that his interests were
conflicting with that of his brother's estate he was later required by the Court to resign as
such executor and was succeeded by Rogelio Limaco, a son-in-law of Quintin de Borja.
It also appears that on February 16, 1940, at the hearing set for the approval of the
statement of accounts of the late administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de
Borja, then being opposed by Francisco de Borja, the parties submitted an agreement,
which was approved by the Court (Exh. A). Said agreement, translated into English,
reads as follows:
1. All the accounts submitted and those that are to be submitted corresponding to this
year will be considered approved;
2. No heir shall claim anything of the harvests from the lands in Cainta that came from
Exequiel Ampil, deceased, nor from the land in Tabuatin, Nueva Ecija;
3. That the amounts of money taken by each heir shall be considered as deposited in
conjunction with the other properties of the intestate and shall form part of the mass
without drawing any interest;
4. That it shall be understood as included in this mass the sum of twelve thousand pesos
(P12,000) that the sisters Crisanta and Juliana de Borja paid of their own money as part
of the price the lands and three thousand pesos (P3,000) the price of the machinery for
irrigation;
5. The right, interests or participation that the deceased Quintin de Borja has or may
have in Civil Case No. 6190 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, shall be
likewise included in the total mass of the inheritance of the Intestate;
6. Not only the lands in Tabuatin but also those in Cainta coming from the now deceased
Exequiel Ampil shall also from part of the total mass of the inheritance of the Intestate of
the late Marcelo de Borja;
7. Once the total of the inheritance of the intestate is made up as specified before in this
Agreement, partition thereof will be made as follows:
From the total mass shall be deducted in case or in kind, Twelve Thousand Pesos
(P12,000) that shall be delivered to Da. Juliana de Borja and Da. Crisanta de Borja in
equal shares, and the rest shall be divided among the four heirs, i. e., Don Francisco de
Borja, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, Da. Juliana de Borja, and Da. Crisanta de Borja, in
equal parts. (TRANSLATION)
The Intestate remained under the administration of Crisanto de Borja until the then
outbreak of the war. From then on and until the termination of the war, there was a lull
and state of inaction in Special proceeding No. 2414 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasig branch (In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja), until upon
petition filed by Miguel B. Dayco, as administrator of the estate of his deceased mother,
Crisanta de Borja, who is one of heirs, for reconstitution of the records of this case, the
Court on December 11, 1945, ordered the reconstitution of the same, requiring the
administrator to submit his report and a copy of the project of partition.
On January 3, 1946, the administrator, Dr. Crisanto de Borja, filed his accounts for the
period ranging from March 1 to December 22, 1945, which according to the heirs of
Quintin de Borja were so inadequate and general that on February 28, 1946, they filed a
motion for specification. On April 30, 1946, they also filed their opposition to said
statement of accounts alleging that the income reported in said statement was very much
less than the true and actual income of the estate and that the expenses appearing
therein were exaggerated and/or not actually incurred, and prayed that the statement of
accounts submitted by the administrator be disapproved.
The administrator later filed another report of his administration, dated August 9, 1949,
corresponding to the period lapsed from December 23, 1945, to July 31, 1949, showing a
cash balance of P71.96, but with pending obligation amounting to P35,415.
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
On August 22, 1949, Juan de Borja and sisters, heirs of the deceased Quintin de Borja,
filed their opposition to the statement of accounts filed by the administrator on the ground
that same was not detailed enough to enable the interested parties to verify the same;
that they cannot understand why the Intestate could suffer any loss considering that
during the administration of the same by Quintin de Borja, the Estate accumulated gains
of more than P100,000 in the form of advances to the heirs as well as cash balance; that
they desired to examine the accounts of Dr. Crisanto de Borja to verify the loss and
therefore prayed that the administrator be ordered to deposit with the Clerk of Court all
books, receipts, accounts and other papers pertaining to the Estate of Marcelo de Borja.
This motion was answered by the administrator contending that the Report referred to
was already clear and enough, the income as well as the expenditures being specified
therein; that he had to spend for the repairs of the properties of the Estate damaged
during the Japanese occupation; that the allegation that during the administration of
Quintin de Boria the Estate realized a profit of P100,000 was not true, because instead of
gain there was even a shortage in the funds although said administrator had collected all
his fees (honorarios) and commissions corresponding to the entire period of his
incumbency; that the obligations mentioned in said report will be liquidated before the
termination of the proceedings in the same manner as it is done in any other intestate
case; that he was willing to submit all the receipts of the accounts for the examination of
the interested parties before the Clerk or before the Court itself; that this Intestate could
be terminated, the project of partition having been allowed and confirmed by the
Supreme Court and that the Administrator was also desirous of terminating it definitely for
the benefit of all the parties.
On September 14, 1949, the administrator filed another statement of accounts covering
the period of from March 1, 1945, to July 31, 1949, which showed a cash balance of
P71.95, with pending obligations in the sum of P35,810.
The heirs of Quintin de Borja, Juan de Borja and his sisters, registered their opposition
said statement of accounts and prayed the Court to disapprove the same and to appoint
an account to go over the books of the administrator and to submit a report thereon as
soon as possible. The heir Juliana de Borja also formally offered her objection to the
approval of the accounts submitted by the administrator and prayed further that said
administrator be required to submit a complete accounting of his administration of the
Estate from 1937 to 1949. On the other hand, Francisco de Borja and Miguel B. Dayco,
as the only heir of the deceased Crisanta de Borja, submitted to the Court an agreement
to relieve the administrator from accounting for the period of the Japanese occupation;
that as to the accounting from 1937 to 1941, they affirmed their conformity with the
agreement entered into by all the heirs appearing in the Bill of Exceptions of Juliana de
Borja; and they have no objection to the approval of the statement of accounts submitted
by the administrator covering of the years 1945 to 1949.
On December 6, 1949, the administrator, answered the opposition of the heir Juliana de
Borja, alleging that the corresponding statement of accounts for the years 1937, 1938,
1939, 1940 and 1941 were presented and approved by the Court before and during the
Japanese occupation, but the records of the same were destroyed in the Office of the
Clerk of that Court during the liberation of the province of Rizal, and his personal records
were also lost during the Japanese occupation, when his house was burned; that Judge
Peña who was presiding over the Court in 1945 impliedly denied the petition of heirs to
require him to render an accounting for the period from 1942 to the early part of 1945, for
the reason that whatever money obtained from the Estate during said period could not be
made the subject of any adjudication it having been declared fiat money and without
value, and ordered that the statement of accounts be presented only for the period
starting from March 1, 1945. The administrator further stated that he was anxious to
terminate this administration but some of the heirs had not yet complied with the
conditions imposed in the project of partition which was approved by the Supreme Court;
that in accordance with said partition agreement, Juliana de Borja must deliver to the
administrator all the jewelry, objects of value, utensils and other personal belongings of
the deceased spouses Marcelo de Borja and Tircila Quiogue, which said heir had kept
and continued to retain in her possession; that the heirs of Quintin de Borja should
deliver to the administrator all the lands and a document transferring in favor of the
Intestate the two parcels of land with a total area of 71 hectares of cultivated land in
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija which were in the possession of said heirs, together with the
house of Feliciana Mariano Vda. de Sarangaya, which were the objects of Civil Case No.
6190 mentioned in Paragraph 11 of the project of partition; that as consequence of the
said dispossession the heirs of Quintin de Borja must deliver to the administrator the
products of the 71 hectares of land in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and the rentals of the
house of Feliciana Mariano or else render to the Court an accounting of the products of
these properties from the time they took possession of the same in 1937 to the present;
that there was a pending obligation amounting to P36,000 as of September 14, 1949,
which the heirs should pay before the properties adjudicated to them would be delivered.
The Court, however, ordered the administrator on December 10, 1949, to show and
prove by evidence why he should not be accounts the proceeds of his administration
from 1937.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
Meantime, Juliana de Borja filed a Constancia denying possession of any jewelry
belonging to the deceased spouses Marcelo de Borja and Tarcilla Quiogue or any other
personal belonging of said spouses, and signified her willingness to turn over to the
administrator the silver wares mentioned in Paragraph III of the project of partition, which
were the only property in her care, on the date that she would expect the delivery to her
of her share in the inheritance from her deceased parents.
On July 6, 1950, Juan de Borja and his sisters Marcela, Saturnina, Eufracia, Jacoba and
Olimpia, all surnamed de Borja, as heirs of Quintin de Borja, filed a motion for the
delivery to them of their inheritance in the estate, tendering to the administrator a
document ceding and transferring to the latter all the rights, interests and participation of
Quintin de Borja in Civil Case No. 7190 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
pursuant to the provisions of the project of Partition, and expressing their willingness to
put up a bond if required to do so by the Court, and on July 18, 1950, the Court ordered
the administrator to deliver to Marcela, Juan, Saturniana, Eufracia, Jacoba and Olimpia,
all surnamed de Borja, all the properties adjudicated to them in the Project of Partition
dated February 8, 1944, upon the latter's filing a bond in the sum of P10,000 conditioned
upon the payment of such obligation as may be ordered by the Court after a hearing on
the controverted accounts of the administrator. The Court considered the fact that the
heirs had complied with the requirement imposed by the Project of Partition when they
tendered the document ceding and transferring the rights and interests of Quintin de
Borja in the aforementioned lands and expressed the necessity of terminating the
proceedings as soon as practicable, observing that the Estate had been under
administration for over twenty-five years already. The Court, however, deferred action on
the petition filed by the special administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Juliana de Borja
until after compliance with the conditions imposed by the project of partition. But on July
20, 1950, apparently before the properties were delivered to the heirs, Francisco de
Borja and Miguel B. Dayco filed a motion informing the Court that the two parcels of land
located in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, produced some 21,300 cavans of palay, amounting
to P213,000 at P10 per cavan, which were enjoyed by some heirs; that the administrator
Crisanto de Borja had not taken possession of the same for circumstances beyond his
control; and that there also existed the sum of P70,204 which the former administrator,
Quintin de Borja, received from properties that were redeemed, but which amount did not
come into the hands of the present, administrator because according to reliable
information, same was delivered to the heir Juliana de Borja who deposited it in her
name at the Philippine National Bank. It was, therefore prayed that the administrator be
required to exert the necessary effort to ascertain the identity of the person or persons
who were in possession of the same amount and of the value of the products of the lands
in Mayapyap, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and to recover the same for the Intestate
Estate.
On July 28, 1950, the special administratrix of the estate of Juliana de Borja, then
deceased, filed an answer to the motion of these two heirs, denying the allegation that
said heir any product of the lands mentioned from Quintin de Borja, and informed the
Court that the Mayapyap property had always been in the possession of Francisco de
Borja himself and prayed the court that the administrator be instructed to demand all the
fruits and products of said property from Francisco de Borja.
On July 28, 1950, the heirs of Quintin de Borja also filed their opposition to the said
motion of Francisco de Borja and Miguel B. Dayco on the ground that the petition was
superfluous because the present proceeding was only for the approval of the statement
of accounts filed by the administrator; that said motion was improper because it was
asking the Court to order the administrator to perform what he was duty bound to do; and
that said heirs were already barred or stopped from raising that question in view of their
absolute ratification of and assent to the statement of accounts submitted by the
administrator.
On August 16, 1950, by order of the Court, the properties adjudicated to Juliana de Borja
in the project of Partition were finally delivered to the estate of said heir upon the filing of
a bond for P20,000. In that same order, the Court denied the administrator's motion to
reconsider the order of July 18, 1950, requiring him to deliver to the heirs of Quintin de
Borja the properties corresponding to them, on the ground that there existed no sufficient
reason to disturb said order. It also ruled that as the petition of Francisco de Borja and
Miguel B. Dayco made mention of certain properties allegedly belonging to the Intestate,
said petition should properly be considered to gather with the final accounts of the
administrator.
The administrator raised the matter by certiorari to this Tribunal, which was, docketed as
G.R. No. L-4179, and on May 30, 1951, We rendered decision affirming the order
complained of, finding that the Juan de Borja and sisters have complied with the
requirement imposed in the Project of Partition upon the tender of the document of
cession of rights and quit-claim executed by Marcela de Borja, the administratrix of the
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
19
Estate of Quintin de Borja, and holding that the reasons advanced by the administrator in
opposing the execution of the order of delivery were trivial.
On August 27, 1951, the administrator filed his amended statement of accounts covering
the period from March 1, 1945, to July 31, 1949, which showed a cash balance of
P36,660. An additional statement of accounts filed on August 31, 1961 for the period of
from August 1, 1949, to August 31, 1951, showed a cash balance of P5,851.17 and
pending obligations in the amount of P6,165.03.
The heirs of Quintin de Borja again opposed the approval of the statements of accounts
charging the administrator with having failed to include the fruits which the estate should
have accrued from 1941 to 1951 amounting to P479,429.70, but as the other heirs
seemed satisfied with the accounts presented by said administrator and as their group
was only one of the 4 heirs of Intestate Estate, they prayed that the administrator be held
liable for only P119,932.42 which was 1/4 of the amount alleged to have been omitted.
On October 4, 1951, the administrator filed a reply to said opposition containing a
counterclaim for moral damages against all the heirs of Quintin de Borja in the sum of
P30,000 which was admitted by the Court over the objection of the heirs of Quintin de
Borja that the said pleading was filed out of time.
The oppositors, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, then filed their answer to the counterclaim
denying the charges therein, but later served interrogatories on the administrator relative
to the averments of said counterclaim. Upon receipt of the answer to said interrogatories
specifying the acts upon which the claim for moral damages was based, the oppositors
filed an amended answer contending that inasmuch as the acts, manifestations and
pleadings referred to therein were admittedly committed and prepared by their lawyer,
Atty. Amador E. Gomez, same cannot be made the basis of a counterclaim, said lawyer
not being a party to the action, and furthermore, as the acts upon which the claim for
moral damages were based had been committed prior to the effectivity of the new Civil
Code, the provisions of said Code on moral damages could not be invoked. On January
15, 1952, the administrator filed an amended counterclaim including the counsel for the
oppositors as defendant.
There followed a momentary respite in the proceedings until another judge was assigned
to preside over said court to dispose of the old case pending therein. On August 15,
1952, Judge Encarnacion issued an order denying admission to administrator's amended
counterclaim directed against the lawyer, Atty. Amador E. Gomez, holding that a lawyer,
not being a party to the action, cannot be made answerable for counterclaims. Another
order was also issued on the same date dismissing the administrator's counterclaim for
moral damages against the heirs of Quintin de Borja and their counsel for the alleged
defamatory acts, manifestation and utterances, and stating that granting the same to be
meritorious, yet it was a strictly private controversy between said heirs and the
administrator which would not in any way affect the interest of the Intestate, and,
therefore, not proper in an intestate proceedings. The Court stressed that to allow the
ventilation of such personal controversies would further delay the proceedings in the
case which had already lagged for almost 30 years, a situation which the Court would not
countenance.
Having disposed of these pending incidents which arose out of the principal issue, that is,
the disputed statement of accounts submitted by the administrator, the Court rendered
judgment on September 5, 1952, ordering the administrator to distribute the funds in his
possession to the heirs as follows: P1,395.90 to the heirs of Quintin de Borja; P314.99 to
Francisco de Borja; P314.99 to the Estate of Juliana de Borja and P314.99 to Miguel B.
Dayco, but as the latter still owed the intestate the sum of P900, said heirs was ordered
to pay instead the 3 others the sum of P146.05 each. After considering the testimonies of
the witnesses presented by both parties and the available records on hand, the Court
found the administrator guilty of maladministration and sentenced Crisanto de Borja to
pay to the oppositors, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, the sum of P83,337.31, which was
1/4 of the amount which the state lost, with legal interest from the date of the judgment.
On the same day, the Court also issued an order requiring the administrator to deliver to
the Clerk of that Court PNB Certificate of Deposit No. 211649 for P978.50 which was
issued in the name of Quintin de Borja.
The administrator, Dr. Crisanto de Borja, gave notice to appeal from the lower Court's
orders of August 15, 1952, the decision of September 5, 1952, and the order of even
date, but when the Record on Appeal was finally approved, the Court ordered the
exclusion of the appeal from the order of September 5, 1952, requiring the administrator
to deposit the PNB Certificate of Deposit No. 2114649 with the Clerk of Court, after the
oppositors had shown that during the hearing of that incident, the parties agreed to abide
by whatever resolution the Court would make on the ownership of the funds covered by
that deposit.
20 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73

The issues. — Reducing the issues to bare essentials, the questions left for our
determination are: (1) whether the counsel for a party in a case may be included as a
defendant in a counterclaim; (2) whether a claim for moral damages may be entertained
in a proceeding for the settlement of an estate; (3) what may be considered as acts of
maladministration and whether an administrator, as the one in the case at bar, may be
held accountable for any loss or damage that the estate under his administration may
incur by reason of his negligence, bad faith or acts of maladministration; and (4) in the
case at bar has the Intestate or any of the heirs suffered any loss or damage by reason
of the administrator's negligence, bad faith or maladministration? If so, what is the
amount of such loss or damage?
I. — Section 1, Rule 10, of the Rules of Court defines a counterclaim as:
SECTION 1. Counterclaim Defined. — A counterclaim is any claim, whether for money or
otherwise, which a party may have against the opposing party. A counterclaim need not
dismiss or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party, but may claim relief
exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought by the opposing party's claim.
incidental questions entirely foreign in probate proceedings should not be encouraged for
to do otherwise would run counter to the clear intention of the law, for it was held that:
The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of the creditors
and those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and
expenses of administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law
(Magabanua vs. Akel, 72 Phil., 567, 40 Off Gaz., 1871).
III. and IV. — This appeal arose from the opposition of the heirs of Quintin de Borja to the
approval of the statements of accounts rendered by the administrator of the Intestate
Estate of Marcelo de Borja, on the ground that certain fruits which should have been
accrued to the estate were unaccounted for, which charge the administrator denied. After
a protracted and extensive hearing on the matter, the Court, finding the administrator, Dr.
Crisanto de Borja, guilty of certain acts of maladministration, held him liable for the
payment to the oppositors, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, of 1/4 of the unreported income
which the estate should have received. The evidence presented in the court below bear
out the following facts:

It is an elementary rule of procedure that a counterclaim is a relief available to a party- (a) The estate owns a 6-door building, Nos. 1541, 1543, 1545, 1547, 1549 and 1551 in
defendant against the adverse party which may or may not be independent from the Azcarraga Street, Manila, situated in front of the Arranque market. Of this property, the
main issue. There is no controversy in the case at bar, that the acts, manifestations and administrator reported to have received for the estate the following rentals:
actuations alleged to be defamatory and upon which the counterclaim was based were
done or prepared by counsel for oppositors; and the administrator contends that as the Period of time
very oppositors manifested that whatever civil liability arising from acts, actuations,
pleadings and manifestations attributable to their lawyer is enforceable against said Total rentals
lawyer, the amended counterclaim was filed against the latter not in his individual or
personal capacity but as counsel for the oppositors. It is his stand, therefore, that the Annual
lower erred in denying admission to said pleading. We differ from the view taken by the monthly rental
administrator. The appearance of a lawyer as counsel for a party and his participation in
a case as such counsel does not make him a party to the action. The fact that he March to December, 1945
represents the interests of his client or that he acts in their behalf will not hold him liable
for or make him entitled to any award that the Court may adjudicate to the parties, other P3,085.00
than his professional fees. The principle that a counterclaim cannot be filed against
persons who are acting in representation of another — such as trustees — in their P51.42
individual capacities (Chambers vs. Cameron, 2 Fed. Rules Service, p. 155; 29 F. Supp.
742) could be applied with more force and effect in the case of a counsel whose January to December, 1946
participation in the action is merely confined to the preparation of the defense of his
client. Appellant, however, asserted that he filed the counterclaim against said lawyer not 4,980.00
in his individual capacity but as counsel for the heirs of Quintin de Borja. But as we have
already stated that the existence of a lawyer-client relationship does not make the former 69.17
a party to the action, even this allegation of appellant will not alter the result We have
arrived at. January to December, 1947

Granting that the lawyer really employed intemperate language in the course of the 8,330.00
hearings or in the preparation of the pleadings filed in connection with this case, the
remedy against said counsel would be to have him cited for contempt of court or take 115.70
other administrative measures that may be proper in the case, but certainly not a
counterclaim for moral damages. January to December, 1948

II. — Special Proceedings No. 6414 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig branch) 9,000.00
was instituted for the purpose of settling the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja. In
taking cognizance of the case, the Court was clothed with a limited jurisdiction which 125.00
cannot expand to collateral matters not arising out of or in any way related to the
settlement and adjudication of the properties of the deceased, for it is a settled rule that January to December, 1949
the jurisdiction of a probate court is limited and special (Guzman vs. Anog, 37 Phil. 361).
Although there is a tendency now to relax this rule and extend the jurisdiction of the 8,840.00
probate court in respect to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its
recognized powers (14 Am. Jur. 251-252), this should be understood to comprehend only 122.77
cases related to those powers specifically allowed by the statutes. For it was even said
that: January to December, 1950

Probate proceedings are purely statutory and their functions limited to the control of the 6,060.00
property upon the death of its owner, and cannot extend to the adjudication of collateral
questions (Woesmes, The American Law of Administration, Vol. I, p. 514, 662-663). 184.16

It was in the acknowledgment of its limited jurisdiction that the lower court dismissed the Total
administrator's counterclaim for moral damages against the oppositors, particularly
against Marcela de Borja who allegedly uttered derogatory remarks intended to cast P40,295.00
dishonor to said administrator sometime in 1950 or 1951, his Honor's ground being that
the court exercising limited jurisdiction cannot entertain claims of this kind which should The oppositors, in disputing this record income, presented at the witness stand Lauro
properly belong to a court general jurisdiction. From what ever angle it may be looked at, Aguila, a lawyer who occupied the basement of Door No. 1541 and the whole of Door
a counterclaim for moral damages demanded by an administrator against the heirs for No. 1543 from 1945 to November 15, 1949, and who testified that he paid rentals on said
alleged utterances, pleadings and actuations made in the course of the proceeding, is an apartments as follows:
extraneous matter in a testate or intestate proceedings. The injection into the action of
1945
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
 21
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73

Door No. 1541 (basement) P5,035.00

February
1948
P20.00 January-December

Door No. 1543 P1,920.00

March
January-December
20.00
P5,150.00
For 7 months at P300
1949
April January-November 15

60.00 P1,680.00

a month January-December

P2,100.00 P4,315.00

May-December From the testimony of said witness, it appears that from 1945 to November 15,1949, he
paid a total of P28,200 for the lease of Door No. 1543 and the basement of Door No.
800.00 1541. These figures were not controverted or disputed by the administrator but claim that
said tenant subleased the apartments occupied by Pedro Enriquez and Soledad Sodora
Total and paid the said rentals, not to the administrator, but to said Enriquez. The transcript of
the testimony of this witness really bolster this contention — that Lauro Aguila talked with
P900.00 said Pedro Enriquez when he leased the aforementioned apartments and admitted
paying the rentals to the latter and not to the administrator. It is interesting to note that
1946 Pedro Enriquez is the same person who appeared to be the administrator's collector, duly
January-December authorized to receive the rentals from this Azcarraga property and for which services,
said Enriquez received 5 per cent of the amount he might be able to collect as
P1,200.00 commission. If we are to believe appellant's contention, aside from the commission that
Pedro Enriquez received he also sublet the apartments he was occupying at a very much
January-December higher rate than that he actually paid the estate without the knowledge of the
administrator or with his approval. As the administrator also seemed to possess that
P4,080.00 peculiar habit of giving little importance to bookkeeping methods, for he never kept a
ledger or book of entry for amounts received for the estate, We find no record of the
1947 rentals the lessees of the other doors were paying. It was, however, brought about at the
January hearing that the 6 doors of this building are of the same sizes and construction and the
lower Court based its computation of the amount this property should have earned for the
P100.00 estate on the rental paid by Atty. Aguila for the 1 1/2 doors that he occupied. We see no
excuse why the administrator could not have taken cognizance of these rates and
January received the same for the benefit of the estate he was administering, considering the fact
that he used to make trips to Manila usually once a month and for which he charged to
P380.00 the estate P8 as transportation expenses for every trip.

February Basing on the rentals paid by Atty. Aguila for 1 1/2 doors, the estate received P112,800
from February 1, 1945, to November 15, 1949, for the 6 doors, but the lower Court held
100.00 him accountable not only for the sum of P34,235 reported for the period ranging from
March 1, 1945, to December 31, 1949, but also for a deficit of P90,525 or a total of
February P124,760. The record shows, however that the upper floor of Door No. 1549 was vacant
in September, 1949, and as Atty. Aguila used to pay P390 a month for the use of an
380.00 entire apartment from September to November, 1949, and he also paid P160 for the use
of the basement of an apartment (Door No. 1541), the use, therefore, of said upper floor
March would cost P230 which should be deducted, even if the computation of the lower Court
would have to be followed.
180.00
There being no proper evidence to show that the administrator collected more rentals
March 1-15 than those reported by him, except in the instance already mentioned, We are reluctant
to bold him accountable in the amount for which he was held liable by the lower Court,
190.00 and We think that under the circumstances it would be more just to add to the sum
reported by the administrator as received by him as rents for 1945-1949 only, the
April-December difference between the sum reported as paid by Atty. Aguila and the sum actually paid by
the latter as rents of 1 1/2 of the apartments during the said period, or P25,457.09 1/4 of
1,140.00 which is P6,364.27 which shall be paid to the oppositors.

March 16-December The record also shows that in July, 1950, the administrator delivered to the other heirs
Doors Nos. 1545, 1547, 1549 and 1551 although Doors Nos. 1541 and 1543 adjudicated
4,085.00 to the oppositors remained under his administration. For the period from January to June,
1950, that the entire property was still administered by him, the administrator reported to
P1,820.00 have received for the 2 oppositors' apartments for said period of six months at P168.33 a

NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA

22 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
month, the sum of P1,010 which belongs to the oppositors and should be taken from the
amount reported by the administrator.
The lower Court computed at P40 a month the pre-war rental admittedly received for
every apartment, the income that said property would have earned from 1941 to 1944, or
a total of P11,520, but as We have to exclude the period covered by the Japanese
occupation, the estate should receive only P2,880 1/4 of which P720 the administrator
should pay to the oppositors for the year 1941.
(b) The Intestate estate also owned a parcel of land in Mayapyap, Nueva Ecija, with an
area of 71 hectares, 95 ares and 4 centares, acquired by Quintin de Borja the spouses
Cornelio Sarangaya and Feliciana Mariano in Civil Case NO. 6190 of the Court of First
Instance of said province, In virtue of the agreement entered into by the heirs, this
property was turned over by the estate of Quintin de Borja to the intestate and formed
part of the general mass of said estate. The report of the administrator failed to disclose
any return from this property alleging that he had not taken possession of the same. He
does not deny however that he knew of the existence of this land but claimed that when
he demanded the delivery of the Certificate of Title covering this property, Rogelio
Limaco, then administrator of the estate of Quintin de Borja, refused to surrender the
same and he did not take any further action to recover the same.
To counteract the insinuation that the Estate of Quintin de Borja was in possession of this
property from 1940 to 1950, the oppositors presented several witnesses, among them
was an old man, Narciso Punzal, who testified that he knew both Quintin and Francisco
de Borja; that before the war or sometime in 1937, the former administrator of the
Intestate, Quintin de Borja, offered him the position of overseer (encargado) of this land
but he was notable to assume the same due to the death of said administrator; that on
July 7, 1951, herein appellant invited him to go to his house in Pateros, Rizal, and while
in said house, he was instructed by appellant to testify in court next day that he was the
overseer of the Mayapyap property for Quintin de Borja from 1937-1944, delivering the
yearly proceeds of 1,000 cavanes of Palay to Rogelio Limaco; that he did not need to be
afraid because both Quintin de Borja and Rogelio Limaco were already dead. But as he
knew that the facts on which he was to testify were false, he went instead to the house of
one of the daughters of Quintin de Borja, who, together with her brother, Atty. Juan de
Borja, accompanied him to the house of the counsel for said oppositors before whom his
sworn declaration was taken (Exh. 3).
Other witnesses, i.e., Isidro Benuya, Federico Cojo, Emilio de la Cruz and Ernesto
Mangulabnan, testified that they were some of the tenants of the Mayapyap property;
that they were paying their shares to the overseers of Francisco de Borja and sometimes
to his wife, which the administrator was not able to contradict, and the lower Court found
no reason why the administrator would fail to take possession of this property
considering that this was even the subject of the agreement of February 16, 1940,
executed by the heirs of the Intestate.
The lower Court, giving due credence to the testimonies of the witnesses for the
oppositors, computed the loss the estate suffered in the form of unreported income from
the rice lands for 10 years at P67,000 (6,700 a year)and the amount of P4,000 from the
remaining portion of the land not devoted to rice cultivation which was being leased at
P20 per hectare. Consequently, the Court held the administrator liable to appellees in the
sum of P17,750 which is 1/4 of the total amount which should have accrued to the estate
for this item.
But if We exclude the 3 years of occupation, the income for 7 years would be P46,900 for
the ricelands and P2,800 (at P400 a year) for the remaining portion not developed to rice
cultivation or a total of P48,700, 1/4 of which is P12,175 which We hold the administrator
liable to the oppositors.
(c) The Hacienda Jalajala located in said town of Rizal, was divided into 3 parts: the
Punta section belonged to Marcelo de Borja, the Bagombong pertained to Bernardo de
Borja and Francisco de Borja got the Jalajala proper. For the purpose of this case, we will
just deal with that part called Junta. This property has an area of 1,345, hectares, 29 ares
and 2 centares (Exh. 36) of which, according to the surveyor who measured the same,
200 hectares were of cultivated rice fields and 100 hectares dedicated to the planting of
upland rice. It has also timberland and forest which produce considerable amount of
trees and firewoods. From the said property which has an assessed value of P115,000
and for which the estates pay real estate tax of P1,500 annually, the administrator
reported the following:
Year
Income
Expenditure (not including administration's fees
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
1945...........
P625.00
P1,310.42
1946.............
1,800.00
3,471.00
1947.............
2,550.00
2,912.91
1948.............
1,828.00
3,311.88
1949.............
3,204.50
4,792.09
1950.............
2,082.00
2,940.91
P12,089.50
P18,739.21
This statement was assailed by the oppositors and to substantiate their charge that the
administrator did not file the true income of the property, they presented several
witnesses who testified that there were about 200 tenants working therein; that these
tenants paid to Crisanto de Borja rentals at the rate of 6 cavanes of palay per hectare;
that in the years of 1943 and 1944, the Japanese were the ones who collected their
rentals, and that the estate could have received no less than 1,000 cavanes of palay
yearly. After the administrator had presented witnesses to refute the facts previously
testified to by the witnesses for the oppositors, the Court held that the report of the
administrator did not contain the real income of the property devoted to rice cultivation,
which was fixed at 1,000 cavanes every year — for 1941, 1942, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948,
1949 and 1950, or a total of 8,000 cavanes valued at P73,000. But as the administrator
accounted for the sum of P11,155 collected from rice harvests and if to this amount we
add the sum of P8,739.20 for expenses, this will make a total of P19,894.20, thus leaving
a deficit of P53,105.80, ¼ of which will be P13,276.45 which the administrator is held
liable to pay the heirs of Quintin de Borja.
It was also proved during the hearing that the forest land of this property yields
considerable amount of marketable firewoods. Taking into consideration the testimonies
of witnesses for both parties, the Court arrived at the conclusion that the administrator
sold to Gregorio Santos firewoods worth P600 in 1941, P3,500 in 1945 and P4,200 in
1946 or a total of P8,300. As the report included only the amount of P625, there was a
balance of P7,675 in favor of the estate. The oppositors were not able to present any
proof of sales made after these years, if there were any and the administrator was held
accountable to the oppositors for only P1,918.75.
(d) The estate also, owned ricefields in Cainta, Rizal, with a total area of 22 hectares, 76
ares and 66 centares. Of this particular item, the administrator reported an income of
P12,104 from 1945 to 1951. The oppositors protested against this report and presented
witnesses to disprove the same.
Basilio Javier worked as a tenant in the land of Juliana de Borja which is near the land
belonging to the Intestate, the 2 properties being separated only by a river. As tenant of
Juliana de Borja, he knew the tenants working on the property and also knows that both
lands are of the same class, and that an area accommodating one cavan of seedlings
yields at most 100 cavanes and 60 cavanes at the least. The administrator failed to

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
overcome this testimony. The lower Court considering the facts testified to by this witness
made a finding that the property belonging to this Intestate was actually occupied by
several persons accommodating 13 ½ cavanes of seedlings; that as for every cavan of
seedlings, the land produces 60 cavanes of palay, the whole area under cultivation would
have yielded 810 cavanes a year and under the 50-50 sharing system (which was
testified by witness Javier), the estate would have received no less than 405 cavanes
every year. Now, for the period of 7 years — from 1941 to 1950, excluding the 3 years of
war — the corresponding earning of the estate should be 2,835 cavanes, out of which
the 405 cavanes from the harvest of 1941 is valued at P1,215 and the rest 2,430
cavanes at P10 is valued at P24,300, or all in all P25,515. If from this amount the
reported income of P12,104 is deducted, there will be a balance of P13,411.10 1/4 of
which or P3,352.75 the administrator is held liable to pay to the oppositors.
(e) The records show that the administrator paid surcharges and penalties with a total of
P988.75 for his failure to pay on time the taxes imposed on the properties under his
administration. He advanced the reason that he lagged in the payment of those tax
obligations because of lack of cash balance for the estate. The oppositors, however,
presented evidence that on October 29, 1939, the administrator received from Juliana de
Borja the sum of P20,475.17 together with certain papers pertaining to the intestate (Exh.
4),aside from the checks in the name of Quintin de Borja. Likewise, for his failure to pay
the taxes on the building at Azcarraga for 1947, 1948 and 1949, said property was sold
at public auction and the administrator had to redeem the same at P3,295.48, although
the amount that should have been paid was only P2,917.26. The estate therefore
suffered a loss of P378.22. Attributing these surcharges and penalties to the negligence
of the administrator, the lower Court adjudged him liable to pay the oppositors ¼ of
P1,366.97, the total loss suffered by the Intestate, or P341.74.
(f) Sometime in 1942, a big fire razed numerous houses in Pateros, Rizal, including that
of Dr. Crisanto de Borja. Thereafter, he claimed that among the properties burned therein
was his safe containing P15,000 belonging to the estate under his administration. The
administrator contended that this loss was already proved to the satisfaction of the Court
who, approved the same by order of January 8, 1943, purportedly issued by Judge
Servillano Platon(Exh. B). The oppositors contested the genuineness of this order and
presented on April 21, 1950, an expert witness who conducted several tests to determine
the probable age of the questioned document, and arrived at the conclusion that the
questioned ink writing "(Fdo)" appearing at the bottom of Exhibit B cannot be more than 4
years old (Exh. 39). However, another expert witness presented by the administrator
contradicted this finding and testified that this conclusion arrived at by expert witness Mr.
Pedro Manzañares was not supported by authorities and was merely the result of his
own theory, as there was no method yet discovered that would determine the age of a
document, for every document has its own reaction to different chemicals used in the
tests. There is, however, another fact that called the attention of the lower Court: the
administrator testified that the money and other papers delivered by Juliana de Borja to
him on October 29, 1939, were saved from said fire. The administrator justified the
existence of these valuables by asserting that these properties were locked by Juliana de
Borja in her drawer in the "casa solariega" in Pateros and hence was not in his safe
when his house, together with the safe, was burned. This line of reasoning is really
subject to doubt and the lower Court opined, that it runs counter to the ordinary course of
human behaviour for an administrator to leave in the drawer of the "aparador" of Juliana
de Borja the money and other documents belonging to the estate under his
administration, which delivery has receipted for, rather than to keep it in his safe together
with the alleged P15,000 also belonging to the Intestate. The subsequent orders of
Judge Platon also put the defense of appellant to bad light, for on February 6, 1943, the
Court required Crisanto de Borja to appear before the Court of examination of the other
heirs in connection with the reported loss, and on March 1, 1943, authorized the lawyers
for the other parties to inspect the safe allegedly burned (Exh. 35). It is inconceivable that
Judge Platon would still order the inspection of the safe if there was really an order
approving the loss of those P15,000. We must not forget, in this connection, that the
records of this case were burned and that at the time of the hearing of this incident in
1951, Judge Platon was already dead. The lower Court also found no reason why the
administrator should keep in his such amount of money, for ordinary prudence would
dictate that as an administration funds that come into his possession in a fiduciary
capacity should not be mingled with his personal funds and should have been deposited
in the Bank in the name of the intestate. The administrator was held responsible for this
loss and ordered to pay ¼ thereof, or the sum of P3,750.
(g) Unauthorized expenditures —
1. The report of the administrator contained certain sums amounting to P2,130 paid to
and receipted by Juanita V. Jarencio the administrator's wife, as his private secretary. In
explaining this item, the administrator alleged that he needed her services to keep
receipts and records for him, and that he did not secure first the authorization from the
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
23
court before making these disbursements because it was merely a pure administrative
function.
The keeping of receipts and retaining in his custody records connected with the
management of the properties under administration is a duty that properly belongs to the
administrator, necessary to support the statement of accounts that he is obliged to submit
to the court for approval. If ever his wife took charge of the safekeeping of these receipts
and for which she should be compensated, the same should be taken from his fee. This
disbursement was disallowed by the Court for being unauthorized and the administrator
required to pay the oppositors ¼, thereof or P532.50.
2. The salaries of Pedro Enriquez, as collector of the Azcarraga property; of Briccio
Matienzo and Leoncio Perez, as encargados, and of Vicente Panganiban and
Herminigildo Macetas as forest-guards were found justified, although un authorized, as
they appear to be reasonable and necessary for the care and preservation of the
Intestate.
3. The lower Court disallowed as unjustified and unnecessary the expenses for salaries
paid to special policemen amounting to P1,509. Appellant contended that he sought for
the services of Macario Kamungol and others to act as special policemen during harvest
time because most of the workers tilting the Punta property were not natives of Jalajala
but of the neighboring towns and they were likely to run away with the harvest without
giving the share of the estate if they were not policed. This kind of reasoning did not
appear to be convincing to the trial judge as the cause for such fear seemed to exist only
in the imagination. Granting that such kind of situation existed, the proper thing for the
administrator to do would have been to secure the previous authorization from the Court
if he failed to secure the help of the local police. He should be held liable for this
unauthorized expenditure and pay the heirs of Quintin de Borja ¼ thereof or P377.25.
4. From the year 1942 when his house was burned, the administrator and his family took
shelter at the house belonging to the Intestate known as "casa solariega" which, in the
Project of Partition was adjudicated to his father, Francisco de Borja. This property,
however, remained under his administration and for its repairs he spent from 1945-1950,
P1465,14, duly receipted.
None of these repairs appear to be extraordinary for the receipts were for nipa, for
carpenters and thatchers. Although it is true that Rule 85, section 2 provides that:
SEC. 2. EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR TO KEEP BUILDINGS IN REPAIR. — An
executor or administrator shall maintain in tenant able repair the houses and other
structures and fences belonging to the estate, and deliver the same in such repair to the
heirs or devisees when directed so to do by the court.
yet considering that during his occupancy of the said "casa solariega" he was not paying
any rental at all, it is but reasonable that he should take care of the expenses for the
ordinary repair of said house. Appellant asserted that had he and his family not occupied
the same, they would have to pay someone to watch and take care of said house. But
this will not excuse him from this responsibility for the disbursements he made in
connection with the aforementioned repairs because even if he stayed in another house,
he would have had to pay rentals or else take charge also of expenses for the repairs of
his residence. The administrator should be held liable to the oppositors in the amount of
P366.28.
5. Appellant reported to have incurred expenses amounting to P6,304.75 for alleged
repairs on the rice mill in Pateros, also belonging to the Intestate. Of the disbursements
made therein, the items corresponding, to Exhibits I, I-1, I-21, L-26, L-15, L-64 and L-65,
in the total sum of P570.70 were rejected by the lower court on the ground that they were
all unsigned although some were dated. The lower Court, however, made an oversight in
including the sum of P150 covered by Exhibit L-26 which was duly signed by Claudio
Reyes because this does not refer to the repair of the rice-mill but for the roofing of the
house and another building and shall be allowed. Consequently, the sum of P570.70
shall be reduced to P420.70 which added to the sum of P3,059 representing
expenditures rejected as unauthorized to wit:
Exhibit L-59 .............
P500.00
Yek Wing
Exhibit L-60 .............
24 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73

616.00
P64.00
Yek Wing
To Jalajala ...............
Exhibit L-61 .............
5 x P35.00
600.00
=
Yek Wing
P175.00
Exhibit L-62 .............
=
840.00
P399.00
Yek Wing
(Exhibit W-54).
Exhibit L-63 .............
From the report of the administrator, We are being made to believe that the Intestate
180.00 estate is a losing proposition and assuming arguendo that this is true, that precarious
financial condition which he, as administrator, should know, did not deter Crisanto de
Yek Wing Borja from charging to the depleted funds of the estate comparatively big amounts for his
transportation expenses. Appellant tried to justify these charges by contending that he
Exhibit Q-2 ............. used his own car in making those trips to Manila, Pasig and Cainta and a launch in
visiting the properties in Jalajala, and they were for the gasoline consumed. This rather
323.00 unreasonable spending of the estate's fund prompted the Court to observe that one will
have to spend only P0.40 for transportation in making a trip from Pateros to Manila and
scale "Howe" practically the same amount in going to Pasig. From his report for 1949 alone, appellant
made a total of 97 trips to these places or an average of one trip for every 3 1/2 days. Yet
Total ...................... We must not forget that it was during this period that the administrator failed or refused to
take cognizance of the prevailing rentals of commercial places in Manila that caused
P3,059.00 certain loss to the estate and for which he was accordingly held responsible. For the
reason that the alleged disbursements made for transportation expenses cannot be said
will give a total of P3,479 1/4 of which is P869.92 that belongs to the oppositors. to be economical, the lower Court held that the administrator should be held liable to the
oppositors for ¼ thereof or the sum of P1,292.50, though We think that this sum should
6. On the expenses for planting in the Cainta ricefields: — In his statement of accounts, still be reduced to P500.
appellant reported to have incurred a total expense of P5,977 for the planting of the
ricefields in Cainta, Rizal, from the agricultural year 1945-46 to 1950-51. It was proved 8. Other expenses:
that the prevailing sharing system in this part of the country was on 50-50 basis.
Appellant admitted that expenses for planting were advanced by the estate and The administrator also ordered 40 booklets of printed contracts of lease in the name of
liquidated after each harvest. But the report, except for the agricultural year 1950 the Hacienda Jalajala which cost P150. As the said hacienda was divided into 3 parts
contained nothing of the payments that the tenants should have made. If the total one belonging to this Intestate and the other two parts to Francisco de Boria and
expenses for said planting amounted to P5,977, ½ thereof or P2,988.50 should have Bernardo de Borja, ordinarily the Intestate should only shoulder ¹/3 of the said expense,
been paid by the tenants as their share of such expenditures, and as P965 was reported but as the tenants who testified during the hearing of the matter testified that those
by the administrator as paid back in 1950, there still remains a balance of P2,023.50 printed forms were not being used, the Court adjudged the administrator personally
unaccounted for. For this shortage, the administrator is responsible and should pay the responsible for this amount. The records reveal, that this printed form was not utilized
oppositors ¼ thereof or P505.87. because the tenants refused to sign any, and We can presume that when the
administrator ordered for the printing of the same, he did not foresee this situation. As
7. On the transportation expenses of the administrator: — It appears that from the year there is no showing that said printed contracts were used by another and that they are
1945 to 1951, the administrator charged the estate with a total of P5,170 for still in the possession of the administrator which could be utilized anytime, this
transportation expenses. The un receipted disbursements were correspondingly disbursement may be allowed.
itemized, a typical example of which is as follows:
The report also contains a receipt of payment made to Mr. Severo Abellera in the sum of
1950 P375 for his transportation expenses as one of the two commissioners who prepared the
Gastos de viaje del administrador From Pateros Project of Partition. The oppositors were able to prove that on May 24, 1941, the Court
To Pasig ................ authorized the administrator to withdraw from the funds of the intestate the sum of P300
to defray the transportation expenses of the commissioners. The administrator, however,
50 x P4.00 alleged that he used this amount for the payment of certain fees necessary in connection
with the approval of the proposed plan of the Azcarraga property which was then being
= processed in the City Engineer's Office. From that testimony, it would seem that appellant
could even go to the extent of disobeying the order of the Court specifying for what
P200.00 purpose that amount should be appropriated and took upon himself the task of judging
for what it will serve best. Since he was not able to show or prove that the money
To Manila ............... intended and ordered by the Court to be paid for the transportation expenses of the
commissioners was spent for the benefit of the estate as claimed, the administrator
50 x P10.00 should be held responsible therefor and pay to the oppositors ¼ of P375 or the sum of
P93.75.
=
The records reveal that for the service of summons to the defendants in Civil Case No.
P500.00 84 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, P104 was paid to the Provincial Sheriff of the
same province (Exhibit H-7). However, an item for P40 appeared to have been paid to
To Cainta ................ the Chief of Police on Jalajala allegedly for the service of the same summons. Appellant
claimed that as the defendants in said civil case lived in remote barrios, the services of
8 x P8.00 the Chief of Police as delegate or agent of the Provincial Sheriff were necessary. He
forgot probably the fact that the local chiefs of police are deputy sheriffs ex-officio. The
=
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
administrator was therefore ordered by the lower Court to pay ¼ of said amount or P10
to the oppositors.
The administrator included in his Report the sum of P550 paid to Atty. Filamor for his
professional services rendered for the defense of the administrator in G.R. No. L-4179,
which was decided against him, with costs. The lower Court disallowed this disbursement
on the ground that this Court provided that the costs of that litigation should not be borne
by the estate but by the administrator himself, personally.
Costs of a litigation in the Supreme Court taxed by the Clerk of Court, after a verified
petition has been filed by the prevailing party, shall be awarded to said party and will only
include his fee and that of his attorney for their appearance which shall not be more than
P40; expenses for the printing and the copies of the record on appeal; all lawful charges
imposed by the Clerk of Court; fees for the taking of depositions and other expenses
connected with the appearance of witnesses or for lawful fees of a commissioner (De la
Cruz, Philippine Supreme Court Practice, p. 70-71). If the costs provided for in that case,
which this Court ordered to be chargeable personally against the administrator are not
recoverable by the latter, with more reason this item could not be charged against the
Intestate. Consequently, the administrator should pay the oppositors ¼ of the sum of
P550 or P137.50.
(e) The lower Court in its decision required appellant to pay the oppositors the sum of
P1,395 out of the funds still in the possession of the administrator.
In the statement of accounts submitted by the administrator, there appeared a cash
balance of P5,851.17 as of August 31, 1961. From this amount, the sum of P1,002.96
representing the Certificate of Deposit No. 21619 and Check No. 57338, both of the
Philippine National Bank and in the name of Quintin de Borja, was deducted leaving a
balance of P4,848. As Judge Zulueta ordered the delivery to the oppositors of the
amount of P1,890 in his order of October 8, 1951; the delivery of the amount of P810 to
the estate of Juliana de Borja in his order of October 23, 1951, and the sum of P932.32
to the same estate of Juliana de Borja by order of the Court of February 29, 1952, or a
total of P3,632.32 after deducting the same from the cash in the possession of the
administrator, there will only be a remainder of P134.98.
The Intestate is also the creditor of Miguel B. Dayco, heir and administrator of the estate
of Crisanta de Borja, in the sum of P900 (Exhibits S and S-1). Adding this credit to the
actual cash on hand, there will be a total of P1,034.98, ¼, of which or P258.74 properly
belongs to the oppositors. However, as there is only a residue of P134.98 in the hands of
the administrator and dividing it among the 3 groups of heirs who are not indebted to the
Intestate, each group will receive P44.99, and Miguel B. Dayco is under obligation to
reimburse P213.76 to each of them.
The lower Court ordered the administrator to deliver to the oppositors the amount of
P1,395.90 and P314.99 each to Francisco de Borja and the estate of Juliana de Borja,
but as We have arrived at the computation that the three heirs not idebted to the
Intestate ought to receive P44.99 each out of the amount of P134.98, the oppositors are
entitled to the sum of P1,080.91 — the amount deducted from them as taxes but which
the Court ordered to be returned to them — plus P44.99 or a total of P1,125.90. It
appearing however, that ina Joint Motion dated November 27, 1952, duly approved by
the Court, the parties agreed to fix the amount at P1,125.58, as the amount due and said
heirs have already received this amount in satisfaction of this item, no other sum can be
chargeable against the administrator.
(f) The probate Court also ordered the administrator to render an accounting of his
administration during the Japanese occupation on the ground that although appellant
maintained that whatever money he received during that period is worthless, same
having been declared without any value, yet during the early years of the war, or during
1942-43, the Philippine peso was still in circulation, and articles of prime necessity as
rice and firewood commanded high prices and were paid with jewels or other valuables.
But We must not forget that in his order of December 11, 1945, Judge Peña required the
administrator to render an accounting of his administration only from March 1, 1945, to
December of the same year without ordering said administrator to include therein the
occupation period. Although the Court below mentioned the condition then prevailing
during the war-years, We cannot simply presume, in the absence of proof to that effect,
that the administrator received such valuables or properties for the use or in exchange of
any asset or produce of the Intestate, and in view of the aforementioned order of Judge
Peña, which We find no reason to disturb, We see no practical reason for requiring
appellant to account for those occupation years when everything was affected by the
abnormal conditions created by the war. The records of the Philippine National Bank
show that there was a current account jointly in the names of Crisanto de Borja and
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
25
Juanita V. Jarencio, his wife, with a balance of P36,750.35 in Japanese military notes
and admittedly belonging to the Intestate and We do not believe that the oppositors or
any of the heirs would be interested in an accounting for the purpose of dividing or
distributing this deposit.
(g) On the sum of P13,294 for administrator's fees:
It is not disputed that the administrator set aside for himself and collected from the estate
the sum of P13,294 as his fees from 1945 to 1951 at the rate of P2,400 a year. There is
no controversy as to the fact that this appropriated amount was taken without the order
or previous approval by the probate Court. Neither is there any doubt that the
administration of the Intestate estate by Crisanto de Borja is far from satisfactory.
Yet it is a fact that Crisanto de Borja exercised the functions of an administrator and is
entitled also to a certain amount as compensation for the work and services he has
rendered as such. Now, considering the extent and size of the estate, the amount
involved and the nature of the properties under administration, the amount collected by
the administrator for his compensation at P200 a month is not unreasonable and should
therefore be allowed.
It might be argued against this disbursement that the records are replete with instances
of highly irregular practices of the administrator, such as the pretended ignorance of the
necessity of a book or ledger or at least a list of chronological and dated entries of money
or produce the Intestate acquired and the amount of disbursements made for the same
properties; that admittedly he did not have even a list of the names of the lessees to the
properties under his administration, nor even a list of those who owed back rentals, and
although We certainly agree with the probate Court in finding appellant guilty of acts of
maladministration, specifically in mixing the funds of the estate under his administration
with his personal funds instead of keeping a current account for the Intestate in his
capacity as administrator, We are of the opinion that despite these irregular practices for
which he was held already liable and made in some instances to reimburse the Intestate
for amounts that were not properly accounted for, his claim for compensation as
administrator's fees shall be as they are hereby allowed.
Recapitulation. — Taking all the matters threshed herein together, the administrator is
held liable to pay to the heirs of Quintin de Borja the following:
Under Paragraphs III and IV:
(a) ...............................................................................
P7,084.27
(b) ...............................................................................
12,175.00
(c) ...............................................................................
16,113.95
(d) ...............................................................................
3,352.75
(e) ...............................................................................
341.74
(f) ................................................................................
3,750.00
(g) 1 .....................................................................
532.50
2 .....................................................................
377.25
3 .....................................................................
26 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
366.28
4 .....................................................................
869.92
5 .....................................................................
505.87
6 .....................................................................
500.00
7-a
b ..................................................................
93.75
c ..................................................................
10.00
d ...................................................................
137.50
P46,210.00
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is modified by reducing the amount
that the administrator was sentenced to pay the oppositors to the sum of P46,210.78
(instead of P83,337.31), plus legal interests on this amount from the date of the decision
appealed from, which is hereby affirmed in all other respects. Without pronouncement as
to costs. It is so ordered.
11. REYES VS ENRIQUEZ
FACTS: The subject matter of the present case is a parcel of land known as Lot No.
1851 Flr-133 with an aggregate area of 2,017 square meters located in Talisay, Cebu.[2]
According to petitioners Faustino Reyes, Esperidion Reyes, Julieta C. Rivera, and
Eutiquio Dico, Jr., they are the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the subject
parcel of land with Anacleto Cabrera as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. RT-3551 (T-8070). On April 17, 1996, petitioners executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes (the Extra Judicial Settlement)
involving a portion of the subject parcel of land. On March 21, 1997, the petitioners and
the known heirs of Anacleto Cabrera executed a Segregation of Real Estate and
Confirmation of Sale (the Segregation and Confirmation) over the same property. By
virtue of the aforestated documents, TCT No. RT-35551 (T-8070) was cancelled and new
TCTs were issued: (1) TCT No. T-98576 in the name of Anacleto Cabrera covering Lot
1851-A; (2) TCT No. T-98577 covering Lot 1851-B in the name of petitioner Eutiquio
Dico, Jr.; (3) TCT No. T-98578 covering Lot 1851-C in the name of petitioner Faustino
Reyes; (4) TCT No. T-98579 covering Lot 1851-D in the name of petitioner Esperidion
Reyes; (5) TCT No. T-98580 covering Lot 1851-E in the name of petitioner Julieta G.
Rivera; (6) TCT No. T-98581 covering Lot 1851-F in the name of Felipe Dico; and (7)
TCT No. T-98582 covering Lot 1851-G in the name of Archimedes C. Villaluz.[3]
Respondents Peter B. Enriquez (Peter) for himself and on behalf of his minor daughter
Deborah Ann C. Enriquez (Deborah Ann), also known as Dina Abdullah Enriquez
Alsagoff, on the other hand, alleges that their predecessor-in-interest Anacleto Cabrera
and his wife Patricia Seguera Cabrera (collectively the Spouses Cabrera) owned pro-
indiviso share in the subject parcel of land or 1051 sq. m. They further allege that
Spouses Cabrera were survived by two daughters Graciana, who died single and without
issue, and Etta, the wife of respondent Peter and mother of respondent Deborah Ann
who succeeded their parents rights and took possession of the 1051 sq. m. of the subject
parcel of land. During her lifetime, Graciana sold her share over the land to Etta. Thus,
making the latter the sole owner of the one-half share of the subject parcel of land.
Subsequently, Etta died and the property passed on to petitioners Peter and Deborah
Ann by virtue of an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate. On June 19, 1999, petitioners
Peter and Deborah Ann sold 200 sq. m. out of the 1051 sq. m. for P200,000.00 to
Spouses Dionisio and Catalina Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez), also their co-
respondents in the case at bar. After the sale, Spouses Fernandez took possession of
the said area in the subject parcel of land.[4]
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the subject land, they
discovered that certain documents prevent them from doing so: (1) Affidavit by Anacleto
Cabrera dated March 16, 1957 stating that his share in Lot No. 1851, the subject
property, is approximately 369 sq. m.; (2) Affidavit by Dionisia Reyes dated July 13, 1929
stating that Anacleto only owned of Lot No. 1851, while 302.55 sq. m. belongs to Dionisia
and the rest of the property is co-owned by Nicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes, Florentino
Reyes and Maximiano Dico; (3) Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale of the Estate of
Dionisia Reyes dated April 17, 1996; (4) certificates of title in the name of the herein
petitioners; and (5) Deed of Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale dated
March 21, 1997 executed by the alleged heirs of Dionisia Reyes and Anacleto Cabrera.
Alleging that the foregoing documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the respondents filed
a complaint for annulment or nullification of the aforementioned documents and for
damages. [5] They likewise prayed for the repartition and resubdivision of the subject
property.[6]
The RTC, upon motion of the herein petitioners, dismissed the case on the ground that
the respondents-plaintiffs were actually seeking first and foremost to be declared heirs of
Anacleto Cabrera since they can not demand the partition of the real property without
first being declared as legal heirs and such may not be done in an ordinary civil action,
as in this case, but through a special proceeding specifically instituted for the purpose.[7]
ISSUE: whether or not the respondents have to institute a special proceeding to
determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an ordinary civil
action to nullify the affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes, the Extra-Judicial
Settlement with the Sale of Estate of Dionisia Reyes, and the Deed of Segregation of
Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale executed by the heirs of Dionisia Reyes and the
heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as well as to cancel the new transfer certificates of title issued
by virtue of the above-questioned documents.
HELD: We answer in the affirmative.
An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.[10] A special proceeding, on
the other hand, is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a
particular fact.[11]
The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed to prosecute and
defend an action in court.[12] A real party in interest is the one who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the one entitled to the avails thereof.
[13] Such interest, to be considered a real interest, must be one which is present and
substantial, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest.[14] A plaintiff is a real party in interest when he is
the one who has a legal right to enforce or protect, while a defendant is a real party in
interest when he is the one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong
done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendants act or omission which had violated the
legal right of the former.[15] The purpose of the rule is to protect persons against undue
and unnecessary litigation.[16] It likewise ensures that the court will have the benefit of
having before it the real adverse parties in the consideration of a case.[17] Thus, a
plaintiffs right to institute an ordinary civil action should be based on his own right to the
relief sought.
In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property was registered
sue to recover the said property through the institution of an ordinary civil action, such as
a complaint for reconveyance and partition,[18] or nullification of transfer certificate of
titles and other deeds or documents related thereto,[19] this Court has consistently ruled
that a declaration of heirship is improper in an ordinary civil action since the matter is
within the exclusive competence of the court in a special proceeding. [20]
In the recent case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,[21] the Court had the occasion to
clarify its ruling on the issue at hand, to wit:
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are
putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its
settlement is that
 if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings
filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one,
then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and
settled in said special proceedings.
 Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed
and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have
himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer
ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his
declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or
distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate
of the deceased.[22]
In the instant case , while the complaint was denominated as an action for the
Declaration of Non-Existency[sic], Nullity of Deeds, and Cancellation of Certificates of

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
Title, etc., a review of the allegations therein reveals that the right being asserted by the
respondents are their right as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who they claim co-owned one-
half of the subject property and not merely one-fourth as stated in the documents the
respondents sought to annul. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the ruling in the
case of Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay v. Hon. Roy del Rosario[23] is applicable in the case at
bar. In the said case, the petitioners therein, claiming to be the legal heirs of the late
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay filed for annulment of the transfer certificates of title issued
in the name of Golden Bay Realty Corporation on the ground that the subject properties
rightfully belong to the petitioners predecessor and by virtue of succession have passed
on to them. In affirming the trial court therein, this Court ruled:
...(T)he plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it except the allegations
that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchays that they have been
declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the
legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in
court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take
precedence over the action for reconveyance.[24]
In the same manner, the respondents herein, except for their allegations, have yet to
substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to
the subject property. Neither is there anything in the records of this case which would
show that a special proceeding to have themselves declared as heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera had been instituted. As such, the trial court correctly dismissed the case for
there is a lack of cause of action when a case is instituted by parties who are not real
parties in interest. While a declaration of heirship was not prayed for in the complaint, it is
clear from the allegations therein that the right the respondents sought to protect or
enforce is that of an heir of one of the registered co-owners of the property prior to the
issuance of the new transfer certificates of title that they seek to cancel. Thus, there is a
need to establish their status as such heirs in the proper forum.
Furthermore, in Portugal,[25] the Court held that it would be superfluous to still subject
the estate to administration proceedings since a determination of the parties' status as
heirs could be achieved in the ordinary civil case filed because it appeared from the
records of the case that the only property left by the decedent was the subject matter of
the case and that the parties have already presented evidence to establish their right as
heirs of the decedent. In the present case, however, nothing in the records of this case
shows that the only property left by the deceased Anacleto Cabrera is the subject lot, and
neither had respondents Peter and Deborah Ann presented any evidence to establish
their rights as heirs, considering especially that it appears that there are other heirs of
Anacleto Cabrera who are not parties in this case that had signed one of the questioned
documents. Hence, under the circumstances in this case, this Court finds that a
determination of the rights of respondents Peter and Deborah Ann as heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera in a special proceeding is necessary.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated June 29, 2000
DISMISSING the complaint is REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
12. PORTUGAL VS PORTUGAL-BELTRAN
[G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005]
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., petitioners, vs. LEONILA
PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail the
September 24, 2002[1] Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 124[2] which dismissed, after trial, their
complaint for annulment of title for failure to state a cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following material allegations  claims of
the parties which they sought to prove by testimonial and documentary evidence during
the trial of the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo.[3]
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.[4]
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose
Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner.[5]
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
27
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,[6] later baptized as Leonila Perpetua
Aleli Portugal, herein respondent.[7]
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition and Waiver of Rights[8] over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who
died intestate on November 2, 1964.[9] In the deed, Portugals siblings waived their
rights, interests, and participation over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in
his favor.[10]
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of Jose Q.
Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo.[11]
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of
Estate of Deceased Person[12] adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT
No. 34292/T-172[13] in Portugals name was subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT
No. 159813[14] was issued by the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988
in the name of respondent, Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer by
respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in her name, petitioners filed before the
RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a complaint[15] against respondent for
annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her and the transfer certificate of
title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to the
deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that she
perjured herself when she made false representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in
her name be declared void and that the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to
cancel the TCT in respondents name and to issue in its stead a new one in their
(petitioners) name, and that actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees
and litigation expenses be awarded to them.
Following respondents filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order
chronicling, among other things, the issues as follows:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is
valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal
heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested
by plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the complaint.[16]
(Underscoring supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001,[17] after giving an account of
the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses and of their documentary evidence,
without resolving the issues defined during pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause
of action on the ground that petitioners status and right as putative heirs had not been
established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case, citing
Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.[18]
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at bar.
xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of Live Birth,
pictures (sic) and testimonial evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent.
Thus, the preliminary act of having a status and right to the estate of the decedent, was
sought to be determined herein. However, the establishment of a status, a right, or a
particular fact is remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of
28 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
Court), not an ordinary civil action whereby a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The operative term
in the former is to establish, while in the latter, it is to enforce, a right. Their status and
right as putative heirs of the decedent not having been established, as yet, the Complaint
failed to state a cause of action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs cause
to establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to sue
(Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra).[19] (Italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial courts ratio
decedendi in dismissing the case as diametrically opposed to this Courts following ruling
in Cario v. Cario,[20] viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579
[1993]) However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. (Nial, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In
such cases, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need
not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cario was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent to that of Heirs
of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in 1999), the appellate court found Cario to be
inapplicable, however, to the case in this wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cario case was the validity of
the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago Cario, whose death
benefits was the bone of contention between the two women both named Susan (viz.,
Susan Nicdao Cario and Susan Yee Cario) both of whom he married. It is not disputed in
said case that SPO4 S. Cario contracted two marriages with said two women during his
lifetime, and the only question was: which of these two marriages was validly celebrated?
The award of the death benefits of the deceased Cario was thus, merely an incident to
the question of which of the two marriages was valid. Upon the other hand, the case at
bench is of a different milieu. The main issue here is the annulment of title to property.
The only undisputed fact in this case is that the deceased Jose Portugal, during his
lifetime, owned a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
34292. However, here come two contending parties, herein plaintiffs-appellants and
defendant-appellee, both now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The
status and rights of the parties herein have not, therefore, been definitively established,
as yet. x x x. Necessarily and naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be
properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary civil action,
whereunder a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
protection or redress of a wrong. The institution of an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in
the present case is thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law prohibits or
forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration of
heirship, or the establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to be determined
in an ordinary civil action, not in an appropriate special proceeding brought for that
purpose, is thus to impinge upon this axiom. x x x[21] (Emphasis in the original,
underscoring supplied).
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002,[22] thus affirmed the trial courts
dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,[23] faulting the appellate court to
have erred when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed to state a
cause of action.
II.
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite the
existence of a later and contrary ruling in Cario, and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the
lower court failed to render judgment based on the evidence presented relative to the
issues raised during pre-trial, . . .[24] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that the
questioned CA decision be reversed, and a new one entered in accordance with the
prayers set forth in the instant complaint based on the above disquisition and evidence
adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the
pronouncements in Cario apply, a decision be entered remanding to the court a quo the
determination of the issues of which of the two marriages is valid, and the determination
of heirship and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and Leonila preparatory to the determination of the
annulment of title issued in the name of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.[25]
(Underscoring supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of Guido and
Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by
this Court as a reading of Cario shows; that Cario allows courts to pass on the
determination of heirship and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so long as it is
necessary to the determination of the case; and that contrary to the appellate courts
ruling, they had established their status as compulsory heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to institute a
special proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for
annulment of respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,[26] the therein
petitioners executed on March 17, 1994 an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, owners-claimants of the two lots mentioned
therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994 that a portion, if not all, of the two lots
had been titled in the name of the therein respondent Golden Bay Realty and
Development Corporation which in turn sold portions thereof to the therein individual
respondents. The therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of titles.
The therein respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein petitioners
to, inter alia, state a cause of action and prove their status as heirs. The trial court
granted the motion to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of itexcept the allegations
that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchaysthat they have been
declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the
legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in
court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take
precedence over the action for reconveyance . . .[27] (Italics in the original; underscoring
supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the petition was an
improper recourse, found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the case. Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera[28] and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,[29]
this Court held that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
In the above-cited case of Litam,[30] Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special proceeding for
issuance of letters of administration before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal,
alleging in his petition that he is the son of Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January
10, 1951 and is survived by him and his therein named seven (7) siblings who are
children of the decedent by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the
decedent contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera;
and that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the issuance of
letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, the surviving spouse of the decedent. The
CFI granted the petition and issued letters of administration to, on Marcosas request, her
nephew Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported siblings filed a civil
case before the same court, against the estate of Rafael Litam administrator Arminio
Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint,
Dy Tam and his purported siblings substantially reproduced the allegations made in his

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
petition in the special proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties allegedly
acquired during the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved incidents in
the special proceeding, both were jointly heard by the trial court, following which it
rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it, declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs
Dy Tam et al. are not the children of the decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for determination
was whether they are the legitimate children of Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were
married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of appellants Dy Tam et al., found
substantially correct the trial courts findings of fact and its conclusion that, among other
things, the birth certificates of Dy Tam et al. do not establish the identity of the deceased
Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father [and] it does not appear in the
said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in the
preparation and filing thereof; and that [t]he other documentary evidence presented by
[them] [is] entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage
between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . . as
children of said decedent.
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that the lower court should not have
declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa is the only heir of the decedent, for
such declaration is improper in the [civil case], it being within the exclusive competence
of the court in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding.
In Solivio,[31] also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased, who was a soltero, filed
before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding, Branch 23 of said court declared as
sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedents maternal aunt-half sister of his mother.
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the decedents paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved
to reconsider the courts order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent,
she claiming that she too was an heir. The court denied the motion on the ground of
tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil case
against Celedonia before the same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession, ownership
and damages. The civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which rendered
judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the appellate court affirmed the
said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed, among other
issues, whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain [the civil
action] for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanuevas share of the estate of [the
deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the
same court, this Court held that [i]n the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid
confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedents estate, a court should not interfere
with [estate] proceedings pending in a co-equal court, citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of
Pampanga.[32]
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon [c]onsidering that the estate proceedings are still
pending, but nonetheless [therein private respondent-Concordia Villanueva] had lost her
right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss
the merits of her claim in the interest of justice, and declared her an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas[33] cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted daughter, the
therein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her adoptive father was approved
in the proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of the decedent-adoptive
mother, following which the probate court directed that the records of the case be
archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul the project of
partition on the ground of lesion, preterition and fraud, and prayed that her adoptive
father immediately deliver to her the two lots allocated to her in the project of partition.
She subsequently filed a motion in the testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father
to deliver to her, among other things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties agreement to
suspend action or resolution on Juanitas motion in the testate estate proceedings for the
delivery to her of the two lots alloted to her until after her complaint in the civil case had
been decided, set said case for trial.
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
29
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for trial on the
ground that in the amended complaint she, in the meantime, filed, she acknowledged the
partial legality and validity of the project of partition insofar as she was allotted the two
lots, the delivery of which she was seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set aside
the April 27, 1966 order setting the civil case for hearing that there was no longer a
prejudicial question to her motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her
of the actual possession of the two lots. The trial court, by order of April 27, 1966, denied
the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.
The probate courts approval of the project of partition and directive that the records of the
case be sent to the archives notwithstanding, this Court held that the testate estate
proceedings had not been legally terminated as Juanitas share under the project of
partition had not been delivered to her. Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the
probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson,
supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the
heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor
has not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for the heir
who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the
same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or
administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent
action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a
decision or order of the probate o[r] intestate court already final and executed and re-
shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730,
741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil.
1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).
[34] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court setting the
civil case for hearing, but allowed the civil case to continue because it involves no longer
the two lots adjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are
putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its
settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special
proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one,
then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in
said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have
himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its
re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to
bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or
properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to
Portugals estate, executed on February 15, 1988[35] the questioned Affidavit of
Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court.[36] Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a
property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased
left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.[37]
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate
court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of
Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land,[38] to still subject it, under the circumstances of
the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to
establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the
estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous
in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case subject of the present case, could and
had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction
over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to
still subject Portugals estate to administration proceedings since a determination of
petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners,[39] the
trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the
30 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear
repeating, to wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal
heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested
by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint.[40]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24, 2002
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties and
render a decision on the above-enumerated issues defined during the pre-trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Exceptions
1. ENRICO VS HEIRS MEDINACELI
G.R. No. 173614
The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure assails the Order,[1] dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of its
Order,[2] dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage.
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and
Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity
of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the complaint
alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo,
Cagayan.[3] They begot seven children, herein respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn,
Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd.[4] On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died.
[5] On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo,
Cagayan.[6] Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away.[7]
In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was
entered into without the requisite marriage license. They argued that Article 34[8] of the
Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for at
least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was not
applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not have lived together under the
circumstances required by said provision. Respondents posited that the marriage of
Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters death, or on 1 May 2004, which
was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore,
petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of
marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance
impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and
wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from
the requirement of a marriage license. From their union were born Elvin Enrico and
Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991,
respectively. She further contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the
Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an
affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only
the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,[9] granting the dismissal of the Complaint
for lack of cause of action. It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,[10] dated 7 March 2003,
promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC elucidated on its position
in the following manner:
The Complaint should be dismissed.
1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court which took
effect on March 15, 2003 provides in Section 2, par. (a)[11] that a petition for Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
language of this rule is plain and simple which states that such a petition may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. The rule is clear and unequivocal that only the
husband or the wife may file the petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void
Marriage. The reading of this Court is that the right to bring such petition is exclusive and
this right solely belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased spouse cannot
substitute their late father in bringing the action to declare the marriage null and void.[12]
(Emphasis supplied.)
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense in the answer is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the [respondents] is hereby
DISMISSED with costs de officio. [13]
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by petitioner
of her Comment to the said motion, the RTC rendered an Order[14] dated 3 May 2006,
reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC reinstated the complaint on the
ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog,[15] which was
on the authority for holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to
assail a void marriage even after the death of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, applies only where both parties
to a void marriage are still living.[16] Where one or both parties are deceased, the RTC
held that the heirs may file a petition to declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded
on its stance, thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Nial vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March
14, 2000) in which the Supreme Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a deceased
person may file a petition for the declaration of his marriage after his death. The Order
subject of this motion for reconsideration held that the case of Nial vs. Bayadog is now
superseded by the new Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter
referred to as the Rule) because the Supreme Court has rejected the case of Nial vs.
Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void Marriages. The Order further held that
it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic) the only parties allowed to file an action for
declaration of nullity of their marriage and such right is purely personal and is not
transmissible upon the death of the parties.
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Nial vs. Bayadog and
Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view of this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case of Nial
vs. Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have to determine [the] basic
rights of the parties. The rights of the legitimate heirs of a person who entered into a void
marriage will be prejudiced particularly with respect to their successional rights. During
the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only an inchoate right over the property of the
said parents. Hence, during the lifetime of the parent, it would be proper that it should
solely be the parent who should be allowed to file a petition to declare his marriage void.
However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have already a vested right over
whatever property left by the parent. Such vested right should not be frustrated by any
rules of procedure such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights granted by
substantive law. The heirs, then, have a legal standing in Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by their parent,
especially when the marriage is illegal and feloniously entered into, it will give premium to
such union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask for the annulment of
the marriage. Such void marriage will be given a semblance of validity if the heirs will not
be allowed to file the petition after the death of the parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage is applicable only when both parties to a (sic) void marriage
are still living. Upon the death of anyone of the guilty party to the void marriage, his heirs
may file a petition to declare the the (sic) marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable as
it was not filed b the husband or the wife. It shall be the ordinary rule of civil procedure
which shall be applicable.[17]
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:
In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration dated October
31, 2005 and reinstate this case.[18]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order; however,
on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied the said motion on the ground that no new matter was
raised therein.[19]

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the
sole question of whether the case law as embodied in Nial, or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as specified in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.
At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court,
countenancing the hierarchy of courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent jurisdiction
with the Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for writs enforceable within their respective
regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well
advised against taking a direct recourse to this Court.[20] Instead, they should initially
seek the proper relief from the lower courts. As a court of last resort, this Court should
not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Where the
issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the competence of the Court of
Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle of hierarchy of courts.[21]
However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the discretionary power to brush aside
procedural lapses if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues
raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.[22] Moreover, notwithstanding
the dismissibility of the instant Petition for its failure to observe the doctrine on the
hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on a
pure question of law.
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A contrario,
respondents posit that it is Nial which is applicable, whereby the heirs of the deceased
person were granted the right to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
after his death.
We grant the Petition.
In reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion.
While it is true that Nial in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition
for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after the death
of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned
marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in
Nial recognized that the applicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages
involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration.[23] What we have before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage
sought to be declared void was entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As
can be gleaned from the facts, petitioners marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:
Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The
coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family
Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.[24]
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its publication
in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is
no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Nial,
because they vary in scope and application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in
its application. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004,
and it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC, which provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
31
There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When the
language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates
on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable
marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be
filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2;
Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be
filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of
the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate
heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can
only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to
seek its dissolution.[25] (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless, all is
not lost for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any
recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the
Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or
intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without
prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B.
Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
2. GARCIA-QUIANZON VS BELEN
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
FACTS:
A Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed
by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter . The petition
was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was
married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria
Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION; On 12 September 1994, Maria
Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes),
filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the (RTC) of Las Piñas City. In her
Petition, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and
born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting
on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of
Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted
during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To
prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for
Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In
the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and
personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to
prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her
late father’s estate.
32 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
OPPOSITION:, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the ground that venue of the petition was improperly
laid. The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a
resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of
decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City
RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the
necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in
Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s last
residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay.
CA For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of
Appeals upheld the conclusion that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.
ISSUE: Won Eliseo Quiazon Was A Resident Of Las Piñas And Therefore, The Petition
For Letters Of Administration Was Properly Filed With The Rtc Of Las Piñas;
HELD:
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of
the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent
resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of
the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule
in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule
73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense .14
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term "inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. 16 It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that
for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s
actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.19
THE VENUE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF ELISEO WAS
PROPERLY LAID IN LAS PIÑAS CITY . It is evident from the records that during his
lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City.
For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in
Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his
estate should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs
of a decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not
binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been
living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time
of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an
action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo
went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders
untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with
Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners’ submission that the
lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record.
Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to
be conclusive and binding upon this Court.21
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in
declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though
no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party
may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the
time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the
Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog23 applicable
four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed
therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to
therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from
voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage
had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible,
unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it
cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would
be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such
marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned
directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an
issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in
the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the
death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia, we now
proceed to determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being
bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage
between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of
Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish
of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent
evidence of marriage and the certification from the National Archive that no information
relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries
therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more
than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be found
in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote.
Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at
the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is
that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has not
shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who
are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named
in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of
Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to
the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the
creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in
estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the
decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming
evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’
pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a
desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good
grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to
her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the
distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be
considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August
2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
 Powers of Settlement Court
 Venue
G.R. No. L-8409 December 28, 1956
In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. EUGENIO
EUSEBIO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO,
and CARLOS EUSEBIO,oppositors-appellants.
Francisco M. Ramos and Valeriano Silva for appellee.
Filemon Cajator for appellants.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his
father, Andres Eusebio, who died on November 28, 1952, residing, according to said
petition, in the City of Quezon. On December 4, 1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin,
Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating that they are
illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the ground that
venue had been improperly filed. By an order, dated March 10, 1954, said court
overruled this objection and granted said petition. Hence, the case is before us on appeal
taken, from said order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her aforementioned sister and brothers.
The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on November 28,
1952, for Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizens or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at
the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court
of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
33
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.
It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and had
always been, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as
some other properties. Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr.
Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on
October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house and lot at 889-A España Extention, in
said City (Exhibit 2). While transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the
decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart failure), for which reason Dr. Eusebio took
him to his (Dr. Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the decedent remained until
he was brought to the UST Hospital, in the City of Manila, sometimes before November
26, 1952. On this date, he contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common law
wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later, he died therein of "acute
left ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease", at the age of seventy-
four (74) years (Exhibit A). Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in said house at
España Extention.
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San
Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the presumption is
that he retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory
proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a
new domicile is gained" (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p.70; Restatement of the Law on
Conflict of Laws, p. 47; In re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under the circumstances
surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have
been one of choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity
to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3)
intention to stay therein permanently (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Googrich,
Conflict of Laws, p. 169; Velilla vs. Posadas, 62 Phil., 624; Zuellig vs. Republic of the
Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz. Suppl. No. 11, p. 220). Admittedly, the decedent was juridically
capable of choosing a domicile and had been in Quezon City several days prior to his
demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to whether he intended to stay in that place
permanently.
There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appears to have
manifested his wish to live indefinitely in said city. His son, petitioner-appellee, who took
the witness stand, did not testify thereon, despite the allegation, in his answer to the
aforemention, opposition of the appellants herein, that "the deceased (had) decided to
reside . . . for the rest of his life, in Quezon City". Moreover, said appellee did not
introduce the testimony of his legitimate full brother and son of the decedent, Dr. Jesus
Eusebio, upon whose advice, presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A España
Extention was purchased, and who, therefore, might have cast some light on his
(decedent's) purpose in buying said property. This notwithstanding, the lower court held
that the decedent's intent to stay permanently in Quezon City is "manifest" from the
acquisition of said property and the transfer of his belonging thereto. This conclusion is
untenable.lawphil.net
The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent because he had been
adviced to do so "due to his illness", in the very words of herein appellee. It is not
improbable — in fact, its is very likely — that said advice was given and followed in order
that the patient could be near his doctor and have a more effective treatment. It is well
settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one's
own health", even if coupled with "knowledge that one will never again be able, on
account of illness, to return home." (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, pp. 172-173;
see, also, Shenton vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906; U.S. vs. Knight, D. C. Mont., 291
Fed. 129).
Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando,
Pampanga. Moreover, some of his children, who used to live with him in San Fernando,
Pampanga, remained in that municipality. Then, again, in the deed Exhibit 2, by virtue of
which said property at No. 889-A España Extention, Quezon City, was conveyed to him,
on October 29, 1952, or less than a month before his death , the decedent gave San
Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. Similarly, the "A" and "B" residence certificates
used by the decedent in aknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a notary public, was issued
in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the marriage contract Exhibit 1, signed by the
deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis, to Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST
Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or two (2) days prior to his demise, stated that his
residence is San Fernando, Pampanga. It is worthy of notice that Alfonso Eusebio, one of
the legitimate full brothers of the herein appellee, was a witness to said wedding, thus
indicating that the children of the deceased by his first marriage, including said appellee,
were represented on that occasion and would have objected to said statement about his
residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart from appellee's failure to prove
satisfactory that the decedent had decided to establish his home in Quezon City, the acts
of the latter, shortly and immediately before his death, prove the contrary. At any rate, the
presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1— which is particularly strong
34 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
when the domicile is one of the origin 2as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as
regards said decedent — has not been offset by the evidence of record.
The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being offered in evidence,
and refused to entertain the same in the order appealed from. The reason therefor are
deducible from its resolution in rejecting said documents during the hearing of the
incident at bar. The court then held:
Exihibits "1" and "2" are rejecting but the same may be attached to the
records for whatever action oppositors may want to take later on because
until now the personality of the oppositors has not been established whether
or not they have a right to intervene in this case, and the Court cannot pass
upon this question as the oppositors refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of
this Court and they maintain that these proceedings should be dismissed. (P.
10, t. s. n.)
In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be admitted in evidence
before appellants had established their "personality" to intervene in the case, referring
seemingly to their filiation. When appellants, however, sought, during said hearing, to
establish their relation with the deceased, as his alleged illegitimate children, His Honor,
the trial Judge sustained appellee's objection thereto stating:
Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this Court, and it seems
that you are now trying to prove the status of your client; you are leading so
that. The main point here is your contention that the deceased was never a
resident of Quezon City and that is why I allowed you to cross-examine. If
you are trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I will sustain the
objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court. This is
not yet the time to declare who are persons who should inherit. (p. 1, t. s. n.)
Thus, the lower court refused to consider appellant's evidence on the domicile of the
decedent, because of their alleged lack of "personality", but, when tried to establish such
"personality", they were barred from doing so on account of the question of venue raised
by him. We find ourselves unable to sanction either the foregoing procedure adopted by
the lower court or the inference it drew from the circumstances surrounding the case.
To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions. While, on the
one hand, he declared that appellants could not be permitted to introduce evidence on
the residence of the decedent, for they contestedthe jurisdiction of court , on the other
hand, he held, in the order appealed from, that, by cross-examining the appellee, said
appellants had submitted themselves to the authority of the court.
What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the beginning of the hearing, in
the lower court, appellants' counsel announced that he would take part therein " only to
question the jurisdiction, for the purpose of dismissing this proceeding," (p. 2, t.s.n.).
During the cross-examination of petitioner herein, said counsel tried to elicit the relation
between the decedent and the appellants. As, the appellee objected thereto, the court
said, addressing appellants' counsel: " Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction
of the court. . . . It you are trying to establish the status of the oppositors, I will sustain the
objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the court " (p. 7, t.s.n.).
Thereupon, appellants' counsel refused to do so, stating: "I will insist on my stand." Then,
too, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court rejected Exhibits 1 and 2, for the reason
that appellants "refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this court and they maintain that
these proceedings should bedismissed." Thus, appellants specially made of record that
they were not submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the
purpose only of assailing the same, and the court felt that appellants were not giving up
their stand, which was, and is, a fact.
At any rate, appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not only their
right to object to appellee's petition, but, also, that venue had been laid improperly. Such
facts were: (a) their alleged relationship with the decedent, 3 which, if true, entitle them to
proceed him under the Civil Code of the Philippines; and (b) his alleged residence is
Pampanga. In other words, the lower court should have admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 in
evidence and given thereto the proper effect, in connection with the issue under
consideration.
Appellee, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed in the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or improper venue?" In this
connection, it appears that on November 14, 1953, the Clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga received a petition of appellants herein, dated November 4, 1953,
for the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late Don Andres Eusebio". Attached to
said petition was petition for the docketing thereof free charge, pursuant to Rule 3,
section 22, of the Rules of Court. The latter petition was granted by an order dated
November 16, 1953, which was received by the cashier of said court on November 17,
1953, on which date the case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 957. On
December 14, 1953, Jesus, Eugenio, Amando and Alfonso, all surnamed Eusebio (the
children of the decedent by first marriage, including petitioner herein), moved for the
dismissal of said proceedings, owing to the pendency of the present case, before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, since November 16, 1953. This motion was granted in an
order dated December 21, 1953, relying upon the above Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules
of Court, pursuant to which "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at bar. Said
order did not pass upon the question of domicile or residence of the decedent. Moreover,
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
in granting the court first taking cognizance of the case exclusive jurisdiction over the
same, said provision of the Rules of Court evidently refers to cases triable before two or
more courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly have intended to deprive a
competent court of the authority vested therein by law, merely because a similar case
had been previously filed before a court to which jurisdiction is denied by law, for the
same would then be defeated by the will of one of the parties. More specially, said
provision refers mainly to non-resident decedents who have properties in several
provinces in the Philippines, for the settlement of their respective estates may
undertaken before the court of first instance of either one of said provinces, not only
because said courts then have concurrent jurisdiction — and, hence, the one first taking
cognizance of the case shall exclude the other courts — but, also, because the
statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of the Court immediately
follows the last part of the next preceding sentence, which deals with non-resident
decedents, whose estate may settled the court of first instance of any province in which
they have properties.lawphil.net
In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:
. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two
or more courts, and the question of venue is raised before the same, the court in which
the first case was filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so
held in the case of Taciana Vda. De Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be
decided, in the proceedings before the said court, that venue had been improperly laid,
the case pending therein should be dismissed and the corresponding proceedings may,
thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.
In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority,
therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having
been laid improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have sustained appellants'
opposition and dismissed appellee's petition.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and appellee's petition is
dismissed, with costs against the appellee. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding
Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and
AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.
Francisco Carreon for petitioners.
Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement
of the estate of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a
special administrator is sought to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at
Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of
administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26,
1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna , died intestate in the City
of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other
places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May
2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending
that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without
jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served
upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in
the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of
Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix;
and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia,
therefore, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of
Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B.
Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for
reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous,

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse
interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix
and as officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by
Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on
May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in
Southern Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the
Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental
petition modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the
lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for
the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2)
the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of
Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in
the original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has
expressly renounced her preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of
Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix.
The admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the
reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the beginning because the original
petition was deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental
petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of
interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of
Virginia G Fule as special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for
authority to take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third
persons as well as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling
attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special
administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real properties making up
the state of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by
Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to
reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix,
and admitting the supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1)
jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the
court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as
she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule
admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an
illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no
relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin
the special administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands of third
persons which have not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to
remove the special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the interest
of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss
the petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina
G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to
dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the special administratrix are those
provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to the previous
qualification made by the court that the administration of the properties subject of the
marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association should remain with the latter; and that the special administratrix had already
been authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and possession
of all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent with the
Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of
the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to
deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any qualifying
words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss,
Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of
July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of
Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to
allege in her original petition for letters of administration in the place of residence of the
decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B.
Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections
thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate.
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
35
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or
reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting
the authority of the special administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B.
Garcia also asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of
cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her
motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying
Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the
second, holding that the power allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct
and submit an inventory of the assets of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing
orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or failed
to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule;
(b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special
administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and
effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association,
Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B.
Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar
issued the other three questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G.
Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of
sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate; another,
directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably
belonging to the estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all
certificates of title in his possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified
with the word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge
Malvar, 2Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing
that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B.
Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three
months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified
that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that
he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special
action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before
Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the
alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27,
1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to
dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of
jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain
properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings
before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith
elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-
40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals,
Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of
administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On
February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed
Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B.
Garcia qualified and assumed the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the
pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on
January 30, 1975. She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-
19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the
Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it
being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his
court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending
before the Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December
11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue
and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special appearance of
March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that
36 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
the parties had already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still pending
before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued
an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs
a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for
certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-
19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Paño from further acting in the case. A
restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-
42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: " If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death , whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death , and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by
a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location
of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With
particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence of
jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts,
such as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if
need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who
seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of
death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation facts upon
which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the
intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in
the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause
"so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the
estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of
Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to
define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained
in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing;
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over
the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began."
That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the
manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are
cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the
procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it
legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the
judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it.
The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong
presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction
over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because
of the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court,
however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A
fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will,
and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction
over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that
the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a
deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer
to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down
the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue
statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
— residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses
the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be
more than temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the
residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original
petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Calamba,
Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a
property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real
estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted
statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that
as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is,
according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as
appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the
Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11
Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended
petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of
residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia
was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba,
Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the
time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was
presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows
that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon
City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months
before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12,
1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated
January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in
Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of
residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue
for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court
of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection
to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court
states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed
waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to
substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not
necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy
to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule
fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special
administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the
appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is
delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an
appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the
questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators
appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only proper when
the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however,
broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment is now allowed when there is
delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot
agree among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special
administrator or not lies in the probate court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the
judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his
passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason,
equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and
legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into
account in the appointment of a special administrator. 16Nothing is wrong for the judge to
consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in
appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others in
this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the
decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion
of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership.
For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire
estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad administration of a property
may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the
late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G.
Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
sister of the latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that
Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It
needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary
and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does
not determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled
to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of
distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the
administration as to be the basis of distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia
is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G.
Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is
married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate
to the Constitutional Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1,
1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with
these documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can
be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio.24
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of
Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly
decree that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and transferred to
Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that
the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix over the
latter's estate be approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna be
disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer all the
records thereof to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the
proceedings.
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the
"Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp.
Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang
Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for
payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R.
No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128314 May 29, 2002
RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and
Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents left real
estate, cash, shares of stock and other personal properties.
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over the estate of his parents,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. Q-91-8507.1 Pending the appointment of a regular
administrator, Perico moved that he be appointed as special administrator. He alleged
that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the assets of the estate. More
particularly, Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real properties without rendering any
accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their deceased parents and
disposing of the cash and valuables therein.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue.2 He
argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City either during their
lifetime or at the time of their deaths. The decedent’s actual residence was in Angeles
City, Pampanga, where his late mother used to run and operate a bakery. As the health
of his parents deteriorated due to old age, they stayed in Rodolfo’s residence at 61 Scout
Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment and
hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence previously executed by the
decedents, consisting of income tax returns, voter’s affidavits, statements of assets and
liabilities, real estate tax payments, motor vehicle registration and passports, all
indicating that their permanent residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga. 1âwphi1.nêt
In his opposition,3 Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in
Rodolfo’s house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was
conclusively declared in their death certificates that their last residence before they died
was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City.4 Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry
appearing on the death certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his own signature
on the said document.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the decedents’
residence on the death certificates in good faith and through honest mistake. He gave his
residence only as reference, considering that their parents were treated in their late years
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
37
at the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in his
house was merely transitory, in the same way that they were taken at different times for
the same purpose to Perico’s residence at Legaspi Towers in Roxas Boulevard. The
death certificates could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive evidence of the decedents’
residence in light of the other documents showing otherwise.5
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the position.6 Both
failed to comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the petition be archived.7
Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived.8 After the parties
submitted the names of their respective nominees, the trial court designated Justice
Carlos L. Sundiam as special administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and
Andrea Jao.9
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied, to wit:
A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in
1988 and 1989, respectively, confirm the fact that Quezon City was the last
place of residence of the decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing on
the death certificate of Andrea V. Jao were supplied by movant, Rodolfo V.
Jao, whose signature appears in said document. Movant, therefore, cannot
disown his own representation by taking an inconsistent position other than
his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for
lack of merit movant’s motion to dismiss.
SO ORDERED.10
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 35908. On December 11, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the
court a quo having been shown, the petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED. The questioned order of the respondent Judge is affirmed in
toto.
SO ORDERED.11
Rodolfo’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in the assailed
resolution dated February 17, 1997.12 Hence, this petition for review, anchored on the
following grounds:
I
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN
A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY
CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY
RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO,
100 PHILS. 593, WHICH CLEARLY INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY
RESIDENCE IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL
PRESENCE IN A PLACE AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE OF
DECEDENT’S RESIDENCE RATHER THAN THE INTENTION OF THE
DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN
ANOTHER PLACE.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE
RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE
PURPOSE OF SERVING SUMMONS TO A DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL
ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73
FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING VENUE IN THE SETTLEMENT
OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED.
V
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE
ENTRY OF PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE
RESPECTIVE DEATH CERTIFICATES OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER
THAN THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CLEAR
INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT
RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF
ESTOPPEL AS AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE
PERSUASIVE THAN THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS
THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES
CITY.
VII
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE
38 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF
SP. PROCEEDING NO. Q-91-8507.13
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in
Pampanga, where the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City,
where they actually stayed before their demise?
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled . – If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
(underscoring ours)
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of
administration granted in the proper court located in the province where the
decedent resides at the time of his death.
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al., 14 where
we held that the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place where the decedent
had his permanent residence or domicile at the time of death. In determining residence at
the time of death, the following factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had:
(a) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen;
and (c) intention to stay therein permanently.15 While it appears that the decedents in
this case chose to be physically present in Quezon City for medical convenience,
petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon City as their permanent
residence.1âwphi1.nêt
The contention lacks merit.
The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The decedent therein,
Andres Eusebio, passed away while in the process of transferring his personal
belongings to a house in Quezon City. He was then suffering from a heart ailment and
was advised by his doctor/son to purchase a Quezon City residence, which was nearer
to his doctor. While he was able to acquire a house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even
before he could move therein. In said case, we ruled that Eusebio retained his domicile
--- and hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be said that Eusebio
changed his residence because, strictly speaking, his physical presence in Quezon City
was just temporary.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to
petitioner’s Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondent’s
assertion that their elderly parents stayed in his house for some three to four years
before they died in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decedents’ respective death certificates state that they were both
residents of Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner
himself who filled up his late mother’s death certificate. To our mind, this unqualifiedly
shows that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized his deceased mother’s residence
to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in Ignacio’s death
certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were thus
properly considered and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We agree with the
appellate court’s observation that since the death certificates were accomplished even
before petitioner and respondent quarreled over their inheritance, they may be relied
upon to reflect the true situation at the time of their parents’ death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents’ residence at the time
of death, over the numerous documentary evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure,
the documents presented by petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of
death, as required by the Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile.
In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals,16 we held:
xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides", like the
terms "residing" and "residence", is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In
the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is
the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it
is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence,
that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make
it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary.17
Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the decedents have been
living with petitioner at the time of their deaths and for some time prior thereto. We find
this conclusion to be substantiated by the evidence on record. A close perusal of the
challenged decision shows that, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the court below
considered not only the decedents’ physical presence in Quezon City, but also other
factors indicating that the decedents’ stay therein was more than temporary. In the
absence of any substantial showing that the lower courts’ factual findings stemmed from
an erroneous apprehension of the evidence presented, the same must be held to be
conclusive and binding upon this Court.
Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4, Section
2,18 on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies specifically to
settlement proceedings. He argues that while venue in the former understandably refers
to actual physical residence for the purpose of serving summons, it is the permanent
residence of the decedent which is significant in Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that
venue for the settlement of estates can only refer to permanent residence or domicile
because it is the place where the records of the properties are kept and where most of
the decedents’ properties are located.
Petitioner’s argument fails to persuade.
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a person’s properties are kept in the
place where he permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed that a person’s
properties can be found mostly in the place where he establishes his domicile. It may be
that he has his domicile in a place different from that where he keeps his records, or
where he maintains extensive personal and business interests. No generalizations can
thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep records or retain
properties is entirely dependent upon an individual’s choice and peculiarities.
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates between venue
in ordinary civil actions and venue in special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of
Appeals19 and Bejer v. Court of Appeals,20 we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions
and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined,
"residence", in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s
actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.21 All told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue
for the settlement of the decedents’ intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon City
court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 isAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-6622 July 31, 1957
Intestate Estate of the deceased MARCELO DE BORJA. CRISANTO DE
BORJA, administrator-appellant,
vs.
JUAN DE BORJA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees.
E. V. Filamor for appellant.
Juan de Borja for himself and co-appellees.
FELIX, J. :
The case. — Quintin, Francisco, Crisanta and Juliana, all surnamed de Borja, are
legitimate children of Marcelo de Borja who, upon his demise sometime in 1924 or 1925,
left a considerable amount of property. Intestate proceedings must have followed, and
the pre-war records of the case either burned, lost or destroyed during the last war,
because the record shows that in 1930 Quintin de Borja was already the administrator of
the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja.
In the early part of 1938, Quintin de Borja died and Crisanto de Borja, son of Francisco
de Borja, was appointed and took over as administrator of the Estate. Francisco de
Borja, on the other hand, assumed his duties as executor of the will of Quintin de Borja,
but upon petition of the heirs of said deceased on the ground that his interests were
conflicting with that of his brother's estate he was later required by the Court to resign as
such executor and was succeeded by Rogelio Limaco, a son-in-law of Quintin de Borja.
It also appears that on February 16, 1940, at the hearing set for the approval of the
statement of accounts of the late administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de
Borja, then being opposed by Francisco de Borja, the parties submitted an agreement,
which was approved by the Court (Exh. A). Said agreement, translated into English,
reads as follows:
1. All the accounts submitted and those that are to be submitted
corresponding to this year will be considered approved;
2. No heir shall claim anything of the harvests from the lands in Cainta that
came from Exequiel Ampil, deceased, nor from the land in Tabuatin, Nueva
Ecija;

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
3. That the amounts of money taken by each heir shall be considered as
deposited in conjunction with the other properties of the intestate and shall
form part of the mass without drawing any interest;
4. That it shall be understood as included in this mass the sum of twelve
thousand pesos (P12,000) that the sisters Crisanta and Juliana de Borja
paid of their own money as part of the price the lands and three thousand
pesos (P3,000) the price of the machinery for irrigation;
5. The right, interests or participation that the deceased Quintin de Borja has
or may have in Civil Case No. 6190 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, shall be likewise included in the total mass of the inheritance of the
Intestate;
6. Not only the lands in Tabuatin but also those in Cainta coming from the
now deceased Exequiel Ampil shall also from part of the total mass of the
inheritance of the Intestate of the late Marcelo de Borja;
7. Once the total of the inheritance of the intestate is made up as specified
before in this Agreement, partition thereof will be made as follows:
From the total mass shall be deducted in case or in kind, Twelve Thousand
Pesos (P12,000) that shall be delivered to Da. Juliana de Borja and Da.
Crisanta de Borja in equal shares, and the rest shall be divided among the
four heirs, i. e., Don Francisco de Borja, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, Da.
Juliana de Borja, and Da. Crisanta de Borja, in equal parts. (TRANSLATION)
The Intestate remained under the administration of Crisanto de Borja until the then
outbreak of the war. From then on and until the termination of the war, there was a lull
and state of inaction in Special proceeding No. 2414 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasig branch (In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja), until upon
petition filed by Miguel B. Dayco, as administrator of the estate of his deceased mother,
Crisanta de Borja, who is one of heirs, for reconstitution of the records of this case, the
Court on December 11, 1945, ordered the reconstitution of the same, requiring the
administrator to submit his report and a copy of the project of partition.
On January 3, 1946, the administrator, Dr. Crisanto de Borja, filed his accounts for the
period ranging from March 1 to December 22, 1945, which according to the heirs of
Quintin de Borja were so inadequate and general that on February 28, 1946, they filed a
motion for specification. On April 30, 1946, they also filed their opposition to said
statement of accounts alleging that the income reported in said statement was very much
less than the true and actual income of the estate and that the expenses appearing
therein were exaggerated and/or not actually incurred, and prayed that the statement of
accounts submitted by the administrator be disapproved.
The administrator later filed another report of his administration, dated August 9, 1949,
corresponding to the period lapsed from December 23, 1945, to July 31, 1949, showing a
cash balance of P71.96, but with pending obligation amounting to P35,415.
On August 22, 1949, Juan de Borja and sisters, heirs of the deceased Quintin de Borja,
filed their opposition to the statement of accounts filed by the administrator on the ground
that same was not detailed enough to enable the interested parties to verify the same;
that they cannot understand why the Intestate could suffer any loss considering that
during the administration of the same by Quintin de Borja, the Estate accumulated gains
of more than P100,000 in the form of advances to the heirs as well as cash balance; that
they desired to examine the accounts of Dr. Crisanto de Borja to verify the loss and
therefore prayed that the administrator be ordered to deposit with the Clerk of Court all
books, receipts, accounts and other papers pertaining to the Estate of Marcelo de Borja.
This motion was answered by the administrator contending that the Report referred to
was already clear and enough, the income as well as the expenditures being specified
therein; that he had to spend for the repairs of the properties of the Estate damaged
during the Japanese occupation; that the allegation that during the administration of
Quintin de Boria the Estate realized a profit of P100,000 was not true, because instead of
gain there was even a shortage in the funds although said administrator had collected all
his fees (honorarios) and commissions corresponding to the entire period of his
incumbency; that the obligations mentioned in said report will be liquidated before the
termination of the proceedings in the same manner as it is done in any other intestate
case; that he was willing to submit all the receipts of the accounts for the examination of
the interested parties before the Clerk or before the Court itself; that this Intestate could
be terminated, the project of partition having been allowed and confirmed by the
Supreme Court and that the Administrator was also desirous of terminating it definitely for
the benefit of all the parties.
On September 14, 1949, the administrator filed another statement of accounts covering
the period of from March 1, 1945, to July 31, 1949, which showed a cash balance of
P71.95, with pending obligations in the sum of P35,810.
The heirs of Quintin de Borja, Juan de Borja and his sisters, registered their opposition
said statement of accounts and prayed the Court to disapprove the same and to appoint
an account to go over the books of the administrator and to submit a report thereon as
soon as possible. The heir Juliana de Borja also formally offered her objection to the
approval of the accounts submitted by the administrator and prayed further that said
administrator be required to submit a complete accounting of his administration of the
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
39
Estate from 1937 to 1949. On the other hand, Francisco de Borja and Miguel B. Dayco,
as the only heir of the deceased Crisanta de Borja, submitted to the Court an agreement
to relieve the administrator from accounting for the period of the Japanese occupation;
that as to the accounting from 1937 to 1941, they affirmed their conformity with the
agreement entered into by all the heirs appearing in the Bill of Exceptions of Juliana de
Borja; and they have no objection to the approval of the statement of accounts submitted
by the administrator covering of the years 1945 to 1949.
On December 6, 1949, the administrator, answered the opposition of the heir Juliana de
Borja, alleging that the corresponding statement of accounts for the years 1937, 1938,
1939, 1940 and 1941 were presented and approved by the Court before and during the
Japanese occupation, but the records of the same were destroyed in the Office of the
Clerk of that Court during the liberation of the province of Rizal, and his personal records
were also lost during the Japanese occupation, when his house was burned; that Judge
Peña who was presiding over the Court in 1945 impliedly denied the petition of heirs to
require him to render an accounting for the period from 1942 to the early part of 1945, for
the reason that whatever money obtained from the Estate during said period could not be
made the subject of any adjudication it having been declared fiat money and without
value, and ordered that the statement of accounts be presented only for the period
starting from March 1, 1945. The administrator further stated that he was anxious to
terminate this administration but some of the heirs had not yet complied with the
conditions imposed in the project of partition which was approved by the Supreme Court;
that in accordance with said partition agreement, Juliana de Borja must deliver to the
administrator all the jewelry, objects of value, utensils and other personal belongings of
the deceased spouses Marcelo de Borja and Tircila Quiogue, which said heir had kept
and continued to retain in her possession; that the heirs of Quintin de Borja should
deliver to the administrator all the lands and a document transferring in favor of the
Intestate the two parcels of land with a total area of 71 hectares of cultivated land in
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija which were in the possession of said heirs, together with the
house of Feliciana Mariano Vda. de Sarangaya, which were the objects of Civil Case No.
6190 mentioned in Paragraph 11 of the project of partition; that as consequence of the
said dispossession the heirs of Quintin de Borja must deliver to the administrator the
products of the 71 hectares of land in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and the rentals of the
house of Feliciana Mariano or else render to the Court an accounting of the products of
these properties from the time they took possession of the same in 1937 to the present;
that there was a pending obligation amounting to P36,000 as of September 14, 1949,
which the heirs should pay before the properties adjudicated to them would be delivered.
The Court, however, ordered the administrator on December 10, 1949, to show and
prove by evidence why he should not be accounts the proceeds of his administration
from 1937.
Meantime, Juliana de Borja filed a Constancia denying possession of any jewelry
belonging to the deceased spouses Marcelo de Borja and Tarcilla Quiogue or any other
personal belonging of said spouses, and signified her willingness to turn over to the
administrator the silver wares mentioned in Paragraph III of the project of partition, which
were the only property in her care, on the date that she would expect the delivery to her
of her share in the inheritance from her deceased parents.
On July 6, 1950, Juan de Borja and his sisters Marcela, Saturnina, Eufracia, Jacoba and
Olimpia, all surnamed de Borja, as heirs of Quintin de Borja, filed a motion for the
delivery to them of their inheritance in the estate, tendering to the administrator a
document ceding and transferring to the latter all the rights, interests and participation of
Quintin de Borja in Civil Case No. 7190 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
pursuant to the provisions of the project of Partition, and expressing their willingness to
put up a bond if required to do so by the Court, and on July 18, 1950, the Court ordered
the administrator to deliver to Marcela, Juan, Saturniana, Eufracia, Jacoba and Olimpia,
all surnamed de Borja, all the properties adjudicated to them in the Project of Partition
dated February 8, 1944, upon the latter's filing a bond in the sum of P10,000 conditioned
upon the payment of such obligation as may be ordered by the Court after a hearing on
the controverted accounts of the administrator. The Court considered the fact that the
heirs had complied with the requirement imposed by the Project of Partition when they
tendered the document ceding and transferring the rights and interests of Quintin de
Borja in the aforementioned lands and expressed the necessity of terminating the
proceedings as soon as practicable, observing that the Estate had been under
administration for over twenty-five years already. The Court, however, deferred action on
the petition filed by the special administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Juliana de Borja
until after compliance with the conditions imposed by the project of partition. But on July
20, 1950, apparently before the properties were delivered to the heirs, Francisco de
Borja and Miguel B. Dayco filed a motion informing the Court that the two parcels of land
located in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, produced some 21,300 cavans of palay, amounting
to P213,000 at P10 per cavan, which were enjoyed by some heirs; that the administrator
Crisanto de Borja had not taken possession of the same for circumstances beyond his
control; and that there also existed the sum of P70,204 which the former administrator,
Quintin de Borja, received from properties that were redeemed, but which amount did not
come into the hands of the present, administrator because according to reliable
40 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
information, same was delivered to the heir Juliana de Borja who deposited it in her
name at the Philippine National Bank. It was, therefore prayed that the administrator be
required to exert the necessary effort to ascertain the identity of the person or persons
who were in possession of the same amount and of the value of the products of the lands
in Mayapyap, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and to recover the same for the Intestate
Estate.
On July 28, 1950, the special administratrix of the estate of Juliana de Borja, then
deceased, filed an answer to the motion of these two heirs, denying the allegation that
said heir any product of the lands mentioned from Quintin de Borja, and informed the
Court that the Mayapyap property had always been in the possession of Francisco de
Borja himself and prayed the court that the administrator be instructed to demand all the
fruits and products of said property from Francisco de Borja.
On July 28, 1950, the heirs of Quintin de Borja also filed their opposition to the said
motion of Francisco de Borja and Miguel B. Dayco on the ground that the petition was
superfluous because the present proceeding was only for the approval of the statement
of accounts filed by the administrator; that said motion was improper because it was
asking the Court to order the administrator to perform what he was duty bound to do; and
that said heirs were already barred or stopped from raising that question in view of their
absolute ratification of and assent to the statement of accounts submitted by the
administrator.
On August 16, 1950, by order of the Court, the properties adjudicated to Juliana de Borja
in the project of Partition were finally delivered to the estate of said heir upon the filing of
a bond for P20,000. In that same order, the Court denied the administrator's motion to
reconsider the order of July 18, 1950, requiring him to deliver to the heirs of Quintin de
Borja the properties corresponding to them, on the ground that there existed no sufficient
reason to disturb said order. It also ruled that as the petition of Francisco de Borja and
Miguel B. Dayco made mention of certain properties allegedly belonging to the Intestate,
said petition should properly be considered to gather with the final accounts of the
administrator.
The administrator raised the matter by certiorari to this Tribunal, which was, docketed as
G.R. No. L-4179, and on May 30, 1951, We rendered decision affirming the order
complained of, finding that the Juan de Borja and sisters have complied with the
requirement imposed in the Project of Partition upon the tender of the document of
cession of rights and quit-claim executed by Marcela de Borja, the administratrix of the
Estate of Quintin de Borja, and holding that the reasons advanced by the administrator in
opposing the execution of the order of delivery were trivial.
On August 27, 1951, the administrator filed his amended statement of accounts covering
the period from March 1, 1945, to July 31, 1949, which showed a cash balance of
P36,660. An additional statement of accounts filed on August 31, 1961 for the period of
from August 1, 1949, to August 31, 1951, showed a cash balance of P5,851.17 and
pending obligations in the amount of P6,165.03.
The heirs of Quintin de Borja again opposed the approval of the statements of accounts
charging the administrator with having failed to include the fruits which the estate should
have accrued from 1941 to 1951 amounting to P479,429.70, but as the other heirs
seemed satisfied with the accounts presented by said administrator and as their group
was only one of the 4 heirs of Intestate Estate, they prayed that the administrator be held
liable for only P119,932.42 which was 1/4 of the amount alleged to have been omitted.
On October 4, 1951, the administrator filed a reply to said opposition containing a
counterclaim for moral damages against all the heirs of Quintin de Borja in the sum of
P30,000 which was admitted by the Court over the objection of the heirs of Quintin de
Borja that the said pleading was filed out of time.
The oppositors, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, then filed their answer to the counterclaim
denying the charges therein, but later served interrogatories on the administrator relative
to the averments of said counterclaim. Upon receipt of the answer to said interrogatories
specifying the acts upon which the claim for moral damages was based, the oppositors
filed an amended answer contending that inasmuch as the acts, manifestations and
pleadings referred to therein were admittedly committed and prepared by their lawyer,
Atty. Amador E. Gomez, same cannot be made the basis of a counterclaim, said lawyer
not being a party to the action, and furthermore, as the acts upon which the claim for
moral damages were based had been committed prior to the effectivity of the new Civil
Code, the provisions of said Code on moral damages could not be invoked. On January
15, 1952, the administrator filed an amended counterclaim including the counsel for the
oppositors as defendant.
There followed a momentary respite in the proceedings until another judge was assigned
to preside over said court to dispose of the old case pending therein. On August 15,
1952, Judge Encarnacion issued an order denying admission to administrator's amended
counterclaim directed against the lawyer, Atty. Amador E. Gomez, holding that a lawyer,
not being a party to the action, cannot be made answerable for counterclaims. Another
order was also issued on the same date dismissing the administrator's counterclaim for
moral damages against the heirs of Quintin de Borja and their counsel for the alleged
defamatory acts, manifestation and utterances, and stating that granting the same to be
meritorious, yet it was a strictly private controversy between said heirs and the
administrator which would not in any way affect the interest of the Intestate, and,
therefore, not proper in an intestate proceedings. The Court stressed that to allow the
ventilation of such personal controversies would further delay the proceedings in the
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
case which had already lagged for almost 30 years, a situation which the Court would not
countenance.
Having disposed of these pending incidents which arose out of the principal issue, that is,
the disputed statement of accounts submitted by the administrator, the Court rendered
judgment on September 5, 1952, ordering the administrator to distribute the funds in his
possession to the heirs as follows: P1,395.90 to the heirs of Quintin de Borja; P314.99 to
Francisco de Borja; P314.99 to the Estate of Juliana de Borja and P314.99 to Miguel B.
Dayco, but as the latter still owed the intestate the sum of P900, said heirs was ordered
to pay instead the 3 others the sum of P146.05 each. After considering the testimonies of
the witnesses presented by both parties and the available records on hand, the Court
found the administrator guilty of maladministration and sentenced Crisanto de Borja to
pay to the oppositors, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, the sum of P83,337.31, which was
1/4 of the amount which the state lost, with legal interest from the date of the judgment.
On the same day, the Court also issued an order requiring the administrator to deliver to
the Clerk of that Court PNB Certificate of Deposit No. 211649 for P978.50 which was
issued in the name of Quintin de Borja.
The administrator, Dr. Crisanto de Borja, gave notice to appeal from the lower Court's
orders of August 15, 1952, the decision of September 5, 1952, and the order of even
date, but when the Record on Appeal was finally approved, the Court ordered the
exclusion of the appeal from the order of September 5, 1952, requiring the administrator
to deposit the PNB Certificate of Deposit No. 2114649 with the Clerk of Court, after the
oppositors had shown that during the hearing of that incident, the parties agreed to abide
by whatever resolution the Court would make on the ownership of the funds covered by
that deposit.
The issues. — Reducing the issues to bare essentials, the questions left for our
determination are: (1) whether the counsel for a party in a case may be included as a
defendant in a counterclaim; (2) whether a claim for moral damages may be entertained
in a proceeding for the settlement of an estate; (3) what may be considered as acts of
maladministration and whether an administrator, as the one in the case at bar, may be
held accountable for any loss or damage that the estate under his administration may
incur by reason of his negligence, bad faith or acts of maladministration; and (4) in the
case at bar has the Intestate or any of the heirs suffered any loss or damage by reason
of the administrator's negligence, bad faith or maladministration? If so, what is the
amount of such loss or damage?
I. — Section 1, Rule 10, of the Rules of Court defines a counterclaim as:
SECTION 1. Counterclaim Defined. — A counterclaim is any claim, whether
for money or otherwise, which a party may have against the opposing party .
A counterclaim need not dismiss or defeat the recovery sought by the
opposing party, but may claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind
from that sought by the opposing party's claim.
It is an elementary rule of procedure that a counterclaim is a relief available to a party-
defendant against the adverse party which may or may not be independent from the
main issue. There is no controversy in the case at bar, that the acts, manifestations and
actuations alleged to be defamatory and upon which the counterclaim was based were
done or prepared by counsel for oppositors; and the administrator contends that as the
very oppositors manifested that whatever civil liability arising from acts, actuations,
pleadings and manifestations attributable to their lawyer is enforceable against said
lawyer, the amended counterclaim was filed against the latter not in his individual or
personal capacity but as counsel for the oppositors. It is his stand, therefore, that the
lower erred in denying admission to said pleading. We differ from the view taken by the
administrator. The appearance of a lawyer as counsel for a party and his participation in
a case as such counsel does not make him a party to the action. The fact that he
represents the interests of his client or that he acts in their behalf will not hold him liable
for or make him entitled to any award that the Court may adjudicate to the parties, other
than his professional fees. The principle that a counterclaim cannot be filed against
persons who are acting in representation of another — such as trustees — in their
individual capacities (Chambers vs. Cameron, 2 Fed. Rules Service, p. 155; 29 F. Supp.
742) could be applied with more force and effect in the case of a counsel whose
participation in the action is merely confined to the preparation of the defense of his
client. Appellant, however, asserted that he filed the counterclaim against said lawyer not
in his individual capacity but as counsel for the heirs of Quintin de Borja. But as we have
already stated that the existence of a lawyer-client relationship does not make the former
a party to the action, even this allegation of appellant will not alter the result We have
arrived at.
Granting that the lawyer really employed intemperate language in the course of the
hearings or in the preparation of the pleadings filed in connection with this case, the
remedy against said counsel would be to have him cited for contempt of court or take
other administrative measures that may be proper in the case, but certainly not a
counterclaim for moral damages.
II. — Special Proceedings No. 6414 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig branch)
was instituted for the purpose of settling the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja. In
taking cognizance of the case, the Court was clothed with a limited jurisdiction which
cannot expand to collateral matters not arising out of or in any way related to the
settlement and adjudication of the properties of the deceased, for it is a settled rule that
the jurisdiction of a probate court is limited and special (Guzman vs. Anog, 37 Phil. 361).
 41
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73

Although there is a tendency now to relax this rule and extend the jurisdiction of the April-December 1,140.00 March 16-December 4,0
probate court in respect to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its
P1,820.00 P5
recognized powers (14 Am. Jur. 251-252), this should be understood to comprehend only
cases related to those powers specifically allowed by the statutes. For it was even said 1948
that: January-December P1,920.00 January-December P5
Probate proceedings are purely statutory and their functions limited to the
1949
control of the property upon the death of its owner, and cannot extend to the
adjudication of collateral questions (Woesmes, The American Law of January-November 15 P1,680.00 January-December P4
Administration, Vol. I, p. 514, 662-663). From the testimony of said witness, it appears that from 1945 to November 15,1949, he
It was in the acknowledgment of its limited jurisdiction that the lower court dismissed the paid a total of P28,200 for the lease of Door No. 1543 and the basement of Door No.
administrator's counterclaim for moral damages against the oppositors, particularly 1541. These figures were not controverted or disputed by the administrator but claim that
against Marcela de Borja who allegedly uttered derogatory remarks intended to cast said tenant subleased the apartments occupied by Pedro Enriquez and Soledad Sodora
dishonor to said administrator sometime in 1950 or 1951, his Honor's ground being that and paid the said rentals, not to the administrator, but to said Enriquez. The transcript of
the court exercising limited jurisdiction cannot entertain claims of this kind which should the testimony of this witness really bolster this contention — that Lauro Aguila talked with
properly belong to a court general jurisdiction. From what ever angle it may be looked at, said Pedro Enriquez when he leased the aforementioned apartments and admitted
a counterclaim for moral damages demanded by an administrator against the heirs for paying the rentals to the latter and not to the administrator. It is interesting to note that
alleged utterances, pleadings and actuations made in the course of the proceeding, is an Pedro Enriquez is the same person who appeared to be the administrator's collector, duly
extraneous matter in a testate or intestate proceedings. The injection into the action of authorized to receive the rentals from this Azcarraga property and for which services,
incidental questions entirely foreign in probate proceedings should not be encouraged for said Enriquez received 5 per cent of the amount he might be able to collect as
to do otherwise would run counter to the clear intention of the law, for it was held that: commission. If we are to believe appellant's contention, aside from the commission that
The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of Pedro Enriquez received he also sublet the apartments he was occupying at a very much
the creditors and those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or higher rate than that he actually paid the estate without the knowledge of the
legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been paid, is the administrator or with his approval. As the administrator also seemed to possess that
ruling spirit of our probate law (Magabanua vs. Akel, 72 Phil., 567, 40 Off peculiar habit of giving little importance to bookkeeping methods, for he never kept a
Gaz., 1871). ledger or book of entry for amounts received for the estate, We find no record of the
III. and IV. — This appeal arose from the opposition of the heirs of Quintin de Borja to the rentals the lessees of the other doors were paying. It was, however, brought about at the
approval of the statements of accounts rendered by the administrator of the Intestate hearing that the 6 doors of this building are of the same sizes and construction and the
Estate of Marcelo de Borja, on the ground that certain fruits which should have been lower Court based its computation of the amount this property should have earned for the
accrued to the estate were unaccounted for, which charge the administrator denied. After estate on the rental paid by Atty. Aguila for the 1 1/2 doors that he occupied. We see no
a protracted and extensive hearing on the matter, the Court, finding the administrator, Dr. excuse why the administrator could not have taken cognizance of these rates and
Crisanto de Borja, guilty of certain acts of maladministration, held him liable for the received the same for the benefit of the estate he was administering, considering the fact
payment to the oppositors, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, of 1/4 of the unreported income that he used to make trips to Manila usually once a month and for which he charged to
which the estate should have received. The evidence presented in the court below bear the estate P8 as transportation expenses for every trip.
out the following facts: Basing on the rentals paid by Atty. Aguila for 1 1/2 doors, the estate received P112,800
(a) The estate owns a 6-door building, Nos. 1541, 1543, 1545, 1547, 1549 and 1551 in from February 1, 1945, to November 15, 1949, for the 6 doors, but the lower Court held
Azcarraga Street, Manila, situated in front of the Arranque market. Of this property, the him accountable not only for the sum of P34,235 reported for the period ranging from
administrator reported to have received for the estate the following rentals: March 1, 1945, to December 31, 1949, but also for a deficit of P90,525 or a total of
Annual P124,760. The record shows, however that the upper floor of Door No. 1549 was vacant
Period of time Total rentals in September, 1949, and as Atty. Aguila used to pay P390 a month for the use of an
monthly rental
entire apartment from September to November, 1949, and he also paid P160 for the use
March to December, 1945 P3,085.00 P51.42
of the basement of an apartment (Door No. 1541), the use, therefore, of said upper floor
January to December, 1946 4,980.00 69.17 would cost P230 which should be deducted, even if the computation of the lower Court
January to December, 1947 8,330.00 115.70 would have to be followed.
There being no proper evidence to show that the administrator collected more rentals
January to December, 1948 9,000.00 125.00
than those reported by him, except in the instance already mentioned, We are reluctant
January to December, 1949 8,840.00 122.77 to bold him accountable in the amount for which he was held liable by the lower Court,
January to December, 1950 6,060.00 184.16 and We think that under the circumstances it would be more just to add to the sum
reported by the administrator as received by him as rents for 1945-1949 only, the
Total P40,295.00
difference between the sum reported as paid by Atty. Aguila and the sum actually paid by
The oppositors, in disputing this record income, presented at the witness stand Lauro the latter as rents of 1 1/2 of the apartments during the said period, or P25,457.09 1/4 of
Aguila, a lawyer who occupied the basement of Door No. 1541 and the whole of Door which is P6,364.27 which shall be paid to the oppositors.
No. 1543 from 1945 to November 15, 1949, and who testified that he paid rentals on said The record also shows that in July, 1950, the administrator delivered to the other heirs
apartments as follows: Doors Nos. 1545, 1547, 1549 and 1551 although Doors Nos. 1541 and 1543 adjudicated
1945 to the oppositors remained under his administration. For the period from January to June,
1950, that the entire property was still administered by him, the administrator reported to
have received for the 2 oppositors' apartments for said period of six months at P168.33 a
Door No. 1541 (basement) month, the sum of P1,010 which belongs to the oppositors and should be taken from the
amount reported by the administrator.
February P20.00 Door No. 1543 The lower Court computed at P40 a month the pre-war rental admittedly received for
March 20.00 For 7 months at P300 every apartment, the income that said property would have earned from 1941 to 1944, or
April 60.00 a month a total of P11,520, but as We have to exclude the period covered by the Japanese
occupation, the estate should receive only P2,880 1/4 of which P720 the administrator
May-December 800.00 should pay to the oppositors for the year 1941.
Total P900.00 (b) The Intestate estate also owned a parcel of land in Mayapyap, Nueva Ecija, with an
1946 area of 71 hectares, 95 ares and 4 centares, acquired by Quintin de Borja the spouses
Cornelio Sarangaya and Feliciana Mariano in Civil Case NO. 6190 of the Court of First
January-December P1,200.00 January-December Instance of said province, In virtue of the agreement entered into by the heirs, this
1947 property was turned over by the estate of Quintin de Borja to the intestate and formed
January P100.00 January part of the general mass of said estate. The report of the administrator failed to disclose
any return from this property alleging that he had not taken possession of the same. He
February 100.00 February does not deny however that he knew of the existence of this land but claimed that when
March 180.00 March 1-15 he demanded the delivery of the Certificate of Title covering this property, Rogelio
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
42 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
Limaco, then administrator of the estate of Quintin de Borja, refused to surrender the
same and he did not take any further action to recover the same.
To counteract the insinuation that the Estate of Quintin de Borja was in possession of this
property from 1940 to 1950, the oppositors presented several witnesses, among them
was an old man, Narciso Punzal, who testified that he knew both Quintin and Francisco
de Borja; that before the war or sometime in 1937, the former administrator of the
Intestate, Quintin de Borja, offered him the position of overseer (encargado) of this land
but he was notable to assume the same due to the death of said administrator; that on
July 7, 1951, herein appellant invited him to go to his house in Pateros, Rizal, and while
in said house, he was instructed by appellant to testify in court next day that he was the
overseer of the Mayapyap property for Quintin de Borja from 1937-1944, delivering the
yearly proceeds of 1,000 cavanes of Palay to Rogelio Limaco; that he did not need to be
afraid because both Quintin de Borja and Rogelio Limaco were already dead. But as he
knew that the facts on which he was to testify were false, he went instead to the house of
one of the daughters of Quintin de Borja, who, together with her brother, Atty. Juan de
Borja, accompanied him to the house of the counsel for said oppositors before whom his
sworn declaration was taken (Exh. 3).
Other witnesses, i.e., Isidro Benuya, Federico Cojo, Emilio de la Cruz and Ernesto
Mangulabnan, testified that they were some of the tenants of the Mayapyap property;
that they were paying their shares to the overseers of Francisco de Borja and sometimes
to his wife, which the administrator was not able to contradict, and the lower Court found
no reason why the administrator would fail to take possession of this property
considering that this was even the subject of the agreement of February 16, 1940,
executed by the heirs of the Intestate.
The lower Court, giving due credence to the testimonies of the witnesses for the
oppositors, computed the loss the estate suffered in the form of unreported income from
the rice lands for 10 years at P67,000 (6,700 a year)and the amount of P4,000 from the
remaining portion of the land not devoted to rice cultivation which was being leased at
P20 per hectare. Consequently, the Court held the administrator liable to appellees in the
sum of P17,750 which is 1/4 of the total amount which should have accrued to the estate
for this item.
But if We exclude the 3 years of occupation, the income for 7 years would be P46,900 for
the ricelands and P2,800 (at P400 a year) for the remaining portion not developed to rice
cultivation or a total of P48,700, 1/4 of which is P12,175 which We hold the administrator
liable to the oppositors.
(c) The Hacienda Jalajala located in said town of Rizal, was divided into 3 parts: the
Punta section belonged to Marcelo de Borja, the Bagombong pertained to Bernardo de
Borja and Francisco de Borja got the Jalajala proper. For the purpose of this case, we will
just deal with that part called Junta. This property has an area of 1,345, hectares, 29 ares
and 2 centares (Exh. 36) of which, according to the surveyor who measured the same,
200 hectares were of cultivated rice fields and 100 hectares dedicated to the planting of
upland rice. It has also timberland and forest which produce considerable amount of
trees and firewoods. From the said property which has an assessed value of P115,000
and for which the estates pay real estate tax of P1,500 annually, the administrator
reported the following:
Expenditure
(not including
administration's
Year Income fees
1945........... P625.00 P1,310.42
1946............. 1,800.00 3,471.00
1947............. 2,550.00 2,912.91
1948............. 1,828.00 3,311.88
1949............. 3,204.50 4,792.09
1950............. 2,082.00 2,940.91
P12,089.50 P18,739.21
This statement was assailed by the oppositors and to substantiate their charge that the
administrator did not file the true income of the property, they presented several
witnesses who testified that there were about 200 tenants working therein; that these
tenants paid to Crisanto de Borja rentals at the rate of 6 cavanes of palay per hectare;
that in the years of 1943 and 1944, the Japanese were the ones who collected their
rentals, and that the estate could have received no less than 1,000 cavanes of palay
yearly. After the administrator had presented witnesses to refute the facts previously
testified to by the witnesses for the oppositors, the Court held that the report of the
administrator did not contain the real income of the property devoted to rice cultivation,
which was fixed at 1,000 cavanes every year — for 1941, 1942, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948,
1949 and 1950, or a total of 8,000 cavanes valued at P73,000. But as the administrator
accounted for the sum of P11,155 collected from rice harvests and if to this amount we
add the sum of P8,739.20 for expenses, this will make a total of P19,894.20, thus leaving
a deficit of P53,105.80, ¼ of which will be P13,276.45 which the administrator is held
liable to pay the heirs of Quintin de Borja.
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
It was also proved during the hearing that the forest land of this property yields
considerable amount of marketable firewoods. Taking into consideration the testimonies
of witnesses for both parties, the Court arrived at the conclusion that the administrator
sold to Gregorio Santos firewoods worth P600 in 1941, P3,500 in 1945 and P4,200 in
1946 or a total of P8,300. As the report included only the amount of P625, there was a
balance of P7,675 in favor of the estate. The oppositors were not able to present any
proof of sales made after these years, if there were any and the administrator was held
accountable to the oppositors for only P1,918.75.
(d) The estate also, owned ricefields in Cainta, Rizal, with a total area of 22 hectares, 76
ares and 66 centares. Of this particular item, the administrator reported an income of
P12,104 from 1945 to 1951. The oppositors protested against this report and presented
witnesses to disprove the same.
Basilio Javier worked as a tenant in the land of Juliana de Borja which is near the land
belonging to the Intestate, the 2 properties being separated only by a river. As tenant of
Juliana de Borja, he knew the tenants working on the property and also knows that both
lands are of the same class, and that an area accommodating one cavan of seedlings
yields at most 100 cavanes and 60 cavanes at the least. The administrator failed to
overcome this testimony. The lower Court considering the facts testified to by this witness
made a finding that the property belonging to this Intestate was actually occupied by
several persons accommodating 13 ½ cavanes of seedlings; that as for every cavan of
seedlings, the land produces 60 cavanes of palay, the whole area under cultivation would
have yielded 810 cavanes a year and under the 50-50 sharing system (which was
testified by witness Javier), the estate would have received no less than 405 cavanes
every year. Now, for the period of 7 years — from 1941 to 1950, excluding the 3 years of
war — the corresponding earning of the estate should be 2,835 cavanes, out of which
the 405 cavanes from the harvest of 1941 is valued at P1,215 and the rest 2,430
cavanes at P10 is valued at P24,300, or all in all P25,515. If from this amount the
reported income of P12,104 is deducted, there will be a balance of P13,411.10 1/4 of
which or P3,352.75 the administrator is held liable to pay to the oppositors.
(e) The records show that the administrator paid surcharges and penalties with a total of
P988.75 for his failure to pay on time the taxes imposed on the properties under his
administration. He advanced the reason that he lagged in the payment of those tax
obligations because of lack of cash balance for the estate. The oppositors, however,
presented evidence that on October 29, 1939, the administrator received from Juliana de
Borja the sum of P20,475.17 together with certain papers pertaining to the intestate (Exh.
4),aside from the checks in the name of Quintin de Borja. Likewise, for his failure to pay
the taxes on the building at Azcarraga for 1947, 1948 and 1949, said property was sold
at public auction and the administrator had to redeem the same at P3,295.48, although
the amount that should have been paid was only P2,917.26. The estate therefore
suffered a loss of P378.22. Attributing these surcharges and penalties to the negligence
of the administrator, the lower Court adjudged him liable to pay the oppositors ¼ of
P1,366.97, the total loss suffered by the Intestate, or P341.74.
(f) Sometime in 1942, a big fire razed numerous houses in Pateros, Rizal, including that
of Dr. Crisanto de Borja. Thereafter, he claimed that among the properties burned therein
was his safe containing P15,000 belonging to the estate under his administration. The
administrator contended that this loss was already proved to the satisfaction of the Court
who, approved the same by order of January 8, 1943, purportedly issued by Judge
Servillano Platon(Exh. B). The oppositors contested the genuineness of this order and
presented on April 21, 1950, an expert witness who conducted several tests to determine
the probable age of the questioned document, and arrived at the conclusion that the
questioned ink writing "(Fdo)" appearing at the bottom of Exhibit B cannot be more than 4
years old (Exh. 39). However, another expert witness presented by the administrator
contradicted this finding and testified that this conclusion arrived at by expert witness Mr.
Pedro Manzañares was not supported by authorities and was merely the result of his
own theory, as there was no method yet discovered that would determine the age of a
document, for every document has its own reaction to different chemicals used in the
tests. There is, however, another fact that called the attention of the lower Court: the
administrator testified that the money and other papers delivered by Juliana de Borja to
him on October 29, 1939, were saved from said fire. The administrator justified the
existence of these valuables by asserting that these properties were locked by Juliana de
Borja in her drawer in the "casa solariega" in Pateros and hence was not in his safe
when his house, together with the safe, was burned. This line of reasoning is really
subject to doubt and the lower Court opined, that it runs counter to the ordinary course of
human behaviour for an administrator to leave in the drawer of the "aparador" of Juliana
de Borja the money and other documents belonging to the estate under his
administration, which delivery has receipted for, rather than to keep it in his safe together
with the alleged P15,000 also belonging to the Intestate. The subsequent orders of
Judge Platon also put the defense of appellant to bad light, for on February 6, 1943, the
Court required Crisanto de Borja to appear before the Court of examination of the other
heirs in connection with the reported loss, and on March 1, 1943, authorized the lawyers
for the other parties to inspect the safe allegedly burned (Exh. 35). It is inconceivable that
Judge Platon would still order the inspection of the safe if there was really an order
approving the loss of those P15,000. We must not forget, in this connection, that the
records of this case were burned and that at the time of the hearing of this incident in
1951, Judge Platon was already dead. The lower Court also found no reason why the

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
administrator should keep in his such amount of money, for ordinary prudence would
dictate that as an administration funds that come into his possession in a fiduciary
capacity should not be mingled with his personal funds and should have been deposited
in the Bank in the name of the intestate. The administrator was held responsible for this
loss and ordered to pay ¼ thereof, or the sum of P3,750.
(g) Unauthorized expenditures —
1. The report of the administrator contained certain sums amounting to P2,130 paid to
and receipted by Juanita V. Jarencio the administrator's wife, as his private secretary. In
explaining this item, the administrator alleged that he needed her services to keep
receipts and records for him, and that he did not secure first the authorization from the
court before making these disbursements because it was merely a pure administrative
function.
The keeping of receipts and retaining in his custody records connected with the
management of the properties under administration is a duty that properly belongs to the
administrator, necessary to support the statement of accounts that he is obliged to submit
to the court for approval. If ever his wife took charge of the safekeeping of these receipts
and for which she should be compensated, the same should be taken from his fee. This
disbursement was disallowed by the Court for being unauthorized and the administrator
required to pay the oppositors ¼, thereof or P532.50.
2. The salaries of Pedro Enriquez, as collector of the Azcarraga property; of Briccio
Matienzo and Leoncio Perez, as encargados, and of Vicente Panganiban and
Herminigildo Macetas as forest-guards were found justified, although un authorized, as
they appear to be reasonable and necessary for the care and preservation of the
Intestate.
3. The lower Court disallowed as unjustified and unnecessary the expenses for salaries
paid to special policemen amounting to P1,509. Appellant contended that he sought for
the services of Macario Kamungol and others to act as special policemen during harvest
time because most of the workers tilting the Punta property were not natives of Jalajala
but of the neighboring towns and they were likely to run away with the harvest without
giving the share of the estate if they were not policed. This kind of reasoning did not
appear to be convincing to the trial judge as the cause for such fear seemed to exist only
in the imagination. Granting that such kind of situation existed, the proper thing for the
administrator to do would have been to secure the previous authorization from the Court
if he failed to secure the help of the local police. He should be held liable for this
unauthorized expenditure and pay the heirs of Quintin de Borja ¼ thereof or P377.25.
4. From the year 1942 when his house was burned, the administrator and his family took
shelter at the house belonging to the Intestate known as "casa solariega" which, in the
Project of Partition was adjudicated to his father, Francisco de Borja. This property,
however, remained under his administration and for its repairs he spent from 1945-1950,
P1465,14, duly receipted.
None of these repairs appear to be extraordinary for the receipts were for nipa, for
carpenters and thatchers. Although it is true that Rule 85, section 2 provides that:
SEC. 2. EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR TO KEEP BUILDINGS IN
REPAIR. — An executor or administrator shall maintain in tenant able repair
the houses and other structures and fences belonging to the estate, and
deliver the same in such repair to the heirs or devisees when directed so to
do by the court.
yet considering that during his occupancy of the said "casa solariega" he was not paying
any rental at all, it is but reasonable that he should take care of the expenses for the
ordinary repair of said house. Appellant asserted that had he and his family not occupied
the same, they would have to pay someone to watch and take care of said house. But
this will not excuse him from this responsibility for the disbursements he made in
connection with the aforementioned repairs because even if he stayed in another house,
he would have had to pay rentals or else take charge also of expenses for the repairs of
his residence. The administrator should be held liable to the oppositors in the amount
of P366.28.
5. Appellant reported to have incurred expenses amounting to P6,304.75 for alleged
repairs on the rice mill in Pateros, also belonging to the Intestate. Of the disbursements
made therein, the items corresponding, to Exhibits I, I-1, I-21, L-26, L-15, L-64 and L-65,
in the total sum of P570.70 were rejected by the lower court on the ground that they were
all unsigned although some were dated. The lower Court, however, made an oversight in
including the sum of P150 covered by Exhibit L-26 which was duly signed by Claudio
Reyes because this does not refer to the repair of the rice-mill but for the roofing of the
house and another building and shall be allowed. Consequently, the sum of P570.70
shall be reduced to P420.70 which added to the sum of P3,059 representing
expenditures rejected as unauthorized to wit:
Exhibit L-59 ............. P500.00 Yek Wing
Exhibit L-60 ............. 616.00 Yek Wing
Exhibit L-61 ............. 600.00 Yek Wing
Exhibit L-62 ............. 840.00 Yek Wing
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
43
Exhibit L-63 ............. 180.00 Yek Wing
Exhibit Q-2 ............. 323.00 scale "Howe"
Total ...................... P3,059.00
will give a total of P3,479 1/4 of which is P869.92 that belongs to the oppositors.
6. On the expenses for planting in the Cainta ricefields: — In his statement of accounts,
appellant reported to have incurred a total expense of P5,977 for the planting of the
ricefields in Cainta, Rizal, from the agricultural year 1945-46 to 1950-51. It was proved
that the prevailing sharing system in this part of the country was on 50-50 basis.
Appellant admitted that expenses for planting were advanced by the estate and
liquidated after each harvest. But the report, except for the agricultural year 1950
contained nothing of the payments that the tenants should have made. If the total
expenses for said planting amounted to P5,977, ½ thereof or P2,988.50 should have
been paid by the tenants as their share of such expenditures, and as P965 was reported
by the administrator as paid back in 1950, there still remains a balance of P2,023.50
unaccounted for. For this shortage, the administrator is responsible and should pay the
oppositors ¼ thereof or P505.87.
7. On the transportation expenses of the administrator: — It appears that from the year
1945 to 1951, the administrator charged the estate with a total of P5,170 for
transportation expenses. The un receipted disbursements were correspondingly
itemized, a typical example of which is as follows:
1950
Gastos de viaje del administrador From Pateros
To Pasig ................ 50 x P4.00 = P200.00
To Manila ............... 50 x P10.00 = P500.00
To Cainta ................ 8 x P8.00 = P64.00
To Jalajala ............... 5 x P35.00 = P175.00
= P399.00
(Exhibit W-54).
From the report of the administrator, We are being made to believe that the Intestate
estate is a losing proposition and assuming arguendo that this is true, that precarious
financial condition which he, as administrator, should know, did not deter Crisanto de
Borja from charging to the depleted funds of the estate comparatively big amounts for his
transportation expenses. Appellant tried to justify these charges by contending that he
used his own car in making those trips to Manila, Pasig and Cainta and a launch in
visiting the properties in Jalajala, and they were for the gasoline consumed. This rather
unreasonable spending of the estate's fund prompted the Court to observe that one will
have to spend only P0.40 for transportation in making a trip from Pateros to Manila and
practically the same amount in going to Pasig. From his report for 1949 alone, appellant
made a total of 97 trips to these places or an average of one trip for every 3 1/2 days. Yet
We must not forget that it was during this period that the administrator failed or refused to
take cognizance of the prevailing rentals of commercial places in Manila that caused
certain loss to the estate and for which he was accordingly held responsible. For the
reason that the alleged disbursements made for transportation expenses cannot be said
to be economical, the lower Court held that the administrator should be held liable to the
oppositors for ¼ thereof or the sum of P1,292.50, though We think that this sum should
still be reduced to P500.
8. Other expenses:
The administrator also ordered 40 booklets of printed contracts of lease in the name of
the Hacienda Jalajala which cost P150. As the said hacienda was divided into 3 parts
one belonging to this Intestate and the other two parts to Francisco de Boria and
Bernardo de Borja, ordinarily the Intestate should only shoulder ¹/3 of the said expense,
but as the tenants who testified during the hearing of the matter testified that those
printed forms were not being used, the Court adjudged the administrator personally
responsible for this amount. The records reveal, that this printed form was not utilized
because the tenants refused to sign any, and We can presume that when the
administrator ordered for the printing of the same, he did not foresee this situation. As
there is no showing that said printed contracts were used by another and that they are
still in the possession of the administrator which could be utilized anytime, this
disbursement may be allowed.
The report also contains a receipt of payment made to Mr. Severo Abellera in the sum of
P375 for his transportation expenses as one of the two commissioners who prepared the
Project of Partition. The oppositors were able to prove that on May 24, 1941, the Court
authorized the administrator to withdraw from the funds of the intestate the sum of P300
to defray the transportation expenses of the commissioners. The administrator, however,
alleged that he used this amount for the payment of certain fees necessary in connection
with the approval of the proposed plan of the Azcarraga property which was then being
processed in the City Engineer's Office. From that testimony, it would seem that appellant
could even go to the extent of disobeying the order of the Court specifying for what
purpose that amount should be appropriated and took upon himself the task of judging
44 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
for what it will serve best. Since he was not able to show or prove that the money
intended and ordered by the Court to be paid for the transportation expenses of the
commissioners was spent for the benefit of the estate as claimed, the administrator
should be held responsible therefor and pay to the oppositors ¼ of P375 or the sum
ofP93.75.
The records reveal that for the service of summons to the defendants in Civil Case No.
84 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, P104 was paid to the Provincial Sheriff of the
same province (Exhibit H-7). However, an item for P40 appeared to have been paid to
the Chief of Police on Jalajala allegedly for the service of the same summons. Appellant
claimed that as the defendants in said civil case lived in remote barrios, the services of
the Chief of Police as delegate or agent of the Provincial Sheriff were necessary. He
forgot probably the fact that the local chiefs of police are deputy sheriffs ex-officio. The
administrator was therefore ordered by the lower Court to pay ¼ of said amount or P10
to the oppositors.
The administrator included in his Report the sum of P550 paid to Atty. Filamor for his
professional services rendered for the defense of the administrator in G.R. No. L-4179,
which was decided against him, with costs. The lower Court disallowed this disbursement
on the ground that this Court provided that the costs of that litigation should not be borne
by the estate but by the administrator himself, personally.
Costs of a litigation in the Supreme Court taxed by the Clerk of Court, after a verified
petition has been filed by the prevailing party, shall be awarded to said party and will only
include his fee and that of his attorney for their appearance which shall not be more than
P40; expenses for the printing and the copies of the record on appeal; all lawful charges
imposed by the Clerk of Court; fees for the taking of depositions and other expenses
connected with the appearance of witnesses or for lawful fees of a commissioner (De la
Cruz, Philippine Supreme Court Practice, p. 70-71). If the costs provided for in that case,
which this Court ordered to be chargeable personally against the administrator are not
recoverable by the latter, with more reason this item could not be charged against the
Intestate. Consequently, the administrator should pay the oppositors ¼ of the sum of
P550 or P137.50.
(e) The lower Court in its decision required appellant to pay the oppositors the sum of
P1,395 out of the funds still in the possession of the administrator.
In the statement of accounts submitted by the administrator, there appeared a cash
balance of P5,851.17 as of August 31, 1961. From this amount, the sum of P1,002.96
representing the Certificate of Deposit No. 21619 and Check No. 57338, both of the
Philippine National Bank and in the name of Quintin de Borja, was deducted leaving a
balance of P4,848. As Judge Zulueta ordered the delivery to the oppositors of the
amount of P1,890 in his order of October 8, 1951; the delivery of the amount of P810 to
the estate of Juliana de Borja in his order of October 23, 1951, and the sum of P932.32
to the same estate of Juliana de Borja by order of the Court of February 29, 1952, or a
total of P3,632.32 after deducting the same from the cash in the possession of the
administrator, there will only be a remainder of P134.98.
The Intestate is also the creditor of Miguel B. Dayco, heir and administrator of the estate
of Crisanta de Borja, in the sum of P900 (Exhibits S and S-1). Adding this credit to the
actual cash on hand, there will be a total of P1,034.98, ¼, of which or P258.74 properly
belongs to the oppositors. However, as there is only a residue of P134.98 in the hands of
the administrator and dividing it among the 3 groups of heirs who are not indebted to the
Intestate, each group will receive P44.99, and Miguel B. Dayco is under obligation to
reimburse P213.76 to each of them.
The lower Court ordered the administrator to deliver to the oppositors the amount of
P1,395.90 and P314.99 each to Francisco de Borja and the estate of Juliana de Borja,
but as We have arrived at the computation that the three heirs not idebted to the
Intestate ought to receive P44.99 each out of the amount of P134.98, the oppositors are
entitled to the sum of P1,080.91 — the amount deducted from them as taxes but which
the Court ordered to be returned to them — plus P44.99 or a total of P1,125.90. It
appearing however, that ina Joint Motion dated November 27, 1952, duly approved by
the Court, the parties agreed to fix the amount at P1,125.58, as the amount due and said
heirs have already received this amount in satisfaction of this item, no other sum can be
chargeable against the administrator.
(f) The probate Court also ordered the administrator to render an accounting of his
administration during the Japanese occupation on the ground that although appellant
maintained that whatever money he received during that period is worthless, same
having been declared without any value, yet during the early years of the war, or during
1942-43, the Philippine peso was still in circulation, and articles of prime necessity as
rice and firewood commanded high prices and were paid with jewels or other valuables.
But We must not forget that in his order of December 11, 1945, Judge Peña required the
administrator to render an accounting of his administration only from March 1, 1945, to
December of the same year without ordering said administrator to include therein the
occupation period. Although the Court below mentioned the condition then prevailing
during the war-years, We cannot simply presume, in the absence of proof to that effect,
that the administrator received such valuables or properties for the use or in exchange of
any asset or produce of the Intestate, and in view of the aforementioned order of Judge
Peña, which We find no reason to disturb, We see no practical reason for requiring
appellant to account for those occupation years when everything was affected by the
abnormal conditions created by the war. The records of the Philippine National Bank
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
show that there was a current account jointly in the names of Crisanto de Borja and
Juanita V. Jarencio, his wife, with a balance of P36,750.35 in Japanese military notes
and admittedly belonging to the Intestate and We do not believe that the oppositors or
any of the heirs would be interested in an accounting for the purpose of dividing or
distributing this deposit.
(g) On the sum of P13,294 for administrator's fees:
It is not disputed that the administrator set aside for himself and collected from the estate
the sum of P13,294 as his fees from 1945 to 1951 at the rate of P2,400 a year. There is
no controversy as to the fact that this appropriated amount was taken without the order
or previous approval by the probate Court. Neither is there any doubt that the
administration of the Intestate estate by Crisanto de Borja is far from satisfactory.
Yet it is a fact that Crisanto de Borja exercised the functions of an administrator and is
entitled also to a certain amount as compensation for the work and services he has
rendered as such. Now, considering the extent and size of the estate, the amount
involved and the nature of the properties under administration, the amount collected by
the administrator for his compensation at P200 a month is not unreasonable and should
therefore be allowed.
It might be argued against this disbursement that the records are replete with instances
of highly irregular practices of the administrator, such as the pretended ignorance of the
necessity of a book or ledger or at least a list of chronological and dated entries of money
or produce the Intestate acquired and the amount of disbursements made for the same
properties; that admittedly he did not have even a list of the names of the lessees to the
properties under his administration, nor even a list of those who owed back rentals, and
although We certainly agree with the probate Court in finding appellant guilty of acts of
maladministration, specifically in mixing the funds of the estate under his administration
with his personal funds instead of keeping a current account for the Intestate in his
capacity as administrator, We are of the opinion that despite these irregular practices for
which he was held already liable and made in some instances to reimburse the Intestate
for amounts that were not properly accounted for, his claim for compensation as
administrator's fees shall be as they are hereby allowed.
Recapitulation. — Taking all the matters threshed herein together, the administrator is
held liable to pay to the heirs of Quintin de Borja the following:
Under Paragraphs III and IV:
(a) ............................................................................... P7,084.27
(b) ............................................................................... 12,175.00
(c) ............................................................................... 16,113.95
(d) ............................................................................... 3,352.75
(e) ............................................................................... 341.74
(f) ................................................................................ 3,750.00
(g) 1 ..................................................................... 532.50
2 ..................................................................... 377.25
3 ..................................................................... 366.28
4 ..................................................................... 869.92
5 ..................................................................... 505.87
6 ..................................................................... 500.00
7-a
b .................................................................. 93.75
c .................................................................. 10.00
d ................................................................... 137.50
P46,210.00
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is modified by reducing the amount
that the administrator was sentenced to pay the oppositors to the sum of P46,210.78
(instead of P83,337.31), plus legal interests on this amount from the date of the decision
appealed from, which is hereby affirmed in all other respects. Without pronouncement as
to costs. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989
VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA
NAGAC, respondents.
Benjamin J. Quitoriano for petitioner.
Linzag-Arcilla & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate
without leaving any debts? May the probate court appoint the surviving sister of the
deceased as the administratrix of the estate of the deceased instead of the surviving
spouse? These are the main questions which need to be resolved in this case.
Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away on
January 3, 1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was survived by his legitimate
spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita
Pereira Nagac, the herein private respondent.
On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the Regional Trial
Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance of
letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de
Guzman Pereira. 1 In her verified petition, private respondent alleged the following: that
she and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the
deceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left
several properties, namely: death benefits from the Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL
Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
(PESALA) and the Social Security System (SSS), as well as savings deposits with the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at Barangay Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and
finally, that the spouse of the deceased (herein petitioner) had been working in London
as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the
deceased.
On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of
private respondent 2alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of
administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of
administration relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.
In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, appointed private
respondent Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate of Andres de
Guzman Pereira upon a bond posted by her in the amount of Pl,000.00. The trial court
ordered her to take custody of all the real and personal properties of the deceased and to
file an inventory thereof within three months after receipt of the order. 3
Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner brought the case to the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the appointment of private respondent as
administratrix in its decision dated December 15, 1987. 4
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the following issues:
(1) Whether or not there exists an estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for
purposes of administration; (2) Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is
necessary where there are no debts left by the decedent; and, (3) Who has the better
right to be appointed as administratrix of the estate of the deceased, the surviving
spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira or the surviving sister Rita Pereira Nagac?
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no estate of the deceased for
purposes of administration for the following reasons: firstly, the death benefits from PAL,
PALEA, PESALA and the SSS belong exclusively to her, being the sole beneficiary and
in support of this claim she submitted letter-replies from these institutions showing that
she is the exclusive beneficiary of said death benefits; secondly, the savings deposits in
the name of her deceased husband with the PNB and the PCIB had been used to defray
the funeral expenses as supported by several receipts; and, finally, the only real property
of the deceased has been extrajudicially settled between the petitioner and the private
respondent as the only surviving heirs of the deceased.
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for petitioner to decide what
properties form part of the estate of the deceased and to appropriate them for herself.
She points out that this function is vested in the court in charge of the intestate
proceedings.
Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not belong to the
estate of the deceased on the basis of her bare allegations as aforestated and a handful
of documents. Inasmuch as this Court is not a trier of facts, We cannot order an
unqualified and final exclusion or non-exclusion of the property involved from the estate
of the deceased. 5
The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the
administration proceedings are pending. The trial court is in the best position to receive
evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of the decedent's
estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if
any. 6 The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in
the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly
within the competence of the probate court. However, the court's determination is only
provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action which may be instituted by the parties. 7
Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira
for purposes of administration, We nonetheless find the administration proceedings
instituted by private respondent to be unnecessary as contended by petitioner for the
reasons herein below discussed.
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
45
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator,
in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case
he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein. 8 An exception to this rule is
established in Section 1 of Rule 74. 9 Under this exception, when all the heirs are of
lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to
partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the
appointment of an administrator.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs
from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations,
if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While
Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or
to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do
so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. 10 It should be noted
that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is
sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition.
Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened
with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. 11
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending
obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the
property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such
case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous
and unnecessary proceedings . 12
Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of a
deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on
the circumstances of each case.
In one case, 13 We said:
Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have
any dispute as to the bulk of the hereditary estate but only in the
manner of partition does section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court
apply and that in this case the parties are at loggerheads as to
the corpus of the hereditary estate because respondents
succeeded in sequestering some assets of the intestate. The
argument is unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge
has indicated, questions as to what property belonged to the
deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated
in the partition proceedings, especially where such property is in
the hands of one heir.
In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as administrator
is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to
ask for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective could be
achieved in an action for partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of
administration. 14 In still another case, We did not find so powerful a reason the
argument that the appointment of the husband, a usufructuary forced heir of his
deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary in order for him to have legal
capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased mother, since he
may just adduce proof of his being a forced heir in the intestate proceedings of the
latter. 15
We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are only two
surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a sister, both of age. The parties admit that
there are no debts of the deceased to be paid. What is at once apparent is that these two
heirs are not in good terms. The only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks
appointment as administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of
the deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are presently in the hands of
petitioner who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this
is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of
the deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not
appear to be substantial especially since the only real property left has been
extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful purpose would only
unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered. In most instances of a
similar nature, 16 the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may
be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors, should there
be any, are protected in any event.
We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration proceedings are
pending was not justified in issuing letters of administration, there being no good reason
for burdening the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs and
expenses of an administration proceeding.
With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the issue of who, as
between the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira and the sister Rita Pereira Nagac,
should be preferred to be appointed as administratrix.
46 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor
to Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the administration proceeding dismissed
without prejudice to the right of private respondent to commence a new action for
partition of the property left by Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-21993 June 21, 1966
ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch III,
ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, respondents.
Lorenzo Somulong for petitioners.
Torres and Torres for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petitioners Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio, surnamed Rodriguez, petition this Court
for a writ of certiorariand prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, for its
refusal to grant their motion to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 1331, which said Court
is alleged to have taken cognizance of without jurisdiction.
The facts and issues are succinctly narrated in the order of the respondent court, dated
June 13, 1963 (Petition, Annex 0), in this wise:
It is alleged in the motion to dismiss filed by Angela, Maria, Abelardo and
Antonio Rodriguez, through counsel, that this Court "has no jurisdiction to try
the above-entitled case in view of the pendency of another action for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, namely, Sp. Proceedings No. 3907 entitled
'In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino
Rodriguez which was filed ahead of the instant case".
The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in
the City of Manila; that on March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida
Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and
testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that on March 8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and
Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow
them to examine the alleged will; that on March 11, 1963 before the Court
could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn; that on March 12, 1963,
aforementioned petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging,
among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Parañaque, Rizal,
and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be
appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate; and that on March 12,
1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court
for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. It was
stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Parañaque, Rizal;
that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from
the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in
Parañaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and
Bulacan.
The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the
petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at
11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain
the petition for probate, citing as authority in support thereof the case
of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja , G.R. No. 7792, July 27,
1955.
The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand
that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case
upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and
that the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in
Rizal on March 12, 1963.
The Court of First Instance, as previously stated denied the motion to dismiss on the
ground that a difference of a few hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference over
the other; that, as early as March 7, movants were aware of the existence of the
purported will of Father Rodriguez, deposited in the Court of Bulacan, since they filed a
petition to examine the same, and that movants clearly filed the intestate proceedings in
Rizal "for no other purpose than to prevent this Court (of Bulacan) from exercising
jurisdiction over the probate proceedings". Reconsideration having been denied,
movants, now petitioners, came to this Court, relying principally on Rule 73, section 1 of
the Rules of Court, and invoking our ruling in Ongsingco vs. Tan and De Borja , L-7792,
July 27, 1955.
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent
is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen
or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and
his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province which he had estate. The
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, as far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez
on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon
the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time
and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what
is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of
the old Rules):
SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will . Notice thereof to be
published. — When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a
will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and
place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the
allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and place to be
published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate
has been filed by the testator himself.
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the
allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit
therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed.
Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed
to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr.
Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while
petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on
March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court
is incontestable.1äwphï1.ñët
But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a will being
delivered to "the Court having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the Bulacan court did
not have it because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal province. We can not disregard
Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-1963);
but even if we do so, and consider that he retained throughout some animus
revertendi to the place of his birth in Parañaque, Rizal, that detail would not imply that the
Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle
decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile
of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court ( In re Kaw
Singco, 74 Phil. 239; Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73 Phil. 676).
Neither party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that he left personal
property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan (t.s.n. p. 46, hearing of June 11, 1963, Annex
"H", Petition, Rec., p. 48). That is sufficient in the case before us.
In the Kaw Singco case (ante) this Court ruled that:
"... If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction
of the trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole
proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which have
arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to be
commenced anew before another court of the same rank in another
province. That this is of mischievous effect in the prompt administration of
justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio &
Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942). Furthermore, section 600 of Act
No. 190, providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in
the province where he had last resided, could not have been intended as
defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject matter, because
such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is one
thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney General
vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction — Act
No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon Courts of First Instance
jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of
the deceased.1 Since, however, there are many Courts of First Instance in
the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the
venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of
residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject
matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules
of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
is properly called "venue" (Rule 75, section 1.) Motion for reconsideration is
denied.
The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance
ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old
Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins that:
The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. (Sec.
1)
This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper venue,
yet the rule grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first invoked, without
taking venue into account.
There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One is that
their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the
decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to
divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the order
of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not designed to convert the
settlement of decedent's estates into a race between applicants, with the administration
of the properties as the price for the fleetest.
The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary
or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid
operative will. Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has
subsequently lost its validity;
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property
belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place
only with respect to the property in which the testator has not disposed;
(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not
happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates
the inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of accretion takes
place;
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases
provided in this Code.
Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final decision as
to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form
of pre-established action". The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus
proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending.
We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the settlement
of the estate in question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate. proceedings, said
court did not commit any abuse of discretion. It is the proceedings in the Rizal Court that
should be discontinued.
Wherefore, the writ of certiorari applied for is denied. Costs against petitioners
Rodriguez.
G.R. No. L-18148 February 28, 1963
DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the deceased
EUSEBIO CAPILI; and the instituted heirs, namely: ARMANDO CAPILI and
ARTURO BERNARDO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMOGENA
REYES, namely: FRANCISCO REYES, ET AL., and JOSE ISIDORO, ET
AL., respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla Law Offices for petitioners.
Romerico F. Flores for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan holding that the probate court in
Special Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the deed of donation
in question and to pass upon the question of title or ownership of the properties
mentioned therein.
The facts are briefly stated in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died
on July 27, 1958 and a testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate
was instituted in the Court of the Fist Instance of Bulacan. His will was
admitted to probate on October 9, 1958, disposing of his properties in favor
of his widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all surnamed
Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo.
Hermogena Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon petition of
Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili,
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
47
she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs, namely,
Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and Jose,
Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro.
On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in the testate
proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the estate
of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of
Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted to her collateral relatives
aforementioned. On June 16, 1959 these relatives filed an opposition to the
executor's project of partition and submitted a counter-project of partition of
their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the
deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not to the latter
alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and February 10,
1960, respectively, set the two projects of partition for hearing, at which
evidence was presented by the parties, followed by the submission of
memoranda discussing certain legal issues. In the memorandum for the
executor and the instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that the properties
disposed of in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him
exclusively and not to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyes
had donated to him her half share of such partnership; (2) that the collateral
heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing or grounds to question
the validity of the donation; and (3) that even assuming that they could
question the validity of the donation, the same must be litigated not in the
testate proceeding but in a separate civil action.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts
be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the
parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part, argued that the
deed of donation itself was determinative of the original conjugal character to
the properties, aside from the legal presumption laid down in Article 160 of
the Civil Code, and that since the donation was null and void the deceased
Eusebio Capili did not become owner of the share of his wife and therefore
could not validly dispose of it in his will.
On September 14, 1960, the probate court, the Honorable M. Mejia
presiding, issued an order declaring the donation void without making any
specific finding as to its juridical nature, that is, whether it was inter vivos or
mortis causa, for the reason that, considered under the first category, it falls
under Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits donations between
spouses during the marriage; and considered under the second category, it
does not comply with the formalities of a will as required by Article 728 in
relation to Article 805 of the same Code, there being no attestation clause. In
the same order the court disapproved both projects of partition and directed
the executor to file another," dividing the property mentioned in the last will
and testament of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the properties mentioned
in the deed of donation, Exhibit B, between the instituted heirs of the
deceased Eusebio Capili and the legal heirs of the deceased Hermogena
Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were conjugal properties of
the deceased spouses." On September 27, 1960, the executor filed a motion
for new trial, reiterating and emphasizing the contention previously raised in
their memorandum that the probate court had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the claim of the legal heirs of Hermogena Reyes involving title
to the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio Capili and taking exception
to the court's declaration of the nullity of the donation "without stating facts or
provision of law on which it was based." The motion for new trial was denied
in an order dated October 3, 1960.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being affirmed, petitioners
filed this present petition for review by certiorari.
The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate court erred in not declaring that the
probate court, having limited and special jurisdiction, had generally no power to
adjudicate title and erred in applying the exception to the rule.
In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to
title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings,"1 except
where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of
the property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question
without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.2 However, we have also
held that when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them
to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted,
said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil.
561; Manalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661); and that with the consent of the parties,
matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by
48 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not
prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232).
In the light of this doctrine, may it be said correctly that the trial court as well as the Court
of Appeals erred in upholding the power of the probate court in this case to adjudicate in
the testate proceedings, the question as to whether the properties herein involved belong
to the conjugal partnership of Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes, or to the deceased
husband exclusively?
At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issue is not a question of jurisdiction, in
the sense advanced by appellants that the trial court had completely no authority to pass
upon the title to the lands in dispute, and that its decision on the subject is null and void
and does not bind even those who had invoked its authority and submitted to its decision
because, it is contended, jurisdiction is a creature of law and parties to an action can not
vest, extend or broaden it. If appellants' contention is correct, then there can be no
exception to the no-jurisdiction theory. But as has been stated in the case of Cunanan v.
Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason:
"Determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The
responding Soriano's objection (that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to order the
delivery of the possession of the lots to the estate) relates exclusively to the procedure,
which is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only personal rights to a mode of practice (the
filing of an independent ordinary action) which may be waived". Strictly speaking, it is
more a question of jurisdiction over the person, not over the subject matter, for the
jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased person regarding the
ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate, has been recognized to be
vested in probate courts. This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding
is the liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and
legatees. Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of
all the debts and expenses.3 Thereafter, distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated
estate among the persons entitled to succeed him. The proceeding is in the nature of an
action of partition, in which each party is required to bring into the mass whatever
community property he has in his possession. To this end, and as a necessary corollary,
the interested parties may introduce proofs relative to the ownership of the properties in
dispute. All the heirs who take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are before
the court, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents necessary to
the complete settlement of such estate, so long as no interests of third parties are
affected.4
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of
certain of the properties involved — whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to
the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate
court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the
estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to
the proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented because of her death,
by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who
have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. It is
true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the
widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that is
being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being
asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with
the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners and the
widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator.
Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the probate court, for the purpose of the determination of the question of
ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borne by the admitted facts. On the
contrary, it is undisputed that they were the ones who presented the project of partition
claiming the questioned properties as part of the testator's asset. The respondents, as
representatives or substitutes of the deceased widow opposed the project of partition and
submitted another. As the Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of them must be deemed
to have submitted the issue for resolution in the same proceeding. Certainly, the
petitioners can not be heard to insist, as they do, on the approval of their project of
partition and, thus, have the court take it for granted that their theory as to the character
of the properties is correct, entirely without regard to the opposition of the respondents".
In other words, by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed lands
(upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband), petitioners
themselves put in issue the question of ownership of the properties — which is well
within the competence of the probate court — and just because of an opposition thereto,
they can not thereafter withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction
of the court. Certainly, there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the objection
are the ones who set the court in motion.5 They can not be permitted to complain if the
court, after due hearing, adjudges question against them.6
Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of
ownership of the properties involved because the widow herself, during her lifetime, not
only did not object to the inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the assets of her
deceased husband, but also signed an extra-judicial partition of those inventoried
properties. But the very authorities cited by appellants require that to constitute estoppel,
the actor must have knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time he
performs the act constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
estoppel.7 In the present case, the deceased widow acted as she did because of the
deed of donation she executed in favor of her husband not knowing that such deed was
illegal, if inter-vivos, and ineffectual if mortis-causa, as it has not been executed with the
required formalities similar to a will.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals being in accordance with law, the
same is hereby affirmed with costs against appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact
of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an
order that has become final and executory still be given effect? This is the issue that
arose from the following antecedents:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta
Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter.
Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of
Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will
and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandro's will to probate.
Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion To
Declare The Will Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion and issued an
order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued
declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro
Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of
Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the
oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda
Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the late spouses
Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective
estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to the laws
on intestacy upon payment of estate and other taxes due to the
government.1
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation
since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were
not married to each other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file
appellant's brief within the extended period
granted. 2 This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989 and a
corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals on May
16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued by the lower court to implement the final and
executory Order. Consequently, private respondents filed several motions including a
motion to compel petitioner to surrender to them the Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT)
covering the properties of the late Alejandro. When petitioner refused to surrender the
TCT's, private respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for issuance
of new titles in their names. Petitioner opposed the motion.
An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the
final and executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the
issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that the order was merely "interlocutory",
hence not final in character. The court added that the dispositive portion of the said Order
even directs the distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses. Private respondents
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991.
Thus, private respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the
two assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990 and February 1, 1991.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed by private
respondents before the Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that in issuing the
two assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to have no jurisdiction because he was
particularly designated to hear the case. Petitioner likewise assails the Order of the Court
of Appeals upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order which declared the
intrinsic invalidity of Alejandro's will that was earlier admitted to probate.
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate of the late
Alejandro and to maintain the status quo or lease of the premises thereon to third
parties. 3 Private respondents opposed the motion on the ground that petitioner has no
interest in the estate since she is not the lawful wife of the late Alejandro.
The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be
disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January
30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of
judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot
reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to
negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a
final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. 4

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or
order of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order
allowing the will became final and the question determined by the court in such order can
no longer be raised anew, either in the same proceedings or in a different motion. The
matters of due execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the
character ofres judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical questions
in connection therewith being for once and forever closed. 5 Such final order makes the
will conclusive against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due execution. 6
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of
the will sought to be probated, 7 particularly on three aspects:
n whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;
n compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
n the testamentary capacity of the testator; 8
n and the due execution of the last will and testament. 9
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was
of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the
will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will
is genuine and not a forgery, 10 that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he
is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will. 11
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be
raised even after the will has been authenticated. 12 Thus, it does not necessarily follow
that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the
will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs
the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on
succession, 13 the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is
specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision
that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of
finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds
the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party
had the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no
longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes
waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was
aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is
satisfied with the decision or order. As early as 1918, it has been declared that public
policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of
courts must at some point of time fixed by law 14 become final otherwise there will be no
end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium — the very object of which the courts
were constituted was to put an end to controversies. 15 To fulfill this purpose and to do
so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the
slothful. 16 The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may
have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence, 17 which circumstances do not concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the
will, as she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final
and executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as
the only heirs do not bind those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged
illegitimate son of the testator, the same constitutes res judicata with respect to those
who were parties to the probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters
anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It should be
remembered that forum shopping also occurs when the same issue had already been
resolved adversely by some other court. 18 It is clear from the executory order that the
estates of Alejandro and his spouse should be distributed according to the laws of
intestate succession.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory, hence it can still
be set aside by the trial court. In support thereof, petitioner argues that "an order merely
declaring who are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs is entitled cannot be the
basis of execution to require delivery of shares from one person to another particularly
when no project of partition has been filed." 19 The trial court declared in the January 30,
1986 Order that petitioner is not the legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his
three legitimate children (petitioners herein), and at the same time it nullified the will. But
it should be noted that in the same Order, the trial court also said that the estate of the
late spouses be distributed according to the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no
option but to implement that order of intestate distribution and not to reopen and again
re-examine the intrinsic provisions of the same will.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional
rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy. 20 But before there could be testate
distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law
considering that the deceased testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of
his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature
and that no one is presumed to give — Nemo praesumitur donare. 21 No intestate
distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
49
extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply
regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to
determine its intrinsic validity — that is whether the provisions of the will are valid
according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of
Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the
rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandro's disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal
properties of his late spouse, whom he described as his "only beloved wife", is not a valid
reason to reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not
belonging exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of the conjugal regime
cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the properties that were
disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and determined in
the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late spouse's estate.
Petitioner's motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot considering that
she was not married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 75773 April 17, 1990
TOMAS JIMENEZ, VISITACION JIMENEZ, DIGNO JIMENEZ, ANTONIO
JIMENEZ, AMADEO JIMENEZ, MODESTO JIMENEZ and VIRGINIA
JIMENEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. AMANDA VALERA-
CABIGAO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
XXXVII, Lingayen, Pangasinan, LEONARDO JIMENEZ, JR. and CORAZON
JIMENEZ, respondents.
Simplicio M. Sevilleja for petitioners.
Bitty S. Viliran for private respondents.
Leonardo B. Jimenez, Jr. for respondents.
FERNAN, CJ.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 29, 1986 which dismissed the petition
for certiorari and mandamus in AC-G.R. No. 06578 entitled "Tomas Jimenez, et. al. vs.
Hon. Amanda Valera-Cabigao."
The facts are as follows:
The marriage of Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson produced four (4)
children, namely: Alberto, Leonardo, Sr., Alejandra and Angeles. During the existence of
the marriage, Lino Jimenez acquired five (5) parcels of land in Salomague, Bugallon,
Pangasinan.
After the death of Consolacion Ungson, Lino married Genoveva Caolboy with whom he
begot the seven petitioners herein: Tomas, Visitacion, Digno, Antonio, Amadeo, Modesto
and Virginia, all surnamed Jimenez. Lino Jimenez died on August 11, 1951 while
Genoveva Caolboy died on November 21, 1978.
Thereafter, in April 1979, Virginia Jimenez filed a petition before the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 5346, praying
to be appointed as administratrix of the properties of the deceased spouses Lino and
Genoveva. Enumerated in her petition were the supposed heirs of the deceased spouses
which included herein co-petitioners and the four children of Lino Jimenez by
Consolacion Ungson, his previous wife. 2
In October, 1979, herein private respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr., son of Leonardo
Jimenez, Sr., filed a motion for the exclusion of his father's name and those of Alberto,
Alejandra, and Angeles from the petition, inasmuch as they are children of the union of
Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson and not of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy
and because they have already received their inheritance consisting of five (5) parcels of
lands in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan. 3
On March 23, 1981, petitioner Virginia Jimenez was appointed administrator of the
Intestate Estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy. 4 On May 21, 1981, she filed
an inventory of the estate of the spouses Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy wherein
she included the five (5) parcels of land in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan. As a
consequence, Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. moved for the exclusion of these properties from
the inventory on the ground that these had already been adjudicated to Leonardo Sr.,
Alberto, Alejandra and Angeles by their deceased father Lino Jimenez. Private
respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. presented testimonial and documentary evidence in
support of his motion while petitioner Virginia Jimenez, other than cross-examining the
witnesses of Leonardo, presented no evidence of her own, oral or documentary.
On September 29, 1981, the probate court ordered the exclusion of the five (5) parcels of
land from the inventory on the basis of the evidence of private respondent Leonardo
Jimenez, Jr. which consisted among others of: (1) Tax Declaration showing that the
subject properties were acquired during the conjugal partnership of Lino Jimenez and
50 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73

Consolacion Ungson; and, (2) a Deed of Sale dated May 12, 1964 wherein Genoveva provisional, petitioners are not barred from instituting the appropriate action in Civil Case
Caolboy stated, that the subject properties had been adjudicated by Lino Jimenez to his No. 16111.
children by a previous marriage, namely: Alberto, Leonardo, Alejandra and Indeed, the grounds relied upon by private respondents in their motion to dismiss do not
Angeles. 5 The motion for reconsideration of said order was denied on January 26, appear to be indubitable.Res judicata has been shown here to be unavailable and the
1982. 6 other grounds of prescription and laches pleaded by private respondents are seriously
Petitioner Virginia Jimenez then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition disputed. The allegation in the complaint is that the heirs of Leonardo Jimenez, Sr.
for certiorari and prohibition, docketed thereat as CA-G.R. No. SP-13916, seeking the (referring to private respondents,) forcibly intruded into and took possession of the
annulment of the order dated September 29, 1981 as well as the order of January 26, disputed properties only in 1978, after the death of Genoveva Caolboy. Since the action
1982. On November 18, 1982, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because (1) for reconveyance was instituted in 1984, it would appear that the same has not yet
Genoveva Caolboy, petitioners' mother, had admitted that the subject parcels of land had prescribed or otherwise barred by laches.
been adjudicated to the children of the previous nuptial; (2) the subject properties could There are a number of factual issues raised by petitioners before the lower court which
not have been acquired during the marriage of Lino Jimenez to Genoveva Caolboy cannot be resolved without the presentation of evidence at a full-blown trial and which
because they were already titled in the name of Lino Jimenez even prior to 1921, long make the grounds for dismissal dubitable. Among others, the alleged admission made by
before Lino's marriage to Genoveva in 1940; (3) the claim of Virginia Jimenez was barred petitioners' mother in the deed of sale is vehemently denied, as well as the fact itself of
by prescription because it was only in 1981 when they questioned the adjudication of the adjudication, there being no showing that the conjugal partnership of Lino Jimenez and
subject properties, more than ten (10) years after Genoveva had admitted such Consolacion Ungson had been liquidated nor that a judicial or extra-judicial settlement of
adjudication in a public document in 1964; and, (4) petitioner Virginia Jimenez was guilty the estate of Lino Jimenez was undertaken whereby such adjudication could have been
of laches. This decision became final and executory. 7 effected.
Two (2) years after, petitioners filed an amended complaint dated December 10, 1984 The grounds stated in the motion to dismiss not being indubitable, the trial court
before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII, docketed thereat as Civil committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 16111.
Case No. 16111, to recover possession/ownership of the subject five (5) parcels of land WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby
as part of the estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy and to order private REVERSED. Civil Case No. 16111 is reinstated and the Regional Trial Court of
respondents to render an accounting of the produce therefrom. Private respondents Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII is directed to proceed in said case with dispatch.
moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the action was barred by SO ORDERED.
prior judgment in CA-G.R. No. SP-13916 dated November 18, 1982 and by prescription
and laches. However, petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending that (1) the
action was not barred by prior judgment because the probate court had no jurisdiction to LACHENAL VS SALAS
determine with finality the question of ownership of the lots which must be ventilated in a G.R. No. L-42257 June 14, 1976
separate action; and, (2) the action instituted in 1981 was not barred by prescription or SON IN LAW IS A STRANGER TO SETTLEMENT PROCEEDINGS
laches because private respondents' forcible acquisition of the subject properties
occurred only after the death of petitioners' mother, Genoveva Caolboy in 1978.
FACTS: Victorio Lachenal died on November 20, 1969. His testate estate is pending
On February 13, 1985, the trial court resolved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
settlement in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch I (Special Proceeding No.
of res judicata. 8 On May 31, 1985, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
5836). His son, Ildefonso Lachenal, was named executor of his will. Among the
resolution was denied. As earlier intimated, the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed
properties included in the inventory of his estate is a fishing boat called Lachenal VII.
by petitioners before the appellate court was likewise denied due course and dismissed
On April 1, 1971 the executor filed in that proceeding a motion to require the spouses
in a decision dated May 29, 1986. 9
Lope L. Leonio and Flaviana Lachenal-Leonio to pay the rentals for the lease
Hence, this recourse.
of Lachenal VII and to return the boat to Navotas, Rizal for drydocking and repair.
The issue in this case is whether in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate) the
Mrs. Leonio, who was a daughter of the testator, opposed the executor's motion. She
lower court has jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership and whether res
countered with a motion to exclude the fishing boat from the decedent's estate. She
judicata exists as to bar petitioners' present action for the recovery of possession and
claimed that she is the owner of the boat because she purchased it from her father in
ownership of the five (5) parcels of land. In the negative, is the present action for
1967. The executor opposed the motion for exclusion.
reconveyance barred by prescription and/or laches?
The probate court in its order of January 28, 1972 designated a commissioner to receive
We reverse. Petitioners' present action for recovery of possession and ownership is
the evidence of the parties relative to the ownership of the motorboat. Mrs. Leonio had
appropriately filed because as a general rule, a probate court can only pass upon
already finished the presentation of her evidence before the commissioner.
questions of title provisionally. Since the probate, court's findings are not conclusive
The executor did not present his countervailing evidence. Instead, on July 8, 1975 he
being prima facie, 10 a separate proceeding is necessary to establish the ownership of
and the testator's other children named Flora, Elias and Irenea, and the children of a
the five (5) parcels of land. 11
deceased child filed in the Caloocan City Branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal an
The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that
action against the Leonio spouses and the other three children of the testator named
questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of
Crispula, Modesto and Esperanza, for the recovery of the motorboat Lachenal VII,
the property, can only be settled in a separate action. 12
allegedly valued at P150,000, together with back rentals and damages (Civil Case No.
All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they
3597).
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered
It was alleged in the complaint that Victorio Lachenal in 1964 leased the said motorboat
by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties
to his son-in-law, Lope L. Leonio, for a monthly rental of P2,000 and that after Victorio's
and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
death, the executor of his estate demanded from Leonio the return of the boat and the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. 13
payment of the back rentals.
The provisional character of the inclusion in the inventory of a contested property was
again reiterated in the following cases: Pio Barreto Realty Development, Inc. vs. Court of
PLAINTIFFS IN THE RECOVERY CASE: On July 20, 1975 the said plaintiffs in Civil
Appeals, 14 Junquera vs. Borromeo, 15Borromeo vs. Canonoy, 16 Recto vs. de la
Case No. 3597 filed in the probate court their own motion to exclude the said motorboat
Rosa. 17 It has also been held that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the
from the decedent's estate on the ground that the, probate court has no jurisdiction to
question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve
decide the question as to its ownership because that matter has to be resolved by the
with finality. 18 This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate
Caloocan court where Civil Case No. 3597 is pending.
proceeding as in the case at bar.
Res judicata 19 does not exist because of the difference in the causes of actions.
THE PROBATE COURT denied that motion. It held that it has jurisdiction over the
Specifically in S.P. No. 5346, the action was for the settlement of the intestate estate of
issue of ownership because the heirs had agreed to present their evidence on that point
Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy while Civil Case No. 16111 was an action for the
before a commissioner.
recovery of possession and ownership of the five (5) parcels of land. Moreover, while
It invoked the rule that generally "questions of title to property cannot be passed upon in
admittedly, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V in S.P. No. 5346 had
testate or intestate proceedings, except when the parties interested are all heirs of the
jurisdiction, the same was merely limited jurisdiction. Any pronouncement by said court
deceased in which event it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court the
as to title is not conclusive and could still be attacked in a separate proceeding. Civil
question as to title to property and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely
Case No. 16111, on the other hand. was lodged before the Regional Trial Court of
pass judgment thereon. The reason is that questions of collation or of advancement are
Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII in the exercise of the court's general jurisdiction. It was, in
generally inevitably involved therein which are proper matters to be passed upon in the
fact, such "separate or ordinary proceedings" contemplated by the rules for a final
due course of administration. And it has also been held that with the consent of the
determination of the issue of ownership of the disputed properties. To repeat, since the
parties, matters affecting property under administration may be taken cognizance of by
determination of the question of title to the subject properties in S.P. 5346 was merely

NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA


SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
the court in the course of the intestate proceedings provided the interests of third persons
are not prejudiced."
ISSUE: whether the probate court should be allowed to continue the hearing on the
ownership of the fishing boat or whether that question should be left to the determination
of the Caloocan court where the subsequent separate action (now in the pre-trial stage)
for the recovery of the motorboat is pending.
HELD: the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597 because
it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L Leonio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although
married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to
his estate. "The administrator may not pull him against his will, by motion, into the
administration proceeding"
THIS CASE FALLS UNDER THE GENERAL RULE THAT QUESTIONS AS TO
TITLE TO PROPERTY CANNOT BE PASSED UPON IN THE TESTATE OR
INTESTATE PROCEEDING BUT SHOULD BE VENTILATED IN A SEPARATE
ACTION Where a party in a probate proceeding prays for the inclusion in, or exclusion
from, the inventory of a piece of property, the court may provisionally pass upon the
question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. The Court of
First Instance is a court of general original jurisdiction invested with power to take
cognizance of all kinds of cases: civil cases, criminal cases, special proceedings, land
registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty and insolvency cases
Whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (probate,
land registration, etc.) is in reality not a question of over the subject matter. It is in
essence a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived"
PROBATE JURISDICTION includes all matters relating to the settlement of estates
and the probate of wills of persons (Sec. 599, Act 190), particularly the administration of
the decedent's estate, the payment of his debts, questions as to collation or
advancements to the heirs, the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, and the partition
and distribution of the estate (De La Cruz vs. Camon, supra).
For the recovery or protection or the property rights of the decedent. an executor or
administrator may bring or defend in the right of the decedent, actions for causes which
survive. Actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the
decedent's estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an
injury to or property, real or personal, may be commenced against an executor or
administrator (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 87, Rules of Court).
In the instant case , the executor, by virtue of section 2 of Rule 87, filed a separate
action in the Caloocan court for the recovery of the fishing boat and back rentals from the
Leonio spouses.
In the De la Cruz case, supra, it was held that rentals allegedly due to the decedent's
estate may not be collected by the administrator by filing a motion in the testate
proceeding. The said rentals do not constitute property in the administrator's hands and
are not thus within the effective control of the probate court. The proper procedure in
collecting such rentals is to file an independent action in the Court of First Instance so
that the right of the estate thereto may be threshed out in a full-dress trial on the merits.
The ruling in the De la Cruz case applies with stronger force to this case because here
the executor seeks to recover not only the rentals but also the leased property itself, as
to which the wife of the lessee had asserted adverse title.
Normally, it is expedient and convenient that the question of title to property, which arises
between the decedent's estate and other persons, should be adjucated in a separate
action because such a question requires the presentation of appropriate pleadings
(complaint, motion to dismiss, answer, counterclaim and reply). A resort to the modes of
discovery may be necessary so that the issues may be clearly defined and the trial may
be expedited. Those matters can be effectively accomplished in an ordinary action rather
than in the testamentary or intestate proceeding (Mangaliman vs. Gonzales, L-21033,
December 28, 1970, 36 SCRA 462).
The court may also have to resolve ancillary issues as to damages and counterclaims for
money or property. Ultimately, execution has to be issued. The execution of a judgment is
usually made by the Court of First Instance in an ordinary action and not in a special
proceeding (See Magallanes vs. Kayanan, supra).
. embraced in said undertaking. Approval of the agreement with Moslares was strongly
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
51
PIO BARETTO VS CA
G.R. No. L-62431-33 August 31, 1984
PIO BARRETTO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) and HONOR MOSLARES, respondents.
Azucena E. Lozada for petitioner.
Estrella Funelas Iral & Associates and Tomas Trinidad for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS: The proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Drepin were initiated shortly
after his death on July 29, 1972 with the filing of a petition for probate of his holographic
will on August 23, 1972.
In this holographic will the late Drepin listed twenty-two (22) persons as his alleged
creditors, and within the six (6) months after publication within which to file claims against
the estate, twelve (12) persons filed their respective claims. The total amount of
obligations that may be chargeable against the Drepin Estate is P1,299,652.66.
The only asset of the testate estate of Drepin consists of three (3) parcels of titled land
with an area of approximately eighty (80) hectares, and another parcel with an area of
eighty-one (81) hectares still pending registration. The estate is saddled with claims of
creditors named in the Drepin will and creditors who have filed their claims within the
reglementary period. The only way to pay their claims is to sell the Drepin lots, so that
from the proceeds of the sale, the debts of the estate could be paid, and any remaining
balance distributed to the Drepin heirs.
Since the filing of the petition for probate of the Drepin will, on August 23, 1972, nine (9)
offers had been made for the purchase of the Drepin lands, among them, that of GM
Management Phils., dated August 15, 1978, through its President Honor P. Moslares.
Basis for Moslares' letter proposal is a deed of sale with mortgage executed by the
decedent in his favor on October 9, 1970. It appears that on said date, the deceased sold
80.3980 hectares of land absolutely and perpetually to Honor P. Moslares for the sum of
P2,600,000.00 with a downpayment of P300,000.00. To secure the payment of the
remaining P2,300,000.00, the latter mortgaged the land to the former. The parties further
agreed not to register the sale yet until P1,300,000.00 shall have been paid to Drepin
and P1,000.000.00 paid to Drepin's creditors.
Subsequently, on June 25, 1971, Drepin and Moslares entered into a "Joint Venture
Agreement". Said agreement listed Drepin as the registered "owner" of the lots and
denominated Moslares as "developer" tasked with converting the lands into a residential
subdivision.
Before the agreement could be implemented, Nicolai Drepin died.
Upon learning of the existence of Special Proceedings No. 7257, 7261 and 7269 herein
respondent Moslares, on August 15, 1978, informed the Judicial Administrator
Atty. Tomas Trinidad that he is already the owner of the properties made subject matter of
the Special Proceedings and proposed that he be permitted to pay the balance on the
sale with mortgage in accordance with the terms of his written proposal.
The PROBATE COURT, on August 17, 1978 issued an order approving respondent
Moslares' proposal and authorizing administrator Trinidad to enter into the appropriate
agreement. This was reiterated by the court in its order dated January 9, 1979, with the
condition that GM Management Phils. had only up to February 28, 1979 to comply with
its letter-offer dated August 15, 1978 and "failure on their part to comply with the same
within the period specified, the contract with the decedent shall be deemed resolved and
ineffective." Counsel for heir claimant Cornelia Tejano was Revise given up to said date
to make and submit a more beneficial offer. Neither GM Management nor counsel for
Tejano was able to perform as required.
Requests for revision of payment and extension of period within which to pay the balance
of P1,600,000.00 were made by Moslares. Further, he filed a Manifestation and Urgent
Motion proposing transfer of the certificate of titles over the land subject of the
proceedings so as to enable him to generate funds to liquidate the payable balance. The
same were left unacted upon by the probate court.
Meanwhile, on September 25,1979, A Deed of Undertaking was entered into by
respondent Moslares and the Administrator to implement the Contract of Sale with
Mortgage. Such deed provided for the mode of payment which Moslares was to follow as
well as the clearing and transfer of the certificates of title in the name of Moslares. The
latter proviso was to enable Moslares to secure the loan needed to pay for the balance of
the purchase price. Postdated checks were issued by Moslares to cover the amount
urged by the Administrator. No action was taken by the court thereon. At the hearing of
October 19, 1979, Moslares tendered P1,600,000.00 to the Judicial Administrator. This
was opposed by counsel for heir Tejano, Atty. Ramon Encarnacion, on the ground that
52 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
respondent Moslares had only until February 28, 1979 within which to pay the same.
Attorney Encarnacion thereupon brought to the attention of the court an offer to buy the
properties for P3,000,000.00 by herein petitioner Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc.
Because of the differing contentions and the new offer, the probate court ordered the
parties to submit memoranda and set a conference on November 28, 1979 to discuss the
new offer.
On November 12, 1979, respondent Moslares submitted his memorandum containing
three points to wit:
l. Actually, Honor P. Moslares is already owner of the Property,
subject matter of this proceedings, and as such, could no longer
be the subject matter of this testate proceedings. The payment
made by Honor P. Moslares to the Judicial Administrator through
this Honorable Court on 19 October, 1979, is in compliance with
the Contract entered into between him and the late Nicolai
Drepin, in 1970;
2. The Order of this Honorable Court dated 9 January, 1979,
particularly with reference to the period, mentioned in No. 1,
page 2 of the Order of this Honorable Court giving Honor P.
Moslares up to 28 February, 1979, within which to comply with
his letter-offer to the Court dated 15 August, 1978, is not yet
final, said period having been extended;
3. The Order of this Honorable Court dated 9 January, 1979,
particularly No. 2, Page 2 thereof, barred Counsel for Cornelia
B. Tejano from making any further offer, his right to do so having
expired on 28 February, 1979.
Thereupon, the probate court judge directed Moslares through the administrator Atty.
Trinidad, to furnish copies of — (1) Deed of Absolute Sale; (2) Special Power of Attorney;
and (3) Joint Venture Agreement. The same were promptly submitted.
On February 28, 1979, March 6, 1980 and April 15, 1980, letters to Judicial Administrator
Trinidad were sent by respondent Moslares seeking further extension of time within
which to pay the balance of his obligation to the estate, and for favorable
recommendations to the probate court in his reports saying: "Help me now, this is ours.
We can make money of all this sacrifice we had on the pass (sic)."
On April 15, 1980, the probate court reiterated its order dated August 17, 1978
authorizing the Administrator to finalize the sale with GM Management Phils. and giving
respondent Moslares ten (10) days from date to deposit the necessary amount to cover
the value of the checks as each fallsdue. Failure to do so would result in the automatic
rescission of the authority to sell to GM Management Phils. and the Administrator would
be permitted to accept other offers in the best interest of the Estate. This order was the
probate court's prompt action on a "Report with Motion for Cancellation of Order
Approving Sale to GM Management, Phils. Honor P. Moslares, if it fails to make good the
April 15, 1980 check "As Token Payment in Good Faith", filed by administrator Trinidad
on the same day, April 15, 1980.
GM Management sought reconsideration and amendment of the Order of April 15, 1980
to conform to the provisions of the Deed of Undertaking.
On May 23, 1980, administrator Trinidad filed a "Report with Motion to Authorize
Administrator to Screen Offers to Purchase Estate and Others.
On May 31, 1980, respondent Moslares filed another manifestation praying that his
pending motions be acted upon and that the motion of administrator Trinidad be denied
for lack of merit.
On June 30, 1980, administrator Trinidad made the following "Observation and Report on
the Motion of Buyer GM Management Phils. for reconsideration" —
2. Two checks, one for P50,000.00 and one for P250,000.00
were deposited on April 28, 1980 after the Order of the Probate
Court. BOTH BOUNCED. DAIF (Drawn against insufficient
funds).
3. Another check for P300,000.00 is now held by the
Administrator, postdated for today, June 30, 1980 and
Administrator just received, June 29, 1980 a telegram asking to
withhold deposit until after 30 days from amendatory order of
the Probate Court.
xxx xxx xxx
6. The motion of Administrator is reiterated.
On July 2, 1980, the probate court issued the following order:
Finding the Motion of the Administrator well-taken and in the
best interests of the Estate, the administrator is authorized to
enter into agreement with any other interested parties on a first
paid first served basis without prejudice to G.M. Management
Philippines to continue with its offer and make good the same in
as an ordinary buyer on the same first paid first served basis.
Respondent Moslares filed a motion for reconsideration of said July 2, 1980 order on the
ground that:
1. The Honorable Probate Court has no jurisdiction over the
three (3) parcels of land, consisting of 80.3980 hectares subject
matter of the Deed of Sale which the late Nicolai Drepin,
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
conveyed to Movant Honor P. Moslares. The only right which
pertains to the ESTATE, is the right to demand from Honor P.
Moslares, the balance of the Deed of Sale, which has been fixed
by this Honorable Court at ONE MILLION SIX HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P1,600,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency;
2. As of November, 1979, the law that governs between the
ESTATE and MOVANT, Honor P. Moslares, is the DEED OF
UNDERTAKING executed by the Administrator in favor of
Movant Honor P. Moslares, pursuant to the authority given by
the Honorable Probate Court to the Administrator contained in
the Order dated August 15, 1978, reiterated in the Order dated
January 9, 1979, and in the Order dated 15 April 1980; and
3. The Honorable Probate Court has no jurisdiction to decree
rescission of the Contract into (sic) between the decedent and
Movant Honor P. Moslares on the 9th day of October, 1970.
This motion for reconsideration was opposed by administrator Trinidad as well as the
Tejano heirs through counsel, arguing that the probate court has jurisdiction to issue the
questioned orders because petitioner submitted himself to the court's jurisdiction and his
checks bounced also that the Deed of Undertaking was validly cancelled as a result of
the valid rescission of Trinidad's authority to sell to petitioner.
On September 30, 1980, the probate court issued an order denying respondent
Moslares' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. And on October 10, 1980
administrator Trinidad executed the Deed of Sale in favor of Pio Barretto Realty, Inc.
transferring the titles to the properties in question in the name of the latter . The same
was duly registered. On October 20, 1980, the probate court approved the report of
administrator Trinidad dated October 16, 1980, with xerox copies of the Deed of Sale in
favor of Pio Barretto Realty, Inc. of the estate of Nicolai Drepin pursuant to respondent
court's order authorizing the sale, and of the approved Deed of Undertaking with the
vendee.
An urgent Motion and Manifestation was filed by respondent Moslares on April 8, 1981
praying that his motion for reconsideration of the orders be already resolved, followed by
an Omnibus Motion on April 27, 1981 to resolve all pending motions and praying that the
Deed of Sale and Deed of Undertaking in favor of Pio Barretto be cancelled. The same
remained unacted upon.
On May 18, 1981, respondent filed Civil Case No. 41287 before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Pasig, Metro Manila to determine title and ownership over the Drepin
lands.
On June 23, 1981, a petition for certiorari was filed by respondent Moslares before the
Court of Appeals which issued a temporary restraining order. Judgment was rendered by
respondent court in favor of respondent Moslares, the dispositive portion of which has
been quoted.
Barretto filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on November 12, 1982.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
HELD: For continually presuming that the three titled lots were part of the Drepin estate
and for refusing to provisionally pass upon the question of exclusion, did the respondent
court act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion?
We hold that even with such presumption and refusal, the respondent court still
acted within its jurisdiction and not with grave abuse of discretion. After all, the
jurisprudence and rule are both to the effect that the probate court "may"
provisionally pass upon the question of exclusion, not "should". The obvious
reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or
ownership, which result to inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can
only be settled in a separate action. Hence, even if respondent court presumed an the
way that the properties sold by Drepin to petitioner were part of Drepin's estate, that
would not prevent nor defeat petitioner's remedy in a separate suit.
And We hold that Civil Case No. 41287 is just such a suit instituted to settle the question
of ownership over the lots covered originally by TCTs Nos. 259060, 259061 and 259062,
despite the claim for damages, because of the composite effect of the prayer in the
complaint thereof ...
xxx xxx xx
In effect, We are saying that the question of whether the properties sold by Drepin to
Petitioner should be excluded from the probate proceedings below, can not be
determined with finality by Us in this case, because in this petition We are merely
reviewing the acts of the respondent CFI as a probate court.
Any ruling by the probate court to include those properties "is only provisional in
character and is without prejudice to a judgment in a separate action on the issue of title
or ownership" (Sebial v. Sebial, L-23419, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 385). Consequently,
in reviewing the exercise of such limited probate jurisdiction, We cannot order an
unqualified and final exclusion of the properties involved, as prayed for; to do so would

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
expand the probate court's jurisdiction beyond the perimeters set by law and
jurisprudence. It is fitting and proper that this issue be ventilated and finally resolved in
the already instituted Civil Case No. 41287, even as We hold that respondent court's act
of not excluding the lots involved did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. In view of
this limitation, We need not resolve the issue of whether there was novation of the Deed
of Sale with Mortgage, or not.
This same elemental principle, we found occasion to reiterate in the cases
However, from here, the road forks as we disagree with the respondent court's findings
on the second issue.
In his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, respondent Moslares assails the
issuance of the four impugned orders by the probate court on the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction to rescind the Deed of Sale with the Mortgage entered into by the
deceased during his lifetime, due to the limited jurisdiction of the probate court merely to
settle and liquidate the estates of a decedent and not to pass upon questions of title to
property.
On the other hand, the petitioner argues that in voiding and nullifying the four orders of
the probate court, the Court of Appeals, in effect, would have the former court recognize
the alleged ownership of Mr. Moslares over the three titled Drepin lots involved in this
case contrary to its pronouncement in settling the first issue.
It is to be noted that the last agreement entered into by the deceased prior to
his death, that is, the Joint Venture Agreement listing Drepin as owner of the
properties in question, and the surrender to administrator Trinidad of the
certificates of title, had led the probate court to enter or include said properties
in its inventory of the deceased's estate . Thus, provisionally, ownership thereof
was recognized as vested in the estate. Subsequently, in the course of the
probate proceedings, the sale of the properties was found to be necessary to
settle the deceased's obligations. It was then that herein private respondent
Moslares submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court in an "Offer to Buy" said
properties, based on his previous agreement with the deceased during the latter's
lifetime.
It is noteworthy that contrary to Moslares' assertion of ownership, he had offered to buy
the Drepin lands from the probate court. Surely, this is not conduct ordinarily expected of
one who is the owner of the property. Further, the fact that subsequent to the Deed of
Sale, the deceased as buyer and as absolute owner entered into an agreement with the
respondent merely as developer of the lands in question evidences a change of cause or
object as well as a change of relation between the parties. Moslares' own acts negate his
claims in this petition that he had acquired ownership of the properties. Thus, the
transparency of respondent's argument becomes readily apparent.
Having submitted his letter-proposal to the court, the same was approved, allowing
Moslares to pay the balance of the purchase price agreed upon by respondent and the
decedent in the amount of One Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,600,000.00)
specifying the time and manner of payment thereof. Thus, he was given preference and
priority over other persons or groups offering to buy the estate. Having failed to comply
with the conditions of payment of the contract, the same was rescinded by the probate
court. Now, respondent questions this rescission which he maintains to be beyond the
jurisdiction of the court.
Estoppel works to preclude respondent from questioning the jurisdiction of the court. By
offering to buy the properties in question, respondent has clearly recognized the
jurisdiction of the probate court to which he had effectively submitted himself. It is well
settled that a party is estopped from disputing the jurisdiction of the court after invoking it
himself (Tible v. Aquino, 65 SCRA 207). After voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court (People v. Munar, 53 SCRA 278; Capilitan v. dela Cruz,
55 SCRA 706; Summit Guaranty and Insurance Co., Inc., v. Court of Appeals, 110 SCRA
241; Tajonera v. Lamoroza, 110 SCRA 438). A party will not be allowed to make a
mockery of justice by taking inconsistent positions. Doctrine of estoppel bars a party from
trifling with the courts (Depositario v. Hervias, 121 SCRA 756).
The merits of the case likewise lead to similar conclusions.
IT CANNOT BUT BE CONCEDED THAT THE LIMITED JURISDICTION OF A
PROBATE COURT PROHIBITS IT FROM DETERMINING RIGHTS TO
PROPERTY LEFT BY A DECEDENT WHICH DEPENDS ON THE CONTRACT
(Goodin v. Casselman 200 N.W. 94, 51 N.D. 543). However, actions of the probate court,
in the case at bar, do not refer to the adjudication of rights under the contract entered into
by the deceased during his lifetime. It is to be noted that the dealings of the respondent
with the court arose out of the latter's bid to sell property under its authority to sell,
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
53
mortgage or otherwise encumber property of the estate to pay or settle against the estate
(Rule 89, Revised Rules of Court). Thus, respondent bound himself under an agreement
with the court separate and distinct from that which he had with the decedent. In
rescinding such contract, the court merely seeks to enforce its right to put an end to an
agreement which had ceased to be a working proposition. Surely, this is well within the
power of the probate court. Though of limited and special jurisdiction, it cannot be
denied, however, that when the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed
to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdicton to make it effective (Zuniga
v. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 740).
We cannot allow an absurd situation to arise where the Drepin estate will never be
settled and liquidated because even if Moslares cannot pay the agreed purchase price of
the Drepin lands, still the probate court can no longer sell the lands to other prospective
buyers. Under the theory of respondent, it is insisted that the probate court has no
authority to cancel his unfulfilled offer to buy, notwithstanding the fact that he failed
miserably to comply with the terms of his own offer to buy. It is to be remembered that
Moslares had already been granted undue leniency by the probate court to meet his
obligations to pay. But, the saga of Moslares' bouncing checks remains. Three reports of
Administrator Trinidad had been submitted as annexes to the petition for certiorari. The
report, dated June 30, 1980 showed that two of Moslares' checks were dishonored,
having been drawn against insufficient funds. The August 18, 1980 report stated that: "All
the checks submitted to the probate court for payment bounced." And in the report dated
April 15, 1981, it was further averred by the administrator that "... believing that the
bouncing checks were not intended to defraud the Estate," "he refrained from
prosecuting Honor P. Moslares criminally under the law on dishonored checks."
It is also to be emphasized that it was not respondent's contract of sale with decedent
that had been invalidated but rather the administrator's authority to sell to respondent.
Although the court recognized the Deed of Sale with Mortgage, still the same was not
being enforced as such but was used only as basis for the terms and conditions of
respondent's agreement with the court. To enforce the same is truly beyond the scope of
the probate court's jurisdiction. The court's actions constitute a refusal to pass upon the
validity of the contract to sell.
Further, the probate court has ample discretion in determining whether conditions of a
particular sale would be beneficial to the estate and this is generally respected by the
appellate courts (Court of First Instance v. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 114, Fernandez,
et al., v. Montejo, 109 Phil. 701). To attack the nullity of the order of the probate court to
sell property of the deceased, it must be shown that the contract of sale is null and void
(Rafols v. Barba, 119 SCRA 147). The infirmity of the subject deed of sale is premised on
the alleged nullity of the order of the court authorizing the sale. The validity of said order
may not be attacked in a collateral proceeding, the supposed ground for declaring it void
for lack of jurisdiction not being apparent on the face thereof (Rafols v. Barba, supra).
Nevertheless, respondent could have prevented the sale of the Drepin lands. Section 3,
Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Persons interested may prevent such sale, etc., by
giving bond. — No such authority to sell mortgage, or otherwise
encumber real or personal estate shall be granted if any person
interested in the estate gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned to pay the debts, expenses of administration,
and legacies within such tune as the court directs; and such
bond shall be for the security of the creditors, as well as of the
executor or administrator, and may be prosecuted for the benefit
of either.
provides respondent with the legal means by which he could have forestalled the sale of
the Drepin lands to the petitioner. (Court of First Instance v. Court of Appeals, supra) If
third persons oppose an application for leave to sell the property of the decedent,
claiming title to the property, the title claim, cannot be adjudicated by the probate court,
but it can hold approval of the sale in abeyance until the question of ownership shall have
been decided in a proper action (Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501). But this, he failed to
do. Ergo, we find no reason to disturb the questioned orders of the probate court.
Moreover, the respondent is not without remedy if truly his claim of ownership is proper
and meritorious. Since the probate court has no jurisdiction over the question of title and
ownership of the properties, the respondents may bring a separate action if they wish to
question the petitioner's titles and ownership (Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 91
SCRA 540). Though an order of the probate court approving the sale of the decedent's
property is final, the respondent may file a complaint in the proper court for the rescission
of the sale. (Pizarro v. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 72). Likewise, the initial question of
respondent regarding the propriety of including the properties in question in the inventory
of the probate court as he claims ownership thereof may therein be finally and
conclusively settled (Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, supra; Lachenal v. Salas, 71
SCRA 202). The respondent has ample protection of his rights for the province of the
probate court remains merely the settlement of the estate and may not be extended
beyond (Pizarro v. Court of Appeals, supra).
54 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
The decision of the Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court), dated June 30,
1982 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The permanent restraining order issued against
the trial court is hereby DISMISSED. The impugned orders of the probate court dated
April 15, 1980, July 2, 1980, September 30, 1980 and October 20, 1980 are accordingly
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-42678 April 9, 1987
PEDRO E. BAYBAYAN, CIPRIANO EVANGELISTA, and SPOUSES
BARTOLOME and CONSUELO BAYBAYAN,petitioners,
vs.
HON. NARCISO A. AQUINO, as Presiding Judge CFI Pangasinan Branch XIV;
Deputy Sheriff CONSTANCIO PAGADUAN; EULALIA EVANGELISTA,
NORBERTO, PAULINA, FELIZA, all surnamed PADUA; DIONISIA, LAUREANO,
JOSEFINA, LEONARDO, ANASTACIA, VALENTINA, all surnamed ORPIANO;
SERVILLANO, GERTRUDES, PASTORA, LORENZO, FAUSTA, all surnamed
DELFIN; and DIONISIO, FAUSTINA, AMADO BENJAMIN, all surnamed
ORIA, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the Order issued by the respondent
Judge on 4 December 1975, which dismissed, without prejudice, the petitioners'
complaint filed in Civil Case No. 23 1 -R of the then Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, as well as the Order, dated 24 December 1975, which denied petitioners'
motion for the reconsideration of said order.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On 19 January 1960, herein private respondents Norberto Padua, Paulina Padua, Felisa
Padua, Dionisia Orpiano, Laureano Orpiano, Leonardo Orpiano, Josefina Orpiano,
Valentina Orpiano, Servillano Delfin, Gertrudes Delfin, Pastors Delfin Lorenzo Delfin,
Fausta Delfin, Dionisio Oria, Faustina Oria, Amado Oria, and Benjamin Oria, all claiming
to be the nephews and nieces of one Vicente Oria who died intestate sometime in 1945
in Balungao, Pangasinan, filed a petition for the summary settlement of the decedent's
estate, the value of which did not exceed P6,000.00. The petition was filed in the then
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Tayug Branch. The case was docketed therein as
Special Proceeding No. T-300. 1
After due publication and hearing, the probate court issued an order adjudicating the
estate to the heirs of the decedent, who were ordered to submit a project of
partition. 2 Sometime in 1971, the case was transferred to the Resales Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan where it was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 24-R.
On 18 September 1974, the probate court confirmed the adjudication earlier made and
ordered Eulalia Evangelista to deliver the respective shares of her co-heirs; to make an
accounting of the produce thereof from 1960; and to deliver said produce to her co-heirs
or pay its equivalent. A writ of execution was subsequently issued pursuant thereto. 3
A writ of possession was also issued sometime thereafter, and the private respondents
were placed in possession of their respective shares. 4 However, when a representative
of the private respondents went to cultivate the portion adjudicated to said private
respondents, he was prevented by Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelista. In view thereof,
the private respondents filed a motion to cite said Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelista in
contempt of court. 5
As a consequence, herein petitioners Pedro Baybayan, Cipriano Evangelists, and the
spouses Bartolome and Consuelo Baybayan, claiming to be the registered owners of the
lots involved, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Rosales
Branch docketed therein as Civil Case No. 231-R, against the Deputy Sheriff and the
herein private respondents, for the quieting of their title, plus damages, and to restrain
said defendants from enforcing the writ of execution issued in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R. 6
Meanwhile, at the hearing of the motion for contempt in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, the
question of the Identity of the lands subject of Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, was brought up, so
that the probate court ordered a relocation survey and commissioned a geodetic
engineer to undertake said survey. After the survey, the commissioner submitted to the
Court a report stating, among others, that the lands which were delivered by the Deputy
Sheriff to the heirs of Vicente Oria, pursuant to the writ of possession issued by the
probate court, are registered in the names of herein petitioners under TCT No. 50269
and TCT No. 50270 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. 7
By reason thereof, the probate court, in an order dated 30 October 1975, dismissed the
contempt charge against Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelists. However, the same court
ordered the petitioners to amend their complaint filed in Civil Case No. 231-R since "it is
necessary that an amended complaint be filed by Pedro Baybayan in order to determine
whether or not the property in question is part of the property under Spec. Proc. No. 24-
R, inasmuch as it is now the property claimed by him which is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 50269." 8
Pursuant thereto, the herein petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion in Civil Case No. 231-R,
to which was attached an amended complaint wherein some defendants were
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
dropped. 9 The respondent Judge, however, found that the Amended Complaint did not
comply with his order of 30 October 1975 to exclude Lot E and dismissed the case,
"without prejudice on the part of the plaintiffs to file a proper complaint for the recovery of
ownership or possession of the property in controversy which is Lot B in the relocation
plan and formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 23684, now under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 50269." 10
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, 11 but the motion was
denied on 24 December 1975. 12 Thereupon, they filed with this Court a petition for
certiorari for the review of the orders of the lower court. The Court treated the petition as
a special civil action for certiorari. 13
Counsel for the petitioners, in this petition, contends that the respondent Judge had no
authority under the law, both substantive and procedural, to issue the questioned orders
because the order to amend the complaint was issued in, and in connection with Spec.
Proc. No. 24-R where the herein petitioners are not even parties.
The contention, in our opinion, is not meritorious. While it may be true that the order to
amend the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 231-R was issued in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R,
so that it cannot ordinarily bind the herein petitioners who are not parties in said special
proceedings, it appears, however, that the petitioners voluntarily submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of the probate court, when they filed an Omnibus Motion in Civil Case No.
231-R, wherein they prayed for leave to amend their complaint in accordance with the
order of the probate court of 30 October 1975. They cannot now be allowed belatedly to
adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the respondent trial Judge to
whom they submitted their cause voluntarily. 14
We find, however, that the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in dismissing the complaint filed by the petitioners, for
their alleged failure to amend their complaint to exclude therefrom Lot E which the
respondent Judge found, in his order of 30 October 1975, issued in the probate court, to
be owned by the petitioners Cipriano Evangelists and Consuelo Baybayan. The findings
of the respondent Judge as to the ownership of Lot E after the hearing conducted in
Spec. Proc. No. 24-R do not justify the order to amend the complaint since the
determination of the ownership of the said lot by the respondent Judge presiding over a
court exercising probate jurisdiction is not final or ultimate in nature and is without
prejudice to the right of an interested party to raise the question of ownership in a proper
action. 15
It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long fine of
decisions, that "when questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of
the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property,
not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of
the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of
administrative proceedings. The Court of First Instance, acting, as a probate court, has
no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the Court of
First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a court of first instance." 16
Besides, the order to amend the complaint is vague and hazy and does not specify what
the amendments should be or how the complaint should be amended so that the
petitioners should not be faulted if the amended complaint subsequently filed by them in
Civil Case No. 231-R does not contain the allegations that the respondent Judge would
want to appear therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and a writ issued, setting aside the Orders
issued by the respondent Judge on 7 December 1975 and 24 December 1975, in Civil
Case No. 231-R of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.
Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.
Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.
HILADO, J. :
Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy
Commissioner Fidel Ibañez, rendered its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O.
Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and
operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission held that the evidence
therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be promoted in a proper and
suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant of
two and one-half (2-½) tons in the municipality of San Juan; that the original applicant
Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate
estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service". The commission,
therefore, overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the
provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of
public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante,
authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed
by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a
daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
and to sell the ice produced from said plant in the said Municipality of San Juan and in
the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject to the conditions
therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34).
Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:
1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with
law.
2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably
supported by evidence.
3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice
and Cold Storage Industries of the Philippines, Inc., as existing operators, a
reasonable opportunity to meet the increased demand.
4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted
departure from its announced policy with respect to the establishment and
operation of ice plant. (Pp. 1-2, petitioner's brief.)
In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to
allow the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for
the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and in
subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in
contravention of law.
If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the
right to prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one
would have denied him that right. As declared by the commission in its decision, he had
invested in the ice plant in question P 35,000, and from what the commission said
regarding his other properties and business, he would certainly have been financially
able to maintain and operate said plant had he not died. His transportation business
alone was netting him about P1,440 a month. He was a Filipino citizen and continued to
be such till his demise. The commission declared in its decision, in view of the evidence
before it, that his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The
aforesaid right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its conclusion was
one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the
assets of his estate, for which a right was property despite the possibility that in the end
the commission might have denied application, although under the facts of the case, the
commission granted the application in view of the financial ability of the estate to
maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum of March 19, 1947,
admits (page 3) that the certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule, should
descend to his estate as an asset". Such certificate would certainly be property, and the
right to acquire such a certificate, by complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to
the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his
death.
If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and
during the life of the option he died, if the option had been given him in the ordinary
course of business and not out of special consideration for his person, there would be no
doubt that said option and the right to exercise it would have survived to his estate and
legal representatives. In such a case there would also be the possibility of failure to
acquire the property should he or his estate or legal representative fail to comply with the
conditions of the option. In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted right to apply
for and acquire the desired certificate of public convenience — the evidence established
that the public needed the ice plant — was under the law conditioned only upon the
requisite citizenship and economic ability to maintain and operate the service. Of course,
such right to acquire or obtain such certificate of public convenience was subject to
failure to secure its objective through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the
situation here is no different from the legal standpoint from that of the option in the
illustration just given.
Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend
actions, among other cases, for the protection of the property or rights of the deceased
which survive, and it says that such actions may be brought or defended "in the right of
the deceased".
Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor or
administrator, the making of an inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate
of the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge, or to the possession
of any other person for him.
In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366, 367) the
present chief Justice of this Court draws the following conclusion from the decisions cited
by him:
Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting
the property or rights (emphasis supplied) of a deceased person which may
be brought by or against him if he were alive, may likewise be instituted and
prosecuted by or against the administrator, unless the action is for recovery
of money, debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot
survive, because death extinguishes the right . . . .
It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience
before the Public Service Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
55
and citations go to prove that the decedent's rights which by their nature are not
extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate which,
being placed under the control and management of the executor or administrator, can not
be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors,
devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved
happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for
a certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the Public Service
Commission, it is but logical that the legal representative be empowered and entitled in
behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that proceeding.
Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the Civil
Code, respectively, consider as immovable and movable things rights which are not
material. The same eminent commentator says in the cited volume (p. 45) that article 336
of the Civil Code has been deficiently drafted in that it is not sufficiently expressive of all
incorporeal rights which are also property for juridical purposes.
Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term, property
includes, among other things, "an option", and "the certificate of the railroad commission
permitting the operation of a bus line", and on page 748 of the same volume we read:
However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also been
declared to include every species of title, inchoate or complete, and
embrace rights which lie in contract, whether executory or executed.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O.
Fragrante is a "person" within the meaning of the Public Service Act.
Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the following doctrine in the
jurisdiction of the State of Indiana:
As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgery
committed after the death of the man whose name purports to be signed to
the instrument may be prosecuted as with the intent to defraud the estate.
Billings vs. State, 107 Ind., 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.
The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case of forgery
committed after the death of one Morgan for the purpose of defrauding his estate. The
objection was urged that the information did not aver that the forgery was committed with
the intent to defraud any person. The Court, per Elliott, J., disposed of this objection as
follows:
. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does
not regard the estate of a decedent as a person. This intention (contention)
cannot prevail. The estate of the decedent is a person in legal
contemplation. "The word "person" says Mr. Abbot, "in its legal signification,
is a generic term, and includes artificial as well as natural persons," 2 Abb.
Dict. 271; Douglas vs. Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal. 304; Planters', etc., Bank vs.
Andrews, 8 Port. (Ala.) 404. It said in another work that 'persons are of two
kinds: natural and artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificial
persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a
corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes the
capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is
recognized only to a limited extent in our law. "Examples are the estate of a
bankrupt or deceased person." 2 Rapalje & L. Law Dict. 954. Our own cases
inferentially recognize the correctness of the definition given by the authors
from whom we have quoted, for they declare that it is sufficient, in pleading a
claim against a decedent's estate, to designate the defendant as the estate
of the deceased person, naming him. Ginn vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless
we accept this definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in
cases where, as here, the forgery is committed after the death of a person
whose name is forged; and this is a result to be avoided if it can be done
consistent with principle. We perceive no difficulty in avoiding such a result;
for, to our minds, it seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should
be regarded as an artificial person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of
enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made, and, although
natural persons as heirs, devises, or creditors, have an interest in the
property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal entity. The interest which
natural persons have in it is not complete until there has been a due
administration; and one who forges the name of the decedent to an
instrument purporting to be a promissory note must be regarded as having
intended to defraud the estate of the decedent, and not the natural persons
having diverse interests in it, since ha cannot be presumed to have known
who those persons were, or what was the nature of their respective interest.
The fraudulent intent is against the artificial person, — the estate — and not
the natural persons who have direct or contingent interest in it. (107 Ind. 54,
55, 6 N.E. 914-915.)
In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro O.
Fragrante is considered a "person", for quashing of the proceedings for no other reason
than his death would entail prejudicial results to his investment amounting to P35,000.00
56 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
as found by the commission, not counting the expenses and disbursements which the
proceeding can be presumed to have occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone those
defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show
that the estate of a deceased person is also considered as having legal personality
independent of their heirs. Among the most recent cases may be mentioned that of
"Estate of Mota vs. Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal plaintiff was the
estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave judgment in favor of said estate
along with the other plaintiffs in these words:
. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds that
defendants Concepcion and Whitaker are indebted to he plaintiffs in the
amount of P245,804.69 . . . .
Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the heirs of a deceased person were considered in contemplation of law as
the continuation of his personality by virtue of the provision of article 661 of the first Code
that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of
his death. It was so held by this Court in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46. However, after
the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, article 661 of the Civil Code was
abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan , 12 Phil., 13, 22. In that case, as
well as in many others decided by this Court after the innovations introduced by the Code
of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been the constant
doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the
decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights
and obligations which survive after his demise.
The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality
simply by legal fiction, for they might not have been flesh and blood — the reason was
one in the nature of a legal exigency derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded
to the rights and obligations of the decedent. Under the present legal system, such rights
and obligations as survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the
estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not indulged, there would be
no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the executor or administrator, to exercise
those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased. The reason and purpose for
indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases. This is why according to the
Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L. Dictionary,
954, among the artificial persons recognized by law figures "a collection of property to
which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties", as for instance, the
estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.
Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante
can be considered a "citizen of the Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the
Public Service Act, as amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and
categorically limiting the power of the commission to issue certificates of public
convenience or certificates of public convenience and necessity "only to citizens of the
Philippines or of the United States or to corporations, copartnerships, associations, or
joint-stock companies constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines", and
the further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such entities
must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.
Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal
fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considered a
"person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of
exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as
survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged. Substantially the same reason is
assigned to support the same rule in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana, as
announced in Billings vs. State, supra, when the Supreme Court of said State said:
. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as
an artificial person. it is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a
disposition of the assets to be properly made . . . .
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example,
under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the
majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and
(2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise these latter
would be without the constitutional guarantee against being deprived of property without
due process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. We take
it that it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no less than
natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature. Among
these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, we hold
that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be
considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and
distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial
administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which
survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending
application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the
prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would
ensue from the opposite course.
How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is considered
extended so that any debts or obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and
any surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs,
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
respectively, we find no sound and cogent reason for denying the application of the same
fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise extended for the purposes
of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public Service Commission. The
outcome of said proceeding, if successful, would in the end inure to the benefit of the
same creditors and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could not allege any prejudice
in the legal sense, any more than he could have done if Fragrante had lived longer and
obtained the desired certificate. The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is
grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of
the extension of personality. The fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice of
subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death to the loss of the
investment amounting to P35,000, which he has already made in the ice plant, not
counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the Public
Service Commission of this Court.
We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the constitution
(Article IV), its provisions on Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of extension
above adverted to. If for reasons already stated our law indulges the fiction of extension
of personality, if for such reasons the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered
an artificial or juridical person herein, we can find no justification for refusing to declare a
like fiction as to the extension of his citizenship for the purposes of this proceeding.
Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the
evidence of record, he would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which
he was applying. The situation has suffered but one change, and that is, his death. His
estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to appropriately and
adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received
from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary showing, which does not exist
here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is
the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it.
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said
case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the
personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the
meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the
constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.
Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set
aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March
17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita
and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he
had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at
Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent
but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No.
M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six
children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real
properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the
decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal
partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his
first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to
state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration
should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of
residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality
to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the
time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo
in seeking the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while
Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to
their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime
in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry
Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity
to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine
laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions
for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted
that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to
validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair
vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a
motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for
disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding
Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of
said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On
even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their
motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was
based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for
inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position
papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition.
On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence
set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and
Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration.
It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a
resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce
dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not
bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge
Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of
the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term
"place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or
place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted
that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
57
resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was
properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by
virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between
Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under
paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage
with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family
Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and
philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to
sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article
26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in
any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts
should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign
divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino
divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason,
the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a
bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse
can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x
x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were
denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition
which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the
subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our
rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence"
is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile
at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous
because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee.
They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would
impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot
be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether
respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the
province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court
of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as
contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule
in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule
73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence
or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in
Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election
cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of
58 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73
election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election
cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence
or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided
he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person
may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the
Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased
the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements45 from the Philippine Heart
Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating
the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent
also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village
Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990
sent by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s
calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang
Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject
petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which
has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial
jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his
alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that
Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2)
considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the
affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his
Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained
abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the
alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership
should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held
that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after
the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by
the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,
799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband
and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to
one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty
party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from
the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to
perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to
be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the
alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The
NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA
Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other , hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast
obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals , 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling inVan Dorn applies. 58 Although
decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when
the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of
divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as
severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino
spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van
Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court
likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative
intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article
26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order
No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law .63 (Emphasis
added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and
paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established
through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance
intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community,
relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce
abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is
void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this
Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In
Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may
add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice
as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for
we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice.
Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some
laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because
only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to
 59
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES – RULE 73

their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are
justice may be done even as the law is obeyed. not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to
it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their
are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
beyond them." xxxx
xxxx In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by
law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be
to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69 proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81
Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject
with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of
However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo Family Code.
under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating
guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed
and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the
or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) trial court for further proceedings.
an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of
the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,
U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated
text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage
was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for
letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards
the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be
granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof
also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to
the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The
interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct
interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which
was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties
who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage
is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired
through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union
is prima faciepresumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the
portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage,
the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of
couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid
v. Court of Appeals , 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property
occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court
described the property regime under this provision as follows:

NARTATEZ, CARELL RYZA