PARTISAN WARFARE IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1942−44 | The Carrier Myth | Plan to Invade Malta | The German Poltava Raid

The Strategy & Tactics of World War II #16 FEB−MAR 2011

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“Blackman Street, London, 1885” by John Atkinson Grimshaw (1836-93). Image from Wikimedia Commons.
 The Strategy & Tactics
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#
16 | FEB−MAR 2011

6 18 38

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6 14
Partisan:
A Strategic Analysis of the
War in Yugoslavia, 1942−44
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Partisan: A Strategic Analysis
of the War in Yugoslavia, 1942−44 by Javier
Romero

A determined looking woman Partisan shoulders an Italian rifle. During the war, 100,000 women served with the Partisans and estimated 25,000 died.

6 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011

B
y the summer of 1940 the grow-
ing strength of Germany and
Italy made Yugoslav neutrality
difficult to maintain. After the fall of
France and the isolation of Britain,
Yugoslavia was diplomatically alone.
Further, Mussolini, who’d just taken his
country into the war, wanted to invade
Yugoslavia and annex the territories of
Dalmatia and Istria while also sponsor-
ing Croatian separatism. Hitler initially
thought otherwise, though, because
he viewed the Yugoslav Army as the
direct descendent of the staunch Serb
Army of World War I, and he also saw
any distraction of forces to the strategic
backwater of the Balkans as undesirable.
By 1941, however, the Germans were
no longer content with Yugoslav neutral-
ity, and during the winter of 1940−41
their diplomatic pressure increased on
Belgrade. The Yugoslav government,
lacking allies in Europe after the
destruction of France, Czechoslovakia
and Poland, finally joined the Axis on
25 March. That government was in
turn overthrown, only two days later,
by a military coup supported by an
WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 7
angry mob that occupied the streets of
Belgrade. All pro-German diplomats
and ministers were swiftly replaced.
In the words of British soldier Michael
McConville, who fought in Yugoslavia
with No. 2 Commando Brigade: “it [the
coup] was a self-generated outburst of
spontaneous revulsion at the expedient
abandonment of a hallowed national,
primarily Serbian, custom of hitting
back hard at the teeth of threats and
to hell with the consequences.”
The coup in Belgrade caused
a tantrum in Hitler. He decided to
conquer the Balkans before beginning
the invasion of the USSR in order to
secure his deep southern flank. The
British air force was already moving into
Greece to support that nation’s defensive
stand against Mussolini’s stalled inva-
sion; so it was possible RAF bombers
would soon be in range of the Ploesti
oil wells. Those facilities were vital for
the Wehrmacht, at least until Soviet
oil was at its disposal. On 6 April 1941,
then, German, Italian and Hungarian
forces invaded Yugoslavia. Belgrade was
savagely bombed for three days, with
thousands of its inhabitants killed in the
aptly named “Operation Punishment.”
In order to try to maintain the politi-
cal integrity of the country, the Yugoslav
Royal Army deployed to defend all its
territory, thereby fatally overextending
its units on a long front. Further, when
the Germans struck, the Yugoslav
mobilization was only about 70 percent
complete. Within less than two weeks all
was over: the overall defense collapsed
while most Slovene and Croat units
deserted and went home. Zagreb, where
the Germans were greeted as liberators,
fell on the 10th; Belgrade followed on the
13th. In two weeks of campaigning the
Germans suffered only 558 casualties
and the Italians 3,500, while capturing
some 300,000 prisoners of war. At the
same time, though, no less than 200,000
former Yugoslav soldiers remained free,
most of them Serbs. Vast quantities of
weapons were also left scattered every-
where, while thousands went home
carrying their rifles with them. The
Germans were in a hurry to withdraw
the bulk of their force in order to allow
it time to regroup prior to the coming
invasion of the USSR; so they didn’t
spend much effort in cleanup opera-
tions. Many within the manpower pool
left behind by the Germans were there-
fore soon again at war with the Reich.
to the Germans while the Italians got
the south. Slovenia was annexed by
Germany, Kosovo and the Albanian-
populated areas of Macedonia were
added to Italian-controlled Albania,
while a pseudo-independent Croatian
client state (including Bosnia and
Herzegovina) was also set up. A large
part of ethnically Croatian Dalmatia,
and almost all the Adriatic islands,
were directly annexed by Italy along
with Kotor bay and the Montenegro
coast. Montenegro and a rump Serbia
were also declared “independent,”
while Budapest was given the
ethnically Hungarian Vojvodina region.
Finally, Bulgaria got Macedonia,
western Thrace (from Greece), and
some smaller areas bordering Serbia.
Rebellion against the occupation
began in August 1941, when an uprising
in Montenegro drove the Italians to
take refuge inside their garrison towns.
The Italians took almost a year to put
down that uprising, and did so only by
finally reaching an agreement with the
local Chetnik (Serbian royalist) militias:
the Italians would yield control of the
countryside; in exchange, those same
Chetniks would keep the territory free
of partisans (pan-Slav communists).
Upon the start of the invasion of
the USSR in June 1941— prior to which
they had orders from Moscow not
to interfere with the occupiers — the
communists began to raise partisan
(literally “politically based”) units.
Tito had proved prescient enough
to warn, in May, that the Nazi-Soviet
pact wouldn’t last and to prepare for
an uprising. At the same time he was
wrong, though, in that he also expected
the arrival of the victorious Red Army
soon after the new phase of the war
started. In fact, he remained undercover
in Belgrade until mid-September in
order to be in the best position to
welcome the Soviets when they arrived.
The partisans first gained
control of the region along the Bosnia-
Montenegro-Serbia border, centered
on the town of Uzice (hence its name,
“Uzice Republic”), which was in turn
attacked in November 1941 by German
troops (their so-called “First Offensive”).
The partisans fled and regrouped in
Montenegro and southeastern Bosnia.
continued on page 10 »

The New Order

At the end of the campaign the

Germans and Italians divided Yugoslavia
into two broad areas of occupation.
The line Visegrad-Sarajevo-Banja Luka
marked the boundary between the two
spheres: everything north of it went

upper-right — SS troops in the Balkans for the

1941 invasion serve as human brakes as their
personnel carrier, which ran off the roadway
and teeters on the edge of a rocky incline.

lower-right — German motorcyclists bump

slowly along a stretch of hurriedly constructed
corduroy road, made of rough-hewn logs
laid side by side by combat engineers.

8 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011

 Tito
During the second half of the 20th century, Tito passed from
being idolized at home and hailed abroad as one of the most
outstanding leaders of his era, to being reviled in his own country
and all but forgotten abroad. He passed away on 4 May 1980, and
in 1982 then US Secretary of State Alexander Haig wrote in the
visitors book at his tomb that Tito had been the: “great leader and
world statesman who led the Yugoslav peoples out of the ruins of
war, to stability at home, to respect and prestige in the world.”
Since the break up of Yugoslavia into its constituent
republics, virtually every monument, statue and bust of Tito has
been stored away, obliterated or otherwise covered up.
The seventh son of a peasant family of mixed Croat and Slovene
ancestry, Tito was born Josip Broz on 25 May 1892 in Kumrovec,
then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1914 he fought with
distinction in the Austro-Hungarian Army, first against the Serbs then
against the Russians, being promoted to sergeant and proposed for a
WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 9
decoration. In April 1915 he was captured and made a prisoner of war.
In 1917, during the turmoil of the Russian Revolution, he declared for
the Bolsheviks, joining the Communist Party. By 1920 he was back in
the newly created “Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes,” also
known as Yugoslavia (“Land of the South Slavs”), where he joined the
Yugoslav Communist Party or KPJ (Komunistika Partija Jugoslavije).
After several years of political activity he was imprisoned by
the royalist government and served five years. After his release in
March 1934 he lived clandestinely under the new name of “Tito.”
That was the first of the some 70 nom de guerre he used during the
inter-war period. For example, within the Komintern he was known
as “Comrade Walter.” In early 1935 he visited Stalin’s Russia, where
he impressed many with his steadfastness and loyalty. When the
head of the Yugoslav Communist Party was purged in 1937, on
Stalin’s orders, Tito was given that post, the same one he held in
April 1941 when Yugoslavia was invaded by the Axis powers.  ★
Marshall Tito
» continued from page 8
At the same time, Col. Dragoljub
“Draza” Mihailovic, a Serb officer from
the old royalist army, with a group
of Chetnik (“military”) followers,
established himself at Ravna Gora.
Appointed by the Yugoslav government-
in-exile as commander-in-chief of the
Yugoslav Army of the Homeland (JVO),
he recruited followers exclusively among
Serbs. Initially, at least, he seemed to
have no political agenda: he simply
fought for the old Serbia he knew.
From the onset both guerrilla
movements had opposing strategies.
Tito wanted to wage immediate and
broad-scale war at all costs. Mihailovic
wanted to gather strength, wait until the
Western Allies returned to the continent,
then attack as a kind of liberating
spearhead that would thus prevent
the communists from taking over the
country. He also feared terrible reprisals
from the Axis occupiers if they attacked
the enemy prematurely. He was right in
that, while the Germans suffered only
some 20,000 casualties during their
entire time in Yugoslavia, from June 1941
Bearded Drazha Mihailovich addresses villagers in west Bosnia to gain support for the Serbian Chetniks.
10 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011
to April 1945, reprisals and the civil war
caused some 1 million Yugoslav deaths.
Of course, it must also be pointed out the
Axis occupation of an increasingly restive
Yugoslavia required as much as 38 of their
divisions, which — under Mihailovic’s
strategy — could’ve been used elsewhere.
Tito wanted to wage all-out war
not only to destroy German units, thus
forcing Berlin to send troops badly
needed elsewhere simply to maintain
the occupation of Yugoslavia. He also
understood the resultant chaos and
anarchy of guerrilla war would go a
long way toward enabling his revo-
lutionary movement to take over the
entire country at the end of the war. In
that regard, Tito also had an advantage
in that he had multi-ethnic units
willing and able to operate anywhere.
(Those first “proletarian” brigades and
divisions began to be formed in 1942)
Tito’s men would hit enemy garrisons
without concern about possible
local reprisals. On the contrary, such
reprisals ended up being a source of
recruits for his units. Mihailovic’s units
were strictly territorial and mono-
ethnic. Even more, he couldn’t always
control them; most of them (especially
the Chetniks of Bosnia) recognised
him only as honorary leader, only
obeying his orders when they
coincided with their own priorities.
Waging immediate revolutionary
war thus became Tito’s first break with
Moscow’s orders. That is, through
the end of 1941, Stalin’s top priority
was simply ensuring the survival of
the Soviet Union. He feared open
communist revolution in the Balkans
would lead the Western Allies to stop
sending military aid to the USSR.
Stalin therefore called for collaboration
with the Chetniks and the forming
a “united front” coalition with all
“anti-fascist elements” in the country.
1942
Strategically isolated from the larger
war, both the partisans and Chetniks
were largely left to their own devices.
Tito began the year based in the Foca
area (the border region between
Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia), while
Mihailovic remained in his stronghold
of Ravna Gora. From January through
March 1942, several Italo-German
anti-partisan drives in eastern Bosnia
(termed their “Second” and “Third
Offensives”) forced Tito to withdraw to
western Bosnia; however, that already
devastated territory couldn’t support
them; so they moved into western
Bosnia. That region was populated by
Serbs but was controlled and terrorized
by the Croatian Ustache (native fascist)
movement. Amid that sympathetic
population the partisans could regroup,
recruit new troops and strike into Serbia,
control of which was to eventually prove
key in winning the entire guerrilla war
(in western Bosnia there were no Italian
above — German security police find a just-abandoned campsite in Slovenia.
below — SS troops mow down fugitives in Serbia in 1942. Thousands of innocent civilians
were killed by the Germans, who looked on them as “bandits” or “Communist suspects.”
troops, as they’d withdrawn from the
area, preferring instead to sponsor
Serbian Chetniks and local militias). In
November 1942, Tito established his
new headquarters in the town of Bihac.
Tito’s force continued to grow during
the winter of 1942−43. Unobserved by
the Western Allies — who knew almost
nothing of partisan activities; only
ULTRA intercepts of German commu-
nications being sent out of Yugoslavia
gave them an idea of what was
happening — by early 1943 the partisans
deployed nine divisions (including
the elite 1st and 2nd Proletarian and
3rd Assault Divisions), eight brigades
and many smaller detachments.
WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 11
1943−44
The new year soon provided great
news: the fall of Stalingrad followed by
the Axis defeat in Libya. The Germans
then had to fear possible Allied
landings in Sicily, mainland Italy or
the Balkan peninsula; so they set in
motion plans aimed at suppressing
the Yugoslav insurgents before any of
those projected operations could take
place. That was the Fourth Offensive,
also codenamed Operations White
I, II and III. They were the largest
anti-partisan efforts to date, with
the first objective the destruction
of Tito’s stronghold at Bihac.
Operation White I opened on
20 January with 90,000 Axis troops
(German, Italian and Croat) participat-
ing. Tito fled from Bihac and moved
back into eastern Bosnia. At the Battle
of the Neretva River, in March, the
partisans managed to cross that water
barrier and break out of a German
encirclement, though they suffered
heavy casualties while doing so. The
survivors then cut their way relatively
easily through some 20,000 Chetniks
who attempted to prevent them from
moving toward Montenegro and Serbia.
During that period Tito also
attempted to negotiate a truce with the
Germans in order to allow his forces to
concentrate on destroying the Chetniks.
The Germans, though, correctly
perceived the communists were the
far bigger threat to their occupation,
and so refused to make a deal.
 In May and June the Germans
launched another major offensive,
Operation Black. It forced Tito to
suspend further operations against
the Chetniks. At the Battle of Sutjeska
Valley the partisans again managed
to disengage and flee, re-establish-
ing themselves in eastern Bosnia.
By that time, however, the entire
partisan army had been reduced to
no more than 10,000 combatants.
In July the Anglo-Americans landed
in Sicily, and follow-on landings were
expected shortly in mainland Italy or
the Balkans. At that juncture the British
called on the Chetniks, for whom they
were the main weapons supplier, to
increase their activities so as to tie up
as many German units as possible.
Along that same line, Sir William
Deakin, who’d been an assistant to
Winston Churchill prior to the war,
had been parachuted into Tito’s
headquarters in May. His reports made
it clear Tito’s partisans represented
the only effective movement fighting
the Germans, while Mihailovic did
nothing and, worse, often reached
agreements with the Axis occupiers
to fight the partisans. By September,
then, when Italy surrendered, the
Western Allies decided to give all
their support to Tito. Tito’s winning
personality had also played a part in
that reassessment, as Deakin wrote:
Partisans use a captured 50mm German gun to fire on advancing tanks in Bosnia in December 1943.
12 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011
One would expect to be dealing
with a rigid doctrinaire fanatic,
harshly moulded by underground
life, narrow in outlook, and
impervious to open debate.
Instead, the personality of Tito
emerged as that of a man broad-
ened by the experience of exile
and prison, flexible in discussion,
with a sharp and humorous
wit, and a wide curiosity.
Back in eastern Bosnia, Tito’s
movement reaped dividends from
the disappointment of the Croatian
population with the fanatic Ustashe.
Croats began to join the partisan bands,
while the communist political program
offered an idea for a new Yugoslavia that
increasingly appealed to all nationalities
in the country. The Italian surrender
also gave the partisans access to a huge
amount of materiel abandoned by those
units, as well as a sudden, though tem-
porary, expansion of territorial control.
When Italy surrendered, the
Germans launched Operation
Constantine, the goal of which was
to occupy their former zone, disarm
their units and send the men into
captivity in Germany. An entire Italian
division, the 41st Firenze Infantry
Division, defected and joined the
partisans. That was followed by a race
among the Germans, partisans and
Chetniks to seize the caches of arms
and supplies in the former Italian
zone. Tito was furious the Western
Allies hadn’t trusted him enough to tip
him off about the Italian surrender.
After several weeks of chaotic fight-
ing, the Germans controlled the main
coastal cities and the islands, except
for Vis (Lissa in Italian), where a British
base was established through which
to channel further logistical support to
Yugoslavia. From there a British com-
mando brigade under Maj. Randolph
Churchill (son of Winston) operated
until 1945, launching raids against other
islands and the Yugoslav mainland.
By late September there were 14
German divisions in Yugoslavia fight-
ing some 145,000 insurgents (90,000
partisans). In November there were 17
divisions; by the end of the year there
were 20 divisions fielding some 700,000
troops (though almost all of them
were second-rate or third-rate units).
The Western Allies remained fully
committed to Tito, but their advance in
Italy had stalled in front of the Germans’
Gustav line. In December, after having
reconquered the Yugoslav coast and its
immediate hinterland, the Germans
launched a new anti-partisan drive
(the Sixth Offensive) into eastern Bosnia,
Herzegovina and Croatia, again in antic-
ipation of an Allied landing. The partisan
main force and Tito’s headquarters
moved back to Drvar in western Bosnia.
On 25 May 1944, Tito’s birthday,
the Germans launched yet another
offensive, (the Seventh) against the par-
tisans. It was an airborne raid by an SS
parachute battalion aimed at assassinat-
ing Tito. With the partisans leaderless,
a joint offensive was then to have been
launched by Ustache and German troops
in Bosnia. Though the SS battalion
was effectively destroyed (70 percent
casualties), Tito barely escaped capture.
He fled to the British base on Vis.
1944−45
Conclusion
In respect to the Balkans, the
Germans were strategically concerned
with only by two things. First, they
wanted to secure their southern flank
against Anglo-Allied invasion. Second,
they wanted to secure the sources of
several critical raw materials, namely
Ploesti oil and other minerals com-
ing from Yugoslav mines. All their
operations in Yugoslavia were ultimately
driven by those two concerns.
Below the strategic level, however,
the horrific Axis conduct of their Balkan
impose a substitute system. The result
was violent anarchy and an ideal situa-
tion for the propagation of revolutionary
war that Tito exploited to the full.  ✪
SOURCES
Deakin, F. W. The Embattled Mountain. London, 1971.
Djilas, Milovan. Wartime. New York, 1977.
Malaparte, Curzio. Kaputt. Barcelona, 1990.
McLean, Fitzroy. Eastern Approaches. London, 1991.
McConville, Michael. A Small War in the Balkans.
London, 2007.
Pavlowitch, Stevan K. Tito: A Reassessment. London, 1992.
_______. Hitler’s New Disorder:
The Second World War in Yugoslavia. London, 2008.
Tomasevich, Jozo. War and Revolution in Yugoslavia,
1941−45: Occupation and Collaboration. Stanford,
CA, 2001.

counterinsurgency provides a case study

By the summer of 1944, the partisan of how not to wage such a war. Their
movement had grown even inside counter-productive and bloody policies,
Croatia. At the same time, though, as well as those of their imitative Croat
Serbia remained firmly supportive of satellite state, created perfect conditions
Mihailovic. That remained true even for the communists to eventually take
after he was stripped of official position: over: they destroyed existing authority
in September, the government in exile and set the various nationalities against
appealed to all Yugoslavs to support Tito. each other, while at the same time
In September 1944, with the Red lacking sufficient on-hand strength to
Army at last approaching the Yugoslav
border, Tito flew to Moscow to co-
ordinate the military aspects of that
arrival. The plan agreed on stipulated
the Soviets wouldn’t take Belgrade until
such time as the partisans also arrived
there in force. During that month the
Soviet 3rd Ukrainian Front reached
the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border. At
the same time, though, the German
troops occupying Greece and Albania
managed to escape north in an orderly
retreat, with the partisans unable to
stop them. The partisans entered
Belgrade on 20 October 1944, in a
joint offensive with Soviet 57th Army.
The guerrilla phase of the war was
then over. A conventional war took its
place, one for which the partisans were
ill prepared. Though further strength-
ened by continued Western Allied aid, by
the newly allied Bulgarian Army, and by
mass conscription and amnesty in the
newly liberated territories, the partisans,
numbering some 800,000 troops by April
1945, found it difficult to advance in
open country against a veteran and well-
equipped enemy. The Germans success-
fully contested all Yugoslav offensives.
Zagreb, for instance, didn’t fall until
May 1945, when the remaining Croat
and Chetnik forces decided to retreat to
Austria to surrender there to the British.
(The move did them no good: they
were handed over to the partisans, who
indulged in a final round of reprisals,
executing some 30,000.) In fact, the
fighting in Yugoslavia didn’t fully end
until 15 May, a week after the surrender
of all other Axis forces in Europe. Dazed and wounded Partisans rest at Milinklade in June 1943 after a nine-hour bombing attack.

WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 13

Design Corner
Joseph Miranda
PARTIZAN!
P
artisan warfare has always been
a difficult topic to simulate.
One reason is that it involves
irregular forces that have little in the
way of a solid order of battle, therefore
making force structure more difficult
to translate onto a wargame map.
Another difficulty comes from the fact
it involves an additional dimension of
conflict, usually with an underground
organization of some kind. That means
the game has to simulate intelligence
operations and psychological warfare
on top of conventional combat.
There are also game-play aspects.
Wargame guru Jim Dunnigan has stated
that, for a wargame to “work,” there
must be movement (while wargame
sub-guru Richard Berg has argued
there merely needs to be the “illusion of
movement.”) Players have to see units
moving across the map. Partisan warfare
mitigates against movement on the stra-
tegic/operational scale. Most partisan
actions are local, involving such things as
sabotage, ambushes, raids, and recruit-
ing. A successful partisan war might
end with a wide-open conventional
offensive, but that only takes place after
much time has been spent in guerrilla
warfare. Those were all challenges faced
by Partizan’s designer Javier Romero,
and by its developer Eric Harvey.
One way movement is put into the
game is by the concept of victory points
14 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011
(VP). Players gain VP in the course of
play by attacking objectives and captur-
ing cities and towns. That represents the
incremental effects of partisan warfare
across the theater of operations. You can
see the VP index moving, representing
overall progress in the campaign.
Historically the German anti-partisan
command realized its best bet was to
hold the economic and population
centers necessary for the Reich’s
prosecution of the wider war. That meant
the countryside could, for the most
part, be abandoned, while a credible
victory could still be claimed as long as
the economic centers remained under
Axis control. That’s modeled in the way
objectives are generated in the game.
Then there was the bigger picture.
Axis forces consisted of a range of
units: German, Italian, Hungarian,
Bulgarian, as well as “friendly” (if that
word can be appropriately used here)
local forces. That force mix changed
depending on such things as the Italian
surrender in 1943, and the relative
importance of the Balkans to Hitler’s
larger calculations as the war continued.
On the other side, the Partisans got
support from various Allied forces, such
as bombers and commando units.
One of the unique features of
Partizan is the Target Objective Matrix.
It generates a range of objectives that
can be attacked by the Partisans, from
whole rail lines down to individual
motor pools. That gives more color (or
“chrome” as we call it) to the game, and it
also shows what’s going on down below
the level of the individual map hexagons.
Limited intelligence is accounted
for by the hoary wargame device of
Partisan units being deployed facedown.
Thus the Axis player must fight for
information if he wants to get a picture
of enemy strength. The Partisans
also get weapons caches that can
temporarily vary their combat strength.
There are also specialized units.
The Germans get the 500th SS
Parachute Battalion, which they used
historically to try to kill or capture
Tito in a daring airborne assault. On
the other side, the Partisans can get
the support of the British Special
Air Service. There is Tito himself,
represented as a unit in the game. He
brings with him a certain amount of
prestige points, a quantification of
the personal dimension of this kind of
warfare. Prestige points can be translated
into additional reinforcements.
For those wanting a more conven-
tional conflict, Partizan includes an
option for an Anglo-Allied invasion.
During the historic campaign the
Germans had to keep guard against
the possibility of amphibious landings.
That creates a real strategic dilemma
and something of a two front war.  ★
PARTIZAN!
Partizan is a two-player, intermediate-complexity, historical simulation To purchase the game that covers the battles featured in
of the struggle between the Communists and the Axis occupation forces this issue send your name and address along with:
for mastery of Yugoslavia from 1941 through 1944. It starts with the
first uprisings against the Axis in Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro in late $30 US Customers
1941, and ends in late 1944 just before the Soviet Army entered the $36 Canadian Customers
country. The game is won by the Partisan player by waging an aggressive $38 Overseas Customers
guerilla war: harassing the occupiers and destroying infrastructure
that may be of use to them: warehouses, fuel dumps, bridges, dams, All prices include postage for first class or airmail shipping.
depots, railroads, viaducts, motor pools, etc (each represented by CA residents add $1.98 sales tax.
variably placed counters). “Resource hexes” represent strategic mineral
deposits, such as bauxite, copper and chromium, which the Axis Send to:
player must protect, along with routes from them back to Germany,
while also guarding possible invasion beaches along the coast. Decision Games
During the game, the exact strengths of Partisan units are mostly unknown ATTN: WaW Game Offer
by the Axis player (via “tried” and “untried” counter-sides). He must attempt PO Box 21598
to head off Partisan operations while never certain exactly where they’re Bakersfield, CA 93390
headed. The Partisan player must select his targets carefully in order to
disrupt the occupation enough for him to win the game, while avoiding
becoming surrounded and destroyed by the Germans in the process.
16 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011
 INTRODUCING THE DECISION GAMES
FOLIO GAME SERIES
The Folio Game Series provides dozens of games using the same eight-page Standard rules
(Musket & Saber for 19th century battles, Fire & Movement for WWII and modern battles) with a short
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be played in about 90 minutes allowing for multiple games to be played in an afternoon or evening.

CHALONS: The Fate of Europe | MARENGO: Morning Defeat, Afternoon Victory

LEIPZIG: Napoleon Encircled | CHICKAMAUGA: River of Death | STONES RIVER: Turning Point in Tennessee
FRAYSER’S FARM: Wasted Opportunity | SHILOH: Grant Surprised | ARNHEM: The Farthest Bridge
NEW
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DMZ: The Next Korean War (below) | SHOWDOWN: The Coming Indo-Pakistani War

DMZ
MODERN
The Next BATTLES
Korean War
FOLIO GA
ME SERI
Technically spea
has remained
king, the Korea
active since the
n War ES
agreement of cease-fire
1953
have never actua : the belligerents
lly ratified a fi
accord. Since nal peace
1953, the Korea
has remained n peninsula
devo
only South Korea id of open war, though

DMZ
has prospered
that time. In contr during
ast, North Korea
has become
isolated, bank
confrontational rupt and
. Indeed, as the
Korean economy North
continues to
more starvation implode, and
ensu
a desperate North es, it’s conceivable
Korea could resor
war to try to
avoid its own t to
final collapse. The Next Kore
DMZ utilizes
combat syste
the new Fire
& Movement
an War
m that’s desig
can augment ned so players
their units with
fire” during the “support
course of the
artillery to helic turns. From
opter gunships,
can receive supp units
ort to engage
positions and enemy
formations, allow
combat to deve ing
lop at all levels
armor brigade, . A single
for example —
with close air perhaps
supp
to assault a lone ort — could be tasked
enemy infantry
defending an corps
airbase. As that
underway, that attack gets
armor brigade
itself under fi may find
re from rocke
more support t batte
fire will be nece ries;
take the airba ssary to
se, but asset
s are limited.
In DMZ, the attrit
ional design of
Combat Resu the new
lts Table simu
true nature of lates the
modern warfa
typically two- re.
sided formation Units are
incur casualties s that
, accurately replic can
realities of comb ating the
at and the high
likely to be susta losses
ined by both
during another sides
Korean War.
a battle is thus Winn
a matter of mane ing
firepower and
asset manageme uver,
nt

Game Conten
ts:
• 17 x 22” (43
x 56 cm) terrain
• 100 die-cut map
counters
• One Standard
• One Exclusive
Rules booklet
for this series DMZ
Rules booklet
for this title
PLAYERS
2

LEVEL II III X XX XXX

DIVISION
HEX SCALE
3 mi (4.8 km)
PLAYING TIME
Each counter repres
ents an individual 1-2 hrs
North Korean, or American,
South Korean forma
among the actual tion from COMPLEXITY
forces fielded by •••••
armies, including those three LOW
1617 mechanized corps,
divisions, stryke
r brigades, and more.
armored
Minutes to lea
SOLITAIRE ••••• rn. Quick to pla
HIGH
y. Historicall
A FOLIO SERIES
A product of
GAME
Decision Games
y Accurate.
Copyright © ,
2010. All Rights Inc.
Reserved.

1/6 th Actual Size Copyright ©

2010, Decisio
n Games, Inc.
www.decision
All Rights Reserve
d. Made & Printed
games.com in U.S.A.

EACH GAME UNDER $25 (MOST UNDER $20)

P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598 | (661) 587-9633 phone | (661) 587-5031 fax | decisiongames.com
Myths &
Realities
of Carrier Warfare in the Pacific,
1941−42 by Joseph Miranda

18 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011

Rise of the Carriers
O
ne of the enduring myths of
World War II has been that the
aircraft carrier, starting with the
Pear Harbor raid, rendered obsolete
the battleship. A careful analysis of
what happened in the Pacific Theater
of Operations (PTO) during the
campaigns of 1941– 42, however, reveals
a more nuanced picture, one in which
the aircraft carrier, while certainly a
critical weapon, proved effective only
as part of the array of combined
operations — what today would be
called “joint warfare.” Within that
picture, big-gun ships were still critical,
even if no longer decisive on their own.
The aircraft carrier had its origins
in World War I, when the British Royal
Navy added improvised flight decks
to several ships. The British utilized
those carriers to launch air attacks
against German Zeppelin bases and in
support of their ground forces in various
theaters. Following the end of World
War I, the great powers continued the
development of naval aviation. That
included both carrier and land-based
aircraft. Naval aviation enthusiasts
advocated planes be used in a range
of missions: reconnaissance, attacking
ships, supporting ground forces and
providing general air cover. Carriers,
their supporters pointed out, had a
major advantage over land airfields
in that the ships were mobile, thereby
being able to appear anywhere in
an oceanic theater of operations.
Additional impetus was given to the
development of naval airpower by the
Washington Naval Treaties of the 1920s.
They were intended to limit naval arms
races via the 5:5:3 formula. That was
the ratio of warship tonnage allowed
to each signatory power’s navy. The US
and Britain would each be allowed five
tons for each three tons of Japanese
warships. France and Italy, the other
two Allied signatory powers, were each
allotted 1.75 tons. There were also limits
on such things as the size of naval guns.
Given the limits of those treaties,
naval staffs looked for new ways to
maintain combat strength. Aircraft car-
riers were seen as a viable way around
the restrictions, since they could, at
least theoretically, project great power
at a relatively low tonnage per ship (and
gun size wasn’t a concern). Accordingly,
both the US Navy (USN) and Imperial
Japanese Navy (IJN) converted a number
of large ship hulls — which would’ve
otherwise been scrapped by the
treaties — to carriers. The Japanese also
constructed the first purpose-built car-
rier, the Hosho, commissioned in 1922.
Meanwhile, forward looking
naval officers, such as Japan’s Isoruku
Yamamoto and America’s William
Halsey, actively promoted aviation to the
point of becoming qualified pilots them-
selves. Alongside the carriers, the navies
also built up land-based airpower under
their own commands. The IJN organized
Eleventh Air Fleet, made up of land-
based aircraft whose pilots were trained
to attack ships at sea. Both the US Navy
and Marine Corps also developed their
own land-based airpower. The carriers
continued to be reckoned most critical,
however, since their mobility allowed
them to be used as a fleet element all
across the expanse of the Pacific.
Decisive Battle
As the 1930s unfolded, and with
another global war taking on the aura
of inevitability, the major powers’ naval
commands looked to come up with a
doctrine that would bring victory at
sea. Doctrine was critical because it
created the premise on which training
Japanese aircraft carrier Hosho, 1922
WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 19
would be conducted and the ways
in which the disparate types of naval
power — surface, submarine, aviation,
amphibious — could be integrated into
a single service. Leading the doctrine
race were the two major powers in
the Pacific, Japan and the US.
IJN planners worked from the
premise their country couldn’t win a
protracted war with the Allies owing to
superior American industrial power.
IJN doctrine, therefore, aimed to take
advantage of Japanese strengths at the
start of a new war. Japan would begin
hostilities with a surprise attack to
neutralize the USN in the Pacific, seize
islands for use as bases for land-based
airpower, and then fight what they
termed the “decisive naval battle.” The
expected Japanese victory in that battle
would give Tokyo the upper hand in
negotiations to end the war. As will be
seen, that plan wasn’t unrealistic, and
it brought some short-term successes
after Japan struck in December 1941.
Alongside the IJN, the Imperial
Japanese Army (IJA) was also planning
for war. At the start of hostilities it would
seize the resource areas of Southeast
Asia and the Dutch East Indies. Those
resources were expected to give
Japan the economic wherewithal to
sustain a war long enough to convince
Washington to negotiate peace on
terms favorable to Tokyo. Within that
larger strategy the carriers were to
operate as the naval strike force.
One IJN innovation in support of
that strategy was to form a higher-
level organization to control all their
carrier aviation, First Air Fleet. Under
its auspices carrier task forces oper-
ated as “carrier divisions,” each with
a commander who could assemble
large air formations from several flight
decks to make coordinated attacks.
 After the initial strikes, the Japanese
planned to defend their perimeter
with island-based aircraft and sub-
marines used to detect and attack all
enemy fleets attempting to penetrate
it. Carriers, held in reserve, would be
moved to any such penetration to
add the weight of their aircraft, while
IJN battleships would be massed to
fight and defeat USN surface units.
Thus, when the “decisive battle”
finally occurred, it would start in a
setting already favorable to the IJN.
Doctrine also drove Japanese aircraft
design. They were made long-ranged
on the reasonable premise they would
be called on to dependably find enemy
fleets across the expanse of the Pacific,
and then also be able to strike quickly,
delivering the first blow before enemy
carriers could counterattack. The
downside was Japanese aircraft, at least
in the early war period, tended to be too
lightly constructed for sustained combat
operations, lacking such features as
armor and self-sealing fuel tanks that
would’ve detracted from their range.
Since surface action was to be the
culmination of the “decisive battle,” the
IJN also built up its battle fleet. That
included a new type of large battle-
ship — the Yamato-class — whose guns
could engage enemy ships at long range
with overwhelming firepower. Further,
it wasn’t only the battleships that were
to engage the enemy. Cruisers and
20 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011
destroyers were to add their weight, and
one way they were to do so was by using
torpedoes. Another major Japanese
innovation therefore came to be their
“Long Lance” torpedoes, which were
longer-ranged and carried more explo-
sives than the torpedoes of other navies.
The IJN didn’t look at only material
factors. In peacetime, units trained as if
they were at war, so squadrons and fleets
could become accustomed to acting
as coordinated units. Fighting at night
was emphasized, supported by superior
optical equipment, searchlights and
aerially delivered flares. Night actions
would allow IJN units to operate even
in the face of enemy air superiority,
since the aircraft of that day couldn’t
operate effectively in darkness.
With all that in mind, the
Japanese believed the balance
of naval forces would be in their
favor in the coming war.
The IJN Strikes
The Japanese surprise attack was
delivered not only against Pearl Harbor,
but also against other Allied forces in
the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Japanese
air units based on Formosa made a
devastating raid against the US Far
Eastern Air Force in the Philippines,
followed by an amphibious landing.
Meanwhile transports carried IJA
divisions and Special Naval Landing
Forces (SNLF) for attacks on British
Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.
Initial operations in the Pacific
War seemed to vindicate the airpower
advocates. The First Air Fleet strike on
Pearl Harbor sank or damaged eight
battleships; however, with those ships
being in shallow anchorages, they
would be raised, repaired and returned
to service later. First Air Fleet missed
the USN carriers, which were at sea at
the time, but the IJN had still gained
a much bigger (and easier) victory
than had been expected, taking only
a small number of aircraft as losses in
return for the effective neutralization
of the American fleet’s battle line.
There followed the sinking of the
Royal Navy’s capital ships Prince of
Wales and Repulse in Malayan waters
by land-based aviation (10 December
1941). First Air Fleet followed up with
an Indian Ocean raid (March – April
1942), which resulted in the destruction
of much of the British naval power in
the Far East. That same raid also had
impact on the land war in Southeast
Asia, since it caused the British to
shift ground and air forces from the
defense of Burma back to India.
Despite the victories for naval avia-
tion, however, surface warfare was also
still a factor. At the Battles of the Java
Sea and Sunda Strait (27 February — 1
March 1942), IJN cruisers and destroyers
engaged and defeated a combined
America-British-Dutch-Australian
(ABDA) fleet. The IJN had the edge in
leadership, training and torpedoes, as
well as air cover. At the opening of the
Solomons Campaign, a Japanese cruis-
er-destroyer squadron defeated a similar
USN-Australian force in a night action
at Savo Island (9 August). Yet, despite
those surface victories, the IJN high
command still believed the war would
ultimately be decided by its carriers.
Carrier Versus Carrier,
May – June 1942
In 1942, two major engagements
were fought between the IJN and USN
that tested the doctrine of decisive
battle: Coral Sea and Midway. Those
battles have become famous for being
the first great carrier versus carrier
fights. To understand why they were
critical, however, it’s necessary to
look at the larger strategic framework
in which they were fought.
By April 1942 the Japanese seemed
to have gained their strategic objectives
in the Pacific. Their forces had seized
Southeast Asia and the East Indies, as
well as the island chains on which they
were to establish their defensive bases.
It was then the Japanese changed their
strategic plan by deciding to continue
the offensive. That resulted in two new
operations. The first was codenamed
“MO,” the planned seizure of Port
Moresby in New Guinea and, ancillary
to it, the establishment of bases in the
Solomons. The second was codenamed
“MI,” for Midway. Both operations sent
Japanese forces beyond their originally
planned defensive perimeter. The earlier
Japanese successes had convinced
them such extended offensives could
be successful, if executed immediately,
before the Allies mobilized further and
recovered from the earlier defeats.
Another part of the reason for the
changeover was the fact the Allies had
shown themselves unwilling to negotiate
an end to the war. On the contrary,
following Pearl Harbor the Americans
in particular mobilized to fight the
war through to the end. Further, at the
operational level the American carriers
had yet to be engaged and destroyed,
while the USN used them to conduct a
series of raids against Japanese positions
in the Pacific throughout early 1942, the
most notable of which was the Doolittle
raid on Tokyo itself. Clearly, the origi-
nally proposed defensive perimeter had
proven too permeable and too close to
home. Finally, there is what came to be
called “victory disease,” the widespread
belief in the Japanese military that, given
their stunning successes so far in the
war, anything could be accomplished.
Despite the prevalence of “victory
disease” within their high command,
the decision to initiate the new round
of offensives wasn’t adopted without
Naval Strengths in the Pacific, 7 December 1941 *(see pg. 23 for NOTES)
CV
Japan 11
United States 3 9
British Commonwealth
Netherlands
WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 21
debate. One faction pointed out the
MO and MI operations would place the
IJN beyond the range of its land-based
airpower in waters dominated by the
Allies. To be sure, that had also been
an issue during the initial offensive,
but then the Japanese had surprise
and an edge in tactical ability.
The faction advocating the new
offensives argued, since the US was
clearly going to stay in the war, the USN
had to be engaged and destroyed sooner
rather than later, when it would have
overwhelming strength. The conditions
for the decisive battle had to be created
as soon as possible. That faction, led by
Adm. Yamamoto, effectively switched
doctrine, from one in which the decisive
battle was no longer part of a strategic
defense, to one in which it was the ulti-
mate objective of operational offensives.
Yet, despite that profound doctrinal
change, both the Coral Sea and Midway
operations were then actually launched
in such a manner as to be indecisive,
both strategically and operationally.
The Coral Sea offensive was intended
to accomplish at least three separate
objectives: 1) support the transport
of an amphibious ground force to
take Port Moresby in southeastern
New Guinea, thereby consolidating
Japanese control of that island; 2)
establish a seaplane base on Tulagi
and an airfield on Guadalcanal; and
continued on page 25 »
BB CA/CL DD SS
11 41 129 67
24 80 56
2 8 13
3 7 13
Naval Actions 1941−42 *

South China Sea

CV CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Naval Aircraft Other
10 December 1941
88
Japanese present
(land based)
Japanese lost 5
Allied present 2 4
Allied lost 2

Java Sea – Sunda Strait

CV CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Naval Aircraft Other
27 February – 1 March 1942
Japanese present 1 5 14 c. 40 1 YP
Japanese lost 1d 1d
Allied present 5 10
Allied lost 5 6

Indian Ocean Raid

CV CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Naval Aircraft Other
31 March – 10 April 1942
Japanese present 5 1 4 7 19 350
Japanese lost 20
Allied present 3 5 7 15 100
Allied lost 1 2 2 40 3 smaller craft

Coral Sea
CV CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Naval Aircraft Other
4 – 8 May 1942 (CC)
Japanese present 2 1 9 15 127 1 YP
Japanese lost 1d 1 1 + 1d 92
Large numbers of
Allied present 2 9 13 128 LBAC but ineffective

Allied lost 1 1 69 1 oiler

Midway
CV CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Naval Aircraft Other
4 – 6 June 1942 (CC)
Japanese present (CSF) 4 2 3 12 248
70
Japanese lost 4 1 248 LBAC being transported
233 127
Allied present 3 8 15 land based aircraft
180
Allied lost 1 1 (naval + LBAC)

22 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011

(CSF): Carrier Striking Force only *

Savo Island
CV CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Naval Aircraft Other
8 – 9 August 1942
Japanese present 7 1
Japanese lost 3d
Allied present 8 15
Allied lost 4 + 1d 2d

Eastern Solomons
CV CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Naval Aircraft Other
24 – 25 August 1942 (CC)
Japanese present 2 1 2 16 25 175 1 YP
Japanese lost 1 1d 1 75 1d YP

Allied present 2 1 4 11
176
Allied lost 1d 25

Santa Cruz
CV CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Naval Aircraft Other
26 – 27 October 1942 (CC)
Japanese present 2 2 4 10 22 199
Japanese lost 1d 1d 1d 99

Allied present 2 1 6 14
136
Allied lost 1 + 1d 1 + 2d 81

Naval Battles of
Guadalcanal CV CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Naval Aircraft Other
12 – 15 November 1942
Japanese present 1 (a) 2 8 16 ?
Japanese lost 2 1 3 41
Henderson
Allied present 1 (a) 2 5 12
? Field LBAC
26
Allied lost 1d 2 7 (naval + LBAC)

*
NOTES

In some cases, the number of ships varies depending on their presence at individual actions within a battle.
Damaged ships are indicated by “+ d”; in several of the battles, damaged ships aren’t listed.
(a): carriers provided air cover from a distance. but didn’t engage each other.
(CC): carrier vs. carrier battle. Other battles are surface versus surface or combined air-surface.

Abbreviations
BB: Battleships and battlecruisers
CA/CL: heavy and lighter cruisers
CV/CVL/CVE: fleet aircraft carriers/ light carriers/escort carriers
DD: destroyers (sometimes includes lighter ships)
LBAC: Land based aircraft
SS: Submarines
YP: Seaplane Tender

WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 23

 USN Carrier Losses in 1942

The usual interpretation of the Battle of Midway was that it was a blow to Japanese naval air-
power and, of course, the loss of four carriers and their pilots was important. Yet the Japanese would
continue offensive operations elsewhere in the Pacific, notably the Solomons, for the remainder of
1942. One thing allowing for that came from the fact, by the late autumn of 1942, the USN was down
to one fully operational carrier in the PTO: CV-3 Saratoga. That was in part due to the attrition of the
Coral Sea and Midway operations, and in part due to losses owing to IJN submarine operations.
Overall in 1942, the USN would have three aircraft carriers sunk by enemy carrier air attacks (CV-2
Lexington, CV-5 Yorktown, CV-8 Hornet), and one to land-based airpower (the old CV-1 Langley). A
Japanese submarine sank CV-7 Wasp, while another damaged Saratoga. That could’ve been decisive, since
in 1942 the USN had only eight operational carriers globally (CV-4 Ranger was in the Atlantic); so those
losses represented the majority of the American carrier force in the first year of the war. The next year
would see American industry begin to produce the great fleet of carriers that would sweep the Pacific,
but that was still in the future, and Nimitz and the USN had to fight with what they had in 1942.  ★

upper-left
USS Hornet CV-8

lower-left
USS Yorktown CV-5

below (top, center)

USS Saritoga CV-3

bottom
USS Lexington CV-2

24 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011

» continued from page 21
3) engage and destroy whatever
USN carriers might be in the area.
The overall objective was to threaten
Australia with land-based airpower.
While the IJA ruled out an invasion of
the southern continent for lack of troops
and transport, new South Seas bases
could be used to interdict Allied lines of
communication with the US west coast,
and thus force them to counterattack
in arena of Japan’s choosing. Japanese
air and naval bases at Rabaul and Truk
were in a position to partially support
the operations; however, as events
would demonstrate, they weren’t close
enough to provide full coverage.
The Midway operation was much
more ambitious: to seize the atoll of
that name and then use it as a base
from which to threaten all of Hawaii.
Yamamoto believed such a threat would
draw the American carriers into a battle
at sea where the odds would be in
favor of his carrier aviation. If it came
down to a surface battle, the presence
of Japanese battleships in the Midway
force would certainly decide the issue in
his favor given the fact the US battle line
had still to be repaired or reinforced.
While all that seemed sound in
theory, the plans were overly ambitious.
Strategically, they divided Japanese forc-
es between two widely divergent axes:
the Coral Sea to the south and Midway
to the east. The result was the IJN would
be able to pit only two fleet carriers (CV)
and one light carrier (CVL) in the Coral
Sea against two USN CV. In terms of
surface units, total Japanese strength in
cruisers and destroyers ended up being
only on a par with that of the Allies in the
South Seas, and parity wasn’t enough.
The bulk of IJN carrier and battle-
ship strength was committed to the
Midway operation. The balance of forces
there appeared to give the Japanese
the decisive edge, but again it was
dissipated owing to the way in which
they deployed. Instead of one combined
force that could’ve overwhelmed all
USN forces opposed to it, Yamamoto
divided his fleet into several task groups.
His carrier strike force (four CV plus
two battleships and escorts), under Vice
Adm. Nagumo, was intended to fight
the American carriers and bombard
Midway. Behind those carriers came his
main group, with three battleships and
a light carrier, and then an amphibious
assault force with two more battleships
and another light carrier. And that wasn’t
all: he also dispatched a task group of
two CVL and their escorts north toward
the Aleutians as a deception to draw off
American forces (an effort that failed).
Effectively, Yamamoto’s division of
forces brought him down to parity with
the USN at the critical moment: four
Japanese CV versus three American
CV and the airbase on Midway.
There was a similar division of force
in the Coral Sea, where the Japanese
organized themselves into five separate
task groups. Theoretically each group
was supposed to be within support
range of the others, but that didn’t work
out in the event. Japanese intelligence
operations were ineffective beyond
tactical reconnaissance. Their task
groups failed to coordinate. What
followed were several days of operations
(4 – 8 May) that resulted in opposing
carrier aircraft sinking one USN CV and
one IJN CVL. The remaining carriers
on both sides received some damage,
and therefore had to be withdrawn for
refit; their air groups also took losses.
The Japanese transports carrying the
Port Moresby invasion force turned
back without delivering their troops.
What caused the order to be given to
recall those Japanese troop transports
was their fear that, without carrier air
cover, they would be targeted by Allied
surface units. That fear wasn’t unre-
alistic, as the USN commander there,
Adm. Fletcher, did detach a number of
cruisers toward New Guinea for exactly
that purpose. Thus, at Coral Sea, surface
naval power was still a critical factor.
Both the USN and IJN carriers had, in
effect, cancelled each other, thereby
allowing for a more traditional surface
decision, even if that decision was then
resolved as the mere threat of such an
attack. Coral Sea thus demonstrated
carriers were most effective as part
of a larger combined force, one that
utilized all elements of naval power.
What decided the battle operation-
ally was the fact the Allies were better
organized and better coordinated.
Fletcher concentrated on a single
objective: the destruction of enemy
naval power. The IJN was trying to
accomplish too much with too little.
Oddly enough, one element of
the Japanese Coral Sea operation did
succeed insofar as the Tulagi group
established bases on that island and
Guadalcanal. Later in 1942 those
bases did indeed serve as magnets
for the Allied counteroffensive that
kicked off at Guadalcanal.
As for Midway, the entire battle was a
touch and go affair. The Americans had
the advantage of MAGIC intelligence
(their signals intercept and cryptanalysis
program). MAGIC gave the USN com-
WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 25
mander in the Pacific, Adm. Nimitz, the
location of Yamamoto’s objective; so the
USN could concentrate its carrier forces
there. Yamamoto, meanwhile, was in the
dark, with Japanese intelligence operat-
ing on the assumption more American
carriers had been sunk at Coral Sea
than was the case, and that the USN
therefore wasn’t able to defend Midway.
The ensuing carrier clash saw the
Japanese losing four big CV while the
Americans lost one. Yamamoto briefly
ordered his fleet to press on in the hope
its surface units would catch the remain-
ing American CV at sea, but they quickly
withdrew out of range. Yamamoto,
believing he couldn’t continue without
air cover, then withdrew. Ironically, that
assumption wasn’t necessarily true.
The US carrier air groups had sustained
heavy losses and, had the Japanese
massed their still considerable surface
power, they may well have been able to
fend off any subsequent air attacks while
landing their ground force on Midway.
Eastern Solomons
& Santa Cruz
Shortly after Midway, Allied intel-
ligence detected the Japanese building
an airfield on Guadalcanal, and that
led to the decision to launch a strategic
counteroffensive in the Solomons. On 7
August 1942 the 1st USMC Division land-
ed there, seizing the base and rechristen-
ing it “Henderson Field,” after a Marine
aviator killed at Midway. The Japanese
quickly responded, sending a cruiser
squadron that attacked and wrecked a
US-Australian cruiser force at nearby
Savo Island (8−9 August). That began
a series of naval actions surrounding
Guadalcanal that, after several months
of hard fought combat, saw Allied naval,
air and land power emerge victorious.
American control of Henderson
Field proved decisive, as it allowed the
Allies to establish local air superiority via
land-based airpower. That brought with
it the ability to perform aerial recon-
naissance; so the US command had a
more certain picture of the situation
than did the Japanese. It also provided
an unsinkable base for air attacks on
Japanese shipping. The IJN soon found it
too dangerous to approach Guadalcanal
during daytime. Allied attacks on
Japanese troop transports and cargo
ships limited their ability to reinforce
their units on the island. That forced
expedients, such as using destroyers
as fast transports, an effort nicknamed
by the Americans the “Tokyo Express.”
While the Express performed some
prodigious feats, it was no substitute
for a regular naval line of supply.
American dominance of the
daytime skies also led to a shift in IJN
operational practice. While the Japanese
fleet could temporarily project power
into the Solomons, it could no longer
maintain a permanent presence in
those waters. Even after the Japanese
tactical victories at Savo Island and
Santa Cruz (26−27 October), the IJN
had to withdraw or risk daylight aerial
attack from Henderson’s airplanes.
Both sides were circumspect in the
commitment of their carriers to the
Solomons. A major danger point for
the Marines on Guadalcanal in the first
week of the campaign was Fletcher’s
26 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011
withdrawal of his carriers for fear of their
being targeted by air and surface attacks.
That was a real concern, however, given
the IJN’s victory at Savo Island as well as
the demonstrated effectiveness of their
land-based airpower. (IJN air units were
operating from bases such as Rabaul.)
The IJN, since it had lost four of its
fleet carriers at Midway, simply found
itself unable to risk much more in that
regard. To be sure, a couple carrier
battles were fought during the course
of the campaign: Eastern Solomons
(24−25 August) and Santa Cruz Islands
(25−26 October). The former was a
USN tactical victory, the latter an IJN,
with the victor in each case sinking one
opposing carrier. As with Coral Sea,
the carriers that weren’t sunk received
some damage while also losing aircraft;
so they had to be withdrawn after the
battle. What that showed was even a
nominally successful carrier battle
would take the victorious carriers out
of action, as they had to go back to base
for repair, refit and air group replenish-
ment. In the long run that favored
the Americans, since US industrial
and pilot training capacities were far
greater than those of the Japanese.
In both those Solomons actions,
each side made the opposing carriers
their primary targets, on the reasonable
assumption airpower was the critical
element. That assumption had truth
to it, but it also meant carrier aviation
USS Yorktown CV-5
wasn’t being used against enemy surface
units, as had been the expectation of
pre-war doctrine. That left those surface
units — cruisers, destroyers and even
the lumbering battleships — potentially
still available to fight it out.
In that regard the USN was also
getting better. The initial American
naval defeats at Java Sea and Savo
Island were in large part due to a lack
of wartime training. Captains and
crews in those actions maneuvered
according to peacetime regimen;
however, as the Americans gained
experience, tactics and coordination
improved. The USN also began to take
advantage of radar to detect enemy
ships and direct gunfire. In that way,
then, the US caught up with the early
war Japanese tactical edge at sea.
The decision in the Solomons
was reached after a series of surface
actions that became known as the
Naval Battles of Guadalcanal (12−15
November). In those actions the IJN lost
two battleships, Hiei and Kirishima.
The former was damaged during a
surface naval fight and then, when it
failed to escape before daylight, was
sunk by air attack. The latter was sunk
in a duel with two US battlewagons,
South Dakota and Washington. By the
end of 1942 the Japanese concluded
Guadalcanal couldn’t be secured, so they
evacuated the island in February 1943.
Solomons campaign, it was land-based
airpower that gave the edge at sea.
Airpower had thus become critical in
the Pacific not because of a dependable
ability to engage and destroy enemy
warships, but because of its wider range
of application. Aviation could intercept
the resupply and reinforcement of
enemy ground forces that, in turn,
allowed for the seizure of islands that
could be turned into airbases to support
further naval advances. The trick was
getting naval, air and land forces to
work together, which the US proved
able to do on a huge scale. As the war
developed, American strategy came to
revolve around the isolation of Japan’s
island bases, thereby setting them
up for ground assault (Guadalcanal,
Tarawa, etc.) or bypassing, thus
effectively taking them out of the
strategic equation (Rabaul, Truk, etc.).
The Japanese doctrine of decisive
battle had set the pace for its operations
in 1941−42. Many of those operations
were in pursuit of that single great
battle that would win the war for
them. The interesting thing is that by
mid-1942 the IJN had attained much
of that objective even though they
didn’t realize it at the time. The IJN’s
victories at Pearl Harbor, in the South
China Sea and Indian Ocean had sunk
or otherwise taken out of the war
virtually every Allied capital ship in the
Pacific. Added to that were the Japanese
surface naval victories in the Battle of
the Java Sea and Savo Island, which
eliminated much of the Allied cruiser
force in the Pacific. There was also
attrition of USN carriers in the battles
of 1942 as well as by submarine attack.
In retrospect, it could be claimed
that by the spring of 1942 the IJN had
actually won its decisive battle, at least
in terms of attaining a favorable ratio
of force against the Allied navies. Even
so, that didn’t bring the Japanese their
expected victory. Much of that went
back to the realm of pure strategy. Had
the Japanese concentrated their forces
for a single offensive in the Coral Sea,
they likely would’ve cleared Allied
naval power from the approaches to
Australia. Had Yamamoto not taken
the offensive at Midway, and instead
held the originally planned perimeter,
the IJN could’ve preserved its carriers
and aircraft for a substantial defense
of that line. Instead, in pursuit of the
chimera of a single decisive victory, the
Japanese facilitated their own defeat in
a series of attritional engagements.  ✪

Decision at Sea

The Pacific War saw a total of five

carrier versus carrier battles. Four of
them were fought in 1942. The fifth,
the Battle of Philippine Sea, 19−20
June 1944, was a major American
victory. In the four 1942 battles, the
IJN carriers sank three enemy carriers
and three other ships; USN carriers
sank six Japanese carriers and three
other ships. (Additionally, the IJN sank
a British carrier and four other ships in
the Indian Ocean raid.) Surface ships,
especially torpedo-armed cruisers
and destroyers, sank more enemy
warships than that in 1942, though
they never succeeded in engaging or
destroying a carrier (see the charts).
What all that indicates is, in that
first stage of the war, surface naval
warfare was still a crucial element. No
battleship was sunk at sea by carrier
attack in 1941−42. The Prince of Wales
and Repulse were sunk by land-based
aviation; the Hiei by a combination of
surface naval gunfire and land-based
aircraft, while the Kirishima was put IJN Akagi, April 1942
down by other battleships. In the

WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 27

 Planning for the
Invasion
of Malta,
1942
Background
W
hen Italy joined the war
in June 1940 there were
no plans to invade Malta,
despite the obvious importance of
its location. Later that same month,
Adm. Domenico Cavagnari, Italy’s
naval Chief of Staff, declared the threat
Malta posed to Italian communica-
tions with North Africa was only of
“secondary importance” because
the British had “abandoned its use
as a main base of operations,” and
thus it didn’t need to be taken. Aerial
bombing, Cavagnari decided, would
be sufficient to neutralize the island.
Part of his assessment also cited the
difficult conditions invaders would face
in going against the island’s defenses,
which included 12,000 troops and an
estimated 100 tanks. (That last number
would’ve come as a surprise to the
defenders, because at the time there
were no tanks at all on the island.)
Thus the Italians didn’t start planning own army and navy — Kesselring
an actual invasion until late 1941 when,
contrary to Cavagnari’s prediction,
Malta-based Allied aircraft, submarines
and surface ships began taking a major
toll on Axis shipping to North Africa,
severely impacting operations there.
The slaughter of the Duisberg convoy
(seven ships, totaling nearly 40,000 tons, the idea in principle, but he wanted
400 vehicles and an escorting destroyer) it attempted toward the end of May.
by the cruisers and destroyers of the
Royal Navy’s Force K in October finally
got the Axis high command thinking
28 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011
by John D. Burtt & David Pastore
seriously about taking the island. The
chief of the Italian high command
(Comando Supremo), Gen. Ugo
Cavallero, instructed his chief of staff,
Gen. Mario Roatta, to begin drafting a
plan under the bland and innocuous
codename “C3.” Then the British
North African offensive, Operation
Crusader, took place, driving German
and Italian forces west; so resolving that
emergency had to take precedence.
Planning began again in January
1942 with a combined group of 25
officers from all three services under the
supervision of Cavallero’s chief opera-
tions officer, Gen. Antonio Gandin. The
task took a further step forward when
Hitler assigned Field Marshal Albert
Kesselring as Germany’s “Commander-
in-Chief-South.” Kesselring pushed
for an invasion from the very start
of his new assignment. Though his
actual responsibilities extended only
to Luftwaffe operations — the Italians
maintained nominal control of their
attempted, by force of personality, to
take charge of the overall C3 operation,
suggesting a surprise assault at a
conference in March, hoping to invade
as soon as the preparatory aerial
offensive by Fliegerkorps II achieved air
supremacy. In April, Mussolini approved
Hitler by then had little faith in the
Italians or their schemes; so he became
increasingly skeptical even as planning
proceeded. Gen. Alfred Jodl, Chief of
the Operations Staff of the Army High
Command, echoed his master’s doubts
by telling Kesselring to continue plan-
ning but not to expect the operation to
ever actually take place. The German
approach to C3 thereafter appeared to
be mostly concerned with limiting their
involvement, which in turn resurfaced
the Italians’ earlier doubts about the
operation. They went ahead, however,
by rationalizing the continued planning
and training would at least create a
reserve of troops that might eventually
be put to good use elsewhere.
Jodl and Rommel met in April to
discuss follow-on operations to be
conducted once the latter had regained
all of Libya. They agreed to launch an
assault on the Allied line near Gazala
toward the end of May, but Rommel
wanted Malta taken first: the loss of
all those supplies the previous year
was still vivid in his memory. That
insistence brought Hitler around again,
at least tentatively; so he sent paratroop
commander Gen. Kurt Student to Rome
to get involved in the C3 planning.
At the end of the month, at Schloss
Klessheim near Salzburg, Hitler and
Mussolini met to chart their course of
action. What came out of that meeting
was a commitment to launch C3, but
only after Rommel had attacked the
British at Gazala and taken Tobruk. Once
that port had been taken, the bulk of the
Axis air forces would be transferred to
continued on page 30 »
 inse
tm
ap
(ab
ove
)

WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 29

Sicily for C3 while Panzer Armee Afrika
regrouped near Sollum on the Egyptian
border. Though the two dictators were
expecting Tobruk to fall quickly, and
hoped for Malta to follow soon after
in June, further planning resulted in
the actual target date dropping back
into mid-July’s new moon period.
C3 planners soon identified a key
requirement: fuel oil for the Italian
Navy. Fuel was becoming critical for
the Regia Marina; they were already
idling ships to provide fuel for others.
At Taranto, for example, 500 tons of
fuel was siphoned out of the battleship
Cesare for transfer to escort destroyers.
On 1 June the planners estimated they
would need 43,000 tons of fuel for the
first 10 days of the C3 operation. Four
days later an urgent request was sent by
Cavallero to Berlin for 40,000 tons to be
stockpiled in Sicily and southern Italy
at least 20 days prior to starting C3.
Three weeks later, though, after
Student reported on what he appraised
to be the “chaotic” status of C3 planning,
Hitler again changed his mind. In a rant
to his paratroop commander, he decried
the lack of Italian security, belittled
their offensive strength, and claimed
the Italian Navy would certainly run
back to port if the Royal Navy merely
approached. He then ordered Student
not to return to Rome. He had appar-
ently decided C3 wasn’t viable in 1942;
however, he chose not to announce
that decision to Student or the Italians,
and thus C3 planning continued.
The Italians themselves were aware
C3 was stricken with difficulties. A
week earlier, Italian Foreign Minister
Count Gian Galeazzo Ciano recorded
in his diary that several officers,
including Luftwaffe Gen. Bruno Lorzer,
commander of Fliegerkorps II, were
expressing doubts about the invasion.
On 20 June, with Rommel closing
on Tobruk, Mussolini stepped in with
a personal letter to Hitler, specifying:
“the center of our strategic framework
is the problem of Malta...the action
against Malta is required more than
ever...to keep the results achieved in
North Africa and ensure future needs.”
He also stressed that securing
the needed stock of fuel continued
to remain vital to the operation.
Since Hitler hadn’t ordered Student
not to conduct any more C3 planning,
he continued. Specifically, he brought in
the commander of Fleiger Korps XI, Lt.
Gen. Gerhardt Conrad, and his logistics
expert Lt. Gen. Conrad Seibt, to discuss
transport issues. The two men were
told the C3 plan currently called for the
30 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011
use of five paratroop regiments and
one artillery regiment, along with an
engineer and a machinegun battalion.
At the end of June a landing exercise
was performed on Italy’s rocky coast
south of Livorno, between Antignano
and Querciannella. Some 4,500 troops
took part with King Emmanuelle
watching and expressing his delight.
Other exercises took place between
Marina di Pisa and Cecina, and all went
well. The C3 plan thus evolved into an
enormous and complex undertaking.
Italian Forces
The five divisions Comando Supremo
selected for the amphibious part of the
invasion were all two-regiment “binary”
divisions. Italy, in fact, fielded the only
two-regiment divisions during the war.
That organization had been instituted
in 1936 by then Army Chief of Staff Gen.
Federico Baistrocchi, in order to create
lighter and more easily transportable
and maneuverable units. His successor,
Gen. Alberto Pariani, finished the
development by giving the new divisions
artillery support equivalent to that of
the older three-regiment divisions, but
using more mortars and anti-tank guns.
Each infantry regiment was made up
of the standard three battalions of three
rifle companies, with a heavy weapons
company that was usually parceled out
to the line companies. Each division had
a battalion of mortars and an artillery
regiment to support its two infantry
regiments. The five divisions slated for
the amphibious assault were as follows.
• 1st Division Superga (General di
Divisione Dante Lorenzelli) started
the war as a standard division, but in
the spring 1942 was reconfigured to
be an assault division. As such it was
heavily reinforced with assault guns
and additional support weapons.
Two companies of Semovente L40
da 47/32 assault guns (16 vehicles
and three additional command
vehicles) were attached to the
artillery regiment, and two more
companies were attached to the
anti-tank battalion. Superga had
each of its six battalions reinforced
with companies of support
weapons, including four 47mm/32
infantry guns, 81mm mortars
and flamethrowers. The guns and
mortars were to be moved around
by three-wheeled motorcycles.
• 4th Division Livorno (General di
Divisione Domenico Chirieleison)
was also converted to an
assault division in March 1942.
It was similar to Superga.
• 20th Division Fruili (General di
Divisione Giacomo Carboni) was
also designated an assault divi-
sion; however, its conversion had
never been completed. It was still
supported by the older 65mm/17
infantry guns from World War I,
and didn’t have the new Semovente
L40s. The 88th CCNN Legion was
assigned to Friuli for the invasion.
• 26th Division Assietta, (General
di Divisione Pietro Zaglio) was a
standard binary division that had
actually begun the war designated
a mountain infantry division, the
difference being the number of
horses and mules assigned for
transport. The 17th CCNN Legion
was to land with Assietta.
• 54th Division Napoli (General
di Divisione Giulio Cesare Gotti
Porcinari) was also a standard
binary division. Napoli was a
newly raised division, and the CCNN
173rd Legion was assigned to it.
As mentioned above, some of the
divisions were reinforced by attaching
a Camicie Nere (CCNN or Blackshirt)
“legion” (brigade). They were highly
motivated troops, but their combat
skills were mediocre. They were known
more for their Fascist political ardor
than for their tactical abilities. In fact,
dependent as they were on the army for
equipment and training, they generally
remained just poorly armed rabble led
by officers chosen for political reliability
and not military ability. Each legion was
made up of two battalions with three
companies, each with two platoons.
There was also a machinegun company
for support with 12 heavy machineguns.
The best of the Italian ground force
was the 1st Folgore Parachute Division.
It had two regiments, each with three
battalions, along with a sapper battalion
and an artillery battalion, all under
Gen. Enrico Frattini. A third regiment
was added in 1942, and in June the unit
took the name Folgore (lightning bolt).
Aside from the paratroops, the
Italians also planned to use special
forces in their assault on Malta. One
of those units was the San Marcos
Marine Regiment. In June 1940, when
Italy first entered the war, only a single
San Marcos battalion existed. Another
was formed with plans to use it to land
behind French lines, but the French
surrender aborted that operation. The
two battalions saw service in Greece
and Yugoslavia before being brought
home for C3 training. Both battalions • Friuli had a single 75mm bat- older mountain howitzer. They could
were made up of four line companies, talion in its artillery regiment, be broken down into eight pieces for
supported by an 81mm mortar company along with three batteries of older transport. Given the terrain on Malta’s
and one of 47mm/32 infantry guns. World War I-vintage guns. south coast, that was important.
Two other specialist battalions had • Assietta had three batteries (12 guns With a range of over 10,000 yards,
also been created. A parachute unit total) in its artillery battalion, along the 75s would’ve been an effective
was formed in March 1941 designated with a battalion of 12 older guns. infantry support weapon on Malta.
P Battalion. Composed of 140 men • Napoli had three batteries (12 guns) Heavier support weapons were
split into six teams, their primary in its artillery battalion, and two allocated to the Fruili Division, which
mission was to drop behind enemy batteries as add-on reinforcements. had a battalion of 100mm guns with
lines. Finally the Assault Swimmer tractors. They were actually weapons
Battalion was created, in June 1941, Those 75s had been designed in that had been captured during World
from 200 San Marcos marines and 200 the 1930s as a replacement for the War I. They had a shorter range than
volunteers from the Maritime Militia.
The Italians didn’t assign a lot of
armor to the C3 operation; what they DZ road:
did assign came in the form of assault This is a typical road on Malta in the landing area;
there is barely enough room of a regular vehicle,
guns: Gruppo Artiglieria Semovente,
much less an armored vehicle.
with eight Semovente M41 assault
guns. They were 16-foot wide, 15-ton
armored vehicles, each sporting a
75mm gun and an 8mm machinegun.
The gun fired both high explosive and
armor piercing rounds. The latter were
capable of defeating up to 59mm of
armor. The wide M41s would’ve had a
difficult time negotiating the narrow
and rock-wall-lined roads on Malta.
More prevalent were the smaller
L40 47/32 assault guns assigned to
the Superga and Livorno Divisions.
The L40 were narrower (12.5 feet) and
lighter (seven tons), armed with a 47mm
gun and an 8mm machinegun. The
47mm also fired both high explosive
and armor piercing rounds, and could
penetrate 50mm of armor. A total of
64 assault guns were to be used.
To support the infantry the Italians
were going to land large amounts of
artillery. As noted above, the Superga
and Livorno Divisions had each of their
six battalions reinforced with companies
of support weapons, including four
47mm infantry guns, 81mm mortars,
and flamethrowers. As they were
capable of both high explosive and
armor piercing fire, the guns could’ve
provided good support, provided they
could get them ashore and deployed.
The Friuli Division had each of its two
regiments supported by a company of
65mm guns. Those guns dated from
World War I, having started their service
with Italian mountain troops in 1913,
but their light weight and reliability
made them good support weapons.
The primary gun in the artil-
lery regiments was the 75mm
howitzer. That weapon was to be
deployed in the following way.

• Superga and Livorno had two

artillery battalions of 12 guns each.

WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 31

the 75mm guns, but their rounds were
more powerful. Their drawback was
the need for a tractor to move them,
something that would’ve been difficult
in the terrain facing the Fruili Division.
To support the invasion from the sea,
the Italians set up three key naval groups.
First Squadron, based in Naples,
was centered around the battleship
Vittorio Veneto. To add more weight
the battleship Giulio Cesare was
brought in. Also under First Squadron’s
operational control was a division of
light cruisers operating out of Cagliari
on Sardinia. Ten destroyers were
to accompany the capital ships.
First Squadron’s primary responsibil-
ity would be to engage and block any
Allied force that attempted to come
through the Sicilian Narrows. Actual
defense inside the narrows was assigned
to two flotillas of torpedo boats.
Second Squadron, based along the
coast of Sicily and Reggio Calabria,
was centered around the battleship
Caio Duilio. With the Conte di Cavour
still repairing damage taken during
November 1941’s Taranto raid, and
Giulio Cesare transferred to Naples,
the only other battleship available
was the Andrea Doria; however, this
squadron also included three heavy
and three light cruisers, with 14
destroyers to provide escort.
Second Squadron’s role in C3 was
twofold. First, while accompanying the
invasion convoys, its battleships would
engage Forts Delimara and Benghaisa
on Malta’s southern tip. Those battle-
ships and their escorts were then to
attack other targets of opportunity, such
as fortifications and troop concentra-
tions. Those ships had never trained
for such support activity, so little could
actually have been expected from them.
Second, the whole force would be used
to block any Royal Navy incursion
from Alexandria. There the British
were under-strength, having only light
cruisers to use in an offensive capacity.
German Ground Force
The original German portion of
the plan called for the full 7 th Flieger
Division — three regiments and a
detachment from the then still forming
4th Regiment — to be used in the inva-
sion. The 1st and 3rd Regiments were
being rebuilt and retrained in France
and Germany after service on the east
front near Leningrad, where they’d
suffered over 3,000 casualties. The 2nd
Regiment, however, was recalled to the
Ukraine to meet a Soviet offensive there.
32 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011
It didn’t return to Germany again until
June 1942, and when it did it was in no
condition to take part in an operation. In
its place a scratch brigade was formed in
April under Gen. Bernard Ramcke, who’d
been in Italy since March, working with
the Folgore paratroops. His unit included
four rifle battalions, with two battalions
reinforced with an extra rifle company.
Apart from the paratroop regiments
the Germans planned to support the
C3 operation with a special armor com-
pany. The 66th Panzer Battalion was to be
composed of two companies of armor,
one with 12 Panzer IVGs, five Panzer IPs,
and five Panzer IIJs. The second compa-
ny was to be made up of captured Soviet
tanks: 10 KV-Is and one KV-II, along with
12 T-34s. The detachment was created
on 28 April 1942 under the auspices
of the elite Panzer Lehr Regiment.
The Defense
The force defending Malta was built
around 14 infantry battalions organized
into four brigades. In general each
battalion was organized into a head-
quarters company and four line-infantry
companies, designated A through D.
British headquarters companies of that
period generally consisted of a variety
of support platoons: anti-aircraft,
signals, carrier, engineers, and mortars;
however, on Malta the battalions didn’t
have integral anti-aircraft or engineer
platoons. Each rifle company had three
platoons of 36 men each, along with
2-inch mortars, Bren light machineguns,
Sten submachineguns and an anti-tank
gun. The total allotted strength of each
battalion was 786 officers and men.
Each battalion was assigned a
specific part of the island as its primary
responsibility. Any airfield within a
battalion’s area was to be most heavily
defended and denied to the enemy as
long as possible. In the summer of 1942
the four infantry brigades on the island
had two field artillery regiments to back
them up: the 26th Defense Regiment
and the 12th Field Artillery Regiment.
The British also had a total of 11 tanks,
including Mark VI light tanks, small
A-9 cruisers, and some heavy Matildas.
A specific defense plan had been
established with specific combat loca-
tions identified for each unit. One key to
the defense was the establishment of a
reserve — the 4th (Western) Brigade and
all the tanks — on the high ground over-
looking the airfields. That brigade was
intended to counterattack any incursion.
The wild card of the British defense
was the Royal Navy. Stationed about
1,000 miles away at Alexandria and
Gibraltar, the RN’s ability to affect
the invasion’s outcome depended
on when its ships actually got there
and how long they would remain
in an Axis air superiority environ-
ment. Churchill’s political situation
demanded the Navy respond strongly.
Final Plan
The initial drop of the Axis paratroop
force was scheduled to begin at 1:00
p.m. on 15 August. German and Italian
combat aircraft were to be over Malta
earlier, starting at 4:00 a.m. Their targets
were any defensive installations inside
the paratroop landing area, along with
airfields, anti-aircraft positions and
coastal forts. A final mission to drop
smoke bombs to screen the incoming
paratroop transports was also planned.
A total of six German and three
Italian battalions were to be dropped
initially. Their aircraft were to come
in from the south of the island and fly
north, dropping their human cargo
as soon as they crossed the Maltese
coast. The initial landing targets of
the nine first-wave battalions had two
German battalions landing on the left,
the Italians in the center, and the four
remaining German battalions on the
right. Gliders carrying heavy weapons
and artillery were to follow that initial
drop as well as a load of supply.
Two more waves of German para-
troops, to bring in the remaining three
battalions, were to take place from 5:00
to 6:00 p.m. The Italian paratroopers
were to concentrate on seizing Qrendi
Airfield, with the secondary task of pre-
paring it for Axis use as soon as possible.
The follow-on task of the paratroops
was to establish a defensive perimeter,
with specific sites to be established to
control road access to the area. The
Axis expected a quick counterattack to
come from the Luqa/Hal Far area, with
another likely coming from Zebbuj.
Little response was expected from the
Mdina area on the Dingli plateau.
The Axis hope for the success of their
seaborne contingent was predicated on
landing where the British didn’t expect
them: the inhospitable southern coast-
line. That coastline was so rugged and
difficult that only Fort Benghaisa had
coastal defense artillery sited to cover it.
The primary landing zone,
codenamed “Famagusta,” stretched
from Hajia-is-Soda in the west to
Wied-il-Bassasa in the east, a distance
of some 5,900 yards. Onto those rocks
the Italians planned to land some 14,000
troops of the Friuli Division and San
Marcos Marines, 45 Semoventes and
56 75mm guns, with the 8,600 men of
Livorno right behind them. To make
matters even more difficult than the
terrain, the initial landings were to start
before dawn at 10 separate locations.
The secondary landing zone,
codenamed “Larnaca,” centered
around Marsa Scirocco Bay, with
commando landings at seven locations
on the more hospitable shoreline
near Forts Benghaisa and Delimara,
and with German armor coming
ashore inside the bay at the British
seaplane base at Kalafrana.
The final portion of the plan called
for the landing of the Superga Division
on the island of Gozo, northwest of
Malta, codenamed “Cipro.” A total
of nine landing sites on that island
had been selected to put ashore over
10,000 troops. Given the entire island
held only about that same number
of adult males, with no organized
defense, that portion of the invasion
was expected to succeed easily.
The Friuli Division was to consoli-
date around the village of Bubakra, then
drive east toward Hal Far Airfield. Its
Famagusta:
This is a sea-level shot from offshore of the Famagusta landing “beach.”
next effort would be to link with the
Larnaca invasion force and clear the rest
of the Marsaxlokk harbor area to open
it up for Axis shipping. On the left, the
Livorno Division would push east as
well to consolidate around the village
of Gudia. It would then sweep toward
Marsa Scala and down the Delimara
peninsula toward Fort Delimara.
Timing for the invasion called for
all the first wave and Livorno to be
unloaded and ashore by 7:00 p.m. on 15
August. Then the ships would start the
13-hour journey back to Sicily to pick up
the Assietta and Napoli Divisions. They
would be loaded in 12 hours and arrive
off Malta on the morning of 17 August.
While Livorno and Friuli were
clearing the eastern section of Malta, the
follow-up divisions would be landing.
Assietta was to consolidate on the Dingli
plateau, then move through the town
of Rabat and along the eastern edge of
the Vittoria Lines to the north coast.
Its task was the most challenging, as
getting troops, supply and equipment,
especially artillery, up onto the plateau
was problematic because of the narrow-
ness and poor condition of the roads.
The Napoli Division would consolidate
WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 33
around the village of Siggiewi. Once
fully organized, it would move north, on
the right of Assietta, toward the coast.
The final act of the invasion was
to be carried out by a single regiment
of the Superga Division, which would
land on Malta’s north coast east of
St. Paul’s Bay. That would take place
after Gozo had been captured.
Supplying the invasion had
substantial requirements for both
the 15,000 paratroops and the 80,000
seaborne troops. Each paratrooper was
to land with six quarts of water and
about 20 lbs. of food and ammunition.
The water was expected to last two
days, by which time offshore tankers
were be in place to provide resupply.
Starting on day two, the paratroops
would have needed some 180 tons
dropped to them daily in order to keep
those units fully combat effective.
The basis of the seaborne logistics
was to have enough supply for the first
five days delivered with the first-wave
troops. Each man would land with about
two quarts of water and 40 lbs. of ammu-
nition and food. Another four quarts
of water and 90 lbs. per man was to be
landed separately from the troops and
then transported to assembly locations.
For the 10,000-strong Friuli, that meant
470 tons of food and ammunition,
plus 40 tons of water, would have to be
unloaded from boats — along with sup-
port weapons, artillery, and armor — and
moved up from the landing areas. For
the initial landing of 24,000 troops, that
meant some 113,00 tons needed to be
off-loaded on day one. The delivered
water was expected to last two days,
after which water tankers offshore, car-
rying some 500 tons — enough for 50,000
men for three days — were to be avail-
able. Rope-tow systems were designed
to get the water off the landing sites to
the tops of the surrounding ridges.
Factors Favoring the Attackers
The primary advantage the Axis had
in the operation was their numbers.
They were planning on committing,
beneath complete air superiority, nearly
100,000 men against 26,000 defenders.
The planners believed they might lose
as much as 20 percent in the initial
drops and landings but, even so, they’d
then still hold a decisive numeric edge.
The possibility of Axis defeat, despite
the numbers, lay in their unquantifiable
ability to concentrate and apply their
numeric advantage. The paratroopers
were all highly trained, high-morale
troops; the Livorno and Fruili Divisions
were better trained than most Italian
troops and would probably have
operated effectively. The Assietta and
Napoli Divisions were average Italian
divisions, which previous actions in
the war had shown to be ineffective.
Time, in the tactical sense, was on
the side of the Axis for two reasons.
First, Malta was isolated; any incursion
by the Royal Navy would have been of
short duration if those ships were to
avoid daylight exposure to Axis airpower.
Second, Malta was isolated: every Allied
bullet, artillery shell and mortar round
expended couldn’t be replaced.
At the same time, though, in the
strategic sense the Axis needed to
hurry. Hitler needed to have the Malta
operation completed swiftly for two
reasons. First, the eastern front offensive
was already underway and needed
every ounce of Germany’s resources.
Second, Axis forces in North Africa
were coming under increasing pressure
from Allied airpower on the Egyptian
border. In both cases, the Germans
needed to relocate Luftwaffe assets to
those other areas as soon as possible.
Conditions on the island itself were
by that time becoming desperate for
34 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011
the Allies. Rationing had been in force
since April 1941, and had to be made
ever more stringent as time went on.
The daily ration for each serviceman
was only: 11 ounces of bread, four
ounces of tinned meat, one ounce of
tinned milk, a half-ounce of sugar, an
ounce of tinned potatoes, two ounces of
onions, two ounces of fresh vegetables
(when available), and 1.5 ounces of tea.
As noted by Maj. Gen. William Beckett,
commander of Malta’s artillery: “We
were fighting exhaustion on a ration of
three thin slices of bully, three thin slices
of bread twice a day, and a cabbage-stalk
to discuss in company once a week!”
In addition to the effects of the
poor rations, disease also took its toll:
polio, typhoid fever, tuberculosis,
scabies, pneumonia, dysentery and
stomach flu (nicknamed the “Malta
Dog”) struck hard at civilians and
military alike. Effects on the military
were pronounced, given the strenuous
duties they performed. In short, the
infantry were ill prepared, militarily
and physically, to face the rigors of an
active defense. Combat exertions might
well have quickly and fully sapped
the staying power of the troops.
Yet another factor working against
the defenders on Malta was the training
and tactical organization of the British
company verses its enemy counterparts.
Their training gave them a disadvantage
in two aspects, one specific to Malta.
That is, the infantry spent much of the
time at the airfields, providing support
in building aircraft revetments, filling
bomb craters, and everything else the
RAF needed to keep its aircraft flying.
That left little time for actual ground
combat training. Some did occur, but
almost all of it was conducted at platoon
and company levels. Little battalion-
level training took place. For example,
the Southern Brigade held an exercise
that pitted the 1st Dorsetshire and a
troop of the 12th Field Artillery Regiment
against a company from the 8th King’s
Own and two companies of the 3rd King’s
Own Malta Regiment. The exercise was
intended to practice rapid concentration
from scattered battle positions and
attacking swiftly after a forced march.
Significantly, there was no training on
coordinating with supporting armor, nor
was there any training at brigade-level.
The other disadvantage lay with
the British regimental system itself.
It promoted strong unit loyalty and
cohesion, but it also stressed social
skills and conformity over tactical
capability and junior officer initiative.
There was no centralized direction or
emphasis for training, so junior officers
were trained at the battalion level in
whatever way the regimental com-
mander saw fit. Most of that training
tended to emphasize conformity to
orders from above rather than swift
exploitation of the situation at hand.
British training had two further
disadvantages when compared to that
of the Germans. First, the Germans
trained both their commissioned and
noncommissioned officers to command
higher-level formations, while the British
limited that to commissioned officers.
Second, British regimental training was
done in isolation, not encouraging coop-
eration with other services or branches
or even other battalions. The Germans
training emphasized such cooperation.
The end result, then, was a
British force that could’ve likely
defended itself well, especially from
within prepared positions, but that
was unprepared for counterattacking.
Combined operations — either with
infantry/armor or among the infantry
battalions — would’ve likely proved
impossible simply because they hadn’t
been practiced. Going up against a
disorganized force of just-arrived para-
troopers or seaborne troops, the British
may well have given a good account
of themselves; attacking a regrouped
Axis force would’ve been difficult.
Terrain Factors Hindering
the Attackers
The terrain on Malta favored the
defenders in general, due to both the
island’s small size and the ubiquitous
stonewalls that crisscrossed much
of it. Similarly, there were also
several other terrain considerations
that would’ve hindered the attackers.
The first consideration was the steep
seaborne landing sites. Troops landing
using ladders there would’ve probably
been able to negotiate the transition
from boat to land, but getting equip-
ment ashore would’ve been harder,
especially under artillery fire. Add the
fact the initial landings were to start
at night, and it can easily be seen they
would’ve been chaotic at worst and slow
at best. As noted earlier, the plan called
for the landing of 24,000 troops, 45
armored vehicles, 48 artillery pieces, and
113,000 tons of supply in 15 hours. Given
the terrain involved, it’s hard to imagine
how that would’ve been possible.
Second, most of the roads on Malta
were narrow, rock-wall-lined paths.
None of the armor or tractors brought
ashore by the Axis would’ve been
able to use any but the main roads.
Though the armor could bull through
and over the walls, such a process
would soon take a toll on the machines
and would’ve slowed progress.
Third, the plan called for the
quick seizure of several villages by
the paratroops. Urban warfare in the
confined, narrow, rubble-choked
streets would’ve likely been hor-
rendous, both in time and casualties.
Surprise & Intelligence
The British had been able to
decrypt German codes since early 1940,
based on a captured “Enigma” coding
machine. In addition, the British had
broken the Italian C38m naval code in
May 1941, which gave them access to
all Supermarina plans. For example, it
had been a C38m decrypted intercept
that led to Force K’s slaughter of the
Duisberg convoy in November 1941.
Further decryptions from that source
picked up the details of 26 separate
shipping movements between Italy
and North Africa in April and May.
Given the enormous role the Italian
Navy was going to play in C3, most
of the messages detailing the plans,
routes, and times of the convoys and
supporting ships would almost certainly
have been intercepted. Because the
Famagusta:
This is the same “beach” seen from on top of the plateau the Axis assault troops would’ve had to climb while carrying all their equipment and supplies.
convoys needed to regroup at sea prior
to heading to their invasion sites, warn-
ing of the impending attack would’ve
been received well ahead of time. The
invasion craft would have come under
early attack, and submarines could’ve
been positioned along the route.
Similarly, British intelligence also had
decryption capability for the Luftwaffe’s
Enigma messages. That source told the
British a supply base for Fliegerkorps XI
(the air landing command) had been
set up in Reggia Calabria in February,
and that a “senior” paratroop general
(Student) was in Rome in April.
British intelligence was limited, since
most of the discussions and planning
done by the Germans were conducted
over landlines and therefore weren’t
intercepted. There was only a single spe-
cific reference picked up — the Italian
chief of staff’s request for exercises in
connection with the operation — and
the code breakers had no idea what
the operation was at that time. At the
same time, however, any orders for a
concentration of paratroopers, transport
planes or shipping would’ve been
intercepted. In general, then, there was
little chance the Germans and Italians
could’ve surprised the British on Malta.
On the other side of the intelligence
equation, though the Axis had amassed
considerable photographic and other
WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 35
intelligence on the defenses of Malta,
they missed two critical items. First,
the location of the reserve, 4th (Western)
Brigade, wasn’t identified; so the Axis
drop plan forecast no threat from where
that unit was located on the invasion’s
left flank. The 1st Paratroop Regiment
was, in fact, going to land directly on
top of the reserve brigade. Second, the
Axis didn’t know about Fort Campbell,
which was ideally sited to interdict
the Superga Division’s invasion area.
Axis Apathy
The single most damaging factor
weighing against the attackers was their
own leadership’s apathy and uncertainty
concerning the project. Hitler had other
priorities and a negative view of Italian
capabilities. He’d opted not to attack
Malta in 1941 and, though he’d come
around to agree to move forward with
the operation at the end of April, he’d
done so while also expecting miracles
from Rommel in June. Though Hitler
had finally agreed to provide the fuel
and paratroops needed for the inva-
sion, his doubts were still prevalent.
Among the Italians there was
concern as well. Foreign Minister
Ciano recorded a conversation with
Friuli’s commander, Gen. Camponi,
expressing his fears. That general, he
wrote, was: “convinced, technically British failed to keep the paratroopers by then consuming unsustainable
convinced, that we are heading for an disrupted, or failed to interfere with masses of men and material, and
unheard-of disaster. Preparations have the seaborne landing of troops and the United States was preparing to
been childish; equipment is lacking supply — either by land counterattack add its weight to the conflict.  ✪
and inadequate. The landing troops will or by Royal Navy interference — time
never succeed in landing or, if they land, would’ve begun working to give the SOURCES
they are doomed to total destruction.” Axis the edge against the defenders. Of
Boog, Horst, et. al. Germany and the Second World War,
course, delays in getting troops ashore, Vol. III: The Mediterranean, South-East Europe and
Conclusion heavy losses on land, and losses at sea North Africa 1939−1941; Volume VI: The Global War.
Claredon Press: Oxford, 2001.
against the Royal Navy, might well have Gabriele, Mariano. Operazione C3: Malta, 2a Edizione.
Overall the Axis plan appears as if it panicked the Italian high command into Officio Storico Delia Marina, Gaeta, Italy, 1990.
would’ve given them an excellent chance prematurely abandoning the effort.
to take Malta. The seaborne landings In retrospect, the Italians should’ve
would’ve been far more difficult to com- started their war with a concrete plan to
plete than had been anticipated, and the take Malta in 1940. Another opportunity
location of the British reserve brigade, was missed in 1941, when Hitler chose
though perhaps partially nullified by the to land on Crete to protect Rumanian
1st Paratroop Regiment landing on top oil fields rather than secure the supply
of it, would’ve likely put the invasion line to North Africa. By 1942 a successful
schedule and the opening battles into a invasion wouldn’t have decisively
crisis state for the Axis. If, however, the helped the Axis: the eastern front was

Axis C3 Order of Battle

Airborne 75th Reggimento Fanteria (3 bn)

7th Flieger Division 76th Reggimento Fanteria (3 bn)
1st Fallschirmjager Regiment (3 bn) LIV Battaglione Mortai
3rd Fallschirmjager Regiment (3 bn) 54th Compagnia cannoni anticarro
Ramcke’s Fallschirmjager Brigade (4 bn) 54th Reggimento Artiglieria (six batteries 75 mm guns)
1st Divisione Paracadutiste (Folgore) 173rd Legion CCNN
1st Reggimento Fanteria Paracadutiste (3 bn)
2nd Reggimento Fanteria Paracadutiste (3 bn) Other Forces
29th Raggruamento Artiglieria (six batteries 105
Seaborne mm guns, three batteries 149 mm guns)
1st Divisione di Fanteria d’Assaulto (Superga) 10th Raggruamento Corazzato (armored assault guns)
91st Reggimento Fanteria (3 bn) Reggimento San Marcos (2 bn marines)
92nd Reggimento Fanteria (3 bn) I Battaglione d’assaulto Paracadustiste del Aeronautica
I Battaglione Mortai (81 mm Mortars) Battaglione Riattatori “Loreto”
I Battaglione Controcarro Semovente (anti-tank vehicles) Battaglione Speciale Arditi
I Battaglione Guastatori (combat engineers)
5th Reggimento Artiglieria Allied Defense Order of Battle
4th Divisione di Fanteria d’Assaulto (Livorno) 33rd Reggimento 1st (Southern) Brigade
Fanteria (3 bn) 34th Reggimento Fanteria (3 bn) IV Battaglione 2nd Bn Devonshires
Mortai IV Battaglione Controcarro Semovente XI Battaglione 1st Bn Dorsetshires
Guastatori 28th Reggimento Artiglieria (six batteries 75/18 guns) 1st Bn Hampshires
20th Divisione di Fanteria d’Assaulto (Friuli) 3rd Bn King’s Own Malta Regiment
87th Reggimento Fanteria (3 bn) 2nd (Northern) Brigade
88th Reggimento Fanteria (3 bn) 1st Bn Kings Own Malta Regiment
XX Battaglione Mortai 2nd Bn Kings Own Malta Regiment
III Battaglione Controcarro (anti-tank guns) 2nd Bn Royal Irish Fusiliers
V Battaglione Guastatori (combat engineers) 8th Bn Manchester 3rd (Central) Brigade
35th Reggimento Artiglieria (six batteries 75 mm guns; 11th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers
three batteries 100 mm guns) 2nd Bn Queen’s Own Royal West Kent
88th Legion CCNN 1st Bn Cheshire Regiment (machinegun) 4th (Western) Brigade
26th Divisione di Fanteria (Assietta) 29th Reggimento Fanteria (3 bn) 4th Bn Royal West Kents (The Buffs)
30th Reggimento Fanteria (3 bn) 8th Kings Own
CXXVI Battaglione Mortal 1st Durham Light Infantry
126th Compagnia cannoni anticarro
25th Reggimento Artigheria (six batteries 75 mm guns) 1st Independent Troop Royal Tank Regiment
17th Legion CCNN 12th Field Artillery Regiment
54th Divisione Fanteria (Napoli) 26th Defense Regiment, Royal Artillery.  ★

36 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011

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itself under the may find
guns of enem
So more supp y artillery.
ort fire will be
to take the hill, necessary
but assets are
limited.
In Crusader, the
attritional desig
new Combat n of the
Results Table
true nature of simu
battles in North lates the
are typically two- Africa. Units
sided formation
can incur casu
alties, accurately s that
the realities of replicating
combat and the
losses sustained high
by both sides
actual fighting during the
around Tobru
the battle is thus k. Winn
a matter of mane ing
firepower and
asset manageme uver,
nt.

Game Conten
ts:
• 17 x 22” (43 x 56
cm) terrain map
• 100 die-cut coun
ters
• One Standard
Rules booklet
• One Exclusive for this series
Rules booklet
for this title

Crusader
PLAYERS
2

LEVEL II III X XX XXX

BATTALION
HEX SCALE
2 mi (3.2 km)
PLAYING TIME
Each counter repres
ents 1-2 hrs
formation from among an individual historical
and Commonwea the German, Italian
lth forces that fough , British COMPLEXITY
including armor t for Tobruk, •••••
regiments, anti-ta LOW
1614 infantry brigades,
recon elements,
nk battalions,
Minutes to lea
and more. SOLITAIRE ••••• rn. Quick to pla
HIGH
y. Historicall
A FOLIO SERIES
A product of
GAME
Decision Games
y Accurate.
Copyright © ,
2010. All Rights Inc.
Reserved.

1/6 th Actual Size Copyright ©

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n Games, Inc.
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d. Made & Printed
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The Poltava Raid:
Act One of the Cold War?
The VVS
T
he Soviet Air Force (Russian-
language acronym: VVS) was the
world’s largest when Germany
attacked in June 1941; however, much
of the VVS was then destroyed on
the ground in the war’s first days.
Badly outclassed by the Luftwaffe,
the VVS gained distinction only for its
scale of sacrifice: some Soviet pilots
resorted to suicidal ramming attacks
to bring down German planes they
couldn’t outfight any other way.
Aided by the Soviet Union’s ability to
manufacture huge numbers of aircraft,
the VVS absorbed vast losses and kept
up the fight. The Soviet aviation industry
steadily improved the aircraft designs
with which it started the war, and intro-
duced a handful of new types. Soviet
aircraft lacked sophisticated instru-
mentation, and were designed only for
low- and mid-altitude performance,
38 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011
by Jonathan Lupton
but basic characteristics, like speed
and rate of climb, steadily improved.
By the summer of 1944, then, the VVS
had reached approximate performance
parity with Luftwaffe aircraft over the
front. One fighter type, the Yak-3 (which,
through a numerical identification error,
was actually a later model than earlier
Yak-7 and Yak-9 designs), was so good
that German fighter pilots were given
instructions to avoid combat with it.
During the Battle of Kursk in mid-1943,
Flag of the VVS
the VVS was still losing four aircraft for
every German plane shot down. By
1944 that ratio had narrowed to 1.5:1.
As for bombers, the VVS had some
good designs, like the fast Petlyakov Pe-2
and Tupolev Tu-2. It could also saturate
German ground defenses with its robust
and numerous Il-2 Sturmovik attack
bombers, of which 36,000 were pro-
duced during the war. By the summer of
1944, the overall VVS numerical advan-
tage over the Luftwaffe exceeded 6:1.
The VVS was used mainly as a tacti-
cal support arm of the Soviet ground
force. The air war on the eastern front
was carried out almost entirely at low
altitude, and usually within a few miles
on either side of the front. While the
VVS lacked a strategic capability, by
1944 it held air superiority over the
front, and was well suited to assist in the
titanic ground war going on beneath its
wings. The VVS had just one remaining
vulnerability in 1944: night air defense.
The Luftwaffe
The Luftwaffe had dominated the
sky during the war’s early years, but
those successes merely disguised
its weaknesses for a time. From the
beginning of the war to the end,
Germany produced fewer aircraft annu-
ally than did the Soviet Union. Britain
out-produced Germany in planes
every year until 1944, while aircraft
production in the US dwarfed that of
all other combatant nations. Fighting
the Soviets in the east, and the Western
Allies in the Mediterranean and later
over occupied Europe, the Luftwaffe
was spread ever thinner after 1942.
For a while the quality of German
aircraft designs and the expertise of
its crews and pilots compensated
for small numbers, especially on the
eastern front, but aircraft development
increasingly lagged. By 1944, Germany’s
Bf-109G and FW-190A fighters were
outclassed by the latest US, British, and
Soviet fighter designs. In the category
of bombers, the Allies had surpassed
the quality of German aircraft by
mid-war while building quantities
the Luftwaffe could never match. bulked out by a hapless mass of hastily
By the summer of 1944 the Luftwaffe trained rookies. At the same time, the
had in fact already lost the fight for fuel supply was so ravaged by Allied
its life over Germany, against massive bombing that training had to be
fighter-escorted raids by the USAAF. severely curtailed. Combat operations
Rapid production of new fighter planes were also increasingly constrained by
could replace material losses, but it the growing petroleum shortage.
didn’t compensate for a desperate On the eastern front a handful of
shortage of experienced pilots. The experienced Luftwaffe aces continued
fighter pilot strength that remained racking up good scores. For example,
included a tiny handful of veterans in late 1943 over 60 German east
(Experten), which was only somewhat front pilots each had more than 100
Soviet Night Air Defenses at Poltava
Long before the Poltava raid, USAAF officers had queried the Soviets
about their night defenses. In return they received vague assurances the
problem was taken care of. In truth, Soviet night defenses were weak.
The VVS operated two types of night fighter: Yak-9 single-engine fighters and
Petlyakov Pe-3 twin-engine fighters (the latter a derivative of the highly effective Pe-2
light bomber). Small in number, those night forces weren’t supported by the kind of control
system or the radars that had become standard in the RAF, the USAAF and the Luftwaffe.
On the night of 21−22 June, a single regiment (about 30 aircraft) of Soviet Yak-9s
attempted to stop the German bombers bearing on Poltava, but they made no intercep-
tions. With German bombers operating over the target for almost two hours, and doing
the same thing at Mirgorod the next night, their failure remains hard to explain.  ★
WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 39
kills. Even so, the Luftwaffe could
no longer offset the sheer weight
of Soviet numbers in the air.
Late in 1943, then, the Luftwaffe
sought, found, and concentrated on
the single remaining key weakness
in the VVS: its system of night air
defense remained rudimentary. The
Luftwaffe had prepared a bomber
force, Fliegerkorps IV, to conduct a
strategic bombing campaign to hurt the
Soviets on that basis. They wanted to
hit industrial targets, but its bombers’
short range hindered that prospect
as the front rolled west. Every Red
Army advance put more and more
industrial facilities out of range. Instead,
Fliegerkorps IV would pound rail targets
closer behind the front, hoping to
disrupt Soviet offensive preparations.
The Luftwaffe also had, by early
1944, a handful of new He-177 heavy
bombers that had the range to reach a
significant portion of Soviet industry.
With good performance and a decent
bomb load, the He-177s might’ve
done real damage to the Soviets, but
Hitler turned against the potential of
strategic night bombing in the east.
Instead, he diverted the He-177s, and
most of the Luftwaffe’s other modern
aircraft, like Me-410s and Do-217s,
to the “Baby Blitz” revenge offensive
He-177 A-02 production prototype
40 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011
against Britain in early 1944. That costly P-38 could at least stand up statistically
and fruitless campaign left Fliegerkorps to most versions of the German Bf-109
IV with the leftovers: several groups and FW-190, but it wasn’t their match
of He-111s and a handful of Ju-88s. in actual air combat situations.
Despite its outdated aircraft, The USAAF came to stand out
Fliegerkorps IV conducted Fall mainly for its bombers, some of which
Zaunkonig (Operation Wren), a success- were remarkably sturdy aircraft, with
ful night bombing effort in the spring of good performance, reliability, and
1944. During it the Germans used target armament. First among them was the
marking and illuminating techniques Boeing B-17, an aircraft that had been
copied from the RAF. By hitting flying since 1935. It had been designed
railways, especially marshalling yards for strategic bombing, with a high
and junctions, the Luftwaffe bottled service ceiling, respectable performance
up Soviet rail traffic in the area south and long range. Though its design was
of the Pripyet Marsh. Thanks to the as old as the less capable German He-
aforementioned minimal Soviet night 111 and the British Wellington, the B-17
defenses, German bomber losses were was in a class by itself for many years.
few. Yet in strategic terms it was too little Its power was supplemented by the top-
too late, and against the wrong targets. secret Norden bombsight, the world’s
The Soviets had successfully duped most advanced visual bomb-aiming
the Germans into expecting the main instrument, which allowed reasonably
summer offensive south of the Pripyet accurate level-bombing from high
Marsh, while they were actually massing altitudes. When the US prepared for
forces farther north, preparing for war in Europe, “daylight precision
Operation Bagration, a gigantic frontal bombing” was the mantra of its airmen.
attack against Army Group Center. Beginning in 1942 and continuing
The USAAF
The United States Army Air Force
(USAAF) had, by the summer of 1944,
multiplied faster from its prewar
strength than any other air service in
World War II. By June the USAAF had
10,200 aircraft in the European theater
alone. That was over six times the total
US military aircraft strength in 1938.
Nonetheless, at the war’s outbreak
in late 1941 the US had faced major
challenges in the realm of airpower.
Its gravest problem was an inadequate
stable of fighters. Early in the war many
US units were equipped with British
Spitfires in order to give them a chance
against the Germans. The US had begun
the war with small numbers of just one
competitive fighter, the P-38. Notable He-111
for its long range and versatility, the
through the autumn of 1943, growing
numbers of B-17s, supplemented by
even larger numbers of equally doughty
B-24s, conducted a daylight bombing
campaign over occupied Europe. P-47
and Spitfire fighters accompanied the
bombers as far into the continent as
range would permit, but to reach targets
deep in Germany the bombers had to
fly beyond the range of those escorts.
They did so by using tight “combat
box” formations to concentrate their
fire against increasingly competent
German fighters. It almost worked, for,
in addition to its good performance and
heavy armament, the B-17 was a robust
aircraft that could absorb tremendous
damage and still keep flying.
Precision bombing was, on occasion,
remarkably effective, and German war
industry began feeling the strain, but US
losses among the crew of the unescorted
bombers became too much to bear. For
example, in the second Schweinfurt raid
of 14 October 1943 the US lost 60 out of
291 bombers — just over 20 percent air-
craft losses, with 10 highly trained crew-
man also lost with each downed plane.
Other raids had similar results and, by
mid-October 1943, it was clear unes-
corted daylight bombing couldn’t be
sustained. A solution had to be found.
unwilling to flatly deny the American
request: he needed to keep US Lend-
Lease aid flowing. Thus, Stalin agreed
to shuttle bombing “in principle,”
while continuing to stonewall and
delay its actual implementation.
While the diplomatic haggling
continued so did the air war, and the
US began finding other solutions. Allied
landings in Italy opened up bases there
for a new strategic bomber command,
Fifteenth Air Force. Longer-range
escort fighters, and vastly increased
production of auxiliary fuel tanks
for them, also began helping. The
first P-51B Mustangs — a top-notch
air superiority fighter — made their
combat debut in December.
With the landing in France,
Operation Overlord, planned for the
late spring of 1944, the Western Allies
urgently needed to gain mastery of the
skies over Europe. To do that the USAAF
began Operation Argument, a series
of intensive bombing raids aimed at
aircraft factories and other targets vital
to the Luftwaffe, in late February 1944.
American losses were heavy, but with
the help of the new Italian bases and
long-range escort fighters, Argument
turned the tide against the Luftwaffe.
In retrospect, Operation Argument
can be seen to have tipped the
Luftwaffe into its final downward spiral;
however, the immediate magnitude of
that Allied victory was less clear in the
spring of 1944 than it is to historians
today. Arnold therefore continued
pressing for the use of Soviet bases.
Deal With the Devil
Stalin continued stonewalling. At
the same time, US officials knew he
was interested in acquiring his own
strategic bombing capability. Desperate
to get Operation Frantic underway,
the Americans therefore offered the
Soviets the Norden bombsight, along
with the essential autopilot navigation
P-51

Operation Frantic

One answer was to conduct shuttle

bombing: sending US bombers across
the Reich to land them at Soviet airfields
beyond the eastern front. With US
bombers shuttling from both east and
west, the Luftwaffe would in theory
have to disperse its defense by spread-
ing radars, flak batteries and fighter
squadrons ever more widely. Shuttle
bombing would also make bombing
missions harder for the Germans to
predict, since US bombers would no
longer automatically fly a reciprocal
course back to bases in England.
US officials had actually broached
the shuttle bombing idea to the
Soviets earlier in the war, but with no
result. In October 1943, Gen. Henry
“Hap” Arnold, commander of the
USAAF, presented an ambitious new
proposal for shuttle bombing to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington.
They approved the project, which
would be called “Operation Frantic.”
The Americans naively discounted
the one factor without which the
new plan couldn’t work: full Soviet
cooperation. Stalin wasn’t eager to
have US bombers operating on his
soil. At the same time, though, he was

WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 41

equipment that accompanied it, if they
would finally ink the shuttle bombing
agreement. (The US hadn’t even given
the British access to that technology.)
In the spring of 1944, then, Arnold
traded away some of the USAAF’s
most cherished technology in order
to gain increasingly irrelevant Soviet
bases, thereby providing incalculable
aid to grow the air war capabilities of
America’s future Cold War enemy.
Even with that Soviet approval,
setting up bases proved difficult. The
Soviet police state’s level of paranoia
defied American comprehension.
Every USAAF airman, mechanic and
clerk was viewed by the Reds as a
potential spy. US officials requested
the right to send 2,100 men as the
bare minimum necessary to operate
the shuttle bomber bases. The Soviets
refused to allow more than 1,200. The
US requested six bases for 360 heavy
bombers, with locations at both the

Operation FRANTIC: Badly damaged B-17 bomber and Russian soldiers. Poltava, Russia 22 June 1944

USAAF-Civilian Relations in the Ukraine

When USAAF aircrew arrived in the Ukraine, they found little to like.
Conditions were primitive. They had to live in clothes worn during their flight
across the Reich, plus whatever small stash they’d carried along in duffel
bags. The young airmen were delighted, though, when pretty Ukrainian girls
greeted them with questions like: “Say, would you like to f***?” and served them
in the mess line by asking: “Would you like a g*******d cup of coffee?”
The girls had been taught a few phrases of scatological English by US ground crew-
men who’d been sent to the Ukraine earlier in order to get the airbases operational.
When the girls greeted higher-ranking USAAF officers the same way, those brass
hats weren’t amused. They confronted Soviet officers, who in turn understandably
took offense at the way US personnel had exploited the young women’s ignorance.
The money, resourcefulness and cocky arrogance of USAAF personnel contrasted
sharply with the poverty and fear of Ukrainian civilians under Soviet domination.
Fraternization was discouraged, but bored and lonely airmen made contact with
local civilians anyway. By late summer it was hard to find civilians living near the
bases who weren’t wearing USAAF clothing items, which had been gained by trading
food, trinkets and sex. Some of Stalin’s distaste for the US bases stemmed from his
fear of what would happen when airmen from the foremost capitalist democracy
came face-to-face with the impoverished civilians of his police state.  ★

42 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011

northern and southern ends of the
front. The Soviets responded by allowing
just three bases at the south-center
of the front, suitable for about 160
bombers. Marshal Alexander Novikov,
overall head of the VVS, seemed to
want to help, but he was constrained
by needing to get Stalin’s personal
approval of even the smallest details.
The three fields Novikov granted the
USAAF were just east of Kiev and the
Dnepr River. He explained that using
only southerly bases would mean they
would dry up sooner from the spring
thaw, allowing more time to get them
ready for the heavy bombers. The B-17s
required a mile-long runway; so existing
Soviet fields would have to be extended
and fitted with steel decking. The
bombers would operate from Mirgorod
and Poltava, with the latter serving as
the primary base and headquarters for
the overall shuttle-bombing program.
US fighters would use a base farther
west at Piryatin, closer to the front
and a shorter flying distance from
US bases in Britain and Italy.
The first shuttle-bombing mission,
codenamed “Frantic Joe,” was flown
on 2 June 1944 from Fifteenth Air
Force bases in Italy. It was a success,
with the bombers hitting the railway
yard at Debrecen, Hungary. One B-17
was lost to flak; the rest made safe
landings at Poltava, Mirgorod and
Piryatin. The crews were greeted by
news correspondents and cameramen
from the US and the Soviet Union.
News of the successful mission was fed
into Allied propaganda broadcasts.
The bombers and fighters then
flew a mission from the Soviet airfields
against a German airbase in Romania.
On 11 June they struck another
Romanian airfield, then returned to
their bases in Italy. There was just
one loss, but it proved critical: the
B-17 brought down by German flak
contained the entire photographic
record of Operation Frantic Joe. German
intelligence found the images intact
among the plane’s wreckage, and was
soon analyzing detailed information
about the operation and its Soviet bases.
Frantic II
On 21 June 1944 it was the turn of
Eighth Air Force, based in Britain, to do
a shuttle-bombing mission. That time
Berlin was hit in a massive raid by 20
wings of heavy bombers and 23 fighter
groups, 2,500 planes in all. Of them,
six bomber and two fighter groups
(163 B-17s and 70 P-51s) shuttled east
to the Soviet Union. The trip from limits of their range as they struggled
Britain to Poltava was 1,441 nautical to reach Piryatin. Col. Old had to
miles, virtually the range limit for the let his fighters land. Unmolested,
B-17s. Similarly, the P-51s would have the German plane then shadowed
nearly dry tanks when they reached the B-17s all rest of the way to the
Piryatin, about 150 miles closer. Russian front before turning back.
German air defenses fought hard, Americans and Soviets waiting
bringing down 44 bombers as they hit at Poltava that afternoon saw an
aircraft engine factories and railroad impressive spectacle, as 76 silver B-17s
marshalling yards; however, the landed, one by one, after their flight
shuttle bombers, under Col. Archibald across the Reich. There were blast-proof
Old, Jr., faced only mild opposition revetments for just three bombers; so
when they bombed a synthetic oil the remaining aircraft were spread out
facility south of Berlin. A few German in an unsheltered arc west of the field.
fighters were scrambled over Poland, The bombers landing at Mirgorod, and
but the P-51s fought them off, losing the fighters at Piryatin, were equally
only a single one of their number. exposed. Around sunset the Americans
Just after the US planes passed at Poltava witnessed the thin, white
Warsaw, a single German plane, contrail of a plane high above the
probably a Bf-109, was sighted keep- field, followed by a few scattered
ing pace with the group. When the bursts of flak. The plane, a high-flying
Mustangs attempted to engage, the reconnaissance He-177, passed directly
lone fighter would duck below the over the base at Poltava, then turned
clouds only to reappear later. The P-51s slowly back west. The pilot had his
were running low on gas, pushing the photographs for Luftwaffe intelligence.
Lingering Questions
German records show the Luftwaffe began shifting aircraft east to forward bases
early on the morning of 21 June 1944, in preparation for the raid on Poltava that
evening. There is nothing surprising about that, except those German movements
occurred before the first US bomber had taken off from its English bases. There
are other mysteries, too. Immediately after the raid, the P-51 pilots at Piryatin
pleaded with the Soviets for permission to take off and pursue the slow German
bombers, which were still withdrawing over Soviet air space at first light on 22
June. To the Americans’ fury, their request was denied. There was also the puzzling
Soviet inability to intercept any Luftwaffe bombers on two consecutive nights.
What happened at Poltava, at least the conclusion offered by some historians, is the
German raid succeeded through a combination of Soviet and American over-confidence
and neglect, abetted by astute enemy intelligence work and a quick Luftwaffe response.
Yet there’s another possible answer that lies in the cloak-and-dagger realm of espionage.
While the Western Allies excelled at signals intelligence, the Soviets were
masters of human intelligence. They managed to penetrate the Abwehr, the
German intelligence service, with a number of effective double agents. It’s known
that Operation Bagration, the Soviet offensive against Army Group Center during
the summer of 1944, was one of the Soviets’ greatest intelligence successes of
the war. Their double agent network helped convince the German high command
that Soviet attack would erupt in the vicinity of Lwow, south of the Pripyet Marsh.
The Germans therefore thinned Army Group Center to better resist the expected
push from the south. In reality, Soviet forces were massing north of the marsh.
The Ukrainian bases at Poltava and Mirgorod lay south of the Pripyet, a few
miles behind the area where the Germans assumed Soviet forces were massing. The
Soviets had every incentive to keep German attention diverted southward. It’s therefore
certainly possible Stalin used his counter-espionage network to tip off the Germans.
We may never know the full story. Sixty-seven years after the Poltava raid,
such a revelation would still shock international sensibilities. Yet the circumstantial
evidence and timing remain intriguing. The wreckage of 47 destroyed B-17s at
Poltava was still smoking on the morning of 22 June 1944, when Soviet tanks and
soldiers began advancing into German lines to launch Operation Bagration. Aided
by a successful deception, of which the Poltava raid may well have been part, that
huge and devastating offensive would doom the Wehrmacht in the east.  ★
WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 43
Poltava Target Practice burst over Poltava airfield. Looking down of dirt, ordering the Americans to stay
onto the suddenly brightened ground, away for their own safety. Several Soviets
It was still light at 8:45 p.m. that the He-111 bombardiers saw one of were killed or injured when the fuel tanks
evening when German crews of KG-4, the richest targets imaginable: 76 B-17s of stricken B-17s exploded. The Soviets
27, 53 and 55, based around Minsk got and a handful other aircraft, completely also began clearing the mines in their
orders to prepare for action. At 9:00 p.m. unprotected. The lack of revetments (or brave and fatalistic way, searching for
colored signal flares launched the He-111 “blast pens”) meant direct hits weren’t them visually without electric detection
and Ju-88 bombers on their mission. necessary. Flying splinters from bombs equipment. When a mine was found,
Bf-109 and Fw-190 fighters joined and damaged B-17s would spread the the crews would flatten themselves
them as they headed east into the long destruction. From 4,000 meters — about against the ground while one man
midsummer twilight. There was some 13,000 feet — the He-111s steadily detonated the weapon with a long stick.
flak as they passed over the front, and unloaded 110 tons of bombs. The bombs
KG-55 was intercepted by Yak fighters. rained down until 1:45 a.m. — an hour Results
Bf-109 escorts fired back, blasting one and 15 minutes — with no defensive
Yak into a ball of flame in the gathering response beyond some scattered flak. The raid on Poltava ranks as one of
dark. The German escort fighters soon Twice He-111s were “coned” by Soviet the most one-sided actions of the war,
reached their range limit and turned searchlights; yet they continued to bomb more akin to German successes that
back. The He-111s were supposed to and remained unhit. A few minutes after characterized its start than the two-sided
attack the B-17 base at Mirgorod, but the bombing had stopped, a handful of attrition common by mid-war. Though
German pathfinder aircraft couldn’t Ju-88s came over at lower altitude, straf- the German bombers operated for
find it; so they were diverted to join ing the field and dropping antipersonnel nearly two hours over the target, Soviet
the attack bound for Poltava. bombs and mines. Finally, at 2:20 a.m., night fighters failed to intercept. Not
At 11:55 p.m. the Americans and the bombing stopped. There was a bright a single German bomber was lost.
Soviets at Poltava were alerted that flash high in the sky. Veterans on the While Allied casualties were light,
German aircraft had crossed the front, ground recognized it as a magnesium the aircraft losses were comparable to
bearing toward Poltava. Soviet officials flash bomb, used by the Germans to some of the USAAF’s most costly raids
reassured the Americans such warnings illuminate a target for a final post-strike of the war, without any compensating
were common, but German bombers damage-assessment photograph. damage to the enemy. A total of 47 B-17s
never came all that way east. When air As they climbed out of the trenches were destroyed — nearly two-thirds of
raid alarms sounded, a few crewmen to view the damage, American crewmen the Poltava-based force. The Germans
ran to nearby slit trenches. Others, could see from the bright light of burning also destroyed two C-47s and one F-5
accustomed to nuisance raids in the B-17s that the area was covered with but- reconnaissance plane. Eleven more B-17s
British Isles, paid little attention. terfly mines. Soviet ground crews began were severely damaged while eight
At 30 minutes past midnight a flare trying to douse the flames with shovels others were moderately damaged. The
had also destroyed or damaged trucks,
trailers and cranes, a serious blow
A Riddle Wrapped in a Mystery Inside an Enigma because that vital equipment had been
shunted through the twin-gauntlets of
Churchill once described the actions of Soviet Russia as the Murmansk convoys and Soviet foot
“a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” Certainly, for American dragging. It couldn’t be easily replaced.
diplomats and USAAF officers and men, the Soviets’ obstructive behavior Even more serious was the loss of a
surrounding the shuttle-bombing program fit Churchill’s description. carefully built-up stock of 200,000 gallons
The USAAF was eager to use Operation Frantic as a starting-point in of aviation fuel. The American planes
acquiring Siberian bases for bombing Japan once Germany was defeated. depended on that high-grade 100-octane
President Roosevelt felt building closer working ties during the war would also fuel, which the Soviets lacked. The night
encourage US-Soviet cooperation in the postwar world. In reality, though, there after the Poltava raid the Germans
were vast differences between US and Soviet political, social and economic struck the other B-17 base at Mirgorod.
systems that made cooperation problematic at best, even in the short run. The US bombers there had meanwhile
Like the Americans, Stalin was looking beyond the war’s conclusion, but with different dispersed to other Soviet fields, but
motives. The targets the USAAF wanted to bomb, in Latvia and Poland, were inside the Germans still torched another
the sphere of influence he intended to maintain after the war. The Soviets were also 197,000 gallons of 100-octane fuel.
particularly sensitive about aerial reconnaissance: US requests for recon bases at the Thus the Poltava raid dealt a fatal
front’s northern and southern ends were flatly refused. US recon planes were regularly blow to Operation Frantic. US strate-
fired on by Soviet flak, and one unarmed F-5 recon plane involved in Operation Frantic gists at first hoped the Soviets would
was shot down by Soviet fighters (which were, ironically, American-built Airacobras). be apologetic after the disaster, and
The final straw for US-Soviet aerial cooperation came shortly after the Poltava hence become more helpful. That
disaster, when the Soviets obstructed USAAF efforts to help the Polish underground during notion proved as guileless as previous
its desperate Warsaw uprising. By the time the USAAF got grudging Soviet approval to use American thinking about the Soviets.
its Ukrainian bases to drop supplies on 18 September 1944, it was too late to do any good. When the USAAF requested the right
By then the Americans were beginning to belatedly understand Stalin was to base a night fighter squadron on the
threatened by US airbases on his soil, and he certainly didn’t want US reconnaissance eastern front, the Soviets refused.
planes mapping his territory. From our perspective today, what stands out, then, isn’t Unwilling to put large numbers of
Soviet cynicism but American naiveté. Stalin’s outlook was a crude power calculus bombers at risk, the USAAF only carried
with little regard for human life or liberty, but it was really no riddle even then.  ★ out a handful of other missions from the
Ukraine. One of them was Frantic III,

44 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011

a successful sweep by P-38s and P-51s
from the Fifteenth Air Force in Italy, which
landed in the Soviet Union in early July.
They operated from the eastern front
briefly, bombing and strafing airfields
and railroads, then returned to Italy.
As the eastern and western fronts
drew closer, the need for shuttle bombing
diminished. By October 1944 only about
200 US personnel were left in the Soviet
Union. Missions were shut down entirely
for the winter and were never resumed.
Perspective
Gen. Arnold’s shuttle bombing project
looked like an idea worth trying in mid-
1943, when US strategic bombing had
hit a wall and no other solution seemed
available. In historical perspective, it’s
obvious the advent of long-range escort
fighters would solve the problem, but
that wasn’t clear at the time. The ultimate
US failure was an inability to accurately
perceive Stalin’s aims, a mistake that lies
as much with the Roosevelt administra-
tion as the US military command.
Operation Frantic was ultimately a
matter of little importance. The USAAF
defeat at Poltava scarcely affected the
larger strategic picture. The 47 US
bombers lost represented barely over one
percent of the USAAF’s B-17 inventory
that summer. Equally, eastern front
shuttle bombing never compelled the
Luftwaffe to alter the dispositions of its
fighters, radar or flak units. Putting an
end to Operation Frantic benefited the
Luftwaffe, but not much. The Poltava
raid’s historical importance, then, lies
not in how it affected the course of World
War II but rather in how it foreshadowed
the coming of the Cold War.  ✪
SOURCES
Luftwaffe Bomber Development
When the Heinkel 111 first flew in 1935, its maximum speed of 250 mph ranked
it among the fastest combat aircraft in the world. Even so, just five years later, during
the Battle of Britain in August and September 1940, the He-111 proved too slow to
evade Britain’s Hurricane and Spitfire fighters and too poorly armed to fend them
off. The He-111 was thereafter relegated mainly to night bombing missions.
Despite its vulnerabilities, Germany continued building the 111 until late 1944.
That was due to the fact it could be produced cheaply and was mechanically reliable.
More to the point, the Luftwaffe had failed to produce anything better. Germany’s
efforts to produce a long-range high-altitude bomber with a large carrying capacity were
centered on the Heinkel-177, a plane that first flew in 1939 but that wasn’t ready for
combat until late 1942. Even then production was slow because the 177 was plagued
by mechanical problems. Its design was overly ambitious, attempting to satisfy too
many demands at once. (Hitler slowed things up by maintaining for a while that it had
to have the capacity to dive-bomb.) The biggest problem was the powerful but troubled
DB 606 engine, which paired two conventional engines in the same nacelle. That
reduced drag, but the DB 606 engines were hard to service and caught fire easily.
While performance was good, the He-177 suffered a high accident rate, and poor
reliability kept its sortie rate low. The few in service in the summer of 1944 were
mostly in the west, where they flew in the “Baby Blitz” revenge offensive against
Britain, with minimal success against increasingly sophisticated RAF night defenses.
When the Luftwaffe looked for bombers it could use against the shuttle bombing
bases in the Ukraine, the He-111s of Fliegerkorps IV were the best it could do. With
no opposition, however, those obsolete bombers had a field day over Poltava.
The fact the He-111 was still the backbone of Luftwaffe bomber force on
the eastern front at that late date also explains another aspect of Germany’s
declining aerial fortunes. The German aircraft industry had imaginative thinkers
and competent designs, but short-term planning, unrealistic expectations and
petty infighting stunted and mutated the development of badly needed new aircraft
types. Ironically, shortly after Poltava, KG-1 began successfully using He-177s on
the eastern front. It was too late, however; the growing lack of fuel soon grounded
the mighty bombers and they ended by being cut up for scrap metal.  ★
left
He-111 in the preliminary
stage of wing installation
below
He-111 production in 1939

Astor, Gerald. The Mighty Eighth: The Air War in Europe as

Told by the Men Who Fought It.
Donald I. Fine Books, 1997.
Boost, Horg. “German Air Intelligence in World War II,”
Aerospace Historian, June 1986.
Bergstrom, Christer. Bagration to Berlin: The Final Air Battles
in the East, 1944−1945. Ian Allan Publishing, 2008.
Conversino, Mark J. Fighting With the Soviets:
The Failure of Operation Frantic 1944−1945.
University Press of Kansas, 1997.
Craven, Wesley & James Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in
World War II, Volume Three: Europe: Argument to V-E
Day January 1944 to May 1945.
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951.
Dressel, Joachim & Manfred Greihl. Bombers of the
Luftwaffe. Arms and Armor Press, 1994.
Herwig, Dieter &Heinz Rode. Luftwaffe Secret Projects:
Strategic Bombers 1939−1945. Midland Publishing, 2000.
Infield, Glenn B. The Poltava Affair: A Russian Warning:
An American Tragedy. Macmillan, 1973.
Leshuk, Leonard. US Intelligence Perceptions of Soviet
Power 1921−1946. Frank Cass Pubs., 2003.
Lukas, Richard. Eagles East: The Army Air Forces
and the Soviet Union 1941−1945.
Florida State Univ., Press, 1970.
Stephan, Robert. Stalin’s Secret War: Soviet
Counterintelligence Against the Nazis, 1941−1945.
Univ. Press of Kansas, 2004.

WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 45

The Conquerors
The Macedonians
Alexander in Persia, 334−331 BC
In the Spring of 334 B.C., young king
Alexander of Macedon with an army
40,000 strong, set out to fulfill the
centuries old dream of his countrymen
by launching the invasion of the Persian
Empire, the largest and most powerful
empire in the Mediterranean world.
The Romans
Mediterranean Expansion, 200−189 BC
A century and a half later, the Roman
Republic was just emerging from its 2nd
and most debilitating conflict with the
Mediterranean trading power — Carthage.
Philip V was on the throne of Macedon,
and his interventions in Greek politics
would soon draw Rome’s response
and eventual advance to become an
Eastern Mediterranean power.
Even after several years of conflict with
Philip, Rome would not rest. Rome found
herself again involved in an immense con-
flict — this time in Asia. The great Seleucid
King, Antiochus, threatened the very exis-
tence of Rome’s two key allies — Rhodes
and Pergamum — and threatened to
march into Europe itself on a mission of
conquest. Thus began the Syrian War.
46 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011
The Conquerors is a double game
that covers both of these theatres of
conquest at a grand strategic level.
Each game in this Twin-Pack has its
own counters, rules and game map.
However, the rules of both games are
based upon the same system so that
having played one it is quite simple
to play the other. Also introduced is
an optional Tactical Battle System.
Game components include:
Two large rules books; two large
playing maps, 1,200 die-cut counters;
plus numerous player aids.
Battle for Stalingrad
In the autumn of 1942, 14 German
divisions of the Sixth Army and Fourth
Panzer Army were poised to attack
the vital city of Stalingrad. Facing the
German forces were dozens of divi-
sions and brigades of the Soviet 62nd
army. For seven weeks the Germans
would hammer at the city in a seesaw
conflict for control of the Volga River.
Battle for Stalingrad simulates the cam-
paign that would halt the German drive to
the east in the Soviet Union. The playing
map represents the terrain in and around
Stalingrad, and the colorful cardboard
playing pieces reflect the sizes and
strengths of the opposing military units.
Battle for Stalingrad is a classic game
design by noted game designer John Hill.
Game components include:
Two rule booklets (standard and optional),
600 die cut cardboard playing pieces, one
22 x 34 inch map and various player aids.

A Mighty Fortress
Between 1531 and 1555 the world
shook to the reverberations of a
struggle whose resolution was to
chart the course of Europe’s religious
and political alliances for centuries. It
was in these years that the conflicting
ideologies of Lutheran Reformation
and Catholic Counter-Reformation
inexorably drew the disparate empires,
nations, and leaders of Europe into a
maelstrom of religious war and dispute.
A Mighty Fortress simulates this major
historical conflict on a beautifully illustrat-
ed political map of Europe. Colorful card-
board playing pieces move, position. And
engage in battle upon this map through
a superimposed hexagonal grid, which
functions like a chessboard’s squares.
Game components include:
One rules booklet, 200 die cut
playing pieces, one 22 x 34 inch
map and various player aids.
Classic
History
Classic
Games
Ancient Conquest
Ancient Conquest is a classic and highly
rated multiplayer game covering at a
grand strategic level the rise and fall of
empires and peoples in the ancient near
east. Ancient Assyria, Egypt, Babylon
and the Hittites are all included, as
well as numerous other powers.
Historically, a highly accurate game,
while yet designed with elegantly
simple game mechanics; Ancient
Conquest is sure to be a favorite. A
must for any game enthusiast.
Game components include:
Full color rule booklet, one map and 200
die cut counters and numerous charts.
available from:
Decision Games
(661) 587-9633 | (661) 587-5031 fax
P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield CA 93390
decisiongames.com
WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 47
Observation
Game PreviewPost
THE SOUTH SEAS
CAMPAIGN
T
he South Seas Campaign,
1942−43 (SSC), designed by
Joseph Miranda, is a two player,
strategic-level wargame of intermediate
complexity that covers the struggle for
control of the naval, air and land lines
of communication between Australia
and the US during those two years. Most
ground units in the game represent
divisions, brigades or regiments. Aircraft
units represent two groups or air
regiments (six to eight squadrons). Ship
units mostly represent one fleet aircraft
carrier, “divisions” of two light or escort
carriers, two battleships, four cruisers,
squadrons of six to eight destroyers (plus
48 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011
Japanese light cruiser destroyer leaders),
and various numbers of other ship WaW UPCOMING
types. On the area map, each inch equals FEATURES
90 miles. Each turn represents from two
weeks to two months, depending on #
18: South Seas Campaign
the tempo of action at any given time.
Special rules cover such things
#
19: Hardest Days
as: random events, reinforcements, #
20: Gross Deutschland
withdrawals, refits, fog of war, off-map
bases, interceptions, invading Australia,
#
21: Rhineland 36
long-range bombers, protected targets, #
22: Minsk 1944
shore bombardment, commandos,
airborne units, seaplanes, and the Tokyo
Visit STRATEGYandTACTICSpress.com
Express. The game uses the system
for previews of these issues.
originally created for our earlier-pub-
lished game, Red Dragon Rising.   ★
A FAST & EASY PLAYING SERIES OF CARD GAMES
WAR ON TERROR — Fight the war on terror with America’s cutting edge weapon systems! You have been
charged with hunting down terrorists aiding regions around the world and toppling their corrupt governments. To accomplish
this, you have been given command of the latest weapons and best personnel America has to offer. You get to command
elements of the Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines, Special Forces and Propaganda Warfare. War on Terror is an ultra-low
complexity card game for all ages. The focus is on fast card play, strategy, and fun interactive game play for 2-4 players.

D-DAY — June 6, 1944, the day that decided the fate of World War II in Europe. Now you command the Allied and
Axis armies as each struggles to control the five key beaches along the Normandy coastline. If the Allied troops seize the
beaches, Germany is doomed. But if the assault fails, Germany will have the time it needs to build its ultimate weapons.
You get to make vital command decisions that send troops into battle, assault enemy positions, and create heroic sacrifices
so others can advance to victory!

MIDWAY — From June 4th to June 6 th of 1942, a massive battle raged around the tiny Pacific island of Midway that
changed the course of World War II. The victorious Imperial Japanese Navy was poised to capture the airfield on the island
of Midway and thus threaten Hawaii and the United States. The only obstacle in their path was an outnumbered US fleet
itching for payback for Pearl Harbor. You get to command the US and Japanese fleets and their squadrons of fighter planes,
torpedo bombers and dive bombers in this epic battle!

NORTH AFRICA — Covering the great battles of Erwin Rommel from 1941 to 1943, as he fought his way back
and forth across the deserts of North Africa. LNA uses cards to represent the military units, supply convoys and objectives
of the historic campaign. To win, you must consider your units’ combat power and maneuver options as well as their supply
situation. The game features: the Afrika Korps, Tobruk, the Desert Rats, Malta, anti-tank guns, resupply from Europe,
minefields and more. LNA is based around a new combat system that makes maneuver and planning as important as brute
force. That approach is faithful to the historic events, in which smaller forces were often able to defeat and rout larger ones by
using better tactics and planning. In LNA, battles can be won not only by overwhelming the enemy with firepower, but also by
out-thinking and bluffing him. The dynamic game system puts you in charge of one of the most famous theaters of WWII.

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QTY. Lightning North Africa $19.99 ITEM TOTAL

QTY. Lightning War on Terror $19.99 ITEM TOTAL

QTY. Lightning Midway $19.99 ITEM TOTAL

QTY. Lightning D-Day $19.99 ITEM TOTAL

QTY. Special Price! All 4 games $60.00 ITEM TOTAL

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$ $

P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598 | (661) 587-9633 phone | (661) 587-5031 fax | decisiongames.com

WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 49

Observation Post
HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
Flight as Propaganda
in Fascist Italy
T
he Fascist Italian leaders in
the 1920s and 30s wanted their
nation to be seen as a modern
industrial power deserving prestige
rivaling that of any other nation. One
way in which Mussolini attempted
to create that image was through the
use of airplanes, then still a relatively
new invention just beginning to see
use in everyday life. By making and
flying planes that set new standards,
Italy could appear modern without
having to spend too much money or
tie up too much of its industry and,
with the help of Aviation Minister
Italo Balbo, that was accomplished.
Through the use of large formation
flights across great distances, record-
setting flights by prototype aircraft,
and the swagger of Balbo himself,
Fascist Italy enhanced its image
through propagandistic aviation.
Bablo wasn’t working from a clean
slate: Italy had a strong history of
aviation despite its lack of industrial
power. The Italo-Turkish War of 1911
had seen the first-ever use of airplanes
in war as Italy conquered Libya.
Mussolini had a keen interest in
aviation starting in his youth, and he
wanted Fascism and flight to be as
linked as closely as possible in the
popular culture of the world. That
outlook was furthered by popular writ-
ings of the Italian futurist school, which
was made up of writers and artists
devoted to the romance of industrial
progress and machines. Leading futurist
Filippo Tommaso Marinetti had penned
“Manifesto Aeropoesia” in 1931, which
codified poetry devoted to airplanes
and flight, and that went along with
the already existing aerially themed
futurist music and painting. In the
theater, Giannina Censi performed
aerodanze (aerial dances), which sought
to model aeronautic experience in
50 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011
that medium. Italian designs won the
Schneider Trophy, a highly publicized
international seaplane race, three of
the 11 times it was held. Founding
airpower theorist Giulio Douhet
hailed from Italy, which cemented the
country’s reputation as having a military
obsessed with flight and developing
its myriad uses in military matters.
Balbo, though, above all others,
promoted the use of aviation for
propaganda. As Minister of Aviation
from 1929 to 1933, he personally led
two trans-Atlantic flights of flying
boats. Those flights created excitement
everywhere they landed. When he
landed in Chicago, for instance, a
column was dedicated in his honor,
and even today Balbo Avenue still
runs through the city. The flight also
earned him the Distinguished Flying
Cross, given directly from the hand of
President Roosevelt. The Sioux Indians
made him an honorary chief, naming
him “Flying Eagle.” In slang English, the
word “Balbo” for a time came to mean
any large formation of airplanes, and
the Marx Brothers even parodied him in
their film A Night at the Opera. Balbo’s
seaplane flights set a number of long-
distance speed records that stood for
decades. In fact, between 1927 and 1939,
Italian planes set 110 aviation records.
The Regia Aeronautica (Royal
Italian Air Force) was one of the first
independent air services in the world
and, at least on paper, it was one
of the dominant air forces among
those of all the great powers in the
late 1920s and early 1930s. During
that period, Italy could claim to have
the second-largest air force in the
world, behind only that of France.
Even after Balbo moved on from
his aviation post to become colonial
governor of Libya, the Aeronautica
continued to make technological
advancements. Most interestingly, in
1940 the RA claimed to have flown the
first jet aircraft, the Caproni Campini
N.1. Though the aircraft was underpow-
ered, the achievement was publicized
at the time as yet another first in world
aviation. (It would later become known
Germany had flown a jet aircraft a
year prior to Italy without making the
event public.) The Fascist regime had
been so focused on achieving another
propaganda coup, as opposed to
actual military development, they’d
rushed ahead with an underpowered
and impractical jet simply to be first,
making their progress public while the
other great powers secretly developed
their own deadlier machines.
Despite all that seemingly quantifi-
able success, then, the Italian Air Force
still found itself outclassed in actual
warfare when it eventually came in
1940. The RA then still fielded many
squadrons of obsolete biplanes. More
disastrously, Italy had failed to develop
torpedo planes, carrier-based aircraft (or
carriers for that matter), as well as dive-
bombers. Their air force was also woe-
fully short of strategic bombers, despite
having been Douhet’s homeland.
Many historians have in fact
blamed the Aeronautica’s wartime
failure on the pre-war concentration
on aviation as propaganda. Even
contemporaries of Balbo shared that
view. The Aeronautica’s Chief of Staff
Francesco De Pinedo went to Mussolini
with his condemnation of Balbo’s
spending. Even Luigi Federzoni, a
leading Fascist politician and friend of
Balbo, charged that the Aeronautica
was too superficial and too focused
on technical development without
actually making those developments
feasible. Ironically, Balbo himself at first
criticized the air force when he took over
there in 1925, saying: “Our Aeronautica
was nothing more than an office for
propaganda…now it is necessary to
begin building military aviation and its
weaponry has not even been studied.”
Though he certainly made the
Aeronautica more war-ready than
it had been in 1925, his legacy was
undoubtedly more aligned with
propaganda than practical military
engineering or development. At the
same time, it may have been that
Italy’s industrial capacity was simply
unable to sustain a modern air force
regardless of how it was led. Though
in the 1920s Douhet had proposed
victory through air power as a cheap
alternative relative to other military
strategies, and therefore one his native
country could and should support, by
1939 that was really no longer the case.
Italy’s dominance in the air fell
apart as soon as the other great powers
mobilized. Between 1940 and 1943, Italy
produced 10,000 total aircraft, while in
the same period the United Kingdom
produced twice as many Spitfires alone.
Though Italy had brilliant aircraft
designers, the country’s raw material
base could not support high production
levels, and the country’s domestic
market wasn’t large enough to support
the industry. Italian researchers had
attempted to make the country energy
self-sufficient by developing tar as a
source of fuel, but the experiment was
unsuccessful. Other important raw
materials were unavailable domestically,
and Fascist laws against buying them
abroad further starved industry.
Even engine design plagued
Italy, as the same companies that
designed record-setting engines for
individual planes and prototypes failed
to develop mass-producible models
for wartime fighters and bombers.
Thus Italian warplanes were forced
to either use underpowered Italian
or imported German engines.
Balbo himself had no faith Italy
could win any upcoming war, and he
disagreed with Mussolini’s decision to
join an alliance with Germany. He didn’t
consider any branch of Italy’s military
to be ready for modern combat, and
he remarked in a letter to Mussolini’s
mistress (and biographer) that he could
write an article for her titled: “How we
are getting ready to lose the future war.”
The Italian use of aviation for
propaganda was thus not the major
cause of their air force’s weak showing in
World War II. The propaganda, whether
it was truly useful in popularizing
Fascism throughout the world, at least
left a colorful legacy that was only
somewhat tainted by the totalitarianism
behind it. Italo Balbo and the Regia
Aeronautica can still be viewed as
having been important pioneers during
aviation’s golden age, helping to popu-
larize flight at a time when its future
everyday use still wasn’t a certainty.
 — Nathaniel Edwards
Italo Balbo
WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 51
MOVERS & SHAKERS
A Tough & Smart Enemy
As World War II fades from living
memory, a misleading narrative about
the Allied victory in the Pacific still
displays staying power in the public
consciousness. Instead of seeing impe-
rial Japan as a country that obeyed
different cultural imperatives while
borrowing from models like the Prussian
Army and the British naval tradition,
that popular narrative paints the
Japanese, particularly their military, as
backward but with the ignorant audac-
ity to attack more advanced societies.
Like many false narratives, it contains
elements of truth: the sheer size of
the US, UK and Soviet economies did
eventually translate into overwhelming
material and technological superiority.
The deeper truth, however, is differ-
ent and more complex. For example, an
examination of their foreign language
skills and travel abroad casts illumina-
tion on the quality of those running the
Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. It
was precisely because many Japanese
officers did understand their opponents’
strengths and weaknesses, through such
study and travel, that many displayed a
high level of pragmatism and flexibility.
Gen. Masaharu Homma, command-
er of Japanese Fourteenth Army, which
conquered the Philippines, spoke fluent
English. While serving with the British
Army in France in 1918, he’d earned
a decoration for bravery. When the
discredited Homma stepped down (for
having been too lenient in his occupa-
tion policies in the Philippines), his suc-
cessor was Gen. Shijuichi Tanaka, former
commander of the entire Kempeitai.
Tanaka spoke English and Spanish,
learned during seven years spent in
London, Mexico City and Washington as
military attaché. When Tanaka returned
to Tokyo in May 1943, his successor
was Gen. Shigenari Kuroda, a man
fluent in English after having spent
five years in Britain and New Delhi.
Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita, who
Observation Post
led the army that captured Singapore,
didn’t speak English, but he’d served
as a military attaché in Switzerland.
Col. Masanobu Tsuji, his chief opera-
tions planner, had a nickname as the
“god of operations.” He managed to
elude war crimes investigators by
hiding in Southeast Asia, and was later
elected to the Japanese Parliament
before finally vanishing back into
Southeast Asia in the early 1960s.
Col. Kunio Nakagawa, who organized
the defense at Peleliu, was another
interesting case. He was one of the few
officers in the IJA well studied in the
use of armored forces. He was informed
enough on that matter to realize the
need for a shift in overall tactical
doctrine, preserving a large portion
of his force from the cauldron of the
landing beaches, and instead defending
strong positions in the interior on high
ground. When Maj. Gen. Kenjiro Murai
was sent to command the island, he and
Nakagawa worked effectively together
as a team. As a result, the US 1st Marine
Division was effectively rendered hors
de combat in capturing the island.
Gen. Tadamichi Kuribayashi,
commander on Iwo Jima and better
known now because of Clint Eastwood’s
film Letters from Iwo Jima, was also
fluent in English. He used many of the
same tactics as Nakagawa. In addition
to stints at embassies in Canada
and Washington, he’d also traveled
extensively in the United States.
Col. Hiromichi Yahara, the operations
planner for Thirty-Second Army, which
defended Okinawa so tenaciously, spent
two years (1933−35) in the US in Boston
and Washington, including six months
with the US 8th Infantry Regiment.
Yahara also spent time in China with
a field army and as a spy in Southeast
Asia. He left one of several stints as an
instructor at the Imperial War College
to join Thirty-Second Army’s staff.
Of course, organizations as large as
the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy
contained their share of nitwits and
incompetents. At the same time, though,
allowing the foolishness and savagery of
52 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011
banzai charges and prisoner executions
to mask the deeper competence and
professionalism of those forces actually
serves to diminish the accomplishment
of the victorious Allied soldiers, sailors,
marines and aircrews. The Allied forces
in the Pacific defeated a tough and
smart enemy, one driven by a quasi-
religious militarism and a deep belief
in ethno-racial superiority. That truer
narrative, then, is the one that led USMC and counter-measures employed were
combat veteran and author E.B. Sledge
to state: “To defeat an enemy as tough
and dedicated as the Japanese, we had
to be just as tough….On Peleliu the
opposing forces were like two scorpions
in a bottle. One was annihilated, the
other nearly so. Only Americans who
excelled could have defeated them.”
 — Nick Capo than one group who wished him
Gen. Masaharu Homma
COMPARE &
CONTRAST
Churchill’s & Hitler’s
Personal Security
During the Second World War the
governments of Great Britain and
Germany were both concerned about
the security of their leaders. The threats
illustrative of the larger outlooks of
the leaders both regimes had during
that war. The British favored a simple
civilian-based protection scheme, while
the Germans developed a complicated
and multi-layered military solution.
In the late 1930s war loomed. Hitler
had been in power since 1933, and
he’d attracted attention from more
dead. From 1933 to September 1939
there had been numerous attempts
on his life. They ranged from the
bombing of a Munich beer hall where
he was speaking, to lone gunmen who
attempted to breach security around his
vacation home in the Bavarian Alps.
Hitler could be said to have been the
first truly modern politician of the 20th
century. He spoke regularly on radio and
traveled by train, car and plane to politi-
cal functions. His security arrangements
had started with a small group of plain-
clothes detectives and brownshirts from
the Sturm Abteilung (SA). As he became
more of a public figure, his security detail
expanded into three branches: the Reich
Sicherheitsdienst (Reich Security Service),
the SS Begleit Kommando (SS Escort
Detachment), and the Fuehrer Begleit
Abteilung (Fuhrer Escort Battalion).
The RSD were recruited from former
police detectives and were a hybrid
civilian/military organization. That gave
them flexibility and jurisdiction in any
situation. They were authorized to wear
any uniforms, including those of the
SS, civilian police, and any branch of
the military. They fell under the direct
control of SS Chief Heinrich Himmler.
The SS Begleit Kommando also
came under the control of Himmler.
They served as ceremonial guards at the
Reich Chancellery, the Brown House
(Nazi Party National Headquarters)
in Munich, Hitler’s Berghof retreat
in Bavaria, and at government
buildings throughout Berlin. When
traveling, the SS Begliet Kommando
was combined with the RSD. Hitler’s
personal valets were part of that unit.
Prior to the invasion of Poland, the
army jumped into the security mix with
the Fuehrer Begleit Battalion. That unit
had responsibility for Hitler’s safety at
any military headquarters and whenever
he traveled in his role as military com-
mander-in-chief. The first commander
of the unit was Erwin Rommel, who
was also in overall command of the
Frontgruppe Fuehrerhauptquartier
(Fuehrer Headquarters Lead Group) dur-
ing the invasion of Poland. That was the
umbrella organization that handled the
day-to-day administration of Hitler’s mil-
Winston Churchill tests a Sten Gun, 1941.
Thompson stands to Churchill’s left (in front of the crowd, in a pinstripe suit and tie).
itary headquarters wherever he traveled.
Security for the British Prime Minister
was traditionally handled by the Special
Branch of the Metropolitan Police, also
known as the Special Branch Detectives
of Scotland Yard. They were the rough
equivalent of a melding of local police,
the FBI and the US Secret Service.
They were responsible for a variety of
duties, from investigating subversives to
providing personal protection for elected
officials and members of the royal family.
Churchill had served in a variety
of cabinet posts that entitled him to
a personal bodyguard. His regular
bodyguard was Detective Inspector
Walter Thompson. When Churchill fell
out of favor and public office in the
1930s, Thompson retired from Scotland
Yard. In 1939 Churchill summoned
him to his home at Chartwell and
told him he was needed to return to
active service as his bodyguard.
WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 53
Retired Royal Marines were also
asked to return to service for the
duration of the war to provide security
for the War Cabinet Room. Security
at 10 Downing Street was provided by
uniformed and plainclothes members
of Special Branch. Chequers, the vaca-
tion residence of the Prime Minister,
was protected by Special Branch
officers backed up by regular Army
troops to prevent attack by German
paratroopers. Thompson served
as Churchill’s primary bodyguard
throughout the war. Occasionally
a second detective from Special
Branch was detailed for long trips.
D.I. Thompson was normally armed
with a .32 Webley semi-automatic pistol
he carried in a homemade shoulder
holster, and Churchill often traveled
alone with him in a variety of town cars
and London cabs. That was in stark
contrast with US President Franklin
Roosevelt, who always traveled in
an armored Cadillac limousine with
a full detail of Secret Service agents
armed with a heavy arsenal including
Thompson submachine guns.
During Churchill’s overseas trips,
local troops were sometimes used as
supplemental security. That was espe-
cially true during his trips to North Africa
and Egypt. The only intelligence indicat-
ing a possible assassination threat was
intercepted during Churchill’s trip to the
Tehran conference in 1943. There were
rumors a Nazi assassination team would
attempt to kill all of the “Big Three” there.
Additional security was therefore laid on
by US and British forces during that trip.
Both Hitler and Churchill had
doubles, but little is known about them.
Churchill used them to hide his where-
abouts while traveling, and Hitler suf-
fered a security lapse when over-zealous
local party leaders published newspaper
photos of a double passing through their
community while the real Hitler was
making a speech in Berlin. Things in the
Third Reich, though, were such that no
one felt compelled to seek an explana-
tion for the simultaneous appearances of
the Fuehrer. There is also a photograph
Observation Post
from April 1945 showing Soviet soldiers
near the Reich Chancellery posing with
a corpse resembling Hitler. Experts
have speculated that was actually one
of the doubles, Gustav Weler, killed
in the final fighting in Berlin.
Both Churchill and Hitler were
familiar with firearms; both had combat
experience and were comfortable car-
rying handguns. Churchill occasionally
carried two types of handguns: a Colt .45
revolver and a Colt .32 semi-automatic.
Thompson reported Churchill liked
to set up targets in the garden at his
home in Kent, and then conduct target
practice with him. During Hitler’s early
years as politician he relied on a short
leather whip as a means of discouraging
attackers. He also sometimes carried a
.22 Smith and Wesson revolver or one
of several Walther and Mauser pistols.
Travel security was different for each
leader. When Hitler traveled by train,
he was accompanied by a full detail
that included members of the RSD,
the SS Begleit Kommando, the Fuehrer
Begleit Battalion, as well as detectives
from the Reichsbahn (railroad) police.
The Begleit Battalion would pre-posi-
tion armored and convoy vehicles at
destinations, and also transported a
compliment of vehicles on a follow-up
train for contingencies. Upon stopping,
Hitler’s train would immediately be
protected by up to several hundred
local police, area military units, and the
Fuehrer’s personal bodyguard troops.
The Begleit unit also formed the
convoys of military vehicles for the
Fuehrer’s transportation away from
planes and trains. Known as “Grey
Columns,” they were particularly
active after the victories in Poland and
France, when Hitler left Berlin to tour
the newly conquered territories, as
well as behind the eastern front.
When Churchill traveled by train
he was sometimes accompanied by
military staff officers (who might
carry handguns) along with his
Special Branch detectives. When the
train stopped it was customary for
one of the detectives to patrol the
54 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011
siding until the train left the station.
Air travel with Hitler involved using
a rigid protocol of dual aircraft and
pre-departure altitude flight checks for
bombs. Churchill at first generally com-
mandeered whatever was available that
met his schedule. He eventually had a
military plane converted for his use.
Hitler’s travel and personal appear-
ances evolved into a standardized
choreography of movement and
security cordons. From 1933 on, the
ability of crowds to come close to him
gradually subsided. Newsreels from
his entry into Austria and during the
Berlin victory parade in 1940 show
crowds approaching his Mercedes
with children throwing bouquets into
the open car. That practice generally
ended by 1941, coinciding with the
start of Operation Barbarossa.
Churchill was the opposite. As the
blitz on London began to take a toll,
he routinely motored to the hardest hit
neighborhoods along with members
of the royal family, cabinet ministers
and local politicians. He would take
D.I. Thompson for protection, but on
arrival he would immediately plunge
into the crowd to shake hands and con-
sole the bereaved. That kind of thing
culminated the night the surrender
of Germany was announced. Then
Churchill commandeered a London
cab near Downing Street, climbed on
the roof, and sat down with his feet
on the hood. He was driven through
the crowds for several hours while
waving his bowler hat and cheering.
From 1933 through 1945, Hitler
had many unsuccessful attempts
against his life. His personal security
meanwhile evolved from a handful
of brownshirts to a unit equivalent to
an infantry regiment. Churchill had
no attempts on his life, and he mostly
relied on a handful of lightly armed
detectives for his protection. Given
the relative threat level to each leader,
the extent of their personal security
efforts was probably appropriate.
 — Roger Mason
BEHIND THE LINES
Frank Loesser’s WWII Songs
Students of the history of American
popular song know Frank Loesser as
the writer of both the lyrics and the
music for Guys and Dolls, the classic
celebration of postwar New York City
gamblers and their molls. Few are aware,
however, of the many songs he wrote
during World War II to strengthen morale.
“In My Arms” is the fervent request
of a soldier for a final night of romance.
“Comes the dawn, I’ll be gone, I’ll be
heading for the thick of the fight.”
What’s needed: “was for something
nice and cute in female, I’ll never get it
in the V-mail, give me a girl in my arms
tonight.” (V-mail was a process devised
to reduce the weight of letters to and
from those serving in the military. The
original letter was photographed and
then reduced in size. Thus it took up less
space at a time when military equipment
and supplies needed all the transport
room they could get. How lucky for
Loesser V-mail rhymed with female.)
One of the favorite pastimes of those
in the service was grousing, complaining
about conditions, food or anything else,
just to keep from having to face how
boring things were. Loesser captured
those sentiments in “What Do You Do
in the Infantry?” The answer, of course,
was: “You march, you march, you march,
your back as stiff as starch. There’s many
a fall in cavalry, but never a fallen arch,
and what do you do in the infantry?
You march, you march, you march.”
Others always had it better. “The
son of a gun in the signal corps is riding
on a bike and what do you do in the
infantry? You hike, you hike, you hike.”
But it would be all right in the end.
“What do you do in the infantry? You
win, you win, you win. What do you do
in the infantry? You march into Berlin.”
Loesser’s lyrics didn’t avoid the reality
of death and the demands that made
on those who served. Consider “Praise
the Lord and Pass the Ammunition.”
“Down went the gunner, a bullet was
his fate. Down went the gunner, then
the gunner’s mate. Up jumped the
sky pilot, gave the boys a look and
manned the gun himself as he laid
aside The Book, shouting, ‘Praise the
Lord and pass the ammunition.’”
In World War II military slang
chaplains were known as “sky pilots.”
The chaplain in Loesser’s song clearly
isn’t a pacifist. With no one to fire the
gun, he puts down his Bible and shoots
it himself. And he did pretty well:
“You’ve got to give him credit for a
son-of-a-gun-of-a-gunner was he.”
Loesser’s greatest song of heroism was
“The Ballad of Rodger Young.” Rodger
Young was a 25-year-old infantryman
serving in the Pacific. On 31 July 1943
he was fighting on the island of New
Georgia, where his platoon was pinned
down by a Japanese machinegun. Though
he was wounded twice, he advanced on
the gun, firing his rifle and throwing hand
grenades. A third wound killed him, but
his heroism enabled his platoon to with-
draw without another loss. For his cour-
age he was awarded the Medal of Honor.
As Loesser’s lyrics proclaimed: “Oh,
they’ve got no time for glory in the
Infantry. Oh, they’ve got no time for
praises loudly sung. But in every Soldier’s
heart in all the Infantry shines the name,
shines the name of Rodger Young. Shines
the name Rodger Young! Fought and
died for the men he marched among.
To the ever-lasting glory of the Infantry,
lives the story of Private Rodger Young.”
Loesser certainly did his part making
Young’s story live. The pity today is,
despite a surfeit of CDs collecting
songs of World War II, almost never do
you find the “Ballad of Rodger Young.”
Robert Heinlein’s novel, Starship
Troopers, put Young’s name on one of
its spaceship transports, which was
also done in the movie of the same
name. So, though World War II glory
hasn’t proved everlasting, when morale
needed a boost through honoring
the courage of those who served,
Frank Loesser did it with his songs.

 — Jorgen Rasmussen Frank Loesser music covers

WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 55

Observation Post
STRATEGIC
BACKWATERS
De Gaulle’s North American
Teacup Tempest
A tiny archipelago of islands, a mere
93.4 square miles in area and just 6.2
miles off the coast of Newfoundland,
Canada, was the last remnant of the
former North American empire of “New
France.” Officially called the “Territorial
Collectivity of Saint Pierre and
Miquelon,” its two main islands, Saint
Pierre and Miquelon-Langlade, respec-
tively, were home to approximately 4,000
French citizens in December 1941. They
were economically sustained by the
fishing industry. Facing the same choice
as all overseas French territories and
possessions, the citizens of that territory
decided to remain loyal to the Vichy gov-
ernment of Marshal Petain rather than
declare for the uncertainty of Charles
De Gaulle and the Free French cause.
After the 1940 armistice the islands
came under the temporary administra-
tion of the French High Commissioner
of the French Antilles, Adm. Robert, on
Martinique. Thus they were included
in the special agreement between the
Vichy government and the neutral
United States, the aim of which was to
respect the status of the islands in their
loyalty to France and Petain while also
certifying they would have no contact
with the Axis powers. A part of that
special status was the granting to the
US of facilities on the islands for the
dissemination of propaganda and other
activities (intelligence collection). Thus
the US was keen to maintain the status
quo on the islands, and communicated
that De Gaulle, who the US did then not
yet recognize, via his British handlers.
Saint Pierre and Miquelon at the time
was over-populated, as many of the fish-
ing vessels there were from ports along
the Atlantic coast of France, which tradi-
tionally worked the fishing from France
to the islands and then back. Due to the
war and the armistice, many declined
to return to their occupied country. Also
56 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011
located on the island was a powerful
French radio station. The Canadians
were particularly concerned to control
it, lest it begin broadcasting Axis propa-
ganda (it never did). The Canadians also
alleged the station was assisting U-boats,
but they could never prove it. Initially
working to merely place Canadian tech-
nicians at the station (they never did),
the Canadians also began making plans
to invade. As the Battle of the Atlantic
began to rage, the British themselves
became concerned Vichy might be
coerced to provide U-boat refueling and
replenishment facilities on the islands
(if they didn’t do so voluntarily because
of the British attack at Mers-el-Kebir).
De Gaulle was driven to seek
control of the islands to publicize both
the Free French movement and as a
demonstration he wasn’t a mere tool of
the British. Already angry with the US
for unilaterally “requisitioning” French
commercial shipping stranded in US
ports in 1940, without reference to his
Free French delegation or even the Vichy
government, De Gaulle simply decided
to take the islands. Adm. Emile Muselier,
though not a favorite of De Gaulle, was
senior Free French naval commander
in Britain. He was ordered by De Gaulle
to take the islands in what the general
declared would be a “domestic affair.”
Muselier thus departed Great
Britain aboard the corvette Lobelia,
officially to conduct an “inspection
tour” of her sister corvettes, ships Britain
had handed over to the Free French
in mid-1941 to reinforce their small
“fleet,” which otherwise consisted of the
submarine Surcouf and some colonial
sloops. The plan was to collect three of
the corvettes (each armed with a single
4-inch deck gun and two .50 caliber
machineguns), the Mimosa (in Iceland,
where Muselier transferred from the
Lobelia, which didn’t participate in the
operation), along with the Alysse and
the Aconit (both in Halifax, Canada).
The sailors from those ships would also
constitute the landing force. While in
Halifax, the local commander of the
Canadian Navy commented to Muselier
on the abnormal concentration of Free
French Naval Forces (FFNF). He said
he was unsure if it was prudent to allow
such a strong FFNF group to cruise in
the vicinity of Saint Pierre and Miquelon.
Muselier then sailed to Quebec
aboard Mimosa, where he met with the
Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
who communicated the ongoing US
reservations over the situation and
counseled patience and prudence (traits
never noted of De Gaulle). It was also
explained Canada was contemplating
occupying the islands temporarily,
and that they would be handed over
to the Free French “sooner or later.”
After the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor and the subsequent German
declaration of war on America, De
Gaulle decided the time had come
to rush the operation into action.
Reinforced in Halifax by the Surcouf
with its twin 8-inch guns (the super-
submarine also carried a single Besson
MB.411 observation float plane, eight
550mm and four 400mm torpedo
tubes, a 15 foot motor launch, two
37mm AA guns and four 13.2mm AA
machineguns), the FFNF group set off.
The waters around the islands are
treacherous, with the three-mile strait
separating St. Pierre from Miquelon
especially difficult, the local fisherman
calling it the “Mouth of Hell.” With over
600 shipwrecks along the coasts of the
islands, and with neither purpose-
designed amphibious landing craft nor
personnel trained in amphibious opera-
tions, the ad hoc task force opted for
the direct approach. The ships steamed
into the harbor of Saint Pierre on 24
December 1941, sidled up to the pier and
off-loaded the “invasion” force. Groups
of armed sailors quickly rounded up the
four-man Vichy garrison and arrested
the governor, Gilbert de Bournat, bring-
ing Vichy rule to an end within 30 min-
utes of landing. Then a plebiscite was
conducted to give the action a veneer of
legality and thereby stave off American,
Canadian and British political repercus-
sions. The phrasing of the plebiscite
question didn’t offer a choice between
 •

Vichy or the Free French, but rather

“joining with the Free French” or “col-
laborating with the Axis powers,” which
thus gave it a foregone conclusion.
US reaction was swift, as the move
angered President Roosevelt. US
Secretary of State Cordell Hull was
outraged at what he considered a
British betrayal when London approved
the Free French action. For the US
the unilateral action by De Gaulle
endangered the special agreement with
Vichy. There was a call within the US
government to demand restitution of Great Miquelon
the islands to Vichy, as well as furious (Grande Miquelon)
diplomatic activity to get the Free French
to withdraw. The Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor, as well as other events in
the Pacific and Atlantic, fully occupied
the US military, however, which had
no time for any action, however small,
against islands already occupied by
friendly forces. As well, the mean-
spirited State Department fulminations
only worked to increase public support
in the US for the Free French. Thus, by
early January 1942, Secretary Hull came
to accept the action as a fait accompli.
The French vessels that participated
in the action didn’t long enjoy the fruits
of victory. The submarine Surcouf,
commissioned in 1934 as an “undersea
cruiser,” and for a while the largest
submarine in the world (eventually
surpassed by the Japanese I-400), was
mysteriously lost at sea off the west coast
of Panama on 18 February 1942. It’s
thought she was possibly rammed by the
American cargo ship SS Thompson Lykes,
but there’s no real evidence. Of the three Little Miquelon
corvettes, only the Mimosa finished out (Petite Miquelon)
the war unscathed. The Alysse was lost
on 9 February 1942, 420 miles off south-
east Newfoundland while on escort duty,
sunk by U-654. Thirty-six of her crew
died. The Aconit, largely crewed by men
from Saint Pierre and Miquelon after the
Free French liberation, was lost on 9 June
1942 while on escort duty, sunk by U-
Saint-Pierre •
(Île Saint-Pierre)
124. Only six men were rescued while 64
died, 58 French and six British crewmen.

 — Vernie Liebl

WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 57

Observation Post

NOT SO ELITE BEAT That led to the neglect of the Canadian manpower served during World War I.
armed forces during the inter-war That set in place a continued politi-
Canadian Army Deficiencies, years. With a population of 11 million, cal inability to fully mobilize for World
1944−45 Canada had an army of only 5,000 just War II. Conscripts weren’t required to
prior to the start of World War II. serve overseas, and 80 percent declined
Ed’s Note: this was sent to us as a Deep divisions also existed in to do so. That left Canadian units
counter-analysis of the piece on the Canadian society between French- overseas deficient in replacements,
Canadian Army we ran a while back speakers and English-speakers, which which in turn led to over-cautiousness
under the heading “Elite Beat.” had been further exacerbated by the on the battlefield due to the impera-
experience of World War I. The infamous tive to minimize casualties. (On the
The Canadian Army in World War II “Regulation 17” of 1912 had outraged positive side, it also meant all Canadian
suffered profound and grave defects that French-Canadians by limiting the troops overseas were volunteers.)
in many ways crippled its effectiveness teaching of their language in schools. A conscription crisis again erupted
in the campaign for Northwest Europe in During World War I, Francophone militia in 1944, though there was less actual
1944−45. They began with the Canadian units had been broken up and those rioting than had occurred in 1917. All
cultural and geographic situation. men dispersed into English-speaking told, then, only five battalions of
Culturally, within Canada there’d units. Because of that, the war had been French-Canadians served overseas,
been a strong post-World War I backlash unpopular among French-Canadians, and those formations suffered even
against militarism, as well as the popular precipitating a full-on conscription more severely than the rest of the
acceptance of the belief there would crisis in 1917. The upshot was only army from replacement shortages.
never again be the need for a mass a small percentage of the otherwise Pre-war neglect of the Canadian
army to fight another such conflict. available French-speaking Canadian armed services also caused over-reliance

58 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011

on the British for doctrine, organization
and equipment. While Canadian arms
had been highly respected at the end
of World War I, that “institutional
memory” was lost between the wars.
Canada thus entered World War II
without modern armed forces. While
they did create a modern force after
1940, the over-dependence on British
support inevitably meant Canadian
forces absorbed the worst of British
practices and all the flaws of the British
Army. In many respects those flaws were
magnified in the Canadian service.
The most serious of them was the
lack of combined-arms integration.
While the German Army created bal-
anced and integrated combined-arms
units at all levels, Anglo-Canadian
forces fell short in that regard,
with disastrous consequences.
The British never really came around
to fully practicing combined-arms; in
practice, tanks and infantry usually
fought their own battles. The British
regimental system, while fostering
strong unit cohesion, pride and
loyalty, also created cliquishness within
each unit, thereby further hindering
effective combined-arms operations.
Communications between tanks
and infantry were poor: their radios
were incompatible. For example, 2nd
Armoured Brigade and 3rd Infantry
Division only conducted joint
combined-arms training for three days
during their preparation for D-Day.
British class stratification reduced
their military establishment’s ability to
correct its flaws, and that carried over
to Canadian forces. The Canadians
were top-heavy with officers and
administration, but remained deficient
in artillery, transport, logistics and
replacements. The “tooth-to-tail” ratio
of the Canadian Army was higher
than that of any other Allied force.
Few Canadian officers had any
combat experience; so, to provide such
leaders experience for the Normandy
invasion, Canadian I Corps was sent
to Italy. Unfortunately, that unit wasn’t
then returned prior to D-Day, which
robbed 1st Canadian Army in France in Europe. That is, Canadian 1st Army
of half its troops. Because of that, it was assigned the sector along the
was filled out with expatriate forma- coast, where the Germans had heavily
tions from the countries of occupied fortified several ports. That meant the
Europe. Naturally, those units also Canadians had to go up against some
lacked a ready pool of replacements. of the strongest fortifications in Europe.
Within Canadian tank units, there They were also responsible for clearing
was practically no armored vehicle the Scheldt Estuary, which was vital
recovery, repair or replacement organi- for the opening of the huge port of
zation. Tank recovery companies each Antwerp. Those battles were fought in
had to serve six armored battalions. September, October and the early part
Signals security was faulty during of November 1944. Until that area was
training in England prior to D-Day, and captured, Antwerp, the largest port on
that later hurt the Canadians on the the continent, couldn’t be used to bring
battlefield. The Germans repeatedly in supplies. That hurt the larger Allied
broke into Canadian radio nets during war effort and prolonged the war.
6 to 12 June and attempted, sometimes
successfully, to issue spurious orders.  — Mark Day
Further deficiencies in training
existed that were never corrected. Basic ★
training conducted in Canada was large-
ly useless; troops arriving in England
had to be retrained, costing valuable
time and duplication of effort. That also
reduced the amount of time available at
the end of the basic training sequence
for higher-level unit and combined-
arms training. The number of available
infantry replacements on the eve of D-
Day was only half of what was called for
by doctrine, and that doctrinal number
also turned out to be insufficient.
Given all that, it’s surprising the
Canadians fought as well as they did,
which must be taken as a tribute to the
native ability of the troops themselves.
Canadian troops in Europe (recall: all
volunteers) generally displayed excel-
lent morale and esprit, which wasn’t
matched by the level of leadership,
organization, doctrine or understanding
of tactical and operational war-fighting
at higher levels. Those deficiencies
compromised what otherwise could’ve
been the Canadian Army’s contribu-
tion to the campaign, which resulted
in frequently poor performance in
Normandy, and their units’ subsequent
delegation to a flanking and subsidiary
role in the following operations.
Ironically, that caused the Canadians
to be involved in much heavy fighting,
and affected the entire Allied war effort
WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 NK_sixthpageST.indd 1 6/08/10 59
12:28 PM
Media Reviews
Decision at Strasbourg: Ike’s Strategic
Decision to Halt the Sixth Army Group
at the Rhine in 1944, by David Colley
(Naval Institute Press, 2008).
Reviewed by Steve Conlon.
60 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011
I
t’s well known that, after the
breakout from Normandy in
1944, Eisenhower pursued a
cautious “broad front” strategy that
by November had stalled into a war
of attrition on the German border.
Less known is that farther south,
in Alsace, Lt. Gen Jacob Devers’s
350,000-man Sixth Army Group, at
the end of a drive as rapid as Patton’s
across France, was massed and ready
to attack over the southern Rhine. If
successful, Devers would’ve flanked
the German front, thereby likely
averting America’s costliest battle, the
Bulge, and ending the war quickly.
But Ike stopped that assault, and this
book illuminates that decision.
Cooley provides ample evidence that
Devers’s well supplied forces could’ve
reached their objectives at minimal risk.
The crossing points were well planned,
and patrols had revealed the bunkers on
the opposite shore to be empty. To put it
simply, however, Ike didn’t like Devers,
and therefore wasn’t prepared to give
him the green light for a bold stroke
that ran counter to his own cautious
strategy. Cooley’s careful reconstruction
of events and personalities provides an
interesting reassessment of this portion
of the history of the 1944 campaign
in the European theater. He takes us
inside the high-level staff meetings,
as well as the lowliest foxhole, in an
attempt to establish historical reality.
He’s passionate about his findings,
but carefully objective, citing a range
of official documents, interviews and
other confirmed sources. His method
elevates the book from the easy “what
if” of some counter-factual analyses,
but the account also remains dramatic.
The book’s only faults lie in its
attempt to be all-inclusive. The chapters
segue between the “big picture” and
various actions (all needing maps) as
Colley builds his case and we follow
Sixth Army Group through southern
France. Importantly, he digs deep into
the involved leaders’ complex biogra-
phies and illuminates the personality
conflicts among Monty, Patton, Ike,
Bradley and Devers. Into that mix he
adds DeGaulle and the French generals.
Nonetheless, Decision at Strasbourg is
a convincing critique and an important
one. One suspects this book will be
seminal, in that it forces serious reas-
sessment of the strategy as well as cur-
rent historiography of the Allied victory.

Hitler’s Rockets — The Story of the V-2s,
by Norman Longmate
(Skyhorse Publishing, 2009).
Reviewed by Steve Dixon.
Before World War II, long range
missiles and rockets were something
reserved for science fiction. Then
came Nazi Germany’s revolutionary
V-2 rockets, which created a force so
devastating it not only marked a new
phase in the bombardment of London,
but a new era in the history of warfare.
Hitler’s Rockets is a detailed investiga-
tion of the V2 weapon that caused so
much havoc in 1944 and 1945. By the
time the last rocket fell, more than
3,000 British civilians were killed and
nearly twice that number were injured.
Steel
Longmate provides a detailed
look at the inception of the V2
program inside Nazi Germany, from
the technical achievements to the
Wolves
political infighting and finally its
production and deployment. Also
covered in great detail is the English
government’s political reaction to
the V2 and its curious decision to try
to cover up the V-2 menace. What
really stands out are the accounts from
the civilians who had to withstand
the deadly blasts of the V-2. There
are also interviews with German
engineers, British officials, and those
who witnessed firsthand the carnage.
Also provided are photos of the
destruction, some never seen before.
The book is written for an English
audience; so, if you don’t know
SURFACING NOW!
offhand what a quid or shilling
was, or what the numerous English Germany’s Submarine
paramilitary organizations were dur-
ing that time (for example: the WVS,
Campaign Against
or Women’s Voluntary Services), you British & Allied
may be hard-pressed to understand
some of the terminology. A conversion Shipping,
table and a list of abbreviations in
the appendices would have been
Vol. 1 - 1939-43
helpful. Another deficiency is the poor
quality of the maps: in some cases Steel Wolves places YOU in
the place names are actually unread-
able. All that is trivial, though, when supreme command of the
compared to what the book offers.
U-Boat fleet.
Even though the V-2 may be known
to those who’ve made studying World YOUR MISSION:
War II their hobby, the coverage of
what the civilians had to endure makes Deploy your forces with
this book a must-have. It covers a
subject rarely seen in this country.  ★
maximum effect to destroy
British and Allied shipping.
The follow-up title to the
award-winning Silent War.
VISIT
c omp a s s g ame s . c om
NOW to order this game.
WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011 61
 STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION

1. Publication Title: World at War

2. Publication Number PE25-504
3. Filing Date: 10/1/10
4. Issue Frequency : Bi-monthly
5. Number of Issues Published Annually: 6
6. Annual Subscription Price: $119/24.95.
Contact Person: Callie Cummins Telephone 661-587-9633
7. Complete Mailing Address of Known Office of Publication:
2804 Mosasco St, Bakersfield CA 93312
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Publisher: Christopher Cummins, PO Box 21598,
Bakersfield CA 93390
Editor: Joseph Miranda, PO Box 21598, Bakersfield CA 93390
Managing Editor: Ty Bomba, PO Box 21598, Bakersfield CA 93390
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Full Name Complete Mailing Address
Decision Games PO Box 21598,
Bakersfield CA 93390
Christopher & Callie Cummins PO Box 21598,
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Owning or Holding 1 Percent or More of Total Amount of Bonds,
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X Has Not Changed During Preceding 12 Months
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13. Publication Title: World at War
14. Issue Date for Circulation Data Below: OCT 10

Average No. No. Copies of

Copies Each Single Issue
15. Extent and Nature of Circulation: Issue During Published
General Publication Preceding Nearest to
12 Months Filing Date
a. Total Number of Copies (Net press run) 19,667 22,000
b. Paid Circulation (By Mail
and Outside the Mail):
(1) Mailed Outside-County Paid
Subscriptions Stated on PS Form 2,223 2,589
3541(Include paid distribution above
nominal rate, advertiser’s proof
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(2) Mailed In-County Paid
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With Custer at the Death

nominal rate, advertiser’s proof
copies, and exchange copies)
(3) Paid Distribution Outside the
Mails Including Sales Through
Dealers and Carriers, Street Vendors, 13,943 12,811
Counter Sales, and Other Paid
by Robert F. Burke Distribution Outside USPS®
(4) Paid Distribution by Other
Classes of Mail Through the
The fascination with Custer’s Last Stand hasn’t diminished in the decades since 1876. USPS (e.g. First-Class Mail®)
He led his regiment well ahead of the main body, only to run into an unprecedented c. Total Paid Distribution (Sum
16,166 15,400
of 15b (1), (2), (3), and (4))
gathering of Indians. The first accounts were pieced together by other soldiers arriving d. Free or Nominal Rate Distribution
on the scene in the battle’s aftermath, and by archaeologists in the generations since. (By Mail and Outside the Mail):
(1) Free or Nominal Rate Outside-County 2,642 5,850
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Interleaving and cross-referencing all those accounts provides a minute-by-minute story (2) Free or Nominal Rate In-County
Copies Included on PS Form 3541
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narrative is supported by dozens of detailed maps and orders of battle for both sides. (4) Free or Nominal Rate
Distribution Outside the Mail
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e. Total Free or Nominal Rate Distribution
(Sum of 15d (1), (2), (3) and (4)) 2,642 5,850

f. Total Distribution (Sum of 15c and 15e) 18,808 21,250

g. Copies not Distributed (See
Available now from Instructions to Publishers #4 (page #3)) 859 750

h. Total (Sum of 15f and g) 19,667 22,000

i. Percent Paid (15c divided
by 15f times 100) 86.0% 72.4%

PO Box 21598 16. Publication of Statement of Ownership: If the publication is

Bakersfield, CA 93390 a general publication, publication of this statement is required.
(661) 587-9633 Will be printed in the FEB 2011 issue of this publication.
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Manager, or Owner: Callie Cummins Date: 10/1/10

62 WORLD at WAR 16 | FEB−MAR 2011

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