JELBERT B. GALICTO, G.R. No.

193978
Petitioner,
Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO BERSAMIN,
SIMEON C. AQUINO III, in his DEL CASTILLO,*
capacity as President of the ABAD,
Republic of the Philippines; VILLARAMA, JR.,
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, PEREZ,
JR., in his capacity as Executive MENDOZA,
Secretary; and FLORENCIO B. SERENO,**
ABAD, in his capacity as REYES, and
Secretary of the Department of PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Budget and Management,
Respondents. Promulgated:

February 28, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for

Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order,[1] seeking to
nullify and enjoin the implementation of Executive Order No. (EO) 7 issued by the
Office of the President on September 8, 2010. Petitioner Jelbert B. Galicto asserts
that EO 7 is unconstitutional for having been issued beyond the powers of the
President and for being in breach of existing laws.

The petitioner is a Filipino citizen and an employee of the Philippine Health

Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth).[2] He is currently holding the position of
Court Attorney IV and is assigned at the PhilHealth Regional Office CARAGA.[3]
 Respondent Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III is the President of the Republic
of the Philippines (Pres. Aquino); he issued EO 7 and has the duty of implementing
it. Respondent Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. is the incumbent Executive Secretary and, as
the alter ego of Pres. Aquino, is tasked with the implementation of EO
7. Respondent Florencio B. Abad is the incumbent Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) charged with the implementation of EO 7.[4]

The Antecedent Facts

On July 26, 2010, Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation
Address the alleged excessive allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers
and Members of the Board of Directors of the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage
System – a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) which has been
unable to meet its standing obligations.[5] Subsequently, the Senate of
the Philippines (Senate), through the Senate Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises, conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on
the reported excessive salaries, allowances, and other benefits of GOCCs and
government financial institutions (GFIs).[6]

Based on its findings that “officials and governing boards of various

[GOCCs] and [GFIs] x x x have been granting themselves unwarranted
allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other benefits [as well as other]
irregular and abusive practices,”[7] the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17
“urging the President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually large and
apparently excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members
of the governing boards of [GOCCs] and [GFIs].”[8]

Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued

EO 7, entitled “Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position
Classification System in the [GOCCs] and [GFIs], and for Other Purposes.” EO 7
provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed
compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs. A Task
Force was also created to review all remunerations of GOCC and GFI employees
and officers, while GOCCs and GFIs were ordered to submit to the Task Force
information regarding their compensation. Finally, EO 7 ordered (1) a
moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation,
except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI
employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President,[9] and (2) a
suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the Board
of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010.[10]
EO 7 was published on September 10, 2010.[11] It took effect on September
25, 2010 and precluded the Board of Directors, Trustees and/or Officers of GOCCs
from granting and releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the board of
directors, and from increasing salary rates of and granting new or additional
benefits and allowances to their employees.

The Petition

The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the

implementation of EO 7, which was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, based on the following arguments:

I.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OF LEGAL

BASIS DUE TO THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:

A. P.D. 985 IS NOT APPLICABLE AS BASIS FOR EXECUTIVE

ORDER NO. 7 BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND
CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY
GRANTED THE POWER TO FIX COMPENSATION LONG
AFTER SUCH POWER HAS BEEN REVOKED BY P.D. 1597
AND R.A. 6758.

B. THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED

CORPORATIONS DO NOT NEED TO HAVE ITS
COMPENSATION PLANS, RATES AND POLICIES
REVIEWED BY THE DBM AND APPROVED BY THE
PRESIDENT BECAUSE P.D. 1597 REQUIRES ONLY THE
GOCCs TO REPORT TO THE OFFICE TO THE PRESIDENT
THEIR COMPENSATION PLANS AND RATES BUT THE
SAME DOES NOT GIVE THE PRESIDENT THE POWER OF
CONTROL OVER THE FISCAL POWER OF THE GOCCs.

C. J.R. NO. 4, [SERIES] 2009 IS NOT APPLICABLE AS LEGAL

BASIS BECAUSE IT HAD NOT RIPENED INTO X X X LAW,
THE SAME NOT HAVING BEEN PUBLISHED.

D. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT J.R. NO. 1, S. 2004 (sic) AND

J.R. 4, S. 2009 ARE VALID, STILL THEY ARE NOT
APPLICABLE AS LEGAL BASIS BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT
LAWS WHICH MAY VALIDLY DELEGATE POWER TO THE
 PRESIDENT TO SUSPEND THE POWER OF THE BOARD TO
FIX COMPENSATION.

II.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS INVALID FOR DIVESTING THE BOARD OF

DIRECTORS OF [THE] GOCCS OF THEIR POWER TO FIX THE
COMPENSATION, A POWER WHICH IS A LEGISLATIVE GRANT AND
WHICH COULD NOT BE REVOKED OR MODIFIED BY AN EXECUTIVE
FIAT.

III.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS BY SUBSTANCE A LAW, WHICH IS A

DEROGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL PREROGATIVE AND IS
THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

IV.

THE ACTS OF SUSPENDING AND IMPOSING MORATORIUM ARE

ULTRA VIRES ACTS BECAUSE J.R. NO. 4 DOES NOT EXPRESSLY
AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT TO EXERCISE SUCH POWERS.

V.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS AN INVALID ISSUANCE BECAUSE IT HAS

NO SUFFICIENT STANDARDS AND IS THEREFORE ARBITRARY,
UNREASONABLE AND A VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS.

VI.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 INVOLVES THE DETERMINATION AND

DISCRETION AS TO WHAT THE LAW SHALL BE AND IS THEREFORE
INVALID FOR ITS USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.

VII.

CONSISTENT WITH THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN

PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE CASE, EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS ONLY
DIRECTORY AND NOT MANDATORY.[12]

The Case for the Respondents

On December 13, 2010, the respondents filed their Comment. They pointed
out the following procedural defects as grounds for the petition’s dismissal: (1) the
petitioner lacks locus standi; (2) the petitioner failed to attach a board resolution or
secretary’s certificate authorizing him to question EO 7 in behalf of PhilHealth;
(3) the petitioner’s signature does not indicate his PTR Number, Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance Number and Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Number; (4) thejurat of the Verification and Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping failed to indicate a valid identification card as provided
under A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC; (5) the President should be dropped as a party
respondent as he is immune from suit; and (6) certiorari is not applicable to this
case.[13]

The respondents also raised substantive defenses to support the validity of

EO 7. They claim that the President exercises control over the governing boards of
the GOCCs and GFIs; thus, he can fix their compensation packages. In addition,
EO 7 was issued in accordance with law for the purpose of controlling the grant of
excessive salaries, allowances, incentives and other benefits to GOCC and GFI
employees. They also advocate the validity of Joint Resolution (J.R.) No. 4, which
they point to as the authority for issuing EO 7.[14]

Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No.

10149,[15] otherwise known as the “GOCC Governance Act of 2011.” Section 11
of RA 10149 expressly authorizes the President to fix the compensation framework
of GOCCs and GFIs.

The Court’s Ruling

We resolve to DISMISS the petition for its patent formal and

procedural infirmities, and for having been mooted by subsequent events.
A. Certiorari is not the proper remedy.

Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are
availed of to question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the
issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition
for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy; instead a petition for
declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), is the proper recourse to assail the validity of EO 7:

Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
 regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
(Emphases ours.)

Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila[16] is a case in

point.[17] In Liga, we dismissed the petition for certiorari to set aside an EO issued
by a City Mayor and insisted that a petition for declaratory relief should have been
filed with the RTC. We painstakingly ruled:

After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolve to

dismiss this petition for certiorari.
First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-
judicial capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial or quasi-
judicial prerogatives. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is a special civil action that may be invoked
only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following
requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board,
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal,
board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting [to] lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
 A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he
has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of
the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is “a term which
applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or
bodies … required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their
official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.”
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-
judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some
specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such
rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before
a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to
determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending
parties.
The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As correctly
pointed out by the respondents, the enactment by the City Council of
Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by respondent Mayor
of the questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative
and executive functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie.
Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition
for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the
unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and
executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court
 may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question. (Italics supplied).
As such, this petition must necessar[ily] fail, as this Court does
not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if
only questions of law are involved.[18]

Likewise, in Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti

Terrorism Council,[19] we similarly dismissed the petitions for certiorari and
prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9372, otherwise known as
the “Human Security Act of 2007,” since the respondents therein (members of the
Anti-Terrorism Council) did not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

While we have recognized in the past that we can exercise the discretion and
rulemaking authority we are granted under the Constitution,[20] and set aside
procedural considerations to permit parties to bring a suit before us at the first
instance through certiorari and/or prohibition,[21] this liberal policy remains to be
an exception to the general rule, and thus, has its limits. In Concepcion v.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC),[22] we emphasized the importance of
availing of the proper remedies and cautioned against the wrongful use
of certiorari in order to assail the quasi-legislative acts of the COMELEC,
especially by the wrong party. In ruling that liberality and the transcendental
doctrine cannot trump blatant disregard of procedural rules, and considering that
the petitioner had other available remedies (such as a petition for declaratory relief
with the appropriate RTC under the terms of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court), as in
this case, we categorically ruled:

The petitioner’s unusual approaches and use of Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court do not appear to us to be the result of any error in reading
Rule 65, given the way the petition was crafted. Rather, it was a
backdoor approach to achieve what the petitioner could not directly do in
his individual capacity under Rule 65. It was, at the very least, an
attempted bypass of other available, albeit lengthier, modes of review
that the Rules of Court provide. While we stop short of concluding that
the petitioner’s approaches constitute an abuse of process through a
 manipulative reading and application of the Rules of Court, we
nevertheless resolve that the petition should be dismissed for its
blatant violation of the Rules. The transgressions alleged in a
petition, however weighty they may sound, cannot be justifications
for blatantly disregarding the rules of procedure, particularly when
remedial measures were available under these same rules to achieve
the petitioner’s objectives. For our part, we cannot and should not –
in the name of liberality and the “transcendental importance”
doctrine – entertain these types of petitions. As we held in the very
recent case of Lozano, et al. vs. Nograles, albeit from a different
perspective, our liberal approach has its limits and should not be
abused.[23] [emphasis supplied]

B. Petitioner lacks locus standi.

“Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and

substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.”[24] This requirement of standing relates to the constitutional
mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies.[25]

Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to “raise a constitutional question”

when (1) he can show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened
injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed
by a favorable action.[26]

Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to

be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest."[27]
 To support his claim that he has locus standi to file the present petition, the
petitioner contends that as an employee of PhilHealth, he “stands to be prejudiced
by [EO] 7, which suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of salary
increases or new or increased benefits to officers and employees of GOCC[s] and x
x x curtail[s] the prerogative of those officers who are to fix and determine his
compensation.”[28] The petitioner also claims that he has standing as a member of
the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the
Philippine government are legally and validly issued and implemented.

The respondents meanwhile argue that the petitioner is not a real party-in-
interest since future increases in salaries and other benefits are merely contingent
events or expectancies.[29] The petitioner, too, is not asserting a public right for
which he is entitled to seek judicial protection. Section 9 of EO 7 reads:

Section 9. Moratorium on Increases in Salaries, Allowances,

Incentives and Other Benefits. –Moratorium on increases in the rates of salaries,
and the grant of new increases in the rates of allowances, incentives and other
benefits, except salary adjustments pursuant to Executive Order No. 8011 dated
June 17, 2009 and Executive Order No. 900 dated June 23, 2010, are hereby
imposed until specifically authorized by the President. [emphasis ours]

In the present case, we are not convinced that the petitioner has
demonstrated that he has a personal stake or material interest in the outcome of the
case because his interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere
expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and
other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent events or expectancies. To
be sure, he has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of
such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7.

It has been held that as to the element of injury, such aspect is not
something that just anybody with some grievance or pain may assert. It has to
be direct and substantial to make it worth the court’s time, as well as the effort of
inquiry into the constitutionality of the acts of another department of
government. If the asserted injury is more imagined than real, or is merely
superficial and insubstantial, then the courts may end up being importuned to
decide a matter that does not really justify such an excursion into constitutional
adjudication.[30] The rationale for this constitutional requirement of locus standi is
by no means trifle. Not only does it assure the vigorous adversary presentation of
the case; more importantly, it must suffice to warrant the Judiciary’s overruling the
determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of government, such as
the President, and the clear approval by Congress, in this case. Indeed, the rationale
goes to the very essence of representative democracies.[31]

Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioner’s claim that he
is instituting the present petition as a member of the bar in good standing who has
an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are
legally and validly issued. This supposed interest has been branded by the Court
in Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) v. Hon. Zamora,[32] “as too general an interest
which is shared by other groups and [by] the whole citizenry.” [33] Thus, the Court
ruled in IBP that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of
law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with
standing in that case. The Court made a similar ruling inProf. David v. Pres.
Macapagal-Arroyo[34] and held that the petitioners therein, who are national
officers of the IBP, have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or
potential injury which the IBP, as an institution, or its members may suffer as a
consequence of the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General
Order No. 5.[35]

We note that while the petition raises vital constitutional and statutory
questions concerning the power of the President to fix the compensation packages
of GOCCs and GFIs with possible implications on their officials and employees,
the same cannot “infuse” or give the petitioner locus standi under the
transcendental importance or paramount public interest doctrine. In Velarde v.
Social Justice Society,[36] we held that even if the Court could have exempted the
case from the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort would be futile
because the transcendental issue could not be resolved any way, due to
procedural infirmities and shortcomings, as in the present case.[37] In other
words, giving due course to the present petition which is saddled with formal and
procedural infirmities explained above in this Resolution, cannot but be an exercise
in futility that does not merit the Court’s liberality. As we emphasized in Lozano
v. Nograles,[38] “while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to
the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of ‘personal
injury’ to the broader ‘transcendental importance’ doctrine, such liberality is
not to be abused.”[39]

Finally, since the petitioner has failed to demonstrate a material and

personal interest in the issue in dispute, he cannot also be considered to have filed
the present case as a representative of PhilHealth. In this regard, we cannot ignore
or excuse the blatant failure of the petitioner to provide a Board Resolution or a
Secretary’s Certificate from PhilHealth to act as its representative.

C. The petition has a defective

jurat.

The respondents claim that the petition should be dismissed for failing to
comply with Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires the
party or the counsel representing him to sign the pleading and indicate an address
that should not be a post office box. The petition also allegedly violated the
Supreme Court En BancResolution dated November 12, 2001, requiring counsels
to indicate in their pleadings their Roll of Attorneys Number, their PTR Number
and their IBP Official Receipt or Lifetime Member Number; otherwise, the
pleadings would be considered unsigned and dismissible. Bar Matter No. 1922
likewise states that a counsel should note down his MCLE Certificate of
Compliance or Certificate of Exemption in the pleading, but the petitioner had
failed to do so.[40]

We do not see any violation of Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil

Procedure as the petition bears the petitioner’s signature and office address. The
present suit was brought before this Court by the petitioner himself as a party
litigant and not through counsel. Therefore, the requirements under the Supreme
Court En Banc Resolution datedNovember 12, 2001 and Bar Matter No. 1922 do
not apply. In Bar Matter No. 1132, April 1, 2003, we clarified that a party who is
not a lawyer is not precluded from signing his own pleadings as this is allowed by
the Rules of Court; the purpose of requiring a counsel to indicate his IBP Number
and PTR Number is merely to protect the public from bogus lawyers. A similar
construction should be given to Bar Matter No. 1922, which requires lawyers to
indicate their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption;
otherwise, the provision that allows parties to sign their own pleadings will be
negated.

However, the point raised by the respondents regarding the petitioner’s

defective jurat is correct. Indeed, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, dated February 19, 2008,
calls for a current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the
photograph and signature of the individual as competent evidence of
identity. Nevertheless, we hasten to clarify that the defective jurat in the
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is not a fatal defect, as we held
in In-N-Out Burger, Inc. v. Sehwani, Incorporated.[41] The verification is only a
formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement that the Court may waive.

D. The petition has been mooted

by supervening events.

Because of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed out that the
present case has already been rendered moot by these supervening events: (1) the
lapse on December 31, 2010 of Section 10 of EO 7 that suspended the allowances
and bonuses of the directors and trustees of GOCCs and GFIs; and (2) the
enactment of R.A. No. 10149 amending the provisions in the charters of GOCCs
and GFIs empowering their board of directors/trustees to determine their own
compensation system, in favor of the grant of authority to the President to perform
this act.

With the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, the President is
now authorized to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs. The
pertinent provisions read:
Section 5. Creation of the Governance Commission for Government-
Owned or -Controlled Corporations. — There is hereby created an advisory,
monitoring, and oversight body with authority to formulate, implement and
coordinate policies to be known as the Governance Commission for Government-
Owned or-Controlled Corporations, hereinafter referred to as the GCG, which
shall be attached to the Office of the President. The GCG shall have the
following powers and functions:

xxxx

h) Conduct compensation studies, develop and recommend to the

President a competitive compensation and remuneration system which shall
attract and retain talent, at the same time allowing the GOCC to be financially
sound and sustainable;

xxxx

Section 8. Coverage of the Compensation and Position Classification

System. — The GCG, after conducting a compensation study, shall develop a
Compensation and Position Classification System which shall apply to all officers
and employees of the GOCCs whether under the Salary Standardization Law or
exempt therefrom and shall consist of classes of positions grouped into such
categories as the GCG may determine, subject to approval of the President.
 Section 9. Position Titles and Salary Grades. — All positions in the
Positions Classification System, as determined by the GCG and as approved by
the President, shall be allocated to their proper position titles and salary grades in
accordance with an Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary
Grades of the Compensation and Position Classification System, which shall be
prepared by the GCG and approved by the President.

xxxx

[N]o GOCC shall be exempt from the coverage of the Compensation and
Position Classification System developed by the GCG under this Act.

As may be gleaned from these provisions, the new law amended R.A. No.
7875 and other laws that enabled certain GOCCs and GFIs to fix their own
compensation frameworks; the law now authorizes the President to fix the
compensation and position classification system for all GOCCs and GFIs, as well
as other entities covered by the law. This means that, the President can now
reissue an EO containing these same provisions without any legal constraints.

A moot case is “one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue

of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value.”[42] “[A]n action is considered ‘moot’ when it no longer presents a
justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or
dead[,] or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is
not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again
between the parties x x x. Simply stated, there is nothing for the x x x court to
resolve as [its] determination x x x has been overtaken by subsequent events.”[43]

This is the present situation here. Congress, thru R.A. No. 10149, has
expressly empowered the President to establish the compensation systems of
GOCCs and GFIs. For the Court to still rule upon the supposed unconstitutionality
of EO 7 will merely be an academic exercise. Any further discussion of the
constitutionality of EO 7 serves no useful purpose since such issue is moot in its
face in light of the enactment of R.A. No. 10149. In the words of the eminent
constitutional law expert, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., “the Court normally [will not]
entertain a petition touching on an issue that has become moot because x x x
there would [be] no longer x x x a ‘flesh and blood’ case for the Court to
resolve.”[44]
 All told, in view of the supervening events rendering the petition moot, as
well as its patent formal and procedural infirmities, we no longer see any reason
for the Court to resolve the other issues raised in the certiorari petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. No

costs.

SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by the Philippine Human
Resources Development Center and Construction Manpower
Development Foundation),petitioner, vs. HON. CESAR A.
MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge of RTC-Cavite, Branch 22, Imus,
PHILIPPINE WOMEN’S UNIVERSITY and HELENA Z.
BENITEZ, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for certiorari assails the Orders issued by Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang,
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. 055-
96. Petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the order[1] dated April 14, 1997, consolidating Civil
Case No. 055-96 with Civil Case No. 1277-96, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Imus,
Cavite, Branch 20; and the order[2]dated August 26, 1997 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The factual antecedents to this petition are as follows:
Private respondent Helena Z. Benitez, a former Senator, is the owner of two parcels of land
located in Barangay Salawag, Dasmariñas, Cavite, covered by TCT No. 14701, with an area of
483,331 square meters more or less.
On March 30, 1983, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Philippine Human
Resources Development Center (PHRDC), signed a Memorandum of Agreement with Benitez
whereby the latter undertook to lease her property in favor of PHRDC, for a period of 20 years
and/or sell a portion thereof which shall be no less than ten hectares. PHRDC in turn agreed to
lease within the same period and/or buy said property site.
On September 22, 1983, private respondent Philippine Women’s University (PWU) and
Benitez granted a permit to PHRDC to occupy and use the land in question and to undertake land
development, electrical and road network installations and other related works necessary to attain
the latter’s objectives. Pursuant thereto, the Construction Manpower Development Foundation
(CMDF)[3] took possession of the property and erected buildings and other related facilities
necessary for its operations.
 A lease contract was thereafter signed by PWU and PHRDC on a ten-hectare portion of the
land which stipulated, among others, a rental of P200,000.00 per annum for an initial term of
four years, from January 1, 1984 to January 1, 1988, with an option granted to PHRDC to renew
the lease upon agreement of both parties, for a further period of up to but not exceeding 20 years
from the expiration of the initial term thereof.
PWU’s participation in the above transactions stemmed from its being a donee of the
property involved, as embodied in a deed of donation, which deed was executed by Benitez in its
favor only in December 1984.
At the end of the initial four-year term of the lease, negotiations began for the purchase of a
seven-hectare portion of the property. In a series of letters,[4] Benitez made the offer to sell the
property at a price of P70.00 per square meter.
In view of the on-going negotiations for the eventual sale of the lot, Benitez and PHRDC,
through its General Manager Juvenal Catajoy, Jr., agreed that the payment of rentals would cease
effective July 1, 1989.[5] Benitez however contends that no such agreement was entered into; in
fact, she said petitioner simply failed to pay rentals from July 1, 1989 up to the present despite
repeated and friendly demands made by private respondents.[6]
PHRDC had by then already prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale, for the signature of Benitez
as vendor, and PHRDC and CMDF as vendees. However, Benitez refused to sign the Deed of
Absolute Sale since, according to her, there was never any perfected contract or agreement to sell
the property.[7]
In a letter dated August 15, 1995, Benitez and PWU demanded from PHRDC the payment
of rentals and to vacate the premises within thirty days from notice.
Thereafter, on December 14, 1995, Benitez and PWU filed an ejectment case based on
alleged unlawful detainer[8] against PHRDC and CMDF before the Municipal Trial Court of
Dasmariñas, Cavite.
In the meantime, petitioner, through the Department of Trade and Industry, to which the
CMDF is attached, instituted a complaint for Eminent Domain, pursuant to the provisions of
Executive Order No. 1035,[9] which case is now pending before the RTC, Branch 20 of Imus,
Cavite and docketed as Civil Case No. 1277-96.
The MTC of Dasmariñas rendered a decision[10] dated September 2, 1996 in favor of PWU
and Benitez, ordering the defendants therein to vacate the premises, pay arrearages in rentals,
reasonable compensation for their continued stay in the premises and attorney’s fees.
The decision was appealed by PHRDC and CMDF to the RTC of Imus, Cavite, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 055-96, raffled off and assigned to the RTC, Branch 22, which was
presided over by respondent Judge Mangrobang.
On October 24, 1996, PWU and Benitez filed a Petition for Consolidation[11] of the appealed
Civil Case No. 055-96 with Civil Case No. 1277-96. PHRDC and CMDF opposed[12] the
petition.
On April 14, 1997, respondent Judge issued the Order[13] granting the petition for
consolidation, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, let this case be, as it is hereby referred to Branch 20 of RTC, Imus,
Cavite to be jointly tried/resolved together with Civil case No. 1277-96 entitled
Republic of the Philippines (represented by the Department of Trade and Industry) vs.
Helena Z. Benitez.

SO ORDERED.[14]

PHRDC and CMDF filed a Motion for Reconsideration[15] of the above order. Respondent
Judge denied the same through an Order[16] dated August 26, 1997.
Petitioner is now before us with this petition on the ground that:

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN, WITHOUT
ANY LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS, HE ORDERED THE
CONSOLIDATION/JOINT TRIAL OF THE TWO (2) CASES,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THEY INVOLVED DIFFERENT
CAUSES OF ACTION, ISSUES AND EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION.

For resolution is whether or not an appealed case emanating from the decision of a
Municipal Trial Court in an ejectment case and now pending before a Regional Trial Court can
be consolidated with an original action for eminent domain pending before another branch of the
RTC.
The legal basis of an order for consolidation of two cases is Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, which states:

Section 1. Consolidation. – When actions involving a common question of law or fact

are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the
matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may
make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary
costs or delay.

Petitioner argues against consolidation, contending that the ejectment case is an appealed
case where the RTC exercises its appellate jurisdiction, while the case for eminent domain is an
original action where the RTC exercises original and exclusive jurisdiction. Moreover, the issue
in the ejectment case is only of possession while the expropriation case will involve the issue of
ownership. In addition, petitioner contends that the trial stage of the ejectment case was already
over in the MTC while the expropriation case has yet to begin trial before the RTC.
Thus, petitioner contends that since the two cases are separate, distinct and independent
from each other, whatever decision will be given in the appealed ejectment case will not affect
proceedings in the eminent domain case.[17]
 In moving for consolidation, private respondents contend that there is no requirement found
in the rules that both cases should be of the same nature and cause of action, nor that they should
involve a similar exercise of jurisdiction.[18]
Both parties submit that at the very least Rule 31, Section 1, requires that there be common
questions of fact or law between the cases sought to be consolidated.
Respondent Judge cites judicial economy, convenience of the parties, as well as the
avoidance of the issuance of conflicting decisions by two (2) branches of the RTC as reasons for
granting the motion for consolidation. According to him, consolidation would insure a more
orderly proceeding and administration of justice. He states that both refer to a common or
similar issue, which is possession of the same property.[19]
In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan,[20] we declared:

The main object of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against

oppression or abuse, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the
trial court and save unnecessary costs and expense.[21]

While nothing in the rules expressly prohibits the consolidation of an appealed case with a
case being heard originally, consolidation of the two cases involved herein would serve none of
the purposes cited above.
First, it would only delay the resolution of the two cases. Note that by itself ejectment is
summary in nature for it involves “perturbation of social order which must be restored as
promptly as possible.”[22] Similarly, speedy action is essential in expropriation, hence the rule that
the plaintiff in an expropriation case may already take or enter upon possession of the property
after depositing with an authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed
value of the property.[23] But consolidation of these two diverse cases would not necessarily
expedite either of them.
The ejectment case instituted by private respondents against PHRDC and CMDF was
decided by the municipal trial court on September 2, 1996. Now the resolution of the appeal
before the RTC remains pending notwithstanding the lapse of over five years. In regard to the
case for eminent domain, we have already ruled on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of herein petitioner, in the case of Republic v. Tagle, decided in 1998. Three
years have already passed despite the urgent nature of the case. To begin consolidation of the
two cases at this time would only exacerbate the delay.
Second, as pointed out by petitioner, the two cases raise dissimilar issues, though the facts
are evidently intertwined. In the ejectment case, the issue is possession of the disputed property,
while in the eminent domain case, the issue is the taking by the State of the property by virtue of
its power of eminent domain. Note, however, that the decision in one will not necessarily affect
the decision in the other.
Third, it does not appear certain that consolidation is a wise step where one or both cases
had already been partially heard. It might just complicate procedural requirements. The judge to
whom the consolidated case will be assigned would not have had the opportunity to observe
first-hand the witnesses in one of the cases.[24] Fairness and due process might be hampered
rather than helped if these cases were consolidated.
As a general proposition, the propriety of consolidation rests upon the sound discretion of
the trial court judge. But in this instance, however, we are of the considered view that the
exercise of such discretion in order to consolidate the ejectment case with the eminent domain
case was less than judicious. We are constrained to agree with petitioner that, given the
circumstances herein cited, public respondent’s discretion has been gravely abused.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated April 14 and August
26, 1997, issued by public respondent are hereby SET ASIDE. Let the cases for ejectment and
for eminent domain proceed independently and be resolved with despatch separately.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the Department of

Trade and Industry, petitioner, vs. HON. LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
Presiding Judge of RTC, Imus, Cavite, Branch 20; and HELENA Z.
BENITEZ, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Executive Order No. 1035[1] (EO 1035) was enacted to facilitate government acquisition of
private property to be used for infrastructure or other development projects. Under Section 7
thereof, it is the ministerial duty of courts to issue a writ of possession within five days from the
time the government deposits 10 percent of the just compensation payable. Moreover, such writ
cannot be nullified by an adverse decision in an ejectment proceeding involving the same
property and the same parties.

Statement of the Case

This principium is used by this Court in resolving this petition for certiorari under Rule 65
assailing the Orders dated July 26, 1996[2] and February 20, 1997,[3] promulgated by the Regional
Trial Court[4] of Imus, Cavite in Civil Case No. 1277-96. The first ruling quashed the May 24,
1996 writ of possession issued earlier, pursuant to EO 1035, and the second denied petitioner’s
plea for reconsideration.

The Antecedent Facts

The facts, as narrated in the solicitor general’s Memorandum, are as follows:

“Private respondent Helena Z. Benitez is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of
land located in Barangay Salawag, Dasmariñas, Cavite covered [by] TCT No. 14701
containing an area of Four Hundred Eighty Three Thousand Three Hundred Thirty
One (483,331) square meters more or less.

“Sometime in September 1982, the Philippine Government, through the Philippine

Human Resources Development Center (PHRDC for short), an agency under the then
Ministry of Human Settlements, negotiated with the Japanese International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) Survey Team on the technicalities of the establishment of
the ASEAN Human Resources Development Project in the Philippines. Among the
five (5) main programs of the proposed project was Program III (Construction
Manpower Development) which involved the establishment of a Construction
Manpower Development Center (CMDC for short), an agency now under the
Department of Trade and Industry.

“On March 30, 1983, PHRDC and private respondent Helena Z. Benitez (BENITEZ
for short), signed a Memorandum of Agreement (Annex ‘C’, Petition) which provides,
among others, [that] BENITEZ ‘undertakes to lease within the period of twenty (20)
years and/or sell a portion of that property (which is no less than ten-hectares)’ in
favor of PHRDC ‘which likewise agrees to lease’ within a period of twenty (20) years
and/or buy said property site’.

“On September 22, 1983, the Philippine Women’s University (PWU for short) and
BENITEZ granted a permit to PHRDC ‘to occupy and use’ the land in question and
‘to undertake land development, electrical and road network installations and other
related works necessary to attain its objectives...’. Pursuant thereto, the CMDF took
possession of the property and erected buildings and other related facilities necessary
for its operations.

“Accordingly, in December 1983, PWU entered into a purported contract of

lease with PHRDC on a ten (10)-hectare piece of land which stipulated, among other
things, a rental of P200,000.00 per annum for an initial term of four (4) years from
January 1, 1984 to January 1, 1988, with an option
granted to PHRDC to renew the lease, upon agreement of both
parties, ‘for a further period up to, but not exceeding twenty (20) years from the
expiration of the initial term hereof ...’.

“PWU entered into the aforesaid lease contract, dated December 3, 1983, purporting
to be the donee of the property involved in a deed of donation executed by BENITEZ
in its favor; which deed of donation, however, was executed only in December 1984,
much later than the execution of the lease contract.
“After the expiration of the lease contract on January 1, 1988, negotiations began on
the purchase of the property in question on a plain offer of BENITEZ to sell the
same. In her letter of 21 August 1989, BENITEZ advised the PHRDC, through its
General Manager Mr. Juvenal Catajoy, to ‘pursue the successful completion of the
sale of the subject 7-hectare property within 30 days from August 31, 1989 at the
agreed price of P70.00 per square meter’.

“Again, in BENITEZ’ letter of February 4, 1991, she stated the position of the
University regarding the negotiated sale of the 7-hectare property in Dasmariñas,
Cavite’ and ‘confirme(d) that the agreed purchase price in 1989 [was] P70.00 per sq.
m. ...’.

“In view of the agreement on the sale of the land in question, PHRDC prepared a
Deed of Absolute Sale with BENITEZ, as vendor, and PHRDC and CMDF, as
vendees, duly represented by then Undersecretary Gloria M. Arroyo, for the signature
of BENITEZ.

“Subsequently, BENITEZ and PHRDC, represented by PHRDC General Manager

Juvenal Catajoy, Jr., agreed that the payment of ‘rentals for the Dasmariñas lot
[would] cease effective July 1, 1989 in view of on-going negotiations for the eventual
sale of the lot’.

“However, for reasons known only to her, BENITEZ did not sign the Deed of
Absolute Sale thus reneging on her commitment to sell the lot in question.

“Thereafter, in a letter dated August 15, 1995, BENITEZ and PWU demanded from
PHRDC the payment of rentals and to vacate the premises within 30 days from
notice. It later filed an unlawful detainer suit against petitioner.

“Failing to acquire the property involved through negotiated sale, petitioner, through
the Department of Trade and Industry, to which CMDF is attached, instituted a
complaint for Eminent Domain, pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No.
1035, dated June 25, 1985.

“In compliance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, as amended by

Presidential Decree No. 42, petitioner deposited with the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), Makati Avenue Branch, in favor of defendant, Seven Hundred Eight Thousand
Four Hundred Ninety Pesos (P708,490.00) an amount equivalent to the provisional
value of the land sought to be expropriated.

“On May 16, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
“On May 24, 1996 respondent Judge issued an Order (Annex ‘D’, Petition) granting
petitioner’s Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Possession.

“In compliance with the Order of May 24, 1996, the Clerk of Court issued a Writ of
Possession (Annex ‘E’, Petition) which the Sheriff duly implemented.

“Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of May 24, 1996
xxx which petitioner opposed.

“On July 26, 1996, respondent Judge issued the assailed Order (Annex ‘A’, Petition)
the dispositive portion of which reads:

‘WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration is

granted. Accordingly, the Order dated May 24, 1996 is hereby set aside and
reconsidered. The Writ of Possession issued in consonance therewith is hereby
quashed.’

“On August 21, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Annex ‘F’,
Petition) of the above Order. Private respondent filed an Opposition (Annex ‘G’,
Petition) thereto.

“On February 20, 1997, respondent Judge denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration (Annex
‘B’, Petition).”[5]

The foregoing narration of the facts was not contradicted by private respondent.[6] Not
satisfied by the court a quo’s rulings, petitioner thus elevated the matter to this Court.[7]

The Issue

In its Memorandum, petitioner submits that “[t]he only legal issue raised in the petition is
whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he quashed the writ
of possession which he had previously issued.”[8] Put differently, the issue is whether the
respondent judge may quash a writ of possession on the ground that the expropriating
government agency is already occupying the property sought to be expropriated.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

Issuance of Writ of Possession:

 A Duty Mandated by Law

It is undisputed that the expropriation proceeding in the case at bar involves a development
project covered by EO 1035. The site, which is being used by the Philippine Human Resources
Development Center (PHRDC), is sought to be expropriated for the establishment and operation
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Human Resources Development Project
of the Philippines, a component of which is the Construction Manpower Development Center
(CMDC), an agency now under the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Plainly, the
respondent judge is required to issue a writ of possession in favor of petitioner, pursuant to
Section 7 of EO 1035, which reads:

“SEC 7. Expropriation. If the parties fail to agree in negotiation of the sale of the
land as provided in the preceding section, the government implementing
agency/instrumentality concerned shall have authority to immediately institute
expropriation proceedings through the Office of the Solicitor General, as the case may
be. The just compensation to be paid for the property acquired through expropriation
shall be in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 1533. Courts shall give priority
to the adjudication of cases on expropriation and shall immediately issue the
necessary writ of possession upon deposit by the government implementing
agency/instrumentality concerned of an amount equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of
the amount of just compensation provided under P.D. No. 1533; Provided, That the
period within which said writ of possession shall be issued shall in no case extend
beyond five (5) days from the date such deposit was made.”

Under this statutory provision, when the government or its authorized agent makes the
required deposit, the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession. We note that
the respondent judge indeed issued such writ in favor of petitioner, aptly stating:

“There being a deposit made by the plaintiff with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the
amount of P708,490.00 which is equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject matter
hereof based on defendant’s 1990 tax declaration, coupled with the fact that notice to defendant
as landowner has been effected, the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession is hereby
GRANTED. Forthwith, let a Writ of Possession be issued ordering the Sheriff to place plaintiff
in possession of the property involved in this case.”[9]

Writ of Possession Necessary

As previously mentioned, the trial court reversed itself by later issuing an Order quashing
the writ of possession, reasoning as follows:

“While this Court fully agrees with the plaintiff that it is entitled to be placed in possession of the
property subject of the Complaint at once, the position of the parties in the case at bar is
different. For, plaintiff admitted that it is already in possession of subject premises. Such being
the case, it is obvious that plaintiff’s purpose in securing a writ of possession is only to utilize it
as leverage in the ejectment suit filed against it by defendant Benitez wherein the issue is
possession.”[10]

In denying the motion for reconsideration of said Order, the respondent judge reiterated his
position, adding that “the present case is different from the ordinary action for eminent domain
because prior to the filing of this case, there was already an ejectment suit instituted against
plaintiff-corporation.”[11] Agreeing with the trial court, private respondent contends that “the writ
of possession is warranted only in cases where the party seeking [it] is not yet in possession [of]
the property sought to be expropriated.”[12]

Private respondent underscores Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure,
which in part states that “the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of
the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation xxx.”[13] She also points
out that since Presidential Decree (PD) 42 provides that the “plaintiff shall have the right to take
or enter upon the possession of the real property involved,” the writ of possession it requires to
be issued “is not to maintain possession but intended for the purpose of taking or entering
possession.” [14]
The Court is not persuaded. The expropriation of real property does not include mere
physical entry or occupation of land. Although eminent domain usually involves a taking of
title, there may also be compensable taking of only some, not all, of the property interests in the
bundle of rights that constitute ownership.[15]
In the instant case, it is manifest that the petitioner, in pursuit of an objective beneficial to
public interest, seeks to realize the same through its power of eminent domain. In exercising this
power, petitioner intended to acquire not only physical possession but also the legal right to
possess and ultimately to own the subject property. Hence, its mere physical entry and
occupation of the property fall short of the taking of title, which includes all the rights that may
be exercised by an owner over the subject property. Its actual occupation, which renders
academic the need for it to enter, does not by itself include its acquisition of all the
rights of ownership. Its right to possess did not attend its initial physical possession of the
property because the lease, which had authorized said possession, lapsed. In short, petitioner
wanted not merely possession de facto but possession de jure as well.
What will happen if the required writ of possession is not issued? This question becomes
very important because the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), where private respondent sued
petitioner for unlawful detainer, has rendered a decision ordering petitioner to vacate the
property.[16] It would be circuitous, if not legally absurd, for this Court to require petitioner to
first vacate the property in view of the adverse judgment in the unlawful detainer case, and soon
afterwards, order the trial court to issue in petitioner’s favor a writ of possession pursuant to the
expropriation proceedings. Such a scenario is a bureaucratic waste of precious time and
resources. This precisely is the sort of pernicious and unreasonable delay of government
infrastructure or development projects, which EO 1035 intended to address by requiring the
immediate issuance of a writ of possession. Ineludibly, said writ is both necessary and practical,
because mere physical possession that is gained by entering the property is not equivalent to
expropriating it with the aim of acquiring ownership over, or even the right to possess, the
expropriated property.
Citing J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals[17] and Cuatico v. Court of
Appeals,[18] private respondent further submits that “the eminent domain case, much less the writ
of possession, cannot be entertained to defeat the ejectment case.”[19]
Such argument is untenable. It is well-settled that eminent domain is an inherent power of
the State that need not be granted even by the fundamental law.[20] Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, in mandating that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation,” merely imposes a limit on the government’s exercise of this power and provides
a measure of protection to the individual’s right to property.[21] Thus, in J.M. Tuason &
Co. and Cuatico, the Court merely enforced the constitutional limitation regarding the payment
of just compensation. Clearly, an ejectment suit ordinarily should not prevail over the State’s
power of eminent domain.
We note that in the present case, petitioner has deposited not just the 10 percent required
under EO 1035, but the whole amount of the just compensation that private respondent is entitled
to. Thus, we are unable to find any legal impediment for the issuance of a writ of possession in
favor of petitioner. Precisely, the purpose of instituting expropriation proceedings is to prevent
petitioner from being ejected from the subject property; otherwise, the above-mentioned absurd
and circuitous rulings would arise.

Assailed Orders Tainted by Grave Abuse of Discretion

It is clear that, in quashing the writ of possession, respondent judge violated EO 1035 on the
quaint and whimsical ground that petitioner was already in actual possession of the
property.[22] His assailed Orders dated July 26, 1996 and February 20, 1997 are therefore void for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.[23]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Orders dated July 26, 1996 and
February 20, 1997 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

FERDINAND S. TOPACIO, G.R. No. 179895

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
 AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF VELASCO, JR.,
THE SANDIGANBAYAN NACHURA,
GREGORY SANTOS ONG REYES,
and THE OFFICE OF THE LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
SOLICITOR GENERAL, BRION, JJ.
Respondents.
Promulgated:

December 18, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Ferdinand Topacio (petitioner) via the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition seeks, in the main, to prevent Justice Gregory Ong (Ong) from further
exercising the powers, duties and responsibilities of a Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice.

It will be recalled that in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,[1] the Court, by

Decision of July 3, 2007, enjoined Ong “from accepting an appointment to the
position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming the position and
discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have successfully completed
all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to
show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth
and citizenship.”[2]

On July 9, 2007, Ong immediately filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig City a Petition for the “amendment/ correction/ supplementation or
annotation of an entry in [his] Certificate of Birth,” docketed as S.P. Proc No.
11767-SJ, “Gregory Santos Ong v. The Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila,
et al.”[3]
 Meanwhile, petitioner, by verified Letter-Request/Complaint[4] of September
5, 2007, implored respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to initiate
post-haste aquo warranto proceeding against Ong in the latter’s capacity as an
incumbent Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. Invoking paragraph 1, Section
7, Article VIII of the Constitution[5] in conjunction with the Court’s Decision
in Kilosbayan Foundation
v. Ermita,[6] petitioner points out that natural-born citizenship is also a qualification
for appointment as member of the Sandiganbayan and that Ong has failed to meet
the citizenship requirement from the time of his appointment as such in October
1998.

The OSG, by letter of September 25, 2007, informed petitioner that it

“cannot favorably act on [his] request for the filing of a quo warranto petition until
the [RTC] case shall have been terminated with finality.”[7] Petitioner assails this
position of the OSG as being tainted with grave abuse of discretion, aside from
Ong’s continuous discharge of judicial functions.

Hence, this petition, positing that:

IN OCTOBER OF 1998, RESPONDENT WAS NOT DULY-

QUALIFIED UNDER THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 1,
SECTION 7, OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, TO BE APPOINTED
AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, MERELY
ON THE STRENGTH OF AN IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATE
ISSUED BY THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND A 1ST
INDORSEMENT DATED 22 MAY 1997 ISSUED BY THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, BECAUSE, AS OF OCTOBER 1998,
RESPONDET’S BIRTH CERTIFICATE INDICATED THAT
RESPONDENT IS A CHINESE CITIZEN AND BECAUSE, AS OF
OCTOBER 1998, THE RECORDS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT
DECLARED THAT RESPONDENT IS A NATURALIZED FILIPINO
CITIZEN.[8] (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner thus contends that Ong should immediately desist from holding
the position of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan since he is disqualified on
the basis of citizenship, whether gauged from his birth certificate which indicates
him to be a Chinese citizen or against his bar records bearing out his status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen, as declared in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita.

Ong, on the other hand, states that Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita did not
annul or declare null his appointment as Justice of the Supreme Court, but merely
enjoined him from accepting his appointment, and that there is no definitive
pronouncement therein that he is not a natural-born Filipino. He informs that he,
nonetheless, voluntarily relinquished the appointment to the Supreme Court out of
judicial statesmanship.[9]

By Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss of January 3, 2008, Ong informs

that the RTC, by Decision of October 24, 2007, already granted his petition and
recognized him as a natural-born citizen. The Decision having, to him, become
final,[10]he caused the corresponding annotation thereof on his Certificate of
Birth.[11]

Invoking the curative provisions of the 1987 Constitution, Ong explains that
his status as a natural-born citizen inheres from birth and the legal effect of such
recognition retroacts to the time of his birth.

Ong thus concludes that in view of the RTC decision, there is no more legal
or factual basis for the present petition, or at the very least this petition must await
the final disposition of the RTC case which to him involves a prejudicial issue.

The parties to the present petition have exchanged pleadings [12] that mirror
the issues in the pending petitions for certiorari in G.R. No. 180543, “Kilosbayan
Foundation, et al. v. Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr., et al,” filed with this Court and in
CA-G.R. SP No. 102318, “Ferdinand S. Topacio v. Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr., et
al.,”[13] filed with the appellate court, both of which assail, inter alia, the RTC
October 24, 2007 Decision.

First, on the objection concerning the verification of the petition.

The OSG alleges that the petition is defectively verified, being based on
petitioner’s “personal knowledge and belief and/or authentic records,” and having
been “acknowledged” before a notary public who happens to be petitioner’s father,
contrary to the Rules of Court[14] and the Rules on Notarial Practice of
2004,[15] respectively.

This technicality deserves scant consideration where the question at issue, as

in this case, is one purely of law and there is no need of delving into the veracity of
the allegations in the petition, which are not disputed at all by respondents.[16]
 One factual allegation extant from the petition is the exchange of written
communications between petitioner and the OSG, the truthfulness of which the
latter does not challenge. Moreover, petitioner also verifies such correspondence
on the basis of the thereto attached letters, the authenticity of which he warranted
in the same verification-affidavit. Other allegations in the petition are verifiable in
a similar fashion, while the rest are posed as citations of law.

The purpose of verification is simply to secure an assurance that the

allegations of the petition or complaint have been made in good faith; or are true
and correct, not merely speculative. This requirement is simply a condition
affecting the form of pleadings, and non-compliance therewith does not necessarily
render it fatally defective. Indeed, verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional
requirement.[17]

In the same vein, the Court brushes aside the defect, insofar as the petition is
concerned, of a notarial act performed by one who is disqualified by reason of
consanguinity, without prejudice to any administrative complaint that may be filed
against the notary public.

Certiorari with respect to the OSG

On the issue of whether the OSG committed grave abuse of discretion in

deferring the filing of a petition for quo warranto, the Court rules in the negative.

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.[18]

The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion, much less, a grave one, on the
part of the OSG in deferring action on the filing of a quo warranto case until after
the RTC case has been terminated with finality. A decision is not deemed tainted
with grave abuse of discretion simply because the affected party disagrees with
it.[19]
 The Solicitor General is the counsel of the government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and its officials or agents. In the discharge of its task, the
Solicitor General must see to it that the best interest of the government is upheld
within the limits set by law.[20]

The pertinent rules of Rule 66 on quo warranto provide:

SECTION 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An

action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be
commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the
provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within
the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful
authority so to act.
SEC. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must
commence action. ─ The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when
directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or
otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the
preceding section can be established by proof, must commence such
action.
SEC. 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor may
commence action with permission of court. ─ The Solicitor General or a
public prosecutor may, with the permission of the court in which the
action is to be commenced, bring such an action at the request and upon
the relation of another person; but in such case the officer bringing it
may first require an indemnity for the expenses and costs of the action in
an amount approved by and to be deposited in the court by the person at
whose request and upon whose relation the same is brought. (Italics and
emphasis in the original)
 In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor General may suspend or
turn down the institution of an action for quo warranto where there are just and
valid reasons.[21] Thus, in Gonzales v. Chavez,[22] the Court ruled:

Like the Attorney-General of the United States who has

absolute discretion in choosing whether to prosecute or not to
prosecute or to abandon a prosecution already started, our own
Solicitor General may even dismiss, abandon, discontinue or
compromise suits either with or without stipulation with the other
party. Abandonment of a case, however, does not mean that the
Solicitor General may just drop it without any legal and valid reasons,
for the discretion given him is not unlimited. Its exercise must be, not
only within the parameters get by law but with the best interest of the
State as the ultimate goal.[23]

Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his
discretion in the management of the case. He may start the prosecution of the case
by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file the case at all. He
may do everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the
national interest and the policy of the government on the matter at hand.[24]

It appears that after studying the case, the Solicitor General saw the folly of
re-litigating the same issue of Ong’s citizenship in the quo warranto case
simultaneously with the RTC case, not to mention the consequent risk of forum-
shopping. In any event, the OSG did not totally write finis to the issue as it merely
advised petitioner to await the outcome of the RTC case.

Certiorari and Prohibition with respect to Ong

By petitioner’s admission, what is at issue is Ong’s title to the office of

Associate Justice of Sandiganbayan.[25] He claims to have been constrained to file
the present petition after the OSG refused to heed his request to institute a suit
for quo warranto. Averring that Ong is disqualified to be a member of any lower
collegiate court, petitioner specifically prays that, after appropriate proceedings,
the Court
 . . . issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition against Respondent Ong,
ordering Respondent Ong to cease and desist from further exercising the
powers, duties, and responsibilities of a Justice of the Sandiganbayan due
to violation of the first sentence of paragraph 1, Section 7, of the 1987
Constitution; . . . issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition against
Respondent Ong and declare that he was disqualified from being
appointed to the post of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan in
October of 1998, considering that, as of October of 1998, the birth
certificate of Respondent Ong declared that he is a Chinese citizen, while
even the records of this Honorable Court, as of October of 1998, declared
that Respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino; x x x[26]

While denominated as a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the petition

partakes of the nature of a quo warranto proceeding with respect to Ong, for it
effectively seeks to declare null and void his appointment as an Associate Justice
of the Sandiganbayan for being unconstitutional. While the petition professes to be
one for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner even adverts to a “quo warranto”
aspect of the petition.[27]

Being a collateral attack on a public officer’s title, the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition must be dismissed.

The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo
warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally,[28] even through
mandamus[29] or a motion to annul or set aside order.[30] In Nacionalista Party v.
De Vera,[31] the Court ruled that prohibition does not lie to inquire into the validity
of the appointment of a public officer.

x x x [T]he writ of prohibition, even when directed against persons acting

as judges or other judicial officers, cannot be treated as a substitute
for quo warranto or be rightfully called upon to perform any of the
functions of the writ. If there is a court, judge or officer de facto, the title
to the office and the right to act cannot be questioned by prohibition. If
an intruder takes possession of a judicial office, the person dispossessed
cannot obtain relief through a writ of prohibition commanding the alleged
intruder to cease from performing judicial acts, since in its very nature
 prohibition is an improper remedy by which to determine the title to an
office.[32]

Even if the Court treats the case as one for quo warranto, the petition is, just
the same, dismissible.

A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right
or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment.[33] It is brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped,
intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office, [34] and may be
commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or
by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another.[35]

Nothing is more settled than the principle, which goes back to the 1905 case
of Acosta v. Flor,[36] reiterated in the recent 2008 case of Feliciano v.
Villasin,[37] that for aquo warranto petition to be successful, the private person
suing must show a clear right to the contested office. In fact, not even a mere
preferential right to be appointed thereto can lend a modicum of legal ground to
proceed with the action.[38]

In the present case, petitioner presented no sufficient proof of a clear and

indubitable franchise to the office of an Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan. He in fact concedes that he was never entitled to assume the
office of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.[39]

In the instance in which the Petition for Quo Warranto is filed by

an individual in his own name, he must be able to prove that he is entitled
to the controverted public office, position, or franchise; otherwise, the
holder of the same has a right to the undisturbed possession thereof. In
actions for Quo Warranto to determine title to a public office, the
complaint, to be sufficient in form, must show that the plaintiff is entitled
to the office. In Garcia v. Perez, this Court ruled that the person
instituting Quo Warranto proceedings on his own behalf, under Section
5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, must aver and be able to show that he is
entitled to the office in dispute. Without such averment or evidence of
 such right, the action may be dismissed at any stage.[40](Emphasis
in the original)

The rightful authority of a judge, in the full exercise of his public judicial
functions, cannot be questioned by any merely private suitor, or by any other,
except in the form especially provided by law.[41] To uphold such action would
encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing
incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the governmental
machine.[42]

Clearly then, it becomes entirely unwarranted at this time to pass upon the
citizenship of Ong. The Court cannot, upon the authority of the present petition,
determine said question without encroaching on and preempting the proceedings
emanating from the RTC case. Even petitioner clarifies that he is not presently
seeking a resolution on Ong’s citizenship, even while he acknowledges the
uncertainty of Ong’s natural-born citizenship.[43]

The present case is different from Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, given

Ong’s actual physical possession and exercise of the functions of the office of an
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan, which is a factor that sets into motion
the de facto doctrine.

Suffice it to mention that a de facto officer is one who is in possession of the

office and is discharging its duties under color of authority, and by color of
authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment, however irregular
or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.[44] If a person appointed
to an office is subsequently declared ineligible therefor, his presumably valid
appointment will give him color of title that will confer on him the status of a de
facto officer.[45]

x x x A judge de facto assumes the exercise of a part of the prerogative of

sovereignty, and the legality of that assumption is open to the attack of
the sovereign power alone. Accordingly, it is a well-established
principle, dating back from the earliest period and repeatedly confirmed
by an unbroken current of decisions, that the official acts of a de
facto judge are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure judge, so
 far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are
concerned.[46]

If only to protect the sanctity of dealings by the public with persons whose
ostensible authority emanates from the State, and without ruling on the conditions
for the interplay of the de facto doctrine, the Court declares that Ong may turn out
to be either a de jure officer who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed and
qualified and whose term of office has not expired, or a de facto officer who enjoys
certain rights, among which is that his title to said office may not be contested
except directly by writ of quo warranto,[47] which contingencies all depend on the
final outcome of the RTC case.

With the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to dwell on the

ancillary issues raised by the parties.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., HON. HERMOGENES CALAUAG, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Quezon City, Branch IV) and HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch V), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), THE CHAIRMAN-ADMINISTRATOR OF THE LAND
TENURE ADMINISTRATION, BRUNA ROSETE and BUENAVENTURA DIZON, respondents.

---------------------------------

G.R. No. L-18672 December 26, 1961

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the Land Tenure

Administration), petitioner,
vs.
J. M. TUAZON & CO., ET AL., respondents.

Araneta and Araneta for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General and Legal Staff, LTA for respondents.
Legal Staff, LTA for petitioner.
Araneta and Araneta and A. M. Tolentino for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

The record shows that the judgments rendered in 1955 by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in its
ejectment cases Q-1401 and Q-1402, were, upon regular appeal, sequently affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals in its cases CA-G.R. Nos. 16265-66-R, "Tuason & Company, Inc. vs. Bruna Rosete
and Buenaventura Dizon". The Court of First Instance, after the appellate court's decision became
final and upon return of the records in due course, issued writ of execution of the judgment against
Rosete and Dizon, as prayed for by the landowner Tuason & Company. Subsequently, on November
19, 1960, the Court of First Instance issued orders of demolition of the houses of the evictees or
judgment debtors.

A few days previously, on November 16, 1960, the land-owner J. M. Tuason & Company had also
applied for a writ of prohibition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (Case No. Q-5527)
against the Land Tenure administration, the Auditor General, and the Solicitor General, to restrain
them from instituting expropriation proceedings of the petitioner Company's land in Quezon City,
generally known as the "Tatalon Estate", as expressly and specifically authorized by Republic Act
No. 2616, that became law, without executive approval, on August 3, 1959; the Company claiming
mainly that the Republic Act was unconstitutional, null and void, as legislation aimed at depriving it of
its property for the benefit of squatters and occupants, even if the property had been actually
subdivided, and its lots were being sold to the public; and that respondent officers threatened to
enforce said law by initiating expropriation proceedings. At petitioner's request, Judge Hermogenes
Caluag of the Quezon City Court of First Instance (to whom the prohibition case was assigned)
issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction on November 18, 1960, upon the filing of a bond of
P20,000.

After injunction was issued, the evictees in Quezon City cases Q-1401 and 1402, Bruna Rosete and
Tranquilino Dizon, petitioned the Court of First Instance to suspend the order of demolition of their
houses, on the ground that they were tenants of the Tatalon Estate; that Republic Act No. 2616,
after specifically authorizing the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate, in its section 4, prescribes as
follows:

Section 4. After the expropriation proceedings mentioned in section two of this Act shall have
been initiated and during the pendency of the same, no ejectment proceedings shall be
instituted or prosecuted against the present occupant of any lot in said Tatalon Estate, and
no ejectment proceedings already commenced shall be continued and such lot or any portion
thereof shall not be sold by the owners of said estate to any person other than the present
occupant without the consent of the latter given in a public document.

However, Judge Nicasio Yatco of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City denied the suspension
because no expropriation proceedings had been actually filed.

Thereupon, the evictees Rosete and Dizon recoursed to the Court of Appeals, and there instituted,
on February 4, 1961, certiorari proceedings (C.A.-G.R. No. 28842-R) against Judge Yatco and
Caluag, J. M. Tuason & Co. Inc., and the Land Tenure Administration. They averred, after recital of
the facts, that Judge Caluag, gravely abused his discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction in the
prohibition case No. Q-5527 to restrain the initiation of condemnation proceedings over the Tatalon
Estate; that as beneficiaries under section 4 of Republic Act No. 2616, they were entitled to a stay of
the demolition proceedings against them; and that Judge Yatco abused his discretion in refusing to
suspend the same until the expropriation case was terminated. The petitioners prayed that —

(1) Judge Yatco be enjoined from issuing orders of demolition in Cases Nos. Q-1401 and
1402;
 (2) Judge Caluag be enjoined from enforcing the preliminary injunction he had issued in
Case No. Q-5527; and

(3) That the Land Tenure Administrator be commanded to institute the expropriation
proceedings authorized by Republic Act No. 2616.

The Court of Appeals gave due course to the certiorari petition, and on February 9, 1961 ordered the
issuance ex parte of the preliminary injunction prayed for, upon the filing of a P1,000 bond, which
was done. Respondent Tuason & Company, Inc., moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction of the
Court of Appeals, pointing out that said Court's jurisdiction to take cognizance
of certiorari proceedings and to issue injunction was only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; that the
orders of execution issued by the Quezon City Court are not appealable; that the prohibition
proceedings in case No. Q-5527, involving (as they did) a question of constitutionality of a statute,
were likewise not appealable to the Court of Appeals; and that said Court, therefore, was without
jurisdiction to pass over the questioned orders and that its injunction was improperly issued, not
being in aid of the appellate jurisdiction the Court of Appeals. These points were reiterated in the
Company's answer to the petition forcertiorari. The Court of Appeals (Second Division) refused to lift
the preliminary injunction; on the contrary, on February 26, upon motion of one of the respondents,
the Land Tenure Administration, it clarified the previous writ of preliminary injunction.

in the sense that said Writ lifts, quashes or dissolves writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the Hon. Judge Hermogenes Caluag, in Civil Case No. 5527, CFI, Rizal, so that respondent
Land Tenure Administration may thus properly file the complaint for expropriation as
authorized by Republic Act No. 2616.

Thereupon, Tuason & Company instituted in this Supreme Court certiorari proceedings (G.R. No. L-
18128). We gave it due course and enjoined enforcement of orders of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-
G.R. No. 28842, and order the Land Tenure Administration to the defer the filing of the expropriation
proceedings until further orders.

The sequel to the events narrated can be gleaned from the record of case G.R. No. L-18672,
a certiorariproceeding filed by the Land Tenure Administration against Judge Hermogenes Caluag
and Tuason & Company, Inc. The motion of the Land Tenure Administration and its correspondents
to dismiss the prohibition case in the Quezon City Court (Case No. Q-5527), as well as their motion
to dissolve the preliminary injunction issued by Judge Caluag, was denied by him; and when the
Second Division of the Court of Appeals issued its resolution of February 26, 1961, quashing Judge
Caluag's preliminary injunction, the Land Tenure Administration attorneys attempted to file the
complaint for the expropriation of 93 hectares of the Tatalon Estate in the Quezon City court, but
said complaint could not be docketed because the Judge had forbidden the Court Clerk to do so.
Despite entreaties, Judge Caluag refused to allow the expropriation complaint to be docketed,
claiming that he had no official knowledge of the resolution of the Court of Appeals, even after he
was served with a certified copy thereof.

The Land Tenure Administration avers that the issuance of the injunction in the prohibition case (Q-
5527), the denial of the motion to dismiss the case, the refusal to dissolve the injunction, and the
refusal to have the complaint for expropriation docketed were all in abuse of discretion and excess of
jurisdiction; that furthermore, venue was improperly laid, because an action for prohibition is
personal in character, and neither petitioner nor any of the respondents in said prohibition case were
domiciled in Quezon City. Petitioner Land Tenure Administration, therefore, prayed that Judge
Caluag be ordered by this Court to refrain from proceeding with the prohibition case, from enforcing
the writ of preliminary injunction issued therein, from issuing orders of demolition of the tenant's
houses, and to allow the expropriation case to be docketed and regularly proceeded with.
As we view it, two main questions are involved in these cases:

(1) In G.R. L-18128: Did the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to lift, quash, and dissolve the
preliminary writ of injunction issued by Judge Caluag in the prohibition case No. Q-5527 pending in
his court?

(2) In G.R. L-18672: Did Judge Caluag act without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
preliminary injunction in the prohibition case?

As to the first issue, we are satisfied that the writ of injunction issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 28842-R is null and void for want of jurisdiction. The authority of said Court to issue writs
of mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari and habeas corpus is expressly limited by statute to
their issuance in aid of its appellate jurisdiction (Judiciary Act, sec. 30), and it has been repeatedly
ruled by us that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to issue such writs must be based on the
existence of a right to appeal to it from the judgment on the merits in the main case. Without such
right of appeal, the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to interfere, for that Court is purely a
creature of statute.1 Since the issuance of orders for execution after the judgment of ejectment had
become final are not appealable, as the Court of Appeals itself has ruled,2 otherwise litigations would
never end, and since the prohibition case No. Q-5527 involved the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 2616, an issue of which the Court of Appeals could not take cognizance, said Court clearly had
no authority to interfere by prerogative writ in either litigation, for lack of appellate jurisdiction Judge
Caluag of Quezon City was, therefore, not bound by the writs so issued by the Court of Appeals.

On the second question, the preliminary injunction issued by Judge Caluag was merely an incident
to the main (prohibition) case, and evidently had for its object to prevent that the principal case and
any remedy to be granted therein should be rendered moot and nugatory by the filing of the
condemnation proceedings sought to be prohibited. Issuance of the injunction was authorized by
section 7 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, dealing with writs, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

SEC. 7. Expediting proceedings. Preliminary injunction.

The court in which the petition is filed, or a judge thereof, may make orders expediting the
proceedings, and may also grant a preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of
the parties pending such proceedings.

Authority is likewise derived from section 6 of Rule 124, concerning the powers and duties of courts.

When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs,
processes and other means necessary to carry into effect may be employed by such court or
officer.

That the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 2616 could be invoked as a defense in the
expropriation proceedings does not alter the right of respondent Tuason & Company to invoke it in
the prohibition case, without awaiting the initiation of the condemnation case. In any event, the issue
of constitutionality would be like a prejudicial question to the expropriation, as it would be a waste of
time and effort to appoint evaluation commissioners and debate the market value of the property
sought to be condemned if it turned out that the condemnation was illegal.

It is urged by amicus curiae that Courts of First Instance have no jurisdiction to entertain actions
assailing the constitutionality of statutes or treaties, because section 10 of Article VIII of the
Constitution prescribes that —
 No treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds of all
the members of the (Supreme) Court.

This contention is, however, destroyed by the terms of section 2 of Article VIII, wherein the
Constitution itself inhibits Congress from depriving the Supreme Court —

of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari or writ of
error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts in —

(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance or executive
orders or regulations is in question (Emphasis supplied).

Plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases
involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of
inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue. Construing both
provisions together, it is readily discerned that the two-third vote of the Supreme Court, required by
section 10 of Article VIII, conditions only the decisions of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.

It is true that, as argued by the petitioner Land Tenure Administration, the mere fact that a statute is
alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid will not entitle a party to have its enforcement enjoined. But
the rule is not without exceptions. In Cochiong vs. Dinglasan, 79 Phil. 125, this Court quoted with
approval from 28 Am. Jur. 369-371 the rule that —

It is recognized, however, that an injunction will lie to restrain the threatened enforcement of
an invalid law where the lawful use and enjoyment of private property will be injuriously
affected by its enforcement ...,

and the petition for a writ of prohibition in Q-5527 Court of First Instance of Quezon City pleads
precisely this threatened injury to the proprietary rights of Tuason & Company, Inc., as owners of the
Tatalon Estates. Whether this injury is real or not must be decided on the evidence submitted in that
case, and we are in no position to resolve it in the certiorari proceedings now before us. Our task
here is merely to determine absence or excess of jurisdiction: and on the facts and applicable law
we cannot say that in the issuance of the preliminary injunction by the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City there was such grave abuse of discretion as would constitute excess of jurisdiction.

It may be added that the maintenance of the injunction issued by Judge Caluag works no real
prejudice at present, not only because we cannot anticipate the final decision of Judge Caluag on
the issue of constitutionality, but also because the Land Tenure Administration confesses that it has
only two million pesos available to pay for property that, according to the proposed complaint for
expropriation, has an area of 1,096,849.50 square meters with a reasonable assessed value of
P6,034,865.95. Plainly, the government is not now in a position to take over the possession of the
land since it does not have the money that it must deposit as a prerequisite to its entry (section 3 of
Rule 69 on Eminent Domain).

In moving for the lifting of the preliminary injunction and for a stay of the ejectment proceedings, the
Land Tenure Administration and the other movants assume that, upon filing of the condemnation
petition, the land owner will be barred from enforcing its final judgments of ejectment against the
possessors of the land, even if the Government should not take over the possession of the property
involved. This view, in our opinion, is not warranted. We see nothing in the terms of Republic Act No.
2616 to justify the belief that the Legislature intended a departure from the normal course prescribed
for eminent domain cases, where the rights of the owner of the land may not be disturbed without
previous deposit of the provisional value of the property bought to be condemned. The effectivity of
section 4 of Republic Act 2616, discontinuing ejectment proceedings against the present occupants,
and restraining any act of disposition of the property, is justifiable only if the Government takes
possession of the land in question by depositing its value. It needs no argument to show that by
restraining the land owner from enforcing even final judgments in his favor to recover possession of
his property, as well as from disposing of it to persons of his choice, he is deprived of the substance
of ownership, and his title is left as an empty shell. The land owner would then be deprived of those
attributes of ownership that give it value, and his property is virtually taken from him without
compensation and in violation of the Constitution, particularly in view of the fact that R.A. 2616
(unlike previous Acts of similar character) does not even provide for a deposit of the current rentals
by the tenants during the pendency of the proceedings (Cf. R.A. No. 1126, section 5). The Bill of
Rights, in requiring that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation," and Article XIII, section 4 in prescribing that "Congress may authorize, upon
payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and
conveyed at cost to individuals," prohibit any disturbance of proprietary rights without coetaneous
payment of just indemnity. Hence, the mere filing of the condemnation proceedings for the benefit of
tenants cannot, by itself alone, lawfully suspend the condemnee's dominical rights, whether of
possession, enjoyment, or disposition. And this is especially the case where final and executory
judgments of ejectment have been obtained against the occupants of the property.

Whether or not venue was correctly laid in the prohibition case now pending in the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City is a question of law that does not affect jurisdiction, and any resolution of
the trial Court thereon is reviewable by appeal and not by certiorari.

In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) In Case G.R. No. L-18128, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals et al., setting aside the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals in its case CA-G.R. No. 28842-R, the
same being null andvoid for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Court to take cognizance of said
case;

(b) In Case G.R. No. L-18672, Republic of the Philippines vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. et al.,
dismissing the petition for certiorari, and denying the writs of certiorari and injunction applied for. lawphil.net

The Court of First Instance of Quezon City is directed to hear and resolve the prohibition case No.
Q-5527 with all practicable dispatch.

Without costs. So ordered.

MUNICIPALITY OF BIÑAN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOSE MAR GARCIA, Judge of the Regional Trial Court at Biñan, Laguna (BRANCH
XXXIV, Region IV), and ERLINDA FRANCISCO, respondents.

The Provincial Fiscal for petitioner.

Roman M. Alonte for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

Three (3) questions are resolved in the action of certiorari at bar. The first is whether the special civil
action of eminent domain under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court is a case "wherein multiple appeals
are allowed, 1 as regards which 'the period of appeal shall be thirty [30] days, 2 instead of fifteen (15)
days. 3 The second is whether or not the Trial Court may treat the motion to dismiss" filed by one of the
defendants in the action of eminent domain as a "motion to dismiss" under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,
reverse the sequence of trial in order and hear and determine said motion to dismiss, and thereafter
dismiss the expropriation suit as against the movant. And the third is whether or not a "locational
clearance issued by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission relative to use of land is a bar to an
expropriation suit involving that land.

The expropriation suit involved in this certiorari proceeding was commenced by complaint of the
Municipality of Biñan, Laguna 4 filed in the Regional Trial Court of Laguna and City of San Pablo,
presided over by respondent Judge Jose Mar Garcia. The complaint named as defendants the owners of
eleven (11) adjacent parcels of land in Biñan with an aggregate area of about eleven and a half (11-1/2)
hectares. The land sought to be expropriated was intended for use as the new site of a modern public
market and the acquisition was authorized by a resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan of Biñan approved
on April 11, 1983.

One of the defendants was Erlinda Francisco. She filed a "Motion to Dismiss" dated August 26,
1983, on the following grounds; (a) the allegations of the complaint are vague and conjectural; (b)
the complaint violates the constitutional limitations of law and jurisprudence on eminent domain; (c) it
is oppressive; (d) it is barred by prior decision and disposition on the subject matter; and (e) it states
no cause of action. 5 Now, her motion to dismiss" was filed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court:

Sec. 3. Defenses and objections within the time specified in the summons, each
defendant, in lieu of an answer, shall present in a single motion to dismiss or for
other apppropriate relief, all of his objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff
to take his property for the use or purpose specified in the complaint. All such
objections and defenses not so presented are waived. A copy of the motion shall be
served on the plaintiffs attorney of record and filed with the court with the proof of
service.

Her "motion to dismiss" was thus actually a pleading, taking the place of an answer in an ordinary
civil action; 6 it was not an ordinary motion governed by Rule 15, or a "motion to dismiss" within the
contemplation of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.

On October 23, 1983, respondent Judge issued a writ of possession in favor of the plaintiff
Municipality.

On February 3, 1984, Erlinda Francisco filed a "Motion for Separate Trial," invoking Section 2, Rule
31. 7 She alleged that there had already been no little delay in bringing all the defendants within the
court's jurisdiction, and some of the defendants seemed "nonchalant or without special interest in the
case" if not mere "free riders;" and "while the cause of action and defenses are basically the same;" she
had, among other defenses, "a constitutional defense of vested right via a pre-existing approved
Locational Clearance from the H.S.R.C." 8 Until this clearance was revoked, Francisco contended, or the
Municipality had submitted and obtained approval of a "rezoning of the lots in question," it was premature
for it to "file a case for expropriation. 9 The Court granted the motion. By Order dated March 2, 1984, it
directed that a separate trial be held for defendant Erlinda Francisco regarding her special defenses
mentioned in her .. Motion for Separate Trial and in her Motion to Dismiss, distinct from and separate from
the defenses commonly raised by all the defendants in their respective motions to dismiss."
At the separate trial, the Fiscal, in representation of the Municipality called the Trial Court's attention
to the irregularity of allowing Francisco to present her evidence ahead of the plaintiff, "putting the
cart before the horse, as it were." He argued that the motion to dismiss was in truth an answer, citing
Rural Progress Administration v. Judge de Guzman, and its filing did "not mean that the order of
presentation of evidence will be reversed," but the usual procedure should be followed; and the
evidence adduced should be deemed "evidence only for the motion for reconsideration of the writ of
possession." 10

Nevertheless, at the hearing of March 5, and March 26, 1984, the Court directed Francisco to
commence the presentation of evidence. Francisco presented the testimony of Atty. Josue L.
Jorvina, Jr. and certain exhibits the Land Use Map of the Municipality of Biñan, the Locational
Clearance and Development Permit issued by the H.S.R.C. in favor of "Erlinda Francisco c/o Ferlins
Realty & Development Corporation, and Executive Order No. 648 and Letter of Instruction No. 729,
etc. Thereafter, the respondent Judge issued an Order dated July 24, 1984 dismissing the complaint
"as against defendant ERLINDA FRANCISCO," and amending the Writ of Possession dated October
18, 1983 so as to "exclude therefrom and from its force and effects said defendant .. and her
property ..." His Honor found that-

1) a Locational Clearance had been issued on May 4,1983 by the

Human Settlements Regulatory Commission to the "Ferlin's Realty ..
owned by defendant Erlinda Francisco to convert .. (her) lot to a
commercial complex;"

2) according to the testimony of Atty. Jorvina of the H.S.R.C., a

grantee of a locational clearance acquires a vested right over the
subject property in the sense that .. said property may not be subject
of an application for locational clearance by another applicant while
said locational clearance is subsisting;"

3) such a clearance should be "considered as a decision and

disposition of private property co-equal with or in parity with a
disposition of private property through eminent domain;

4) the clearance was therefore "a legal bar against the right of plaintiff
Municipality .. to expropriate the said property."

The Municipality filed on August 17, 1984 a Motion for Reconsideration. Therein it (a) reiterated its
contention respecting the irregularity of the reversal of the order of trial, supra. 11 (b) decried the act of
the Court in considering the case submitted for decision after the presentation of evidence by Francisco
without setting the case for further hearing for the reception of the plaintiffs own proofs, (c) pointed out
that as admitted by Atty. Jorvina, the locational clearance did not "mean that other persons are already
prevented from filing locational clearance for the same project, and so could not be considered a bar to
expropriation, (d) argued that the locational clearance issued on May 4, 1983, became a "worthless sheet
of paper" one year later, on May 4, 1984 in accordance with the explicit condition in the clearance that it
"shall be considered automatically revoked if not used within a period of one (1) year from date of issue,"
the required municipal permits to put up the commercial complex never having been obtained by
Francisco; and (e) alleged that all legal requirements for the expropriation of the property had been duly
complied with by the Municipality. 12

The Municipality set its motion for reconsideration for hearing on August 28, 1984 after furnishing
Francisco's counsel with copy thereof The Court however re-scheduled the hearing more than two
(2) months later, on November 20, 1984. 13 Why the hearing was reset to such a remote date is not
explained.
On September 13, 1984, Francisco filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Execution and/or Finality of Order,"
contending that the Order of July 27, 1984 had become "final and executory on August 12, 1984" for
failure of the Municipality to file a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal within the reglementary
period," 14 i.e "fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order .. appealed from. 15

On October 10, 1984, the Court issued an Order declaring the Municipality's motion for
reconsideration dated August 15, 1984 to have been "filed out of time," on account of which the
Court 49 could not give due course to and/or act x x (thereon) except to dismiss (as it did thereby
dismiss) the same." 16 It drew attention to the fact that notice of its Order of July 24, 1984 (dismissing the
complaint as against Francisco) was served on plaintiff Municipality on July 27, 1984, but its motion for
reconsideration was not presented until August 17, 1984, beyond the fifteen-day period for appeal
prescribed by law. And on October 15, 1985, His Honor promulgated another Order directing the
issuance of (1) a writ of execution of the Order of July 24, 1984, and (2) a "certificate of finality" of said
order. 17

The Municipality attempted to have the respondent Court reconsider both and Orders of October 10,
and October 15, 1984. To this end it submitted a motion contending that: 18

1) "multiple appeals are allowed by law" in actions of eminent

domain, and hence the period of appeal is thirty (30), not fifteen (15)
days;

2) moreover, the grant of a separate trial at Francisco's instance had

given rise "ipso facto to a situation where multiple appeals became
available (Sections 4 and 5, Rule 36, .. Santos v. Pecson, 79 Phil.
261);"

3) it was wrong for the Trial Court to have acted exparte on the
motion for execution, the motion being "litigable in character;" and

4) it (the Municipality) was denied due process when the Court, after
receiving Francisco's evidence and admitting her exhibits,
immediately resolved the case on the merits as regards Francisco,
without setting the case "for further hearing for reception of evidence
for the plaintiff."

The motion was denied, by Order dated October 18, 1984; hence, the special civil action
of certiorari at bar.

1. There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned
with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the
suit. 19 It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring
that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the
public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation
to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint." 20 An order of dismissal, if
this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action
and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the Merits. 21 So, too, would an order
of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the
proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of
condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be flied or heard. 22
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of
"the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. 23 The order fixing the just compensation on the
basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally
dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the
issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of
the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek reversal
of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.

A similar two-phase feature is found in the special civil action of partition and accounting under Rule
69 of the Rules of Court. 24

The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or
not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally prescribed) and
may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. 25 This phase may
end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does
not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. 26 It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-
ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits
received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. 27 In the latter case, "the parties
may, ff they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance,
and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. 28, In either case i.e. either the action is
dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed the order is a final one, and may be appealed by any
party aggrieved thereby. 29

The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition" directed by the court. In that event partition shall be done for the parties by the Court with
the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. 30 This second stage may well also deal with
the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the Court after the parties have been accorded
opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of
their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question." 31 Such an order is, to be sure, final
and appealable.

Now, this Court has settled the question of the finality and appealability of a decision or order
decreeing partition or recovery of property and/or accounting. In Miranda v. Court of Appeals,
decided on June 18, 1986,32 the Court resolved the question affirmatively, and expressly revoked
the ruling in Zaldarriaga v. Enriquez 33 -that a decision or order of partition is not final because it leaves
something more to be done in the trial court for the complete disposition of the case, i.e, the appointment
of commissioners, the proceedings for the determination by said commissioners of just compensation, the
submission of their reports, and hearing thereon, and the approval of the partition-and in Fuentebella vs.
Carrascoso 34 -that a judgement for recovery of property with account is not final, but merely interlocutory
and hence not appealable until the accounting is made and passed upon. As pointed out in Miranda,
imperative considerations of public policy, of sound practice and adherence to the constitutional mandate
of simplified, just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action require that judgments for
recovery (or partition) of property with accounting be considered as final judgments, duly appealable.
This, notwithstanding that further proceedings will still have to be rendered by the party required to do so,
it will be ventilated and discussed by the parties, and will eventually be passed upon by the Court. It is of
course entirely possible that the Court disposition may not sit well with either the party in whose favor the
accounting is made, or the party rendering it. In either case, the Court's adjudication on the accounting is
without doubt a final one, for it would finally terminate the proceedings thereon and leave nothing more to
be done by the Court on the merits of the issue. And it goes without saying that any party feeling
aggrieved by that ultimate action of the Court on the accounting may seek reversal or modification thereof
by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. 35
The Miranda doctrine was reiterated in de Guzman v. C.A.- 36 Valdez v. Bagaso; 37 Lagunzad v.
Gonzales; 38 Cease v. C.A., 39 Macadangdang v. C.A. 40 and Hernandez v. C.A., 41 Gabor v.
C.A. 42 Fabrica v. C.A . 43

No reason presents itself for different disposition as regards cases of eminent domain. On the
contrary, the close analogy between the special actions of eminent domain and partition already
pointed out, argues for the application of the same rule to both proceedings.

The Court therefore holds that in actions of eminent domain, as in actions for partition, since no less
than two (2) appeals are allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of condemnation 44 is
thirty (30) days counted from notice of order and not the ordinary period of fifteen (15) days prescribed for
actions in general, conformably with the provision of Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, in
relation to paragraph 19 (b) of the Implementing Rules to the effect that in "appeals in special
proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals
are allowed, the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required. 45

The municipality's motion for reconsideration filed on August 17, 1984 was therefore timely
presented, well within the thirty-day period laid down by law therefor; and it was error for the Trial
Court to have ruled otherwise and to have declared that the order sought to be considered had
become final and executory.

2. As already observed, the Municipality's complaint for expropriation impleaded

eleven (11) defendants. A separate trial was held on motion of one of them, Erlinda
Francisco, 46 it appearing that she had asserted a defense personal and peculiar to her,
and inapplicable to the other defendants, supra. Subsequently, and on the basis of the
evidence presented by her, the Trial Court promulgated a separate Order dismissing the
action as to her, in accordance with Section 4, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court reading as
follows:

Sec. 4. Several judgments in an action against several defendants, the court may,
when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of them,
leaving the action to proceed against the others.

It is now claimed by the Municipality that the issuance of such a separate, final order or judgment
had given rise "ipso facto to a situation where multiple appeals became available." The Municipality
is right.

In the case at bar, where a single complaint was filed against several defendants having individual,
separate interests, and a separate trial was held relative to one of said defendants after which a final
order or judgment was rendered on the merits of the plaintiff s claim against that particular
defendant, it is obvious that in the event of an appeal from that separate judgment, the original
record cannot and should not be sent up to the appellate tribunal. The record will have to stay with
the trial court because it will still try the case as regards the other defendants. As the rule above
quoted settles, "In an action against several defendants, the court may, when a several judgment is
proper, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the
others. " 47 In lieu of the original record, a record on appeal will perforce have to be prepared and
transmitted to the appellate court. More than one appeal being permitted in this case, therefore, "the
period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required as provided by the
Implementing Rules in relation to Section 39 of B.P. Blg. 129, supra. 48

3. Erlinda Francisco filed a "motion to dismiss" intraverse of the averments of the

Municipality's complaint for expropriation. That "motion to dismiss" was in fact the
indicated responsive pleading to the complaint, "in lieu of an answer." 49
Now, the Trial Court conducted a separate trial to determine whether or not, as alleged by Francisco
in her "motion to dismiss," she had a "vested right via a pre-existing approved Locational Clearance
from the HRSC.," making the expropriation suit premature. 50 While such a separate trial was not
improper in the premises, 51 and was not put at issue by the Municipality, the latter did protest against the
Trial Court's (a) reversing the order of trial and receiving first, the evidence of defendant Francisco, and
(b) subsequently rendering its order sustaining Francisco's defense and dismissing the action as to her,
solely on the basis of said Francisco's evidence and without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to present
its own evidence on the issue. The Trial Court was clearly wrong on both counts. The Court will have to
sustain the Municipality on these points.

Nothing in the record reveals any valid cause to reverse the order of trial. What the Trial Court might
have had in mind was the provision of Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court allowing "any of the
grounds for dismissal" in Rule 16 to "be pleaded as an affirmative defense and authorizing the
holding of a "preliminary hearing .. thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed." Assuming this to
be the fact, the reception of Francisco's evidence first was wrong, because obviously, her asserted
objection or defense that the locational clearance issued in her favor by the HSRC was a legal bar to
the expropriation suit was not a ground for dismissal under Rule 16. She evidently meant to prove
the Municipality's lack of cause of action; but lack of cause of action is not a ground for dismissal of
an action under Rule 16; the ground is the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, which is
obviously not the same as plaintiff's not having a cause of action.

Nothing in the record, moreover, discloses any circumstances from which a waiver by the
Municipality of the right to present contrary proofs may be inferred. So, in deciding the issue without
according the Municipality that right to present contrary evidence, the Trial Court had effectively
denied the Municipality due process and thus incurred in another reversible error.

4. Turning now to the locational clearance issued by the HSRC in Francisco's favor
on May 4, 1983, it seems evident that said clearance did become a "worthless sheet
of paper," as averred by the Municipality, upon the lapse of one (1) year from said
date in light of the explicit condition in the clearance that it 44 shall be considered
automatically revoked if not used within a period of one (1) year from date of issue,"
and the unrebutted fact that Francisco had not really made use of it within that
period. The failure of the Court to consider these facts, despite its attention having
been drawn to them, is yet another error which must be corrected.

WHEREFORE, the challenged Order issued by His Honor on July 24,1984 in Civil Case No. 8-1960
is ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, and the case is remanded to the Trial Court for the reception of the
evidence of the plaintiff Municipality of Biñan as against defendant Erlinda Francisco, and for
subsequent proceedings and judgment in accordance with the Rules of Court and the law. Costs
against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY (deceased) and LEONORA MODAY, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, AGUSAN DEL SUR AND MUNICIPALITY OF BUNAWAN, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
The main issue presented in this case is whether a municipality may expropriate private property by
virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Petitioner
seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision and resolution, promulgated on July 15, 1992
and October 22, 1992 respectively, 1and a declaration that Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 of the
Bunawan Sangguniang Bayan is null and void.

On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed
Resolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a
One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival
Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities." 2

In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and
transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. On September 11, 1989, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment that
"expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the
establishment of the government center." 3

The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent, subsequently filed a petition for Eminent
Domain against petitioner Percival Moday before the Regional Trial Court at Prosperidad, Agusan
del Sur. 4 The complaint was later amended to include the registered owners, Percival Moday's parents,
Zotico and Leonora Moday, as party defendants.

On March 6, 1991, public respondent municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the
Possession of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had already deposited with the municipal
treasurer the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court
and that it would be in the government's best interest for public respondent to be allowed to take
possession of the property.

Despite petitioners' opposition and after a hearing on the merits, the Regional Trial Court granted
respondent municipality's motion to take possession of the land. The lower court held that the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective. It added that
the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances and resolutions
passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337, old Local Government
Code and that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of the two acts enumerated in Section 19
thereof requiring the approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. 5 The dispositive portion of the lower
court's Order dated July 2, 1991 reads:

WHEREFORE, it appearing that the amount of P632.39 had been deposited as per
Official Receipt No. 5379647 on December 12, 1989 which this Court now
determines as the provisional value of the land, the Motion to Take or Enter Upon the
Possession of the Property filed by petitioner through counsel is hereby GRANTED.
The Sheriff of this Court is ordered to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the
property involved.

Let the hearing be set on August 9, 1991 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning for the
purpose of ascertaining the just compensation or fair market value of the property
sought to be taken, with notice to all the parties concerned.

SO ORDERED. 6

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on October 31, 1991.
Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court, but the same was dismissed by respondent appellate court on July 15, 1992. 7 The
Court of Appeals held that the public purpose for the expropriation is clear from Resolution No. 43-89 and
that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid,
expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed.

Respondent appellate court also denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration on October 22,
1992. 8

Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject property: the
Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, the Municipal Motorpool, both wooden structures, and
the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which is made of concrete.

In the instant petition for review filed on November 23, 1992, petitioner seeks the reversal of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and a declaration that Resolution No. 43-89 of the
Municipality of Bunawan is null and void.

On December 8, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining and restraining
public respondent Judge Evangeline Yuipco from enforcing her July 2, 1991 Order and respondent
municipality from using and occupying all the buildings constructed and from further constructing any
building on the land subject of this petition. 9

Acting on petitioners' Omnibus Motion for Enforcement of Restraining Order and for Contempt, the
Court issued a Resolution on March 15, 1995, citing incumbent municipal mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo
for contempt, ordering him to pay the fine and to demolish the "blocktiendas" which were built in
violation of the restraining order. 10

Former Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo paid the fine and manifested that he lost in the May 8, 1995
election. 11 The incumbent Mayor Leonardo Barrios, filed a Manifestation, Motion to Resolve "Urgent
Motion for Immediate Dissolution of the Temporary Restraining Order" and Memorandum on June 11,
1996 for the Municipality of Bunawan. 12

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the legality of the condemnation
proceedings initiated by the municipality. According to petitioners, the expropriation was politically
motivated and Resolution No. 43-89 was correctly disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
there being other municipal properties available for the purpose. Petitioners also pray that the former
Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo be ordered to pay damages for insisting on the enforcement of a void
municipal resolution.

The Court of Appeals declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's reason for disapproving the
resolution "could be baseless, because it failed to point out which and where are those available
lots.'" Respondent court also concluded that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan did not declare
the municipal board's resolution as invalid, expropriation of petitioners' property could
proceed. 13

The Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a
fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. 14 It is government's right to
appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or
purpose. 15 Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly
delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. 16 For the taking of private
property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just
compensation. 17

The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is
expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the local Government Code 18 in force at the time
expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law states:

Sec. 9. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its head and
acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent
domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.

What petitioners question is the lack of authority of the municipality to exercise this right since the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution No. 43-89.

Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides:

Sec. 153. Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review. — (1) Within thirty days after receiving
copies of approved ordinances, resolutions and executive orders promulgated by the
municipal mayor, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or
transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial fiscal,
who shall examine them promptly and inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in
writing of any defect or impropriety which he may discover therein and make such
comments or recommendations as shall appear to him proper.

(2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal ordinance,
resolution or executive order is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang
bayan or the mayor, it shall declare such ordinance, resolution or executive order
invalid in whole or in part, entering its actions upon the minutes and advising the
proper municipal authorities thereof. The effect of such an action shall be to annul
the ordinance, resolution or executive order in question in whole or in part. The
action of the sangguniang panlalawigan shall be final.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action
which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P.
Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid
on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue.
Although pertaining to a similar provision of law but different factual milieu then obtaining, the Court's
pronouncements in Velazco v. Blas, 19 where we cited significant early jurisprudence, are applicable to
the case at bar.

The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal
resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is
"beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same."
Absolutely no other ground is recognized by the law. A strictly legal question is
before the provincial board in its consideration of a municipal resolution, ordinance,
or order. The provincial (board's) disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order
must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order
is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board
passes these limits, it usurps the legislative function of the municipal council or
president. Such has been the consistent course of executive authority. 20
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution
No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent
domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the
earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and
binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners'
property.

As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is alleged that Percival Moday incurred the ire of
then Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo when he refused to support the latter's candidacy for mayor in
previous elections. Petitioners claim that then incumbent Mayor C. Bustillo used the expropriation to
retaliate by expropriating their land even if there were other properties belonging to the municipality
and available for the purpose. Specifically, they allege that the municipality owns a vacant seven-
hectare property adjacent to petitioners' land, evidenced by a sketch plan. 21

The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public, compensation must
be made and due process of law must be
observed. 22 The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation,
necessity of the taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking, 23 has ruled that the
necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character. 24 Government may
not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.

After a careful study of the records of the case, however, we find no evidentiary support for
petitioners' allegations. The uncertified photocopy of the sketch plan does not conclusively prove that
the municipality does own vacant land adjacent to petitioners' property suited to the purpose of the
expropriation. In the questioned decision, respondent appellate court similarly held that the
pleadings and documents on record have not pointed out any of respondent municipality's "other
available properties available for the same purpose." 25 The accusations of political reprisal are likewise
unsupported by competent evidence. Consequently, the Court holds that petitioners' demand that the
former municipal mayor be personally liable for damages is without basis.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in the case of "Percival Moday." et al. v. Municipality of Bunawan, et al." (CA
G.R. SP No. 26712) are AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on
December 8, 1993 is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

GREGORIO Y. LIMPIN, JR. and ROGELIO SARMIENTO, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and GUILLERMO PONCE, respondents.

Danilo A. Basa for petitioners.

Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano & Hernandez Law Office and Eugenio C. Lindo for private respondent.

NARVASA, J:
Assailed in this petition for review is the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in A.C.-G.R.
No. 02516, entitled "Guillermo Ponce, versus Hon. Antonio P. Solano, etc., et al.," the dispositive
portion of which reads —

WHEREFORE, the orders dated October 16, 1983 1 and December 19, 1983 of the respondent
court, so far as they deny the confirmation of the sale of the lots formerly covered by TCT Nos. 92836 and 92837, are
SET ASIDE and the respondent court is hereby ORDERED to confirm the sale and issue a writ of possession to the
petitioner with respect to the aforesaid lots, subject to the equity of redemption of the respondent Rogelio V. Sarmiento.
Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

The conflict in claims resulting from the mortgage and subsequent sale to different persons of the
same real property, and the execution sale thereof at a still later date at the instance of yet another
party, is what is chiefly involved in the case at bar, as well as the matter of the remedies available to
correct errors in the execution of a final and executory judgment.

On February 28, 1973, four lots covered by TCTs Nos. 92836, 92837, 92839 and 92840 of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City were mortgaged by the spouses Jose and Marcelina Aquino to
Guillermo Ponce and his wife Adela (since deceased) as security for a loan of P2,200,000.00. The
mortgages were registered on March 1, 1973. Two of the lots, those covered by TCTs Nos. 92836
and 92837, were afterwards sold in 1978 by the Aquinos to the Butuan Bay Wood Export
Corporation, which caused an adverse claim to be annotated on the certificates of title on February
24, 1978. 2

In 1979, Gregorio Y. Limpin, Jr. obtained a money Judgement against Butuan Bay Wood Export
Corporation in Civil Case No. 10463 of the Court of First Instance of Davao. To satisfy the judgment,
the lots covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837 were levied upon on September 3, 1980 and sold
at public auction to Limpin as the highest bidder for the sum of P517,485.41 on October 6, 1980. On
order of the trial court, the covering titles were cancelled and in their stead TCTs Nos. 285450 and
285451 were issued to Limpin. On November 21, 1981, Limpin sold the two lots to Rogelio M.
Sarmiento. By virtue of said sale, TCTs Nos. 285450 and 285451 were cancelled on November 4,
1983, and replaced by TCTs Nos. 307100 and 397124 in Sarmiento's name. 3

On September 2, 1980 (a day before Limpin's levy on the two lots), Ponce filed suit against the
Aquino spouses for judicial foreclosure of the mortgage over the Aquinos' four lots. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-30726 of the former Court of First Instance of Quezon City. On June
8, 1982, judgment was rendered in favor of Ponce. After the judgment became final, the Trial Court,
in an order dated September 13, 1983, directed the sale at public auction of the four (4) mortgaged
lots to satisfy the judgment. On October 12, 1983, the four lots, including those formerly covered by
TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, were sold to Ponce himself whose bid of P5,200,000.00 was the
highest and exactly correspond to the judgment debt. On the same day, the sheriff's certificate of
sale was registered. 4

Ponce then moved for the confirmation of the sale and the issuance of a writ of possession in his
favor covering an the four lots. But the Trial Court, by order dated October 26, 1983, confirmed only
the sale of the lots covered by TCTs Nos. 02839 and 92840, refusing to confirm the sale or issue a
writ of possession in regard to the lots covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837 on the ground that
those titles had already been cancelled and new ones issued to Gregorio F. Limpin, by order of
February 16, 1982 of the Court of First Instance of Davao City in Civil Case No. 10463, already
referred to.
Ponce filed a motion for reconsideration and notified Limpin. Limpin however refused to participate in
the hearings contending that the Court had no jurisdiction over his person; but he did comment that
the mortgage over the lots covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837 had been released by Ponce by
virtue of a "Partial Release of Real Estate Mortgage" dated July 20, 1977. The Trial Court denied
Ponce's motion for reconsideration, whereupon he sought corrective relief by filing a special civil
action for certiorari and mandamus in the Intermediate Appellate Court, impleading Limpin and
Rogelio M. Sarmiento, Limpin's vendee, as private respondents. 5

After hearing and submission by the parties of extensive memoranda as well as documentary
evidence, the respondent Appellate Court rendered the questioned decision on February 28, 1985,
setting aside the judgment of the Trial Court which denied the confirmation of the sale of the lots
formerly covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, and ordering said Court to confirm the same and
issue a writ of possession to Ponce with respect thereto, subject to Sarmiento's equity of
redemption.

Hence, this petition for review, filed by Limpin and Sarmiento.

The petition should be denied.

The petitioners' contention that the action of certiorari and mandamus (instituted by Ponce in the
Intermediate Appellate Court) was not the proper remedy is not well taken. The Appellate Court
disposed of this preliminary issue as follows:

Nor is there any merit in the argument of the respondents that petitioner's remedy is
to appeal from the orders denying the motion for confirmation of the sale. The
respondents claim that these orders are final orders and cite in support of their
contention the decision in Domalante vs. Martinez, 20 SCRA 1136 (1967), where it
was held that "An order of confirmation in court foreclosure proceedings is a final
order, not merely interlocutory. The right of appeal therefore, has long been
recognized." The Court was there speaking of an order confirming the sale, as
between the parties to a mortgage, not of an order, such as the ones herein in
question, denying confirmation because a third party, not a party in the foreclosure
proceedings, asserts a right to the properties sought to be foreclosed. Only a
separate proceeding, such as the present case, could possibly determine mine the
rights of such party. (See Rivero de Ortega v. Natividad, 71 Phil. 340 (1941). 6 lwphl@itç

Certain it is that courts have plenary authority and control over the execution of their final and
executory judgments and orders. 7 Indeed, once that authority i timely and properly in voked, it becomes
8
the court's ministerial and mandatory function to direct execution.

That authority lasts until the judgments are fully satisfied, subject only to the time limitations
prescribed therefor. 9With particular reference to the execution of a judgment hi a mortgage foreclosure
action, the authority to direct and effect the same exists until the confirmation of the foreclosure sale (and
issuance and implementation of the writ of possession), confirmation being the final act which disposes of
the case. 10

Certain it is too, that execution of final and executory judgments may no longer be contested and
prevented, and no appeal should lie therefrom; otherwise, cases would be interminable, and there
would be negation of the overmastering need to end litigations. 11
There may, to be sure, be instances when an error may be committed in the course of execution
proceedings prejudicial to the rights of a party. These instances, rare though they may be, do call for
correction by a superior court, as where —

1) the writ of executio nvaries the judgment 12

2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; 13

3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; 14

4) it appears that the controversy has never been submitted to the judgment of the court; 15

5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation
thereof; 16 or,

6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or
otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority;17

In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some
mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court, That mode of
elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari, 18 or by a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or
mandamus.) 19

The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Appellate Court over their persons,
alleging that they were not original parties to the action for judicial foreclosure. It appears, however,
that despite awareness of this ostensible defect, they fully participated without objection in the
certiorari and mandamus proceedings before the respondent Appellate Court. Having thus
voluntarily appeared and seen the case through its final resolution, they cannot now be permitted to
turn about and repudiate the Appellate Court's jurisdiction over them.

This Court has ruled:

* * * * And as we have previously quoted approvingly "a party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction."
While the jurisdiction of a tribunal may be challenged at any time, sound public policy
bars the petitioners from so doing after having procured that jurisdiction themselves,
speculating on the fortunes of litigation.

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioners, to borrow the language of Justice Bautista Angelo, "cannot adopt a
posture of double-dealing without running afoul of the doctrine of estoppel." The
principle of estoppel is in the interest of a sound administration of the laws. It should
deter those who are disposed to trifle with the courts by taking inconsistent positions
contrary to the elementary principles of right dealing and good faith. For this reason,
this Court closes the door to the petitioners' challenge against the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appellants' and will not even honor the question with a pronouncement. 20
 Petitioner, however, is estopped, on ground of public policy, from invoking the plea of
lack of jurisdiction after submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and
assailing its jurisdiction only after an adverse judgment was rendered against the
petitioner. ... 21

The petitioners further argue that the Appellate Court erred in according superiority to the mortgage
rights of Ponce over the levy and sale in favor of petitioner Limpin and the subsequent sale of the
property to petitioner Sarmiento.

The Appellate Court correctly ruled that the rights and interests of petitioners Limpin and Sarmiento
to the property in question are subordinate to those of respondent Ponce, who holds a prior and
senior lien. According to said Court:

* * * This case is controlled by the decision in Santiago v. Dionisio, 92 Phil. 495

(1935). In theSantiago case, Ramon San Diego mortgaged his land to Eulalia
Resurreccion. Later he sold it to Apolonia Santiago. As the mortgage debt was not
paid, Resurreccion had the mortgage foreclosed. The Supreme Court upheld the
sale to Dionisio, subject, however, to the equity of redemption of Santiago. The Court
stated:

... [T]he effect of the failure to implead a subordinate lienholder or

subsequent purchaser or both is to render the foreclosure ineffective
as against them, with the result that there remains in their favor the
"unforeclosed equity of redemption." But the foreclosure is valid as
between the parties to the suit. (Ibid; 2 Moran's Rules of Court, 3rd
ed., p. 239)

Applied to this case, this means that the sale to Ponce, as the highest bidder in the
foreclosure sale of the two lots in question should have been confirmed, subject to
Limpin's (and now Sarmiento's equity to redemption. As held in Santiago v. Dionisio
supra, the registration of the lands, first in the name of Limpin and later of Sarmiento,
was premature. At most what they were entitled to was the registration of their equity
of redemption. 22

Moreover:

The superiority of the mortgagee's lien over that of a subsequent judgment creditor is
now expressly provided in Rule 39, Section 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
states with regard to the effect of levy on execution that it shall create a lien in favor
of a judgment creditor over the right title and interest of the judgment debtor in such
property at the time of the levy, subject to the liens or encumbrances then existing. 23

It is well settled that a recorded mortgage is a right in rem, a hen on the property whoever its owner
may be. 24The recordation of the mortgage in this case put the whole world, petitioners included, on
constructive notice of its existence and warned everyone who thereafter dealt with the property on which
it was constituted that he would have to reckon with that encumbrance. Hence, Limpin's subsequent
purchase of the "interests and participation" of Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation in the lots covered
by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, as well as the sale of the same to Sarmiento on November 21, 1981,
were both subject to said mortgage. On the other hand, Ponce's purchase of the lots mortgaged to him at
the foreclosure sale on October 12, 1983, was subject to no prior lien or encumbrance, and could in no
way be affected or prejudiced by a subsequent or junior lien, such as that of Limpin. 25 Petitioner
Sarmiento having acquired no better right than his predecessor-in-interest, petitioner Limpin, his title must
likewise fail.
The fact that at the time Ponce foreclosed the mortgage on October 21, 1983, the lots had already
been bought by Limpin and subsequently sold to Sarmiento is of no consequence, since the settled
doctrine is that the effects of the foreclosure sale retroact to the date of registration of the mortgage,
i.e., March 1, 1973 in the present case.

* * * It is well to note that the mortgage in favor of the late Ramon Eugelio was
annotated on November 13, 1952 at the back of the certificates of title in controversy,
while the adverse claim was only annotated on the same certificate more than one
year later, on December 21, 1953. Hence, the adverse claim could not effect the
rights of the mortgagee; and the fact that the foreclosure of the mortgage and the
consequent public auction sale have been effected long after the annotation of the
adverse claim is of no moment, because the foreclosure sale retroacts to the date of
registration of the mortgage. 26

Anent the claim that respondent Ponce executed a deed of partial release of his mortgage on July
20, 1977, the evidence discloses that Ponce and Jose Aquino, the mortgagor, thereafter executed
separate affidavits dated December 1, 1983, stating that the said partial release was void, not only
for want of consideration but also for lack of the signatures of Ponce's two sons who at the time of
the execution of the document, were co-mortgagees as successors and heirs of Mrs. Adela Ponce.
Moreover, the Deed of Partial Release was not registered but had simply been attached, together
with the Deed of Sale of the lands to Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation, to said corporation's
affidavit of adverse claim, the last being the document which was actually registered, on February 4,
1978 as already stated. Thus the mortgage in favor of Ponce and his late wife was still subsisting,
when the notice of levy in favor of Limpin was annotated on the original of OCTs Nos. 92836 and
92837, and even when the execution sale in favor of Limpin pursuant to the levy was registered.
Said annotation was cancelled only on November 25, 1981, after the properties had been sold on
execution to Limpin on October 6, 1981.

The petitioners finally assert that respondent Ponce did not have a right of action for foreclosure over
the lots in question in the Trial Court, much less to pursue this case, first in the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court and now, before this Court, because as early as August 18, 1976, he
and his wife had donated the lots to the Doña Josefa Edralin Marcos Foundation and the donation
had been accepted on August 31, 1976. However, that donation was never registered, a fact that the
petitioners admit. Even if this Court were inclined to take up that issue now, though raised only for
the first time, it is obvious that no resolution thereof could possibly improve the petitioners' position
as against that of the private respondent or the latter's transferee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied, with costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CIRILO P. BAYLOSIS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Manuel P. Calanog and Cirilo Baylosis for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose G. Bautista and Rafael Caniza for
appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:
These expropriation proceedings initiated in the Court of First Instance of Batangas by the Bureau of
Lands in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, involve seven lots formerly a part of the Hacienda
LIAN or LIAN ESTATE in the municipality of Lian, Batangas, which estate formerly belonged in its
entirety to the Colegio de San Jose Inc., a Jesuit corporation, under Original Certificate of Title No.
15521. It seems that the Hacienda or rather the income therefrom was used for the support and
education of young Filipinos studying for the priesthood. The Hacienda originally had an extension of
several thousand hectares and was occupied and cultivated by lessees and by tenants (inquilinos).
About the year 1931 the religious authorities decided to break up this big estate as far as possible
into small lots averaging one hundred hectares each and sell it to bona fide lessees, the price to be
payable on the installment plan.

One of these lessees was Nelson V. Sinclair. He had occupied under a contract of lease a portion of
this estate since 1928, cultivating a portion by means of tractors and the remainder by means
of aparceros under yearly contracts such as Exhibits 4, 4-A, 4-B (Baylosis).

In 1937 he brought the Lian Estate the portion leased to him with an approximate area of 87
hectares. Subsequently, this portion was subdivided into seven lots, to wit: 306-YYYY, 306-BBBB,
306-CCCC, 306-DDDD, 306-EEEE, 306-LL. In 1947 Sinclair sold lot 306-YYYY with an area of
about 25 hectares and 306-BBBB with an area of about 17 hectares to Cirilo P. Baylosis for P40,000
and P28,000, respectively, although the corresponding transfer certificates of title were not issued
until 1948 and 1949, respectively. After the purchase, Cirilo P. Baylosis subdivided the two lots into
small parcels and sold the same to his co-defendants in this case, except Sinclair and Luis Baylosis.
In 1950 Sinclair sold to Cirilo P. Baylosis lot 306-DDDD with an area of about 10 hectares and lot
306-DDDD with an area of about 10 hectares for P39,000. (See Exhibit 16-Baylosis).

About October 7, 1946, some 68 persons claiming to be tenants and occupants of the parcels
originally owned by Sinclair addressed a petition in Tagalog to the Rural Progress Administration, a
rough translation in English of which follows:

We, the undersigned, are all workers in this land for a long time , and were the ones who
cleared the place of its big trees.

That is why we are requesting the Government to buy the land and we shall pay the
installment to the Government.

Much later, on the basis of the petition, the Rural Progress Administration through its Manager
Faustino Aguilar, on May 4, 1948, addressed a letter to Sinclair reading as follows:

May 4, 1948

Mr. N.V. Sinclair

181 David, Escolta
Manila
Sir:

There has been received in this Office a petition for the acquisition by the Government for
resale to the tenants of the following six lots in Binubusan, owned and/or administered by
you:

Lot N. 306 — CCCC under tax declaration No. 852

 Area — 13.9125 hectares.
Kind — Irrigated agricultural land.
Assessed value — P6,400.00

Lot No. 306 — Z under tax declaration No. 858

Area — 8.7762 hectares.

Kind — 7.7762 hectares irrigated agricultural land 1.0000 hectare
— riceland.
Assessed value — P4,040.

Lot No. 306 — YYY under tax declaration No. 864

Area — 25.0159 hectares.

Kind — Irrigated agricultural land.
Assessed value — P9,760.

Lot No. 306 — BBBB under tax declaration No. 365

Area — 17.9827 hectares.

Kind — Irrigated agricultural land.
Assessed value — P7,010.

Lot No. 306 — EEEE under tax declaration No. 866

Area — 10.4955.
Kind — Irrigated agricultural land.
Assessed value — P4,090.

Lot No. 306 — LL under tax declaration No. 350

Owner — Colegio de San Jose.

Administrator — N.V. Sinclair.
Area — 14.3208 hectares.
Kind — Fish pond.
Assessed value — P5,730.

The reason given by the tenants in presenting their position is that your relation with them is
not altogether too satisfactory having on previous occasion tried to disregard the 70-30 crop
sharing basis, although later have yielded to observance thereof upon the insistence of the
tenants. They likewise complain that you are planning to eject them, a plan which if carried
out, will result in untold sufferings on their part, without mentioning the pain of leaving the
premises which they have occupied and tilled since time immemorial.

Before we take action on their petition we will appreciate your favor of informing us for your
willingness to sell said parcels of land, in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 539 and the conditions of the sale.

Respectfully,
 (Sgd.) FAUSTINO AGUILAR
Manager

On May 7th, Sinclair wrote the following answer:

May 7, 1948

Rural Progress Administration

Department of Justice Building
Walled City, Manila

Attention: Mr. Faustino Aguilar,

Manager

Gentleman:

This will acknowledge receipt today your communication dated May 4th, with reference to the
petition for your Administration to purchase lands of the writer located in barrio Binubusan,
municipality of Lian, Province of Batangas.

The reasons given by the petitioners are not true and it will be a pleasure to, acquaint you
with the facts concerned with each of the lots specified.

This information will be assembled at the earliest possible time and in order to expedite its
submission to your goodselves, your letter is being forwarded to my representative at Lian.

In the meantime, it is requested that you kindly allow me sufficient time to submit the true
facts pertaining to each lot before you take action on this Petition.

Respectfully,

(Sgd.) N.V. SINCLAIR

Owner

On November 15, 1958, Manager Aguilar again wrote to Sinclair as follows:

November 15, 1948

Mr. N.V. Sinclair

181 David Escolta
Manila

Sir:

In connection with your letter dated May 7, 1948, advising us that you will forward to this
Office under separate cover information regarding your refusal to sell to certain petitioners
 your lands in Binubusan, Lian, Batangas, known as lot Nos. 306-CCCC; 306-Z; 306-YYY;
306-EEE and 306-LL, please be informed that up to the present we have not as yet received
said letter. As it is our desire to apprise the petitioners of the same, the favor of an early
information from you will be appreciated.

Likewise the petitioners again called at this Office and have made an offer to buy said lands
at P600 per hectare on a 10 year period to pay. If the said price is acceptable to you, please
advise us accordingly.

Respectfully,

(Sgd.) FAUSTINO AGUILAR

Manager

Thereafter, having been informed that Sinclair had sold his parcels or some of them to one Cirilo P.
Baylosis, Manager Aguilar on January 17, 1949, wrote the following letter:

January 17, 1949.

Atty. Cirilo P. Baylosis

Balayan, Batangas.

Sir:

We have been informed that you bought the lands of N. V. Sinclair at Binubusan, Lian,
Batangas, known as lots 306-YYY; 306-LL; 306-Z; 306-CCCC; 306-BBBB and 306-EEEE
and that you are at present taking all the crops thereon including the share due to the
tenants with help of constabulary soldiers. If the report is true, we request that you refrain
from taking such step in order to avoid any untoward incident that may arise therefrom.

The lands which you bought are the subject of a petition for acquisition and resale to the
tenants thereof which is pending final action by this Office.

Respectfully,

(Sgd.) FAUSTINO AGUILAR

Manager

Thereafter, on February 6, 1951, the Republic of the Philippines filed the original complaint for
expropriation against Cirilo P. Baylosis and Sinclair, which complaint was twice amended, the
second amended complaint being filed on April 16, 1952, so as to include all the persons to whom
Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis had sold portions of the lots sought to be expropriated.

On February 14, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Batangas after hearing the parties issued an
order placing the plaintiffs in possession of the property sought to be expropriated after plaintiff had
made a deposit of P27,105.22. On February 24, 1951, the tenants and occupants in whose behalf
the expropriation proceedings were instituted moved to intervene, accompanying their motion with a
complaint in intervention. Believing that their interests were sufficiently taken care of and defended
by the plaintiff, the trial court deemed said intervention unnecessary. The defendants numbering
about 21 filed 9 separate motions to dismiss based on several grounds, among which are: that the
expropriation was being made not for public use; that the defendants would be deprived of their
property without due process of law; that the plaintiff has no right under the guise of expropriation to
take the property of a private citizen and deliver the same to another private individual; that the
Constitution authorizes the expropriation of big landed estates but not of small areas like these
owned by the defendants; that the present expropriation was intended to benefit only about 44
persons who do not represent the public and that many of said persons already have lands of their
own; that the various defendants individually own only small portion of the property under
expropriation; that the second amended complaint is defective in that it did not describe the specific
property sought to be expropriated; and that the current price of irrigated lands in Batangas is about
P3,000 per hectare and so plaintiff's deposit was insufficient.

After hearing and the introduction of evidence, both oral and documentary, the trial court issued an
order dated July 18, 1952, dismissing the various motions for dismissal and declaring the plaintiff
entitled to take the property sought to be condemned for public use as described in the second
amended complaint upon payment of just compensation to be ascertained by Commissioner to be
appointed by the court for this purpose. The defendants are now appealing from that order directly to
this Tribunal.

The trial court declared that the present expropriations proceedings are based on Section 4, Article
XIII of the Constitution which provides that —

The Congress may authorize upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands
to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at costs to individuals.

and section 1 of Commonwealth Act 539 which provides that the President of the Philippines is
authorized to acquire private lands through purchase or expropriation and subdivided the same into
home lots or small farms for resale to bona fide tenants or occupants. The trial court also said that
although this Tribunal in the case ofGuido vs. Rural Progress Administration, G.R. No., L-2089 (47
Off. Gaz., No. 4 p. 1848) held that section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution had reference to large
estates, still, the total area of the parcels now sought to be expropriated, which is between 67 and 77
hectares, may not be considered small; that the tenants and occupants of the land for whom these
expropriation proceedings were instituted have by themselves and their ancestors been occupying,
clearing and cultivating the land for many years and that they are entitled now to purchase the same;
that the situation in the area in question was far from peaceful because there was misunderstanding
and trouble between tenants on one side, and their landlords (the defendants herein) on the other,
regarding their shares in the harvests and that the only way to solve this tenancy problem was to
expropriate the land and sell it to the tenants; that both Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis were formerly
agreeable to sell this land to others for a profit as shown by the fact that they had actually sold
portions thereof to others and that consequently, they can now have no valid objection to the
expropriation, that heretofore the Government had already expropriated a large portion of Lian
Estate of Hacienda, divided the same small lots and thereafter resold them to tenants, thereby
showing that by its nature, location and destination the property is suitable for the purpose for which
it is being expropriated, and that these proceedings are in keeping with what the Government had
already done with respect to other portions; that although it is contended that several of the tenants
and occupants have already lands of their own aside from the portions they are now occupying, still,
they are actual occupants and it would not be fair or just that they would not be included in the
benefits of the expropriation, and that in any event, once the expropriation is carried out, it is for the
Government to screen and process the tenants, and that those found already owning lands may be
disqualified to buy the land being expropriated. As to the portions into which lots 306-YYYY and 306-
BB have been sub-divided and then sold by Cirilo P. Baylosis to his co-defendants, the trial
observed that said sales were made after Baylosis had been served on January 17, 1949, with
notice by the Rural Progress Administration of the intention of the Government to purchase said lots,
and that considering that the purchasers are relatives of Baylosis, and that the transfer certificates of
title were issued in 1950, there was reason to believe that these sales by Baylosis were simulated,
and intended to frustrate the attempt of the Government to expropriate.

For a better and a clearer understanding of the facts in this case, particularly the parcels involved,
their areas and owners, the particular portions sought to be expropriated and the number of tenants
and occupants sought to be benefitted by the expropriation, we have prepared the following tables or
graphs, marked "A" and "G", based on the pleadings and on the order appealed from.

Table "A" Area.

1. Lot 306-YYY 25.0159 square meters To be acquired 22.4033 square meters Occupants
21 Dependents 100.

2. Lot 306 BBB 17.9827 square meters To be acquired 13.4564 square meters Occupants
10 Dependents 40.

3. Lot 306-CCC 13.9129 square meters Whole to be acquired Occupants 9 Dependents 40.

4. Lot 306-EEEE 10.4955 square meters To be acquired. 9,1809 square meters Occupants .
4 Dependents 20.

5. Lot 306-Z 8.7762 square meters To be acquired 4.0000 square meters Occupants 1
Dependent 4.

6. Lot 306-LL 14.3208 square meters To be acquired 1.5000 square meters Occupants 1
Dependent 4.

7. Lot 306-DDDD 5.8946 square meters To be acquired 3.0000 square meters Occupants 1
Dependents 4 Owners 23 Dependents 90 Occupants 44 Dependents 214.

TABLE "B".

Names of defendants Lot Nos. and Area in Title No. hectares.

Maria Lunesa 306-YYY-1 4.9996 TCT-2959 Pastora Baylosis 306-YYY-2 2.0000 TCT-3079
Spouses Marcelo Basit and Magdalena Bayungan 306-YYY-3 2.0000 Spouses Tomas
Asuncion and Bonifacio Bayungan 306-YYY-4 1.0315 Spouses Raymunda Hernandez and
Juan Gonzales 306-YYY-5 1.0998 TOT-2960 Spouses Tirso de Padua and Maria Dolores
Bayungan 306-YYY-6 3.0000 Spouses Luis Baylosis and Manuela Pineda 306-YYY-8
9.9974 TOT-3510 Spouses Benito Baylosis and Macaria L. Torres 306-BBB-1 2.4256 306-
BBB-9 0.9639 TOT-2877 Spouses Alejandro Abellera and Juliana Camellon 306-BBB-7
1.0711 TAT-2897 Spouses Roberto Capoon and Gavina Baylosis 306-BBB-7 3.7725 Luis
Baylosis 306-Z 3.8009 Cirilo P. Baylosis T-3133 8.8051 T-3426 N.V. Sinclair and C. P.
Baylosis306-CCCC 13.9125 306-EEEE 9.1809 N.V. Sinclair 306-LL 4.0000 306-DDDD
5.8946

Table "A" shows the number of lots to be affected by the expropriation including the areas to be
expropriated, and the number of their occupants and dependents. Table "B" shows the names of the
owners of the original seven lots involved and of the smaller lots into which they had been
subdivided and their areas. Table "A" further shows the area sought to be expropriated from each
individual lot, totalling approximately 67 hectares. The number of tenants or occupants is about 44
and the number of their dependents is about 214. For the defendants owners, there are about 23 of
them with about 90 dependents.

It will be seen from the tables that neither the exact location of the portion to be expropriated from
each lot nor its form or shape is stated or defined, thereby supporting the contention of the
defendants on this point. Table "A" also show that the Government wants to expropriate, not one
whole parcel or the seven lots comprising said parcel but is selecting only portions of said seven
different and separate lots, presumably those actually occupied and cultivated by the tenants. If the
appropriation is carried out we do not know what portions would be left to the owners, the forms
thereof and whether or not it would be worthwhile for the said owners to keep them.

Let us now discuss the several reasons given by the trial court for upholding the right of the
Government to expropriate in this case. It says that the tenants and occupants for whose benefit the
land is being expropriated have by themselves and their ancestors been occupying and cultivating
the same for many years and are therefore entitled to purchase the same. We are afraid that that
holding has no legal basis. The mere fact that a person as a tenant has occupied and cultivated and
even cleared the land for his landlord does not entitle him to purchase the same against his
landlord's will, by means of expropriation. Expropriation by the Government, obliging a land owner to
part with his real estate is authorized only when done for public use or for public benefit and not to
enable one to own real property at the expense of another especially when said owner has no other
real property except the one being expropriated. Some of the defendants herein (Alejandro Abellera
and Benito Baylosis) have no other land except the small lots bought by them from Cirilo P. Baylosis
and now subject of the present expropriation proceedings. Defendant Juan Gonzales told the Court
that he is actually by himself, plowing and cultivating the small lot of about one hectare that he
bought from Cirilo P. Baylosis, now sought to be condemned. We should not forget that the
Constitution protects private property, prohibits a citizen being deprived of his property without due
process of law, and that even in condemnation proceedings when said citizen is given just
compensation for his property expropriated, still, the expropriation to be valid must be for a public
use or public benefit.

Again the trial court says that there are tenancy problems in the lands being expropriated, there
being misunderstanding between the owners and the tenants as to the share of each in the harvest,
and that the only way this problem could be solved is to expropriate the land. This seems to be a
novel theory which finds no statutory or constitutional support. If this theory were correct and is to be
followed and applied, then all that a tenant has to do in order to be able to buy the lands of his
landlord is for him, or better still, with the help and cooperation of his co-tenants, to violate the
tenancy law, refuse to give the 30% corresponding to his or their landlord or even deny the title of
said landlord, thereby creating a tenancy problem, upon which the Government will immediately step
in and commence expropriation proceedings, claiming that the only solution of the trouble between
the landlord and the tenants lies in expropriation. We cannot believe that was ever the intention of
either the framers of the Constitution or of the members of Congress. That is the reason why
Congress has promulgated the Tenancy Law, clearly specifying the rights and obligations of both
landlord and tenant, their respective shares in the harvest, and the removal of a tenant only for
certain specified reasons or causes; and that is why we have the Tenancy Division in the Court of
Industrial Relations to handle and decide tenancy disputes.

Furthermore, it is not exactly correct to say that there is a tenancy problem in the land in question,
and even if there were, the fault may be attributed to the tenants themselves rather than the owners.
It will be remembered that in the petition filed by about 68 persons claiming to be occupants of the
parcels originally owned by the Sinclair dated October 6, 1946, addressed to the Rural Progress
Administration, nothing was said about tenancy trouble. All that they said in said petition was that
they had been working on the land for a long time and had cleared the place of big trees, and that
they wanted to buy the land and pay the price to the Government in installment. Indeed, the
evidence shows that Sinclair never had any trouble with his tenants. And there is reason to believe
and evidence to support the belief that the tenancy trouble on the land in question began only
around the year 1948 after the tenants and occupants were presumably given the hope and the
assurance by the Rural Progress Administration that the Government was going to acquire the land
for them either through purchase or expropriation. It was then according to Cirilo P. Baylosis that the
tenants refused to give him and his co-defendants their share of the harvest and even refused to
acknowledge him as owner of the land he had bought from Sincliar. So, according to Cirilo P.
Baylosis, he and his co-defendants to whom he had resold portions of the land bought from Sinclair,
had to go to the Tenancy Law Enforcement Office and complain against the tenants and said
Tenancy Office in several orders concurred in by the Court of Industrial Relations held that even
under Commonwealth Act 538 which authorizes the suspension of cases of ejectment against
tenants of lands included in condemnation proceedings, the tenants should first pay the current rents
or give the shares of the landlords in the harvest, a thing which tenants in those cases had failed and
refused to do and so the cases against the tenants were decided against them. (See Exhibits V-1-1,
V-2-1, V-3-1 and V-4-1).

The trial court also said that if Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis formerly were willing to sell their
holdings or portions thereof to others as they have done to their co-defendants, there was no reason
why the defendants should now object to the Government purchasing said lands through
expropriation. But there is a difference and room for distinction. The right to dispose or not to
dispose of one's property is one of the attributes of ownership. A person just because he is willing to
sell his property to "A" may not be obliged to sell it to "B" unless the law in certain specific cases
such as legal redemption compels him to do so. Again, a land owner may be willing or even offer to
sell his land today to "A", but unless the offer is accepted and acted upon, he may change his mind
and refuse to sell to "A" next year or refuse to sell it to anyone for that matter.

The evidence shows that both Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis at one time were willing to sell to some
of the tenants and occupants herein involved under certain conditions and provided that they buy in
groups, presumably to avoid subdivisions and the problem of dealing with many individual buyers,
but the tenants failed to buy. Naturally, they may not now compel Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis to
sell to them through the Government by means of expropriation. Besides, the bulk of the lands that
Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis had formerly offered to them for sale which offer they failed to take
advantage of, has now been sold to others, the other co-defendants herein, in small lots.

One reason not improbable why the tenants and occupants failed to take advantage of the former
offer of Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis to sell the lands to them was the matter of price. According to
the letter of the Rural Progress Administration to Sinclair on November 15, 1948, those who signed
the petition of October 17, 1946 claiming to be the tenants and occupants of the land, offered to but
the same at P600 per hectare, payable within a period of ten years. The defendant owners of the
land herein claim that the current price of the first class riceland in Batangas is around P3,000 per
hectare. Even taking as a basis the price paid by Cirilo P. Baylosis for the lots bought by him from
Sinclair, now being expropriated, the price is way over P1,000 almost P2,000 per hectare. Naturally,
Sinclair and Baylosis were unwilling to sell at P600 a hectare, to say nothing of said price being paid
in ten years. And that is the reason why the defendants herein claim that the deposit of P27,000
made by the tenants and occupants, is insufficient to cover the price of the land, said amount of the
deposit being equivalent to only about P400 per hectare for the 67 hectares sought to be
expropriated.

Supposing that the expropriation is carried out and the Commissioners and the trial court find that
the land expropriated is worth P2,000 or more per hectare, would the tenants and occupants be still
willing and would they be able to pay said price? Supposing that they were not, then what would
happen? Would the Government undertake to pay the difference between the actual value of the
land expropriated for them and their offer to pay only P600 per hectare, and this payable in ten years
at that? Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution on which the present expropriation proceedings are
supposed to be based says that the lands expropriated are to be subdivided into small lots and
conveyed at cost to individuals. That means that the Government will not make any profit in the
transaction, but it also conveys the idea that the Government will sell at a price to include what it
cost the Government to expropriate. The cost of subdivision, registration fees and transfer
certificates of title will probably have to be added to the cost of the land. Again, it may be asked,
what will the Government do if the tenants and occupants are neither willing nor able to pay said
total cost?.

There is another point that merits consideration. The defendants claim and correctly that many of the
tenants and occupants now insisting on expropriation have lands of their own. According to the list
prepared by the Bureau of Lands containing the names of persons who are occupying and holding
portions of land being administered by the Bureau of Lands in Batangas (Exhibit 13,-Baylosis),
many, if not the majority of the tenants and occupants of the lands now sought to be expropriated
are included in said list. The evidence further shows that several of the tenants, among them Victor
Magpantay, C. Balaquiot, Luciano Panganiban, Isabelo Manguera and Andres Castronuevo have
lands of their own; that some of the lands are sugar lands for which they hold sugar quotas and one
of the said tenants, Andres Castronuevo, is cultivating a portion of the land sought to be
expropriated and which he wants to buy, not by himself but through an aparcero or tenant.

In relation to this claim of the defendants that some of the tenants and occupants have lands of their
own and so are not qualified to be the beneficiaries of expropriation, the trial court said that that is no
problem because the government can later screen and process said tenants and occupants, and
that if some are found to be disqualified because they are already land owners, then they should not
be allowed to purchase the portions occupied by them. But if and when this happens, what becomes
of said portions taken away from their former owners over their vigorous opposition and which
portions later proved to be not subject to expropriation for the reason that the persons occupying
them do not deserve and are not qualified to purchase them? A real injustice will have been done to
the owners of these portions because they had been included and made defendants in these
proceedings, deprived of their holdings against their will, only to find out later that the expropriation
as to these portions was improper and unjustified.

The defendants have introduced evidence without refutation through the testimony of one Anacleto
Jonson, an employee of the Bureau of Lands in charge of the 3,700 hectares of the Lian Estate
expropriated by the Government way back in 1940 and 1941, and intended to be subdivided into
small lots and resold to their tenants and occupants, on the status of said lands. According to
Jonson, since then which up to now, involves a period of about thirteen years, said area of 3,700
hectares remains unsubdivided; that no portion of said big area has been resold or even contracted
to be resold by the Government to their occupants and tenants, and all that the Government is doing
is to administer the same and receive the portion of the yearly harvest corresponding to the owner.
In other words, all that has been done, thirteen years after the expropriation was to transfer the
ownership and administration of this big area with about 800 tenants and families from the Lian
Estate to the Government which has assumed the role of lessor and landlord. No reason or
explanation was given for this rather strange if not anomalous situation. The defendants, owners of
the land being condemned, feeling a little bitter against the Government, condemns its action in
instituting the present proceedings, and point to this unfortunate situation and status of the 3,700
hectares expropriated in 1941 as an example of the Government's rather over-ambitious program of
expropriation. They say:

.. . In 1939, the Commonwealth of the Philippines, filed the expropriation proceedings in the
Court of First Instance of Batangas of certain portions of the Lian Estate still owned by
 Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and occupied by 800 persons (t. s. n.,p. 359). The Colegio de San
Jose, Inc., finally executed the Deed of Sale for 4,300 hectares of land on May 1940, and
title and ownership to these lands were then transferred to the Commonwealth of the
Philippines (t. s. n., pp. 73-74, 357-359). However, notwithstanding, the expropriation of this
large estate of 4,300 hectares of homesites and agricultural lands by the Commonwealth of
the Philippines 13 years ago, for resale to the poor and landless, up to the present time this
property has not been subdivided into small lots, nor sold to the actual occupants (t. s. n., p.
360). Notwithstanding this state of affairs, the plaintiff is still bent on expropriating another 67
hectares of agricultural lands consisting of 18 small lots of small areas which do not adjoin
each other and belonging to 20 small landowners (Record on Appeal, pp. 4-14) who are
intended by the framers of the Constitution to be protected by section 4, Article XIII of the
Constitution. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-8.).

This Tribunal in the case of Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration, supra, held that section 4 of
Article XIII of the Constitution has reference only to large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and the lands
that embrace a whole town or a large portion of a town or city. The lands now sought to be
expropriated with a total area of 67 hectares even if considered as one whole parcel which they are
not, can of course not be regarded as a landed estate. During the discussion of this case it was
urged by the minority that as long as any land formerly formed part of a landed or large estate, it
may, regardless of its present area be still subject to expropriation under section 4, Article XIII of the
Constitution, citing the doctrine laid down in the case of Rural Progress Administration vs.
Reyes, G.R. No. L-4703, October 8, 1953. It is true that said ruling was made in the Reyes case but
we should bear in mind that that was a decision by a highly divided court, six for the majority and
four dissenting , but two majority concurring only in the result and one of them concurring in a
separate opinion. It seems that the members of the Tribunal espousing the majority opinion therein
were greatly impressed by the fact that notwithstanding the small area involved, about two hectares,
there were 113 persons living in the same, and dependent on the products of the fisheries on it, and
evidently had no other place to go to live. We feel that the decision in that Reyes case was a
departure from doctrine laid down in the leading case of Guido which doctrine has been
subsequently affirmed and reiterated in a long line of cases, and we now believe that in abandoning
the ruling made in the Reyes case, this tribunal is merely returning to and re-affirming the sound and
wholesome doctrine laid down in the GuidoCase.

The main purpose of the constitutional provision contained in section 4, Article XIII of that instrument
was to break up landed estates into reasonably small portions. Once said landed estate is broken
up, the purpose of the Constitution is achieved. Otherwise, were we to adhere to the rule made in
the Reyes case that if a piece of land, regardless of size, formerly formed part of a big landed estate,
it is necessarily subject to expropriation then there would be no limit or foreseeable end to
expropriation. A landed estate of say 3,000 hectares is broken up into say 50-hectare lots and sold
to the lessees or occupants thereof. The tenants in that 50-hectare lot want to buy their holdings and
because the lot was formerly a part of a landed estate, it is again expropriated and subdivided into
say 5-hectare lots. A buyer of this 5-hectare portion may have tenants cultivating portions thereof
and these tenants would again insist on expropriation into say one hectare lots and so this
expropriation would and may go on endlessly until the minimum of a few square meters reached,
just to accommodate one single tenant. We hold that that could not have been the intention of the
framers of the Constitution. We also say that once a landed estate is broken up into portions of
reasonable area, the buyers thereof are protected by the Constitution against further expropriation.

The trial court in justifying the present expropriation held that the land sought to be condemned with
an area between 67 and 77 hectares is not small. It perhaps meant to say that it is large, and so may
be regarded as a landed estate coming within the contemplation of the Constitution for purposes of
expropriation. As a matter of fact, the land is only about 67 hectares in area. Not only this but it has
already been subdivided into smaller portions ranging from thirteen hectares to as small as one
hectare and now owned by different individual families. But even considering the land as a whole
parcel of 67 hectares, may it be considered a landed estate whose ownership by one person is
discouraged by the Constitution, and so subject to expropriation.

Our attention is called by the defendants-appellants to Land Administrative Order Bo. R-3 issued by
the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Executive Order No. 376 dated November 28,
1950, abolished the Rural Progress Administration which was formerly in charge of the expropriation
of landed estates and transferred said function to the Bureau of Lands, creating therein a Division of
Landed Estates. The Bureau of Lands is under the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the latter promulgated Administrative Order No. R-3 under the provisions of Section 79-B of the
Revised Administrative Code. This Administrative Order is entitled "Rules and Regulations
Governing the Acquisition and Disposition of Landed Estates. Section 3 thereof reads as follows:

3. Minimum Area of Private Estates to be acquired. — Except in special cases, no

proceedings shall be initiated for the appropriation of an estate unless the area thereof be at
least 5 hectares if for residential purpose; and at least 100 hectares if for agricultural
purpose. This shall be without prejudice to the acquisition of smaller areas thru negotiation.

According to the above reproduced section, no agricultural land will be expropriated for purposes of
resale if less than 100 hectares in area. Although this Administrative Order was issued on October
19, 1951, after the commencement of the present expropriation proceedings, nevertheless it
embodied the policy of the Government as to the size of agricultural lands that may be expropriated
under section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution. In other words, the Government considers 100
hectares of agricultural land not to be too large to be owned by an individual, family, or entity so as
to be subject to expropriation. And this policy contained in our laws governing the public domain.
Under the old Public Land law (Act No. 926), a person and his family may apply for and obtain a
homestead with an area of 16 hectares. This was evidently found to be too small for purposes of
expansion for a family and the area for a homestead was later increased to 24 hectares under Act
2874 and Commonwealth Act 141. That means that a man, poor and landless, who has to apply to
the Government for a homestead may own as much as 24 hectares of land. Commonwealth Act 141
provides that an individual may purchase 144 hectares of public land, meaning to say, that 144
hectares is not too large a parcel to be owned by a person or a family. And as to corporations the
Public Land Act authorizes them to purchase or lease 1024 hectares of the public domain. In view of
this policy of the Government as to the size of agricultural land which a corporation or an individual
may legitimately own, even purchase from the Government itself, it is clear that a parcel of 67
hectares in an area such as the land now sought to be expropriated is not a landed estate or too
large a parcel so as to justify expropriation; and if we consider the fact that these 67 hectares were
originally seven distinct and separate parcels owned by Sinclair and later subdivided into about 17
parcels now owned by twenty-three, one would realize the impropriety of expropriating so as to
enable the tenants and occupants thereof to buy them. In theGuido case we indirectly held through
Mr. Justice Tuason that parcels of 10, 15 or 25 hectares in area may not be expropriated for the
purpose of reselling them to the tenants and occupants., and that to do so would be an act of
oppression. What the Government is now trying to do in the present case is to take away parcels
ranging from one to thirteen hectares in area from about 23 landowners with about 90 dependents
and transfer them to about forty-four tenants with about 214 dependents. We hold that that cannot
be done, not only because it has no statutory or constitutional support but also because it is unjust.
What section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution intended and sought to do was merely to break up
landed estates, and trusts in perpetuity. It intended to discourage the concentration of and excessive
landed wealth in an entity or a few individuals, but surely it did not intend or seek to distribute wealth
among citizens or take away from a citizen land which he did not actually need and give it to another
who needs it. That does not come within the realm of social justice. Said this Tribunal in
theGuido case:
 The presumption of social justice ordained by the Constitution does not supply paramount
basis for untrammeled expropriation of private land by the Rural Progress Administration or
any other government instrumentality. Social justice does not champion division of property
or equality of economic status; what it and the Constitution to guaranty are equality of
opportunity, equality of political rights, equality before the law, equality between values given
and received, and equitable sharing of social and material moods on the basis of efforts in
their production.

The trial court held that Cirilo P. Baylosis subdivided lots 306-YYY and 306-BB and sold them to
many of its co-defendants in the year 1950, as shown by the dates of the registration of the sales in
the Office of the Register of Deeds, this, after he had been notified by the Rural Progress
Administration in 1949 of the intention of the Government to expropriate those lots, and that
furthermore, many if not all of the purchasers of his lots as subdivided were his relatives, thereby
giving said court reason to believe that those sales by Cirilo were all simulated, intended to frustrate
the attempt of the Government to expropriate. In the first place, Cirilo asserts that he made the
subdivision and made the sales before he received the notice from the Rural Progress
Administration in 1949 but because it took the Bureau of Lands a long time to approve the
subdivision survey and plan, the sales were not registered until 1950. In the second place, the mere
fact that a land owner subdivides his land and sells them to his relatives does not mean that the
sales are simulated or fraudulent. It is not unnatural for a person who has something to sell, to give
preference to his relatives; and with respect to lands, to have as his neighbors and adjoining owners
people whom he knows and are related to him. In the third place, and this is the most important,
even assuming that Cirilo P. Baylosis was previously notified of the intention of the Government to
expropriate his land, said notice by no means could legally prevent him from disposing of his
property; otherwise, the mere announcement or notice of the intention of the Government to
expropriate a parcel of land, however indefinite and uncertain that intention may be, would as it were
freeze said property in the hands of its owner. Thereafter, the owner may not deal with his own
property, mortgage it, much less sell it and all he could do is to wait patiently, for any future action of
the Government in the way of expropriation. Said expropriation may come along afterwards or may
not come at all because the Government may change its mind, and in the meantime the landowner
is rendered helpless as regards his own property. In the present case, as already stated, the petition
for expropriation was not filed by the Government until the year 1951, more than two years after the
notice of the Government's intention to expropriate was served on Cirilo. We hold that mere notice of
the intention of the Government to expropriate lands in the future does not and cannot bind the
landowner and prevent him from dealing with his property. To bind the land to be expropriated and
the owner thereof, the expropriation must be commenced in court and even then we are not certain
that the owner may not deal with his property thereafter, mortgage or even sell it if he can find
persons who would step into his shoes and deal with the Government, either resist the expropriation
if in their opinion it is illegal or accept the expropriation and remain with what is left of the property if
the entire property is not needed by the Government.

In conclusion we hold that under section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, the Government may
expropriate only landed estates with extensive areas, specially those embracing the whole or a large
part of a town or city; that once a landed estate is broken up and divided into parcels of reasonable
areas, either thru voluntary sales by the owner or owners of said landed estate, or thru expropriation,
the resulting parcels are no longer subject to further expropriation under section 4, Article XIII of the
Constitution; that mere notice of the intention of the Government to expropriate a parcel of land does
not bind either the land or the owner so as to prevent subsequent disposition of the property such as
mortgaging or even selling it in whole or by subdivision; that tenancy trouble alone whether due to
the fault of the tenants or of the landowners does not justify expropriation; that the Constitution
protects a landowner against indiscriminate and unwarranted expropriations; that to justify
expropriation, it must be for the public purpose and public benefit, and that just to enable the tenants
of a piece of land of reasonable area to own portions of it, even if they and their ancestors had
cleared the land and cultivated it for their landlord for many years, is no valid reason or justification
under the Constitution to deprive the owners or landlord of his property by means of expropriation.

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from reversed; the motions for dismissal filed by
defendants-appellants are granted; and the petition for expropriation is dismissed, with costs in both
instances.

SALVADOR BIGLANG-AWA, REMEDIOS BIGLANG-AWA, petitioners,

vs. HON. JUDGE MARCIANO I. BACALLA in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 216 – Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS),respondents.

DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,

with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, seeking to
annul and set aside the Orders of the respondent Court dated August 5, 1998,
ordering the issuance of Writs of Possession of the properties of herein
petitioners, and the Order dated August 12, 1998, issuing the corresponding
Writs of Possession, as well as the Order dated July 7, 1999, denying the
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the August 5, 1998 Orders. The
petition further prays for the dismissal of Civil Cases Nos. Q-97-31368 and Q-
97-31369 for being premature due to failure to comply with the substantive
requirements of Executive Order No. 1035 (1985). [1]

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioners Remedios Biglang-awa and Salvador Biglang-awa are the
registered owners of certain parcels of land situated in Talipapa, Novaliches,
Quezon City. The parcel of land owned by petitioner Remedios Biglang-awa
is covered by T.C.T. No. RT-101389 (362966) with an area of 769 sq. m.,
while that owned by Salvador Biglang-awa is covered by T.C.T. No. RT-
101390 (19352) with an area of 2,151 sq. m. The government needed to
expropriate 558 sq. m. of the aforesaid property of petitioner Remedios
Biglang-awa, and 881 sq. m. of that belonging to petitioner Salvador Biglang-
awa for the construction of the Mindanao Avenue Extension, Stages II-B and
II-C..
On August 29, 1996, the petitioner Remedios Biglang-awa received a
Notice from the respondent Republic, through the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH) Project Manager Patrick G. Gatan, requiring her to
submit the documents necessary to determine the just compensation for her
property.[2]

On October 15, 1996, Final Notices, signed by Project Director Cresencio

M. Rocamora, were given by the DPWH to the petitioners to submit within five
(5) days the pertinent documents, otherwise, expropriation proceedings would
be filed against their properties. As the petitioners failed to comply with these
[3]

final notices, the respondent Republic, through the DPWH, filed with the
respondent Regional Trial Court of Quezon City separate cases for
[4]

expropriation against the petitioners, docketed as Civil Case Nos. Q-99-31368

and Q-97-31369.
On July 10, 1997, the petitioners received summons from the respondent
court, and were ordered to file their respective Answers to the Complaints for
expropriation. The petitioners filed their Answers on August 11, 1997.
Subsequently, the respondent Republic, through the DPWH, deposited
with the Land Bank of the Philippines the amounts of P3,964,500.00 and
P2,511,000.00 for the properties of Salvador and Remedios Biglang-awa,
respectively, based on the appraisal report of the Quezon City Appraisal
Committee.
On April 24, 1998, respondent Republic filed separate Motions for the
Issuance of Writs of Possession of the properties of the petitioners with the
respondent court. The court issued Orders giving the petitioners,
through counsel Atty. Jose Felix Lucero, ten (10) days within which to submit
their Opposition to the said motions. The petitioners failed to file their
Opposition to the Motion.
On August 5, 1998, the respondent court issued separate Orders granting
[5]

the motions for the issuance of writs of possession. Accordingly, the writs of
possession were issued by the respondent court on August 12, 1998. [6]

On September 11, 1998, petitioner Remedios Biglang-awa received a

Notice to Vacate her property. A similar Notice was likewise received by
petitioner Salvador Biglang-awa at about the same time.
On January 25, 1999, the petitioners filed a joint Manifestation with the
respondent court to the effect that they were retaining the law firm of Gumpal
and Valenzuela, in lieu of Atty. Jose Felix Lucero whose services they had
already terminated due to the latter’s inaction and abandonment of their
cases.
On May 10, 1999, the petitioners, through their new counsel, moved for a
reconsideration of the respondent court’s Orders dated August 5, 1998, and a
recall of the writs of possession issued on August 12, 1998, mainly on the
ground that the respondent Republic failed to comply with the provisions of
E.O. 1035 (1985), relating to the conduct of feasibility studies, information
campaign, detailed engineering/surveys, and negotiation prior to the
acquisition of, or entry into, the property being expropriated.
On July 7, 1999, the respondent court issued an Order denying the
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, a copy of which was received by the
petitioners on July 26, 1999.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari.
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the respondent court gravely
abused its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction, when it
issued the questioned orders.
We rule in the negative.
The petitioners contend that due process of law in relation to expropriation
proceedings mandates that there be compliance with the provisions of
Executive Order No. 1035, particularly Sections 2, 3, 4 and 6, claimed to
constitute the substantive requirements of the expropriation law, prior, and as
a condition precedent, to Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. Hence, a writ of possession pursuant to the above provision
of Rule 67 will issue only upon showing that the said provisions of E.O. 1035
have already been complied with. As the writs of possession in the instant
case were issued by the respondent court without the respondent Republic,
through the DPWH, having furnished the petitioners any feasibility study and
“approved” parcellary survey in connection with the Mindanao Avenue
Extension Project, despite formal request by the latter, and therefore without
[7] [8]

showing prior compliance with E.O. 1035, the petitioners contend that such
issuance of the writs of possession by the respondent court was made with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
We do not agree.
The provisions of law adverted to by petitioners are as follows:

Title A. Activities Preparatory To Acquisition Of Property

Sec. 2. Feasibility Studies. Feasibility studies shall be undertaken for all

major projects, and such studies shall, in addition to the usual technical,
economic and operational aspects, include the social, political, cultural and
environmental impact of the project.
Sec. 3. Information Campaign. Every agency, office and instrumentality of the
government proposing to implement a development project which requires the
acquisition of private real property or rights thereon shall first make
consultations with the local government officials, including the regional
development councils having jurisdiction over the area where the project will
be undertaken to elicit their support and assistance for the smooth
implementation of the project. The implementing agency/instrumentality
concerned with the assistance of the local government officials and
representatives of the Office of Media Affairs shall conduct an extensive public
information campaign among the local inhabitants that will be affected by the
project to acquaint them with the objectives and benefits to be derived from
the project and thus avoid any resistance to or objection against the
acquisition of the property for the project.

Sec. 4. Detailed Engineering/Surveys. The implementing government agency/

instrumentality concerned shall, well in advance of the scheduled construction
of the project, undertake detailed engineering, including parcellary surveys to
indicate the location and size of the sites and to determine ownership of the
land to be acquired, including the status of such landownership.

xxx xxx xxx

Title B. Procedure For Acquisition Of Property

Sec. 6. Acquisition Through Negotiated Sale. As an initial step, the

government implementing agency/instrumentality concerned shall negotiate
with the owner of the land that is needed for the project for the purchase of
said land, including improvements thereon. In the determination of the
purchase price to be paid, the Ministry of Finance and the
Provincial/City/Municipal Assessors shall extend full assistance and
coordinate with the personnel of the government implementing agency
concerned in the valuation of lands and improvements thereon taking into
consideration the current and fair market value declared by the owner or
administrator of the land, or such current market value as determined by the
assessor, whichever is lower, prior to the negotiation. [Executive Order No.
1035 (1985)]

Nothing in the foregoing provisions supports the contention of the

petitioners. A careful perusal of the provisions cited do not yield the
conclusion that the conduct of feasibility studies, information campaign and
detailed engineering/surveys are conditions precedent to the issuance of a
writ of possession against the property being expropriated. Although
compliance with these activities should indeed be made prior to the decision
to expropriate private property, the requirements for issuance of a writ of
possession once the expropriation case is filed, are expressly and specifically
governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit:

Sec.2. Entry of the plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized

government depositary.-- Upon the filing of the complaint or at anytime
thereafter, and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the
right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he
deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to
the assessed value of the property for the purposes of taxation to be held by
such bank subject to the orders of the court xxx xxx .

xxx xxx xxx

If such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer
to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and
promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the
parties.

As clearly enunciated in Robern Development Corporation vs. Judge

Jesus Quitain :
[9]

“Expropriation proceedings are governed by revised Rule 67 of the 1997

Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1, 1997. Previous
doctrines inconsistent with this Rule are deemed reversed or modified.
Specifically, (1) an answer, not a motion to dismiss, is the responsive pleading
to a complaint in eminent domain; (2) the trial court may issue a writ of
possession once the plaintiff deposits an amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the property, pursuant to Section 2 of said Rule,
without need of a hearing to determine the provisional sum to be
deposited; and (3) a final order of expropriation may not be issued prior to a
full hearing and resolution of the objections and defenses of the property
owner.”(Emphasis Ours)

Thus, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil

Procedure and the Robern Development Corporation case, the only requisites
for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings are: (1) the filing
of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the
making of a deposit equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject
to expropriation. Upon compliance with the requirements the issuance of the
writ of possession becomes “ministerial.” [10]
 The antecedents and the rationale for the rule are explained thus:

“There is no prohibition against a procedure whereby immediate possession

of the land involved in expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided
always that due provision is made to secure the prompt adjudication and
payment of just compensation to the owners. However, the requirements for
authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings have changed.

To start with, in Manila Railroad Company v. Paredes, [Manila Railroad

Company v. Paredes, 31 Phil 118, 135, March 31 & December 17, 1915] the
Court held that the railway corporation had the right to enter and possess the
land involved in condemnation proceedings under Section 1, Act No. 1592,
immediately upon the filing of a deposit fixed by order of the court.

The Rules of Court of 1964 sanctioned this procedure as follows:

Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with National or

Provincial Treasurer. Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter
the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the
real or personal property involved if he deposits with the National or Provincial
Treasurer its value, as provisionally and promptly ascertained and fixed by the
court having jurisdiction of the proceedings, to be held by such treasurer
subject to the orders and final disposition of the court. . . . (emphasis ours.)

Subsequently, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed into law

Presidential Decree No. 42 and its companion decrees, which removed the
court's discretion in determining the amount of the provisional value of the
land to be expropriated and fixed the provisional deposit at its assessed value
for taxation purposes. Hearing was not required; only notice to the owner of
the property sought to be condemned.

On the issue of the immediate possession, PD 42 (Authorizing The Plaintiff In

Eminent Domain Proceedings To Take Possession Of The Property Involved
Upon Depositing The Assessed Value, For Purposes of Taxation) provided:

WHEREAS, the existing procedure for the exercise of the right of eminent
domain is not expeditious enough to enable the plaintiff to take or enter upon
the possession of the real property involved as soon as possible, when
needed for public purposes;

xxx xxx xxx

. . . [T]hat, upon filing in the proper court of the complaint in eminent domain
proceedings or at anytime thereafter, and after due notice to the defendant,
plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real
property involved if he deposits with the Philippine National Bank, . . . an
amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of
taxation, to be held by said bank subject to the orders and final disposition of
the court.

The provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and of any other existing law
contrary to or inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.

Paragraph 3 of PD No. 1224 (Defining The Policy On The Expropriation Of

Private Property for Socialized Housing Upon Payment Of Just
Compensation) also authorized immediate takeover of the property in this
manner:

3. Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation and the deposit of the
amount of just compensation as provided for herein, the Government, or its
authorized agency or entity, shall immediately have possession, control and
disposition of the real property and the improvements thereon even pending
resolution of the issues that may be raised whether before the Court of First
Instance or the higher courts.

Where the "taking" was for "socialized housing," Section 3, PD 1259

(Amending Paragraphs 1, 2, And 3 Of PD No. 1224 Further Defining The
Policy On The Expropriation Of Private Property For Socialized Housing Upon
Payment Of Just Compensation), amending the above-quoted paragraph,
provided:

Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation and the deposit of the amount
of the just compensation provided for in Section 2 hereof, the Government, or
its authorized agency or entity, shall immediately have possession, control
and disposition of the real property and the improvements thereon even
pending resolution of the issues that may be raised whether before the Court
of First Instance, Court of Agrarian Relations or the higher courts.

Similarly, Section 1, PD No. 1313 (Further Amending Paragraph 3 Of

Presidential Decree No. 1224 As Amended By Presidential Decree No. 1259,
Defining The Policy On The Expropriation Of Private Property For Socialized
Housing Upon Payment Of Just Compensation), amending paragraph 3 of PD
1224, decreed:
Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation and the deposit in the Philippine
National Bank at its main office or any of its branches of the amount
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the just compensation provided for in
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1259, the government, or its authorized
agency or entity, shall immediately have possession, control and disposition of
the real property and the improvements thereon with the power of demolition,
if necessary, even pending resolution of the issues that may be raised
whether before the Court of First Instance, Court of Agrarian Relations, or the
higher Courts.

In this connection, we also quote Section 7 of PD No. 1517 (Proclaiming

Urban Land Reform In The Philippines And Providing For The Implementing
Machinery Thereof), which reads:

xxx xxx xxx

Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation and the deposit in the
Philippine National Bank at its main office or any of its branches of the
amount equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the declared assessment
value in 1975, the Government, or its authorized agency or entity shall
immediately have possession, control and disposition of the real
property and the improvements thereon with the power of demolition, if
necessary, even pending resolution of the issues that may be raised
whether before the Court of First Instance, Court of Agrarian
Relations, or the higher Courts.

Finally, PD 1533 (Establishing A Uniform Basis For Determining Just

Compensation And The Amount Of Deposit For Immediate Possession Of
The Property Involved In Eminent Domain Proceedings) mandated the deposit
of only ten percent (10%) of the assessed value of the private property being
sought to be expropriated, after fixing the just compensation for it at a value
not exceeding that declared by the owner or determined by the assessor,
whichever is lower. Section 2 thereof reads:

Sec. 2. Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation and the
deposit in the Philippine National Bank at its main office or any of its
branches of an amount equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the amount
of compensation provided in Section 1 hereof, the government or its
authorized instrumentality agency or entity shall be entitled to
immediate possession, control and disposition of the real property and
the improvements thereon, including the power of demolition if
 necessary, notwithstanding the pendency of the issues before the
courts.

Accordingly, in San Diego v. Valdellon [80 Phil 305, 310, November 22, 1977],
Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals [93 SCRA 503, 525, October 18,
1979], and Haguisan v. Emilia [131 SCRA 517, 522-524, August 31, 1984],
the Court reversed itself and ruled that Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules,
was repealed by Presidential Decree No. 42. The judicial duty of ascertaining
and fixing the provisional value of the property was done away with, because
the hearing on the matter had not been "expeditious enough to enable the
plaintiff to take possession of the property involved as soon as possible, when
needed for public purpose."

In Daet, the Court clarified that the provisional value of the land did not
necessarily represent the true and correct one but only tentatively served as
the basis for immediate occupancy by the condemnor. The just compensation
for the property continued to be based on its current and fair market value, not
on its assessed value which constituted only a percentage of its current fair
market value.

However, these rulings were abandoned in Export Processing Zone Authority

v. Dulay [149 SCRA 305, 311 & 316, April 29, 1987], because "[t]he method
of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitute[d]
impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tend[ed] to render this
Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution [was] reserved to it for
final determination." The Court added:

We return to older and more sound precedents. This Court has the duty to
formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines,
or rules. (See Salonga v. Cruz Pano, supra).

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a

judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the
initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in
the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without
just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its
own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the
courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed
compensation.

xxx xxx xxx

More precisely, Panes v. Visayas State College of Agriculture [264 SCRA
708, 719, November 27, 1996.] ruled that the judicial determination of just
compensation included the determination of the provisional deposit. In that
case, the Court invalidated the Writ of Possession because of lack of hearing
on the provisional deposit, as required under then Section 2 of Rule 67, pre-
1997 Rules. In the light of the declared unconstitutionality of PD Nos. 76, 1533
and 42, insofar as they sanctioned executive determination of just
compensation, any right to immediate possession of the property must be
firmly grounded on valid compliance with Section 2 of Rule 67, pre-1997
Rules; that is, the value of the subject property, as provisionally and promptly
ascertained and fixed by the court that has jurisdiction over the proceedings,
must be deposited with the national or the provincial treasurer.

However, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure revised Section 2 of Rule 67 and
clearly reverted to the San Diego, Daet and Haguisan rulings. Section 2 now
reads:

Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with government

depositary. Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after
due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter
upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the
authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed
value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject
to the orders of the court. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper
officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved
and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to
the parties. [Emphasis ours.]

In the present case, although the Complaint for expropriation was filed on
June 6, 1997, the Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Possession was filed
on July 28, 1997; thus, the issuance of the Writ is covered by the 1997 Rules.
As earlier stated, procedural rules are given immediate effect and are
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time they are passed;
new court rules apply to proceedings that take place after the date of their
effectivity. Therefore, Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
is the prevailing and governing law in this case.
With the revision of the Rules, the trial court's issuance of the Writ of
Possession becomes ministerial, once the provisional compensation
mentioned in the 1997 Rule is deposited. Thus, in the instant case the trial
court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the NPC's
Motion for the issuance of the Writ, despite the absence of hearing on the
amount of the provisional deposit.

The Court nonetheless hastens to add that PD 1533 is not being revived.

Under Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules, the provisional deposit should be
in an amount equivalent to the full assessed value of the property to be
condemned, not merely ten percent of it. Therefore, the provisional deposit of
NPC is insufficient. Since it seeks to expropriate portions, not the whole, of
four parcels of land owned by Robern, the provisional deposit should be
computed on the basis of the Tax Declarations of the property: xxx”

Hence, the issuance of writs of possession by the respondent court in

favor of the respondent Republic after the latter, through the DPWH, filed
complaints for expropriation and deposited the amounts of P3,964,500.00 and
P2,511,000.00 equivalent to the assessed value of the properties of the
petitioners is proper and not without basis.
Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, the issuance of a writ of
possession pursuant to Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
alone is neither “capricious” nor “oppressive”, as the said rule affords owners
safeguards against unlawful deprivation of their property in expropriation
proceedings, one of which is the deposit requirement which constitutes
advance payment in the event expropriation proceeds, and stands as
indemnity for damages should the proceedings fail of consummation. The [11]

deposit likewise sufficiently satisfies the compensation requirement of the

Constitution. Moreover, the owners of the expropriated lands are entitled to
[12]

legal interest on the compensation eventually adjudged from the date the
condemnor takes possession of the land until the full compensation is paid to
them or deposited in court.[13]

It is the ruling of this Court that there is no grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent court
in issuing the orders and the writs of possession herein
questioned. Accordingly, the prayer for the dismissal of Civil Cases Nos. Q-
97-31368 and Q-97-31369 on the ground of prematurity for failure to comply
with E.O. 1035 is denied.
 As regards Section 6 (Acquisition through Negotiated Sale) of E.O. 1035,
records show that there had been an attempt on the part of the Republic to
negotiate with the petitioners through the Notices sent by the former through
the DPWH. The Notice dated August 29, 1996 sent to petitioner Remedios
Biglang-awa by the respondent Republic was intended not only to inform her
[14]

formally of the planned expropriation, but also to require her to submit several
documents needed for the determination of the just compensation for her
property. The petitioner failed to submit the required documents. The
respondent Republic sent both petitioners Remedios and Salvador Biglang-
awa Final Notices dated October 15, 1996 stating that failure to submit the
required documents “significantly delay[ed] the completion of the xxx project”,
and that the petitioners were given five (5) days to “cooperate by way of
submitting the documents being requested”, otherwise expropriation
proceedings would be initiated against them. These notices were ignored by
[15]

the petitioners. Consequently, the respondent Republic, through the DPWH,

filed expropriation cases against the petitioners, conformably with Section 7 of
E.O. 1035, to wit:

Sec. 7. Expropriation. If the parties fail to agree in negotiation of the sale of

the land as provided in the preceding section, the government implementing
agency/instrumentality concerned shall have authority to immediately institute
expropriation proceedings through the Office of the Solicitor General or the
Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be. The just compensation
to be paid for the property acquired through expropriation shall be in
accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 1533. Courts shall give priority to
the adjudication of cases on expropriation and shall immediately issue the
necessary writ of possession upon deposit by the government implementing
agency/instrumentality concerned of an amount equivalent to ten per cent
(10%) of the amount of just compensation provided under P.D. No. 1533;
Provided, That the period within which said writ of possession shall be issued
shall in no case extend beyond five (5) days from the date such deposit was
made.

Thus, the filing of the expropriation cases against the petitioners was not
in violation of Section 6 of E.O. 1035, and was, on the contrary, in accordance
with the provisions of the said special law.
The petitioners also claim that they are not bound by the gross and
inexcusable abandonment of their cases by their former lawyer, Atty. Jose
Felix Lucero, resulting to the non-filing of their Opposition to the respondents’
Motion for the Issuance of Writs of Possession.
 Although the general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the
client, the rule is not without an exception. Petitioners rely on the case
[16]

of Aceyork Aguilar vs. Court of Appeals wherein the court relaxed the rule to
[17]

prevent miscarriage of justice. We find no such prejudice to petitioners

caused by the failure of their counsel.
When petitioner Remedios received a Notice to Vacate her property on
September 11, 1998, the petitioners immediately tried to get in touch with their
former counsel, Atty. Jose Felix Lucero, but to no avail as the latter refused to
talk to them or even answer their letter. No reason was given for the
[18]

behavior of the counsel. The petitioners wasted no time in hiring the services
of a new counsel, the law firm of Gumpal and Valenzuela. Considering that
once the deposit under Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules on
Civil Procedure has been made, the expropriator becomes entitled to a writ of
possession as a matter of right, and the issuance of the writ becomes
ministerial on the part of the trial court, no opposition on the part of the
petitioners on the grounds now pleaded could have prevented such
issuance. Therefore, the petitioners were not prejudiced by the lost
opportunity to file their opposition to the respondent’s Motions for the Issuance
of Writs of Possession.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

BRIGIDA REYES, petitioner,

vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (National
Irrigation Administration), respondents.

Pedro G. Peralta for petitioner.

Brenda P. Lomabao for respondent WCC.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission in ROI WC
Case No. 7082 entitled "Brigida Reyes, Claimant, versus, Republic of the Philippines (National
Irrigation Administration), Respondent" reversing the decision of the Hearing Officer of Regional
Office No. 1 and dismissing the claim for death benefits for lack of merit. 1

The petitioner, Brigida Reyes, widow of the late Mariano Reyes, filed a claim for death compensation
with the Regional Office No. 1 of the Department of Labor in Dagupan City against the Republic of
the Philippines (National Irrigation Administration). The claim was controverted. Hence the case was
tried on the merits.
The Hearing Officer found the claim compensable in a decision dated December 10, 1974, the
dispositive part of which reads:

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the respondent is hereby ordered:

1. To pay thru this Office Brigida P. Reyes together with her minor children the sum
of FIVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY TWO PESOS (P5,722.00) as
compensation benefit plus TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00) as burial expenses;

2. To pay Atty. Pedro Peralta the sum of TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX PESOS AND
10/100 (P286. 10) as attorney's fee;

3. To pay this Office the sum of FIFTY SEVEN PESOS (P57.00) as WCC fee Sec.
55 of the Act.

SO ORDERED. 2

The Republic of the Philippines (National Irrigation Administration) appealed to the Workmen's
Compensation Commission which reversed the decision of the Hearing Officer on the ground that
the illness of hemorrhagic pancreatitis which resulted in the death of Mariano Reyes was neither
caused nor aggravated by his employment as carpenter of the National Irrigation Administration.

The petitioner contends that the illness of Mariano Reyes was caused or aggravated by his work as
carpenter of the National Irrigation Administration.

The facts, as found by the Hearing Officer, are:

During the hearing of the case, both parties were allowed to present their evidence,
documentary as well as testimonial. The evidence adduced during the hearing of the
case disclosed that the late Mariano Reyes was employed by the respondent as a
carpenter since May 14, 1973 with a daily wage of P9.17. As a carpenter he works in
the construction of a shed and works 8 hours a day, 5 days in a week and worked
overtime up to 12:00 o'clock midnight. That on or about 6:00 o'clock a.m. on July 4,
1973 he was found dead at the bunkhouse of Campsite, Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija.
The deceased was legally married to the claimant-widow and out of their wedlock,
they have begotten seven children namely Zita, Prescilla, Alexander, Joselene,
Mariano Jr., Rolando and Jine all minors (Exhibits 'D', 'E', 'G', 'H', 'I', and 'J') and said
widow and children were dependent from the earnings of the deceased. For the
funeral services including the tomb the widow spent about P1,000.00.

The only issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the death of
Mariano Reyes arose out and in the course of his employment, or work connected
aggravated by the nature of his employment.

As shown by the evidence on record the claimant testified that prior to her husband's
employment with the respondent the deceased worked as a carpenter in Luna, La
Union and complained about his eyes and stomach pains. That when he took his
vacation from his work in the NIA, Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija, he was pale and
yellowish and thin as the work is hard and that he worked overtime from 6:00 o'clock
p.m. up to 12:00 o'clock in the evening continuously. The testimony of the claimant is
bolstered by the fact that the very witness of the respondent Eng. Cirilo Alfonso,
 Camp Superintendent, UPRP, Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija, admitted that the
deceased worked overtime at the shed up to 12:00 o'clock in the evening before he
died. On July 4, 1973 he made a report of death incident (Exhibit '1') regarding the
death of Mariano Reyes, The deceased was requested to work overtime from 6:00
p.m. to 12:00 midnight of July 3, 1973 in the construction of a swimming pool and at
about 5:00'clock a.m. the following day he was discovered dead with an unknown
cause by his co-employees in the bunkhouse.

Dr. Rogelio Sison the physician of project issued the death certificate of the
deceased (Exhibit 'K') and under the medical certificate portion of the death
certificate I-Disease or condition directly leading death; antecedent causes:
'Hemorrhagic Pancreatitis'. II-Other significant conditions - conditions contributing to
the death but not related to the disease or condition causing death - 'Over fatigue'.

Eng. Cirilo Alfonso further testified that the deceased is very obedient, diligent and
hardworking, dedicated to the government and when asked about his personal view
about the deceased he answered 'since the deceased is under my supervision and
worked truely on overtime I believe the cause of the death as per stated by our
physician was connected to his work. (t.s.n., page 4, Dec, 4, 1974 session). 3

It is undisputed that the illness of the late Mariano Reyes supervened during his employment with
the National Irrigation Administration. Hence, there is a disputable presumption that the claim is
compensable. 4 The claimant is relieved of the duty to prove causation as it is then legally presumed that
the illness arose out of the employment. The burden of proof is shifted to the employer to show that the
sickness is not compensable. 5

The private respondent, Republic of the Philippines (National Irrigation Administration), failed to
show that the illness of Mariano Reyes was neither caused nor aggravated by his employment as
carpenter in the Upper Pampanga River Project, Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija.

Moreover, the petitioner adduced evidence to show that Mariano Reyes had been working overtime.
According to the death certificate of the deceased, Exhibit "K", issued by Dr. Rogelio Sison, the
physician of the project, over fatigue contributed to the death of Mariano Reyes. It is evident,
therefore, that the illness of Mariano Reyes was directly caused by the nature of his work with the
National Irrigation Administration.

The Hearing Officer of Regional Office No. 1, Department of Labor, awarded death compensation to
the petitioner on the basis of the following:

Under Sec. 8 (b) of the Act, the claimant-widow together with her minor children Zita,
Prescilla, Alexander, Joselene, Mariano Jr., Rolando and Jine is entitled to death
compensation equivalent to 60% of the deceased average weekly wage. The
deceased was receiving P9.17 per day or an average weekly wage of P45.85 but
under Section 12 of the Act, however the average weekly wage in death case should
be reckoned at not more than P50.00 and 60% of P45.85 is P27.51 tunes 208 weeks
gives total death compensation of P5,722.00 plus P200.00 burial expenses. 6

The foregoing computation is correct.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission sought to be reviewed is

hereby set aside and the respondent, Republic of the Philippines (National Irrigation Administration),
is ordered:
1) To pay the petitioner and her minor children the sum of Five Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty-
two Pesos (P5,722.00) as death benefit plus Two Hundred Pesos (P 200.00) as burial expenses;

2) To pay the petitioner the amount of Five Hundred Seventy Two Pesos (P572.00) as attorney's
fees; and

3) To pay the successor of the Workmen's Compensation Commission the amount of Fifty Seven
Pesos (P57.00) as administrative fee.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL ROMEO ZULUETA,

COMMODORE EDGARDO GALEOS, ANTONIO CABALUNA,
DOROTEO MANTOS & FLORENCIO BELOTINDOS, petitioners,
vs. VICENTE G. LIM, respondent.

RESOLUTION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Justice is the first virtue of social institutions.[1] When the state wields its
power of eminent domain, there arises a correlative obligation on its part to
pay the owner of the expropriated property a just compensation. If it fails,
there is a clear case of injustice that must be redressed. In the present case,
fifty-seven (57) years have lapsed from the time the Decision in the subject
expropriation proceedings became final, but still the Republic of the
Philippines, herein petitioner, has not compensated the owner of the
property. To tolerate such prolonged inaction on its part is to encourage
distrust and resentment among our people – the very vices that corrode the
ties of civility and tempt men to act in ways they would otherwise shun.
A revisit of the pertinent facts in the instant case is imperative.
On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
instituted a special civil action for expropriation with the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. 781, involving Lots 932 and 939 of
the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of
establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. Lot 932 was
registered in the name of Gervasia Denzon under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 14921 with an area of 25,137 square meters, while Lot 939 was in
the name of Eulalia Denzon and covered by TCT No. 12560 consisting of
13,164 square meters.
After depositing P9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank, pursuant to
the Order of the CFI dated October 19, 1938, the Republic took possession of
the lots. Thereafter, or on May 14, 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision
ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just
compensation.
The Denzons interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but it was
dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5,
1948.
In 1950, Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the
National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it “denied
knowledge of the matter.” Another heir, Nestor Belocura, brought the claim to
the Office of then President Carlos Garcia who wrote the Civil Aeronautics
Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to expedite action on
said claim. On September 6, 1961, Lt. Manuel Cabal rejected the claim but
expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a
reasonable time.
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the
Denzons’ successors-in-interest, Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza and
Josefina Galeos-Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of
[2]

possession with damages against the Republic and officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines in possession of the property. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. R-7208.
In the interim or on November 9, 1961, TCT Nos. 23934 and 23935
covering Lots 932 and 939 were issued in the names of Francisca
Valdehueza and Josefina Panerio, respectively. Annotated thereon was the
phrase “subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire
said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a
reasonable market value.”
On July 31, 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza
and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as
such over Lots 932 and 939 because of the Republic’s failure to pay the
amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in
view of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a
deed of sale in favor of the Republic. In view of “the differences in money
value from 1940 up to the present,” the court adjusted the market value
at P16,248.40, to be paid with 6% interest per annum from April 5, 1948, date
of entry in the expropriation proceedings, until full payment.
After their motion for reconsideration was denied, Valdehueza and Panerio
appealed from the CFI Decision, in view of the amount in controversy, directly
to this Court. The case was docketed as No. L-21032.[3] On May 19, 1966,
this Court rendered its Decision affirming the CFI Decision. It held that
Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939,
there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic.
Apparently, this Court found nothing in the records to show that the Republic
paid the owners or their successors-in-interest according to the CFI decision.
While it deposited the amount of P9,500,00, and said deposit was allegedly
disbursed, however, the payees could not be ascertained.
Notwithstanding the above finding, this Court still ruled that Valdehueza
and Panerio are not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only
demand the payment of their fair market value, ratiocinating as follows:

“Appellants would contend that: (1) possession of Lots 932 and 939 should be
restored to them as owners of the same; (2) the Republic should be ordered to pay
rentals for the use of said lots, plus attorney’s fees; and (3) the court a quo in the
present suit had no power to fix the value of the lots and order the execution of the
deed of sale after payment.

It is true that plaintiffs are still the registered owners of the land, there not having been
a transfer of said lots in favor of the Government. The records do not show that the
Government paid the owners or their successors-in-interest according to the 1940 CFI
decision although, as stated, P9,500.00 was deposited by it, and said deposit had been
disbursed. With the records lost, however, it cannot be known who received the
money (Exh. 14 says: ‘It is further certified that the corresponding Vouchers and
pertinent Journal and Cash Book were destroyed during the last World War, and
therefore the names of the payees concerned cannot be ascertained.’) And the
Government now admits that there is no available record showing that payment
for the value of the lots in question has been made (Stipulation of Facts, par. 9,
Rec. on Appeal, p. 28).

The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in
what amount. Said lots have been the subject of expropriation proceedings. By
final and executory judgment in said proceedings, they were condemned for
public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold to the Government. In fact, the
abovementioned title certificates secured by plaintiffs over said lots contained
annotations of the right of the National Airports Corporation (now CAA) to pay
for and acquire them. It follows that both by virtue of the judgment, long final,
in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title certificates,
plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots – which
are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated – but only to
demand the fair market value of the same.”
 Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932
to Vicente Lim, herein respondent,[4] as security for their loans. For their
failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in
1976. Thus, TCT No. 23934 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No.
63894 was issued in his name.
On August 20, 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of
title with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Cebu City, against
General Romeo Zulueta, as Commander of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Commodore Edgardo Galeos, as Commander of Naval District V
of the Philippine Navy, Antonio Cabaluna, Doroteo Mantos and Florencio
Belotindos, herein petitioners. Subsequently, he amended the complaint to
implead the Republic.
On May 4, 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent,
thus:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Vicente Lim and

against all defendants, public and private, declaring plaintiff Vicente Lim the
absolute and exclusive owner of Lot No. 932 with all the rights of an absolute
owner including the right to possession. The monetary claims in the complaint and
in the counter claims contained in the answer of defendants are ordered Dismissed.

Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as

CA-G.R. CV No. 72915. In its Decision[5] dated September 18, 2003, the
Appellate Court sustained the RTC Decision, thus:

“Obviously, defendant-appellant Republic evaded its duty of paying what was

due to the landowners. The expropriation proceedings had already become final
in the late 1940’s and yet, up to now, or more than fifty (50) years after, the
Republic had not yet paid the compensation fixed by the court while
continuously reaping benefits from the expropriated property to the prejudice of
the landowner. x x x. This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the
concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land
within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered “just” for the property owner is made to
suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being
made to wait for a decade or more, in this case more than 50 years, before
actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with the loss. To allow the taking
of the landowners’ properties, and in the meantime leave them empty-handed by
withholding payment of compensation while the government speculates on
whether or not it will pursue expropriation, or worse, for government to
subsequently decide to abandon the property and return it to the landowners, is
undoubtedly an oppressive exercise of eminent domain that must never be
sanctioned. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 404).

x x x x x x

An action to quiet title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt
or uncertainty on the title to real property. It is essential for the plaintiff or
complainant to have a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property, which is
the subject matter of the action. Also the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
that is being alleged as cloud on plaintiff’s title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy (Robles vs.
Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 97). In view of the foregoing discussion, clearly, the
claim of defendant-appellant Republic constitutes a cloud, doubt or uncertainty
on the title of plaintiff-appellee Vicente Lim that can be removed by an action to
quiet title.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and finding no reversible error in the

appealed May 4, 2001 Decision of Branch 9, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, in
Civil Case No. CEB-12701, the said decision is UPHELD AND
AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.”

Undaunted, petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed

with this Court a petition for review on certiorari alleging that the Republic has
remained the owner of Lot 932 as held by this Court in Valdehueza vs.
Republic.[6]
In our Resolution dated March 1, 2004, we denied the petition outright on
the ground that the Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible
error. Petitioners filed an urgent motion for reconsideration but we denied the
same with finality in our Resolution of May 17, 2004.
On May 18, 2004, respondent filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of
an entry of judgment. We only noted the motion in our Resolution of July 12,
2004.
On July 7, 2004, petitioners filed an urgent plea/motion for clarification,
which is actually a second motion for reconsideration. Thus, in our
Resolution of September 6, 2004, we simply noted without action the motion
considering that the instant petition was already denied with finality in our
Resolution of May 17, 2004.
On October 29, 2004, petitioners filed a very urgent motion for leave to file
a motion for reconsideration of our Resolution dated September 6, 2004 (with
prayer to refer the case to theEn Banc). They maintain that the Republic’s
right of ownership has been settled in Valdehueza.
The basic issue for our resolution is whether the Republic has retained
ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-
interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI
rendered as early as May 14, 1940.
Initially, we must rule on the procedural obstacle.
While we commend the Republic for the zeal with which it pursues the
present case, we reiterate that its urgent motion for clarification filed on July 7,
2004 is actually a second motion for reconsideration. This motion is
prohibited under Section 2, Rule 52, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, which provides:

“Sec. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. – No second motion for reconsideration

of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.”

Consequently, as mentioned earlier, we simply noted without action the

motion since petitioners’ petition was already denied with finality.
Considering the Republic’s urgent and serious insistence that it is still the
owner of Lot 932 and in the interest of justice, we take another hard look at
the controversial issue in order to determine the veracity of petitioner’s stance.
One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person
shall be deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in
expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be
just compensation whenever private property is taken for public
use.[7] Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution mandates: “Private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”
The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and
refused to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation
for Lots 932 and 939. The length of time and the manner with which it evaded
payment demonstrate its arbitrary high-handedness and confiscatory attitude.
The final judgment in the expropriation proceedings (Civil Case No. 781) was
entered on April 5, 1948. More than half of a century has passed, yet, to this
day, the landowner, now respondent, has remained empty-handed.
Undoubtedly, over 50 years of delayed payment cannot, in any way, be
viewed as fair. This is more so when such delay is accompanied by
bureaucratic hassles. Apparent from Valdehueza is the fact that respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest were given a “run around” by the Republic’s officials
and agents. In 1950, despite the benefits it derived from the use of the two
lots, the National Airports Corporation denied knowledge of the claim of
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest. Even President Garcia, who sent a
letter to the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of National
Defense to expedite the payment, failed in granting relief to them. And, on
September 6, 1961, while the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces expressed
willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots, nothing happened.
The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republic’s delay is contrary
to the rules of fair play, as “just compensation embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land,
but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its
taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
‘just.’” In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated
property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if the
compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a
trespasser ab initio.[8]
Corollarily, in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De
Villaroya,[9] similar to the present case, this Court expressed its disgust over
the government’s vexatious delay in the payment of just compensation, thus:

“The petitioners have been waiting for more than thirty years to be paid for their
land which was taken for use as a public high school. As a matter of fair procedure,
it is the duty of the Government, whenever it takes property from private persons
against their will, to supply all required documentation and facilitate payment of just
compensation. The imposition of unreasonable requirements and vexatious
delays before effecting payment is not only galling and arbitrary but a rich
source of discontent with government. There should be some kind of swift and
effective recourse against unfeeling and uncaring acts of middle or lower level
bureaucrats.”

We feel the same way in the instant case.

More than anything else, however, it is the obstinacy of the Republic that
prompted us to dismiss its petition outright. As early as May 19, 1966,
in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest the sum of P16,248.40 as “reasonable market value
of the two lots in question.” Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed
several decades to pass without obeying this Court’s mandate. Such
prolonged obstinacy bespeaks of lack of respect to private rights and to the
rule of law, which we cannot countenance. It is tantamount to confiscation of
private property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to the
need of government, and the government may take them whenever the
necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however, the Constitution
guarantees that when this governmental right of expropriation is exercised, it
shall be attended by compensation.[10]From the taking of private property by
the government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an implied
promise to compensate the owner for his loss.[11]
Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting function is in
keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against the arbitrary exercise
of governmental powers to the detriment of the individual’s rights. Given this
function, the provision should therefore be strictly interpreted against the
expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the property owner.[12]
Ironically, in opposing respondent’s claim, the Republic is invoking this
Court’s Decision in Valdehueza, a Decision it utterly defied. How could the
Republic acquire ownership over Lot 932 when it has not paid its owner the
just compensation, required by law, for more than 50 years? The recognized
rule is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation.
Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other
democratic jurisdictions. In Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. et al., vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[13] thus:

“Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest
the condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and
paid, but the condemnor’s title relates back to the date on which the petition under the
Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner’s report under the Local Improvement
Act, is filed.

x x x Although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is
complete at the time of entry, title to the property taken remains in the owner
until payment is actually made. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that
title to property does not pass to the condemnor until just compensation had actually
been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniform to this effect. As early as 1838,
in Rubottom v. McLure, it was held that ‘actual payment to the owner of the
condemned property was a condition precedent to the investment of the title to
the property in the State’ albeit ‘not to the appropriation of it to public
use.’ In Rexford v. Knight, the Court of Appeals of New York said that the
construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the
payment of the compensation although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the
land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further said that ‘both on principle
and authority the rule is . . . that the right to enter on and use the property is
complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of
law for a public use, but that the title does not pass from the owner without his
consent, until just compensation has been made to him.”

Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes,
that:

‘If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are
attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation
adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece
of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until
compensation is paid...’”(Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be no

transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator. Otherwise stated, the
Republic’s acquisition of ownership is conditioned upon the full payment of
just compensation within a reasonable time.[14]
Significantly, in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia[15] this Court ruled that the
expropriation of lands consists of two stages, to wit:

“x x x The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context
of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action,
“of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property
sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint,
upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of
the complaint” x x x.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination
by the court of “the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” This is
done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
x x x.

It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said
to have been completed. In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation,[16] we
ruled that, “the process is not completed until payment of just compensation.”
Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation
process incomplete.
 The Republic now argues that under Valdehueza, respondent is not
entitled to recover possession of Lot 932 but only to demand payment of its
fair market value. Of course, we are aware of the doctrine that “non-payment
of just compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does not entitle the
private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated lots.” This is our
ruling in the recent cases of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,
et al.,[17] and Reyes vs. National Housing Authority.[18] However, the facts of
the present case do not justify its application. It bears stressing that the
Republic was ordered to pay just compensation twice, the first was in the
expropriation proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57)
years have passed since then. We cannot but construe the Republic’s
failure to pay just compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under
such circumstance,recovery of possession is in order. In several
jurisdictions, the courts held that recovery of possession may be had when
property has been wrongfully taken or is wrongfully retained by one claiming
to act under the power of eminent domain[19] or where a rightful entry is
made and the party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which
has been assessed or agreed upon;[20] or fails or refuses to have the
compensation assessed and paid.[21]
The Republic also contends that where there have been constructions
being used by the military, as in this case, public interest demands that the
present suit should not be sustained.
It must be emphasized that an individual cannot be deprived of his
property for the public convenience.[22] In Association of Small Landowners in
the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[23] we ruled:

“One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the
individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that
there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be
in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional
shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the
most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the
bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person
invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of
one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.

The right covers the person’s life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of
Article III of the Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner enjoys the
added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”
 The Republic’s assertion that the defense of the State will be in grave
danger if we shall order the reversion of Lot 932 to respondent is an
overstatement. First, Lot 932 had ceased to operate as an airport. What
remains in the site is just the National Historical Institute’s marking stating that
Lot 932 is the “former location of Lahug Airport.” And second, there are only
thirteen (13) structures located on Lot 932, eight (8) of which are residence
apartments of military personnel. Only two (2) buildings are actually used as
training centers. Thus, practically speaking, the reversion of Lot 932 to
respondent will only affect a handful of military personnel. It will not result to
“irreparable damage” or “damage beyond pecuniary estimation,” as what the
Republic vehemently claims.
We thus rule that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle
respondent to recover possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic.
Unless this form of swift and effective relief is granted to him, the grave
injustice committed against his predecessors-in-interest, though no fault or
negligence on their part, will be perpetuated. Let this case, therefore, serve
as a wake-up call to the Republic that in the exercise of its power of eminent
domain, necessarily in derogation of private rights, it must comply with the
Constitutional limitations. This Court, as the guardian of the people’s right, will
not stand still in the face of the Republic’s oppressive and confiscatory taking
of private property, as in this case.
At this point, it may be argued that respondent Vicente Lim acted in bad
faith in entering into a contract of mortgage with Valdehueza and Panerio
despite the clear annotation in TCT No. 23934 that Lot 932 is “subject to the
priority of the National Airports Corporation [to acquire said parcels of
land] x x x upon previous payment of a reasonable market value.”
The issue of whether or not respondent acted in bad faith is immaterial
considering that the Republic did not complete the expropriation process. In
short, it failed to perfect its title over Lot 932 by its failure to pay just
compensation. The issue of bad faith would have assumed relevance if the
Republic actually acquired title over Lot 932. In such a case, even if
respondent’s title was registered first, it would be the Republic’s title or right of
ownership that shall be upheld. But now, assuming that respondent was
in bad faith, can such fact vest upon the Republic a better title over Lot
932? We believe not. This is because in the first place, the Republic has no
title to speak of.
At any rate, assuming that respondent had indeed knowledge of the
annotation, still nothing would have prevented him from entering into a
mortgage contract involving Lot 932 while the expropriation proceeding was
pending. Any person who deals with a property subject of an
expropriation does so at his own risk, taking into account the ultimate
possibility of losing the property in favor of the government. Here, the
annotation merely served as a caveat that the Republic had
a preferential right to acquire Lot 932 upon its payment of a “reasonable
market value.” It did not proscribe Valdehueza and Panerio from exercising
their rights of ownership including their right to mortgage or even to dispose of
their property. In Republic vs. Salem Investment Corporation,[24] we
recognized the owner’s absolute right over his property pending completion of
the expropriation proceeding, thus:

“It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have
been completed. Moreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation that title
over the property passes to the government. Therefore, until the action for
expropriation has been completed and terminated, ownership over the property being
expropriated remains with the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can
exercise all rights pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his
property subject to the power of the State ultimately to acquire it through
expropriation.

It bears emphasis that when Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932
to respondent in 1964, they were still the owners thereof and their title had not
yet passed to the petitioner Republic. In fact, it never did. Such title or
ownership was rendered conclusive when we categorically ruled
in Valdehueza that: “It is true that plaintiffs are still the registered owners
of the land, there not having been a transfer of said lots in favor of the
Government.”
For respondent’s part, it is reasonable to conclude that he entered into the
contract of mortgage with Valdehueza and Panerio fully aware of the extent of
his right as a mortgagee. A mortgage is merely an accessory contract
intended to secure the performance of the principal obligation. One of its
characteristics is that it is inseparable from the property. It adheres to the
property regardless of who its owner may subsequently be.[25] Respondent
must have known that even if Lot 932 is ultimately expropriated by the
Republic, still, his right as a mortgagee is protected. In this regard, Article
2127 of the Civil Code provides:

“Art. 2127. The mortgage extends to the natural accessions, to the improvements,
growing fruits, and the rents or income not yet received when the obligation becomes
due, and to the amount of the indemnity granted or owing to the proprietor from the
insurers of the property mortgaged, or in virtue of expropriation for public use,
with the declarations, amplifications, and limitations established by law, whether the
estate remains in the possession of the mortgagor or it passes in the hands of a
third person.

In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that “the non-payment of just

compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of
the expropriated lots,[26]however, in cases where the government failed to pay
just compensation within five (5)[27] years from the finality of the judgment
in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right
to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance with the
principle that “the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the
judgment.”[28] To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the
government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with
justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes
property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just
compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals,[29] we defined just
compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid
to the property owner but also the payment of the property within
a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered “just.”
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 72915 is AFFIRMED in toto.
The Republic’s motion for reconsideration of our Resolution dated March
1, 2004 is DENIED with FINALITY. No further pleadings will be allowed.
Let an entry of judgment be made in this case.
SO ORDERED.