Delegate from Represented by Haifa Nesheiwat

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan California State University, Northridge

Position Paper for Preventing Terrorist Acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a supporter of establishing a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Free
Zone1 and is not believed or known to have possessed any or do currently possess such weapons categorized under
WMD, including but not limited to nuclear, chemical, biological weapon programs. Jordan for the past decade has
been supported by countries where the main focus is to adhere to a nuclear program for purposes of peaceful nuclear
technology2. Jordan is a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)3 and holds a good standing reputation in all
relevant non-proliferation treaties. Jordan commends the countries Canada, Italy, France, Spain, China, South
Korea, Argentina, France and Japan4. Jordan maintains the signed agreement with Japan in Nuclear Energy
Cooperation. Jordan is a country new to nuclear power5; therefore relying on assistance from foreign suppliers is a
major resource to keep construction and operation in guiding Jordan through its first nuclear power plant 6.
Jordan, a non-nuclear weapon state, was the first country in 1998 in the Middle East to adopt a protocol allowing
extra assistance in privileged inspections. Jordan is also a participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative7
Jordan is aware of the grant of permanent mandate by the Council where the 1540 committee questions if it is a
reasonable idea to limit illegal smuggling of weapons. Jordan said it was a primary issue to consider amending the
Committee’s mandate, which would include developing a list of smugglers, individuals, non-State actors that
continuously participated in the exercise of smuggling such materials 8. The resolution 1540 plans to review and
prepare steps to ensure regulation and on non-proliferation laws. In adherence to resolution 1540 (2004), the
Council’s approach should not be in a unilateral perspective, but rather for purposes of promoting a consensus
through a group of states versus viewing the States as individual entities. Nuclear weaponry are extremely
dangerous and not managed or found some form of regulation within the Middle East Region will be in danger,
precisely Jordan9. A way to ensure a stable and sage peace amongst the Middle East, these WMD must be regulated
or the result can be crucial to the regions warfare. 10 A regulation can be adhered by all countries in one written and
agreed document stating and based on certain terms, will agree to give up weapons or be subjected to regulatory
inspection to ensure that all countries are abiding by these terms and conditions, amongst other protocols.11 If a
country should fail to abide by the protocol or breached the agreement, the UN decided the ultimate consequence
accordingly to nature of the violation.

Jordan has invested heavily in counter-terrorism efforts, and has received training and other assistance from the
United States to secure its borders against illicit trafficking. 12 The real issue with the EU's methodology, then again,
is that it endeavors to handle the issue of WMD terrorism through non-expansion arrangements just, without
planning particular approaches to manage it. This leaves the EU with the main alternative of supporting worldwide
non-expansion bargains and administrations; this is specialized in giving to third nations in need of aid. Terrorists
can likewise be dissuaded by an all-encompassing discouragement approach, which includes a mixture blend of
routine powers and in addition extensive capacities to react to terrorist attacks. This is since WMD assaults would be
somewhat immoderate and unsafe for terrorists. Accordingly, if terrorists get to realize that the effect of their
assaults will be brought down by successful reaction, then they won't incline toward to do such attacks; instead, they
will be "deterred."

Jordan launched several proposals to advance its nuclear energy security division, including establishing intention to
advance a civilian nuclear power program, by King Abdullah II in January of 2007 13. Jordan experienced few energy
import shortages from Egypt, due to the ongoing conflicts14. Jordan needs 80 percent of natural gas, which is
exported from the Al-Arish pipeline, located in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula; since Egyptian revolution 2011, militants
bombed the area over 20 times. Jordan, a country free from weapons of mass destruction, neither exports, nor
produces nor possesses such weapons, and its defense policy is centered on preventive measures against such
weapons. The Government of Jordan’s main concern is the national security of its people and its territory, as
followed by promoting international peace and forming an agreement to which states would neither harbor or
possess any weapons of mass destruction—indirectly or directly—and prohibited from any engagement in
commerce of these machinery. The Government of Jordan is also making determined efforts within the League of
Arab States to prepare a draft convention making the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction.
1
"Mideast WMD-Free Zone Should be Pursued Incrementally, Experts Say," Global Security Newswire, 2 December 2011, www.nti.org/gsn.
2
http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/jordan/
3
http://www.nti.org/glossary/#non-nuclear-weapon-state-nnws
4
"Jordan: Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries," World Nuclear Association, February 2012, www.world-nuclear.org.
5
Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf, “Al Qaeda’s Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction – The Authoritative Timeline,”
Foreign Policy (25 January 2010).
6
Paul K. Kerr, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, and Mark Holt, "Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Foreign Countries: Issues for Congress," Federation of American Scientists, 8 December 2014,
www.fas.org.
7
"Proliferation Security Initiative Participants," Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, US Department of State, 9 June 2015, www.state.gov.
8
http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/jordan-1540-initial-report.pdf?_=1316785879
9
http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/datr/volume8/03-TheEuropeanUnion_and_WeaponsofMass_Destruction.pdf
10
Council of the European Union, “EU Strategy against the Proliferation of WMD: Monitoring and Enhancing Consistent Implementation.”
11
http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/datr/volume8/03-TheEuropeanUnion_and_WeaponsofMass_Destruction.pdf
12
Zachary Kallenborn and Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Disarming Syria of Its Chemical Weapons: Lessons Learned from Iraq and Libya," Nuclear Threat Initiative, October 31, 2013,
www.nti.org (accessed July 8, 2014); United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, "Report of the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical
Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013," A/67/997-S/2013/553, September 16, 2013.
13
Charles Ebinger, John Banks, Kevin Massy, Govinda Avasarala, "Models for Aspirant Civil Nuclear Energy Nations in the Middle East," Policy Brief 11-01, The Brookings Institute,
September 2011, p. 15-16, www.brookings.edu; "Chapter Four: Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq," in Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), p. 82.
14
Ali Omar, "Al-Arish Natural Gas Pipeline Bombed," Daily News Egypt, May 24, 2014; Chen Kane, "Are Jordan's nuclear ambitions a mirage?" Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, December 15,
2013.