G.R. No. 83907. September 13, 1989.

*
NAPOLEON GEGARE, petitioner
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (ELEVENTH DIVISION) AND ARMIE ELMA, respondents.
Facts:

 This case involves a small piece of land. The decision was to cut it into two between the parties.
The petitioner wants the whole lot. Private respondent is happy with his half.
 The center of controversy is Lot 5989 with an area of about 270 square meters situated at
Dadiangas, General Santos City, and this lot was titled in the name of Paulino Elma.
 A reversion case was filed by the Republic of the Philippines against Paulino Elma in the Court of
First Instance of South Cotabato, declaring the title of Paulino Elma null and void and the same
was ordered cancelled.
 The lot was reverted to the mass of public domain subject to disposition and giving preferential
right to its actual occupant, Napoleon Gegare.
 Both petitioner and private respondent filed an application for this lot in the Board of Liquidators
 Private respondent protested against the application of petitioner
 The Board denied the protest because the case had already been decided by the court.
 A motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent was favorably considered by the Board
 The Board directed the chief of LASEDECO to investigate the occupancy and area of the lot. In this
investigation, it was found that only private respondent was the actual occupant so the LASEDECO
chief recommended the division of the property between petitioner and private respondent.
 Private respondent paid for the value of 1/2 of the lot and applied for the issuance of a patent.
 Petitioner filed an action for Annulment and Cancellation of Partition of Lot 5989
 Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of conciliation efforts pursuant
to Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508. The motion was granted.

Issue:

WON the case is covered by PD 1508?

Held: YES

 Under Section 2 of PD 1508, a case for one of the parties therein is the government or any
subdivision or instrumentality (Board of Liquidators) is exempted for barangay conciliation.
 However, Section 6 of the same decree provides when the government plus another private party
(ELMA) are the respondent, the case must first be submitted for amicable settlement in the
Katarungang Pambarangay.
G.R. No. 76690 February 29, 1988
CLAUDIA RIVERA SANCHEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE MARIANO C. TUPAS

Facts:
 Petitioner and private respondent are both occupants of a public agricultural land Identified as Lot 595 located
at Budbud, Tibungco, Davao City.
 Petitioner claims that the area of 450 square meters, more or less, has been in her possession
since 1947, long before private respondent came in and occupied another portion of Lot 595.
 Private respondent claims that the area being claimed by petitioner is a part of his three-fourth
(3/4) of a hectare parcel, the right to which he acquired from its former possessor and owner of
the improvements.
 Private respondent filed with the City Court of Davao an ejectment case against petitioner
 City Court of Davao rendered a "Judgment by Compromise."
 Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Davao a petition to annul the aforesaid judgment
of the City Court of Davao, she learned for the first time that what she had signed with her
thumbmark assisted by her lawyer was a compromise agreement, wherein she recognized private
respondent's prior occupancy of the land in question, when she received an Order of Guillermo
C. Ferraris, OIC Regional Director of Lands, dropping her petition, together with the petitions of
three others, based, allegedly, on their withdrawal, of their claims over the disputed land; that
she had never intended to recognize the private respondent as having prior possession and
occupancy of the land.
 Private respondent, in a Motion to Dismiss moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
grounds that the records of the case do not show that the same has been referred to the barangay
court for confrontation, conciliation or settlement of the parties concerned as required under the
provisions of Section 6 of PD 1508
 RTC dismissed the case for lack of cause of action or prematurity for not having passed the
Barangay Court.

Issue:
WON RTC erred in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment?

Held: NO

 The records do not show that there was an opposition to the filing of the said ejectment case on
the ground that the dispute had not been submitted to the Barangay Court for possible amicable
settlement under P.D. 1508. The only logical conclusion therefore is that either such requirement
had already been complied with or had been waived. Under either circumstance, there appears
to be no reason, much less a requirement that this case be subjected to the provisions of P.D.
1508.
 In fact, the present controversy is an action for annulment of a compromise judgment which as a
general rule is immediately executory and accordingly, beyond the authority of the Barangay
Court to change or modify.
PETRA VDA. DE BORROMEO, Petitioner, v. HON. JULIAN B. POGOY

Facts:

 Petitioner herein seeks to stop respondent Judge Julian B. Pogoy of the Municipal Trial Court of
Cebu City from taking cognizance of an ejectment suit for failure of the plaintiff to refer the
dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation.
 Deceased Vito Borromeo was the original owner of the building which was leased to herein
petitioner Petra Vda. De Borromeo for P500 per month payable within the first five days of the
month.
 Atty. Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the estate, served upon petitioner a letter demanding that
she pay the overdue rentals corresponding to the period from March to September 1982, and
thereafter to vacate the premises. As petitioner failed to do so, Atty. Reyes instituted an
ejectment case against the former
 Petitioner moved to dismiss the case for failure of Atty. Reyes to refer the dispute to the barangay
court as required by PD no. 1508
 Respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss.
Issue:

WON the motion to dismiss be granted for failure to comply with PD no. 1508?

Held: NO

 Under Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only
where the parties thereto are "individuals." An "individual" means "a single human being as
contrasted with a social group or institution." The law applies only to cases involving natural
persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical person such as a corporation, partnership,
corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc.
 It is indisputable that the real party in interest in the case is the intestate estate under
administration. Since the said estate is a juridical person, plaintiff administrator may file the
complaint directly in court, without the same being coursed to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.
ELMER PEREGRINA, ADELAIDA PEREGRINA and CECILIA PEREGRINA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. DOMINGO D. PANIS, III, PROCOPIO SANCHEZ and CARMELITA SANCHEZ, respondents.

Facts:
 SPOUSES Procopio and Carmelita Sanchez file a case against PETITIONERS Elmer, Adelaida and
Cecilia Peregrina for damages for alleged disrespect for the dignity, privacy and peace of mind of
the SPOUSES under Article 26 of the Civil Code, and for alleged defamation under Article 33 of the
same Code.

 They are neighbors in Olongapo and that no conciliation proceedings was filed.
 PETITIONERS moved for the dismissal of the complaint
 The SPOUSES applied for a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. Thereafter, the SPOUSES presented
their Opposition claiming that, under Section 6(3) of P.D. No. 1508, the parties may go directly to
the Courts if the action is coupled with a provisional remedy such as preliminary attachment.
 Respondent Judge initially dismissed the Complaint for failure of the SPOUSES to comply with the
pre-condition for amicable settlement under P.D. No. 1508, stating that the application for a
provisional remedy was merely an afterthought.
 On motion for reconsideration by the SPOUSES, respondent Judge denied PETITIONERS' Motion
to Dismiss on the ground that under Rule 57, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the application for
attachment can be made at the commencement of the action or any time thereafter.
Issue:

WON the judge erred in denying the motion to dismiss?

Held: YES

 Section 3 of P.D. No. 1508 provides that “disputes between or among persons actually
respectively in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of
said barangay.”
 SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. — No complaint, petition, action or
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided. in Section 2 hereof
shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there
has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat
Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been
repudiated.
 P.D. No. 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent for the
filing of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that condition precedent could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the
ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity. The condition is analogous to exhaustion of
administrative remedies, or the lack of earnest efforts to compromise suits between family
members, lacking which the case can be dismissed
 The parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of P.D. No. 1508. They are actual residents in the
same barangay and their dispute does not fall under any of the excepted cases.
LIBRADA M. AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
ERNEST S. AURE1, respondent.

Facts:

 Aure Lending filed a Complaint for ejectment against Aquino.

 In their Complaint, Aure and Aure Lending alleged that they acquired the subject property from
a Deed of Sale.
 Aquino countered that the Complaint lacks cause of action for Aure and Aure Lending do not have
any legal right over the subject property.
 MeTC rendered in favor of Aquino and dismissed the Complaint for ejectment of Aure and Aure
Lending for non-compliance with the barangay conciliation process, among other grounds.
 The MeTC observed that Aure and Aquino are residents of the same barangay but there is no
showing that any attempt has been made to settle the case amicably at the barangay level.
 RTC affirmed
 CA reversed the MeTC and RTC Decisions and remanding the case to the MeTC for further
proceedings and final determination of the substantive rights of the parties.
ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE BARANGAY CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS IS A

JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT THAT WARRANTS THE DISMISSAL OFTHE COMPLAINT?

HELD: NO

 It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of Section 412
of the Local Government Code on barangay conciliation (previously contained in Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 1508) is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies -- the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; and the
controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.
 Nevertheless, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non-compliance
therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject
matter or over the person of the defendant
 Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on
ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of
competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where
the defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and
even during the entire proceedings a quo
 While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case
by seasonably taking exception thereto, they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing
an answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the
case by cross-examining respondent Planas. Upon this premise, petitioners cannot now be
allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to
which they had submitted themselves voluntarily.
CRISANTA ALCARAZ MIGUEL, Petitioner,
vs.
JERRY D. MONTANEZ, Respondent.

Facts:

 Jerry Montanez (Montanez) secured a loan of One Hundred Forty-Three Thousand Eight Hundred
Sixty-Four Pesos (₱143,864.00), payable in one (1) year, or until February 1, 2002, from the
petitioner.
 Due to the respondent’s failure to pay the loan, the petitioner filed a complaint against the
respondent before the Lupong Tagapamayapa and the parties entered into a Kasunduang Pag-
aayos. However, respondent still failed to pay.
 Petitioner filed with the MeTC, a complaint for Collection of Sum of Money.
 MeTC ordered Montanez to pay the loan
 RTC affirmed the MeTC’s decision
 CA reversed and ruled that the remedy of the petitioner was to file an action for the execution of
the Kasunduang Pag-aayos in court and not for the collection of sum of money.
Issue:
WON a complaint for sum of money is the proper remedy for the petitioner, notwithstanding the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos?

Held: YES
 In the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, a party's non-compliance with the amicable settlement
paved the way for the application of Article 2041 under which the other party may either enforce
the compromise, following the procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law,
or consider it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand
 The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an
amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and
summary in nature on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular
form, which remedy is judicial.
 In the instant case, the respondent did not comply with the terms and conditions of the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos. Such non-compliance may be construed as repudiation because it
denotes that the respondent did not intend to be bound by the terms thereof, thereby negating
the very purpose for which it was executed. The petitioner has the option either to enforce the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos, or to regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand, in
accordance with the provision of Article 2041 of the Civil Code