US v. FRED L. DORR ET AL., GR No.

1051, 1903-05-19
Facts:
The defendants have been convicted upon a complaint charging them with the offense of writing,
publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government of the United States and the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.
The complaint is based upon section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Commission
The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of the "Manila Freedom" under the
caption of "A few hard facts."
It questions the appointing rascally natives to important Government positions
"There is no doubt but that the Filipino office holders of the Islands are in a good many
instances rascals.
"The Commission has exalted to the highest positions in the islands Filipinos who are
alleged to be notoriously corrupt and rascally, and men of no personal character.
Issues:
what is meant in section 8 of Act No. 292 by the expression "the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands." Does it mean in a general and abstract sense the existing laws and
institutions of the Islands, or does it mean the aggregate of the individuals by whom the
Government of the Islands is, for the time being, administered?
Ruling:
"We understand, in modern political science, * * * by the term government, that institution or
aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules
of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed
upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of
prescribing them. Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society. By
administration, again, we understand in modern times, and especially in more or less free
countries, the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the time
being (the chief ministers or heads of departments)." (Bouvier, Law Dictionary, 891.
The term "government" would appear to be used here in the abstract sense of the existing
political system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the Government the Houses of
Congress and the Executive which are also specially mentioned.
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that this is the sense in which the term is used in the
enactment under consideration.
The article in question contains no attack upon the governmental system of the United States,
and it is quite apparent that, though grossly abusive as respects both the Commission as a body
and some of its individual members, it contains no attack upon the governmental system by
which the authority of the United States is enforced in these Islands.
It is the character of the men who are intrusted with the administration of the government that the
writer is seeking to bring into disrepute by impugning the purity of their motives, their public
integrity, and their private morals, and the wisdom of their policy. The publication of the article,
therefore, no seditious tendency being apparent, constitutes no offense under Act No. 292,
section

8.

The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendants are acquitted

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, Corp.

FACTS:

This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes
which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of “55% provided
that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654,
Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by Fortune) as
locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA
7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already covered.

In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated
its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal
protection of the laws.

For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action
against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the
scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the
latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause of
action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.

The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground
that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUES:
Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in
connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office

Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code

HELD:

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may
suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks.
An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not
liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the
Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a
public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith
which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for
official actions.

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith,
malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book,
civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or
negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional
rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts
were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for
acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1)
acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right
of the plaintiff.

On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which
prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).

Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has
been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives
some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been
stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the
tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered
immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the
alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of
good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise
an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant
acted without evil intent.