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PSW0010.1177/1478929916652149<italic>Political Studies Review X(X)</italic>Iley-Williamson

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Political Studies Review

Why Capitalism? 2017, Vol. 15(3) 415­–422

© The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/1478929916652149
https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929916652149
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Dan Iley-Williamson

Abstract
An endorsement of capitalism is often thought to be a concession to human selfishness. The
thought often runs that while some other socioeconomic system – socialism, perhaps – would be
morally preferable, we cannot live up to those high ideals. Jason Brennan has recently attempted
to show that this widespread view is mistaken. Even in terms of ideal theory, Brennan argues,
capitalism is morally superior to its rival. To make this case, Brennan critiques the work of the late
socialist political philosopher, GA Cohen. Brennan argues that Cohen’s justification of socialism
is ill-conceived, and in fact, Cohen’s failure helps to reveal that capitalism is morally superior to
socialism. In this review article, I argue that Brennan’s critique and attempted counter-claim are
unsuccessful. Among other failings, Brennan leaves us with no adequate answer to the question,
why capitalism?

Cohen GA (2009) Why Not Socialism? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Brennan J (2014) Why Not Capitalism? New York: Routledge.

Keywords
capitalism, socialism, distributive justice, GA Cohen, ideal theory

Accepted: 13 April 2016

Most analytic political philosophers are egalitarians in a fairly robust sense. As such,
they believe that large political and economic inequalities are unjust, especially if such
inequalities cannot be appropriately attributed to the choices of individuals. Such a view
unambiguously condemns the deep inequalities that are found within contemporary capi-
talist societies. Not only do these inequalities provide individuals with starkly different
opportunities to flourish, but they also allow a small elite to use the instruments of politi-
cal power to serve their own ends. These deep and growing inequalities seem to be the
result of the internal dynamics of capitalist economies (as detailed by Piketty, 2014). Yet
analytic political philosophers rarely directly address the justness of capitalism. Instead,
most discussions in analytic political philosophy concern fairly small technical points,
which makes it easy to miss the widespread belief that contemporary capitalist societies
are seriously unjust. For political philosophers who care about real politics, this can be
frustrating. With most debates being with fellow egalitarians, there is scant opportunity to

The Queen’s College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Corresponding author:
Dan Iley-Williamson, The Queen’s College, University of Oxford, High Street, Oxford OX1 4AW, UK.
Email: daniel.iley-williamson@politics.ox.ac.uk
416 Political Studies Review 15(3)

do battle with true ideological opponents on grand questions like what socioeconomic
system should we embrace?
Jason Brennan gives the egalitarian political philosopher the opportunity to engage
with such an opponent on precisely this question. In Why Not Capitalism? (WNC;
Brennan, 2014 – henceforth also just Capitalism?), Brennan critiques the late GA Cohen’s
posthumously published book, Why Not Socialism? (WNS; Cohen, 2009 – henceforth
also just Socialism?). There, Cohen presented a case for socialism and equality. The aim
of Capitalism? is not only to defeat Cohen and his egalitarianism but also to demonstrate
that even in terms of ideal theory – let alone hardnosed realism – free market capitalism
is morally superior to its great rival. The egalitarian political philosopher, then, is faced
with a true opponent on an issue of real significance. There is, however, very little within
Capitalism? that is troubling to egalitarian opponents of free market capitalism. Like
Socialism?, Brennan’s book is short, but unlike Socialism? it is poorly argued, often mis-
leading, and (even for such a short book) repetitive and waffle-ridden. Here, I do not
comment on all of its flaws; instead, I focus on some problems internal to Brennan’s argu-
ments. To do this, it will be helpful to give a brief summary of Socialism?.
In Socialism?, Cohen presents a simple thought experiment to attempt to persuade his
readers of the desirability of socialism. He asks us to imagine going on a camping trip
with friends, where the ‘common aim is that each of us should have a good time’ (WNS:
3). Cohen notes that on a desirable camping trip the campers behave like socialists, not
capitalists: the facilities – the pots and pans, the games and sporting equipment, and so on
– are collectively controlled, there is no hierarchy, there is a roughly equal distribution of
benefits and burdens, and the campers care about and care for one another. The campers,
then, do not seek to maximise advantages for themselves at the expense of their fellow
campers (as capitalists would, Cohen says). For example, a camper who, having found an
apple tree, wants to trade the apples for a lesser share of the communal chores would be
rightly met with derision (WNS: 8). This is Cohen’s ‘preliminary case’ for socialism: on
a camping trip, acting like socialists seems both desirable and feasible. From this Cohen
draws out two moral principles that are realised on the trip (a principle of equality and a
principle of community), and he considers potential, moral and practical disanalogies
between camping and large, complex societies (WNS, Parts II and IV, respectively). He
concludes by commenting on particular modes of socialist organisation: market social-
ism, Cohen thinks, goes a significant way to realising the principles that animate social-
ists, but the market taints its credentials (WNS: 74–75). Non-market socialism, in contrast,
offers the hope of fully achieving the socialist vision of equality and community, although
Cohen is only agnostic on the question of its feasibility (WNS: 76).
Capitalism? has two primary aims: first, to show that Cohen’s ‘argument’ for social-
ism (as précised above) ‘fails, and fails badly’ (WNC: 20) and, second, to show that ‘from
a moral point of view, the intrinsically best society is capitalist’ (WNC: 22–23). I will call
the first Brennan’s Negative Thesis and the second his Positive Thesis. It is on these aims
that I will focus. To help achieve these two aims, Brennan presents an alternative ideal-
ised scenario – ‘the Mickey Mouse Clubhouse village’ (the Mickey Mouse Clubhouse is,
we are told, a television programme on the Disney Junior channel). The villagers have
communally owned property (parks and such like) and privately owned property. For
example, Minnie Mouse and Clarabellle Cow own and run a factory and a store, Donald
Duck owns a farm, and Mickey Mouse owns a clubhouse. Each member of the village is
able to pursue their own aims, each does their part in fulfilling common aims, and all do
so with a spirit of civic virtue (WNC: 24–25).
Iley-Williamson 417

The village, so Brennan thinks, represents a capitalist ideal, manifested through its
supposedly ‘voluntaryist, anarchist, capitalist, libertarian structure’ (WNC: 95).
Purportedly parodying Cohen, Brennan contrasts this capitalist way of organising the vil-
lage with a ‘socialist’ alternative, in which Donald Duck and his pals commit atrocities
reminiscent of the most gross crimes perpetrated by twentieth century ‘socialist’ govern-
ments (famine, gulags and mass murders are described) (WNC: 25–29). The Clubhouse
example is intended to help Brennan establish his two theses. I will begin by considering
the Negative Thesis before critiquing the Positive Thesis.
If successful, the Negative Thesis shows that Cohen’s attempted ‘proof’ for the supe-
riority of socialism fails. To justify this contention, Brennan identifies what he believes
are two ‘fallacies’ in Cohen’s ‘argument’. The first, which he dubs ‘the Cohen Fallacy’
(WNC: 60), occurs when Cohen (supposedly) argues that since it would be more desira-
ble to have society run like the socialist camping trip than the capitalist camping trip,
socialism is intrinsically more desirable than capitalism (WNC: 57–58). This argument
relies on an invalid inference, Brennan argues, since Cohen compares an idealised social-
ist camping trip (one exhibiting communal caring, equality and so on) with a camping trip
that is besmirched by how capitalism really is (beset by greed). Why, Brennan asks, is it
right to compare how socialism ideally is with how capitalism really is? Surely, the cor-
rect comparison is either ideal socialism with ideal capitalism or real socialism with real
capitalism. Because Brennan thinks Cohen commits this error when comparing camping
trips, Brennan thinks himself justified in parodying Cohen by comparing an idealised
capitalist village with how socialism ‘really’ is, as depicted in the ‘socialist’ village
(which is, as said above, marred by atrocities reminiscent of twentieth century ‘socialist’
governments). Brennan thinks this parody makes evident ‘the Cohen Fallacy’, thus help-
ing to refute Cohen’s ‘argument’.
Brennan significantly overstates this criticism. For starters, the camping example does
not, contrary to what Brennan says, operate in an ‘argument’ that attempts to ‘prove’ that
socialism is morally superior to capitalism (WNC: 17). Cohen is explicit about this
(WNS: 10–11). Instead, the case Cohen makes in Socialism? is intended to be suggestive
and inspiring, one that urges his readers to (re)consider their attitude to socialism. By
identifying a setting that is likely to be familiar to his readers and one in which socialistic
principles are adhered to and are considered desirable, Cohen is asking, ‘Why not live
like that all the time?’
Still, it might be thought that highlighting ‘the Cohen Fallacy’ reveals that Cohen’s
case for socialism is weaker than it appears, since capitalism need not (at least conceptu-
ally) be tarnished by greed in the way that it is when depicted by Cohen. There is some
truth in this (as others have noted, see Arneson, 2011: 253; Steiner, 2014: 143), but less
than Brennan suggests. This is for at least two reasons. The first concerns a widespread
justification of capitalism and the second concerns what defenders of free market capital-
ism are committed, on principle, to permitting.
A widespread and influential justification for capitalism says that when individuals pur-
sue self-interested goals in the market, an accumulated effect of this is that goods are
allocated in a socially beneficial way, such that capitalist markets turn self-interestedness
into a virtue. To use Bernard Mandeville’s famous phrase, the market turns private vices
into public benefits (Mandeville, 1924). This defence of capitalism, then, is premised on
the pervasive existence of self-interestedness. In contrast to this dog-eat-dog societal ethos,
like many other defenders of socialism, the societal ethos Cohen posits is one in which
individuals care about, and care for, one another. Hence, there is an important respect in
418 Political Studies Review 15(3)

which Cohen is comparing like with like: he is comparing the self-seeking ethos endorsed
by many defenders of capitalism with the caring ethos endorsed my many defenders of
socialism. While Brennan’s idiosyncratic justification of capitalism does not posit perva-
sive self-interestedness, and so is unembarrassed by this comparison, the comparison helps
to highlight an objectionable feature of this influential justification of capitalism.
The second reason Cohen’s comparison is illuminating concerns what defenders of
capitalism like Brennan are committed to permitting. As reported above, Cohen imagines
a camper who, having found an apple tree, attempts to trade the apples for a lesser labour
burden. Brennan agrees that the camper is a schmuck (WNC: 8). However, according to
free market capitalism and the property rights it enshrines, the camper would have owner-
ship rights to the apples and so would be permitted to use them to selfishly bargain with
the other campers (or at least, there would be relevantly similar circumstances in which
capitalist property rights would permit this type of act). Hence, while Brennan can par-
take in condemnation of such selfish behaviour, he cannot, on pain of abandoning free
market capitalism, claim that the camper has no right to behave selfishly. Socialism, and
the principles that animate it, would not allow the selfish camper such rights; the equality
demanded by socialism would see the apples come into common ownership. The general
point is that free market capitalism enshrines the capitalist’s right to market exploitation
and domination, unlike socialism. This difference is drawn out by Cohen’s camping com-
parison and recognition of this difference casts doubt on the justness of capitalist property
rights. In light of this and the above, any error in ‘the Cohen Fallacy’ can be seen to be (at
least) exaggerated by Brennan.
There is a second ‘fallacy’ that Brennan claims Cohen commits, and exposing it is
similarly thought to help establish his Negative Thesis. This ‘fallacy’ occurs when Cohen
identifies socialism with values or motives (WNC: 62). It seems, Brennan says, that
Cohen simply identifies socialism with equality, community and unselfishness and identi-
fies capitalism with greed and fear. But, Brennan goes on, socialism and capitalism are
simply ways of organising property, not principles or motives, and it is clearly a mis-
guided prejudice to identify one’s preferred system with that which is good and identify
one’s dispreferred system with that which is bad (WNC: 63). This accusation is one
example of Brennan being (intentionally?) misleading, since in Socialism? Cohen is
explicit about his understanding of the relationship between socialist principles and
socialist modes of organisation. (One might think that Brennan is being intentionally
misleading because he makes no mention of this distinction, and he cannot be unaware of
it since Socialism? is such a short book.) As Cohen says, he draws a ‘distinction between
socialist principles and socialist modes of organisation, the first, of course, being the
putative justifications of the second’ (WNS: 22). Hence, Cohen is explicit about why he
identifies his favoured principles as socialist principles: he thinks that those principles
can only truly be realised by socialist modes of organisation (collective ownership of the
means of production). Or, to put this differently, Cohen thinks that the reason socialists
affirm socialist modes of organisation is because they affirm socialist principles. A ques-
tion that Socialism? is silent on is why Cohen believes that socialist modes of organisa-
tion are uniquely able to realise the socialist principles he affirms (as noted by Sharon
Krause, 2010: 886). Criticism of Cohen’s silence on that question might be justified, but
that is not a criticism Brennan levels. (Cohen (1995) does answer this question in a pam-
phlet, Is Socialism Inseparable from Common Ownership?. His answer, in short, is that
the equality demanded by socialist principles is incompatible with a division between
capital and labour.)
Iley-Williamson 419

So much then for Brennan’s Negative Thesis. His second aim is to show that an ideal
society would be a free market capitalist society. This is his Positive Thesis, and the
remainder of this review is a critique of it.
It is first useful to dispel a potential source of confusion. As has been suggested in this
review thus far, Brennan takes himself not merely to be showing that an ideal society
would be a capitalist society, but a free market capitalist society.1 As such, his defence of
capitalism is not a defence of welfare-state capitalism or of a property-owning democracy
(i.e. a socioeconomic system that (1) widely disperses capital ownership, (2) prevents
intergenerational transmissions of advantage and (3) safeguards democratic politics from
the influence of capital).2 A more accurate title, therefore, would be Why Not Free Market
Capitalism? This clarification is important because Brennan fails to provide any reason
to positively answer this question, even if he does hint at some reason to positively answer
the book’s actual title.
When discussing the idealised capitalist Clubhouse village, Brennan claims that it
realises, and presumably is justified in terms of, five ‘capitalist principles’ (WNC: 30).
These are as follows:

1. The ‘principle of voluntary community’. According to this principle, ‘people

should live and cooperate with one another without resorting to violence or threats
of violence’ (WNC: 30).
2. The ‘principle of mutual respect’. This principle comes in various incarnations,
including: ‘villagers are tolerant of one another and their differences in taste and
attitudes’; ‘villagers take joy in the diversity of life experiences and perspectives
the others bring to the table’; and the ‘villagers allow one another the freedom to
pursue their respective visions of the good life. They do not interfere in one anoth-
er’s projects’ (WNC: 31).
3. The ‘principle of reciprocity’. This principle says that the villagers ‘trade value
for value in all of their relationships’ (WNC: 32).
4. The ‘principle of social justice’. This principle is realised when the villagers ‘live
under a set of rules designed to ensure that no one, through no fault of his or her
own, will lead a less than decent life’ (WNC: 33).
5. The ‘principle of beneficence’. From this principle, ‘villagers are always willing
to help those in need’, and ‘they care about one another, and, where necessary and
possible, care for one another, and, too, care that they care about one another’
(WNC: 33–34).

To comment on these principles at length would be tedious, but what is important is

that they fail to provide support for free market capitalism. This is because these princi-
ples fail to come close to answering a question that they must be able to answer for them
to serve Brennan’s aim. This question, central to political philosophy, is the question of
distribution: Who is entitled to what and why? Or, in a more Rawlsian vein, what princi-
ples should regulate our major social, political and economic institutions? Adequate
answers to these questions give us an idea of how the benefits and burdens of social
interactions should be distributed and thereby give us an indication of the sort of socio-
economic system that we ought to create and sustain. Robert Nozick, for example,
answers by affirming the principles of his entitlement theory and thereby reaches his
favoured socioeconomic system, free market capitalism (Nozick, 1974); Cohen answers
by affirming the aforementioned principles of equality and community and thereby (so he
420 Political Studies Review 15(3)

thinks) reaches socialism.3 Brennan’s principles, however, provide us with very little
indication of how the benefits and burdens of social interaction should be distributed, and
for that reason his principles are useless, or of very little use, in guiding us towards any
socioeconomic system. They do not suggest capitalism, let alone free market capitalism;
in fact, because they are so lacking in content, a socialist need not object to any of the
principles (which is, of course, untrue of a capitalist’s attitude to the principles Cohen
affirms).
This can be seen by considering the principles: principles 1 and 2 have no distributive
implications; principle 3 merely says – or suggests, since it is unclear what ‘value’ means
– that resources should be tradable; and principles 4 and 5, while the most instructive in
terms of distribution, only require that everyone is able to lead a decent life (some might
say that this means that free market capitalism is therefore ruled out). Hence these princi-
ples do not tell us who is entitled to what and why. Because they do not, Brennan’s prin-
ciples fail to guide us towards free market capitalism.
To highlight the extent of this problem, let us again consider the capitalist Clubhouse
village. Suppose that Mickey is not content with his clubhouse, and so he decides, with-
out permission, to make use of Donald’s farm. Presumably this would not only be against
the rules of the village (else it is a very peculiar capitalist village) but it would also be
wrongful, and presumably it would be wrongful because Mickey would be enjoying
resources he is not entitled to. But why is he not entitled to these resources? Some phi-
losophers might answer that Mickey would be enjoying an unfairly large share of
resources if he were to do this, and that is why he is not entitled to these resources. Others
might say that because Donald was the first to mix his labour with the farmland, the farm
is rightfully his, and that is why Mickey is not entitled to use it. Brennan’s principles,
however, provide us with no reason to think either of these things, and nor do they provide
any other explanation for why Mickey’s behaviour would be wrongful. Brennan’s princi-
ples, then, leave us wondering, why capitalism?4
Later in Capitalism? Brennan presents other attempts at justifying free market capital-
ism. An example of this is his appeal to the value of individuals realising their goals
through capitalist enterprise. In the Clubhouse village, for example, Minnie Mouse ‘takes
a certain pride in having a bow factory that is hers, not because she’s fetishistic about
consumption or control, but because this gives her an avenue to exercise her talents and
achieve excellence in a long-standing project’ (WNC: 79). Here Brennan explicitly fol-
lows John Tomasi, who argues that economic liberties (including private ownership of the
means of production) are of fundamental importance, because they allow for the expres-
sion of human freedom and act as a mechanism of self-realisation (Tomasi, 2012).
However, even if these liberties are of fundamental importance, there seems to be no good
reason to think that free market capitalism follows; indeed, quite possibly the opposite. To
see why, remember Brennan’s village: as described, each villager owns capital – Minnie
Mouse and Clarabellle Cow own and run a factory and a store, respectively, Donald Duck
owns a farm, and Mickey Mouse owns a clubhouse. Capital, that is, is widely dispersed,
such that there is not a capitalist class and a working class. If there were a class division
– if, say, Donald and the other ducks own capital, and Mickey and the other mice own
only their labour – then the village looks a lot less desirable and, crucially, the supposed
value of economic liberties would only be realised by one class of villagers. Assuming the
aim is to protect and promote the interests of everyone, and not merely already existing
capitalists, then affirming the importance of economic liberties seems to imply the need
for a socioeconomic system that widely disperses capital, not one that permits it to be
Iley-Williamson 421

owned by a small minority. As such, Brennan’s commitment to economic liberties seems

to imply a Rawlsian property-owning democracy, not free market capitalism (O’Neill and
Williamson, 2012a). There is more to be said on this point, but here what is important is
that Brennan does not get his conclusion; free market capitalism does not follow from the
value people get from owning capital.
Brennan might respond by saying that ideally free market capitalism includes the wide
dispersal of capital, such that ideally all individuals are able to exercise economic liber-
ties.5 Notice, however, how weak this response is: the appeal to the importance of eco-
nomic liberties helps to justify a socioeconomic system that has widely dispersed capital
ownership. If free market capitalism achieves this, then that is a virtue of free market
capitalism; if property-owning democracy achieves this, then that is a virtue of property-
owning democracy (etc.). The appeal to the importance of economic liberties does not,
then, provide particular justification for free market capitalism. Moreover, if we leave the
realm of ideal theory, and begin to consider the actual instantiations of socioeconomic
systems, we are given good reason to believe that free market capitalism does not lead to
the wide dispersal of capital. As Thomas Piketty (2014) has argued, the internal dynamics
of capitalism leads to the concentration of capital ownership. If we are to take feasibility
issues seriously, as surely we must (and as Cohen does (WNS, Part IV)), this provides a
strong reason against free market capitalism by Brennan’s own standards.
Brennan does attempt to provide some other support for his Positive Thesis, but this is
unpersuasive. He says, for example, that free markets create prosperity, thereby enhanc-
ing people’s positive liberty (WNC: 87–92). (This claim is a particularly grating instance
of Brennan being misleading. In support of it, he cites Cohen’s (2011: 167) thesis that
‘lack of money, poverty, carries with it lack of freedom’. In saying this, Cohen was
expounding the ideologically explosive insight that capitalism cannot, in any simple way,
be defended via the value of negative liberty. To put Cohen’s case simply, under capital-
ism there are continual threats and enforcements of the laws of private property, and the
less money you have, the more those laws will constrain what you are able to do, meaning
you will have less negative liberty. Hence the truth of the quoted claim is proved.
Presumably Brennan distorts Cohen’s thesis in an attempt to hide its ideological repercus-
sions.) Brennan concludes by restating Nozick’s view that an ideal society would allow
people to form their own utopias, rather than conforming to any particular one (WNC:
96–98). There is much wrong with Nozick’s view,6 but what is relevant here is that
Brennan lacks the normative grounding to support it. Unlike Nozick, Brennan fails to
provide a basis for justifying free market capitalism. As I have argued, this is because
Brennan fails to provide criteria for determining questions of distribution.
Some theorists have reflected on the Cohen-Brennan exchange and have concluded
that it exposes the futility of their use of ideal theory (Hall, 2015). Although I have some
sympathy for this reaction, here I have argued that such a reaction is too generous to
Brennan. He sets himself the task of showing that a morally perfect society would be a
free market capitalist society, but he gives us no reason to think free market capitalism has
moral credentials. It is tempting to think that Brennan’s inability to do this is suggestive
of the normative void at the heart of free market capitalist philosophy, but that might be
to read too much into his work.

Acknowledgements
The author thanks Johannes Kniess, Bruno Leipold, Sabrina Martin and the two anonymous referees for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
422 Political Studies Review 15(3)

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes
1 Brennan is not, however, always clear about this. He often speaks simply in terms of ‘capitalism’, but on
occasion he does clarify what is clearly his intention: to defend free market capitalism (WNC: 95).
2 For an account of property-owning democracy and its distinctness from welfare-state capitalism, see John
Rawls (2001: Part IV) and O’Neill and Williamson (2012b).
3 It is telling that Brennan spends no time critically engaging with the principles Cohen articulates and
defends in Socialism?. It is telling because it entrenches the impression that Brennan does not recog-
nise the importance of distributive principles in determining the desirability of different socioeconomic
systems.
4 In fact, if we take his principles seriously – and specifically principle 1, the ‘principle of voluntary
community’, which states that ‘people should live and cooperate with one another without resorting to
violence or threats of violence’ – then it seems that Brennan’s principles imply the wrongfulness of capital-
ism. After all, constitutive of capitalism are laws protecting private property; laws backed up by the threat
of violence.
5 Thanks to a reviewer for pushing me to clarify this point.
6 On this, I think Rawls’ (2001: 52–55) remarks are convincing.

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Author Biography
Dan Iley-Williamson is a DPhil student in Politics at Oxford University and College Lecturer in Politics at The
Queen’s College, Oxford. His DPhil thesis focuses on distributive justice and the duties of individuals.