[G.R. No. 134307.

December 21, 1998]

COJUANGCO, JR., vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

QUISUMBING, J.:]

Respondents were charged for taking undue advantage of their public positions, powers, connections or
relationship with the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos giving Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation (COCOFED), unwarranted to prejudice of the Filipino people and to the Republic. On
February 17, 1995, an order for the arrest of petitioner was issued by the respondent Sandiganbayan.
On February 19, 1995 petitioner filed with respondent court an Opposition to Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest with Motion For Leave To File Motion For Reconsideration of Ombudsman Resolutions. Petitioner
alleged that documents attached to the Information were not adequate for the determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest by respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, petitioner
claims the respondent Sandiganbayan should recall the warrant of arrest already issued or desist from
issuing a warrant of arrest. On February 22, 1995, petitioner posted bail and he likewise filed a
Manifestation stating that he was posting bail without prejudice to the Opposition To Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest

Issue: WON posting a bail bod constitutes a waiver of any irregularity attending the arrest.

Held: YES. The rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to
submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Conceding that the warrant issued in this case
was void for the reason that no probable cause was found by the court before issuing it, the defendant
waived all his rights to object to the same by appearing and giving bond. By posting bail, herein
petitioner cannot claim exemption from the effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent
court. While petitioner has exerted efforts to continue disputing the validity of the issuance of the
warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his claim has been negated when he himself invoked the
jurisdiction of respondent court through the filing of various motions that sought other affirmative
reliefs.
People vs Bohol

G.R. No. 171729 July 28, 2008

Quisumbing, J.:

An informant came to the police station and tipped P/Sr. Insp. Jessie Nitullano that a certain Ricardo
Bohol is engaged in illegal drug trade. P/Sr. Insp. Nitullano then formed a team to verify the informant’s
tip, and, if found positive, to launch then and there a buy-bust entrapment of Bohol. PO2 Ferdinand
Estrada was assigned to act as poseur buyer, and he was provided with a marked ₱100-bill as buy-bust
money. The illicit transaction was consummated, PO2 Estrada gave to his companions their pre-
arranged signal. Emerging from their hiding places, PO2 Luisito Gutierrez and his companions arrested
Bohol. PO2 Gutierrez frisked Bohol and recovered from him the buy-bust money and three plastic
sachets containing similar white crystalline granules suspected to be shabu. Bohol claims that his arrest
was illegal since he could not have committed, nor was he about to commit, a crime as he was
peacefully sleeping when he was arrested without a warrant.

Issue : WON an arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a warrant of arrest.

Held: The arrest of Bohol is legal. The Constitution proscribes unreasonable arrests and provides in the
Bill of Rights that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by
competent judicial authority. However, it is a settled exception to the rule that an arrest made after an
entrapment operation does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and
valid under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.–A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

xxxx

In the present case, the arresting officers were justified in arresting Bohol as he had just committed a
crime when he sold the shabu to PO2 Estrada. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which has
repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law.
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, petitioner vs. CO MMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 102653 March 5, 1992

FELICIANO, J.:

It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates
the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the
prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for
suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely,
media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the
prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public
information and public opinion relevant to election issues. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11
(b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or
political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec
time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or
volume of information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby curtailing and limiting
the right of voters to information and opinion.

Issue: WON Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees
comprising freedom of expression.

Held: No. Article IX(C) (4) of the 1987 Constitution provides “The Commission [on Elections] may,
during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits
for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all
grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any governmentowned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary.
Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to
reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections. “

The Comelec has thus been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and
information. The fundamental purpose of such "supervision or regulation" has been spelled out in the
Constitution as the ensuring of "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply," as well as
uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with "public
information campaigns and forums among candidates."
G.R. No. 133486. January 28, 2000

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: A Resolution restraining ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from
conducting such exit survey was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable
source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV
coverage of the elections x x x and to make [an] exit survey of the x x x vote during the elections for
national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast]
immediately."[2] The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec
count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It
also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABSCBN to undertake the exit survey.

Issue: Whether or not holding and reporting exit polls may be prohibited.

Held: No. An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of
individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking
randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their
ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give
an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate
voted. No law prohibits the holding and the reporting of exit polls

The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be
curtailed is the dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage.
There can be no free and honest elections if, in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and
the right to know are unduly curtailed.
UNITED LABORATORIES, INC. vs. ERNESTO ISIP

[G.R. No. 163858. June 28, 2005]

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts: Rolando H. Besarra of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), filed an application, for the
issuance of a search warrant concerning the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building
owned/operated by Ernesto Isip; and for the seizure, among others Finished or unfinished products of
UNITED LABORATORIES (UNILAB), particularly REVICON multivitamins for violation of Section 4(a), in
relation to Section 8, of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8203. The search warrant was implemented by NBI
agents Besarra and Divinagracia, in coordination with UNILAB employees. No fake Revicon multivitamins
were found; instead, there were sealed boxes at the first and second floors which contained Disudrin
and Inoflox. The respondents filed a Motion to Quash the Search Warrant contending that the
implementing officers of the NBI conducted their search different from the address described in the
search warrant which the trial court granted thus the seized articles could no longer be admitted in
evidenceas the search warrant had already been quashed. UNILAB and NBI filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order, contending that the seizure of the items was justified by the plain view
doctrine.

ISSUE: Whether or not plain view doctrine may be validly contended in this case.

Held: No. Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the executing
officer may be seized by him. However, such seizure cannot be presumed as plain view. The essential
requirements for the doctrine to apply, are as follows (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a
prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a
particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant. It merely serves to supplement the prior justification
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search as an incident to a lawful arrest or some
other legitimate reason for being present, unconnected with a search directed against the accused. It is
a recognition of the fact that when executing police officers comes across immediately incriminating
evidence not covered by the warrant, they should not be required to close their eyes to it, regardless of
whether it is evidence of the crime they are investigating or evidence of some other crime. It would be
needless to require the police to obtain another warrant.

It must be stressed that only the NBI agent/agents who enforced the warrant had personal knowledge
whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were
immediately apparent. However, there is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the
sealed boxes before they were opened.
Umil vs Ramos

G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990

PER CURIAM:

Facts: The Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received
confidential information about a member of the NPA being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes
Hospital. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital
records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad,
responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers. As a consequence of this positive identification,
Rolando Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed an
information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of "Double Murder with Assault
Upon Agents of Persons in Authority." No bail was recommended.It clearly appears that Rolando Dural,
was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he
arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting
incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.

Issue: Whether or not warrantless arrest in this case is valid.

Held: Yes. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is
justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the
nature of continuing crimes. From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they
were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection
or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses
committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith
under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them
apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of
nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of
the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
Soliven vs Makasiar

G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988

PER CURIAM:

Facts: The issue raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on
the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads: Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized
by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest.

Issue: whether or not a judge, prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest should personally examinethe
complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause.

Held: No. This is not an accurate interpretation of Section 2, Article III. What the Constitution
underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In such, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy
dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before
their courts. It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure.
Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES, INC. vs. POEA

G.R. No. 114714 April 21, 1995

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Facts: Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated association of

licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies which hire and
recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign ship owner-principals, urged the
Court to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board" of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of 1994, on the
grounds that, among others, the resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional because
they violate the equal protection and non-impairment of obligation of contracts clauses of the
Constitution. To support its contention of in equality, the petitioners claim discrimination against foreign
ship owners and principals employing Filipino seamen and in favor of foreign employers employing
overseas Filipinos who are not seamen.

Issue: WON the assailed resolution and memorandum circular violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

Held: NO. There is no merit to the claim that the assailed resolution and memorandum circular violate
the equal protection clause of the Constitution. It is an established principle of constitutional law that
the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on reasonable
classification. And for the classification to be reasonable, it (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
must apply equally to all members of the same class. There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities
between land-based and sea-based Filipino overseas workers in terms of, among other things, work
environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb, and accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual
activities.
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC. vs. TH E TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY

G.R. No. L-23794 February 17, 1968

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Facts: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed 1 Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964,
imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in
Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of
America and other foreign countries."

On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with
service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its
Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for
being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution).

Issue: WON said Ordinance is violative of the equal protection clause of the constitution.

Held: Yes. The equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does
not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where
(1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to
those who belong to the same class.

A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them,
for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none
other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the
only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms
applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to
exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the
tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the
ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION vs.

HO N. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR

G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Facts: Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued
and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong
Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a
petition for bail was filed by the private respondent. The petition for bail was denied by reason that
there was no Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high
“flight risk”. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent
judge subject to conditions. Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the
respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue: WON the right to bail can be invoked in extradition cases.

Held: The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual
person and the sanctity of human rights. United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of
every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are
now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in
Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the
Constitution,the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. If bail can be
granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation
cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative
proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
 Chavez vs PCGG

[G.R. No. 130716. December 9, 1998]

PANGANIBAN, J:

Facts: Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated
the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies alleges that what impelled him to bring this action
were several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets referring to the alleged discovery of
billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and the
reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs,
on how to split or share these assets. Among the assailed portion principal Agreement reads:

2. Based on the inventory, the FIRST PARTY shall determine which shall be ceded to the FIRST PARTY,
and which shall be assigned to/retained by the PRIVATE PARTY. The assets of the PRIVATE PARTY shall
be net of, and exempt from, any form of taxes due the Republic of the Philippines. However, considering
the unavailability of all pertinent and relevant documents and information as to balances and
ownership, the actual specification of assets to be retained by the PRIVATE PARTY shall be covered by
supplemental agreements which shall form part of this Agreement.

Issue: Whether or not tax exemption may be validly granted in compromise agreements.

Held: No, under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of
taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the Constitution. The
power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local
legislative bodies. Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution, specifically provides: “No law granting
any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.” The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax exemptions, even under the cover of its
authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases. Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting
the Marcoses from paying taxes on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the
equal protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special grant of tax exemption in favor only of the
Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that “taxation shall
be uniform and equitable.”
Telebap vs Comelec

Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an organization
of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and
registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates radio and television broadcasting
stations throughout the Philippines under a franchise granted by Congress. Petitioners contend that §92
of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process clause6 and the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by
taking air time from radio and television broadcasting stations without payment of just compensation.
Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air
time to advertisers and that to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize a taking
which is not "a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property."

Issue: Whether or not

Held: Petitioners' argument is without merit, all broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations,
is licensed by the government. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, subject to
alteration by Congress when the common good so requires authorized by Art. XII, sec 11 of the
Constitution. The better measures for the common good than one for free air time for the benefit not
only of candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully
informed of the issues in an election. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount.

The basic flaw in petitioner's argument is that it assumes that the provision for COMELEC Time
constitutes the use and operation of the stations of the GMA Network, Inc., This is not so. Under §92 of
B.P. Blg. 881, the COMELEC does not take over the operation of radio and television stations but only
the allocation of air time to the candidates for the purpose of ensuring, among other things, equal
opportunity, time, and the right to reply as mandated by the Constitution. Lastly, there are substantial
distinctions in the characteristics of the broadcast media from those of the print media which justify the
different treatment accorded to each for purposes of free speech, such as, the physical limitations of
the broadcast spectrum, the uniquely pervasive presence of the broadcast media in the lives of all
Filipinos, and the earlier ruling that the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser
than the freedom accorded to the print media.