4.1. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION v.
CA foreclosure with the notary public is not within the contemplation of the aforesaid directive as the same
G.R. No. 121158; 265 SCRA 327; December 5, 1996 FRANCISCO, J.:
Facts: China Banking Corporation (China Bank) extended several loans to Native West International
Trading Corporation (Native West) and to So Ching, Native Wests president. Native West in turn
executed promissory notes in favor of China Bank. So Ching, with the marital consent of his wife,
Cristina So, additionally executed two mortgages over their properties, a real estate mortgage was
executed covering a parcel of land situated in Cubao, Quezon City on July 27, 1989, and another for the
property covering a parcel of land located in Mandaluyong on August 10, 1989. The Promissory notes
matured and despite due demands by China Bank, neither private respondents Native West nor So
Ching paid. Pursuant to the two mortgage contracts, China Bank filed petitions for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties copies of which were given to the spouses So Ching and
Cristina So. After due notice and publication, the notaries public scheduled the foreclosure sale of the
spouses’ real estate properties on April 13, 1993. Eight days before the foreclosure sale, however,
private respondents filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court for accounting with damages and
with temporary restraining order against petitioners. Herein defendants assert that herein petitioners
failed to comply with the mandates of Administrative Order No. 3 of the Supreme Court, Section 2
Presidential Decree No. 1079, the Truth in Lending Act (RP Act No. 3765), Violation of Article 1308 of
the Civil Code, that the mortgagors liability limited to P6,500,000.00 and P3,500,000.00 respectively in
the Mortgages, but the same are not included in the notice of foreclosure and that in all the loans of the
bank that was provided to the respondents, it charged interests excessive to the rates allowed by the
Central Bank. April 7, 1993, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the foreclosure
sale. April 28, 1993, the trial court issued an Order granting the private respondent’s prayer for the
issuance of preliminary injunction. The petitioner filed a motion to reconsider which was denied and
therefore, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which also dismissed it after holding that
Administrative Circular No. 3 is the governing rule in extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, which
petitioners however failed to follow, and with respect to the publication of the notice of the auction sale,
the provisions of P.D. No. 1079 is the applicable statute, which decree petitioners similarly failed to
obey. The CA did not answer any other issues raised by the petitioner. It also dismissed petitioner’s
further motion for reconsideration.
Thus, the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 3 should govern the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
properties.
Held: No, the court finds private respondent’s contention that Administrative Order No. 3 is the
governing rule in foreclosure ofmortgages misplaced. It is an elementary principle in statutory
construction that a statute is superior to an administrative directive and the former cannot be repealed
or amended by the latter. Moreover, the parties have stipulated in the contract that the provisions of Act
No. 3135 is the controlling law in case of foreclosure. By invoking the said Act, there is no doubt that it
must govern the manner in which the sale and redemption shall be effected. Clearly, the fundamental
principle that contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties finds application in the
present case, especially where they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy.
Administrative Order No. 3 is a directive for executive judges and clerks of courts which, under its
preliminary paragraph is in line with the responsibility of an Executive Judge, under Administrative Order
No. 6, dated June 30, 1975, for the management of courts within his administrative area. A petition for
is not filed with the court.
4.2. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK v. VDA. DE COSCOLLUELA
G.R. No. 167724 / June 27, 2006 / Callejo, Sr., J. / Splitting / KJMSTA.ANA
NATURE: Petition for Review under Rule 45
PETITIONERS: BPI Family Savings Bank
RESPONDENTS: Margarita Vda. De Cosculluela
FACTS.
 Respondent and her late husband Oscar obtained an agricultural sugar crop loan from Far East
Bank & Trust Co. (later merged with BPI) for crop years 1997 and 1998. In the book of Far East,
the loan account was treated as a single account, and evidenced by 67 promissory notes.
 Sps. Coscolluela executed a real estate mortgage in favor of FEBTC over their parcel of land as
security of loans on credit accommodation obtained and those that may be obtained.
 Under the terms and conditions of the real estate mortgage, in the event of failure to pay the
mortgage obligation or any portion thereof, the entire principal, interest, penalties, and other
charges shall be immediately due; and Far East mat foreclose the same extra judicially.
 For failure to settle outstanding obligation on the maturity dates, Far East sent a final demand
letter to respondent demanding payment.
 Since respondent failed to settle her obligation, Far East filed a petition for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgaged property, but only only for 31 of the promissory notes.
 During pendency of said case, Far East filed a complaint for collection of money representing the
amounts for the 36 other promissory notes.
 In respondent’s answer, she alleged that the complaint was barred by litis pendentia for the
pending petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM.
 Petitioner presented a loan officer as sole witness, who testified that respondent were granted a
loan, which was a “single loan account.”
 Respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence contending that the loan officer’s admission, that there
is only one loan account secured by the REM thus barred the personal action for collection. She
insisted that the filing of said complaint should be dismissed.
 Petitioner opposed the demurrer, stating that each promissory note constituted a separate
contract.
  The trial court denied the demurrer on the ground that each note covered a loan distinct from the Although another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to pet in the amount of
others. P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other resp. Calion joined in moving
for the dismissal of the complaint.
 Respondent filed MR but denied, prompting her to file a certiorari petition under Rule 65 with CA.
RTC dismissed the complaint.
 CA granted the petitioner, stating that the remedies sought are alternative and not cumulative.
Thus, in denying the demurrer, RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE

 Petitioner filed MR but it was denied. Hence, this petition. WON the trial court correctly ruled on the application of the permissive joinder of parties ruling

ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON collection suit should be dismissed – YES
Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may not institute one suit
for a single cause of action, and, if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of
action, the filing of one on a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the
dismissal of others. The law does not permit the owner of a single of entire cause of action or an entire
or indivisible demand to divide and split the cause to make it the subject of several actions.
The lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality rule introduced in Section
33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules.
Section 33(l) of BP129
That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties,
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the
causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions. ...

The true rule which determined whether a party has only a single and entire cause of action is whether Section 11 of the Interim Rules
the entire amount arises from one and the same act or contract or the several parts arise from distinct
Application of the totality rule. In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the
and different acts. As gleaned from the plain terms of the REM, the real estate of respondent served as
amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the money demands,
a continuing security liable for obligations already obtainer and obligations obtained thereafter. In this
exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of WON the separate claims are owned by or due to
case, the action of petitioner is anchored on one and the same cause: the nonpayment of respondent.
different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically
Though the debt may be covered by several promissory notes and is covered by a real estate
alleged.
mortgage, the latter is subsidiary to the former and both refer to one and the same obligation. A
mortgage creditor may institute two alternative remedies against the debtor, either to collect debt or to former rule under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948
foreclose mortgage, but not both.
Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same parties embodied in the same
DECISION: WHEREFORE instant petition is dismissed for lack of merit. complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the demand in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions; but where
4.5. Flores vs. Mallare-Phillips
the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to different
FACTS: The e first cause of action alleged in the complaint was against Ignacio Binongcal for refusing parties, each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test. ...
to pay the amount of P11,643representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from Flores
comparison of former and present rules
on various occasions from August to October, 1981;
Present Rules Former Rules
The second cause of action was against resp Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount
of P10,212 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from pet on several occasions Where a plaintiff Totality of the claims in all the causes of Totality of the claims in all the causes of
from March, 1981 to January, 1982. sues a defendant action irrespective of whether the COA action irrespective of whether the COA
on two or more arose out of the same or diff transactions. arose out of the same or diff transactions.
Binongcal filed a MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against said
separate causes of If the total demand exceeds P20K – RTC If the total demand exceeds P20K – RTC
resp was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP129 the RTC shall exercise exclusive original
action has jurisdiction has jurisdiction
jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than P20K.
 If the causes of action are separate and If the causes of action are separate and Under the present law, the two cases would be under the jurisdiction of the RTC. Similarly, Brillo vs.
independent, their joinder in one complaint independent, their joinder in one complaint Buklatan and Gacula vs. Martinez, if the separate claims against the several defendants arose out of
is permissive and not mandatory, and any is permissive and not mandatory, and any the same transaction or series of transactions and there is a common question of law or fact, they would
cause of action where the amount of the cause of action where the amount of the now be under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
demand is 20K or less may be the subject demand is 20K or less may be the subject
of a separate complaint filed with a of a separate complaint filed with a In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule
metropolitan or MTC. metropolitan or MTC. 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of
joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount
Two or more Where the claims or causes of action The causes of action in favor of the two or demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
plaintiffs having a joined in a single complaint are separately more plaintiffs or against the two or more
separate causes of owned by or due to different parties, each defendants should arise out of the same The lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties
action against a separate claim shall furnish the transaction or series of transactions and pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful
defendant join in a jurisdictional test there should be a common question of law scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims
single complaint or fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3. against resps Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its
The former rule applied only to cases of jurisdiction.
permissive joinder of parties plaintiff.
However, it was also applicable to cases of 4.6. PANTRANCO North Express, Inc., and Alexander Buncan, versus
permissive joinder of parties defendant. Standard Insurance Company, Inc., and Martina Gicale,
G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005.

Brillo vs. Buklatan (former rule):
Separate claims against several defendants of different amounts each of which is not more than
P2,000 and falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court. The several claims do not arise
from the same transaction or series of transactions and there seem to be no questions of law or of fact
common to all the defendants as may warrant their joinder under Rule 3, section 6.
The difference between the former and present rules in cases of permissive joinder of parties may be
illustrated by the two cases which were cited in the case of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the
Peace as exceptions to the totality rule.
· Soriano y Cia vs. Jose 29 dismissed employees joined in a complaint against the defendant to
collect their respective claims, each of which was within the jurisdiction of the municipal court although
the total exceeded the jurisdictional amount, this Court held that under the law then the municipal court
had jurisdiction. Although the plaintiffs' demands were separate, distinct and independent of one
another, their joint suit was authorized under Section 6 of Rule 3 and each separate claim furnished the
jurisdictional test.
· International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza, 25 dismissed teachers jointly sued for unpaid salaries,
the MC had jurisdiction because the amount of each claim was within, although the total exceeded, its
jurisdiction and it was a case of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff under Section 6 of Rule 3.
NATURE OF THE CASE: The case was elevated to the SC by Pantranco and Buncan by reason of the
ruling of the CA against them and the denial of the appellate court of their motion for reconsideration.
The CA ruled that there was no misjoinder of parties in the complaint filed by Standard and Gicale
against them, and that they are to be held accountable to the money claims of the respondents.
FACTS: Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by his mother Martina Gicale.
Alexander Buncan, on the other hand, was driving a bus owned by Pantranco North Express Inc. Both
drivers were travelling along the National Highway of Talavera, Nueva Ecija in a rainy afternoon. Buncan
was driving the bus northbound while Cripin was trailing behind. When the two vehicles were
negotiating a curve along the highway, the passenger bus overtook the jeepney. In so doing, thhe
passenger bus hit the left rear side of the jeepney and sped away.
Crispin reported the incident to the police and to the insurer of their jeepney, Standard Insurance Co.
The total cost of the repair amounted to P21, 415. Standard only paid P8,000 while Martina Gicale
shouldered the remaining P13,415. Thereafter, Standard and Martina demanded reimbursements from
Pantranco and Buncan, but the bus company and the driver refused. Thus, Standard and Martina were
prompted to file a complaint for sum of money with the RTC of Manila.
Pantranco and Buncan denied the allegations of the complaint and asserted that it is the MeTC which
has jurisdiction over the case.
RTC: The trial court ruled in favor of Standard and Martina, and ordered Pantranco and Buncan to pay
the former reimbursements with interests due thereon plus attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.

Pantranco and Buncan: The RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint.
 1) Martina Gicale was claiming P13,415, while Standard was claiming P8,000. Their individual
claims are below P20,000. Thus, the case falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.
2) There was a misjoinder of parties.
CA: The appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC.
1) Under the Totality Rule provided for under Sec. 19 of BP 129, it is the sum of the two claims
that determines the jurisdictional amount. At the time this case was heard, cases involving money
claims that amounts to more than P20,000 falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
2) Even assuming that there was a misjoinder of parties, it does not affect the jurisdiction of the
court nor is it a ground to dismiss the complaint. The claims of Gicale and Standard arose from the
same vehicular accident involving Pantranco's bus and Gicale's jeepney. Thus, there was a question of
fact common to all parties.
Pantranco and Buncan's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA.
Gicale and Standard: There was no misjoinder of parties. Their individual claims arose from the same
vehicular accident and involve a common question of fact and law. Thus, the RTC has jurisdiction over
the case.
ISSUE: WON there was a misjoinder of parties in the case.
HELD: No. Sec. 6, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the following requirements for a
permissive joinder of parties: (a) the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of
transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and (c)
such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue.
In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantranco’s bus hitting the rear side of
the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligent. There
being a single transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they have the same cause of
action against petitioners.
To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the same evidence which is
necessary to sustain the second cause of action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in
the first. Here, had respondents filed separate suits against petitioners, the same evidence would have
been presented to sustain the same cause of action. Thus, the filing by both respondents of the
complaint with the court below is in order. Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures
the convenient, speedy and orderly administration of justice.
There is NO MISJOINDER OF PARTIES if the money sought to be claimed is in favor of the same
plaintiff/s and against the same defendant/s.
On the issue of lumping together the claims of Gicale and Standard, Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the same
Rules provides:
“Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. – A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following
conditions:
xxx
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.”
Further, the Court reiterates the Totality rule exemplified by Sec. 33 (1) of BP 129: “where there are
several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions.”
4.7. SPOUSES DANILO and CRISTINA DECENA, vs. SPOUSES PEDRO and VALERIA PIQUERO
G.R. No. 155736. March 31, 2005
Facts: Spouses Danilo and Cristina Decena were the owners of a house and lot in Parañaque City. The
petitioners and the respondents, the Spouses Pedro and Valeria Piquero, executed a Memorandum of
Agreement in which the former sold the property to the latter for P940,250.00 payable in six (6)
installments via postdated checks. The vendees forthwith took possession of the property. It appears in
the MOA that the petitioners obliged themselves to transfer the property to the respondents upon the
execution of the MOA with the condition that if two of the postdated checks would be dishonored by the
drawee bank, the latter would be obliged to reconvey the property to the petitioners. On May 17, 1999,
the petitioners, then residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed a Complaint against the respondents with the
RTC Malolos, Bulacan, for the annulment of the sale/MOA, recovery of possession and damages. The
petitioners alleged therein that, they did not transfer the property to and in the names of the
respondents as vendees because the first two checks drawn and issued by them in payment for the
purchase price of the property were dishonored by the drawee bank, and were not replaced with cash
despite demands therefor.
Issue: Whether or not venue was properly laid by the petitioners in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.
Held: After due consideration of the foregoing, we find and so rule that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules
of Court does not apply. This is so because the petitioners, as plaintiffs in the court a quo, had only one
cause of action against the respondents, namely, the breach of the MOA upon the latter’s refusal to pay
the first two installments in payment of the property as agreed upon, and turn over to the petitioners the
possession of the real property, as well as the house constructed thereon occupied by the respondents.
The claim for damages for reasonable compensation for the respondents’ use and occupation of the
property, in the interim, as well as moral and exemplary damages suffered by the petitioners on account
of the aforestated breach of contract of the respondents are merely incidental to the main cause of
action, and are not independent or separate causes of action. The action of the petitioners for the
rescission of the MOA on account of the respondents’ breach thereof and the latter’s failure to return the
premises subject of the complaint to the petitioners, and the respondents’ eviction therefrom is a real
action. As such, the action should have been filed in the proper court where the property is located,
namely, in Parañaque City, conformably with Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. Since the
petitioners, who were residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed their complaint in the said RTC, venue was
improperly laid; hence, the trial court acted conformably with Section 1(c), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
when it ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
4.8. UNIWIDE HOLDINGS, INC., v. ALEXANDER M. CRUZ
529 SCRA 664 (2007)
Where there is a joinder of causes of action between the same parties one of which does not arise out
of the contract where the exclusive venue was stipulated upon, the complain may be brought before
other venues.
Uniwide Holdings, Inc. entered into a franchise agreement with Alexander M. Cruz granting the latter a
five-year franchise to adopt and use the ―Uniwide Family Store System‖ for the establishment and
operation of a ―Uniwide Family Store‖ in Marikina City.
The contract stipulated that Cruz will pay a monthly service fee of P50,000.00 or three percent of gross
monthly purchases, whichever is higher to UHI, payable within five days after the end of each month
without need of formal billing or demand from UHI. In case of any delay in the payment of the monthly
service fee, Cruz would, under Article 10.3 of the agreement, be liable to pay an interest charge of three
percent per month. Cruz thereafter purchased goods from UHI’s affiliated companies First Paragon
Corporation (FPC) and Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, Inc. (USWCI).
FPC and USWCI subsequently executed Deeds of Assignment in favor of UHI assigning all their rights
and interests over Cruz‘s accounts payable to them. Cruz had outstanding obligations with UHI, FPC
and USWCI in the amount of P1, 358, 531.89.00. UHI sent a letter demanding for the payment of such
amount but it was not settled.
Thus, UHI filed a complaint for collection of sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque
against Cruz praying for payment of service fee, accounts payable to FPC and USWCI and attorney‘s
fees and litigation expenses.
Cruz filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. He invokes Article 27.5 of the
agreement which provides that exclusive jurisdiction is vested with the courts f Quezon City. The trial
court granted the Motion to Dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether or not a case based on several causes of action is dismissible on the ground of
improper venue where only one of the causes of action arises from a contract with
exclusive venue stipulation
HELD: In this case, UHI contended that nowhere in the agreement is there a mention of FPC and
USWCI, and neither are the two parties thereto, hence, they cannot be bound to the stipulation on
―exclusive venue.‖ The Court found merit in this contention.
The Supreme Court cited Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which provides that all other actions
may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where
the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant,
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
The forging of a written agreement on an exclusive venue of an action does not, however, exclude
parties from bringing a case to other venues.
Where there is a joinder of causes of action between the same parties one of which does not arise out
of the contract where the exclusive venue was stipulated upon, the complaint, as in the one at bar, may
be brought before other venues provided that such other cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of
the court and the venue lies therein.
It bears emphasis that the causes of action on the assigned accounts are not based on a breach of the
agreement between UHI and Cruz. They are based on separate, distinct and independent contracts-
deeds of assignment in which UHI is the assignee of Cruz‘s obligations to the assignors FPC and
USWCI. Thus, any action arising from the deeds of assignment cannot be subjected to the
exclusive venue stipulation embodied in the agreement.
4.9. Lourdes Suites vs Binaro
Case Digest GR 2047129 Aug 6 2014
Facts: Lourdes Suites filed before the MeTC a small-claims complaint against Binaro for nonpayment of
penalty charges on its rented rooms. Binaro responded with a counterclaim. Lourdes Suites impugned
the validity of Binaro’s pleading stating that it did not comply with the form of an Answer as required in
Rule 11, Sec 1 of the Rules of Court.
The MeTC, after evaluating the evidence, dismissed the complaint with prejudice for lack of cause of
action. Lourdes Suites filed a certiorari before the RTC arguing that lack of cause of action is not a valid
ground for dismissal of cases, much more a dismissal with prejudice. It contends that a complaint even
after the presentation of evidence cannot be dismissed on ground of lack of cause of action because it
is not expressly provided for under the Rules on Small Claims Cases and the Rules of Civil Procedure,
and that if there was a failure to prove a cause of action the only available remedy would be a demurrer
filed by the defendant.
The RTC ruled that there was no grave of abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC. The MR was
also denied. Hence, Lourdes Suites brought the issue to the SC via petition for review under Rule 45.
Issue: W/N dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action is proper under the Rules of Court
Held: Yes. The courts are not precluded from dismissing a case for lack of cause of action such as
insufficiency of evidence. In civil cases, courts must determine if the plaintiff was able to prove his case
by a preponderance of evidence.
The basis of the MeTC in dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action is the failure of plaintiff to
preponderantly establish its claim by clear and convincing evidence. Hence, MeTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action, as it referred to
the evidence presented and not to the allegations in the Complaint.

The dismissal of the complaint with prejudice is likewise not an exercise of wanton or palpable
discretion. This case is an action for small claims where decisions are rendered final and unappealable;
hence, a decision dismissing it is necessarily with prejudice.