Title 2 Cases - Crim2

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 16009. September 21, 1920.]
UY KHEYTIN ET AL. , petitioners, vs . ANTONIO VILLAREAL, Judge of

First Instance for the Twenty-third Judicial District, ET AL. ,
respondents.
Crossfield & O'Brien for petitioners.

Attorney-General Paredes and Assistant Attorney-General Santos for
respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; MAY SEARCH WARRANT

ISSUE FOR OPIUM? — Section 96 of General Orders No. 58 provides that a search
warrant may issue to search (1) for property which was stolen or embezzled, and (2)
for property which was used, or intended to be used, as the means of committing a
felony. Held: Under this provision, whatever may be the technical common-law meaning
of the word "felony" used in paragraph 2 of said section 96, a search warrant is not
illegal which is issued to search for opium. It would be the height of absurdity to hold,
upon technical grounds, that a search warrant is illegal which is issued to search for
and seize property the very possession of which is forbidden by law and constitutes a
crime.
2. ID.; ID.; OTHER ARTICLES SEIZABLE UNDER A SEARCH WARRANT. —
"Search warrants have heretofore been allowed to search for stolen goods, for goods
supposed to have been smuggled into the country in violation of the revenue laws, for
implements of gaming or counterfeiting, for lottery tickets or prohibited liquors kept
for sale contrary to law, for obscene books and papers kept for sale or circulation, and
for powder or other explosive and dangerous material so kept as to endanger the
public safety." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 432.)
3. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF IRREGULARITY IN THE ISSUANCE OF SEARCH
WARRANT. — Even if the issuance of a search was tainted with irregularity, the property
described therein and seized thereunder will not be ordered returned to the owner, nor
will the latter be exonerated, if such property was in fact found in the place described in
the application for search warrant.
4. ID.; ID.; WHAT PROPERTY MAY BE TAKEN UNDER A SEARCH WARRANT. —
The law specifically requires that a search warrant should particulary describe the place
to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this
requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly
described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of the law no discretion
regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that "unreasonable searches and
seizures" may not be made, — that abuses may not be committed. Therefore, no other
property than those described in the search warrant may be taken thereunder.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com
5. ID.; SEARCH WARRANT MAY NOT ISSUE FOR THE PURPOSE OF
OBTAINING EVIDENCE. — Books of account, private documents, and private papers are
property which man may lawfully possess, and cannot be seized under a search
warrant, specially if their seizure is for the purpose of using them as evidence of an
intended crime or of a crime already committed. The seizure or compulsory production
of a man's private papers to be used in evidence against him is equivalent to
compelling him to be a witness against himself.
DECISION
JOHNSON , J : p
This is an original petition, led in this court, for the writs of injunction and
prohibition. It appears from the record that on April 30, 1919, one Ramon Gayanilo,
corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, presented to the judge of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo an application for search warrant, the said Ramon Gayanilo stating in
his application; "That in the house of Chino Uy Kheytin, Sto. Nino St., No. 20, Iloilo, under
the writing desk in his store, there is kept a certain amount of opium." The application
was subscribed and sworn to by the said complainant before the Honorable L. M.
Southworth, judge of the Twenty-third Judicial District.
Upon that application the said judge, on the same day, issued a search warrant in
the following terms:
"The United States, to any officer of the law.
"Whereas on this day proof, by affidavit, having been presented before me
by Corporal Ramon Gayanilo, Philippine Constabulary, that there is probable
cause to believe that in the house of Chino Uy Kheytin, Sto. Nino St., No. 20, under
the desk for writing in his store there is kept a certain amount of opium.
"Therefore, you are hereby commanded during day or night to make an
immediate search on the person of Uy Kheytin or in the house, Sto. Nino St., No.
20, for the following property opium and, if you find the same or any part thereof,
to bring it forthwith before me in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
"Witness my hand this 30th day of April, 1919.
(Sgd.) "L. M. SOUTHWORTH,
"Judge of the Court of Iloilo."
Armed with that search warrant, the respondent M. S. Torralba, lieutenant of the
Philippine Constabulary, accompanied by some of his subordinates, on the same day
(April 30th) searched the house of the petitioner Uy Kheytin and found therein 60 small
cans of opium. They wanted to search also the bodega on the ground- oor of the
house, but Uy Kheytin positively denied that it was his or that he rented it. Lieutenant
Torralba wanted to be sure, and for this reason he placed a guard in the premises to
see that nothing was removed therefrom, and then went away to nd out who the
owner of the bodega was. The next morning he learned from the owner of the house,
one Segovia, of the town of Molo, that the Chinaman Uy Kheytin was the one who was
renting the bodega. Thereupon Lieutenant Torralba and his subordinates resumed the
search and then and there found and seized the following articles:
"No. 2. — One wrap of paper containing a broken bottle of opium liquid,
which is kept in a tin box No. 1.
"No. 3. — One wrap of paper containing an opium pipe, complete, one
opium container, one wrap of opium ashes, one rag soaked in opium and one
thimble with opium.
"No. 4. — One leather hand bag containing 7 small bottles containing
opium, with two cedulas belonging to Tian Liong, with key.
"No. 5. — One wooden box containing 75 empty cans, opium containers.
"No. 6. — One tin box containing 23 small empty cans, opium containers.
"No. 7. — One cardboard box containing 3 pieces of wood,
one old chisel, one file, one piece of soldering lead, one box of matches, 5
pieces of iron plates, and several other tin plates.
"No. 8. — One roll of 7½ sheets of brass.
"No. 9. — Three soldering outfits.
"No. 10. — One hammer.
"No. 11. — One Chinese scale for opium.
"No. 12. — Twelve small bottles empty.
"No. 13. — Two bottles containing opium.
"No. 14. — One bundle of Chinese books of accounts with several personal
letters of Chino Uy Kheytin.
"No. 15. — One tin box containing 60 cans of molasses, with 1 small bottle
containing molasses."
Thereafter a criminal complaint was led in the court of the justice of the peace
of Iloilo against all the petitioners herein, charging them with a violation of the Opium
Law. They were duly arrested, and a preliminary investigation was conducted by the
justice of the peace, after which he found that there was probable cause for believing
that the crime complained of had been committed and that the defendants were the
persons responsible therefor. The cause was duly transmitted to the Court of First
Instance.
While said cause was in the Court of First Instance, pending the ling of a
complaint by the provincial scal, the defendants, petitioners herein, through their
attorney, led a petition in the Court of First Instance, asking for the return of "private
papers, books and other property" which the Constabulary of cers had seized from
said defendants, upon the ground that they had been so seized illegally and in violation
of the constitutional rights of the defendants. It was urged (1) that the search warrant
of April 30th was illegal because the requisites prescribed by the General Orders No. 58
had not been complied with in its issuance; (2) that the searches and seizures made on
May 1st had been made without any semblance of authority and hence illegal; and (3)
that the seizure of the defendants' books and letters was a violation of the provisions
of the Jones Law providing that no person shall be compelled to testify against himself,
and protecting him against unreasonable searches and seizures.
After a hearing upon said motion, the Honorable Antonio Villareal, judge, in a very
carefully prepared opinion, reached the conclusion that the searches and seizures
complained of had been legally made, and consequently, denied the defendants'
petition.
Thereafter and on November 22, 1919, the said defendants, petitioners herein,
filed the present petition in this court, praying as follows:
"Wherefore, in view of the foregoing allegations, it is respectfully prayed
that a preliminary injunction issue.
"First, restraining the respondent judge, and his successors from making
any cognizance of any action of any kind which has or may be brought against
these petitioners which have resulted directly or indirectly from the unlawful
searches and seizures above-mentioned;
"Second, restraining the respondent clerk of the court, the respondent
fiscal, the respondent commandant of the Constabulary, and the successors of
any of them, and the assistants of any of them, from any further examination of
the private papers, books, and other property unlawfully seized as above alleged;
from making or using the same for the purpose or in such a manner that the
character or reputation of these petitioners might be injured; from making or using
any copies, memorandum, notes, or extracts obtained from the books, papers,
etc., so seized; from making any examinations of any of the property thus
obtained or from using any reports or from publishing in any manner any reports
already prepared as a result of the examination of such property; or from making
any other use of the property and papers so obtained until orders are received
from this court regarding the disposition of the same.
"It is further requested, that a writ of prohibition issue, restraining the

respondent judge from at any time taking cognizance of any action or
prosecution growing out of the unlawful searches and seizures above-mentioned,
and directing such judge or his successor to order the immediate return to these
petitioners of all of the papers and other property thus unlawfully obtained,
together with all copies, extracts, memorandum, notes, photographs, reports,
samples, or evidence obtained by reason of such searches and seizures whereby
the reputation and character of petitioners may be further damaged; furthermore
enjoining all of the respondents and their assistants from divulging any of the
secrets or information which they have thus unlawfully obtained from these
petitioners; and especially ordering the respondent judge to dismiss all actions or
prosecutions already filed before him or which may hereafter come before him as
a result of the unlawful acts herein alleged."
I
THE SEARCH WARRANT OF APRIL 30TH
The petitioners contend that the search warrant of April 30, 1919, was illegal, (1)
because it was not issued upon either of the grounds mentioned in section 96 of
General Orders No. 58, and (2) because the judge who issued it did not determine the
probable cause by examining witnesses under oath, as required by section 98 of said
General Orders No. 58.
Section 96 of General Orders No. 58 is as follows:
"SEC. 96. It (a search warrant) may be issued upon either of the following
grounds:
"1. When the property was stolen or embezzled.
"2. When it was used or when the intent exists to use it as the means
of committing a felony."
In support of their first contention the petitioners argue that the property ordered
to be seized, namely, opium, under the said search warrant, had not been stolen or
embezzled, nor had it been used or intended to be used as the means of committing a
felony; that the word "felony" is applicable only to a serious crime which is malum per
se and not to one which is merely malum prohibitum, such as the possession of opium.
For the purpose of this decision we deem it unnecessary to draw the distinction
between the words "felony" and "misdemeanor" as used in the common law. Suf ce it
to say that, whatever may be the technical common-law meaning of the word "felony,"
which is used in paragraph 2 of section 96 above quoted, we believe it would be the
height of absurdity to hold, upon technical grounds, that a search warrant is illegal
which is issued to search for and seize property the very possession of which is
forbidden by law and constitutes a crime. Opium is such property. "Search warrants
have heretofore been allowed to search for stolen goods, for goods supposed to have
been smuggled into the country in violation of the revenue laws, for implements of
gaming or counterfeiting, for lottery tickets or prohibited liquors kept for sale contrary
to law, for obscene books and papers kept for sale or circulation, and for powder or
other explosive and dangerous material so kept as to endanger the public safety."
(Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 432.)
In support of their second contention, the petitioners invoke section 98 of
General Orders No. 58, which provides as follows:
"SEC. 98. The judge or justice must, before issuing the warrant,
examine on oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take
their depositions in writing."
Section 97 provides that "a search warrant shall not issue except for probable
cause" and section 98 above quoted provides the manner in which that probable cause
shall be determined by the judge issuing the warrant. In the present case, however, the
judge did not examine any witness under oath but relied solely upon the sworn
application of the Constabulary of cer in determining whether there was probable
cause. In that application the complainant swore positively: "That in the house of Chino
Uy Kheytin, Sto. Nilio St., No. 20, Iloilo, under the writing desk in his store, there is kept a
certain amount of opium." This statement was found to be true by the subsequent
nding and seizure of a considerable quantity of opium in the place mentioned. The
question now is, whether the omission of the judge to comply with the requirements of
section 98 would, under the circumstances, justify the court in declaring that the search
warrant in question was illegal and ordering the return of the opium found and seized
under said warrant.
A search warrant may be likened to a warrant of arrest. The issuance of both is
restricted by the same provision of the Jones Law (sec. 3) which is as follows:
"That no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the p]ace to be searched and the person
or thing to be seized."
A person, then, is protected from unreasonable arrests just as much as he is
protected from unreasonable searches. But suppose he happened to be arrested
without any warrant, or upon a warrant which had been issued by a judge without rst
properly determining whether there was probable cause, and upon investigation it
should be found, from his own admissions, that he was the author of the crime, —
should he be released upon the ground that he had not been legally arrested ? In the
case of Ker vs. Illinois (119 U. S., 436) Ker having committed the crime of larceny,
escaped and went to Peru. He was kidnapped in Peru and brought back to the State of
Illinois without any pretense of authority. Passing upon the question of the
constitutionality of the arrest of Ker, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking
through Mr. Justice Miller, said:
"We do not intend to say that there may not be proceedings previous to the
trial in regard to which the prisoner could invoke in some manner the provisions
of this clause of the Constitution; but for mere irregularities in the manner in
which he may be brought into the custody of the law, we do not think he is
entitled to say that he should not be tried at all for the crime with which he is
charged in a regular indictment. He may be arrested for a very heinous offense by
persons without any warrant, or without any previous complaint, and brought
before a proper officer, and this may be in some sense said to be 'without process
of law.' But it would hardly be claimed that after the case had been investigated,
and the defendant held by the proper authorities to answer for the crime, he could
plead that he was first arrested 'without due process of law.' " (Followed in U. S.
vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122, 146; U. S. vs. Wilson, 4 Phil., 317.)
In the present case there was an irregularity in the issuance of the search warrant
in question in that the judge did not rst examine the complainant or any witnesses
under oath, as required by section 98 of General Orders No. 58. But the property sought
to be searched for and seized having been actually found in the place described by the
complainant, reasoning by analogy from the case of an improper arrest, we are of the
opinion that irregularity is not suf cient cause for ordering the return of the opium
found and seized under said warrant, to the petitioners, and exonerating the latter.
II
THE SEARCH MADE ON MAY 1ST
Petitioners contend that this was made without any search warrant and without
any authority of law; that the search warrant of April 30th could not be used on May 1st
because that warrant had been executed on the day of its issuance. In support of this
contention counsel for the petitioners, in the lower court, argued that:
"While it is true that a warrant is good for 10 days after the date of
issuance, this cannot be interpreted to mean that a search warrant can be used
every day for 10 days, and for a different purpose each day. This would be
absurd. It is admitted, for sake of argument, that if upon a search, under a legally
issued warrant, some other prohibited articles than those named in the warrant
should be found, these articles might be seized. Also, it might possibly be true,
that if a warrant was issued to search for a certain article and it was not found
after the first search, that another search could be made sometime within the 10
days. But this is certainly the furthest possible extreme the doctrine could be
carried. It certainly could not be interpreted to allow a search to be made, and
after the articles for which the warrant was issued had been seized, to use this
same warrant as authority to make another search."
We agree with counsel that a search warrant cannot be used every day for ten
days, "and for a different purpose each day, " and that after the articles for which the
warrant was issued have been seized the same warrant cannot be used as authority to
make another search. But this argument is not applicable to the facts in this case. It
appears from the oral evidence adduced during the hearing of the petitioners' motion in
the court below that the search for opium, the property mentioned in the warrant, was
not completed on April 30th; it was interrupted by the necessity to ascertain who the
owner of the bodega on the ground- oor was, because the petitioner Uy Kheytin falsely
disclaimed ownership thereof. In other words, the search of May 1st was not made "for
a different purpose," nor could it be considered "another search," but was really a
continuation of the search begun on April 30th. This is shown by the fact that during the
interval between the two searches the premises in question were guarded by
Constabulary soldiers, and the petitioners were made to understand on April 30th that
the authorities were not yet through with the search and would continue the same as
soon as they found out that the bodega was also occupied by the petitioner Uy Kheytin.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the search made on May 1st was authorized under
the search warrant of April 30th.
III
THE SEIZURE OF BOOKS, LETTERS, ETC.
The important question that remains to be decided is whether, under a search
warrant for opium, the of cers of the law were authorized to seize books, personal
letters, and other property having a remote or no connection with opium. The
respondent M. S. Torralba, lieutenant of the Constabulary, testi ed that he seized these
articles because he believed or suspected that they had some relation with the opium in
question; in other words, he thought that they might be used as evidence against the
petitioners when they are prosecuted for a violation of the Opium Law. The
respondents contend that this was a suf cient justi cation under the law for the
seizure of such articles under the same warrant for opium.
We are of the opinion that the respondents' contention is untenable. Both the
Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) speci cally require that a
search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to
be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be
seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant — to leave
the of cers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the
end that "unreasonable searches and seizures" may not be made, — that abuses may
not be committed. That this is the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision
is borne out by American authorities.
"In order to comply with the constitutional provisions regulating the
issuance of search warrants, the property to be seized under a warrant must be
particularly described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder. The
goods to be seized must be described with such certainty as to identify them, and
the description must be so particular that the officer charged with the execution
of the warrant will be left with no discretion respecting the property to be taken . . .
Under a warrant to search a person for stolen goods, the officer cannot lawfully
take from the person a letter, such letter not being particularly described in the
warrant as property to be searched for." (24 R. C. L., 714, 715.)
"It is a violation of the declaration of rights respecting searches and
seizures for an officer, while searching one's person under a search warrant for
stolen goods, to take from it, against the party's will, a letter written to him." (State
vs. Slamon, 87 Am. St. Rep., 711.)
"We have said that if the officer follows the command of his warrant, he is
protected; and this is so even when the complaint proves to have been
unfounded. But if he exceed the command by searching in places not described
therein, or by seizing persons or articles not commanded, he is not protected by
the warrant, and can only justify himself as in other cases where he assumes to
act without process. Obeying strictly the command of his warrant, he may break
open outer or inner doors, and his justification does not depend upon his
discovering that for which he is to make search." (Cooley on Constitutional
Limitations, 7th ed., p. 434.)
That the of cers of the law believed that the books, papers, etc., which they
seized might be used as evidence against the petitioners herein in a criminal action
against them for a violation of the Opium Law, is no reason or justification under the law
for the seizure: First, because they were not "particularly described" or even mentioned
in the search warrant; second, because, even if they had been mentioned in the search
warrant, they could not be legally seized, for a search warrant cannot be used for the
purpose of obtaining evidence; and third, because to compel a person to produce his
private papers to be used in evidence against him would be equivalent to compelling
him to be a witness against himself.
1. The authorities for the first proposition have already been given above.
2. It may be said that —
"Books of account, private documents, and private papers are property
which men may lawfully possess. It is not believed that the statute (subsection 2
of section 96, G. O. 58) was intended to cover property of this class. Granting that
property of which men may lawfully possess themselves has been used in the
commission of a crime and not possessed nor created purely for the purpose of
committing a crime, and not likely to be used again, then certainly its seizure can
only be for the purpose of using the same as evidence to prove the commission
of the crime already committed. This purpose is not contemplated by the
provision of the law. The finding of evidence can not be the immediate reason for
issuing the search warrant. To use a search warrant for the purpose of obtaining
possession of property for this purpose would be an 'unreasonable' use of the
remedy by search warrant, which is prohibited by law." (Regidor vs. Araullo, 5 Off.
Gaz., 955, 961, 962; U. S. vs. De los Reyes and Esguerra, 20 Phil., 467.)
Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 431, says:
"The warrant is not allowed for the purpose of obtaining evidence of an
intended crime: but only after lawful evidence of an offense actually committed.
Nor even then is it allowable to invade one's privacy for the sole purpose of
obtaining evidence against him, except in a few special cases where that which is
the subject of the crime is supposed to be concealed, and the public or the
complainant has an interest in it or in its destruction."
3. In the case of Boyd vs. United States (116 U. S., 616), the Supreme Court
of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Bradley, said:
"The seizure or compulsory production of a man's private papers to be
used in evidence against him is equivalent to compelling him to be a witness
against himself, and, in a prosecution for a crime, penalty or forfeiture, is equally
within the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment.
"Both amendments (fourth and fifth) relate to the personal security of the
citizen. They nearly run into and mutually throw light upon each other. When the
thing forbidden in the Fifth Amendment, namely, compelling a man to be a
witness against himself, is the object of a search and seizure of his private
papers, it is an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the Fourth Amendment.
"Search and seizure of a man's private papers to be used in evidence for
the purpose of convicting him of a crime, recovering a penalty, or of forfeiting his
property, is totally different from the search and seizure of stolen goods, dutiable
articles on which the duties have not been paid, and the like, which rightfully
belong to the custody of the law." (See also Silverthorne Lumber Co. vs. United
States, decided Jan. 26, 1920, by the Supreme Court of the United States.)
"The seizure of a person's private papers, to be used in evidence against
him, is equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself." (State vs.
Slamon, 73 Vt., 212; 87 Am. St. Rep., 711.)
From all of the foregoing our conclusions are:
1. That although in the issuance of the search warrant in question the judge
did not comply with the requirements of section 98 of General Orders No. 58. the
petitioners are not entitled to the return of the opium and its paraphernalia which were
found and seized under said warrant, and much less are they entitled to be exonerated
because of such mission of the judge.
2. That the search made on May 1st was a continuation of the search begun
on the previous day, and, therefore, did not require another search warrant.
3. That the seizure of the petitioners' books, letters, telegrams, and other
articles which have no inherent relation with opium and the possession of which is not
forbidden by law, was illegal and in violation of the petitioners' constitutional rights.
Therefore, it is hereby ordered and decreed that each and all of the respondents
herein, their assistants or successors, be, and they hereby are, forbidden from
examining or making any use of said books, letters, telegrams, etc., namely, the articles
described in items Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10 12, 14, and 15 of the sheriff's return (Exhibit 3,
reproduced at the top of page 3 of this decision 1 ) and they are hereby ordered to
immediately return the said articles to the petitioners. So ordered.
Araullo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Mapa, C.J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
AVANCEÑA , J., concurring and dissenting :
I concur with the decision except as to the part which declares that the search
warrant was irregularly issued.
MOIR , J., with whom concurs, MALCOLM, J., concurring and dissenting :
In concurring in the result in this decision, I desire to state that I do not concur in
that part of the decision which says that the judge did not comply with the requirement
of section 98 of General Orders No. 58 before issuing an order of arrest. That section
reads:
"The judge or justice must, before issuing the warrant, examine on oath the
complainantand any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in
writing."
It appears that complainant in this case was a Constabulary corporal. He made
af davit before the judge of First Instance when the search warrant was issued. It does
not appear that he presented any witnesses whose depositions were to be taken.
General Orders No. 58 expressly provides, in section 99 thereof,
"If the judge or justice is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon
which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they
exist, he must issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the following
form:
"__________________________
"Province of ________________
"The United States to any, _________________ or policeman in the Province of

_________________.
"Proof, by affidavit, having this day been made before me by, etc. etc."
This court says, on page 8 of the decision: 1
"In the present case there was an irregularity in the issuance of the search
warrant in question in that the judge did not first examine the complainant or any
witnesses under oath, as required by section 98 of General Orders No. 58. But the
property sought to be searched for and seized having been actually found in the
place described by the complainant, reasoning by analogy from the case of an
improper arrest, we are of the opinion that irregularity is not sufficient cause for
ordering the return of the opium found and seized under said warrant, to the
petitioners, and exonerating the latter."
We do not think there was any irregularity.
The af davit required by law was made. It is a general practice to issue search
warrants on a single af davit. To require more than one or to require witnesses to be
presented, would add to the law and would defeat the very object of a search warrant,
which is to seize evidence of crime before it can be destroyed. Publicity, which would
ordinarily follow the presentation of witnesses or even getting more than one af davit,
would invite, if not assure, a failure.
If one witness may be suf cient to convict a man of the gravest crime, certainly
one affidavit should be sufficient for a judge to issue a search warrant upon.
Judging from the quantity of opium captured, all the articles mentioned in the
decision were used by the petitioners for unlawful purposes; i. e., the carrying on of a
trade in opium. Liquid opium is necessarily put up in bottles and other small
receptacles, and it would seem that the metal found was for making small containers
for the opium. The writer does not know why the molasses was present, but it is most
frequently present where there is any considerable quantity of opium found.
It would seem that what petitioners really want are the Chinese account book
and the letters, and the reason for their ardent desire to get them can easily be
imagined
We must follow the decisions quoted, and hold that this book and the letters
should be returned, and to this I agree, but we must assume that everything else was
used in and about the sale of opium, and they should not be returned.
Footnotes
1. See page 889, ante.

1. See page 894, ante.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-8474. September 30, 1955.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , petitioner, vs . PEDRO DE LA

PEÑA, OSMUNDO RAMOS and HON. RAMON SAN JOSE , respondents.
Jose G. Lucban, Special Prosecutor, Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant

Solicitor General Jaime de los Angeles and Solicitor Meliton G. Soliman for petitioner.
Enrique Javier and Federico Roy for respondent Osmundo Ramos.
Leodegario Alba for the other respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. SEARCH WARRANTS; EVIDENCE; ILLEGAL PROCUREMENT OF SEARCH

WARRANTS, HOW ESTABLISHED. — The motive of the person accused of illegal
procurement of search warrants may be established, not only by acts preceding, or
coetaneous with, the commission of the offense charged, but, also by acts posterior to
the issuance of the process, such as, an attempt to extort money as a condition
precedent to the release of the complaint.
DECISION
CONCEPCION , J : p
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside certain resolutions of the Court of
First Instance of Manila. However, considering the allegations and the ultimate purpose
of the petition, the same will be regarded as one for mandamus, in accordance with the
doctrine laid down in Guzman vs. Lichauco (42 Phil. 291) and People vs. Concepcion
(55 Phil. 485, 492).
Respondents, Pedro de la Peña and Osmundo Ramos, are accused, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 24746 to 24755 and 24824 to 24833 (20 cases) of said court, of illegal
procurement of search warrants, in violation of Article 129 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the information led in case No. 24750 — the language of which is analogous to that
of the information led in the nineteen (19) cases, except as regards the names and
addresses of the respective complaining witnesses — it is averred:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1951, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the accused Pedro de la Peña, being then the Chief of the Special
Investigating Team, and the accused Osmundo Ramos being then an agent, of
the Military Intelligence Service G-2, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
therefore public of cers or employees, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, and pursuant to a common intent, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously procure a search warrant without a just
cause, by then and there applying for the same and ling a deposition of witness
in support of the application for search warrant before the Court the Court of First
Instance, this City; and by that reason and on account of said application and
deposition the said accused succeeded in procuring from the said court a search
warrant against Ty Kong Tek of 142 V. Mapa St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, where a
search was actually made or caused to be made by the said accused, both
knowing fully well that the statements and allegations contained in the said
application as well as in the said deposition were false." (Record, p. 4.)
At the joint hearing of said twenty (20) cases, before Branch IV of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, presided over by respondent Judge, Honorable Ramon San
Jose, the prosecution placed on the witness stand, the offended party in said case No.
24750, namely, Ty Kong Tek, who testi ed that, while he was in his house at 142 V.
Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, on March 1, 1951, at about 2:00 a.m., Pedro de la Peña,
one of the respondents herein, and one of the defendants therein, came, accompanied
by several persons, including two Chinese named Koa San and Tan Tek; that De la Peña
and his companions, who were provided with a search warrant, searched the house,
stating that they were looking for rearms and U.S. dollars, none of which were found in
the premise; that they found, however, two (2) books of account of Ty Kong Tek for the
years of 1948 and 1949; that at 6:00 a.m., De la Peña took Ty Kong Tek for
investigation to Camp Murphy, where he was urged to confess that he had been
engaged in the exchange business and had been handling U.S. dollars, which the
witness refused to admit; and that, later, in the afternoon, De la Peña arrested the son
and a nephew of the witness. At this juncture, the prosecution inquired whether he knew
why his and nephew were arrested, but, the defense objected thereto upon the ground
that the question referred to an act subsequent to the issuance of the aforementioned
search warrant and, hence, immaterial to the issue. Although the prosecution explained
that it sought to establish the motive of De la Peña in securing the search warrant,
respondent Judge sustained the objection. Thereupon, the prosecution asked Ty Kong
Tek whether he knew whether or not his above mentioned son and nephew had
anything to do with the reason for the search made, in their house, by the party headed
by De la Peña. The defense objected to the question upon the same ground, and the
court sustained the objection.
Ty Kong Tek further stated, on the witness stand, that De la Peña investigated
him six (6) times at Camp Murphy; that during the investigation, De la Peña in the
afternoon of March 1, 1951; that thereafter, one of the members of the party led by De
la Peña, who made a search in complainant's house, namely, Koa San, approached the
(witness') nephew would be released if he (Ty Kong Tek) gave him (Koa San) and De la
Peña the sum of P20,000. On motion of the defense respondent Judge ordered the last
statement of Ty Kong Tek stricken from the record.
Ty Kong Tek, likewise, declared that Koa San was sometimes present during the
investigation of the former in Camp Murphy; that after the rst investigation of Ty Kong
Tek by De la Peña, the former was sent to his quarters in said camp; and that Koa San
then came to see Ty Kong Tek and talked to him. This statement was, also, ordered
stricken out, on the motion of defense. Moreover, the latter made of record its general
objection to all questions relative to events which occurred subsequently to the
issuance of the search warrant aforementioned. Although the prosecution explained
that it was trying to prove the unlawful motive with which the search warrant had
allegedly been obtained, respondent Judge hold that "anything that happened after that
(issuance of the search warrant) will be immaterial" (p. 28, t.s.n.) Thereupon, on the
motion of herein petitioner, Jose G. Lukban, Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), who, as Special Prosecutor handled the case for the Government, in
collaboration with Assistant City Fiscal, Guillermo Dacumos, respondent Judge
suspended the hearing, in order that the prosecution could bring the matter to this
Court, for the determination of the propriety of introducing evidence of acts performed
by the accused after the issuance of the search warrant in question. Hence, the present
case.
Respondents herein maintain that the alleged illegal procurement of the
aforementioned search warrant may be established only by proof of acts either
preceding, or coetaneous with, the commission of offense charged, not by acts
performed subsequently thereto. Upon the other hand, petitioner herein contends that
the motive of the accused may be established by the posterior acts, such as, for
instance, an attempt to extort money as a condition precedent to the release of the
complainant.
It is clear to our mind that said attempt to extort money, even if effected after the
issuance of the search warrant, but prior to the release of the complainant, is relevant
to the question whether or not said was illegally procured, owing to the obvious
tendency of the aforementioned circumstance, if proven, to establish that the accused
was prompted by the desire to get money from the said complainant. The relevancy
would be more patent if a similar attempt had been made in other nineteen (19) cases
or in some of them. It is likewise, apparent that evidence of the intent of party who
obtained said warrant or warrants is not only relevant, but very material, where the
accused are charged with having "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously procured" said
process, "pursuant to a common intent," as alleged in the informations led in the cases
under consideration.
Respondents insist, however, that:
". . . Our Supreme Court, in the case of People vs. Sy Juco, 64 Phil., 667,
ruled that — malicious procurement of a search warrant under Article 129 of the
Revised Penal Code is committed by a public of cer who procures search warrant
without just cause, and that such just cause consist of such facts and
circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant and not to facts
subsequent (Italics ours)." (Respondent's memorandum, p. 2).
This statement is misleading. The accused in the Sy Juco case, cited by
respondents, was not charged with illegal procurement of a search warrant. The main
issues in said case was the validity of a search warrant based upon af davits showing,
on the face thereof, that the statements therein contained were hearsay. This Court
answered the question in the negative. Referring to the issuance of a valid search
warrant, we declared:
". . . It has likewise been held by this court that by probable cause are
meant such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant,
that are in themselves suf cient to induce a cautious man to rely upon them and
act in pursuance thereof." (64 Phil., 667, 674)
The words "facts and circumstance antecedent to the issuance of the warrant"
had no relation whatsoever with, and were not meant to qualify, the evidence admissible
to prove the illegal procurement of a search warrant, in violation of Article 129 of the
Revised Penal Code, which was not in issue in the case. Said expression merely referred
to the norm that should guide a Judge in determining whether or not the process
should be ordered issued. It is not concerned, either with the liability of the person
procuring the warrant, or with the competency of the evidence to establish his guilt.
In this connection, it may not be amiss to stress, one more, the need of adhering
to the policy enunciated in the case of Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co. (52 Phil.,
807,816-817) from which we quote:
"In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most
effectively and expeditiously administered in the courts where trivial objections to
the admission of proof are received with least favor. The practice of excluding
evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections to the
form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is
impossible for a judge of rst instance, in the early stages of the development of
the proof, to know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and
where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering the
evidence, the court may as rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of
the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be
remembered that in the heat of the battle over which he presides a judge of rst
instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a
fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and
the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often nds
embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without
returning the case for new trial - a step which the Court is always very oath to
take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of rst instance, even if
the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in
much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law;
and it is duty upon nal consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and
material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the
cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then has all the
material before it necessary to make a correct judgment." (Italics supplied.)
Inasmuch as the prosecution was entitled to introduce the evidence in question
and respondent Judge was, consequently, "under obligation by reason of his of ce" to
admit said evidence, "and in refusing to do so . . . he failed to perform his judicial duty' —
in the language used by this Court in the case of People vs. Concepcion (supra) — it
follows that said respondent Judge should be, as he is hereby, ordered — in line with the
rule laid down in said case — to allow petitioner herein to prove the motive of the
accused in obtaining the search warrant in question, even if the evidence therefor
should refer to acts posterior to the issuance of said process, and that the resolutions
of the lower court sustaining the objections to the questions above refers to,
propounded by petitioner herein, and directing that portions of the testimony of Ty
Kong Tek be stricken from the record, should be, as said orders are hereby, reversed
and set aside, with costs against respondents, Pedro de la Peña and Osmundo Ramos.
It is ordered.
Bengzon, Acting C.J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and
Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 110097. December 22, 1997.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . ARNULFO

ASTORGA , accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Appellant herein was charged with violation of Article 267, Paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code for kidnapping a minor. Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the
merits ensued. Thereafter, he was convicted by the trial court and was sentenced to
Reclusion Perpetua. This appeal was filed directly with the Supreme Court in view of the
penalty imposed. In the main, appellant challenges the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses and the legal characterization of the acts imputed to him.
According to the Supreme Court, the appellant should be convicted only of grave coercion,
not kidnapping. Appellant's forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be
said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no
"lock up." Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code. The felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article
286 of the same code, the elements of which were sufficiently proved by the prosecution.
Appellant Arnulfo Astorga was convicted of grave coercion and was sentenced to six
months of arresto mayor.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; NOT AFFECTED

BY MINOR INCONSISTENCIES. — The inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses
concerning minor details and collateral matters, like the examples cited by appellant, do
not affect the substance, veracity of weight of their declarations. These inconsistencies
reinforce, rather than weaken, their credibility, for different witnesses of startling events
usually perceive things differently. Indeed, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
cannot be expected to be uniform to the last detail.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY DELAY IN FILING OF COMPLAINTS. — The charge is
not belied by the one-week delay in the filing of the complaint. It has been held that delay
or vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily weaken the credibility
of a witness where such delay is satisfactorily explained. In the present case, one week
was reasonable, considering that the victim was a resident of Binuangan and that the case
was filed in Tagum, Davao.
3.ID.; ID.; ID., ID.; FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT; ACCORDED GREAT RESPECT. —
Appellant utterly fails to justify a departure from the long settled rule that the trial court's
assessment of the credibility of witnesses should be accorded great respect on appeal.
4.CRIMINAL LAW; MOTIVE; NOT AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME. — Motive is not an element
of the crime. Furthermore, motive becomes material only when the evidence is
circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is some doubt on whether a crime has been
committed or whether the accused has committed it. Indeed, motive is totally irrelevant
when ample direct evidence sustains the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. In this case, the identity of appellant is not in question. He himself admitted having
taken Yvonne to Maco Central Elementary School.
5.ID.; KIDNAPPING (ARTICLE 267 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE); ELEMENTS. — Under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of kidnapping are as follows: "(1). That
the offender is a private individual. (2). That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other
manner deprives the latter of his liberty. (3). That the act of detention or kidnapping must
be illegal (4). That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is
present: (a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than five (5) days; or (b) That it
is committed simulating public authority; or (c) That any serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) That
the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer."
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Appellant's apparent intention was to take
Yvonne against her will towards the direction of Tagum. Appellant's plan did not
materialize, however, because Fabila's group chanced upon them. The evidence does not
show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her.
Appellant's forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an
actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no "lockup."
Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code.
7.ID.; GRAVE COERCION; ELEMENTS; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — The felony committed
in this case is grave coercion under Article 286 of the same code. Grave coercion or
coaccion grave has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from doing
something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it
right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by
material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and consequently,
control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will
and liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not made
under authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right. When appellant forcibly
dragged and slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home to Binuangan. Appellant
presented no justification for preventing Yvonne from going home, and we cannot find any.
8.ID.; ID.; CONVICTION; WHEN PROPER. — The information, dated March 24, 1992, filed
against Astorga contains sufficient allegations constituting grave coercion, the elements
of which were sufficiently proved by the prosecution. Hence, a conviction for said crime is
appropriate under Section 4, Rule 120 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure: "Section 4.
Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof - When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or
established by the evidence, and the offenses as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included
in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved.
DECISION

PANGANIBAN , J : p
Actual detention or "locking up" is the primary element of kidnapping. If the evidence does
not adequately prove this element, the accused cannot be held liable for kidnapping. In the
present case, the prosecution merely proved that appellant forcibly dragged the victim
toward a place only he knew. There being no actual detention or confinement, the appellant
may be convicted only of grave coercion. LexLib
The Case
The foregoing principle is used by this Court in resolving the appeal of Arnulfo Astorga
challenging the March 31, 1993 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao
convicting him of kidnapping.
In an Information 2 dated March 24, 1992 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 8243,
Appellant Arnulfo Astorga was charged with violation of Article 267, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:
"That on or about December 29, 1991 in the Municipality of Tagum, Province of
Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with deliberate intent and by means of force, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Yvonne Traya, a minor, 8 years of age,
thereby depriving her of her liberty against her will, to the damage and prejudice
of said offended party."
Arraigned on February 24, 1993, Appellant Astorga, duly assisted by his counsel, 3 pleaded
not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits ensued. The dispositive portion of the assailed
Decision 4 reads as follows: 5
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the guilt of accused ARNULFO ASTORGA
having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to Article 267 paragraph
4 of the Revised Penal Code, [he] is hereby sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua to be
served at the National Penitentiary, [Muntinlupa]."
This appeal was filed directly with this Court in view of the penalty imposed. 6
The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution
The evidence for the prosecution was narrated in the Decision of the trial court, as follows:
7
"Prosecution witnesses extant from their testimonies categorically assert that

around 6:30 P.M. children of neighbors were near the store of the grandparents of
Yvonne Traya.
Incidentally, there was a brown out that evening hence candle was used. The
daughter and nephew of her aunt Bebeth were quarreling [sic] about the
possession of a flashlight until the glass got lost. Accused or 'Boy' Astorga, went
near and asked her daughter Jane what happened. Glenda or Bebeth grabbed her
baby and went home.
Accused told Yvonne to go with him to buy candy. She did not answer and
accused immediately grabbed and hold [sic] her hand. Accused placed his hand
on her shoulder and covered his [sic] mouth.

Yvonne was only eight (8) years old on 29 December 1991 when she was brought
by the accused allegedly to buy candy. Some stores were closed; others were
opened. Accused never went inside the store to buy candy. Instead she [sic] held
and dragged Yvonne until they went inside the compound of Maco Elementary
School. They were walking inside the perimeter fence, [while the accused was]
holding closely the child. Later, there being no person around the gate, accused
brought her out to the highway and walked towards the direction of Tagum.
Yvonne stays with her grandparents and so with her parents at Sitio Binuangan,
Maco. She asked him where they were going and accused answered that they
were going home. She told him that they were already on the opposite direction
because her grandparent's house is at Binuangan, while their route was going
towards Tagum. Indeed, it was an opposite direction. notwithstanding the
assertion of Yvonne that they were on the wrong direction. accused placed his
hands on her shoulder and dragged her. She cried and protested that she must go
home. Accused did not heed her plea and while she was forced to walk she
continued crying.
While accused and Yvonne were walking in the situation as described, somewhere
near the Luponlupon bridge they met some group of men. Having met on their
opposite direction, the two, were noticed by the group of youngsters. The group
were bound to Maco Catholic Church to see a drama. Having met the two and as
noticed by the group accused keep [sic] on looking back at them. The group were
suspicious about the man who was bringing a child. The group decided to follow
them. Accused hurriedly walked fast with Yvonne, and to prevent from being
overtaken, he carried the victim and ran. They were chased. After a distance of
half a kilometer they were overtaken.
Edwin Fabila declared that Jonathan, one of his companions with others in
chasing, asked the accused where they were bound. He answered towards
Binuangan. The group noticed something suspicious because their destination
was already towards Tagum which is an opposite direction to Binuangan.
When asked who is the child, accused answered Traya. Jonathan, one of those
who chased knew the family. He got from the accused Yvonne who showed some
resistance. Nevertheless, the group brought her home at Binuangan. Likewise,
accused was also brought by them to Yvonne's home. The house of accused and
Yvonne were five (5) meters away. Accused wanted to talk to the parents of the
victim, but he was driven by her aunt and adviced [sic] to leave otherwise he will
be stabbed by Yvonne's father. He left and never talked with the family."
Evidence for the Defense

The facts as viewed by the defense are presented in the Appellant's Brief, 8 dated
December 10, 1993:
"The defense consisted of the testimonies of Arbeth Nalcot and the accused-
appellant himself.
Arbeth Nalcot, a resident of Tagum, Davao, testified that [sic] in the afternoon of
December 29, 1991, she was at the Municipal Hall of Maco, Davao. She saw
Astorga with two (2) companions. They were drinking Red Horse and were already
drunk. When they finished drinking, she went with Astorga to the latter's house.
(TSN, pp. 7-8 and 18, March 23, 1993). The house of Astorga is about 5 meters
away from the house of the complainant[.] Yvonne came and asked money from
the accused to buy candy. The two went together and she was left behind. She
told them to hurry up. When they failed to return, she looked for them, but because
it was already dark, she did not find them. She went back to the house of the
accused. (Ibid., pp. 10-11).
Arnulfo Astorga, a resident of Maco, Davao and a gold panner testified that at
around 1:00 P.M. of December 29, 1991, he arrived at Maco from Tagum. Upon
arrival his two friends, Vicvic and Anding were already at his home. They decided
to drink, hence they proceeded to Adecor Cottage and drank two gallons of Tuba.
At around 2:00 P.M., they were at the market place and drink beer grande. At 5:00
P.M. on the same day, the three proceeded near the municipal hall and with some
persons, they again continued their drinking spree taking up Red Horse wine'.
(Decision, p. 3).
At about 6:00 P.M., he was already drunk and he went home. Yvonne approached
him and asked him money to buy candy. He told her that they will buy. They were
not able to buy because the two stores where they went were already closed.
(TSN, pp. 12 and 13, March 24, 1993). He took her for a stroll for his drunkeness
[sic] to subside. They walked inside the school premises which was about 20
meters away from the second store. They went out of the school compound going
towards Lupon-lupon because due to his drunkneness [sic], he thought it was the
way towards their house. (Ibid, pp. 14-15) They reached Lupon-lupon bridge,
crossed it twice thinking that it was the bridge near the municipal hall. After
reaching Purok, they met several persons, he was asked were (sic) they were
heading, and he answered to Tagumpay, but he was told that the [sic] way was
already going to Tagum. He requested those persons to guide them to Tagumpay.
They asked him who was the child he was carrying. He answered that it was
Traya's child. (Ibid, pp. 16-17). He was carrying the child because he was already
crying as she already wanted to go home. The group of persons, men and women,
guided them. Yvonne was being held by the women. They arrived at Yvonne's
house. He talked to the auntie of the child and told her that he would converse
with her but he was advised to go away because the father of Yvonne might hack
him So he went home. (Ibid, pp. 18-19)"
The Trial Court's Ruling

The trial court justified its finding of guilt with the following discussion: 9
"Accused insisted [that] he was already drunk hence when he took Yvonne to buy
candy, he strolled with her so that his drunkenness be subsided.
All these defense version was rebutted by Yvonne when she categorically
declared that she did not smell liquor on the accused.
His defense of intoxication has no leg to stand [on].
Consider these facts.

Never did he present Vicvic and Anding to corroborate that he was intoxicated
that afternoon and at dusk because of their drinking spree from 1:00 P.M. until
5:00 P.M.
He did not rebut the testimonies of Fabila that when they noticed his actions
suspicious bringing with him a child, he walked fast dragging Yvonne. When he
noticed that the group of youngsters were chasing him, he carried Yvonne and ran
until they covered a distance of half a kilometer in chasing them, until they had
overtaken him.
If he was that intoxicated, being under stupor and weakened by liquor, he could
not ran that fast carrying Yvonne for half a kilometer.
Moreover, Yvonne categorically in straight forward testimony asserted that she

did not smell liquor on the accused.
Accused, naivety [sic] that because of his intoxication, he got lost and was not
able to proceed with Yvonne to Binuangan was a shallow afterthought.
It must be recalled that Yvonne told him they were already going at opposite
direction from home. Instead they were heeding towards Tagum. Accused did not
change course.
xxx xxx xxx
Again, not only force was employed in having Yvonne as captive by dragging,
slapping her mouth and was holding her tight, but accused also used
psychological means of scaring her about a red-eyed ghost.
Through this means and efforts, Yvonne was deprived of her liberty and was by
force prevented to go home to her parents.
On rebuttal, Yvonne denied that she asked money from accused to buy candy.
She also denied as testified by defense witness Arbeth Nalcot that she went to the
house of the accused on 29 December 1991 or on any other dates to ask money
from Astorga for candy.
Defense evidence are [sic] punctured with unbelievability in his off tangent and
incredible theory of drunkardness. His alleged being lost in the direction of
Binuangan in spite of Yvonne's insistence and that of the person they met that he
was on the wrong way considering that there are no criss crossing roads except
the highway, is preposterous.
The Issues
Appellant imputes the following errors to the trial court: 1 0
"I
The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's
witnesses which were replete with inconsistencies and contradictions.
II
The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that Yvonne Traya
was not detained, locked-up or deprived of her liberty.
III
The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that appellant had
no motive to kidnap Yvonne Traya."
In the main, appellant challenges the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the legal
characterization of the acts imputed to him.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted only of grave coercion, not
kidnapping.
First Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Appellant contends that the testimonies witnesses are not worthy of credence because
they were inconsistent and improbable. He cites the following:
"Glenda Chavez testified that she was present when the accused told Yvonne that
they will buy candy. She sensed that the accused was drunk. (TSN, pp. 10-11,
March 10. 1993) These testimonies were contradicted by Yvonne Traya when she
declared, that Glenda Chavez had already went [sic] inside their house when [the]
accused told her that they will buy candy (TSN. pp. 10 March 16, 1993). She
testified that she did not smell liquor on the accused. (Decision, pp. 3-4).
Edwin Fabila testified that their group was able to overtake the accused at a
distance of 2 fathoms and they [sic] him about 15 to 20 meters (TSN, p. 35,
March 10, 1993). Arnel Fabila, on the other hand, testified that they overtook the
accused after chasing him at a distance of half kilometer (TSN, p. 10, March 11,
1993).
Yvonne Traya testified that the accused could not ran fast carrying her because
she was heavy. (TSN, p. 19, March 16, 1993). However, Arnel Fabila declared that
they were able to overtake the accused only after chasing him at a distance of
half kilometer (TSN, p. 10, March 11, 1993) meaning accused was running fast."
11
We hold, however, that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses concerning minor

details and collateral matters, like the examples cited by appellant, do not affect the
substance, veracity or weight or their declarations. These inconsistencies reinforce, rather
than weaken, their credibility, for different witnesses of startling events usually perceive
things differently. 1 2 Indeed, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cannot be
expected to be uniform to the last detail.
The testimony of Glenda Chavez that the accused was drunk at that time allegedly
contradicted Yvonne's statement that the accused did not smell of liquor. This, does not
detract from the credibility of either witness. Yvonne, then an eight-year-old child, 1 3 and
her Aunt Glenda, then twenty-seven years old, 1 4 do not have the same experiences or level
of maturity; hence, their perceptions of events differ. More important, whether the accused
was drunk or not is an insignificant detail that does not substantially affect the testimonies
of these witnesses.
Further, the discrepancy in the witnesses' estimate of the distance covered by the men
who chased appellant does not render their testimonies incredible. 15 Quite the contrary,
such discrepancy shows their candor and sincerity, demonstrating that their testimonies
were unrehearsed. 16 Yvonne testified that when appellant noticed the group of men
following them, he carried her and ran. Yvonne's testimony is in accord with that of Arnel
Fabila — a member of the group who chased appellant — that they were able to overtake
appellant after chasing him half a kilometer. 17
Appellant's challenge to the credibility of the prosecution account is also premised on the
alleged failure of the trial court to consider the following points: 1 8
"a)that the alleged victim admitted that she and the accused casually moved
around the school premises, as if they were strolling; That when they were already
in the highway, they were also walking openly and casually until they were met by
a group of youngster[s].
Edwin Fabila, one of the prosecution's witnesses, corroborated the fact that the
two were walking casually along the highway when he first saw them;
b)That it is highly incredible that accused and the alleged victim will not be seen
or noticed by the people travelling or those persons residing along the highway if
it was true that the accused was dragging her and she was continuously crying
from her residence up to a distance of more than one kilometer;
c)That the accused and the alleged victim were travelling at a very slow pace; a
distance of barely a kilometer for a period of more than two hours;
d)That the accused was very drunk, having been drinking different kinds of
intoxicating liquors from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., causing him to be confused on
which way they should take in going home. cdtai
e)That the accused was not hurt by the group of youngsters who; allegedly
rescued the child, nor was immediately brought to the municipal hall which was
just near the house of the victim for the filing of the necessary charge; this [sic]
actuations only confirm the fact that the accused merely sought their help in
guiding them home, and
f)That it took more than one week for the complainant and her parents to file the
case at the Fiscal's Office."
We cannot sustain these contentions. The charge is not belied by the one-week delay in the
filing of the complaint. It has been held that delay or vacillation in making a criminal
accusation does not necessarily weaken the credibility of, a witness where such delay is
satisfactorily explained. 1 9 In the present case, one week was reasonable, considering that
the victim was a resident of Binuangan and that the case was filed in Tagum, Davao.
Furthermore, the group whom appellant met did not hurt or bring him to the municipal hall,
because they deemed it more urgent at the time to rescue Yvonne and to bring her home,
which they actually did. 2 0 There is no settled rule on how a group of young men should
react upon seeing a young girl snatched by an older man. Verily, violence is not the only
normal reaction of young men who see a girl being forcibly taken.
Appellant's claim that he and Yvonne were merely strolling and walking casually does not
negate the fact that Yvonne was deprived of her will. As noted by the trial court, appellant
used physical force and psychological means in restraining her. 2 1 Despite her young age,
Yvonne was able to clearly recount the events that transpired on that fateful night.
Moreover, there is no merit in the argument that the people travelling or living along the
highway should have noticed appellant and Yvonne. The fact is that a group of men actually
noticed and ultimately chased them.
All in all, appellant utterly fails to justify a departure from the long settled rule that the trial
court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses should be accorded great respect on
appeal. 2 2
Second Issue: No Motive to "Kidnap"
Petitioner contends that "[t]here was no evidence presented to prove why the accused
should kidnap Yvonne Traya." He submits that "the prosecution had failed to prove [any]
motive to support the alleged kidnapping incident, thus, making the theory of the defense
more credible and believable." 2 3
The contention is insignificant. Motive is not an element of the crime. Furthermore, motive
becomes material only when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is
some doubt on whether a crime has been committed or whether the accused has
committed it. Indeed, motive is totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the
culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 2 4 In this case, the identity of
appellant is not in question. He himself admitted having taken Yvonne to Maco Central
Elementary School.
Third Issue: Kidnapping or Coercion?
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove one essential element of
kidnapping — the fact of detention or the deprivation of liberty. The solicitor general
counters that deprivation of liberty is not limited to imprisoning or placing the victim in an
enclosure. Citing People vs. Crisostomo, 25 he argues:
'(T)he act proven in the record constitutes (kidnapping) it is no argument against
this conclusion that the accused deprived the offended party of her liberty without
placing her in an inclosure; because illegal detention, as defined and punished in
our Code, may consist not only in imprisoning a person but also in detaining her
or depriving her in any manner of her liberty.'" 2 6
We agree with appellant's contention this time.

Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, 2 7 the elements of kidnapping are as follows:
"1.That the offender is a private individual.
2.That he kidnaps or detains another, other manner or in any deprives the latter of
his liberty .
3.That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.
4.That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is
present:
(a)That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than five (5) days; or
(b)That it is committed simulating public authority ; or
(c)That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the

person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or
(d)That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female,

or a public officer."
The Spanish version of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code uses the terms "lockup"
(encerrar) rather than "kidnap" (secuestrar or raptar). Lockup is included in the broader
term of "detention," which refers not only to the placing of a person in an enclosure which
he cannot leave, but also to any other deprivation of liberty which does not necessarily
involve locking up. 2 8 Likewise, the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and
enacted in Spanish. Consequently, the Spanish text is controlling in cases of conflict with
the English version, as provided in Section 15 of the Revised Administrative Code. 2 9

A review of the events as narrated by the prosecution witnesses ineluctably shows the
absence of "locking up." Victim Yvonne Traya testified: 3 0
"QAnd after that what happened next?
AWhen Auntie Bebeth went inside her house she was already bringing her child
and bringing with her candle. And Arnulfo Astorga told me that we will buy
candy, sir.
QAnd after that?

AAnd while I was not answering the question he immediately grabbed me.
xxx xxx xxx
QAnd after that, after he held your hand. what did he do next?
AHe placed his hands on my shoulder and also covering [sic] my mouth.
xxx xxx xxx
QAnd after that what did he do next?
AHe brought me to the school.
QWhat school did Boy Astorga bring you? What is name of the school?
AMaco Central Elementary School.

QHow far is Maco Central Elementary School from your house?
AA little bit near.
QWhen Boy Astorga brought you to school, was it dark?
AYes, sir.
QExactly where in Maco Elementary School did Boy Astorga bring you?
AInside the gate, sir.
QAnd once inside the gate what did he do to you?
AWe were going around the school?
xxx xxx xxx

QDo you know why you were going around the school?
AYes, sir.
QWhy, what did he do?
AWe were going around and when he saw that there was no person in the gate we
passed at that gate.
QAnd where did he go after passing that gate?
ATowards Lupon-lupon, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

QWhat about you, did you talk to him?
AI asked him where we were going and he told me that we are going home and I
told him that this is not the way to our house, and we did not pass this
way. (Witness gesturing a certain direction).
QAnd so when you said that is not the way, because our house is towards
Binuangan . . .
By the way, you said you were going to Lupon-lupon, do you know to what
direction is going to Lupon-lupon, to what place is Lupon-lupon going to?
AYes, sir.
QWhere?
AGoing to my place.
QDo you know the place where it was going? What is that place?
AOn the road going to Tagum.
QNow, what about your house, where is it going?
ATo Binuangan.
QAnd so when you . . . what did he do next when you said that is not the place
going to your house?
AWe continued walking and he also placed his hands on my shoulder and
dragged me, sir.
QWhat about you, what did you do when he was dragging you?
AI was crying, sir.
QDid you say any word to him when you were crying?
AYes, I told him that we are going home.

QAnd what did Boy Astorga say?
AHe told me that we will be going home, and told me not to make any noise
because if I will make any noise we will be lost on our way.
QAnd so, what did you do?
AI continued crying, sir.
QAnd after that, what happened?

AWe continued walking and we met a person and he asked Boy Astorga where we
are going, sir.
QWhat did that man ask Boy Astorga?
AThe man asked Boy Astorga where are you going, and Boy Astorga answered, to
Binuangan, but the man continued to say that this way is going to Tagum
and not to Binuangan any more.
QWhat else did the man ask, if any?
AI further said that we will already leave, and we will be the ones to go to
Binuangan, and after that, Boy Astorga put me down because he urinated.
So, at that instance, I ran, but, after he urinated, he already took hold of me
not to run any more because there is a ghost.
QWhen you said you ran away after Boy Astorga left you when he urinated, where
did you run?
ATowards Binuangan, sir.
QTowards the direction of your house?
AYes, sir.
QAnd you were overtaken again by Boy Astorga?
AYes, sir.
QWhat did he do to you when you were overtaken by Boy Astorga?
AHe took hold of me again and he told me, he threatened me that there is [sic] a
red eyes but I answered him that is [sic] not a red eyes of the ghost but that
is a light coming from the vehicle.
QNow, what happened next?
AHe placed a necklace on me, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

AHe was dragging me and I was crying when he was dragging me.
QWhile you were being dragged did you make any plea to him?
AYes I told him that I will go home.
QAnd what did he say?

AHe said that we will go home but I know [sic] that place we are [sic] heading to is
[sic] not a way to our home but it is [sic] the opposite.
QSo, what happened next?

AHe continued dragging me and after that we met plenty of persons and I
shouted for help and at that instance, he slapped my mouth and after a
few steps he already carried me.
xxx xxx xxx

AHe continued walking and I also continued crying and I told him that I want to go
home and he told me that we are heading towards home, but I told him
that the way we are going to is not the way to our house.
QBy the way, when you shouted [for] help, was it loud?
AYes, sir.
QSo, what happened next?

AHe continued running and he stopped several vehicles but they did not stop, so,
we just continued walking.
QAfter that, what happened next?
AHe moved closer to the banana plants. He looked back and he saw that persons
were already chasing him and after that he carried me and ran."
From the foregoing, it is clear that the appellant and the victim were constantly on the
move. They went to Maco Elementary School and strolled on the school grounds. When
nobody was at the Luponlupon bridge, appellant took the victim to the highway leading to
Tagum, Davao. At that time, Yvonne pleaded with appellant that she really wanted to go
home to Binuangan, but appellant ignored her pleas and continued walking her toward the
wrong direction. Later on, the group of Witness Arnel Fabila spotted them. Appellant
Astorga carried the victim and ran, but Fabila's group chased and caught up with them.
This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or restraint of the victim,
which is the primary element of kidnapping. 3 1 Appellant's apparent intention was to take
Yvonne against her will towards the direction of Tagum. Appellant's plan did not
materialize, however, because Fabila's group chanced upon them. The evidence does not
show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her.
Appellant's forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an
actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no "lockup".
Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article 286 of the same
code. Grave coercion or coaccion grave has three elements: (a) that any person is
prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do
something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion
is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce
intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the
person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other words,
that the restraint is not made under authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
3 2 When appellant forcibly dragged and slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go
home to Binuangan. Appellant presented no justification for preventing Yvonne from going
home, and we cannot find any. llcd
The present case should be distinguished from People vs. Rosemarie de la Cruz. 33 Here,
Appellant Astorga tricked Yvonne to go with him by telling her that they were going to buy
candy. When Yvonne recognized the deception, she demanded that she be brought home,
but appellant refused and instead dragged her toward the opposite direction against her
will. While it is unclear whether Appellant Astorga intended to detain or "lock up" Yvonne,
there is no question that he forced her to go with him against her will. In Rosemarie de la
Cruz, Victim Whiazel voluntarily went with accused. Furthermore, the accused in that case
failed to consummate the crime of kidnapping because of the timely intervention of the
victim's neighbor. Thus, the Court held in that case: 34
"In a prosecution for kidnapping the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of
the latter's liberty in any manner, needs to be established by indubitable proof
(People vs. Puno 219 SCRA 85 [1993]). The acts held by the trial court, and
maintained by the People, as consummating the crime of kidnapping in this case
are those when accused-appellant held the victim's hand and refused to let go
when the victim asked to go over to her neighbor, who by then already saw what
was happening. This happened for only a very brief span of time and the
evidentiary record shows that there were a good number of people present at that
time, that a guard was stationed at the gate, and that there was at least a teacher
nearby. The child could have just as easily shouted for help. While it does not take
much to scare the wits out of a small child like Whiazel, under the attendant
circumstances, we cannot say with certainty that she was indeed deprived of her
liberty. It must further be noted that up to that brief moment when Cecilia saw
them, and the child asked to be let go, the victim had gone with accused-appellant
voluntarily. Without any further act reinforcing the inference that the victim may
have been denied her liberty, even taking cognizance of her minority, the Court
hesitates to find that kidnapping in the case at bar was consummated. While it is
a well entrenched rule that factual findings of trial courts, especially when they
concern the appreciation of testimony of witnesses, are accorded great respect,
by exception, when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, as, we
perceive in the case at bar, the Court may choose to substitute its own findings
(People vs. Padua, 215 SCRA 266 [1992])."
The Information, dated March 24, 1992, filed against Astorga contains sufficient
allegations constituting grave coercion, the elements of which were sufficiently proved by
the prosecution. Hence, a conviction for said crime is appropriate under Section 4, Rule
120 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure:
"Section 4.Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof . — When
there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information,
and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offenses as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the
offense charged included in that which is proved."
At the time the felony was committed on December 29, 1991, the penalty imposed by law
for grave coercion was arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos. 3 5 The
Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply here because the maximum penalty does not
exceed one year. 3 6 However, appellant has been imprisoned for more than six (6) months.
He has more than served the penalty imposable for such an offense. 37
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Appellant is CONVICTED only of
grave coercion and is sentenced to six (6) months of arresto mayor. Unless he is being
detained for any other valid cause, his IMMEDIATE RELEASE is herewith ordered,
considering that he has more than served the maximum penalty imposable upon him. The
director of prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five days from receipt of this
Decision, of the actual date the appellant is released. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Penned by Judge Marcial L. Fernandez.
2.Original Records, p. 1; Rollo, p. 5.

3.Atty. Fortunato M. Maranian; records, p. 34. The Public Attorney's Office,
however, filed Appellant's Brief before this Court.

4.Records, pp. 60-66; Rollo, pp. 13-19.
5.Ibid., p. 66; Rollo, p. 19.
6.The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon receipt by the Court on January 16, 1996
of the letter of the Bureau of Corrections dated January 11, 1996 confirming the
confinement of the appellant at the New Bilibid Prisons.
7.Decision, pp. 1-3; Rollo, pp. 13-15.
8.At pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 40-42.

10.Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 36; original text in upper case.

11.Ibid., pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 43-44.
12.People vs. De Leon, 248 SCRA 609, 619, September 23, 1995; People vs. Buka, 205 SCRA
567, 583, January 30, 1992.
13.TSN, March 16, 1993, p. 5.
14.TSN, March 10, 1993, p. 5.
15.People vs. Nicolas, 241 SCRA 67, 74, February 1, 1995 citing People vs. Payumo, G.R. No.
81761, July 2, 1990, 187 SCRA 64; People vs. Irenea, 164 SCRA 121; August 5, 1988;
People vs. Cariño, 165 SCRA 664, September 26, 1988; People vs. De Gracia, 18 SCRA
197, September 29, 1966; People vs. Muñoz, 166 SCRA 730, July 29, 1988; Cordial vs.
People, 166 SCRA 17, September 27, 1988.
16.People vs. Padilla, 242 SCRA 629, 642, March 23, 1995 citing People vs. Lase, 219 SCRA
584 [1993]; People vs. Jumamoy , 221 SCRA 333, April 7, 1993; People vs. Ducay , 225
SCRA 1, August 2, 1993; People vs. De Guzman, 188 SCRA 407, 411, August 7, 1990;
People vs. Gadiana, 195 SCRA 211, March 13, 1991; People vs. Madriaga, 211 SCRA
698, 712, July 23, 1992; People vs. Custodio, 197 SCRA 538, May 27, 1991; People vs.
Cabato, 160 SCRA 98, 107, April 15, 1988; People vs. Salufrania, 159 SCRA 401, 416,
March 30, 1988.
17.TSN, March 11, 1993, p. 10.
18.Appellant's Brief, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 46-47.

19.People vs. Dabon, 216 SCRA 656, 667, December 16, 1992; People vs. Banayo, 195 SCRA
543, March 22, 1991; People vs. Yambao, 193 SCRA 571, February 6, 1991; People vs.
Santiago, 197 SCRA 556, May 28, 1991; People vs. Canciller, 206 SCRA 827, 831, March
4, 1992; People vs. Baysa, 172 SCRA 706, April 25, 1989.
20.TSN, March 16, 1993, pp. 20-21.
22.People vs. Ramos, 240 SCRA 191, 201, January 18, 1995; People vs. Dolar, et al., 231 SCRA
414, 422-423, March 24, 1994; People vs. De Guzman, 216 SCRA 754, 759-760,
December 21, 1992.
23.Appellant's Brief, p. 13; Rollo, p. 48.

24.People vs. Sta. Agata, 244 SCRA 677, 684, June 1, 1995 citing People vs. Cayetano, 223
SCRA 770; People vs. Magpayo, 226 SCRA 13; People vs. Joya, 227 SCRA 9.
25.46 Phil. 775 (1923).
26.Appellee's Brief, p. 13; Rollo, p. 81.

27.Prior to its amendment by Section 8, RA No. 7659, effective December 31, 1993. The crime
happened in 1991.
28.Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1988 ed., Vol. III, pp. 1-2 citing Groizard and Cuello Calon.
29.Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1988 ed., Vol. I, pp. 3-4, citing People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil.
665; People vs. Mesias, 65 Phil. 267; People vs. Yabut, 58 Phil. 479; People vs. Balubar,
60 Phil. 698; People vs. Abilong, 82 Phil. 172; Cadiz, 1 ACR and other cases; Reyes, The
Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Twelfth Edition, 1981, Book One, pp. 17-18.
30.TSN, March 16, 1993, pp. 10-18.
31.People vs. Godoy , 250 SCRA 676, 728, December 6, 1995; People vs. Cua, 232 SCRA 507,
516, May 25, 1994; People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85, 93-94; February 17, 1993; United
States vs. Ancheta, 1 Phil. 165 (1902); United States vs. De Leon, 1 Phil. 163 (1902);
People vs. Remalate, 92 Phil. 48 (1952); People vs. Guerrero, 103 Phil. 1136 (1958);
People vs. Ong, et al., 62 SCRA 174, January 30, 1975; People vs. Ty Sui Wong, et al., 83
SCRA 125, May 12, 1978; People vs. Jimenez, et al., 105 SCRA 721, July 24, 1981.
32.Aquino, supra, pp. 66-67.
33.G.R. No. 120988, August 11, 1997, per Melo, J .

34.At pp. 7-8.
35.Article 286 was amended by R.A. No. 7890 on February 20, 1995.
36.Section 2 of Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103 as amended by Act No. 4225).
37.Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides:
"Article 29.Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. —

Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in
the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during
which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees
voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners. except in the following cases:
1.When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime;
and
2.When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender
voluntarily.
xxx xxx xxx

Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to or more
than the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be
sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without
prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same
is under review. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is
destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment. (As
amended by RA No. 6127, and further amended by EO No. 214, prom. July 10, 1987)."

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 153524-25. January 31, 2005.]
RODOLFO SORIA and EDIMAR BISTA , petitioners, vs . HON. ANIANO

DESIERTO in his capacity as Head of the Office of the Ombudsman,
HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman
for Military, P/INS. JEFFREY T. GOROSPE, SPO2 ROLANDO G.
REGACHO, SPO1 ALFREDO B. ALVIAR, JR., PO3 JAIME D. LAZARO,
PO2 FLORANTE B. CARDENAS, PO1 JOSEPH A. BENAZA, SPO1
FRANKLIN D. CABAYA and SPO4 PEDRO PAREL , respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO , J : p
Yet again, we are tasked to substitute our judgment for that of the Office of the
Ombudsman in its finding of lack of probable cause made during preliminary investigation.
And, yet again, we reaffirm the time-honored practice of non-interference in the conduct of
preliminary investigations by our prosecutory bodies absent a showing of grave abuse of
discretion on their part.
Petitioners, thru a special civil action for certiorari, 1 contend precisely that the public
respondents herein — officers of the Office of the Ombudsman — gravely abused their
discretion in dismissing the complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code (Delay in the delivery of detained persons) against private respondents herein,
members of the Philippine National Police stationed at the Municipality of Santa, Ilocos
Sur.
From the respective pleadings 2 of the parties, the following facts appear to be
indubitable:
1. On or about 8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001 (a Sunday and the day
before the 14 May 2001 Elections 3 ), petitioners were arrested without a
warrant by respondents police officers for alleged illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition;
2. Petitioner Soria was arrested for alleged illegal possession of .38 cal.
revolver (a crime which carries with it the penalty of prision correccional in
its maximum period) and for violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the
Omnibus Election Code in relation to the Commission on Election
Resolution No. 3328 (which carries the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than one [1] year but not more than six [6] years);
3. Petitioner Bista was arrested for alleged illegal possession of sub-machine

pistol UZI, cal. 9mm and a .22 cal. revolver with ammunition;
4. Immediately after their arrest, petitioners were detained at the Santa, Ilocos
Sur, Police Station. It was at the Santa Police Station that petitioner Bista
was identified by one of the police officers to have a standing warrant of
arrest for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 issued by the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12272; STEacI
5. The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of 14 May 2001 (Monday and election
day), petitioners were brought to the residence of Provincial Prosecutor
Jessica Viloria in San Juan, Ilocos Sur, before whom a "Joint-Affidavit"
against them was subscribed and sworn to by the arresting officers. From
there, the arresting officers brought the petitioners to the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, and there at about 6:00 p.m. the
"Joint-Affidavit" was filed and docketed;
6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner Soria
was released upon the order of Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the requisite
preliminary investigation, while petitioner Bista was brought back and
continued to be detained at the Santa Police Station. From the time of
petitioner Soria's detention up to the time of his release, twenty-two (22)
hours had already elapsed;
7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, petitioner Bista was
brought before the MTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where the case for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 was pending. Petitioner Bista posted bail and
an Order of Temporary Release was issued thereafter;
8. At this point in time, no order of release was issued in connection with

petitioner Bista's arrest for alleged illegal possession of firearms. At 4:30 in
the afternoon of the same day (15 May 2001), an information for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No.
4413-S, was filed against petitioner Bista with the 4th Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. At 5:00 in the afternoon, informations
for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition and violation of Article
261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to COMELEC
Resolution No. 3328, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 2269-N and No.
2268-N, respectively, were filed in the Regional Trial Court at Narvacan,
Ilocos Sur;
9. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was released upon filing of bail bonds in
Criminal Cases No. 2268-N and No. 4413-S. He was detained for 26 days.
10. On 15 August 2001, petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
for Military Affairs a complaint-affidavit for violation of Art. 125 of the
Revised Penal Code against herein private respondents.
11. After considering the parties' respective submissions, the Office of the
Ombudsman rendered the first assailed Joint Resolution dated 31 January
2002 dismissing the complaint for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised
Penal Code for lack of merit; and
12. On 04 March 2002, petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration
which was denied for lack of merit in the second assailed Resolution dated
25 March 2002.
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities. — The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be
imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for
some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six
(36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or
their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention
and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time
with his attorney or counsel. EHTIcD
It is not under dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Soria was arrested
without warrant are punishable by correctional penalties or their equivalent, thus, criminal
complaints or information should be filed with the proper judicial authorities within 18
hours of his arrest. Neither is it in dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Bista
was arrested are punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he
could only be detained for 36 hours without criminal complaints or information having
been filed with the proper judicial authorities.
The sole bone of contention revolves around the proper application of the 12-18-36
periods. With respect specifically to the detention of petitioner Soria which lasted for 22
hours, it is alleged that public respondents gravely erred in construing Article 125 4 as
excluding Sundays, holidays and election days in the computation of the periods
prescribed within which public officers should deliver arrested persons to the proper
judicial authorities as the law never makes such exception. Statutory construction has it
that if a statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without any attempts at interpretation. 5 Public respondents, on the other hand, relied on
the cases of Medina v. Orozco, Jr., 6 and Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila 7 and on
commentaries 8 of jurists to bolster their position that Sundays, holidays and election days
are excluded in the computation of the periods provided in Article 125, 9 hence, the
arresting officers delivered petitioners well within the allowable time.
In addition to the foregoing arguments and with respect specifically to petitioner Bista,
petitioners maintain that the filing of the information in court against petitioner Bista did
not justify his continuous detention. The information was filed at 4:30 p.m. of 15 May 2001
but the orders for his release were issued by the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial
Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on 08 June 2001 . They argued that based on law and
jurisprudence, if no charge is filed by the prosecutor within the period fixed by law, the
arresting officer must release the detainee lest he be charged with violation of Article 125.
1 0 Public respondents countered that the duty of the arresting officers ended upon the
filing of the informations with the proper judicial authorities following the rulings in Agbay
v. Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, 1 1 and People v. Acosta. 1 2
From a study of the opposing views advanced by the parties, it is evident that public
respondents did not abuse their discretion in dismissing for lack of probable cause the
complaint against private respondents.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the
part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.
The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion or hostility. 1 3

No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to herein public respondents.
Their disposition of petitioners' complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code cannot be said to have been conjured out of thin air as it was properly backed up by
law and jurisprudence. Public respondents ratiocinated thus:
As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar as the complaint of Rodolfo Soria
is concerned, based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a
special holiday, should not be included in the computation of the period
prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of
warrantless arrests, it being a "no-office day." (Medina vs. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313.)
In the instant case, while it appears that the complaints against Soria for Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed
with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur,
only on May 15, 200[1] at 4:30 p.m., he had already been released the day before
or on May 14, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m. by the respondents, as directed by Prov.
Prosecutor Jessica [Viloria]. Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention or
violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to speak of. 1 4
Indeed, we did hold in Medina v. Orozco, Jr., 1 5 that —

. . . The arresting officer's duty under the law was either to deliver him to the
proper judicial authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter release him. The fact
however is that he was not released. From the time of petitioner's arrest at 12:00
o'clock p.m. on November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on November 10 when the information
against him for murder actually was in court, over 75 hours have elapsed.
But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday; November
8 was declared an official holiday; and November 9 (election day) was also an
official holiday. In these three no-office days, it was not an easy matter for a
fiscal to look for his clerk and stenographer, draft the information and search for
the Judge to have him act thereon, and get the clerk of court to open the
courthouse, docket the case and have the order of commitment prepared. And
then, where to locate and the uncertainty of locating those officers and
employees could very well compound the fiscal's difficulties. These are
considerations sufficient enough to deter us from declaring that Arthur Medina
was arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to court on the very first office day
following arrest.
And, in Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila 1 6 —

. . . Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer
detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code,
the means of communication as well as the hour of arrest and other
circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the
fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary information, must
be taken into consideration.
As to the issue concerning the duty of the arresting officer after the information has
already been filed in Court, public respondents acted well within their discretion in ruling
thus:
In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista against the respondents for
Violation of Article 125, will not prosper because the running of the thirty-six (36)-
hour period prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint against him from the
time of his arrest was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he has a
standing warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on May 15,
2001, at about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to post bail and secure an Order of
Release. Obviously, however, he could only be released if he has no other pending
criminal case requiring his continuous detention. cICHTD
The criminal Informations against Bista for Violations of Article 125, RPC and
COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and
Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, on May 15, 2001 (Annexes "G" and
"I", Complaint-Affidavit of Edimar Bista) but he was released from detention only
on June 8, 2001, on orders of the RTC and MTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur (Annexes
"J" and "K", Complaint-Affidavit). Was there a delay in the delivery of detained
person to the proper judicial authorities under the circumstances? The answer is
in the negative. The complaints against him was (sic) seasonably filed in the
court of justice within the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law as
discussed above. The duty of the detaining officers is deemed complied with
upon the filing of the complaints. Further action, like issuance of a Release Order,
then rests upon the judicial authority (People v. Acosta [CA] 54 O.G. 4739). 1 7
The above disposition is in keeping with Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, 1 8
wherein we ordained that —
. . . Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court,
the intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained
person is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application
with the court, he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself acknowledged this
power of the MCTC to order his release when he applied for and was granted his
release upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125 has been
duly served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC. We agree with the
position of the Ombudsman that such filing of the complaint with the MCTC
interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.
All things considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, we have no choice but to
defer to the Office of the Ombudsman's determination that the facts on hand do not make
out a case for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
As we have underscored in numerous decisions —
We have consistently refrained from interfering with the investigatory and
prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman absent any compelling reason. This
policy is based on constitutional, statutory and practical considerations. We are
mindful that the Constitution and RA 6770 endowed the Office of the
Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers,
virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention, in order to insulate
it from outside pressure and improper influence. Moreover, a preliminary
investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case.
Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the
case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an
acquittal. Hence, if the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case
dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless clothed with grave
abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously
hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it. In much the same way, the courts will be swamped with
cases if they will have to review the exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time the latter decide to file an information in court or
dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. 1 9 (Emphasis supplied) DHacTC
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition dated 27 May 2002 is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002 and the Order dated 25
March 2002 of the Office of the Ombudsman are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 3-22.

2. Petitioners' "PETITION FOR CERTIORARI (UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT)"
dated 27 May 2002, Rollo, pp. 3-22; Public Respondents' "COMMENT" dated 09 October
2002, Rollo, pp. 105-128; Petitioners' reply (To: Respondents' Comment dated 09 October
2002), Rollo, pp. 130-137; Petitioners' "MEMORANDUM" dated 25 March 2003, Rollo, pp.
140-164; Public Respondents' "MEMORANDUM" dated 01 April 2003, Rollo, pp. 168-189.
3. Erroneously designated by the public respondents as "Presidential Elections."
4. Revised Penal Code.
5. Rollo, p. 131.
6. No. L-26723, 22 December 1966, 18 SCRA 1168, 1170.
7. No. L-2128, 12 May 1948, 80 Phil. 859.
8. (1) Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1997 ed., p. 74.
(2) Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code, 2001 ed., p. 318 (Rollo, pp. 117
&179).
9. Revised Penal Code.
10. Id.
11. G.R. No. 134503, 02 July 1999, 309 SCRA 726 (Rollo, pp. 123-124).
12. C.A. 54 Official Gazette 4739 (Rollo, pp. 122-123).
13. Duero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131282, 04 January 2002, 373 SCRA 11, 17; Perez v.
Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 131445, 27 May 2004.
14. Rollo, pp. 25-26
15. Supra, note 5.
16. Supra, note 6 at 870.
17. Rollo, p. 26.
18. Supra, note 10 at 739-740.
19. Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman, supra, note 12, citing Presidential Commission on
Good Government v. Desierto, G.R. No. 140232, 19 January 2001, 349 SCRA 767; and
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No.
136192, 14 August 2001, 362 SCRA 730.

Title 2 Cases - Crim2

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Title 2 Cases - Crim2

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 16009. September 21, 1920.]

UY KHEYTIN ET AL. , petitioners, vs . ANTONIO VILLAREAL, Judge of

Crossfield & O'Brien for petitioners.

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; MAY SEARCH WARRANT

(Sgd.) "L. M. SOUTHWORTH,

"Judge of the Court of Iloilo."

"It is further requested, that a writ of prohibition issue, restraining the

"The United States to any, _________________ or policeman in the Province of

1. See page 889, ante.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com

[G.R. No. L-8474. September 30, 1955.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , petitioner, vs . PEDRO DE LA

Jose G. Lucban, Special Prosecutor, Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant

1. SEARCH WARRANTS; EVIDENCE; ILLEGAL PROCUREMENT OF SEARCH

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

[G.R. No. 110097. December 22, 1997.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . ARNULFO

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

1.REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; NOT AFFECTED

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

"Prosecution witnesses extant from their testimonies categorically assert that

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

Evidence for the Defense

The Trial Court's Ruling

Consider these facts.

Moreover, Yvonne categorically in straight forward testimony asserted that she

We hold, however, that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses concerning minor

We agree with appellant's contention this time.

(c)That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the

(d)That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female,

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

QAnd after that?

AMaco Central Elementary School.

xxx xxx xxx

ATowards Lupon-lupon, sir.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

AYes, I told him that we are going home.

AI continued crying, sir.

QAnd after that, what happened?

QWhat did that man ask Boy Astorga?

QTowards the direction of your house?

AHe placed a necklace on me, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

QAnd what did he say?

QSo, what happened next?

xxx xxx xxx

QSo, what happened next?

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

QAfter that, what happened next?

1.Penned by Judge Marcial L. Fernandez.

2.Original Records, p. 1; Rollo, p. 5.

however, filed Appellant's Brief before this Court.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

5.Ibid., p. 66; Rollo, p. 19.

7.Decision, pp. 1-3; Rollo, pp. 13-15.

8.At pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 40-42.

10.Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 36; original text in upper case.

14.TSN, March 10, 1993, p. 5.

17.TSN, March 11, 1993, p. 10.

18.Appellant's Brief, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 46-47.

21.Decision, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 18-19.

23.Appellant's Brief, p. 13; Rollo, p. 48.