4-MANRESA 2008 1
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS is under compulsion to purchase a ticket. It is a totally
1. BALACUIT VS CFI
Facts: At issue in the petition for review before Us is
the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640
passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on
April 21, 1969, the title and text of which are
reproduced below
ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP OF
PERSONS, ENTITY OR CORPORATION ENGAGED IN THE
BUSINESS OF SELLING ADMISSION TICKETS TO ANY
MOVIE OR OTHER PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS, GAMES,
CONTESTS OR OTHER PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE
CHILDREN BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE (12)
YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL PAYMENT FOR TICKETS
INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT SHOULD CHARGE ONLY
ONE-HALF OF THE SAID TICKET
Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit Lamberto Tan, and
Sergio Yu Carcel managers of the theaters and they
attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance
No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an
invalid exercise of police power.
Issue:
Does this power to regulate include the authority to
interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to these
places of exhibition and amusement whether under its
general grant of power or under the general welfare
clause as invoked by the City?
Ruling:
No, the power to regulate and fix the amount of license
fees for theaters and other places of amusement has
been expressly granted to the City of Butuan under its
charter.
However, the ordinance is not justified by any
necessity for the public interest. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest
and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means.
The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease
the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to
shell out the same amount of money for the admission
of their children. A reduction in the price of admission
would mean corresponding savings for the parents;
however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the
cost of these savings.
The ordinance does not only make the petitioners
suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes
them for failure to comply with it.
The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against
this undesirable practice and as such, the respondent
City of Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be
exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of
children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We
can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if
not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners.
Further, there is no discernible relation between the
ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety,
morals and the general welfare.
Furthermore, there is nothing pernicious in demanding
equal price for both children and adults. The
petitioners are merely conducting their legitimate
businesses. The object of every business entrepreneur
is to make a profit out of his venture. In fact, no person
voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a
ticket to such performances
Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and
property rights of petitioners WHEREFORE, a new
judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No.
640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. (Sol
Andoy)
2. DEL ROSARIO VS. BENGZON
Facts:
Class suit filed by the officers of Philippine Medical
Association, wherein they asked the SC to declare as
unconstitutional some provisons of Generics Act of
1988 and its implementing order AO No. 62.
(for purposes of this case digest, the full text of the law
is omitted but can be found in the ruling)
The petitioner's main argument against paragraphs (a)
and (b), Section 6 of the law, is the alleged unequal
treatment of government physicians, dentists, and
veterinarians, on one hand, and those in private
practice on the other hand, in the manner of
prescribing generic drugs, for, while the former are
allegedly required to use only generic terminology in
their prescriptions, the latter may write the brand
name of the drug in parenthesis below the generic
name. The favored treatment of private doctors,
dentists and veterinarians under the law is allegedly a
specie of invalid class legislation.
Ruling:
1. There is no merit in that argument for it proceeds
from a misreading and misinterpretation of the letter
and intent of paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 6 of the
Generics Act. Indeed, as explained by the public
respondent:
"x x x while paragraph (a) enumerates the government
transactions ('purchasing, prescribing, dispensing and
administering of drugs and medicines') where the sole
use of generic terminology has been required, the
'prescription' of drugs is further governed by paragraph
(b). And the use of the word 'all' in the latter provision
emphasizes the absence of any distinction between
government and private physicians. In other words, in
prescribing drugs, physicians, whether in government
service or in private practice, are both governed by
exactly the same rules, and thus, are both authorized
to include the brand name in their respective
prescriptions."
2. Furthermore, it may be observed that while
paragraph (a) refers to "all government health
agencies, and their personnel as well as other
government agencies" (not necessarily physicians,
dentists and veterinarians), paragraph (b) refers to "all
medical, dental and veterinary practitioners, including
private practitioners."
3. The public respondent points out that the institution
of generics in the Philippines will compel physicians to
prescribe drugs based on their therapeutic or "active
ingredient," instead of their well-known brand names.
Multiple medications which may produce potentially
adverse, even lethal, chemical reations in the patient
will thereby be avoided. Patients with limited means
will be able to buy generic drugs that cost less but

possess the same active ingredients, dosage form, and
strength as brand names, many of which are priced
beyond the reach of the common too because the high
costs of advertising, packaging, royalties, and other
inputs of production determine their pricing for the
market.
4. The Court has been unable to find any constitutional
infirmity in the Generics Act. It, on the contrary,
implements the constitutional mandate for the State
"to protect and promote the right to health of the
people" and "to make essential goods, health and
other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost"
5. The prohibition against the use by doctors of "no
substitution" and/or words of similar import in their
prescription, is a valid regulation to prevent the
circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the
right to choose between the brand name and its
generic equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write
both the generic and the brand name in his
prescription form. If a doctor is allowed to prescribe a
brand-name drug with "no substitution," the patient's
option to buy a lower-priced, but equally effective,
generic equivalent would thereby be curtailed. The law
aims to benefit the impoverished (and often sickly)
majority of the population in a still developing country
like ours, not the affluent and generally healthy
minority.
6. There is no merit in the petitioners' theory that the
Generics Act impairs the obligation of contract
between a physician and his patient, for no contract
ever results from a consultation between patient and
physician. A doctor may take in or refuse a patient, just
as the patient may take or refuse the doctor's advice
or prescription. As aptly observed by the public
respondent, no doctor has ever filed an action for
breach of contract against a patient who refused to
take prescribed medication, undergo surgery, or follow
a recommended course treatment by his doctor . In
any event, no private contract between doctor and
patient may be allowed to override the power of the
State to enact laws that are reasonably necessary to
secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or
general welfare of the community. This power can
neither be abdicated nor bargained away. All
contractual and property rights are held subject to a
fair exercise
7. Petitioners have also assailed Section 12,
paragraphs b, c and d, of the Generics Act prescribing
graduated penalties for violations of its provisions.
Petitioners' allegation that these penalties violate the
constitutional guarantee against excessive fines and
cruel and degrading punishment, has no merit. Penal
sanctions are indispensable if the law is to be obeyed.
They are the "teeth" of the law. Without them, the law
would be toothless, not worth the paper it is printed on,
for physicians, dentists and veterinarians may freely
ignore its prescriptions and prohibitions. The penalty of
suspension or cancellation of the physician's license is
neither cruel, inhuman, or degrading. It is no different
from the penalty of suspension or disbarment that this
Court inflicts on lawyers and judges who misbehave or
violate the laws and the Codes of Professional and
Judicial Conduct.
3. YNOT VS. IAC
FACTS. RESTITUTO YNOT (petitioner) challenges the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A (Oct. 25,
1980 enacted by Pres. Marcos in the exercise of his
legislative power). The said EO prohibits the
transportation of carabao and carabeef from one
province to another. Any violation of the said EO will
amount to a confiscation of the carabao and carabeef
by the government.
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YNOT had transported 6 carabaos from Masbate to
Iloilo on January 13, 1984. The carabao was confiscated
by the police station commander, without giving YNOT
any chance to be heard. It was only returned when he
had given a superdedeas bond. Hence, the police
confiscated his carabaos.
YNOT argued that the EO is unconstitutional insofar as
it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef. His claim is that the penalty is invalid
because it is imposed without according the owner a
right to be heard before a competent and impartial
court as guaranteed by due process.
ISSUE. WON YNOT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS.
RULING. YES, Ynot was denied due process.
• There is substantive due process, when the following
requisites are complied:
1. Lawful subject - it must appear that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and
2. Lawful means - that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose,
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
• In the case at bar, EO 626-A has a lawful subject.
The carabao, as the poor man’s tractor has a direct
relevance to the public welfare. The EO will be
conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and
preventing their improvident depletion.
• However, there is no reasonable relation between
between the means and the end.
Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban
not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their
movement. SC believed that the prohibition of the
inter-provincial transport of carabaos cannot prevent
their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they
can be killed anywhere.
• Furthermore, the penalty is outright confiscation of
the carabaos, usually by the police only. In relation to
US v. Toribio, the statute was sustained because the
penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be
imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the
accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly,
no such trial is prescribed, and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the police
and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the
government.
• The minimum requirements of due process are notice
and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be
dispensed with because they are intended as a
safeguard against official arbitrariness.
There are occasions when the notice and hearing may
be dispensed with, such as the immediacy of the
problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the
need to correct it.
In the case at bar, there was no such pressure of time
or action calling for the Ynot's peremptory treatment.
The properties involved were not even inimical per se
as to require their instant destruction. There certainly
was no reason why the offense prohibited by the
executive order should not have been proved first in a
court of justice, with the accused being accorded all
the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
• To sum up then, SC held that:
1. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise
of the police power because the method employed
to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably

necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is
unduly oppressive.
2. Due process is violated because the owner of
the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished.
- The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on
judicial functions and militates against the doctrine
of separation of powers. (Aisa Maunting)
4. CORONA VS. HARBOR PILOTS
FACTS:
Pursuant to its power of control, regulation,
and supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession,
the PPA through PPA General Manager Rogelio Dayan
issued PPA-AO No. 04-92. Providing therein that "all
existing regular appointments which have been
previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or
the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992
only" and that "all appointments to harbor pilot
positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be
only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity
subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the
Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of
performance."
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the PPA violated the respondents' right
to exercise their profession and their right to due
process of law in issuing PPA-AO No. 04-92, limiting the
term of appointment of harbor pilots to one year
subject to yearly renewal or cancellation.
HELD: Yes. Unconstitutional—No due process of
law.
The Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was
issued in stark disregard of respondents' right against
deprivation of property without due process of law.
Consequently, the instant petition must be denied.
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is
known as the "due process clause" of the
Constitution, viz.:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, .
..
In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two
conditions must concur, namely, that there is a
deprivation and that such deprivation is done
without proper observance of due process. When
one speaks of due process of law, however, a
distinction must be made between matters of
procedure and matters of substance. In essence,
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS "refers to the method
or manner by which the law is enforced," while
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS "requires that the law
itself, not merely the procedures by which the law
would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just." PPA-
AO No. 04-92 must be examined in light of this
distinction.
As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the
fundamental requirements of procedural due
process, are essential only when an
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial
function. In the performance of its executive or
legislative functions, such as issuing rules and
regulations, an administrative body need not
comply with the requirements of notice and
hearing.
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession
has taken on the nature of a property right.
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Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced
only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is "the
granting of license especially to practice a profession."
It is also "the system of granting licenses (as for
professional practice) in accordance with
establishment standards." A license is a right or
permission granted by some competent authority to
carry on a business or do an act which, without such
license, would be illegal.
It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly
restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their
profession before their compulsory retirement. In the
past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that
after passing five examinations and undergoing years
of on-the-job training, they would have a license which
they could use until their retirement, unless sooner
revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness.
Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an
annual cancellation of their license which can be
temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of
their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and
neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year
terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period.
Renewal of their license is now dependent on a "rigid
evaluation of performance" which is conducted only
after the license has already been cancelled. Hence,
the use of the term "renewal." It is this pre-evaluation
cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92
unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real
sense, it is a deprivation of property without due
process of law.
(Liezel Cua)
5. GSIS VS. MONTESCLAROS (2004)
Facts: Nicolas filed and was approved an application
for retirement benefits under PD No. 1146 or the
Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977.
Milagros, as wife and designated beneficiary, filed with
GSIS a claim for survivorship pension. GSIS denied the
claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the
surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension
“if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with
the pensioner within three years before the pensioner
qualified for the pension.” According to GSIS, Nicolas
wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from
his date of retirement on “17 February 1984.”
Issue: WON the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146 is
valid and constitutional.
Held: It is void for being violative of the constitutional
guarantees of due process and equal protection of the
law. The GSIS cannot deny the claim of Milagros for
survivorship benefits based on this invalid proviso.
Denial of Due Process. The proviso is contrary to
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides
that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.” The proviso (Sec. 18, PD 1146) is unduly
oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouse’s
claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse
contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-
year prohibited period. There is outright confiscation of
benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the
surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard. The
proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is
to assure comprehensive and integrated social security
and insurance benefits to government employees and
their dependents in the event of sickness, disability,
death, and retirement of the government employees.
(Karla Deles)
6. CHAVEZ VS. COMELEC (2004)

FACTS:
Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into
formal agreements with certain establishments to
endorse their products. Pursuant to these agreements,
three billboards were set up along the Balintawak
Interchange of the North Expressway.
On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator
under Alyansa ng Pag-asa.
On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 6520, which contained Section 32
requiring all propaganda materials such as posters,
billboards, etc showing the image or name of the
candidate to be removed otherwise the same shall be
considered as premature campaigning.
Petitioner was directed to comply with the said
provision by the COMELEC’s Law Department.
Chavez asked the COMELEC that he be exempted from
the application of Section 32, considering that the
billboards
adverted to are mere product endorsements and
cannot be construed as paraphernalia for premature
campaigning under the rules.
The COMELEC answered petitioner’s request by issuing
another letter wherein it ordered him to remove or
cause the removal of the billboards, or to cover them
from public view pending the approval of his request.
ISSUE #1: W/N Sec.32 is an invalid exercise of police
power.
RULING: NO. A close examination of the assailed
provision reveals that its primary objectives are to
prohibit premature campaigning and to level the
playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize
the situation between popular or rich candidates, on
one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on
the other, by preventing the former from enjoying
undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account
of their resources and popularity. It is true that when
petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to
endorse certain products, he acted as a private
individual and had all the right to lend his name and
image to these products. However, when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards
featuring his name and image assumed partisan
political character because the same indirectly
promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was
acting well within its scope of powers when it required
petitioner to discontinue the display of the subject
billboards. (Jo Anne Beltran)
7. CHAVEZ VS. ROMULO (2004)
Facts:
In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
delivered a speech before the members of the PNP
stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all
public places to avert the rising crime incidents. She
directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to
suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms
Outside of Residence (PTCFOR), thus:
Acting on President Arroyo’s directive, respondent
Ebdane issued the assailed guidelines in the
implementation of the ban on the carrying of firearms
outside of residence.
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to
whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to
reconsider the implementation of the assailed
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Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus,
he filed the present petition.
He contends that the PNP Guidelines violate the due
process clause of the Constitution because: 1. the right
to own and carry firearm is necessarily intertwined with
the people’s inherent right to life and to protect life:
and 2. the ownership and carrying of firearms are
constitutionally protected property rights which cannot
be taken without due process of law and without just
cause.
Issue:
Whether pr not the PNP Guidelines violate the due
process clause of the constitution
Ruling:
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that
“no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.”
In evaluating a due process claim, the first and
foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or
property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is
that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain
privilege is neither a property nor property right.
The catena of American jurisprudence involving license
to bear arms is perfectly in accord with our ruling that
a PTCFOR is neither a property nor a property
right.
Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary
licenses in other regulated fields, may be
revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute
right, but only a personal privilege to be
exercised under existing restrictions, and such
as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A
licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as
the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the
statutory conditions of this license is that it might be
revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a
license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not
deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or
privilege within the meaning of these words in the
Declaration of Rights. (Norliza Mamukid)
8. BELTRAN VS. SECRETARY
Facts:
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services
Act of 1994 was enacted into law and it . seeks to
provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting
voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood
banks in the country. RA 7719 provides for the phasing
out of commercial blood banks.
Years prior to the passage of the National Blood
Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already been
operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act
No. 1517, The law, which allowed the establishment
and operation by licensed physicians of blood banks
and blood processing laboratories.
In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine
Foundation released its final report of a study on the
Philippine blood banking system. It was revealed that
the Philippines heavily relied on commercial sources of
blood. It was further found that blood sold by persons
to blood commercial banks are three times more likely
to have any of the infections or blood transfusion
transmissible diseases than those donated to PNRC.
On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act
providing for the phase out of commercial blood banks
took effect. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No.
9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of said law was promulgated by DOH.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7719 IS A VALID
EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER;
Held: The Court finds that the National Blood Services
Act is a valid exercise of the State’s police power.
Therefore, the Legislature, under the circumstances,
adopted a course of action that is both necessary and
reasonable for the common good. Police power is the
State authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare.
It is in this regard that the Court finds the related
grounds and/or issues raised by petitioners, namely,
deprivation of personal liberty and property, and
violation of the non-impairment clause, to be
unmeritorious.
In serving the interest of the public, and to give
meaning to the purpose of the law, the Legislature
deemed it necessary to phase out commercial blood
banks. This action may seriously affect the owners and
operators, as well as the employees, of commercial
blood banks but their interests must give way to serve
a higher end for the interest of the public. (Sol Andoy)
9. CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO
At issue is the constitutionality of the City Ordinance of
Manila entitled: entitled–
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE
ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES
AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE
AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna
parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses,
night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques,
cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns in the Ermita-
Malate area. In Section 3 thereof, owners and/or
operators of the enumerated establishments are given
three (3) months from the date of approval of the
Ordinance within which “to wind up business
operations or to transfer to any place outside the
Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other
kinds of business allowable within the area.” Further, it
states in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent
violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the
“premises of the erring establishment shall be closed
and padlocked permanently.”
Held:
The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional
infirmities that almost every sentence thereof violates
a constitutional provision. ()
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A
long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to
be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and must
be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public
policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable
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Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid
when they are not contrary to the Constitution and to
the laws. The Ordinance must satisfy two
requirements: it must pass muster under the
test of constitutionality and the test of
consistency with the prevailing laws. That
ordinances should be constitutional uphold the
principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The
requirement that the enactment must not violate
existing law gives stress to the precept that local
government units are able to legislate only by virtue of
their derivative legislative power, a delegation of
legislative power from the national legislature.
The constitutional safeguard of due process is
embodied in the fiat “(N)o person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law. . . .”
There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It furnishes though a standard to which
governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. This standard is aptly
described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice, and as
such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police
power.
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent
governmental encroachment against the life, liberty
and property of individuals; to secure the individual
from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the
government, unrestrained by the established principles
of private rights and distributive justice; to protect
property from confiscation by legislative enactments,
from seizure, forfeiture, and destruction without a trial
and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial
procedure; and to secure to all persons equal and
impartial justice and the benefit of the general law.
The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary
regulation, and private corporations and partnerships
are “persons” within the scope of the guaranty insofar
as their property is concerned.
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two
separate limits on government, usually called
“procedural due process” and “substantive due
process.”
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies,
refers to the procedures that the government must
follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property. Classic procedural due process issues are
concerned with what kind of notice and what form of
hearing the government must provide when it takes a
particular action.
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes,
asks whether the government has an adequate reason
for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property. In
other words, substantive due process looks to whether
there is a sufficient justification for the government’s
action
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
(TEST) To successfully invoke the exercise of police
power as the rationale for the enactment of the
Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that
the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require an interference
with private rights, but the means adopted must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It
must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private
rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes of the police measure and the

means employed for its accomplishment, for even
under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the
promotion and protection of the social and moral
values of the community. Granting for the sake of
argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are
within the scope of the City Council’s police powers,
the means employed for the accomplishment thereof
were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit
sexual affairs and as venues to further the illegal
prostitution is of no moment. We lay stress on the acrid
truth that sexual immorality, being a human frailty,
may take place in the most innocent of places
While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral
sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be
punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-
repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or
a naked assumption. If that were so and if that were
allowed, then the Ermita-Malate area would not only be
purged of its supposed social ills, it would be
extinguished of its soul as well as every human
activity, reprehensible or not, in its every nook and
cranny would be laid bare to the estimation of the
authorities.
The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to
address the core issues of morality. Try as the
Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster
the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it
because immorality is not a thing, a building or
establishment; it is in the hearts of men.
Means employed are
constitutionally infirm
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the
Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the
governmental interference itself, infringes on the
constitutional guarantees of a person’s fundamental
right to liberty and property.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined
by Justice Malcolm to include “the right to exist and the
right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude.
The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the
facilities with which he has been endowed by his
Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary
for the common welfare.”
Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may
invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their
bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motel’s
premises. Be it stressed that their consensual sexual
behavior does not contravene any fundamental state
policy as contained in the Constitution. Adults have a
right to choose to forge such relationships with others
in the confines of their own private lives and still retain
their dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by
the Constitution allows persons the right to make this
choice. Their right to liberty under the due process
clause gives them the full right to engage in their
conduct without intervention of the government, as
long as they do not run afoul of the law. Liberty should
be the rule and restraint the exception.
Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means
freedom from unlawful government restraint; it must
include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of
freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning of
all freedoms. t is the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men.
10. DYCAICO VS. SSS
4-MANRESA 2008 6
FACTS: Bonifacio became a member of SSS in 1980
and named Elena and their 8 children as his
beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. He retired in 1989 and began receiving his
SSS pension. He married Elena on January 1997 and
he died on June 19997.
Elena filed for survivor’s pension but said
application was denied on the ground that they were
married after Bonifacio’s retirement. According to the
SSC, it has consistently ruled that entitlement to the
survivor’s pension in one’s capacity as primary
beneficiary is premised on the legitimacy of
relationship with and dependency for support upon the
deceased SSS member during his lifetime.
Section 12-B(d) of RA 8282 provides that the
primary beneficiaries who are entitled to survivor’s
pension are those who qualify as such as of the date of
retirement of the deceased member.
HELD: The proviso infringes the due process clause. In
a pension plan where employee participation is
mandatory, employees have contractual or vested
rights in the pension where the pension is part of the
terms of employment. Where the employee retires
and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a
vested right to benefits that is protected by the due
process clause and retirees enjoy a protected property
interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate
payment under pre-existing law. The mandatory
contributions to the SSS under RA 8282 form part of
the employees’ compensation. The proviso “as of the
date of his retirement” runs afoul of the due process
clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving
spouses whose respective marriages to the
retired SSS members were contracted after the
latter’s retirement of their survivor’s benefits.
There is outright confiscation of benefits due
such surviving spouses without giving them an
opportunity to be heard.
By this outright disqualification, the proviso
qualifying the term “primary beneficiaries” for the
purpose of entitlement to survivor’s pension has
created the presumption that marriages contracted
after the retirement date of SSS members were
entered into for the purpose of securing the benefits
under RA 8282. This presumption, moreover, is
conclusive because the said surviving spouses are not
afforded any opportunity to disprove the presence of
the illicit purpose. The proviso, as it creates this
conclusive presumption, is unconstitutional because it
presumes a fact which is not necessarily or universally
true.
Standards of due process require that the petitioner be
allowed to present evidence to prove that her marriage
to Bonifacio was contracted in good faith and as his
bona fide spouse she is entitled to the survivor’s
pension accruing upon his death. Hence, the proviso
“as of the date of his retirement” in Section 12-B(d)
which deprives the petitioner and those similarly
situated dependent spouses of retired SSS members
this opportunity to be heard must be struck down.
(Jazzie M. Sarona )
11. CARLOS SUPERDRUG VS. DSWD
Facts:
On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A.
No. 7432, was signed into law. Section 4 (a) of the Act
states:
The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount
from all establishments relative to the utilization of
services in hotels and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of
medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or

enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and
burial services for the death of senior citizens;
The establishment may claim the discounts granted
under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on
the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered.
On May 28, 2004, the DSWD approved and adopted
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
9257.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4
(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act on the ground
that: it violates the equal protection clause (Art. III,
Sec. 1) of the Constitution.
Issue: whether the State, in promoting the health and
welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon
private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing
a government program.
Held: The Court believes so.
The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to
maximize the contribution of senior citizens to nation-
building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them
for their improvement and well-being as the State
considers them an integral part of our society.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power
which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object. Accordingly, it has been
described as "the most essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the
great public needs." It is "[t]he power vested in the
legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they
shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as
determined by the legislature, property rights must
bow to the primacy of police power because property
rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to
general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common
good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea
of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and
capital, the questioned provision is invalidated.
Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating
the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in
question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of
the presumption of validity which every law has in its
favor.
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist
that the grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly
oppressive to their business, because petitioners have
not taken time to calculate correctly and come up with
a financial report, so that they have not been able to
show properly whether or not the tax deduction
scheme really works greatly to their disadvantage.
While the Constitution protects property rights,
petitioners must accept the realities of business and
the State, in the exercise of police power, can
intervene in the operations of a business which may
result in an impairment of property rights in the
process.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
MMDA VS. VIRON TRANSPORTATION
[G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007]
4-MANRESA 2008 7
Facts: In 2003 to decongest traffic in the MM, PGMA
issued EO 179 (Providing for the Establishment of
Greater Manila Mass Transport System), which
designated MMDA as the project’s implementing
agency.
To implement the same, MMDA issued a resolution
recognizing the need for the following:
1. To establish common bus parking terminal
areas, and
2. To remove the bus terminals located along
EDSA and other major thoroughfares of MM.
The constitutionality of the EO was questioned on
the ground that it transgresses the possessory rights of
owners and operators of public land transportation
units over their respective terminals.
Issue: Are the means employed appropriate and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose?
Ruling: No; hence, the EO is null and void.
As in Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v.
JAC Liner, Inc., this Court fails to see how the
prohibition against the existence of the bus terminals
can be considered a reasonable necessity to ease
traffic congestion in the metropolis.
On the contrary, the elimination of the bus
terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the
equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the
common parking areas, a case of transference from
one site to another.
In the same case, the SC also noted that bus
terminals per se do not, however, impede or help
impede the flow of traffic. How the outright
proscription against the existence of all terminals can
be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the
traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened.
If terminals lack adequate space such that bus
drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers
on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then
reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could
be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied
those which are unable to meet the specifications.
Hence, the elimination of the terminals does not
satisfy the standards of a valid police power measure.
(Felai Puerto)
GEROCHI VS. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
July 17, 2007
Facts: Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and Rule 18 of its IRR were
alleged as unconstitutional on the ground that the
imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users (of
electricity) is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts
to taxation without representation as the consumers
were not given a chance to be heard and represented.
Issue: Was the law a valid exercise of legislative
power?
Ruling: Yes, it was; hence, Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and its
IRR are valid and constitutional.
The establishment and maintenance of the Special
Trust Fund, under the last paragraph of Section 34,
R.A. No. 9136, is well within the pervasive and non-
waivable power and responsibility of the government
to secure the physical and economic survival and well-
being of the community, that comprehensive sovereign
authority we designate as the police power of the
State.
 4-MANRESA 2008 8
This feature of the Universal Charge further boosts
the position that the same is an exaction imposed
primarily in pursuit of the State's police objectives. The
STF reasonably serves and assures the attainment and
perpetuity of the purposes for which the Universal
Charge is imposed, i.e., to ensure the viability of
the country's electric power industry. (Felai
Puerto)

SECTION 34. Universal Charge. — Within one (1)

year from the effectivity of this Act, a universal charge
to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall
be imposed on all electricity end-users for the following
purposes:

(a) Payment for the stranded debts[4] in excess of

the amount assumed by the National Government and
stranded contract costs of NPC[5] and as well as
qualified stranded contract costs of distribution utilities
resulting from the restructuring of the industry;

(b) Missionary electrification;[6]

(c) The equalization of the taxes and royalties

applied to indigenous or renewable sources of energy
vis-à-vis imported energy fuels;

(d) An environmental charge equivalent to one-fourth

of one centavo per kilowatt-hour (P0.0025/kWh), which
shall accrue to an environmental fund to
be used solely for watershed rehabilitation and
management. Said fund shall be managed by NPC
under existing arrangements; and

(e) A charge to account for all forms of cross-

subsidies for a period not exceeding three (3) years.

The universal charge shall be a non-bypassable charge

which shall be passed on and collected from all end-
users on a monthly basis by the distribution utilities.
Collections by the distribution utilities and the
TRANSCO in any given month shall be remitted to the
PSALM Corp. on or before the fifteenth (15th) of the
succeeding month, net of any amount due to the
distribution utility. Any end-user or self-generating
entity not connected to a distribution utility shall remit
its corresponding universal charge directly to the
TRANSCO. The PSALM Corp., as administrator of the
fund, shall create a Special Trust Fund which shall be
disbursed only for the purposes specified herein in an
open and transparent manner. All amount collected for
the universal charge shall be distributed to the
respective beneficiaries within a reasonable period to
be provided by the ERC.

4. ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL
OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., vs. THE
HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA
Facts:
On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760.
Ordinance No. 4760 has the following provisions:
1. It would require the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of
a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain
from entertaining or accepting any guest or
customer or letting any room or other
quarter to any person or persons without
his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby
open to public view at all times.
2.
3. It also being provided that the premises
and facilities of such hotels, motels and
lodging houses would be open for
inspection either by the City Mayor, or the
Chief of Police, or their duly authorized
representatives.
4. It prohibits a person less than 18 years old
(minor) from being accepted in such hotels,
motels, lodging houses, tavern or common
inn unless accompanied by parents or a
lawful guardian.
5. It makes it unlawful for the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of such establishments to
lease any room or portion thereof more
than twice every 24 hours.
With this, Petitioners who were operators of hotels and
motels filed a petition against respondent assailing the
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 4760.
Issue: W/N Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is
violative of the due process clause.
Ruling: No.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It furnishes though a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. The standard of due process
which exist both as a procedural and as substantive
requisite to free the challenged ordinance or any
governmental action for that matter, from imputation
of legal infirmity, is responsiveness to the supremacy
of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an
ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal
lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious
proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of
authority. It would seem that what should be deemed
unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication
of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an
admitted deterioration of the state of public morals.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the act of
Board of Manila was an exercise of police power for the
said ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. Due to this,
the mantle of protection associated with the due
process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This
particular manifestation of a police power measure
being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is
immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely
on conjecture and unsupported by anything of
substance.
4-MANRESA 2008 9
Also, the prohibition by the ordinance cannot be
considered unreasonable and oppressive because the
petitioners are not prohibited by the said ordinance to
stop their operations. The law simply imposes
restrictions to serve its purpose. It would be different if
the law prohibits the operation of motels and hotels.
(Teen Pague)
5. TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC.,
vs. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND
TRANSPORTATION,
Facts: Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila,
Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of
taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of
Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City
of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to
vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation
Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the
members of TOMMI, each being an operator and
grantee of such certificate of public convenience.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of
Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No.
77-42, providing for the Phasing out and Replacement
of Old and Dilapidated Taxis. Pursuant to this policy,
the Board hereby declares that no car beyond six years
shall be operated as taxi.
On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was
instituted.
Issue: WON the memorandum Circulars did not afford
petitioners procedural and substantive due process,
equal protection of the law, and protection against
arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard.
Held:
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:
It is clear from the provision of Presidential Decree
No. 101 however, that the leeway accorded the Board
gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary
information or data in the formulation of any policy,
plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first
call a conference or require the submission of position
papers or other documents from operators or persons
who may be affected, this being only one of the options
open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary
authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim,
therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due
process.
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance
of the Circulars is neither violative of procedural due
process. As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and
Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307 (1972): It is not essential
to the validity of general rules or regulations
promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or
persons or enterprises, unless the law provides
otherwise."
Petitioners further take the position that fixing the
ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive. As
public respondents contend, however, it is impractical
to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring
evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the
door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible
collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable
standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles
affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six
years supplies that reasonable standard.
On Equal Protection of the Law:
Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question
violates their right to equal protection of the law
because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila
only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At
the outset it should be pointed out that implementation
 4-MANRESA 2008 10
outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in days immediately proceeding every examination day
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. including examination day.

The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially
in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared
to those of other places, are subjected to heavier
traffic pressure and more constant use. Thus is of
common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions
are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction
exists so that infringement of the equal protection
clause can hardly be successfully claimed.
In so far as the non-application of the assailed
Circulars to other transportation services is concerned,
it need only be recalled that the equal protection
clause does not imply that the same treatment be
accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons
identically or similarly situated. It permits of
classification of the object or subject of the law
provided classification is reasonable or based on
substantial distinction, which make for real differences,
and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. What is required under the equal protection
clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that
all persons under identical or similar circumstance
would be accorded the same treatment both in
privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The
challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing
criteria.Bhing doquilla
6. VELASCO VS. VILLEGAS
HELD: Such resolution is unreasonable. The
unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is
caught committing the prohibited acts even without
any ill motives will be barred from taking future
examinations conducted by the respondent PRC.
Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission
can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every
examinee during the three days before the
examination period. Administrative authorities
should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the
issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such
rules and regulations must be reasonable and
fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear
no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they
are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to
be invalid.
PRC has no authority to dictate on the
reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves
for the licensure examinations, as this will infringe n
the examinees’ right to libery.
Such resolution also violates the
academic freedom of the schools concerned.
The enforcement of Resolution No. 105
is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the
licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least
minimized. What is needed to be done by the
respondent is to find out the source of such leakages
and stop it right there. (Jazzie M. Sarona )

‘A city ordinance prohibiting barbershop operators 12. DEPARTMENT VS. SANDIEGO

from rendering massage service to their customers in 13. CORONA VS. UNITED HARBOR
a separate room is a valid exercise of the police
power.’

FACTS: This is an appeal from an order of the

lower court dismissing a suit for declaratory relief
challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance
No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being
that it amounts to a deprivation of property of
petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood
without due process of law.

HELD: Attack against validity cannot succeed.

It is a police power measure. The objectives behind its
enactment are: "(1) To be able to impose payment of
the license fee for engaging in the business of massage
clinic; and, (2) To forestall possible immorality which
might grow out of the construction of separate rooms
for massage of customers.

This Court has been most liberal in sustaining

ordinances based on the general welfare clause. There
is no showing, therefore, of the unconstitutionality of
such ordinance.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court is

affirmed. No costs.

7. BALACUIT VS. CFI

8. DEL ROSARIO VS. BENGZON
9. ERICTA VS. CITY
10. YNOT VS. IAC

11. LUPANGCO VS. CA

FACTS: PRC issued a resolution directing that no

examinee for the CPA Board Exam shall attend any
review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted
by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or
any tip from any school, college or university, or any
review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer,
instructor official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similars institutions during the 3