PEOPLE VS.

DORIA
FACTS: Accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section
21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Members of PNP Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information from two civilian informants (CI) that one “Jun” who was
later identified to be Florencio Doria was engaged in illegal drug activities and decided to entrap and arrest “Jun” in a buy-bust operation.
During the buy-bust operation”Jun” took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit
forthwith arrested “Jun” as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked “Jun” but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon
inquiry, “Jun” revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named “Neneth” (Violeta Gaddao) “Jun” led the police team
to “Neneth’s” house.
The team found the door of “Neneth’s” house open and a woman inside. “Jun” identified the woman as his associate. SPO1
Badua asked “Neneth” about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over “Neneth’s” house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit
noticed a carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box’s flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in
plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier “sold” to him by “Jun.” His suspicion aroused, PO3
Manlangit entered “Neneth’s” house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained 10 bricks of what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants.
Gaddao testified that inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. They asked her about a box on
top of the table. This was the first time she saw the box. The box was closed and tied with a piece of green straw. The men opened the
box and showed her its contents. She said she did not know anything about the box and its contents.
She denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in her person.
The RTC convicted the accused-appellants.
ISSUES:
(1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of accused-appellant Doria;
(2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the
admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom.
RULING:
1. The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as
provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
x x x.”
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he “has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense.” Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is
apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him
even without a warrant.
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of the box of marijuana
and marked bills are different matters.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without such warrant is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant
and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances:(1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a
moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives
his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search and seizure of the box
of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant. It is claimed, however, that the warrants were not
necessary because the arrest was made in “hot pursuit” and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest.
To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances enumerated in Section
5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted.
Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under
Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for
appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in “hot pursuit.” In fact, she was going about her daily chores when
the policemen pounced on her.
Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. “Personal knowledge” of facts
in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon “probable cause” which means an “actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion.” The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers,
the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused. PO3
Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit’s)
query as to where the marked money was. Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but
as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao
conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house, with or without her knowledge,
with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria’s word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that
she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right,
knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.
2. Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her person and home and
the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. This brings us to the
question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even
without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.
The “plain view” doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is
inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot
be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency,
or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is
such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in
plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure.

PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao’s house because they were led there by appellant Doria. The
Narcom agents testified that they had no information on appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria named her and led them to her.
Standing by the door of appellant Gaddao’s house, PO3 Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house. Two and a half meters away
was the dining table and underneath it was a carton box. The box was partially open and revealed something wrapped in plastic.
He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. It was not immediately
apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the
requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been
excluded and never considered by the trial court.
The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana was found in the house of accused-appellant Gaddao does not
justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of proof that the sale took place
between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation of the drug, i.e., the corpus delicti, as evidence in court.The
prosecution has clearly established the fact that in consideration of P1,600.00 which he received, accused-appellant Doria sold and
delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer. The prosecution, however, has failed to
prove that accused-appellant Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug.
1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao is acquitted.
 PEOPLE VS. ELAMPARO
Summary: A buy-bust operation led the pursuing officers of a drug runner into the house of his alleged supplier/dealer. In the house,
they witnessed the alleged dealer repacking bricks of marijuana and arrested him.
Rule of Law: A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person, when in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Facts: Joel Elamparo (D) has been convicted with Illegal Possession of Drugs and penalized with reclusion perpetua. The case
was raised for automatic review.
Police Officer Baldonado of Caloocan City Police received a report from an informant that "some people are selling shabu and
marijuana somewhere in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City." Thus, Baldonado organized a buy-bust team and deployed at a known "market"
for buyers of marijuana. Thereafter, a runner approached the poseur-buyer to confirm an order. The runner then left and returned with
the marijuana. Gaviola, the poseur-buyer and buy-bust team member, then handed over the marked money and arrested the runner
who freed himself and ran.
The buy-bust team pursued the runner, who ran inside a bungalow-type house with steel gate. Having trapped the runner
inside the house, the police officers frisked him and recovered the marked money. The police officers likewise found Joel Elamparo (D)
repacking five bricks of "marijuana" wrapped in a newspaper on top of the round table inside the house. Elamparo (D) was then arrested.
Issues: Is the warrantless arrest valid?
Ruling: Yes. Five generally accepted exceptions to the right against warrantless searches and seizures have been judicially
formulated: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs searches, and (5)
waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.
This case falls squarely under the plain view doctrine. In People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 710-711 (1999), the Court held that—
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even
without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur
(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can
view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully
make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion,
he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery
inadvertent.
When the runner wrenched himself free from the grasp of Gaviola, he instinctively ran towards the house of Elamparo (D). The
members of the buy-bust team were justified in running after him and entering the house without a search warrant for they were
pursuing a fleeing criminal. Once inside the house, the police officers cornered the runner and recovered the buy-bust money from him.
They also caught Elamparo (D) in flagrante delicto repacking the marijuana bricks which were in full view on tap of a table.

PEOPLE VS. HERNANDEZ

ELEMENTS: (of Rebellion, Art134)
1. That there be:
a. Public uprising; and
b. Taking up of arms against the government
2. For the purpose of either:
a. Removing from the allegiance to said government or its laws:
i. The territory of the Philippines, or any part thereof, or
ii. Any body of land, naval or other armed forces; or
b. Depriving the Chief Executive or Congress wholly or partially of any of their powers or prerogatives.
NATURE: petition for bail
FACTS:
 Hernandex et al. (31 defendants), were convicted by the lower courts of rebellion, w/ multiple murder, arsons and robberies
 Organizations they were found to be affiliated w/ (and took part in ‘rebellious’ activities w/): Congress of Labor Organizations
(CLO) w/c is an instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP); Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan (HMB, a.k.a.
Hukbalahaps/Huks)
 Defendants apparently took arms w/ the Huks to make armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary
and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and, as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection
therewith and in furtherance thereof, they also committed then and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder,
arson, and planned destruction of private and public property
  The prosecution maintains that Hernandez is charged with, and has been convicted of, rebellion complexed with murders,
arsons and robberies, for which the capital punishment, it is claimed, may be imposed, although the lower court sentenced
him merely to life imprisonment
 The defense contends, among other things, that rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.
ISSUES:
(1) WoN rebellion can be complexed w/ murder, arson, or robbery
(2) WoN defendants should be granted bail
HELD:
(1) NO. Consider first the following Articles of the RPC:
a. Art 48, RPC:“When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period.”
i. presupposes the commission of 2 or more crimes, does not apply when the culprit is guilty of only one crime
ii. a mere participant in the rebellion, who is not a public officer, should not be placed at a more
disadvantageous position than the promoters, maintainers or leaders of the movement, or the public officers
who join the same, insofar as the application of this article is concerned
b. Art 135; RPC: “…any person, merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.”
i. The penalty is increased to prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000 for “any person who promotes,
maintains or heads a rebellion or insurrection or who, while holding any public office or employment, takes
part therein”: (1) “engaging in war against the forces of the government”, (2) “destroying property”, or (3)
“committing serious violence”, (4) “exacting contributions or” (5) “diverting public funds from the lawful
purpose for which they have been appropriated”.
ii. Whether performed singly or collectively, these 5 classes of acts constitute only one offense, and no more,
and are, altogether, subject to only one penalty — prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000.
Since all of the acts enumerated in Art 135 constitute only ONE offense, Art 48 cannot apply since it presupposes the existence
of TWO. In no occasion has the court ever complexed the crime of rebellion. The rule is that the ingredients of a crime form part and
parcel thereof, and, hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application of Art
48. (court uses several cases to show how this rules is applicable to treason, then says the rule is even more applicable to rebellion,
basically, these violent acts are part of the crime, they are how one commits them, they are inherent to the crime).
Citing Spanish and other foreign cases, the SC states that national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence
overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their
character as “common” offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and,
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a
graver penalty.
Further, if Art 48 were to be used in this case, it would be unfavourable to the culprit, and Art 48 was enacted for the purpose
of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts performed
by him were punished separately. SC also states that simply because one act may constitute two or more offenses, it does not follow
necessarily that a person may be prosecuted for one after conviction for the other, without violating the injunction against double
jeopardy.
(2) YES. Since exclusion from bail in capital offenses is an exception to the otherwise absolute right guaranteed by the constitution,
the natural tendency of the courts has been toward a fair and liberal appreciation of the evidence in the determination of the
degree of proof and presumption of guilt necessary to warrant a deprivation of that right. In the evaluation of the evidence the
probability of flight is one other important factor to be taken into account. The court took into account the ff. things: (1)
Whether it appears that in case of conviction the Defendant’s criminal liability would probably call for a capital punishment
(Answer: no clear showing); and (2) the probablility of flight (Answer: possibility seems remote and nil). Additionally, the
decision appealed from the opposition to the motion in question do not reveal satisfactorily and concrete, positive act of the
accused showing, sufficiently, that his provincial release, during the pendency of the appeal, would jeopardize the security of
the State.
PETITION FOR BAIL GRANTED.
 ENRILE VS. SALAZAR
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement
officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an information signed and
earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R.
Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and
Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the
failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters
on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The
following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody
of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres. 3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was
followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having
been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was
conducted, hence was denied due process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined
the existence of probable cause. 4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990. 5On March 5,
1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been
contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enrile’s co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised
similar questions. Said return urged that the petitioners’ case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it
very simply-the information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the
occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime
(“delito complejo”) arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause
of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime (“delito compuesto”) arising from
a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with
which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of the
same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice,
cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it
was issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that
it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile,
and two 10 against granting bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile’s petition, G.R. No. 92163.
The parties’ oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that
rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed
with common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his
written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of
rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute “common” crimes of grave or less grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course, whether or not
necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the
doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have
withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view
is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution,
saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or
neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that “(w)hen by reason, or on
the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses
upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall
be imposed upon the offender.”‘ 11 In thus acting, the President in effect by legislative fiat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with
the effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its
application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted
as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While
four Members of the Court felt that the proponents’ arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were
not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the
majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at
bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done),
the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000
and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years
of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon
him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating
circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a
penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the words of
Rodriguez Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta
basado francamente en el principio pro reo.’ (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our
Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando
el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represents
la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina
Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty
for the graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts
charged were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit
of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that
prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in
its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties
for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more
crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct
acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more
serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding
doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means
necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner’s guilt or innocence is not here inquired into, much less adjudged.
That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court’s ruling merely provides a take-off point for the disposition of other
questions relevant to the petitioner’s complaints about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense.
Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is
to be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against defendant-appellant Amado V.
Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by
said defendants, as means “necessary” (4) for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the
aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons
and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of
P20,000; and that, in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said
defendant may be allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner’s counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while technically
correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must
therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner
with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The
record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, and that on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors,
culminating in the filing of the questioned information. 14 There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a
respondent an indictment for an offense different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence
developed during the preliminary investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner’s arrest without first personally determining
the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec.
2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal
examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor. 16 Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case
was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the
preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which
to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance
suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court’s reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable
to petitioner’s case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only
the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting
a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner’s right to have provisional
liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was
for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness
of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been
invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner’s premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non-existent crime or,
contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of
remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the
respondent Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the present petition, whether
these went into the substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel
or of the respondent Judge in dealing with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and
should have been brought up there instead of directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability or competence of
the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold
them to be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none,
in short that would justify by passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our
courts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view
that the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter,
denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no
bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor’s recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as
the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged. 19 It is, in any event, incumbent on
the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength
or weakness of the evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a similar situation, all
apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined.
The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this
Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also because to wash the Court’s
hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it has already gone through, the Court now decides the same
on the merits. But in so doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly
progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the relief appealed for was denied
by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas like the present,
that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the
lower courts. What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164)
which is virtually identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles already set
forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in
Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were
taken into custody and detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quintessentially quixotic quality that justifies
the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by
lust for power and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to
stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings,
kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the
military, but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause – and the Court is no exception – that not even the crowded streets of our capital City seem
safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There
is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other
offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity
undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time,
and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this
matter, which is properly within its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information
filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only,
hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court’s earlier grant of bail to petitioners
being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount
of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied
with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

UMIL V. RAMOS
Facts:
 Separate motions before the Court, seeking reconsideration.
 In the Umil case, the arresting officers had good reason to believe that an NPA member (Rolando Dural, although using a
fictitious name) was indeed being treated at St. Agnes Hospital, QC for gunshot wounds. The information was from the
attending doctor and hospital management, and therefore came from reliable sources.
 In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the same admitted that he was an NPA courier.
 In the case of Amelia Roque, subversive documents and live ammunition were found at the time of her arrest, and she admitted
to owning such documents.
 As regards Domingo Anonuevo & Ramon Casiple, agents frisked them and found subversive documents & loaded guns without
permits.
 With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she arrived at a house subject to a search warrant. Ammunition & subversive documents were
found in her car.
 In the Nazareno case, Narciso Nazareno was identified by Ramil Regala as the latter’s companion in killing Romulo Bunye II.
Issue:
 Whether or not Rolando Dural (and other petitioners in the other consolidated cases) was lawfully arrested
Ruling:
 Dural and the other petitioners were lawfully arrested for being members of the New People’s Army (mere membership is
penalized), and for subversion (a continuing offense).
  Subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness &
violence until the objective of overthrowing organized government is attained.
 Likewise, the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who
committed the offense (based on actual facts), coupled with good faith in making the arrest.
 The Court reiterates that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the
arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the validity of the arrests on the compliance with the requirements
of a long existing law; probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers; and that the arrest be on the basis of
actual facts and circumstances.

PEOPLE VS. CABRERA

DOCTRINE Sedition is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state.
(SHORT VERSION) Because of certain incidents, the Philippine constabulary and the Police of Manila had a rough relationship with each
other. The constabulary force had grudges against the Police force of Manila. One night, the constabulary force went to attack the Police
force, killing and wounding several policemen and civilians.

FACTS: The Philippine Constabulary has grudges against the police of Manila and they want to inflict revenge for the following
reasons:
(1) On December 13, 1920, a Manila police arrested a woman who is a member of the household of a constabulary soldier and
was allegedly abused by the said policeman.
(2) Private Macasinag of the Constabulary was shot by a Manila police and was mortally wounded. A day after the incident, a
rumor spread among the Constabulary that the Police who shot Macasinag was back to his original duties while Macasinag was declared
dead. There were also rumors that the said shooting was ordered.
On the night of December 15 some members of the Constabulary escaped their barracks through a window (the saw out the
window bars). They had rifles and ammunitions and were organized in groups under the command of their sergeants and corporals.
They attacked some Manila policemen in these specific instances:
(1) On Calle Real, Intramuros, a group of the Constabulary shot and killed an American Policeman and his friend.
(2) The Constabulary indiscriminately shot at a passer-by, causing a death and wounding most of the passengers.
(3) While riding a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, Captain William E. Wichman (asst. chief of police in Manila) was
shot and killed together with Saplala
ISSUES/HELD
(1) Is there connivance/conspiracy between the accused- YES
(2) Are the accused properly convicted of a violation of the Treason and Sedition Law- YES
RATIO
(1) Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances which vary according to
the purposes to be accomplished. If it be proved that the defendants pursued by their acts the same object, one performing one part
and another another part of the same, so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, one will be justified in the
conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to the effect that object. It is incontestable that all of the defendants were imbued
with the same purpose, which was to avenge themselves on the police force of Manila. A common feeling of resentment animated all.
(2) Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. The Philippine law on the
subject makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force of outside of legal methods
any one of five objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of the
Insular government or of a provincial or municipal government.
The counsel contested that it is necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a public
functioinary, and what really happened was a fight between two armed bodies of the Philippine Government. The court held that this
contention is without foundation. The Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies. What is
important is that there is a public rising to incite or inflict any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent
of the Insular government or of a provincial or municipal government.
DECISION: Judgment affirmed.
 PEOPLE VS. UMALI
Brief: This is an appeal of the decision of the Court of First Instance (RTC) of Quezon province on the conviction of accused
Narciso Umali, Epifanio Pasumbal, and Isidro Capino of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson
and robbery.
Facts:
1. Narciso Umali and Marcial Punzalan were old time friends and belonged to the same political faction. In the general elections
of 1947 Umali campaigned for Punzalan who later was elected Mayor of Tiaong. In the elections of 1949 Punzalan in his turn campaigned
and worked for Narciso Umali resulting in the latter's election as Congressman. However, these friendly relations between the two did
not endure.
2. On the eve of the election, at the house of Pasumbal’s father, then being used as his electoral headquarters, Congressman
Umali instructed Pasumbal to contact the Huks through Commander Abeng so that Punzalan would be killed. Pasumbal complying with
the order of his Chief (Umali) went to the mountains which were quite near the town and held a conference with Commander Abeng.
It would seem that Umali and Pasumbal had a feeling that Punzalan was going to win in the election the next day, and that his death
was the surest way to eliminate him from the electoral fight. Pasumbal reported to Umali that Commander Abeng was agreeable to the
proposition and even outlined the manner of attack.
2. Then the elections of 1951 (November 13) approached and Punzalan ran for re-election. To oppose him, and to clip his
political wings and definitely blast his ambition for continued power and influence in Tiaong, Umali picked Epifanio Pasumbal, his trusted
leader.
3. The result of the elections plainly showed that Punzalan was the political master and leader in Tiaong. He beat Pasumbal by
an overwhelming majority of 2,221 votes.
4. The following day after the elections, after waiting for sometime, Abeng and his troops numbering about fifty, armed with
garlands ans carbines, arrived. Congressman Umali, holding a revolver, was seen in the company of Huk Commander Torio and about
30 armed men. Afterwards, a raid was staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening of November 14,
1951, by armed men. Said raid took place resulted in the burning down and complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial
Punzalan including its content valued at P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of one Mortega, the
death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte
and five civilians; that during and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing one house and two
Chinese stories;
5. Fortunately, however, and apparently unknown to the attackers and those who designed the raid, at six o'clock that morning
of November 14th Punzalan and his Chief of Police had left Tiaong to go to Lucena, the capital, to report the results of the election to
the Governor.
6. As to defendants Pasumbal and Capino, their participation in and responsibility for the raid was duly established and was
witnessed and described by several persons, including policemen who saw Pasumbal and Capino actually taking part in firing at the
house with automatic weapons and hand grenades.
7. As to Umali, his criminal responsibility was also established, though indirectly. Since no one saw him take part in the firing
and attack on the house of Punzalan; nor was he seen near or around said house. Nevertheless, we have the testimony of Amado
Mendoza who heard him instructing Pasumbal to contact Commander Abeng and ask him to raid Tiaong and kill Punzalan.
8. Assuming for a moment as they claim, that the two (Umali and Pasumbal) were not in Tiaong at the commencement of the
raid between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m., and during the whole time the raid lasted, and that they were all that time in the home of Pasumbal
in Taguan, still, according to their own evidence, they were informed by persons coming or fleeing from Tiaong that there was a raid
going on there, and that some houses were burning. As a matter of fact, considering the promixity of Taguan to Tiaong, a distance of
about seven kilometers and the stillness and darkness of the night, the fire and the glow produced by the burning of three houses and
the noise produced by the firing of automatic weapons and the explosion of the hand grenades and bottles of gasoline, could and must
have been seen and heard from Taguan. The natural and logical reaction on the part of Umali and Pasumbal would have been to rush
to Tiaong, see what had really happened and then render help and give succor to the stricken residents, including their own relatives.
This strange act and behaviour of the two men, particularly Umali, all contrary to impulse and natural reaction, and what other
people would ordinarily have done under the circumstances, prompted the trial court in its decision to repeat the old saying "The guilty
man flees even if no one pursues, but the innocent stands bold as a lion.

Issue: Whether or not the defendants-appellants were guilty of the crime of rebellion or sedition.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
RTC:
Defendants-appellants were found guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and
robbery, and sentencing each of them to "life imprisonment, other accessories of the law, to indemnify jointly and severally Marcial
Punzalan in the amount of P24,023; Valentin Robles in the amount of P10,000; Yao Cabon in the amount of P700; Claro Robles in the
amount of P12,800; Pocho Guan in the amount of P600; the heirs of Domingo Pisigan in the amount of P6,000; the heirs of Locadio
Untalan in the amount of P6,000; Patrolman Pedro Lacorte in the amount of P500; Lazaro Ortega in the amount of P300; Hilarion Aselo
in the amount of P300; Calixto Rivano in the amount P50; Melecio Garcia in the amount of P60; and Juanito Lector in the amount of
P90, each to pay one fifteenth of the costs, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency due to the nature of the principal
penalty that is imposed upon them
SC:
The decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED with some modification:
The crimes committed are, therefore, those of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
We are convinced that the principal and main, though not necessarily the most serious, crime committed here was not rebellion
but rather that of sedition. The purpose of the raid and the act of the raiders in rising publicly and taking up arms was not exactly against
the Government and for the purpose of doing the things defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal code under rebellion. The raiders
did not even attack the Presidencia, the seat of local Government. Rather, the object was to attain by means of force, intimidation, etc.
one object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public official, namely, Punzalan was then Mayor of
Tiaong. Under Article 139 of the same Code this was sufficient to constitute sedition.
As regards the crime of robbery with which appellants were charged and of which they were convicted, we are also of the
opinion that it was not one of the purposes of the raid, which was mainly to kidnap or kill Punzalan and destroy his house. The robberies
were actually committed by only some of the raiders, presumably dissidents, as an afterthought, because of the opportunity offered by
the confusion and disorder. For these robberies, only those who actually took part therein are responsible, and not the three appellants
herein.
With respect to the crime of multiple frustrated murder, while the assault upon policeman Pedro Lacorte with a hand grenade
causing him injuries resulting in his blindness in one eye, may be regarded as frustrated murder; the wounding of Ortega, Anselo, Rivano,
Garcia and Lector should be considered as mere physical injuries.
The murders may not be qualified by evident premeditation because the premedition was for the killing of Punzalan. The killing
may, however, be qualified by treachery, the raiders using firearms against which the victims were defenseless, with the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
Appellants were charged with and convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson
and robbery. Is there such a complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, etc?
Considering that, assuming for the moment that there is no such complex crime of rebellion with murder, etc., and that
consequently appellants could not have been legally charged with, much less convicted of said complex crime, and the information
should therefore, be regarded as having charged more than one offense, contrary to Rule 106, section 12 and Rule 113, section 2 (e),
of the Rules of Court, but that appellants having interposed no objection thereto, they were properly tried for and lawfully convicted if
guilty of the several, separate crimes charged therein, we have decided and we rule that the appellants may properly be convicted of said
several and separate crimes, as hereinafter specified. We feel particularly supported and justified in this stand that we take, by the result
of the case, namely, that the prison sentence we impose does not exceed, except perhaps in actual duration, that meted out by the
Court below, which is life imprisonment.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
In conclusion, we find appellants guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries. For the crime
of sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of prision correctional and to pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the three
murders, each of the appellants is sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum of P6,000; and
for the arson, for which we impose the maximum penalty provided in Article 321, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason
that the raiders in setting fire to the buildings, particularly the house of Punzalan they knew that it was then occupied by one or more
persons, because they even and actually saw an old lady, the mother of Punzalan, at the window, and in view of the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, each of the appellants is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the indemnities mentioned in the
decision of the lower court. It shall be understood, however, the pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code the
duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In view of the heavy penalties already imposed and their long duration, we find it
unnecessary to fix and impose the prison sentences corresponding to frustrated murder and physical injuries; however, the sums
awarded the victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by the court below will stand. With these modifications, the
decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.