[AC-5365.

April 27, 2005]

Spouses FRANKLIN and LOURDES OLBES, complainants, vs. Atty. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Constituting a serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility was the malevolent act of
respondent, who filled up the blank checks entrusted to him as security for a loan by writing on those checks amounts
that had not been agreed upon at all, despite his full knowledge that the loan they were meant to secure had already
been paid.

The Case
Before us is a verified Petition[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre, filed by Spouses Franklin and
Lourdes Olbes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. Petitioners charged respondent with willful and
deliberate acts of dishonesty, falsification and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. After he had filed his
Comment[2] on the Petition, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay, held several hearings. During
those hearings, the last of which was held on May 12, 2003,[3] the parties were able to present their respective witnesses
and documentary evidence. After the filing of the parties respective formal offers of evidence, as well as petitioners
Memorandum,[4] the case was considered submitted for resolution. Subsequently, the commissioner rendered his Report and
Recommendation dated January 30, 2004, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution No. XV-2003-177 dated July 30, 2004.

The Facts
In their Petition, Spouses Olbes allege that they were government employees working at the Central Post Office,
Manila; and that Franklin was a letter carrier receiving a monthly salary of P6,700, and Lourdes, a mail sorter, P6,000.[5]
Through respondent, Lourdes renewed on July 1, 1999 her application for a loan from Rodela Loans, Inc., in the
amount of P10,000. As security for the loan, she issued and delivered to respondent five Philippine National Bank (PNB)
blank checks (Nos. 0046241-45), which served as collateral for the approved loan as well as any other loans that might
be obtained in the future.[6]
On August 31, 1999, Lourdes paid respondent the amount of P14,874.37 corresponding to the loan plus surcharges,
penalties and interests, for which the latter issued a receipt,[7] herein quoted as follows:
August 31, 1999
Received the amount of P14,874.37 as payment of the loan of P10,000.00 taken earlier by Lourdes Olbes.

(Sgd.) Atty. Victor V. Deciembre

8-31-99
P10,000.00
PNB Check No. 46241 8/15/99[8]
Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four (of the five) blank PNB Checks (Nos.
0046241, 0046242, 0046243 and 0046244) for the amount of P50,000 each, with different dates of maturity -- August
15, 1999, August 20, 1999, October 15, 1999 and November 15, 1999, respectively.[9]
 On October 19, 1999, respondent filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal an Affidavit-Complaint
against petitioners for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22. He alleged therein that on July 15, 1999, around
one-thirty in the afternoon at Cainta, Rizal, they personally approached him and requested that he immediately
exchange with cash their postdated PNB Check Nos. 0046241 and 0046242 totaling P100,000.[10]
Several months after, or on January 20, 2000, respondent filed against petitioners another Affidavit-Complaint for
estafa and violation of BP 22. He stated, among others, that on the same day, July 15, 1999, around two oclock in the
afternoon at Quezon City, they again approached him and requested that he exchange with cash PNB Check Nos.
0046243 and 0046244 totaling P100,000.[11]
Petitioners insisted that on the afternoon of July 15, 1999, they never went either to Cainta, Rizal, or to Quezon City
to transact business with respondent. Allegedly, they were in their office at the time, as shown by their Daily Time
Records; so it would have been physically impossible for them to transact business in Cainta, Rizal, and, after an interval
of only thirty minutes, in Quezon City, especially considering the heavy traffic conditions in those places.[12]
Petitioners averred that many of their office mates -- among them, Juanita Manaois, Honorata Acosta and Eugenia
Mendoza -- had suffered the same fate in their dealings with respondent.[13]
In his Comment,[14] respondent denied petitioners claims, which he called baseless and devoid of any truth and
merit. Allegedly, petitioners were the ones who had deceived him by not honoring their commitment regarding their
July 15, 1999 transactions. Those transactions, totaling P200,000, had allegedly been covered by their four PNB checks
that were, however, subsequently dishonored due to ACCOUNT CLOSED. Thus, he filed criminal cases against them. He
claimed that the checks had already been fully filled up when petitioners signed them in his presence. He further
claimed that he had given them the amounts of money indicated in the checks, because his previous satisfactory
transactions with them convinced him that they had the capacity to pay.
Moreover, respondent said that the loans were his private and personal transactions, which were not in any way
connected with his profession as a lawyer. The criminal cases against petitioners were allegedly private actions intended
to vindicate his rights against their deception and violation of their obligations. He maintained that his right to litigate
should not be curtailed by this administrative action.

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The commissioner said that respondents version of the facts was not credible. Commissioner Dulay rendered the
following analysis and evaluation of the evidence presented:

In his affidavit-complaint x x x executed to support his complaint filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal
respondent stated that:

2. That last July 15, 1999, in the jurisdiction of Cainta, Rizal, both LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x,
personally met and requested me to immediately exchange with cash, right there and then, their postdated checks
totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their business venture.

Again in his affidavit-complaint executed to support his complaint filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City respondent stated that:

2. That last July 15, 1999, at around 2PM, in the jurisdiction of Quezon City, M.M., both LOURDES E. OLBES and
FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to immediately exchange with cash, right there and then,
their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their business venture.
The above statements executed by respondent under oath are in direct contrast to his testimony before this
Commission on cross-examination during the May 12, 2003 hearing, thus:
ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing)
Q. Based on these four (4) checks which you claimed the complainant issued to you, you filed two separate
criminal cases against them, one, in Pasig City and the other in Quezon City, is that correct?
A. Yes, Your Honor, because the checks were deposited at different banks.
Q. These four checks were accordingly issued to you by the complainants on July 15, 1999, is that correct?
A. I will consult my records, You Honor, because its quite a long time. Yes, Your Honor, the first two checks is in
the morning and the next two checks is in the afternoon (sic).
COMM. DULAY:
Which are the first two checks?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
The first two checks covering check Nos. 46241 and 46242 in the morning. And Check No. 46243 and 46244
in the afternoon, Your Honor.
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Q. Could you recall what particular time in the morning that these two checks with number 0046241 and
0046242 xxx have been issued to you?
A. I could not remember exactly but in the middle part of the morning around 9:30 to 10:00.
Q. This was issued to you in what particular place?
A. Here in my office at Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.
Q. Is that your house?
A. No, its not my house?
Q. What is that, is that your law office?
A. That is my retainer client.
Q. What is the name of that retainer client of yours?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
Your Honor, may I object because what is the materiality of the question?
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
That is very material. I am trying to test your credibility because according to you these checks have been
issued in Pasig in the place of your client on a retainer. Thats why I am asking your client
COMM. DULAY:
The name of the client is not material I think. It is enough that he said it was issued here in Pasig. What
building?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor.
COMM. DULAY:
What is the materiality of knowing the name of his clients office?
 ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Because, Your Honor, the materiality is to find out whether he is telling the truth. The place, Your Honor,
according to the respondent is his client. Now I am asking who is that client?
COMM. DULAY:
Your answer.
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
A. It is AIC Realty Corporation at AIC Building.
Q. And the same date likewise, the complainants in the afternoon issued PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and
0046244, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So would you want to tell this Honorable office that there were four checks issued in the place of your client
in Pasig City, two in the morning and two in the afternoon?
A. That is correct, sir.

Respondent was clearly not being truthful in his narration of the transaction with the complainants. As between his
version as to when the four checks were given, we find the story of complainant[s] more credible. Respondent has
blatantly distorted the truth, insofar as the place where the transaction involving the four checks took place. Such
distortion on a very material fact would seriously cast doubt on his version of the transaction with complainants.

Furthermore respondents statements as to the time when the transactions took place are also obviously and glaringly
inconsistent and contradicts the written statements made before the public prosecutors. Thus further adding to the lack
of credibility of respondents version of the transaction.

Complainants version that they issued blank checks to respondent as security for the payment of a loan of P10,000.00
plus interest, and that respondent filled up the checks in amounts not agreed upon appears to be more credible.
Complainants herein are mere employees of the Central Post Office in Manila who had a previous loan of P10,000.00
from respondent and which has since been paid x x x. Respondent does not deny the said transaction. This appears to be
the only previous transaction between the parties. In fact, complainants were even late in paying the loan when it fell
due such that they had to pay interest. That respondent would trust them once more by giving them
another P200,000.00 allegedly to be used for a business and immediately release the amounts under the circumstances
described by respondent does not appear credible given the background of the previous transaction and personal
circumstances of complainants. That respondent who is a lawyer would not even bother to ask from complainants a
receipt for the money he has given, nor bother to verify and ask them what businesses they would use the money for
contributes further to the lack of credibility of respondents version. These circumstances really cast doubt as to the
version of respondent with regard to the transaction. The resolution of the public prosecutors notwithstanding we
believe respondent is clearly lacking in honesty in dealing with the complainants. Complainant Franklin Olbes had to be
jailed as a result of respondents filing of the criminal cases. Parenthetically, we note that respondent has also filed
similar cases against the co-employees of complainants in the Central Post Office and respondent is facing similar
complaints in the IBP for his actions.[15]

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of Commissioner Dulay, as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of
Governors. However, the penalty should be more severe than what the IBP recommended.

Respondents Administrative Liability

 Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions.[16] It is bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character.[17] A lawyer is an oath-
bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose
primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he [or she] has sworn to be a fearless
crusader.[18]
By taking the lawyers oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable
instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice.[19] Lawyers should act and comport themselves with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the publics faith in the legal profession.[20]
The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following:

Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.
xxxxxxxxx

Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of
the Integrated Bar.
xxxxxxxxx

Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected and required of members of the bar.[21] Such conduct of
nobility and uprightness should remain with them, whether in their public or in their private lives. As officers of the
courts and keepers of the publics faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and are thus
mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor.[22]
The oath that lawyers swear to likewise impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good
faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with others. The oath is a sacred trust that must be upheld and kept
inviolable at all times. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their private
capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court.[23]
In the present case, the IBP commissioner gave credence to the story of petitioners, who said that they had given
five blank personal checks to respondent at the Central Post Office in Manila as security for the P10,000 loan they had
contracted. Found untrue and unbelievable was respondents assertion that they had filled up the checks and exchanged
these with his cash at Quezon City and Cainta, Rizal. After a careful review of the records, we find no reason to deviate
from these findings.
Under the circumstances, there is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion.
Respondent does not deny the P10,000 loan obtained from him by petitioners. According to Franklin Olbes testimony on
cross-examination, they asked respondent for the blank checks after the loan had been paid. On the pretext that he was
not able to bring the checks with him,[24] he was not able to return them. He thus committed abominable dishonesty by
abusing the confidence reposed in him by petitioners. It was their high regard for him as a member of the bar that made
them trust him with their blank checks.[25]
It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act
of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite respondents full
knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of
falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain.
And he did not stop there. Because the checks were dishonored upon presentment, respondent had the temerity to
initiate unfounded criminal suits against petitioners, thereby exhibiting his vile intent to have them punished and
deprived of liberty for frustrating the criminal duplicity he had wanted to foist on them. As a matter of fact, one of the
petitioners (Franklin) was detained for three months[26] because of the Complaints. Respondent is clearly guilty of
serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. He committed an act indicative of moral depravity not expected from,
and highly unbecoming, a member of the bar.
Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. It is equally
essential to observe this norm meticulously during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the
privilege.[27] Good moral character includes at least common honesty.[28] No moral qualification for bar membership is
more important than truthfulness and candor.[29] The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and
condemns duplicitous behavior.[30] Lawyers must be ministers of truth. Hence, they must not mislead the court or allow
it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.[31]
Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and
dishonorable;[32] they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct that
merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws.[33]
Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP
of suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and
misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is
loathsome.
In Eustaquio v. Rimorin,[34] the forging of a special power of attorney (SPA) by the respondent to make it appear that
he was authorized to sell anothers property, as well as his fraudulent and malicious inducement of Alicia Rubis to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement to give a semblance of legality to the SPA, were sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law for five years. Here, the conduct of herein respondent is even worse. He used falsified checks as bases for
maliciously indicting petitioners and thereby caused the detention of one of them.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED from the practice of law effective
immediately. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is
directed to append a copy to respondents personal record. Let another copy be furnished the National Office of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 2841 July 3, 2002

RE: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 44 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH IV, TAGBILARAN CITY, AGAINST ATTY.
SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA.

PER CURIAM:

"Membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order. A lawyer is an oath-bound
servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty
is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader."1 These were the
eloquent words of the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro in exalting the sacred and honorable legal profession. But he
laments the pathetic and deplorable fact that, "many a law practitioner, forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public
servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy
and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality
in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice, a mercenary purveying
the benefits of his enlightened advocacy in direct proportion to a litigant's financial posture instead of a faithful friend of
the courts in the dispensation of equal justice to rich and poor alike."2 Here, Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, as later shown by
his disgraceful and outrageous conduct, is one such lawyer who has become an apostate to his exalted position as an
officer of the court. He thus deserves to be weeded out from the legal profession to protect its sanctity and nobility.

This administrative case stemmed from the settlement of the estate of testator William C. Ogan which has since been
pending in the Court of First Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tagbilaran City, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 423. In 1976, Judge Fernando S. Ruiz took over the case from Judge Paulino S. Marquez who, in turn,
inherited it from Judge Antonio Beldia. Noting that the proceedings have been pending for thirteen (13) years, Judge
Ruiz then inquired into the principal causes of the delay. He found out, as will be shown later in detail, that Atty. Samuel
C. Occeña caused the delay by disobeying lawful court orders and by willfully prolonging the litigation through his
various maneuvers, in gross violation of his oath as a lawyer that he will not willingly sue any groundless, false, or
unlawful suit, or delay any man's cause for money or malice.

Going back to Special Proceedings No. 423, under the terms of the Last Will and Testament of the late William C. Ogan,
his residuary estate was divided among his seven children. One of them, Necitas Ogan-Occeña, was named in the will as
executrix of the estate. As such, she retained her husband, Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, as her lawyer.

The estate consists of bank deposits, securities (both here and in the United States of America), and real estate in Cebu
City and in Ohio, U.S.A. The deceased left no debt. Thus, the settlement of the estate should have been simple and
speedy. However, since the death of the testator on February 1, 1963, the settlement of his estate has not yet been
terminated owing largely to the dilatory tactics of Atty. Occeña.

Looking into the causes of the delay, Judge Ruiz learned that the executrix, Necitas Ogan-Occeña, filed a project of
partition on August 4, 1967. On September 22, 1967, the probate court approved the project except certain portions.
The executrix then interposed an appeal. In view of the delay caused by the pendency of the appeal, the other heirs filed
several motions praying that the estate's remaining P250,000.00 cash as well as its shares of stocks in the Philippines
and in the United States be distributed among all the heirs. The executrix, through her husband Atty. Occeña,
vehemently opposed the motions, asserting that the P250,000.00 cash had already been earmarked for her husband's
attorney's fee and other expenses, and that the shares of stocks could not be distributed among the heirs because the
stock certificates were not in her possession. The dispute between the executrix, on the one hand, and the other heirs,
on the other, which delayed the proceedings, centered mainly on the P250,000.00 cash and the shares of stocks.

Records also show that the executrix, through Atty. Occeña, interposed numerous appeals from the orders of the
probate court. For their part, the heirs repeatedly prayed in their motions for the release of the shares of stocks and the
remaining cash. But the executrix and Atty. Occeña opposed the same, thus prolonging the proceedings. In CA-GR No.
48716-R (December, 1974), the Court of Appeals, in remanding the case to the probate court, had this to say:

"It is, however, earnestly hoped, and the parties are urged, to settle their differences with the view to closing
the estate which has been pending since 1963. The executrix, the heirs, and the lawyers, are reminded that the
prolongation of administrative proceedings can only benefit the executor or administrator or the counsels for
the contending parties. It always results in the diminution of the share of each of the heirs because the estate is
burdened with the expenses of the administration proceedings, the heir must have to pay attorney's fee and the
longer the proceedings the bigger the attorney's fee."3

Obviously, the main causes of the delay in the probate proceedings were Atty. Occeña's claim for attorney's fee in the
amount of P250,000.00 and the executrix's refusal, through her husband, to account for the shares of stocks belonging
to the estate which, according to her, were not in her possession. The other heirs could not accept that explanation
because as executrix, she was charged with the responsibility of collecting all the assets of the estate.

Thus, on August 8, 1977, Judge Ruiz issued an order directing the executrix to comment why the securities were not in
her possession. She filed her comment, through her husband, that some Philippine and American securities were not in
her possession. To determine which securities were in her possession, Judge Ruiz on October 22, 1977, issued an order
requiring her to submit within 30 days the latest inventory of all the securities of the estate. However, she failed to
comply with the order. Judge Ruiz then issued another order on February 6, 1978, "directing her to take possession of all
certificates of stocks or their replacements belonging to the estate and to make an up-to-date inventory thereof with a
statement of their nature and their value." Again, she did not comply with the order.

Determined to block the release of the P250,000.00 to the heirs, the executrix, through Atty. Occeña, appealed the
numerous interlocutory orders of the probate court to the Court of Appeals, hence, adding to the delay. Because of the
propensity of the executrix, through Atty. Occeña, to elevate interlocutory orders to the Court of Appeals, Judge Ruiz
issued an order on June 16, 1978 directing her to "refrain from instituting any action or proceeding without first
informing the court." The executrix and her husband disobeyed this order. In fact, he filed six cases with the Court of
Appeals and one with this Court.

On August 15, 1979, Judge Ruiz issued an order authorizing Nancy Ogan-Gibson, one of the heirs, to go to Vinton
County, Ohio, U.S.A., to take proper action on the five parcels of land owned by the estate and to submit a report to the
probate court. To provide money for the purpose, the court ordered the executrix to release to Nancy Ogan-Gibson the
sum of $1,000.00 from the estate fund, the same to be liquidated with supporting receipts upon her submission of her
report on or before September 30, 1979. The executrix assailed the order before the Court of Appeals in a petition for
prohibition and certiorari, docketed therein as CA-G. R. No. SP-10326. Dismissing the petition on January 13, 1981 for
lack of merit, the Court of Appeals said:

"Indeed it is surprising why petitioner as executrix should oppose such an order of the court which is and would
be for the benefit of the estate and the heirs. All the other heirs completely agreed with what the trial court did.
xxx

"Thus, rather than accuse respondent judge of grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned orders he
should be complimented in finding ways and means of promptly and expeditiously determining the assets of the
estate to be ultimately distributed among the heirs."

On May 12, 1981, Judge Ruiz cited the executrix for contempt of court for her failure to obey the orders of October 22,
1977, December 8, 1977, February 6, 1978 and October 16, 1979 and directed her to report to the court which securities
were and were not in her possession and to give the reason therefor.

On February 11, 1982, the executrix and Atty. Occeña were held in contempt of court and fined P250.00 each for
disobeying the court order of August 15, 1979 requiring the executrix to release $1,000.00 to Nancy Ogan-Gibson. Both
were given the chance to explain their failure to comply with the order, but they did not submit any explanation. On
January 13, 1981, this order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. SP-10326. It bears emphasis that this
incident delayed the proceedings for four (4) years.

On October 16, 1979, the probate court issued an order requiring the executrix to distribute immediately among the
heirs all the shares of stocks of the estate in the Batangas-Laguna Transportation Co., the Masonic Hall, Inc. and the
Motor Service Co.; to report her compliance within 10 days from notice; and within the same period, to file a written
report to the court stating (a) what other certificates of stocks belonging to the estate are in her possession; and (b)
which certificates of stocks are not with her, giving the reasons therefor. Again, the executrix and her husband, Atty.
Occeña, did not comply with the said order. The probate court thus ordered her to explain why she should not be
punished for contempt of court. After several postponements at her instance and that of her husband, the incident was
set for hearing on April 20, 1981. But neither of them appeared, thus delaying the proceedings for about a year and a
half. Finding the executrix unfaithful in the performance of her duties, the probate court, on May 12, 1981, adjudged her
in contempt of court.

Forthwith, Atty. Occeña and his wife, filed with the then CFI of Davao City, Civil Case No. 14456 for damages
(P200,000.00 as moral damages and expenses of litigation) against Judge Ruiz. But, on October 13, 1981, the court
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
After the dismissal of Civil Case No. 14456, Atty. Occeña filed with the Tanodbayan a letter-complaint against Judge Ruiz,
charging him with knowingly rendering unjust interlocutory orders, in that without prior notice and hearing, he punished
the executrix for indirect contempt of court and censured her for non-compliance with the probate court's order of
October 16, 1979. For lack of merit, Atty. Occeña's complaint was dismissed by then Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez
in a Resolution dated November 19, 1984.

On November 13, 1979, Atty. Occeña filed with this Court Administrative Case No. 2345-CFI against Judge Ruiz for gross
inefficiency and dishonesty. In a Resolution dated October 11, 1982, this Court dismissed the complaint for failure of
Atty. Occeña to substantiate his charges during the investigation.

Unhappy with what Judge Ruiz stated in his comment on the said administrative complaint, Atty. Occeña and his wife
filed with the CFI of Davao City Civil Case NO. 14957 for damages against the former. The couple alleged that they
suffered damages upon reading the judge's comment filed with the Supreme Court. On June 11, 1982, the CFI dismissed
the complaint for lack of cause of action, the comment being an absolutely privileged communication.

By filing the said civil actions, criminal charge, and administrative complaints, found to be groundless, Atty. Occeña
further delayed with malice the probate proceedings and inflicted hardship and pain upon Judge Ruiz.

More telling is the fact that by deliberately delaying the proceedings, Atty. Occeña has inflicted greater harm to the
other heirs, with the executrix herself as his willing partner.

From the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13 petitions were filed with this Court and the Court of
Appeals by Atty. Occeña, questioning the interlocutory orders of the probate court. But most, if not all, were without
merit.

Aside from Judge Ruiz, his predecessor, the late Judge Antonio Beldia, in the same probate proceedings, was also
harassed by Atty. Occeña with groundless administrative charges and suits, both criminal and civil. These cases, while
pending, were then utilized by Atty. Occeña in securing restraining orders from the Court of Appeals or as grounds for
the judge's inhibition.

Pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court providing inter alia that the CFI may suspend an attorney
from the practice of law for cause, Judge Ruiz, on May 26, 1982, filed with the same probate court Administrative Case
No. 44 charging Atty. Occeña with gross misconduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer and willful disobedience of lawful
court orders. Instead of filing an answer, he submitted a motion praying for the inhibition of Judge Ruiz. This motion was
denied. Atty. Occeña was then directed to file his answer within 15 days from notice which was extended to another 15
days upon his motion. Still, he did not file an answer. What he submitted was a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction. But it was denied for lack of merit.

Administrative Case No. 44 was set for hearing on December 2 and 3, 1982, morning and afternoon. Upon Atty. Occeña's
motion, he was given an extension of 15 days from November 3, 1982 within which to file his answer. However, he did
not comply. Neither did he appear during the hearing.

Eventually, further hearing of the case was suspended when this Court issued a temporary restraining order in G. R. No.
62453, "Samuel Occeña vs. District Judge Fernando S. Ruiz, CFI-4, Bohol" for prohibition. However, on August 15, 1983,
this Court dismissed Atty. Occeña's petition for lack of merit. The hearing of the administrative case was set on January
30 and 31, 1984, but again, he did not appear.

The hearing was reset but once more, Atty. Occeña failed to appear. Upon his telegraphic request, the hearing was reset
on December 13 and 14, 1984. On December 7, 1984, he filed his Answer and Motion for Referral to the Solicitor
General or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. His motion was denied. The hearing was reset on May 8 and 9, 1985.
Upon another telegraphic request of Atty. Occeña, the hearing was postponed to August 14 and 15, 1985. Again, he did
not appear. Thus, in its order of August 15, 1985, the probate court considered his failure to appear as a waiver of his
right to present evidence.4

On November 14, 1985, based on the evidence presented ex parte, showing that Atty. Occeña has "abused, misused and
overused the judicial system,"5 Judge Ruiz rendered a decision suspending6 him from the practice of law for three (3)
years. The decision7 unfolded a long list of his administrative offenses, thus:

Willful disobedience of lawful orders of the court; gross misconduct in office

During the probate proceedings, respondent Occeña, on behalf of his wife executrix, filed with the Court of Appeals six
(6) cases; and with the Supreme Court one (1) case, assailing the order of the probate court directing the said executrix
to provide Nancy Ogan, authorized to determine the assets of the estate in the U.S., $1,000.00 to be taken from the
estate; and the order ordering the same executrix to report to the probate court the securities belonging to the estate.
Atty. Occeña's refusal to obey the said orders and elevating the same to the higher courts unnecessarily delayed the
probate proceedings.

II

Wittingly or willingly promoted or sued groundless suits and gave aid or consent to the same; delayed persons for
money or malice

Respondent, together with his wife, filed against the judge of the probate court two actions for damages which were
both dismissed for lack of merit and lack of cause of action. Respondent also filed with the Tanodbayan a letter-
complaint charging the judge of the probate court with knowingly rendering unjust interlocutory orders. The complaint
was likewise dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent also filed with this Court an administrative complaint which was
again dismissed for failure of respondent to substantiate the charge.

By filing the above-cited civil actions for damages, administrative complaint and criminal charge which were found to be
groundless and unsubstantiated, respondent unduly delayed the settlement of the estate proceedings by harassing
Judge Ruiz who had to spend time, effort and money to defend himself against said frivolous and unmeritorious cases.

In fact, respondent's propensity to file groundless administrative charges, as well as civil and criminal suits, harassed not
only Judge Ruiz but also the previous judges who handled the case. As a measure of self defense, these judges were
compelled to prepare and file pleadings or comments thereby using time which could have been devoted to expediting
the closure of the estate proceedings.

Finally, since the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13 petitions were filed with the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals questioning the interlocutory orders of the probate court. Most, if not all of these petitions,
were determined to be groundless and without merit.

III

Disobeying the laws

Respondent violated his lawyer's oath of office by flagrantly disobeying the clear provision of Rule 140, Section 6,
Revised Rules of Court, entitled "Charges Against Judges of First Instance," which reads as follows:

"Sec. 6. Confidential – Proceedings against judges of first instance shall be private and confidential."
During the pendency of the administrative complaint (Adm. Matter No. 23345-CFI, Exh. "Z") filed by respondent against
Judge Ruiz in the Supreme Court, he violated the private and confidential nature thereof three (3) times, to wit:

1. On April 1, 1980, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and certiorari, entitled "Estate
of William C. Ogan, et al. vs. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R. No. SP-10604", questioning an interlocutory order of
the probate court (No. 2, Exh. "V") to which he attached as Annex "AW" a complete copy of his aforesaid administrative
complaint against Judge Ruiz albeit the same is completely immaterial to the issue raised in said petition.

2. In another petition for prohibition and certiorari, entitled "Estate of William C. Ogan, et al. vs. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz,
et al., CA-G.R. No. SP-13162" (No. 4, Exh. "V"), impugning an interlocutory order of the probate court, he attached as
Annex "C" thereof a true and complete copy of the said administrative complaint although not relevant to the question
therein raised; and

3. On March 29, 1982, when respondent filed a letter-criminal complaint with the Tanodbayan (Exh. "Y"), he also
attached as Annex "A" thereof a true and complete copy of said administrative complaint against Judge Ruiz even if said
administrative complaint is not germane to the charge (Page 2, No. 1, Exh. "Y").

By repeatedly violating said provision of the Rules of Court, respondent, as an officer of the court, put to naught one of
the principal purposes thereof which is to protect the personal and professional reputation of judges from the baseless
charges of disgruntled, vindictive and irresponsible clients, litigants and counsels (In re Abistado, 57 Phil. 668; Murillo vs.
Superable, Adm. Case No. 341, March 23, 1960; Moran, Rules of Court, 1963 Ed., Vol. VI, page 260). Respondent
committed gross misconduct in office and has not conducted himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge
and discretion.

IV

Did falsehood and consented to the doing of same in court.

In his complaint for damages against Judge Ruiz (Civil Case No. 14456 (Exh. "W"), respondent alleged in paragraph IV-7b
thereof (Exh. "W-1") that his wife-executrix Necitas Ogan Occeña was held in contempt and censured, "without any
hearing," for not obeying the probate court's order of October 16, 1979 (Exh. "N").

However, the records of the Ogan estate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 423) would show that in the order of February 26,
1980, the probate court directed said executrix to explain within 5 days from notice why she should not be cited for
contempt (Exh. "O"). In the order of April 8, 1980, the contempt charge was set for hearing on June 23, 1980, at 9:00
o'clock in the morning (Exh. "P") but was reset to October 22, 1980 after the lifting of the restraining order of the Court
of Appeals (Exh. "Q"). This was again reset to April 20, 1981, subsequent to the denial by the Supreme Court of the
respondent's petition for review impugning the Court of Appeals' decision. As stated in the order of May 12, 1981, page
2, paragraph 3 (Exh. "R"), copies of the order setting the hearing of the contempt charge on said date (April 20, 1981)
were received by the respondent and his wife-executrix on March 24, 1981. On the date of the hearing, neither the
executrix nor respondent appeared. The following day (April 21, 1981), the court received executrix's motion for
postponement of the hearing, which was denied for lack of merit. Subsequently, the order of May 12, 1981 (Exh. "R")
was rendered holding the executrix in contempt and penalized with censure.

In fine, there was hearing with notice but the executrix and her counsel did not attend.

Meanwhile, respondent once more, committed falsehood when he subsequently alleged under oath in his letter-
complaint to the Tanodbayan, dated March 29, 1982, against Judge Ruiz (Exh. "Y") that "without prior notice and
without any hearing," Judge Ruiz adjudged executrix Necitas Ogan Occeña guilty of contempt and censuring her (page 2,
paragraph 2, Exh. "Y-2"; page 5, paragraph 9b, Exh. "Y-3").
Furthermore, in order to avoid complying with the probate court order of August 15, 1979 (Exh. "C"), directing said
executrix to remit immediately the sum of $1,000.00 to her co-heir Nancy Ogan-Gibson with which to meet whatever
necessary expenses that she might incur in inquiring into the status of the 5 parcels of land owned by the estate at
Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A., respondent and his wife-executrix committed falsehood when they stated in their petition
filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-10326 that the said order was issued "without hearing" and thus a
violation of procedural due process. The Court of Appeals, in its decision which has become final (Exh. "E"), confirmed
this falsehood when it held that the petitioner-executrix "was not deprived of her right to be heard when the
respondent judge issued the two orders in question" (Page 6, Exh. "E").

In accordance with the provisions of Section 29, Rule 1388 and Section 9, Rule 1399 of the Revised Rules of Court, Judge
Ruiz, on November 26, 1985, transmitted to this Court a certified true copy of the order of suspension and a full
statement of facts.10

On February 11, 1986, this Court, upon Atty. Occeña's motion, restrained Judge Ruiz from enforcing his decision of
November 14, 1985. The case then has remained pending so that on May 30, 1989, this Court issued an Order 11requiring
"the parties to move in the premises, by informing the Court about the status of the decision or order suspending Atty.
Samuel C. Occeña from the practice of law, Judge Ruiz particularly indicating if he still pursues the instant case, within
ten (10) days from notice."

On June 2, 1989, Judge Ruiz filed a comment that he has been waiting for this Court's action on his decision suspending
Atty. Occeña.

On August 25, 1989, Atty. Occeña filed an Explanation and Motion praying that the case be referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for investigation and recommendation. This Court denied the motion and instead referred the
case to Atty. Emilio Rebueno (now deceased), then Bar Confidant, for evaluation, report and recommendation. After
going over the records, he recommended "that the temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Fernando S. Ruiz from
enforcing the decision dated November 14, 1985 suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occeña from the practice of law for a
period of three years be forthwith LIFTED, and that Atty. Samuel C. Occeña be DISBARRED from the practice of law for
grave violation of his oath of office as attorney; likewise, that his name be DROPPED from the roll of attorneys."

We sustain the evaluation, report and recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant, the same being supported by
the facts on record.

Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.12 His guilt, however, cannot be presumed.13 It must indicate the dubious
character of the acts done, as well as the motivation thereof. Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer must have been given full
opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be
heard by himself and counsel.14 All these requirements have been complied with in the case at hand.

In fact, it was Atty. Occeña who did not bother at all to appear in the hearing of the administrative case against him
which was postponed by Judge Ruiz so many times so that he could be accorded the full measure of due process.
The court a quo, therefore, appropriately proceeded to hear the case ex parte as Atty. Occeña deliberately failed to
appear and answer the accusations against him.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended
by this Court for any (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyer's oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. Not only did Atty.
Occeña commit deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience to a superior court. Beyond these
transgressions, he violated the lawyer's oath whereby he imposed upon himself the following duties, thus:
"I, ________________________,of ________________________,do
(place of birth)
 solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution
and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willing promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the
court as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God."

As shown by the records, Atty. Occeña gravely violated his oath of office in his handling of Special Proceedings No. 423.
The facts of the case succinctly show that through his atrocious maneuvers, he successfully delayed the disposition of
the case for the last thirty-eight (38) years, causing untold hurt and prejudice, not only to the heirs, but also to Judges
Ruiz and Beldia who heard the case. For respondent's part and that of his wife, such prolonged litigation obviously
benefited them. As aptly declared by the Court of Appeals, the delay "can only benefit the executor or administrator"
and "the longer the proceedings, the bigger the attorney's fees." But the more tragic reality is the fact that Atty. Occeña
has caused a mockery of the judicial proceedings and inflicted injury to the administration of justice through his
deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral conduct. Indeed, he abused beyond measure his privilege to practice
law.

This Court has held that a lawyer should not abuse his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause
that had been repeatedly rebuffed. Neither should he use his knowledge of law as an instrument to harass a party nor to
misuse judicial processes, as the same constitutes serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For
while he owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of
justice.15

The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are
competent intellectually, academically and morally.16 A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his
dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.17 He must
faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the
legal profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions by this Court which includes suspension and disbarment.

Clearly, Atty. Occeña's conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession even for a single moment.

It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law.
Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the legal profession.18 Atty. Occeña has definitely fallen below
the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts. This Court has repeatedly
stressed the importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer's equipment in the practice of his
profession,19 because it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished
whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.20

Thus, for his serious administrative offenses, punishable under Section 27 of Rule 138, Atty. Occeña deserves the
ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout
the country.

SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking
due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity
initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty
to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty
to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a
sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1) day to four (4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation
Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order
of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring
petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by
among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise
submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim,
through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to
be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate rather
than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the
neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.

b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only out
of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas
day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They
also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in
the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving father who
had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise
and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.

d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits the
matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications
required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of
this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of
equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of
lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing
petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident
absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and
uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding
that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character. 1

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether
petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's
child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases
where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties.
The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy
and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this case, to find room for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath,
sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral
fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties
and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are
prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer
should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all
lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a
lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of
society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be
set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 4838 July 29, 2003

EMILIO GRANDE, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA, Respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-1353, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 273, for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, entitled "People
of the Philippines, Plaintiff versus Sergio Natividad, Accused." During the proceedings, respondent Atty. Evangeline de
Silva, counsel for the accused, tendered to complainant Check No. 0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn
against her account with the Philippine National Bank, as settlement of the civil aspect of the case against her client.
Complainant refused to accept the check, but respondent assured him that the same will be paid upon its presentment
to her drawee bank. She manifested that as a lawyer, she would not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded. Thus,
respondent was prevailed upon by complainant to accept the check. Consequently, he desisted from participating as a
complaining witness in the criminal case, which led to the dismissal of the same and the release of the accused, Sergio
Natividad.

When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the reason: "Account
Closed." On June 19, 1997, complainant wrote a letter to respondent demanding that she pay the face value of the
check.1 However, his demand was ignored by respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal complaint against her for
Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina, which was
docketed as I.S. No. 97-1036. On September 22, 1997, the Marikina City Prosecutor filed the necessary information for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva.2

On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment of respondent for deceit
and violation of the Lawyer’s Oath.3

In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondent’s given address at Carmelo Compound, Newton Avenue,
Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was required to comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from notice.4 However, it
was returned unserved with the notation "Moved".5 The Assistant National Secretary of the IBP submitted the latest
address of respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Pasig City.6

On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring respondent to comment on the administrative complaint filed against
her was served at the aforesaid address. This was again returned unserved with the notation: "Refused". Thus, the case
was referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation, report and recommendation.7

In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found respondent guilty of deceit,
gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyer’s Oath. Thus, he recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years.

On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-554 which adopted the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2)
years.

We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept her personal check by way of settlement for
the civil liability of her client, Sergio Natividad, with the assurance that the check will have sufficient funds when
presented for payment. In doing so, she deceived complainant into withdrawing his complaint against her client in
exchange for a check which she drew against a closed account.

It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted to deceit and
constituted a violation of her oath, for which she should be accordingly penalized.8 Such an act constitutes gross
misconduct and the penalties for such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. – A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral character. Since this
qualification is a condition precedent to a license to enter upon the practice of law, the maintenance thereof is equally
essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which puts the
lawyer’s moral character in serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the practice of law.9

The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or disbarment,10because
it is important that members of the legal brotherhood must conform to the highest standards of morality.11Any
wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-professional, justifies
disciplinary action. Thus, a lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is
unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the bar, for a lawyer’s professional and personal conduct must at
all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion.12

Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on her betrays a deplorably
willful character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal profession.13 Her conduct not only underscores her
utter lack of respect for authority; it also brings to the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw in her psyche which
renders highly questionable her moral fitness to continue in the practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at
the very core of her profession.

Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of justice because obedience to the dictates
of the law and justice is demanded of every lawyer. How else would respondent even endeavor to serve justice and
uphold the law when she disdains to follow even simple directives? Indeed, the first and foremost command of the Code
of Professional Responsibility could not be any clearer:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LEGAL PROCESSES.

Needless to state, respondent’s persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her with not even an
explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct which merits no compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times. She can only do this by faithfully performing her duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients.14 We can not tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair
name of an honorable profession.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of Two (2) Years, effective upon receipt hereof. Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as
attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.