1.

A "decision" differs from an "assessment" and failure of the FDDA to state the facts and
law on which it is based renders the decision void — but not necessarily the assessment.
Tax laws may not be extended by implication beyond the clear import of their language,
nor their operation enlarged so as to embrace matters not specifically provided. (CIR vs.
Liquigas Philippines corp.)
2. The taxpayer's obligation to pay the tax assessed against him arises only upon
notification of such assessment. It bears reiterating that the assessment fixes and
determines the tax liability of the taxpayer. The basic postulate of fairness thus requires
that it is only upon notice of such assessment that the obligation of the taxpayer to pay
the same arises.
3. Section 11 of R.A. No. 1125, as amended by R.A. No. 9282, 53 embodies the rule that an
appeal to the CTA from the decision of the CIR will not suspend the payment, levy,
distraint, and/or sale of any property of the taxpayer for the satisfaction of his tax
liability as provided by existing law. When, in the view of the CTA, the collection may
jeopardize the interest of the Government and/or the taxpayer, it may suspend the
said collection and require the taxpayer either to deposit the amount claimed or to file a
surety bond.
4. The Court still holds that the CTA has ample authority to issue injunctive writs to
restrain the collection of tax and to even dispense with the deposit of the amount
claimed or the filing of the required bond, whenever the method employed by the CIR in
the collection of tax jeopardizes the interests of a taxpayer for being patently in
violation of the law.
5. The Court has held that when an assessment is made within the prescriptive period, as
in the case at bar, receipt by the taxpayer may or may not be within said period. But it
must be clarified that the rule does not dispense with the requirement that the taxpayer
should actually receive the assessment notice, even beyond the prescriptive period.
6. Options available to a protesting taxpayer under Revenue Regulations No. 12-99:
1. If the protest is wholly or partially denied by the CIR or his authorized
representative, then the taxpayer may appeal to the CTA within 30 days from receipt
of the whole or partial denial of the protest.
2. If the protest is wholly or partially denied by the CIR's authorized representative,
then the taxpayer may appeal to the CIR within 30 days from receipt of the
whole or partial denial of the protest.
3. If the CIR or his authorized representative failed to act upon the protest within
180 days from submission of the required supporting documents, then the
taxpayer may appeal to the CTA within 30 days from the lapse of the 180-day
period.
 To further clarify the three options: A whole or partial denial by the CIR's authorized
representative may be appealed to the CIR or the CTA. A whole or partial denial by the
CIR may be appealed to the CTA. The CIR or the CIR's authorized representative's failure
to act may be appealed to the CTA. There is no mention of an appeal to the CIR from the
failure to act by the CIR's authorized representative.
7. In case of inaction on the part of the BIR on the protest filed by the taxpayer, the later
may just wait for the decision before he goes to the CTA even after the lapse of 180 days
from the submission of complete documents or evidence.
8. It is indisputable that compliance with the 120-day waiting period is mandatory and
jurisdictional for claim of excess input. Failure to comply with the 120-day waiting
period violates a mandatory provision of law. It violates the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and renders the petition premature and thus without a cause
of action, with the effect that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over the taxpayer's
petition.
9. Rule 41, Section 2 (c) of the Rules of Court provides that "[i]n all cases where only
questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45." This includes the decisions
of the RTC on purely question of law.
10. "Amusement places," as defined in Section 131 (c) of the Local Government Code,
"include theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement
where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
performance." Thus, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist
spots do not belong to the same category or class as theaters, cinemas, concert halls,
circuses, and boxing stadia. It follows that they cannot be considered as among the
'other places of amusement' contemplated by Section 140 of the LGC and which may
properly be subject to amusement taxes.
11. Section 112(A) and (C) must be interpreted according to its clear, plain, and unequivocal
language. The taxpayer can file his administrative claim for refund or credit at anytime
within the two-year prescriptive period. If he files his claim on the last day of the two-
year prescriptive period, his claim is still filed on time. The Commissioner will have 120
days from such filing to decide the claim. If the Commissioner decides the claim on the
120th day, or does not decide it on that day, the taxpayer still has 30 days to file his
judicial claim with the CTA. This is not only the plain meaning but also the only logical
interpretation of Section 112(A) and (C).
12. It is not lost upon the Court that the prescription
of the judicial claim has not been
raised as an issue by any of the parties whether before the CTA Division,
CTA en banc, or this Court. Nonetheless, the 120/30-day prescriptive periods are
mandatory and jurisdictional, and the matter of jurisdiction cannot be waived because it is
 conferred by law and is not dependent on the consent or objection or the acts or omissions of
the parties or any one of them. In addition, when a case is on appeal, the Court has the
authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error if their consideration is
necessary in reaching a just conclusion of the case. More importantly, courts have the power to
motu proprio dismiss an action that already prescribed, provided that the ground for dismissal is
apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record.
13. The probative value of BIR Form 2307, which is basically a statement showing the amount paid
for the subject transaction and the amount of tax withheld therefrom, is to establish only the
fact of withholding of the claimed creditable withholding tax. There is nothing in BIR Form No.
2307 which would establish either utilization or non-utilization, as the case may be, of the
creditable withholding tax. While perhaps it may be necessary to prove that the taxpayer did not
use the claimed creditable withholding tax to pay for his/its tax liabilities, there is no basis in law
or jurisprudence to say that BIR Form No. 2307 is the only evidence that may be adduced to
prove such non-use.
14.A VAT invoice is the seller's best proof of the sale of goods or services to
the buyer, while a VAT receipt is the buyer's best evidence of the payment
of goods or services received from the seller. A VAT invoice and a VAT
receipt should not be confused and made to refer to one and the same
thing. Certainly, neither does the law intend the two to be used
alternatively.
15.The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty. It is inherent in the state.
Provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays are mere territorial and
political subdivisions of the state. They act only as part of the sovereign.
Thus, they do not have the inherent power to tax. Their power to tax
must be prescribed by law.
16.There are, in this case, three (3) considerations that illumine our task of
interpretation: (1) the text of Section 235, which, to reiterate, is cast in
permissive language; (2) the seminal purpose of fiscal autonomy; and (3)
the jurisprudentially established preference for weighing the scales in favor
of autonomy of local government units. We find it to be in keeping with
harmonizing these considerations to conclude that Section 235's specified
rate of 1% is a maximum rate rather than an immutable edict. Accordingly,
it was well within the power of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Palawan to enact an ordinance providing for additional levy on real
property tax for the special education fund at the rate of 0.5% rather than
at 1%.
17.We note that petitioner has raised the issue of prescription for the first
time only before this Court. While we are mindful of the established rule of
remedial law that the defense of prescription must be raised at the trial
court that has also been applied for tax cases. Thus, as a rule, the failure to
raise the defense of prescription at the administrative level prevents the
taxpayer from raising it at the appeal stage. This rule, however, is not
absolute. If the pleadings or the evidence on record show that the claim is
barred by prescription, the court is mandated to dismiss the claim even if
prescription is not raised as a defense.
18.Proving that no carry-over has been made does not absolutely require the
presentation of the quarterly ITRs. Requiring that the ITR or the FAR of the
succeeding year be presented to the BIR in requesting a tax refund has no
basis in law and jurisprudence.
19.The Annual ITR or "(t)he Final Adjustment Return is the most reliable
firsthand evidence of corporate acts pertaining to income taxes. In it are
found the itemization and summary of additions to and deductions from
income taxes due. These entries are not without rhyme or reason. They
are required, because they facilitate the tax administration process."
20. A tax amnesty is a general pardon or the intentional overlooking by the State of its
authority to impose penalties on persons otherwise guilty of violation of a tax law. It
partakes of an absolute waiver by the government of its right to collect what is due it
and to give tax evaders who wish to relent a chance to start with a clean slate. A tax
amnesty, much like a tax exemption, is never favored or presumed in law. The grant of a
tax amnesty, similar to a tax exemption, must be construed strictly against the taxpayer
and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.
21. Withholding tax is a method of collecting income tax in advance. "In the operation of
the withholding tax system, the payee is the taxpayer, the person on whom the tax is
imposed, while the payor, a separate entity, acts no more than an agent of the
government for the collection of the tax in order to ensure its payment. Obviously, the
amount thereby used to settle the tax liability is deemed sourced from the proceeds
constitutive of the tax base."
There are three reasons for the utilization of the withholding tax system:
"first, to provide the taxpayer a convenient manner to meet his probable
income tax liability; second, to ensure the collection of income tax which
 can otherwise be lost or substantially reduced through failure to file the
corresponding returns[;] and third, to improve the government's cash
flow."
22. "The liability of the withholding agent is independent from that of the taxpayer." The
[withholding agent] cannot be made liable for the tax due because it is the [taxpayer]
who earned the income subject to withholding tax. The withholding agent is liable only
insofar as he failed to perform his duty to withhold the tax and remit the same to the
government. The liability for the tax, however, remains with the taxpayer because the
gain was realized and received by him.
23. Indirect taxes, like VAT and excise tax, are different from withholding taxes. To
distinguish, in indirect taxes, the incidence of taxation falls on one person but the
burden thereof can be shifted or passed on to another person, such as when the tax is
imposed upon goods before reaching the consumer who ultimately pays for it. On the
other hand, in case of withholding taxes, the incidence and burden of taxation fall on
the same entity, the statutory taxpayer. The burden of taxation is not shifted to the
withholding agent who merely collects, by withholding, the tax due from income
payments to entities arising from certain transactions and remits the same to the
government. Due to this difference, the deficiency VAT and excise tax cannot be
"deemed" as withholding taxes merely because they constitute indirect taxes.
24.In case of an illegal assessment where the assessment was issued without
authority, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not necessary and the
taxpayer may directly resort to judicial action. The taxpayer shall file a
complaint for injunction before the Regional Trial Court to enjoin the local
government unit from collecting real property taxes.
25. In case the local government unit has issued a notice of delinquency, the taxpayer may
file a complaint for injunction to enjoin the impending sale of the real property at public
auction. In case the local government unit has already sold the property at public
auction, the taxpayer must first deposit with the court the amount for which the real
property was sold, together with interest of 2% per month from the date of sale to the
time of the institution of action. The taxpayer may then file a complaint to assail the
validity of the public auction. The decisions of the Regional Trial Court in these cases
shall be appealable before the Court of Tax Appeals, and the latter's decisions
appealable before this court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
26. The PEZA is an instrumentality of the national government. Furthermore, the lands
owned by the PEZA are real properties owned by the Republic of the Philippines. The
 City of Lapu-Lapu and the Province of Bataan cannot collect real property taxes from the
PEZA.
27. Transfer for Less Than Adequate and full Consideration. — Where property, other than
real property referred to in Section 24(D), is transferred for less than an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth, then the amount by which the fair
market value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration shall, for the
purpose of the tax imposed by this Chapter, be deemed a gift, and shall be included in
computing the amount of gifts made during the calendar year.
28.Where does one seek immediate recourse from the adverse ruling of the
Secretary of Finance in its exercise of its power of review under Sec.
4?Admittedly, there is no provision in law that expressly provides where exactly the
ruling of the Secretary of Finance under the adverted NIRC provision is appealable to.
However, We find that Sec. 7 (a) (1) of RA 1125, as amended, addresses the seeming
gap in the law as it vests the CTA, "other matters" arising under the NIRC or
other laws administered by the BIR. To leave undetermined the mode of
appeal from the Secretary of Finance would be an injustice to taxpayers
prejudiced by his adverse rulings. To remedy this situation, We imply from
the purpose of RA 1125 and its amendatory laws that the CTA is the
proper forum with which to institute the appeal.
29. For the purpose of safeguarding taxpayers from any unreasonable examination,
investigation or assessment, our tax law provides a statute of limitations in the
collection of taxes. Thus, the law on prescription, being a remedial measure, should be
liberally construed in order to afford such protection. As a corollary, the exceptions to
the law on prescription should perforce be strictly construed.
30. Both the surcharge and interest are imposable upon failure of the taxpayer to pay the
tax on the date fixed in the law for its payment. The surcharge is imposed to hasten tax
payments and to punish for evasion or neglect of duty, while interest is imposed to
compensate the State "for the delay in paying the tax and for the concomitant use by
the taxpayer of funds that rightfully should be in the government's hands."