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NOTE: This is an early version of paper that was translated into German and published as: “Was ist historische
Epistemologie?“ In Nach Feierabend. Ed. M. Hagner and C. Hirschi. Zurich ,Berlin: Diaphanes, 2013, pp. 123-‐
144. Please quote or refer to the German version of this paper
Longum iter est per praecepta, breve et efficax per exempla
--- Seneca
Historical epistemology has been one remarkably influential approach to the
history of science. Some of the most widely read authors have been its
practitioners, and their works have been of interest to philosophers, historians of
science, historians of art, gender studies, sociologists of science, and cultural
theorists. And recently a succession of international conferences has taken place,
all aiming to get a better grasp on historical epistemology.1 So what is it?
Before we address this question, however, we must begin by sketching a
particular landscape of relationships that have existed between philosophy and
history.
Doing
so
will
provide
the
necessary
perspective
in
order
to
delimit
my
*
This
essay
is
based
on
my
Habilitationsvortrag
delivered
at
the
ETH-‐Zurich,
Oct.
2nd,
2012.
I
would
like
to
gratefully
acknowledge
the
useful
comments
made
by
Michael
Hagner,
and
the
two
anonymous
referees.
1
These
international
conferences
have
included
one
at
Columbia
University
(October
10-‐11,
2008);
at
the
Institute
of
Philosophy,
Leuven
University,
Belgium
(December
10-‐12,
2009);
another
at
the
MPIWG
in
Berlin
(July
24-‐26,
2008);
and
“Epistemologie
und
Geschichte”
at
the
MPIWG
in
Berlin
(December
9-‐11,
2010).
The
last
two
have
resulted
in
publications,
the
former
as
a
special
issue
of
Erkenntnis,
2011,
75,
edited
by
Thomas
Sturm
and
Uljana
Feest;
and
the
last
has
been
released
as
a
MPIWG
pre-‐print
(434)
with
the
title,
“Epistemology
and
History:
From
Bachelard
and
Canguilhem
to
Today’s
History
of
Science,”
edited
by
Henning
Schmidgen,
Peter
Schoettler
and
Jean-‐Francois
Braunstein.
1
answer
to
the
main
question.
But
it
will
also
permit
us
to
understand
the
standard
landscape into which historical epistemology has been typically placed and
subsequently judged. Exploring some of the different features on this landscape—
between philosophy and history—will also enable me to collect issues that will be
flagged and addressed by my succeeding account of what historical epistemology
is. In the second section I will lay out some of the relevant characteristics of the
French background to historical epistemology. Then by using an example, like the
emergence of probability, I will focus in the third section on the broad
characteristics of recent work in historical epistemology. And finally, in the fourth
section I will end with my contribution to the main question. Since there has
recently been so much written about historical epistemology, my contribution is
the result of a survey of the literature, and provides the broad outlines of what I
take to be some of the commonly accepted features in the literature. As a result,
the divergent threads to be found in this sizeable literature will not be directly
addressed, or their mention will be limited to the footnotes. I will however take
head on the following challenges: articulating the differences between historical
epistemology and history of epistemology; the relationship between the former
and epistemology itself; historical epistemology and the history of ideas; and I will
also address the applicability of the genetic and naturalistic fallacies to historical
epistemology.
Aristotle argued that history has for its domain the particulars, while
philosophy studies the universal.2 Against this long and multifaceted tradition, the
2
See
Aristotle’s
Poetics
(9,
1451a,
36-‐38,
1451b,
1-‐10;
23,
1459a,
22-‐29).
In
the
main, however, Aristotle was concerned more with a defense against Plato on
2
seventeenth
century
saw
the
introduction
of
an
experimental
philosophy
aided
by
philosophical instruments in the service of a natural philosophy.3 But while natural
philosophy investigated particulars, it still had not completely dispensed with first
principles and universal laws; in fact, it remained positively imbued with
metaphysics. By the time we get to the nineteenth century—and thus in the midst
of the second scientific revolution—things are quite different, and this thanks to
natural philosophy into modern natural science, making the latter professionally
and epistemologically distinct from philosophy; and second, the rise of a new kind
of history, a historicism that claims to go beyond the particulars even though it
In the first case, the arrival of natural science on the scene helped to carve
out a new identity, profession, and a unique domain of inquiry that no longer
overlapped with philosophy and its concerns, as it once had done. As a result,
forced outside of philosophy itself was not only the most successful form of the
human epistemic enterprise (namely, the natural sciences), but also one of the
most temporal, situated, and empirical components of the philosophical repertoire.
It was Kant who helped to articulate philosophy’s task in this milieu. Philosophy in
his hands becomes the study of universal and apriori conditions and regulations
poetry,
than
with
providing
a
systematic
account
of
history.
For
Aristotle
on
the
nature
of
philosophy,
D.
K.
Modrak,
“Aristotle
on
the
difference
between
Mathematics
and
Physics
and
First
Philosophy,”
Apeiron,
1989,
22:
121–139;
2009;
M.
V.
Wedin,
“The
Science
and
Axioms
of
Being,”
Anagnostopoulos,
2009,
pp.
125–
143.
3
See
Steven
Shapin
and
Simon
Schaffer,
Leviathan
and
the
Air-Pump:
Hobbes,
Boyle,
and
the
Experimental
Life,
Princeton
University
Press,
1985;
Peter
Dear,
Revolutionizing
the
Sciences:
European
Knowledge
and
its
Ambitions,
1500-1700,
Basingstoke:
Palgrave,
2001.
3
that
make
a
science
possible
in
the
first
place;
a
task
that
must
remain
outside
of
the domain of scientific inquiry itself, since the latter’s proper operation depends
on taking for granted those very concepts and categories which are in question for
the philosopher. No longer would it be in the preview of one and the same domain
of inquiry to study the natural world and to study the study of the natural world, as
This separation is not only well exemplified by the invention of the
neologism “scientist” (in contradistinction to “natural philosopher” and “artist”) by
William Whewell in the summer of 1833,5 but also by the fact that Whewell made
it a point to first write the History of the Inductive Sciences (in 3 volumes), and then
and only then to write the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (in 2 volume). It was
only in this way, thought Whewell, that we can extract the logic of justification
from the context of discovery: the is did most certainly imply the ought. The
thinking was that if we go inductively from the particulars that exemplify the
canonical discoveries of scientists in the past, then we can get to the generalities
and thus the precepts that must guide science today. The past of scientific progress
is a how-‐to-‐manual for scientists today. And just like any how-‐to-‐manual its
normativity lies in the conditional (as opposed to the categorical) inference that if
4
See
essays
in
the
volume
edited
by
Tom
Sorell,
G.
A.
J.
Rogers,
and
Jill
Kraye,
4
an
expert
has
already
successfully
accomplished
Φ
by
doing
a,
b,
and
c,
and
if
one
wishes to accomplish the same, then one too ought to do a, b, and c. In fact, before
the advent of historicism, this view of history’s task—to provide an exemplar for
correct action and thought—finds its roots in ancient writings.6 But what makes
Whewell’s work ostensibly historicist in tendency is his overall insistence in
philosophy inextricably dependent on history and its methods. Thus with the
decisive separation of science from philosophy in the nineteenth century, it is
history that comes in to fill the newly formed gap between the two.
With its newly developed tools and techniques, historicism came to be seen
Whewell recognized the power of the historical method that he used it to help him
formulate one of the earliest philosophies of science, a discipline that appears only
after the separation of science from philosophy.8 At the same time, however, we
6
See
George
H.
Nadel,
“Philosophy
of
History
Before
Historicism,”
History
and
was
written
by
one
of
Whewell’s
closest
friends,
Sir
John
Herschel;
that
is,
his
A
Preliminary
Discourse
on
the
Study
of
Natural
Philosophy,
1831.
The
work,
in
fact,
not
only
reads
like
a
manual,
but
it
has
been
argued,
is
a
manual,
see
Marvin
Paul
Bolt,
John
Herschel’s
Natural
Philosophy:
On
the
Knowing
of
Nature
and
the
Nature
of
Knowing
in
Early-Nineteenth
Century
Britain,
a
doctoral
dissertation
submitted
5
have
the
exceptional
phenomena
of
systems
of
thought
that
are
conceptually
reliant on a general history that is intrinsically philosophical, such as in the tomes
of Hegel, Comte, and Marx. For all their differences, history in the hands of these
thinkers is rational and teleological, and is governed by universals. And in sharp
contrast to Whewell’s inductive use of the history of the sciences as a series of
particular exemplars, philosophical history is not only regarded as imbued with
logic (deductive and dialectical), but is also therefore intrinsically normative and
axiological. By bringing time and logic so closely together, Hegel was able to give a
central place to the philosophy of history.9 With the inevitable march of time we
can only come closer and closer to the Truth. The very progress of science is a
necessary function of history; and in so far as history is philosophy, science once
philosophers inspired by the dazzling successes of the natural sciences, attempted
to make philosophy itself into an science, without allowing it to intrude on the
latter’s domain of inquiry. By arguing for hard fast distinctions between analytic
any cross over between the two by means of Kant’s synthetic a priori, philosophers
succeeded—for a time, at least—to demarcate their own distinct domain of subject
matter from the empirical sciences. While the sciences might be said to deal with
the empirical, the time-‐dependent, and what is, it is the domain of philosophy to
study
the
non-‐empirical,
the
timeless,
and
what
must
be
and
what
should
be.
The
to
the
Program
in
History
and
Philosophy
of
Science
at
the
University
of
Notre
Dame,
1998.
9
See
F.
C.
Beiser,
“Hegel’s
Historicism,”
The
Cambridge
Companion
to
Hegel,
edited
6
motivation
for
these
distinctions
arose
partly
in
light
of
a
strong
reaction
by
early
again, and in reaction to Hegelianism, separated philosophy sharply and explicitly
from other empirical disciplines, including history.11 By this time, in fact,
philosophers began to accuse those who had naturalized philosophy, in some way
or other, of having committed two major fallacies; fallacies which were also used
(and continue to be used) to attack the employment of historical methods in
philosophy. One was the genetic fallacy, where deducing the logical validity of a
theory or proposition from information about its origins is deemed logically
from the context of justification is precisely meant to avoid this first kind of fallacy.
And the second is the naturalistic fallacy, which is committed when what is or was
the case is used to imply what ought to be the case. Such critiques by early
In the twentieth century “scientific philosophy” was quick to catch on
among German, Austrian, Polish, and British philosophers; and it is the direct
10
It
should
be
noted
however
analytic
philosophy’s
relationship
to
naturalism
has
remained
a
complex
and
indecisive
one,
right
from
the
start.
See
Martin
Kusch,
Psychologism:
A
Case
Study
in
the
Sociology
of
Philosophical
Knowledge,
Routledge,
1995;
but
especially
Philip
Kitcher,
“The
Naturalists
Return,”
Philosophical
Review,
1992,
101:
53-‐114.
11
For
more
on
Hegel
and
analytic
philosophy,
see
Peter
Hylton,
“Hegel
and
Analytic
Philosophy,”
The
Cambridge
Companion
to
Hegel,
edited
by
F.
C.
Beiser,
Cambride
University
Press,
1993,
pp.
445-‐486,
and
the
essays
edited
by
Angelica
Nuzzo,
Hegel
and
the
Analytic
Tradition,
London:
Continuum,
2010.
7
ancestor
of
the
dominant
model
of
philosophy
today
in
the
Anglo-‐Saxon
world;
namely, analytic philosophy.12 The hallmark of this approach, at least when it first
began on its programmatic path, was that rather than focus on everyday natural
languages, philosophers were tasked with the analysis of scientific statements by
translating them into formal languages made possible thanks to newly developed
logical tools and methods. The analysis of these statements would reveal opaque
or unwarranted assumptions on the part of science, especially with regard to such
notions as existence, time, space, cause, matter, and mind. The task of the
philosopher became a purely second-‐order task, having for its domain the first-‐
order statements of physical theory. As such, philosophy might be kept from
making statements directly about the empirical world. One might go as far as to
say that some luminaries of this approach, like Reichenbach and Rudolf Carnap, at
one time or another, considered it their philosophical duty to expose and clarify
the constitutive and regulative principles, and thus, the a priori framework that
makes the empirical statements of a physical theory possible. It is in this light, and
inspired by the model of geometry and its modern axiomatic method, that
12
For
more
on
this
tradition
in
philosophy
see
the
now
classic
collection
of
essays
by
Juliet
Floyd
and
Sanford
Shieh
(eds.),
Future
Pasts:
The
Analytic
Tradition
in
Twentieth-Century
Philosophy,
Oxford
University
Press,
2001,
and
also
the
essays
in
Anat
Biletzki
and
Anat
Matar
(eds.),
The
Story
of
Analytic
Philosophy:
Plot
and
Heroes,
London
and
New
York:
Routledge,
1998.
13
See
Samet
Bagce,
“Reichenbach
on
the
relative
a
priori
and
the
context
of
8
At
this
time
the
newly
formed
philosophy
of
science
begins
to
flourish,
while the enthusiasm that once existed for the history of philosophy wanes. In fact
the distinctions that were being established and stabilized within the tradition of
history of science—in specific ways. First, with respect to the pursuit of the history
of philosophy, many in the analytic tradition have excluded it from the activity of
philosophy, proper.14 This is because what came to define the scope of analytic
philosophy was a set of definite problems canonized by the likes of Bertrand
Russell and G. E. Moore, like the problem of the external world, the problem of
induction, or the problem of other minds.15 As such, philosophy, much like science,
becomes a problem-‐solving enterprise; and if history can at all be conceived of as
being a part of philosophy it must contribute to this project. In this light, the value
of the history was found in (or limited to) its rational reconstruction of bygone
arguments in order to evaluate them in light of (supposedly) the same set of
problems that philosophers today are concerned with. The problems, arguments,
statements, and concepts employed are presumed to be ahistorical, general, and
universal; and thus there is little inclination to question the similarity or identity of
the concepts, statements, and problems used in another time and place. Present
problems of philosophy are also the problems of yesteryear, and solutions to these
problems, whether from deep in the past or fresh off the press, are all assessed
14
But
see
discussion
and
analysis
in
Hans-‐Johann
Glock,
“Analytic
Philosophy
and
History:
A
Mismatch?”
Mind,
2008,
117:
867-‐897.
For
recent
and
positive
views
on
the
relationship
also
see
essays
in
T.
Sorell
and
G.
A.
J.
Rogers
(eds.),
Analytic
Philosophy
and
History
of
Philosophy,
Oxford:
Clarendon
Press,
2005.
15
Bertrand
Russell,
Problems
of
Philosophy,
1912,
G.
E.
Moore,
Some
Main
Problems
of
Philosophy,
1953
(originally
a
set
of
lectures
from
1910-‐11),
and
William
James,
Some
Problems
of
Philosophy,
1911.
9
equally
and
according
to
the
same
standards
and
methods.
In
this
context,
however, what often goes unacknowledged is that these same standards and
methods, namely modern logical and linguistic analysis, were themselves devised
and developed at a very particular time and place—in fact, there is no functional
The view just outlined has been called the “pen-‐pal” approach to the history
of philosophy. Or as two historians have put it, analytic philosophers treat X, where
X is some great long dead philosopher, “as an absent colleague…on an extended
leave of absence.”16 Considering the early aspirations (or pretensions) of analytic
philosophy in becoming an exact science, this comportment to history should come
as no surprise. For one often finds that those scientists who write the history of
their own discipline tend to embrace anachronism, articulating histories that
happen to neatly progress and develop steadily, rationally, and surely to the most
recent and polished form of science today.17 Foucault refers to this latter history as
one that uses a “recurrential analysis” and regards it to be an exercise within and
internal to the sciences themselves, especially in the case of those that have
reached a high level of formalism.18 In a similar vein, then, many from the analytic
tradition too have written their own histories as a story of progress and success.19
16
Ian
Hacking,
Historical
Ontology,
Harvard
University
Press,
2002,
pp.
6,
27,
55,
56;
and
G.
P.
Baker
and
P.
M.
S.
Hacker,
Language,
Sense
and
Nonsense,
Oxford:
Blackwell,
1984,
p.
4.
17
But
for
an
antidote
to
this
common
generalization
see,
L.
Daston,
“The
Sciences
regard,
Foucault
cites
here
Michel
Serres’
Hermes
ou
la
communication,
p.
78.
19
A
good
example
is
Michael
Dummett,
Origins
of
Analytic
Philosophy,
Harvard
University Press, 1993. In sharp contrast see the historically sensitive work of
10
But
while
one
can
easily
understand
why
science
might
approach
its
history
in
these terms, it is much harder to grant the same to philosophy. To be sure, the
problem whether philosophy has in fact progressed is a recent one, which not only
first arises in attempts to make philosophy a kind of science, but also by the way
analytic philosophy has tended to write its own history—that is, as a science.20
In so far as analytic philosophy of science is concerned, it has been for the
most part a normative enterprise: it decides what sorts of concepts, statements,
arguments, and methods are or are not permissible within the sciences. Its
relationship to history, at least initially, might be summarized by quoting from the
Hans
Sluga,
Gottlob
Frege,
Routledge
and
Kegan
Paul,
1980.
But
perhaps
an
even
better
example
than
Dummett
and
of
this
anachronistic
tendency
is
the
award
winning
two
volume
work
by
Scott
Soames,
Philosophical
Analysis
in
the
Twentieth
Century,
Volume
1:
the
Dawn
of
Analysis,
and
Volume
2:
The
Age
of
Meaning,
Princeton
University
Press,
2003.
The
work
was
not
only
widely
acclaimed,
but
also
widely
criticized
for
its
historiography.
This
is
thus
a
good
place
to
emphasize
that
even
within
analytic
philosophy
there
are
many
who
are
now
taking
its
history
seriously.
Just
consider
the
following
abridged
list
of
those
who
heavily
criticized
Soames’
teleological
history:
P.
M.
S.
Hacker,
“Soames’
History
of
Analytic
Philosophy,”
The
Philosophical
Quarterly,
2006,
56:
121-‐31;
Christopher
Pincock,
“History
of
Philosophical
Analysis
a
Review
of
Soames,”
Russell:
The
Journal
of
Bertrand
Russell
Studies,
2005,
25:
168-‐171;
Scott
Soames,
“Reply
to
Pincock’s
Review,”
Russell:
The
Journal
of
Bertrand
Russell
Studies,
2005,
25:
172-‐177;
Christopher
Pincock,
“Rejoinder
to
Soames,”
Russell:
The
Journal
of
Bertrand
Russell
Studies,
2006,
26:
77-‐86.
In
reply
to
Hacker,
Soames
says
that
the
aim
of
his
two
volumes
was
to
construct
“a
history
that
was
itself
a
piece
of
analytic
philosophy
in
its
emphasis
on
analysis,
reconstruction
and
criticism
of
arguments;”
and
this
required
“a
clear
conception
of
what
did,
and
what
did
not,
constitute
lasting
progress,”
(in
Soames,
“Hacker’s
Complaint,”
The
Philosophical
Quarterly,
2006,
56,
p.
426).
20
See
W.
M.
Urban,
“Progress
in
Philosophy
in
the
Last
Quarter
Century,”
The
Philosophical
Review,
1926,
35:
93-‐123;
T.
C.
Moody,
“Progress
in
Philosphy,”
American
Philosophical
Quarterly,
1986,
23:
35-‐46;
and
recently
Eric
Dietrich,
“There
is
No
Progress
in
Philosophy,”
Essays
in
Philosophy:
Philosophy’s
Future:
Science
or
Something
Else?,
2011,
12:
329-‐344
actually
argues
that
because
philosophers
deal
with
the
very
same
problems
that
the
pre-‐Socratics
did,
there
can
be
no
progress.
See
also,
Gary
Gutting,
What
Philosophers
Know:
Case
Studies
in
Recent
Analytic
Philosophy,
Cambridge
University
Press,
2009.
11
Vienna
Circle’s
manifesto,
wherein
it
is
announced
that
from
a
“entspringt das Suchen nach einem neutralen Formelsystem, einer von den
abgelehnt. In der Wissenschaft gibt es keine ‘Tiefen’; ueberall ist
However, in the 1960s philosophers of science were directly challenged by
the work of Thomas Kuhn (and others like Paul Feyerabend) to open the doors
wide to the darkness and depth of the history of sciences, which instead went far
to make philosophy of science a lot more self-‐reflexive.22 What precisely history of
science’s role is with respect to the philosophy of science has been a matter of
21
Rudolf
Carnap,
Hahns
Hahn,
Otto
Neurath,
“Wissenschaftliche
Welftauffassung
der
Wiener
Kreis,”
Wiener
Kreis:
Texte
zur
wissenschaftlichen
Weltauffassung
von,
Meiner
Verlag,
2006,
11.
22
It
was
already
in
Hacking’s
1975
work,
which
I
take
up
as
an
exemplary
study
in
the
historical
epistemology
below,
that
he
declared
that
“spaces
of
possibilities”
can
“liberate
us
from
the
cycle
of
probability
theories
that
has
trapped
us
for
so
long.
This
last
feature
has
a
familiar
ring.
The
picture
is,
formally,
the
same
as
the
one
used
by
the
psychoanalysts
and
by
the
English
philosophers
of
language.
‘Events
preserved
in
memory
only
below
the
level
of
consciousness’,
‘rules
of
language
that
lie
deep
below
the
surface’,
and
‘a
conceptual
space
determined
by
forgotten
precondtions’:
all
three
have,
of
course,
a
common
ancestor
in
Hegel”
(Hacking,
The
Emergence
of
Probability:
A
Philosophical
Study
of
Early
Ideas
About
Probability,
Induction,
and
Statistical
Inference,
2nd
edition,
Cambridge
University
Press,
2006
[1975],
p.
16.
12
serious
dispute.23
But
there
are
at
least
two
things
that
Kuhn
helped
to
legitimate:
first, the use of history as (counter-‐) evidence in the philosophy of science; and
secondly, with the introduction of the notion of a paradigm-‐shift, a discontinuous
picture of science’s history becomes firmly rooted. This discontinuity has forced
philosophers of science to first acknowledge and access older and other forms of
science before they then can evaluate them. Philosophers of science, therefore,
have confronted (and continue to confront, to some extent or other) the question
of whether concepts, statements, and problems of science have remained the same
regardless of place and time. In some cases, then, getting the history right comes
before analysis in the philosophy of science. The irony, therefore, is that work in
analytic philosophy of science can often be more historically sensitive compared to
The landscape just outlined remains rough but it permits us to appreciate
the array of connections that have existed between philosophy, science, and
history, and thus it goes some ways in helping us to recognize the contingency of
these connections. Indeed, how one comes to formulate the connections between
any of these three will depend heavily on how one defines the parameters of
each—and there have been many different meanings attached to each, even in one
and the same tradition. At the same time, the landscape outlined permits us to
highlight and flag key points and issues related to these relationships just plotted.
Before I go on to contrast the foregoing landscape to historical epistemology then,
23
For
a
recent
and
excellent
survey
of
these
tensions
see,
Jutta
Schickore,
“More
Thoughts
on
HPS:
Another
20
Years
Later,”
Perspectives
on
Science,
2011,
19:
453-‐
481;
also
Larry
Laudan,
“Thoughts
on
HPS:
20
Years
Later,”
Studies
in
the
History
and
Philosophy
of
Science,
1989,
20:
9-‐13;
and
see
the
collection
of
essays
in
S.
Mauskopf
and
T.
Schmaltz
(eds.),
Integrating
History
and
Philosophy
of
Science:
Problems
and
Prospects,
Springer,
2012.
13
allow
me
to
then
clearly
earmark
the
points
and
issues
we
should
keep
before
us
as we continue. These are the relationships between the normative and
(particularly when it comes to the sciences), and finally, the commitment to
timeless elements found or assumed when some philosophers write history. With
these in mind, the contours of historical epistemology will begin to emerge more
clearly.
Historical epistemology seems to originate in two different places at around the
same time. The first is out of what is essentially the Austrian context with the likes
of Ludwig Fleck, and which can be seen as a direct and contemporary response to
early analytic philosophers also in and around the same cultural and geographical
context.24 The second arises from another philosophical traditional or context
altogether; namely, a particular line of thinking about history of science and
philosophy to be found in Paris in the 1920s and 30s. It is only relatively recently
that this tradition was made to confront analytic philosophy. Due to considerations
of space, I have chosen to focus primarily on the second tradition.
on the part of the French epistemological tradition, that knowledge can only be
adequately understood if studied in its historical development; this assumption
can
in
fact
be
traced
to
some
influential
French
thinkers
of
the
nineteenth-‐century,
24
See
Michael
Hagner,
“Perception,
Knowledge,
and
Freedom
in
the
Age
of
Extremes:
On
the
Historical
Epistemology
of
Ludwick
Fleck
and
Michael
Polanyi,”
Studies
in
East
European
Thought,
2012,
64:
107-‐120;
and
Hans-‐Jörg
Rheinberger,
Historische
Epistemologie
zur
Einfuehrung,
Junius
Verlag,
2007.
14
like
Auguste
Comte
and
Antoine
Cournot.
But
in
so
far
as
the
twentieth
century
is
concerned, historical epistemology is connected to the Institut d’Histoire des
Sciences et Technique founded by Abel Rey in 1932 at the Sorbonne. It was Rey’s
successor at the chair and directorship of the institute, Gaston Bachelard, to whom
the label historical epistemologist was first applied.25 The label itself comes from
Georges Canguilhem, who was to be Bachelard’s successor to the same post at the
same institute in 1955. If we add Michel Foucault, who studied with Canguilhem,
we then will have the early institutional and philosophical legacy of historical
My aim is not to provide the details of the different strands of this complex,
multifaceted and ever-‐evolving French tradition.27 But since this tradition is
significant to contemporary work in historical epistemology, it is important to
underscore what I take to be important from it. First with regard to the influential
work of Bachelard, a crucial factor is his claim that history is epistemological
because its movement is also the movement from non-‐science to science,
irrationality to rationality, and subjectivity to objectivity. This is epistemological
because as soon as the rapturous move from one to the other is made concepts,
beliefs, judgments, or objects are excluded while others are included as scientific,
25
D.
Lecourt,
L’Epistémologie
historique
de
Gaston
Bachelard,
Paris:
Vrin,
1969.
26
See
Cristina
Chimisso,
“The
Tribunal
of
Philosophy
and
its
Norms:
History
and
Philosophy and Science in France, 1900 to 1960s, Ashgate, 2008.
15
rational,
and
objective.
The
results
of
this
sharp
break
are
thus
also
normative
because they determine what comes to count as science and what not—and all at a
civilizational level. But while Canguilhem largely agreed with Bachelard, he limits
himself specifically to the life sciences, and to particular concepts like norm,
pathos, health, or reflex. Canguilhem in fact advances one of the most compelling
cases for honing the history of science in on concepts, rather than on true theories
in which those concepts have operated. Secondly, like Bachelard, Canguilhem is
concerned with using the sciences of the present as a criterion or norm for
However, there are further significant differences between the two as well,
such as Canguilhem’s insistence that while there are discontinuities there are also
continuities in the history of science. These continuities, moreover, are not to be
surmised by way of formulations grounded in the “logic of history,” but by a close
study of the internal logic of some past theory or other. It is not enough, that is, to
simply expect, anticipate or assume continuity with past theories, and their
concepts, which seem to resemble or are developmentally linked to accepted
theories today. Instead, scientific concepts might be identified and isolated from
within even false theories or pseudoscientific theories of the past; and this stands
in sharp contradistinction to Bachelard. At the same time, however, Canguilhem is
not suggesting that concepts be taken out of their historical, social, and cultural
contexts, for that would be to treat the object of the history of science in the same
way science itself treats its objects, as context-‐free. In Canguilhem’s understanding,
16
the
domain
of
the
history
of
science
is
a
second-‐order
domain,
which
studies
the
Unlike the latter two, he does not assume current science as a norm from which to
then judge the rest of the history of sciences with. This permits Foucault to take an
assumed corpus of knowledge, such as alchemy, and judge it according to its own
terms and conditions that allow it to see itself as a science. In contrast, therefore,
Foucault searches for the internal norms of a science of the past, rather than
imposing on that “science” standards from current science today—even if Foucault
is interested in the past for the light it can cast on the present. For our purposes
the most revealing way of putting the difference between Canguilhem and Foucault
is to say the latter is concerned with another level altogether. Canguilhem might be
interested with when and where a concept—regarded as true today even it be
couched in a false theory of yesteryear—might have emerged. But Foucault is after
specific historical conditions that make possible the application of the true or the
false to a statement in a particular place and time. The epistemological features of
Foucault’s history thus shift attention from evaluations external to a science at any
given time to a description of the space of possibilities at a particular time, which
28
As
Canguilhem
puts
it,
when
demarcating
the
subject-‐matter
of
the
history
of
science,
“Thus
the
history
of
sciences
is
the
history
of
an
object
which
is
a
history,
which
has
a
history,
whereas
science
is
the
science
of
an
object
which
is
not
history,
which
does
not
have
a
history”
(in
Canguilhem,
“The
Object
of
the
History
of
Science,”
in
Continental
Philosophy
of
Science,
edited
by
Gary
Gutting,
Blackwell
Publishing,
2005,
pp.
198-‐207.
Along
with
Canguilhem’s
essay,
in
this
volume,
there
is
included
an
extremely
helpful
introduction
to
it
by
Hans-‐Jörg
Rheinberger,
“Reassessing
the
Historical
Epistemology
of
Georges
Canguilhem,”
pp.
187-‐197).
Also
see,
Rheinberger,
An
Epistemology
of
the
Concrete:
Twentieth-century
histories
of
life,
Durham
&
London:
Duke
University
Press,
2010.
17
Many have been inspired by Foucault and have attempted to further
develop some of these directions. Probably the most important is Ian Hacking,
especially in his influential book, The Emergence of Probability (1975). This is
noteworthy because apart from contributing in English to what was until then a
primarily French tradition, he is also an analytic philosopher of science. He has
been one of the most articulate practitioners of historical epistemology and has
been fundamental to what others have taken historical epistemology to be.29 One
of the most potent examples of this has been the use Hacking has made of
historical epistemology for the concept of probability, which has inspired an
influential body of work by such scholars as Lorenz Krueger, Lorraine Daston,
Theodore Porter, and others.30 It will be worth our while, therefore, to consider
29
In
Hacking’s
most
sustained
discussion
as
to
what
historical
epistemology
is,
demanded
that
it
be
relabeled,
for
good
reasons,
“historical
meta-‐epistemology,”
see
“Historical
Meta-‐Epistemology,”
Warheit
und
Geschichite,
edited
by
Wolfgang
Carl
and
Loraine
Daston,
Vandenhoeck
and
Ruprecht,
1999,
pp.
53-‐77.
This
never
really
caught
on,
and
so
I
stick
in
this
essay
with
what
has
remained
the
dominant
label
today,
historical
epistemology.
It
should
also
be
noted
here
that
soon
after
Hacking
would
later
come
to
subsume
historical
meta-‐epistemology
under
the
more
general
heading
of
“historical
ontology,”
see
Hacking,
Historical
Ontology,
Harvard
University
Press,
2002,
p.
9.
30
Lorenz
Krüger,
L.
Daston,
M.
Heidelberger,
G.
Gigerenzer
&
M.
S.
Morgan
(eds),
18
some
features
of
historical
epistemology
by
taking
as
our
example
Hacking
on
the
The example kicks off with two fundamental observations about the modern
concept of probability, one has to do with the concept’s history and the other has
to do with the concept as it stands today. The first is that the modern concept of
probability did not exist before circa 1660. And the second is the widely
recognized peculiarity that the single term, probability, harbors two distinct
meanings: it can refer either to a degree of belief or certainty, or to statistical
frequencies. This duality has been the occasion of many general and specialist
disputes and theories; and the attempt to clarify this confusion has been one of the
central tasks of philosophers in the middle of the 20th century onwards.32 Rather
than attempting to dissolve this confusion by using logical analysis, we as good
historical epistemologists ask, Why does our current concept of probability have
this dual character? With some historical work and ingenuity, we discover that the
duality is a remnant trace of the concept’s emergence in the middle of the
seventeenth century, and that it reflects the conditions that made it possible in the
first place.
31
In
this
I
also
follow
Lorraine
Daston
in
her
retrospective
review,
“The
History
of
Emergences,
Ian
Hacking:
The
Emergence
of
Probability
…”
Isis,
98:
801-‐908.
32
See
Rudolf
Carnap,
Logical
Foundations
of
Probability,
Chicago:
University
of
Chicago
Press,
1950;
Carnap,
“K.R.
Popper
on
Probability
and
Induction”,
The
Philosophy
of
Rudolf
Carnap,
P.A.
Schilpp
(ed.),
LaSalle,
IL:
Open
Court,
1963,
995–
998;
Karl
Popper,
“The
Propensity
Interpretation
of
the
Calculus
of
Probability”,
S.
Körner
(ed.),
The
Colston
Papers,
1957,
9:
65–70;
Karl
Popper
“The
Propensity
interpretation
of
Probability”,
British
Journal
for
the
Philosophy
of
Science,
1959,
10:
25–42;
and
see
also,
S.
L.
Zabell,
“Carnap
on
Probability
and
Induction”,
The
Cambridge
Companion
to
Carnap,
M.
Friedman
and
R.
Creath
(eds.),
Cambridge
University
Press,
2007,
273-‐294.
19
So
what
are
these
historical
and
conceptual
conditions?
The
conditions
necessary for the emergence of our modern concept of probability are to be found
in the gradual transformation of a particular set of scholastic and pre-‐modern
notions like opinion, evidence and sign. Each of these transformations has their
own, sometimes interrelated, histories. So for example it is only when things and
not just people can act as evidence that signs of nature can begin to be read—with
more and more frequency—in order to “probably” contribute to the formation of
an opinion, rather than demonstration. In addressing the emergence of a concept,
therefore, we as historians are forced to shift from the typical interest in the “high
sciences” like mathematics and astronomy, to the “low sciences” like medicine,
astrology, and alchemy where one finds opinion rather than demonstration (the
latter was thought to be the true method of knowledge by the scholastics). In any
evolved and modified by the middle of the 1600s, they become the conditions for
the emergence of a Janus-‐faced concept of probability. When the modern concept
of probability emerges from out of this conceptual space of possibilities other
spaces of discourse, practices, objects, and problems are made possible and
determined by that new space; in fact, a new form of knowledge arises, one that is
no longer founded on the scholastic notion of demonstration but on a newly
formed notion of opinion. And when probability is further coupled with a novel
notion of cause, and the arrival of a distinct understanding of fact, the now classical
philosophical problem of induction, first formulated by Hume in 1739, becomes
possible.
This example concerns probability, one of the most central concepts to the
natural and social sciences today. Along similar lines others have engaged in
20
historical
epistemological
studies
with
other
concepts
just
as
basic
to
science
as
we
know it today, such as evidence, objectivity, and facts—these are what Hacking
to focus on the emergence of entire “styles of reasoning,” such as the “psychiatric
style of reasoning,” or the style of reasoning associated with statistical thinking
and probability, or in the grounding of particular periods, communities, and
places.34 There have been studies done of concepts that are more local to certain
scientific practices, such as persons, organism and heredity.35 And, finally, there
have also been studies that target what have been called “epistemic things,” such
targets epistemic things, pioneered by Hans-‐Jörg Rheinberger, are unique in that
they are not so much about systems of concepts as much as they are about
33
Hacking
speaks
at
length
about
organizing
concepts
in
“Historical
Meta-‐
Epistemology,”
pp.
58-‐65.
See
Lorraine
Daston
and
Peter
Galison,
Objectivity,
Zone
Books,
2007;
Mary
Poovey,
A
History
of
the
Modern
Fact:
Problems
of
Knowledge
in
the
Sciences
of
Wealth
and
Society,
University
of
Chicago
Press,
1998.
34
Arnold
Davidson,
The
Emergence
of
Sexuality:
Historical
Epistemology
and
the
Formation
of
Concepts,
Harvard
University
Press,
2001,
p.
136;
Hacking,
The
Emergence
of
Probability,
2nd
edition,
Cambridge
University
Press,
2006
[1975],
and
Hacking,
The
Taming
of
Chance,
Cambridge
University
Press,
1990;
and
James
Elwick,
Styles
of
Reasoning
in
the
British
Life
Sciences:
Shared
Assumptions,
1820-
1858,
London:
Pickering
&
Chatto,
2007.
35
Ian
Hacking,
“Making
Up
People,”
Reconstructing
Individualism:
Autonomy,
Individuality,
and
the
Self
in
Western
Thought,
ed.
Thomas
C.
Heller,
Morton
Sosna,
and
David
E.
Wellbery,
Stanford,
CA:
Stanford
University
Press,
1986,
pp.
161-‐171;
Hans-‐Jörg
Rheiberger
and
Staffan
Müller-‐Wille,
Vererbung
:
Geschichte
und
Kultur
eines
biologischen
Konzepts
Frankfurt
am
Main:
Fischer
Taschenbuch
Verlag,
2009.
36
Staffan
Müller-‐Wille
and
Hans-‐Jörg
Rheinberger,
Das
Gen
im
Zeitalter
der
21
“experimental
systems.”
The
latter
both
materially
shapes
and
conceptually
determines epistemic things; and it is from within these experimental systems, and
in conjunction with their “technical objects,” that novel and surprising results
emerge. As such, the focus on experimental systems (and “epistemic spaces”)
rather than on conceptual spaces of possibilities might be regarded as a reflection
of the material and practical turn that took place in the historiography of the
history of science in recent years. But it should also be noted that collections of
experimental systems contribute to an “experimental culture” which itself may
emerge, as might any epistemic space, under specific set of historical conditions.37
All in all, whether one is engaged with organizing concepts or local
concepts, epistemic things or styles of reasoning, Lorraine Daston’s description is
certainly apt: historical epistemology is the “history of emergence.” Granting the
many possible and actual differences, I believe some fruitful and illuminating
things can be said that are generally speaking common to all these kinds of studies
in historical epistemology. What I intend to do now is present the basic elements of
what constitutes historical epistemology in a way that accounts for similarities
37
For
more
on
the
experimental
system
see
Hans-‐Jörg
Rheinberger,
22
IV.
Bare-Bones
of
Historical
Epistemology
With the foregoing example in mind, but not limited to it, it is time now to get to
the bare bones of what historical epistemology is. To begin with, some scientific
concept or style of reasoning is selected which seems to us today to be inevitable.
Historical epistemologists are not interested in long dead concepts or styles, but
with those that are active today—so active, in fact, that they tend to be taken for
granted. Secondly, the initial assumption is that scientific concepts or styles all
contain in them some trace of their origin. As Hacking puts it, “When there is a
radical transformation of ideas, whatever made the transformation possible leaves
its mark upon subsequent reasoning.”38 So thirdly, one wants to select concepts
that have emerged from out of some transformation in history, so that one can
determine whether or not before the period of transition there was such a concept
or style possible. The transformation need not be recognized as revolutionary or
radical at the time, but might even be gentle, gradual and piecemeal.39 As soon as
one has isolated such an historical target, then the Kantian question to ask is: What
are the conditions that have made this concept or style possible? And why at this
particular time in history have they emerged and not at another? It is in answering
these questions, by pursuing genuine historical research, that one, hopefully more
often than not, arrives at conditions that make a new concept or style emerge then
and there. Since the conditions of emergence are historical but at the same time
38
Ian
Hacking,
“How
Should
We
Do
the
History
of
Statistics?”
I
&
C,
1981,
8:
15-‐26,
p.
17.
39
This
is
particularly
so
for
“styles
of
reasoning,”
according
to
Hacking,
which
“comes
into
being
by
little
microsocial
interactions
and
negotiations,”
(in
“’Style’
for
Historians
and
Philosophers,”
Studies
in
the
History
and
Philosophy
of
Science,
1992,
23:
1-‐20,
p.
10).
23
necessary
for
the
emergence
of
a
concept
or
style,
we
might
say
that
the
conditions
are contingently necessary; in fact these have been aptly referred to as the
“historical a priori.”40 There is, therefore, no need for atemporal or transhistorical
elements that can make this actual historical research relevant or worthwhile to
philosophers, particularly those who care for concepts and their clarification.41
Indeed, we have in historical epistemology a type of conceptual analysis, but one
But, it might be asked, are historical actors and ideas inextricably
determined by historical a priori conditions of possibility? Is this, in other words, a
form of historical determinism? The answer is that it is not. The reason is that the
conditions that make the emergence of a novel style or concept possible are
necessary but not sufficient for its emergence at a particular time and place. So, for
instance: one can have two players at a chess board, who both know the rules, and
have all the pieces available to them, without there necessarily occurring a chess
game. In this case, it is the will to play the game on the part of both parties that
40
The
term
was
first
used
by
Husserl,
then
by
Canguilhem
to
describe
the
result
of
Foucault’s
archeological
method,
and
then
is
used
by
Foucault
himself
in
his
Archeology
of
Knowledge;
for
the
details
of
this
heritage,
see,
David
Hyder,
“Foucault,
Cavailles,
and
Husserl
on
the
Historical
Epistemology
of
the
Sciences,”
Perspective
on
Science,
2003,
11:
107-‐129.
41
I
stress
actual
historical
work
here
because
I
wish
to
distinguish
it
from
the
“imaginary”
or
“fictional”
geneology
employed
by
Bernard
Williams,
Truth
and
Truthfulness:
An
Essay
in
Genealogy,
Princeton
University
Press,
2002,
p.
38.
42
After
Hacking,
this
might
be
called
“historical
analytic.”
But
Hacking
is
also
hesitant
to
regard
this
as
a
kind
of
analysis,
since
there
is
apparently
no
breaking
up
a
concept
into
its
constituent
parts.
However,
in
many
ways,
we
do
end
up
with
historically
constituent
parts
of
a
concept,
even
if
they
are
not
their
logical
parts.
Just
consider
the
case
with
probability
examined
and
the
role
played
by
other
concepts
like
cause,
fact,
opinion
and
sign.
Hacking,
“Historical
Meta-‐
Epistemology,”
pp.
62,
66.
24
would
result
in
the
game
being
played;
the
will
on
the
part
of
both
parties
would
cause the game. The conditions of possibility are not causes, but only conditions.
Agency on the part of the historical actors remains, therefore, intact.43
Now, a similar word like “probable”, “fact”, or “objective” may have been
used before in another time and place in human history; but the point is that the
concept and its new contents cannot have existed before their emergence in that
new form, because the historical set of conditions that make it possible were not
present when the word was used at another period. In this regard, historical
epistemology is not the history of ideas, because: (a) the idea of a precursor or
anticipation so central to the history of ideas is entirely irrelevant; and (b) there is
no need to posit any transhistorical and essentially unchanging “unit-‐idea” that
invariably appear and reappear in history.44 But it does share with the history of
To continue on to the last characteristic of historical epistemology, which is
also the one of the most trickiest, a brand new concept emerging at a particular
point in history may also signal the emergence of a new style of reasoning, as we
have just seen in the case of probability.45 But in other accounts, it is the style of
43
See
James
Elwick,
“Layered
History:
Styles
of
Reasoning
as
Stratified
Conditions
of
Possibility,”
Studies
in
History
and
Philosophy
of
Science,
2012,
43:
619-‐627,
esp.
620.
44
For
more
on
the
unit-‐idea
in
the
history
of
ideas
see
the
introduction
to
Arthur
Lovejoy’s,
The
Great
Chain
of
Being:
A
Study
of
the
History
of
an
Idea,
Harvard
University
Press,
1936.
For
a
reappraisal
see,
Richard
Macksey,
“The
History
of
Ideas
at
80,”
MLN,
2002,
117:
1083-‐1097.
For
more
on
the
critique
of
the
precursor,
see
Canguilhem,
“The
Object
of
the
History
of
Science,”
pp.
205-‐206.
45
This
may
be
a
good
place
for
an
important
caveat.
Ian
Hacking
has
insisted
in
the
past
that
we
keep
separate
his
work
and
interest
in
“historical
meta-‐epistemology”
from
the
work
on
styles.
It
seems
to
have
been
Arnold
Davidson
that
first
brought
the
two
so
close
together,
especially
in
the
way
I
do
here.
As
far
as
one
can
tell,
25
reasoning
that
first
appears
to
emerge
to
make
a
concept
possible.
This
is
the
case,
for example, with Arnold Davidson’s historical analysis of the concept of
perversion. Along with the style of reasoning associated with psychiatry, which
emerges as a result of the way it defines itself against pathology and physiology, a
whole set of new diseases are conceptually made possible, such as sexual
perversion; that is, for the first time diseases that are functional and at the same
not localizable are possible.46 In any case, the order of emergences—concept or
style—are two sides of the same coin, where in fact what often happens, as
Hacking puts it, “The style comes into being with instances although…the
according
to
Hacking,
historical
epistemology
has
to
do
with
rigorous
historical
research,
and
the
other
with
what
Hacking
refers
to
as
mythical
“overarching
pictures
of
civilization.”
However,
the
latter
can
surely
be
the
work
of
an
historian,
which
it
in
fact
is
when
Hacking
elects
to
submit
to
A.
C.
Crombie’s
“styles
of
thinking.”
The
trouble
is
that
Hacking’s
Emergence
of
Probability
can
be
read
as
both
a
work
in
historical
“meta-‐epistemology”
and
as
a
work
in
styles;
after
all,
it
examines
the
emergence
of
a
concept
and
of
number
five
in
Crombie’s
list.
Strangely
enough,
when
Hacking
describes
a
style
of
reasoning
as
introducing
“a
great
many
novelties,”
such
as
objects,
evidence,
sentences,
laws,
possibilities,
he
does
not
at
all
mention
concepts
(“’Styles
for
Historians
and
Philosophers,”
p.
11).
However,
in
the
same
place
he
insists
that
the
work
on
styles
is
connected
to
“objectivity,”
going
as
far
as
to
say
that,
“I
am
concerned
with
the
way
in
which
objectivity
comes
into
being”
(10).
This
sounds
exactly
like
what
work
in
historical
meta-‐epistemology
ought
to
be.
In
fact
in
his
paper
on
historical
meta-‐
epistemology
he
takes
the
concept
of
objectivity
as
his
primary
example.
Another
difference
between
the
two
might
lie
in
the
fact
that
Hacking
nowhere
mentions
“positivities”
when
speaking
about
historical
epistemology
as
he
does
with
styles.
However,
it
would
be
strange
to
say
that
the
emergence
of
a
concept
of
evidence
or
objectivity
do
not
have
with
them
resulting
positivities,
even
if
they
may
not
always
be
of
the
true
or
false
sort.
Recently,
however,
Hacking
has
come
to
accept
that
“it
was
stupid
to
patent
[styles
of
reasoning],
and
to
restrict
it
to
members
of
a
list.”
In
fact
he
says,
Davidson
was
“right
[to
combine
the
two]
and
I
was
wrong”
(Hacking,
“’Language,
Truth,
and
Reason’
30
years
later,”
Studies
in
History
and
Philosophy
of
Science,
2012,
43:
599-‐609.
46
Arnold
Davidson,
The
Emergence
of
Sexuality,
Harvard
University
Press,
2001.
26
recognition
of
something
as
new,
even
the
naming
of
it,
may
solidify
the
style
after
it has begun.”47
But whether we are dealing with the initial emergence of a concept or a
style, with them come internal rules and conditions that help to determine what
makes statements meaningful or not, and true or false. Historical epistemology is
therefore not in the business of evaluating the validity of theories, statements,
beliefs, practices, or concepts, but is rather concerned with revealing how these
made possible, or were made possible by, certain normative regimes. That notions
like objectivity, fact, probability, have in fact had and continue to have a normative
role to play is precisely what historical epistemology attempts to explain. Thus,
rather than taking the normative stance, historical epistemology is concerned with
what grounds the normative stance at any given period in history.48
Thus with regard to the naturalistic fallacy we might address it by stressing
that historical epistemologists are not interested in deducing a norm from a
description. The fallacy is entirely irrelevant to it, since historical epistemology
does not set out to make the relevant kind of prescriptive conclusions. To be sure,
historical epistemology most certainly may describe the emergence or activation of
a norm, such as when the notion of mechanical objectivity in the nineteenth
century brings with it a kind of system of values that go into reshaping the
scientific self.49 But we would not say that the authors of that study would then
prescribe these values. In the same vein, the authors are also not interested in
47
Hacking,
“’Styles’
for
Historians
and
Philosophers,”
p.
11.
48
There
is
also
the
question,
which
will
remain
unexplored
here,
as
to
how
27
justifying
(as
true
or
false,
as
good
or
bad)
the
normative
status
objectivity—that
it
is normative is simply taken for granted. What is not taken for granted are the
contingent but necessary conditions required for a norm to emerge and how it
might in turn contribute to the establishment of new norms; and this is no
It would seem therefore that the genetic fallacy is also inapplicable to
historical epistemology.50 Explaining the origins and genesis of a concept may
actually cast light on why we justify it or value it the way we do today but this is
not to say that the history or origins of the concept does justify or validate a
statement or content. The very question of justification or validation is beyond the
scope of historical epistemology—it does not logically evaluate arguments. Nor, it
should be said, does it attempt to access the psychological or cognitive conditions
of historical actors. Instead, it tries to explain the emergence of conceptual and
epistemic spaces that make certain kinds of evaluations possible rather than
others. In this sense it might be regarded as a second-‐order discipline that is not
itself a normative enterprise, but which has for its domain normative enterprises
like philosophy and science. In fact, it is precisely for this reason that we might,
with Hacking, prefer to use the ugly label, “Historical Meta-‐Epistemology.”
Moreover, as we have just outlined with regard to the skeptical problem of
induction, new philosophical problems can emerge. That is, some philosophical
problems are not timeless and do often contain traces of their origins in how today
50
The
fallacy
itself,
of
late,
has
been
in
a
little
bit
of
trouble.
Very
few
people
know
how
to
precisely
state
it,
and
some
have
also
recently
begun
to
find
exceptions
for
its
plausible
use.
Thus
it
has
been
asked
whether
the
genetic
fallacy
is
really
a
fallacy
after
all.
See,
Kevin
C.
Klement,
“What
Is
Genetic
Reasoning
Not
Fallacious?”
Argumentation,
2002,
16:
383-‐400;
Andrew
C.
Ward,
“The
Value
of
Genetic
Fallacies,”
Informal
Logic,
2010,
30:
1-‐33.
28
they
are
formulated
and
constrained
by
their
historical
path
dependences.
Thus
one cannot simply compare historical epistemology to the history of epistemology
on the basis of which one helps to treat classic epistemological problems in
philosophy. This is because one, historical epistemology, is an activity that does
not assume the stability of the problem, while the other, history of epistemology,
does simply assume it. Historians of epistemology want to know how philosophers
in the past have attempted to solve the same epistemological problem that
we got to formulate the problem the way we do now. It is not the job of historical
epistemology to answer problems of epistemology, but to show us how they have
become problems for us as philosophers today. As such, considering that the
formulation of a problem is a part of the activity of philosophy, then historical
Any attempt to evaluate historical epistemology, therefore, by how well it
treats epistemological problems is to misunderstand what it is.51 So even in an
attempt to supply the historical epistemology of the modern concept of belief, for
example, what it might have to say about belief will not directly address the
epistemological problem of what belief is, or how it is related to knowledge and
justification. Rather, historical epistemology will take the commonly accepted or
problematic features of the current notion of belief, and attempt to answer the
question: when did these features of belief first come to characterize it, and why?
Or when did this modern notion of belief first arise, and why? Answering these
sorts
of
questions
will
provide
a
historical
analysis
of
the
concept
and
will
reveal
51
This
has
to
be
stressed
because
this
is
precisely
what
some
have
tried
to
do,
see
Thomas
Sturm,
“Historical
Epistemology
or
History
of
Epistemology?
The
Case
of
the
Relation
Between
Perception
and
Judgment,”
Erkenntnis,
2011,
75:
303-‐324.
29
the
conceptual
space
required
for
the
concept’s
emergence,
but
it
will
not
pretend
to solve current epistemological problems surrounding belief. It might, at best, go
into providing a kind of conceptual analysis for a concept, in the sense sketched
above, but not in the sense of supplying necessary and sufficient conditions for it.
As such, I do not believe that historical epistemology ought to replace the history
The family of practices and methods regarded to fall under the category of
historical epistemology outlined above have been rightly referred to by Foucault as
a history of the present, for they are committed to historically revealing,
philosophically relevant ways in which high-‐profile concepts, styles of reasoning,
and epistemic things we today take for granted take the shape and dimensions that
they do. It does not, however, exhaust the different ways of doing the history of
science. Nor does it replace epistemology or the history of epistemology, but it can
fruitfully complement each by providing a kind of historical analysis of relevant
concepts and by pointing out path-‐dependencies that have long been forgotten or
erased in each. In fact, the more that philosophical and scientific notions begin to
be regarded as inevitable, the more there will be a need for the application of
historical epistemology. For just as philosophy, as a second-‐order discipline and by
means of logical and linguistic analysis, began to reveal hidden assumptions and
surreptitiously introduced notions in the sciences, so too has historical
epistemology begun by means of rigorous empirical research and study to disclose
connections and long forgotten conditions in not only the sciences but also in
philosophy and its history. Indeed, historical epistemology can aid philosophy to
recognize and form other kinds of correlations, without falling prey to grand
systems or to muddled associations. But historical epistemology is at its best when
30
it
stands
between
philosophy
and
science,
connecting
the
two,
without
reducing
31