G.R. No.
, 117 SCRA 999 On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, reversed the decision of the City Court and
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
September 30, 1982
G.R. No. , ,
vs.
,.
, J.:
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, filed this petition to review on certiorari the order dated
October 13, 1969 of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet
Province, declaring the issuance by the City Court of Search Warrant No. 459, as contrary to law
and ordering the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agents and any person in possession of
the articles seized by virtue of the search warrant to deliver and return the same to Yu Cua Sio,
owner and/or manager of the Suntory Grocery.
On June 15, 1969, NBI Supervising Agent Jose Vicente filed an application for the issuance of a
search warrant with the City Court of Baguio City which provides, among others, the following:
That he has been reliably informed and verily believes that the owner and/or manager of the
Suntory Grocery, of 36 Rajah Soliman St., Baguio City has in his possession and control stocks of
San Miguel Gin, product of the La Tonde?a, Inc., Manila, which is adulterated, bearing fake
auxiliary stamps, and using crown caps not produced by the company, which is in violation of the
provisions of Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code.
... and therefore has reason enough to believe that a search warrant should be issued to enable
the undersigned to take possession and control and bring it to this Court said stock, as evidence in
the above case under investigation.
City Judge Patricio Perez of Baguio City, acting on the aforesaid application issued on June 15,
1967, Search Warrant No. 459, under the following terms:
Whereas, after examination under oath of Supervising Agent, NBI Jose Vicente and Cesar de
Leon, both of the NBI Regional Office, at Dagupan City, this Court finds that there is probable
cause to believe that the owner and/or manager of the Suntory Grocery, located at No. 36 Rajah
Soliman St., Baguio City, is in possession such stock of La Tondena product, San Miguel Gin,
which is adulterated, bearing auxiliary stamps which is tampered and possession of falsified or fake
crown caps, which is now under investigation by the National Bureau of Investigation, in this City.
Therefore, you are hereby commanded during the day only to make an immediate search on the
premises of the store and/or grocery owned by the Manager and/or proprietor of the Suntory
Grocery which is located in No. 36 Rajah Soliman, of this City and if you should find the same to
bring it forthwith before me in the City Court of Baguio to be dealt with as the law directs.
Armed with said search warrant, the NBI agents, on June 19, 1967, searched the premises of the
Suntory Grocery located at 36 Rajah Soliman St., Baguio City, owned and managed by private
respondent Yu Cua Sio. During the search conducted in the presence of private respondent and
his wife, the NBI agents seized the following articles which were properly inventoried and
receipted:
(1) One (1) bundle consisting of rubber siphon, trainer and funnel;
(2) One (1) galvanized tank, 15" in diameter, 2 feet in height;
(3) One (1) mounted crown cap sealer with accessories;
(4) Six (6) cases of San Miguel Gin, round bottles, fined with suspected adulterated Gin and
bearing BIR stamps dated 6 April 1967;
(5) Two(2)cases of San Miguel Gin empty bottles;
(6) One (1) case containing ten (10) San Miguel Gin (adulterated) and 14 empty bottles, without
stamps;
(7) One (1) bundle consisting of two (2) bottles believed to be containing genuine San Miguel Gin
which was marked as standard; and
(8) One (1) paper bag containing 122 auxiliary stamps dated 6 April 1967, without perforation and
bearing successive serial numbers starting from 43,000,000.
Private respondent Yu Cua Sio filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 459 with the City Court
of Baguio. In an Order dated February 3, 1969, the inferior court ordered the NBI agents who
seized and confiscated the various articles from the store of Yu Cua Sio to return the same
immediately to him.
sustained the validity of the questioned search warrant. However, upon motion for reconsideration
filed by private respondent Yu Cua Sio, respondent Judge, on October 13, 1969, reconsidered his
decision and declared the issuance of Search Warrant No. 459 as contrary to law and, forthwith,
ordered the NBI agents to deliver and return the articles seized by virtue of the search warrant to
private respondent Yu Cua Sio.
The only legal issue posed for resolution in this case is the validity of Search Warrant No. 459
issued by City Judge Patricio Perez of Baguio City which respondent Judge declared as null and
void in his order dated October 13, 1969 on the grounds that (1) the same was issued "for more
than one specific offense in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court which states
'no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense' "; and, (2) that the search warrant
was issued to fish for evidence.
Petitioner claims that the lower court erred (1) when it held that the questioned search warrant
violates the provisions of Section 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court; (2) in holding that the
search warrant in question was issued to fish for evidence; and (3) in declaring Search Warrant No.
459 as contrary to law and in ordering the return of the articles seized by virtue of said search
warrant to respondent Yu Cua Sio.
We find merit in the petition. The search warrant issued by the City Court did not mention any
specific offense deemed to have been violated by respondent Yu Cua Sio. It is in the application
filed by the NBI agents which states that the owner and/or manager of the Suntory Grocery has in
his possession and control stocks of San Miguel Gin which are adulterated and therefore, violative
of the provisions of Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code. These articles of the Revised
Penal Code are entitled: "Substituting and Altering Trademarks, Tradenames, or Service marks"
and "Unfair Competition and Fraudulent Registration of Trademark and Tradename," respectively.
As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, "the specific acts defining said offenses and mentioned in
said articles are closely allied to each other that in a sense, the punishable acts defined in one of
them can be considered as including, or necessarily included in the other."
There is no merit also in the pronouncement by respondent Judge that the search warrant was
issued to fish for evidence just because the application for search warrant states that its purpose is
"to take possession and control of the articles to be used as evidence in the above case under
investigation."
The search warrant as issued mentions that respondent has in his possession and control stocks
of La Tonde?a product which are adulterated, with fake auxiliary stamps, and are using crown caps
which are not produced by the company. The articles seized in the premises of respondent Yu Cua
Sio show that he was in possession of these articles mentioned in the application for search
warrant and in the search warrant itself. Possession of said fake stamps is illegal and the same
should not be returned to respondent Yu Cua Sio.
ACCORDINGLY, the order of respondent Judge, dated October 13, 1969, is SET ASIDE, and
private respondent Yu Cua Sio is hereby ordered to return the articles seized if they had been
delivered to him by the NBI agents.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERT FIGUEROA and BEATRICE
VALERIO, accused.
ROBERT FIGUEROA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Accused-appellant ROBERT FIGUEROA (hereafter OBET) appeals from the 18 May 1998
Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 259, in Criminal Case No. 97-
306, convicting him of violation of Section 14-A[2], Article III of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA. No. 7659. His co-accused Beatrice Valerio
(hereafter Betty) was acquitted.
OBET and Betty were indicted under an information, dated 2 April 1997, whose accusatory portion
reads as follows:
That on 16 February 1997 and for sometime prior thereto in Parañaque City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without authority of law, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
manufacture, produce, prepare or process methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated
drug amounting to a 2.4 liters, directly by means of chemical synthesis.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
When arraigned OBET and Betty each entered a plea of not guilty.[4] Trial on the merits then
ensued.
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were NBI Forensic Chemist Mary Ann T. Aranas, NBI
Special Investigator III Pio M. Palencia (hereafter PALENCIA), and NBI Intelligence Agent II Martin
Soriano (hereafter SORIANO).
PALENCIA testified that on 15 February 1997, he was in the office of SORIANO at Project 6,
Quezon City, when they received a call from their informant, a woman, who reported that a certain
OBET was allegedly engaged in large-scale drug trafficking in Makati City. PALENCIA and
SORIANO forthwith instructed their informant to establish contact with OBET for a buy-bust
operation. After several hours, the informant reported that OBET was already waiting for her at No.
1485 Soliman Street, Makati City, with instructions for her to come alone as soon as she was ready
with P150,000. PALENCIA then caused the dusting of fluorescent powder over ten pieces of
authentic P100 bills as buy-bust money and gave them to the informant.[5]
On board a taxi, PALENCIA, SORIANO and their informant proceeded to the rendezvous area.
They arrived at half past twelve o'clock in the early morning of 16 February 1997. As the gate was
already open, the informant entered the premises, while PALENCIA and SORIANO discreetly
crawled and positioned themselves near the gate of the house. Strategically positioned, PALENCIA
overheard OBET ask the informant whether she had the money. PALENCIA then saw the
informant hand over the money to OBET. While counting the money, OBET sensed the presence
of other people in the area. OBET, who was in possession of a .45 caliber pistol, fired it twice
toward the direction of PALENCIA, while hurrying towards the house. OBET then held hostage his
mistress, Estrella Brilliantes, and her two children for the next three hours until the arrival of one
Major Roberto Reyes to whom OBET surrendered. PALENCIA and SORIANO brought OBET, his
firearm and the recovered buy-bust money to the WPD Headquarters for recording purposes and,
thereafter, to the NBI Headquarters.[6]
At the NBI Headquarters, PALENCIA and SORIANO methodically interrogated OBET about the
source of his shabu. OBET eventually volunteered that his source was a certain Betty of 263 El
Grande Street, B.F. Homes, Parañaque City. PALENCIA and SORIANO took OBET to Betty's
house as a follow-up operation. They arrived at around 6:00 a.m. of the same day, 16 February
1997. As OBET called Betty earlier to tell her that he was arriving, Betty already had the gate
opened for them. After parking, PALENCIA saw Betty waiting for them. Upon seeing OBET in
handcuffs, Betty asked what happened. OBET replied that he was just caught in a buy-bust
operation. PALENCIA and SORIANO then tried to convince Betty to surrender the shabu that
OBET insisted was hidden inside the house. As Betty persistently denied the existence of the
shabu, PALENCIA told OBET to confer with Betty. After a while, OBET proceeded to the kitchen of
the guesthouse located outside the main house, followed by Betty. OBET then promptly pointed to
what he termed as liquid shabu inside a white pail along with other drug paraphernalia, such as a
beaker spray. PALENCIA and SORIANO seized the items.[7]
Thereafter, PALENCIA requested a laboratory examination of all the seized items and an ultraviolet
light examination over the persons of OBET, Betty and a certain Eva Baluyot.[8] PALENCIA
claimed that based on the certification issued by the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI, all the
items seized from Betty's residence were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride except
specimen no.7; while from among the persons subjected to ultraviolet light examination, only OBET
was found positive for fluorescent powder.[9]
On cross-examination, PALENCIA admitted that he and SORIANO conducted the search without a
search warrant, but with the consent of Betty.[10] He also admitted that he did not actually see
OBET or Betty in the act of manufacturing shabu.[11]
NBI Intelligence Agent II SORIANO corroborated PALENCIA's testimony. He likewise admitted that
the custodial investigation of OBET, during which he divulged Betty as the source of shabu, was
conducted in the absence of any counsel. SORIANO also confirmed PALENCIA's testimony that
they were not armed with a search warrant, but that they conducted the follow-up operation at
Betty's house under the hot pursuit theory.[12] He further maintained that OBET, after conferring
with Betty, uttered, “Ako na nga, ako na nga"(I will do it, I will do it). OBET then proceeded to the
dirty kitchen, pointed to the refrigerator and had it moved. Thereafter, SORIANO saw a plastic pail
containing liquid with floating brown substances.
SORIANO admitted that he and PALENCIA neither witnessed OBET and Betty manufacture shabu
in the manner described in Section 2(j) of the Dangerous Drugs Act[13]; nor did they possess
evidence, independent of the items they had seized, that OBET and Betty were engaged in the
labeling or manufacturing of shabu.[14]
Forensic Chemist Mary Ann T. Aranas testified that on 16 February 1997, she conducted a
laboratory examination for the presence of any prohibited or regulated drug on eleven different
specimens (Exhibits "B"-"L").[15] The result of the examination disclosed that all the specimens
except specimen no. 7 (Exhibit "H") were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.[16] She
further observed that specimen no. 8 (Exhibit I- I-2), the brown liquid with floating solid flakes
contained in a plastic pail, was positive for epedrine,[17] a substance used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine hydrochloride. She opined that this crude form of shabu would have to undergo
chemical processes, like extraction, crystallization, distillation, before it could be finally converted
into shabu's crystalline form. She also conducted a fluorescent powder examination over the
persons of OBET and Betty. Only OBET gave a positive result.[18]
On the other hand, OBET testified that while he was watching television on the night of 15
February 1997, he heard the doorbell rang. Upon seeing Eva Baluyot, his childhood friend, he
opened the door for her. Inside the house, Eva handed him a bundle of money and stated that she
was buying shabu from him. OBET emphatically told Eva that he was not engaged in such illegal
trade and returned the money. OBET then accompanied Eva out of the house. At the garage,
OBET noticed someone peeping from the dark; so he told Eva to go back inside the house with
him. Eva ignored the request. OBET thus left Eva at the garage and got his .45 caliber gun from his
house. While he was locking the door, his handgun accidentally fired off, as he forgot that it had
already been cocked. This blast was followed by shouts of people outside claiming that they were
NBI men. Uncertain, OBET did not go out of the house but instead told the alleged NBI men to call
the Makati Police, specifically Major Reyes. The NBI agents, however, persisted in convincing
OBET to go out of the house. He did get out of his house after three hours when he heard the
voice of Major Reyes. OBET gave to Major Reyes his gun. The Makati Police and the NBI men
thereafter conducted a joint search inside OBET's house which, however, yielded nothing. OBET
was then brought to the Makati Police Headquarters where the incident was recorded. Thereafter,
PALENCIA, SORIANO and another NBI man brought OBET to the house of Betty, his former live-
in partner, at El Grande Street, B.F. Homes, Parañaque City, upon the insistence and information
of Eva Baluyot.[19]
Upon entering B.F. Homes, SORIANO instructed OBET to call and tell Betty that he was already
near. The gate was already opened when they arrived, and the NBI men freely parked their car at
the garage. Then, PALENCIA and SORIANO alighted from the car and entered Betty's house.
OBET was left in the car under the charge of the third NBI man; hence, he knew nothing of what
happened inside Betty's house.[20]
For her part, Betty admitted that she was romantically involved with OBET and had a child by him.
She recalled that on 16 February 1997, OBET called at around 6:00 a.m. and requested her to
open the gate for him, as he was already near. She ran down to the garage and opened the gate.
Since her car was parked halfway through the garage, she went to the main house to get her car
keys to make way for OBET's car. But as she came out of the main house, OBET's car was
already parked inside the garage. She noticed that OBET had two companions with long firearms.
The two, whom Betty later found out as NBI men PALENCIA and SORIANO, informed her that they
had just come from a buy-bust operation and that OBET had led them to her house, as there were
illegal chemicals kept in the premises. Shocked andamazed, she then asked for a search warrant,
but the NBI men could not produce any.[21]
Betty further recalled that the NBI men claimed that they found contraband items near the dirty
kitchen at a small space behind the refrigerator where cases of softdrinks were stored. Betty
denied any knowledge that there were illegal chemicals inside her house and that these were
manufactured into shabu. She also denied knowing Eva Baluyot.[22]
On cross-examination, Betty disclaimed her alleged consent to the search of her house, for she
specifically asked the NBI men for a search warrant. She asserted that she did not see the NBI
men find the shabu paraphernalia because she went up to the second floor of her house. She only
saw that the NBI men were bringing several items out of her house.[23]
The trial court agreed with the prosecution's theory that the warrantless arrests of OBET and Betty
were conducted within the purview of valid warrantless arrests enumerated in Section 5,[24] Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. It then ruled as valid the consented warrantless search conducted at the
house of Betty. Consequently, it found that the very items seized by the NBI agents at the kitchen
of Betty's guesthouse were admissible as the corpus delicti of the violation of Section 14-A of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Thus, the trial court "believed" that the paraphernalia seized were
indispensable to the processing or manufacturing of shabu into crystallized form. Although it
conceded that the prosecution witnesses did not actually see the crystallization processes, the trial
court observed that the Dangerous Drug Act does not require that there be actual manufacturing
activities at the time of the seizure.
The trial court, however, acquitted Betty for failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence that she,
in conspiracy with OBET, manufactured shabu without the requisite authority. It did not arrive at a
similar conclusion as far as OBET was concerned, but declared that based on the evidence on
record, OBET's guilt of the crime charged was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, in the
decision of 18 May 1998 the trial court decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence insufficient to warrant the conviction of accused Beatrice
Valerio y del Rosario for Violation of Sec. 14-a of Article III of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659,
this court pronounces her NOT GUILTY and considering that she is detained at the NBI the NBI is
directed to immediately release her from custody unless there be some reasons for her detention.
Finding, however, accused Robert Figueroa GUILTY as charged [of] the same offense in the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, this Court hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and to suffer the accessory
penalties provided by law, specifically Art. VI [sic] of the Revised Penal Code.
The Clerk of Court is directed to prepare the Mittimus for the immediate transfer of Robert Figueroa
to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City.
SO ORDERED.
Unsatisfied with the verdict, OBET appealed the decision to us. He principally premises his prayer
for acquittal on the failure of the State to show by convincing evidence that shortly prior to or during
custodial investigation, he was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to have a
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and to be informed of such
rights. He asserts that he did not waive those rights. Thus, whatever admissions were allegedly
extracted from him are inadmissible in evidence. Even assuming that his extrajudicial statements
were admissible, Betty's acquittal would work in his favor because the indictment is based on
conspiracy. In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Therefore, the acts imputed to him were
also the acts of Betty, and vice versa. Since the trial court considered insufficient for conviction the
acts of Betty, then he, too, should be acquitted.
In the Appellee's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that not all warrantless
searches and seizures are illegal. For one, a warrantless search and seizure is not unreasonable
and offensive to the Constitution if consent is shown. In this case, the prosecution convincingly
proved that Betty consented to the search of her house. With her consent, Betty validly waived her
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure. Consequently, the items seized in
her house by virtue of the consented search are admissible in evidence against her and OBET.
The OSG also contends that the acquittal of Betty does not per se work to absolve OBET of the
crime charged. Betty's believable disavowal of the location of the paraphernalia and other
circumstances on record reasonably indicative of her innocence cannot redound in favor of OBET.
The latter apparently knew the exact location of the hidden paraphernalia. By such disclosure, it is
not far-fetched to conclude that OBET had been actually engaged in the manufacture of shabu.
We first resolve the question of whether Betty's acquittal would benefit OBET.
We disagree with the theory of OBET that in an indictment based on conspiracy, the acquittal of a
conspirator likewise absolves a co-conspirator from criminal liability. Indeed, the rule is well-settled
that once a conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all, and each of the conspirators is
liable for the crimes committed by the other conspirators.[25] It follows then that if the prosecution
fails to prove conspiracy, the alleged conspirators should be held individually responsible for their
own respective acts. Accordingly, OBET's criminal liability in this case must be judged on the basis
of his own acts as established by the quantum of proof required in criminal cases.
We should then determine whether the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt
OBET's guilt for unauthorized manufacture of shabu, a regulated drug.
After a meticulous review of the records and of the evidence adduced by the parties in this case,
we find that what PALENCIA and SORIANO did left much to be desired, thereby resulting in a
bungled prosecution of the case. The evidence for the prosecution miserably failed to prove
OBET's guilt of the offense charged.
The buy-bust operation was a failure because no shabu or other regulated or prohibited drug was
found in OBET's person and residence. No evidence was adduced to show that OBET handed
shabu over to the informant. Yet, he was placed in custody. For what offense he was held in
custody does not, initially, appear very clear on the record.
It was established that OBET fired two shots toward the direction of PALENCIA and SORIANO and
held hostage his mistress and her two children. Yet he was not placed under custodial investigation
for such crimes as grave threats, coercion, illegal possession of firearms, or crimes other than that
with which he was charged.
On the contrary, OBET was held in custody and investigated or interrogated about the source of
the shabu, none of which was found during the buy-bust operation. In short he was held in custody
as a consequence of the failed buy-bust operation and as a follow-up to link him to the source and
establish a conspiracy in the illegal trade of shabu. Allegedly, he admitted that the source was
Betty. On the basis of that admission, PALENCIA and SORIANO, together with OBET, proceeded
to the residence of Betty. Needless to state, OBET cannot be investigated for anything in relation to
shabu while under custody without informing him of his rights to remain silent and to have a
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Any waiver of such rights should
be in writing and made in the presence of a counsel pursuant to Section 12 (1)[26], Article III of the
Constitution. It has been held that these rights attach from the moment the investigation starts, i.e.
when the investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or
admissions from the suspect.[27]
It is always incumbent upon the prosecution to prove at the trial that prior to in-custody questioning,
the confessant was informed of his constitutional rights. The presumption of regularity of official
acts does not prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence.[28] Hence, in the absence
of proof that the arresting officers complied with these constitutional safeguards, extrajudicial
statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, made during custodial investigation are
inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of a case.[29] In other words,
confessions and admissions in violation of Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution are
inadmissible in evidence against the declarant and more so against third persons.[30] This is so
even if such statements are gospel truth and voluntarily given.[31] Such statements are useless
except as evidence against the very police authorities who violated the suspect's rights.[32]
SORIANO admitted that the custodial investigation of OBET was conducted without the presence
of a lawyer, and there is no proof that OBET waived said right and the right to remain silent. No
waiver in writing and in the presence of a counsel was presented. Thus, pursuant to paragraph 3 of
Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution any admission obtained from OBET in the course of his
custodial investigation was inadmissible against him and cannot be used as a justification for the
search without a warrant.
questioning on illegal drugs.
There is no showing that the house occupied by Betty and the articles confiscated therefrom
belong to OBET. That OBET pointed to PALENCIA and SORIANO the places where the articles
were found provides no sufficient basis for a conclusion that they belonged to him. Even if the
articles thus seized actually belonged to him, they cannot be constitutionally and legally used
against him to establish his criminal liability therefor, since the seizure was the fruit of an invalid
custodial investigation.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the 18 May 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 259, Parañaque City, convicting herein accused-appellant Robert Figueroa of violation of
Section 14-A, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. He is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, and ORDERED immediately released
from confinement or detention unless his continued detention is warranted by virtue of a valid legal
cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to submit within five (5) days from
receipt of a copy of this decision a report on the release of accused-appellant.

The search conducted on Betty's house was allegedly consented to by Betty. Indeed, a consented
search is one of the exceptions to the requirement of a search warrant. In People v. Chua Ho San
@ Tsay Ho San,[33] we pointed out that:

This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such
warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in
instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4)
waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and (6) search incidental
to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally
valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a
valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1)
arrest flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee, against obtrusive

searches, it is fundamental that to constitute, a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists;
(2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such
right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.[34] The third condition
does not exist in the instant case. The fact is, Betty asked for a search warrant, thus:

Q And of course, these NBI Special Investigators informed you of their purpose is that correct?

A Yes sir.

Q And of course believing that there was nothing in your house you acceded?

A No sir, I was asking for a search warrant.

Q And what was their reply?

A They did not have any but that Figueroa had led them to the property.[35]

Neither can the search be appreciated as a search incidental to a valid warrantless arrest of either
Betty or OBET as intimated by the trial court. First, Betty's arrest did not precede the search.
Second, per the prosecution's evidence OBET was not arrested for possession or sale of regulated
or prohibited drugs as a consequence of the buy-bust operation. He surrendered after taking
hostage Estrella and her two children, although he was thereafter held in custody for further
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ENRIQUE LOPEZ and BIENVENIDA MISERICORDIA, Defendants-Appellants.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
On appeal to this Court is the October 12, 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
00411 affirming an earlier decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 98, which found
herein appellants Enrique Lopez y Diodor (Lopez) and Bienvenida Misericordia y Reytas @ "Nida" (Misericordia)
guilty of violating Section 4, Article II in relation to Section 2(e)1, F and I of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as
amended by Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 179, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
On July 11, 1997, in the RTC of Quezon City, an Information3 for violation of Section 4, Article II in relation to
Section 2(e)1, F and I of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, was filed against appellants Lopez and Misericordia.
Docketed in the RTC as Criminal Case No. Q-97-71868 which was raffled to Branch 98 of the court, the
Information alleges:
That on or about the 8th day of July, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating with and mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver,
transport or distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully and feloniously sell or offer for sale 51.98
grams of marijuana hashish, a prohibited drug to poseur-buyer SPOIII VENUSTO T. JAMISOLAMIN, in violation
of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, both accused entered a plea of "Not Guilty" to the crime charged.
However, on the day the trial was originally scheduled to commence, both accused, through counsel, manifested
their willingness to plead guilty. Accordingly, counsel moved for a suspension of the trial in order to file the
necessary pleading and to obtain the prosecution's conformity to the intended plea of guilty. The trial court
granted the motion.
Later, the two accused, again through counsel, filed a motion for a re-examination of the allegedly confiscated
item to determine the qualitative and quantitative contents thereof of marijuana hashish in the hope of availing of
the right to bail. Counsel, however, failed to attend several subsequent hearings impelling the trial court to
appoint a new counsel in behalf of both accused. The new counsel reiterated the earlier motion for a re-
examination of the confiscated item expressing intention towards plea bargaining should the results of the re-
examination justify the filing of a
new and less serious charge. Though granted, the desired re-examination yielded the same result.
In time, trial ensued. Two conflicting versions of events emerged from the varying testimonies of the prosecution
and defense witnesses.
To substantiate its charge, the prosecution presented police narcotics operatives SPO2 William Manglo, a
member of the buy-bust team, and SPO4 Venusto Jamisolamin, the alleged poseur-buyer. The testimony of the
forensic chemist was dispensed with after stipulations were made as to what she would have testified on.
As narrated by SPOs Manglo and Jamisolamin, the prosecution’s version of the incident is as follows:
At eight o'clock in the morning of July 1, 1997, a report was made that a certain "Iking" of Don Pepe St., Brgy.
Sto. Domingo, Quezon City was engaged in the sale of shabu, marijuana and hashish. Thereafter, a surveillance
team was formed headed by P/Insp. Joselito Dominguez and composed of SPO2 Wilmer G. Antonio, SPO2
Manglo, SPO4 Jamisolamin and the confidential informant. The surveillance conducted by the team from July 2
to 5, 1997 confirmed the report of illegal drug activities of "Iking" which turned out to be a mere alias for accused
Lopez. The surveillance further disclosed that co-accused Misericordia was working with "Iking" in the latter’s
illegal activities.
On July 7, 1997, the police informant accompanied SPO4 Jamisolamin to the place of Lopez where a test-buy
was successfully conducted. Lopez and Misericordia handed over a sample of marijuana to
SPO4 Jamisolamin and it was agreed that a bigger volume of marijuana would be made available the next night.
At eight o'clock in the following evening, July 8, 1997, the team returned to the place of Lopez where its members
positioned themselves in the vicinity while the informant and the disguised poseur-buyer, SPO4 Jamisolamin,
entered Lopez’s house. SPO4 Jamisolamin brought along P10,000.00 boodle money and a Voyager alarm
signal. When SPO4 Jamisolamin flashed the money, Lopez ordered Misericordia to get the drugs and the latter
promptly handed over to SPO4 Jamisolamin a rectangular object wrapped in aluminum foil. While examining the
object, SPO4 Jamisolamin pressed the Voyager alarm and returned to where his companions were stationed.
The team then apprehended the two accused and brought them to the police station while the seized evidence
was forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for technical analysis. The standard tests were conducted, the result
of which proved that the seized evidence was positive for marijuana resin (or hashish), a prohibited drug.
The defense has an entirely different account of what supposedly transpired on the evening of July 8, 1997.
Through the testimonies of the two accused who both categorically denied having sold marijuana hashish on the
evening in question, the defense belabored to establish that at about six o’clock in the early evening of July 8,
1997, Misericordia was conversing with neighbors along Don Pepe Street when a car stopped. Among those on
board the car were men, two of whom Misericordia later learned were SPO4 Jamisolamin and SPO2 Antonio.
The two approached Misericordia and the neighbors she was conversing with and allegedly asked if they knew a
man named Peralta. Misericordia answered in the affirmative, got into the car on request of SPO4 Jamisolamin
and SPO2 Antonio and, after going around, showed them the house of Peralta where she pointed Lopez out. The
two police officers picked up Lopez, made him crouch inside the car and thereafter drove around the streets of
the neighborhood until about nine o’clock that same evening when the two of them i.e., Misericordia and Lopez,
were brought to the police station in Kamuning, thereat booked and detained and brought out for inquest days
later.
In a decision4 dated August 10, 2004, the trial court found both accused GUILTY as charged and sentenced
them accordingly, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds both accused Enrique Lopez y Diodor and Bienvenida
Misericordia y Reytas guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 4, Article II in relation to Section
2(e) 1, F and I of R.A. 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179 in selling 51.98 grams of marijuana resin
and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance present. The prohibited drug seized from the accused is hereby forfeited in favor of the
government, to be disposed in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
Therefrom, both accused went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 00411. As stated at the outset hereof, the
CA, in its decision5 of October 12, 2005, finding no basis for reversal, affirmed that of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, appellants’ present recourse raising the sole issue of whether or not the two courts below gravely erred in
finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 4, Article II in relation to Section 2(e)1, F and
I of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by BP Blg. 179.
We DENY.
Appellants' main arguments rest on their two submissions, namely:
1) Lack of credibility of the testimonies of prosecution's witnesses; and
2) Failure of the prosecution to present the police confidential informant.
It is appellants’ posture that the immediate sale to SPO4 Jamisolamin of an enormous amount of marijuana
hashish on the evening of July 8, 1997, even as they met Jamisolamin only that evening, is not in conformity with
knowledge, nor consistent with the experience of mankind, hence incredible and unworthy of belief.6 On this
score, they invoke the ruling in People v. Pagaura,[7]where the Court stated inter alia:
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses not only appear to be improbable but also incredible. We find it
rather foolish that one who peddles illegal drugs would boldly and unashamedly present his wares to total
strangers, lest he be caught in flagrante when, as has been demonstrated in similar cases, such nefarious deals
are carried on with utmost secrecy or whispers to avoid detection.
Pagaura, however, stems from an entirely different factual milieu. There, the accused approached the police-
witnesses who were then in civilian clothes requesting the latter’s assistance in securing a boat ticket at the
wharf. Pagaura allegedly insisted on their help since he was afraid of the inspection due to his black bag
containing a kilo of marijuana. To convince the men, Pagaura allegedly opened his bag right then and there to
show them the marijuana.
It is not difficult to understand why the Court in Pagaura dismissed such a tall tale of the prosecution. For it is
indeed hard to believe that a person carrying a known prohibited substance would approach complete strangers
to display his wares on the pretext that he was eliciting help from those absolute strangers.
In the present case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses do not suffer from the same inherent
incredibility, as in Pagaura. SPO4 Jamisolamin was accompanied by the informant who was familiar with the
appellants. Furthermore, the night prior to the actual buy-bust operation, the informant and Jamisolamin had met
with the appellants, successfully concluded a test-buy and agreed to meet again the following night for the sale of
a larger quantity. A case more in point would be People v. Chua:[8]
xxx In a string of cases we have held that it is not uncommon for drug dealers to sell their commodities to total
strangers heedless of time or place. Besides, the law does not prescribe as an element of the crime that the
vendor and vendee be familiar with each other. What matters in a drug related case is not the existing familiarity
between the seller and the buyer, but their agreement and the acts constituting the same and delivery of the
prohibited drugs. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx [D]rug pushers do not confine their trade to known customers; complete strangers are accommodated
provided they have the money to pay. Moreover, why a dealer would trust a buyer, which is to say the motive
behind a drug deal, is not an essential element of drug-related offense.
It is appellants' next submission that the prosecution should have presented the confidential informant as a
witness, failing in which a hiatus exists in the prosecution’s evidence. To back up their submission, appellants cite
People v. Bagano[9] and People v. Rojo.[10] Sadly, however, the cases relied upon do not again factually sit
squarely with the case at hand.
In general, the presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it
indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative.
In a case involving the sale of illegal drugs, what should be proven beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of the
sale itself. Hence, like the non-presentation of the marked money used in buying the contraband, the non-
presentation of the informer would not necessarily create a hiatus in the prosecution's evidence.11
For sure, unlike the instant case, Bagano and Rojo arose from a set of circumstances which provide exceptions
to the foregoing general rule. In the two cases invoked by appellants, the testimony of the informant would not be
merely corroborative and cumulative, but was direct and material to the defense of the accused. Hence, it was
absolutely necessary that the accused in those cases were offered the chance to cross-examine the informants.
In both Bagano and Rojo, the testimony of the witnesses presented by the prosecution in lieu of the informants
suffered from the defect of being merely hearsay as only the confidential informant was in a position to testify
from personal knowledge as to the actual sale.
In Bagano, the testimonies of the prosecution's principal witness were mere translations and/or interpretations of
what the accused supposedly said in the dialect to and interpreted by the informant. As such, the informant’s
testimony was pure hearsay. Not only that. In Bagano, the informant's testimony was particularly crucial due to
the accused's claim in that case that the prohibited drug belonged to the informant himself. The Court went on to
say in Bagano:
Emateo's non-production as a witness could have been excused had he merely played the part of a true
informer. An informer is one who communicates knowledge of someone having committed or about to commit a
crime to the proper authorities who by themselves, acting independently, may obtain evidence necessary for the
prosecution of the offender. On the contrary, he did more than that. He played a substantial
part in the act complained of and is in fact claimed by the appellant as the real owner of the subject marijuana.
The case of Sorrentino v. U.S. (163 F. 2d 627 [1947]), provides the distinction between one who played the part
of a mere informer and a decoy. There, the defendant was charged for an illegal sale of opium in favor of a
person, the identity of whom the US government claims to be confidential. Objections as regards questions
seeking to ascertain his identity were sustained by the trial court on the ground that it will violate the privilege of
withholding the identity of informers. In reversing the trial court, it was held that:
"If the person whom Grady called an informer had been an informer and nothing more, appellant would not have
been entitled to have his identity disclosed; but the person whom Grady called an informer was something more.
He was the person to whom appellant was said to have sold and dispensed the opium described in the
indictment. Information as to this person's identity was therefore material to appellant's defense xxx."
The particular factual backdrop in Rojo likewise provided for the indispensability of the confidential informant as a
crucial witness:
The theory of the prosecution is that the informant acted as buyer in the entrapment proceedings. However, the
alleged informant was never presented as a witness. His identity was never revealed because it was supposed to
be confidential information.
The evidence of the prosecution on the matter of the participation of the informant as alleged buyer in the
entrapment proceedings is contradictory. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
Obviously, there is a fatal flaw in the prosecution's evidence on how the alleged entrapment proceedings took
place. The so-called informant was never presented as a witness and he was never identified. His having acted
as buyer in the alleged entrapment proceedings was not established as a fact by evidence beyond reasonable
doubt because of the contradictory evidence as to who really posed as buyer. There is now even a doubt as to
whether or not the entrapment proceedings ever took place at all.
xxx xxx xxx
These are the facts as found by the trial court which show that none of the prosecution witnesses actually saw
the appellant deliver the alleged bag of flowering tops of marijuana which was allegedly sold to the informant. It
also indicates that they did not see the informant pay the alleged consideration of the sale with a 10-peso bill.
They just assumed that the transaction was consummated upon a signal from the informant. There is, therefore,
no direct evidence, much less conclusive proof, to establish the alleged unlawful sale of marijuana being pinned
on appellant.
On the other hand, the present case does not confront us with a situation where it can be said that the
informant's testimony is indispensable such that a conviction would be baseless without it. Here, it was SPO4
Jamisolamin, whose testimony was duly adduced, that acted as poseur-buyer. He testified as to his own personal
knowledge of the sale that had taken place. The informant's testimony, then, would have been merely
corroborative and cumulative because the fact of sale of the prohibited drug was already established by the direct
testimony of SPO4 Jamisolamin who actively took part in the transaction. If the prosecution has several
eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, it need not present all of them but only as many as may be needed to meet
the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies
of the other witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with for being merely corroborative in nature.12
We have, in numerous cases, made clear the policy of the Court, founded on reason and experience, to sustain
the factual findings of the trial court in criminal cases. We give full credence to the appreciation of testimonial
evidence by the trial court especially if what is at issue is the credibility of the witnesses. The oft-repeated
principle is that where the credibility of a witness is an issue, great respect is accorded to the trial court’s
evaluation thereof. This is as it should be. For, in the nature of things, the trial court is in the best position to
assess issues of credibility because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.13
Besides, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they enjoy the presumption of
having performed their duties in a regular manner, unless, of course, there is evidence to the contrary suggesting
ill-motive on their part or deviation from the regular performance of their duties,14 none of which exists in this
case.
There is absolutely no evidence to show that the members of the buy-bust team who were presented as
witnesses were motivated by any reason other than their official duty. If indeed there was a frame-up, the officers
must have known appellants prior to the incident.15 However, appellant Lopez himself admitted neither knowing
these police officers nor having any kind of history with them.
Absent proof of any intent on the part of the police officers to falsely impute commission of a crime against
appellants, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty stands. Appellants’ self-serving claim
of a frame-up must simply collapse.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the CA, affirmatory of that of the trial
court, is AFFIRMED.
ROLANDO PONSICA et al - petitioners vs HON. EMILIO M. IGNALAGA, Presiding Judge,
Municipal Trial Court of Escalante, Negros Occidental, MAYOR BRAULIO LUMAYNO, CAPT. Issue:
MODESTO SAN-SON, CAPT. RAFAEL JUGAN, respondents. Does the mayor have the mayor have the power to conduct preliminary investigations and issue
arrest warrants?
(((The chief issue raised by the petitioners in this case is whether or not Section 143 of the Local
Government Code granting power to the municipal mayor to conduct preliminary investigations and Held:
order the arrest of the accused, was repealed by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure No. It must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the state of the law
promulgated by this Court; and is, in addition, unconstitutional as vesting the power to conduct as it was in September, 1985. The law has since been alter. No longer does the mayor have at this
preliminary investigations in an official who cannot be deemed a "neutral and detached magistrate" time the power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143
within the contemplation of Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. The issue is hereby of the Local Government Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered
resolved adversely to the petitioners, with the stressed qualification that the mayor's power to order functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its
arrest ceased to exist as of February 2, 1987 when the new Constitution was ratified by the Filipino ratification by the Filipino people.
people, and that, in any event, the investigation actually conducted by respondent mayor in the Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently manifest thenceforth, the function of
case at bar was fatally defective))) determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search
Facts: warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the
Shortly after noon on September 20, 1985, an attempt was made by firemen and soldiers to present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law"
disperse a crowd of demonstrators massed in front of the Municipal Building of Escalante, Negros found in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution.
Occidental, with the use first, of water spewed from fire hoses, and later, tear gas. Eventually there The mayor may no longer conduct preliminary investigation, the authority to do so being limited
was gunfire. Within moments, rallyists lay dead on and by the National Road. The fatalities under Section 2, Rule 1 1 2 of the Rules of Court to (1) provincial or city fiscals and their assistants;
numbered fifteen (15), according to the military officers; twenty-nine (29), according to the (2) judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (3) national and regional
demonstrators. state prosecutors; and (d) such other officers as may be authorized by law. But only "the judge"
In the afternoon of that day, Escalante Town Mayor Braulio Lumayno, in view of the absence of the may issue search and arrest warrants after due determination of probable cause.
Municipal Circuit Court Judge (Emilio Ignalaga), took cognizance of a complaint filed by the Military it is required that: "(1) The judge (or) officer must examine the ** witnesses personally; (2) The
Station Commander charging some of the rallyists with the felony of inciting to sedition, and after examination must be under oath; and (3) The examination must be reduced to writing in the form of
avowedly conducting an investigation of the witnesses presented by the complainant, issued an searching questions and answers.
order for the arrest of certain of the demonstrators. THUS, certiorari and prohibition are granted. The order of respondent Mayor Lumayno issued on
About an hour afterwards, fire trucks arrived one after another, as well as jeeploads of soldiers and September 20, 1985 and the resolution promulgated by respondent Judge Ignalaga on October 11,
CHDF members, in full combat gear, Shortly after noon, after "going thru the motions of negotiating 1985 are annulled and set aside, and the respondents are perpetually forbidden to enforce or in
with the demonstrators," the military officers ordered the crowd to disperse; but without warning, any way implement the orders for the arrest of any of the petitioners. No costs.
fire hoses were trained on and sprayed water at the demonstrators. When the rallyists did not
budge, tear gas canisters were thrown at them. A demonstrator picked up a canister and threw it at
an "empty space in the plaza" The soldier and CHDF members thereupon fired indiscriminately at
the crowd, killing 29 and injuring at least 30 persons.
After the Mayor had referred the case to Municipal Trial Court Judge Ignalaga on September 24,
1985,12 an "URGENT MOTION TO QUASH WARRANT OF ARREST" was filed on September 26,
1985 by petitioners' counsel on the ground that a mayor no longer has authority to conduct
preliminary investigations or issue warrants of arrest that authority having been "withheld in the
1985 New Rules on Criminal Procedure."
This was opposed by the Station Commander who invoked Section 143 of the Local Government
Code providing that "(i)n case of temporary absence of the Judge assigned to the municipality, the
mayor may conduct the preliminary examination in criminal cases when, in his opinion the
investigation cannot be delayed without prejudice to the interest of justice.
A reply was filed by the petitioners after their receipt of the opposition "only last October 8, 1985."
They contended that the "power of the municipal mayor to conduct preliminary investigation and
issue a warrant of arrest under the 1964 Revised Rules of Court** (had been) impliedly repealed by
the 1985 New Rules on Criminal Procedure;" that "the 1985 New Rules on Criminal Procedure
being a special law, controls over provisions of the Local Government Code (BP 337, 1983), which
is a general law;" and in any case, "subject warrants of arrest should be reviewed and revoked as
done without observance of legal requisites."

The Judge confirmed the mayor's arrest order. He opined that in the absence of the judge, the
mayor still has authority to conduct preliminary investigations and issue arrest warrants since Rule
112, Sec. 2 (d), of the 1985 Rules, includes as among those authorized to conduct preliminary
investigations, "Such other officers as may be authorized by law;" and the Local G government
Code of 1983, Section 143, grants a town mayor authority to conduct preliminary examinations in
case of the temporary absence of the judge when such investigation cannot be delayed without
prejudice to the interest of justice. The Judge declared that in the case at bar, the mayor had
conducted the examination personally, and having in the exercise of his discretion found probable
cause, issued the warrants of arrest in question; and conceding arguendo irregularity in that the
preliminary examination was conducted without according the parties the assistance of lawyers