Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DISSENTING OPINION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On 11 September 2009, the Court rendered a Decision in the instant case disqualifying Rosalinda A. Penera from running as Mayor of
Sta. Monica, Surigao Del Norte for engaging in the prohibited act of premature campaigning.
Penera forthwith filed a Motion for Reconsideration1 of the above Decision, invoking the following arguments, to wit:
1) Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Section 13
of Republic Act No. 9369.2
2) Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code was expressly repealed by Republic Act No. 9369.3
3) The petition for disqualification failed to submit convincing and substantial evidence against Penera for violation of Section 80 of
the Omnibus Election Code.4
4) Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition for disqualification and has consistently disputed the charge of premature
campaigning.5
5) The admission that Penera participated in a motorcade is not the same as admitting she engaged in premature election
campaigning.6
I vote to deny the Motion for Reconsideration.
Penera’s Motion for Reconsideration
The basic issues in the Motion for Reconsideration were already passed upon in the Decision dated 11 September 2009 and no
substantial arguments were raised.
The grounds that: (1) Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436, as
amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369; (2) Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code was expressly repealed by Republic
Act No. 9369; and (3) the petition for disqualification failed to submit convincing and substantial evidence against Penera for
violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are all reiterations of her previous arguments before the Court and the same
had already been adequately addressed in the Decision dated 11 September 2009.
Incidentally, Penera herself disclosed in her Motion for Reconsideration that she is the respondent in a criminal case filed by Edgar
T. Andanar for the commission of election offenses in violation of the Omnibus Election Code, which is docketed as EO Case No. 08-
99.7 Thus, the pronouncement in the Decision dated 11 September 2009 that the instant case should concern only the electoral
aspect of the disqualification case finds more reason. As noted in the Decision, any discussion on the matter of Penera’s criminal
liability for premature campaigning would have been preemptive and nothing more than obiter dictum.
With respect to the assertion that Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition for disqualification and has consistently
disputed the charge of premature campaigning, the same is utterly without merit. Penera admitted participating in the motorcade
after filing her COC. What she merely denied and/or refuted were the minor details concerning the conduct of said motorcade.
Likewise, Penera’s contention that her admission of participating in the motorcade in this case is not the same as admitting that she
engaged in premature campaigning deserves scant consideration. Logically, to admit to the elements constituting the offense of
premature campaigning is to admit to the commission of the said offense. Precisely, it is the act of participating in the motorcade
after the filing of her COC that constituted the prohibited act of premature campaigning in the instant case.
Finally, the claim of Penera that not all motorcades are designed to promote the election of a candidate is unimpressive. Clearly,
the context of the discussion on motorcades in the Decision dated 11 September 2009 was disregarded. The discussion pertained to
motorcades conducted during election periods by candidates and their supporters. In such an instance, a motorcade assumes an
entirely different significance and that is to promote a candidate.
As held in the Decision dated 11 September 2009, the conduct of a motorcade during election periods is a form of election campaign
or partisan political activity, falling squarely within the ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, on "[h]olding
political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate[.]" The obvious purpose of the conduct of motorcades during
election periods is to introduce the candidates and the positions to which they seek to be elected to the voting public; or to make
them more visible so as to facilitate the recognition and recollection of their names in the minds of the voters come election time.
The pretense that the motorcade was only a convoy of vehicles, which was entirely an unplanned event that dispersed eventually,
does not hold water. After filing their certificates of candidacy, Rosalinda Penera and the other members of her political party
conducted a motorcade and went around the different barangays in the municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao Del Norte. The
motorcade consisted of two (2) jeepneys and ten (10) motorcycles, which were all festooned with multi-colored balloons. There was
marching music being played on the background and the individuals onboard the vehicles threw candies to the people they passed by
along the streets. With the number of vehicles, the balloons, the background marching music, the candies on hand and the route
that took them to the different barangays, the motorcade could hardly be considered as spontaneous and unplanned.
Majority Opinion
Although the majority opinion initially mentions the above-stated grounds of Penera’s Motion for Reconsideration, the same were
not at all discussed. The Resolution of the majority purely involves an exposition of the grounds set forth in the Dissenting Opinion
of Justice Antonio T. Carpio to the Decision dated 11 September 2009.
At the outset, the majority opinion highlights the relevant provisions of law defining the meaning of a candidate.
Under Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, a candidate is "any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who
has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties." On the
other hand, the second sentence in the third paragraph of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No.
9369, states that "[a]ny person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the
start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." The first proviso in the same paragraph provides that
"unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period."
The majority opinion goes on to quote a paragraph in the Decision dated 11 September 2009, underscoring a portion of the same as
follows:
When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can
already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her [certificate of candidacy (COC)] and prior to the campaign period, as the
promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified.
According to the interpretation of the majority of the above pronouncement, the Decision dated 11 September 2009 already
considers a person who filed a COC a "candidate" even before the start of the campaign period. From the filing of the COC, even
before the start of the campaign period, the ponente allegedly considers the partisan political acts of a person filing a COC "as the
promotion of his/her election as a candidate."
The majority clearly mistook the import of the above-quoted portion and read the same out of context. Absolutely nowhere in the
Decision dated 11 September 2009 was it stated that a person who filed a COC is already deemed a candidate even before the start
of the campaign period.
To recall, the Court held in its Decision that Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which defines the prohibited act of premature
campaigning, was not repealed, expressly or impliedly, by Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended.
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:
SECTION 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. — It shall be unlawful for any person,
whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan
political activity except during the campaign period: x x x.
While relevant portions of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, provide:
SECTION.15. Official Ballot. – x x x
xxxx
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall
only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That,
unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period[.]
The Court harmonized and reconciled the above provisions in this wise:
The following points are explanatory:
First, Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, on premature campaigning, explicitly provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any
person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or
partisan political activity, except during the campaign period." Very simply, premature campaigning may be committed even by a
person who is not a candidate.
For this reason, the plain declaration in Lanot that "[w]hat Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits is ‘an election
campaign or partisan political activity’ by a ‘candidate’ ‘outside’ of the campaign period," is clearly erroneous.
Second, Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines election campaign or partisan political activity in the following manner:
SECTION 79. Definitions. - As used in this Code:
xxxx
(b) The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a
particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting
votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any candidate for public
office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
True, that pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even after the filing of the COC but before the start of the
campaign period, a person is not yet officially considered a candidate. Nevertheless, a person, upon the filing of his/her COC,
already explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate in the coming elections. The commission by such a person of any
of the acts enumerated under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e., holding rallies or parades, making speeches, etc.)
can, thus, be logically and reasonably construed as for the purpose of promoting his/her intended candidacy.
When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can
already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election
as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified. x x x (Underscoring supplied.)
The last paragraph of the aforequoted portion of the Decision dated 11 September 2009 should be read together with, and qualified
by, the paragraph immediately preceding it. Clearly, the ponente was quite explicit in stating that, after the filing of the COC but
before the start of the campaign period, a person is not yet considered a candidate. After filing the COC, however, the commission
by such person of the acts enumerated under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code can already be construed as being for the
purpose of promoting his/her intended candidacy.
Thereafter, it is only at the start of the campaign period, when said person is already a formal candidate, that the partisan political
acts that he/she committed after the filing of the COC can already be considered as being for the promotion of his/her election as a
candidate; hence, constituting premature campaigning.
Reversal of Lanot v. Commission on Elections
The majority likewise ascribes error on the part of the ponente for reversing Lanot, which held that a person should be a candidate
before premature campaigning may be committed. Resolved under the auspices of Republic Act No. 8436,8 the previous automation
law, Lanot was allegedly decided on the ground that one who files a COC is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
Supposably, Congress wanted to ensure that any person filing a COC under the early deadline required by the automated election
system would not be disqualified for any partisan political act done prior to the start of the campaign period. In enacting Republic
Act No. 9369, Congress expressly wrote the Lanot doctrine into the second sentence, third paragraph, Sec. 15 of Republic Act No.
8436, which states that "[a]ny person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the period for filing COCs] shall only be
considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy."
The majority, therefore, concludes that the ponente cannot reverse Lanot without repealing the above sentence, since to reverse
Lanot would mean repealing the said sentence. The ponente, however, in reversing Lanot does not claim that the second sentence
or any portion of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, is unconstitutional. Thus, the Decision dated 11 September 2009 is
supposedly self-contradictory – reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the second sentence, which embodies the
Lanot doctrine. In so doing, the majority avers that the majority decision is irreconcilably in conflict with the clear intent and letter
of the second sentence, third paragraph of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369.
The majority opinion arrives at an erroneous conclusion based on a faulty premise.
Lanot was decided on the basis of the requirement therein that there must be first a candidate before the prohibited act of
premature campaigning may be committed.
In Lanot v. Commission on Elections,9 Lanot, et al., filed a petition for disqualification against the then Pasig City mayoralty
candidate Vicente P. Eusebio for engaging in various forms of election campaign on different occasions outside of the designated
campaign period after he filed his COC during the 2004 local elections. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Law Department
recommended the disqualification of Eusebio for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which recommendation was
approved by the COMELEC First Division. The COMELEC en banc referred the case back to the COMELEC Law Department to
determine whether Eusebio actually committed the acts subject of the petition for disqualification.
The Court, speaking through Justice Carpio, adjudged that Eusebio was not liable for premature campaigning given that the latter
committed partisan political acts before he became a candidate. The Court construed the application of Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 8463 vis-à-vis the provisions of Sections 80 and 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 moved
the deadline for the filing of certificates of candidacy to 120 days before election day. The Court ruled that the only purpose for the
early filing of COCs was to give ample time for the printing of official ballots. Congress, however, never intended the early filing of
a COC to make the person filing to become immediately a "candidate" for purposes other than the printing of ballots. This legislative
intent prevented the immediate application of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code to those filing to meet the early deadline.
The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by existing law" prior to Republic Act No. 8436
and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be considered as a candidate."10
Simply stated, the Court adjudged in Lanot that when Eusebio filed his COC to meet the early deadline set by COMELEC, he did not
thereby immediately become a candidate. Thus, there was no premature campaigning since there was no candidate to begin with. It
is on this ground that the majority reversed Lanot.
The ponente reiterates that the existence of a candidate is not necessary before premature campaigning may be committed. Section
80 of the Omnibus Election Code unequivocally provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or
candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity, except during
the campaign period." Very specific are the wordings of the law that the individual who may be held liable to commit the unlawful
act of premature campaigning can be any person: a voter or non-voter, a candidate or a non-candidate.
Furthermore, as already previously discussed, Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code was not repealed by Section 15 of RA 8436,
as amended by RA 9369. In construing the said provisions, as well as that of Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, which
defines the meaning of the term candidate, the majority has settled that, after the filing of the COC but before the start of the
campaign period, a person is yet to be considered a formal candidate. Nonetheless, by filing the COC, the person categorically and
explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate. Thereafter, if such person commits the acts enumerated under Section
79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code, said acts can already be construed as for the purpose of promoting his/her intended
candidacy.1avvphi1
Thus, contrary to the majority opinion, the Decision dated 11 September 2009 is not self-contradictory. The ponente can reverse
Lanot and still uphold the second sentence, third paragraph of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended.
The majority also stresses that in the enactment of Republic Act No. 9369, Congress inserted the word "only" to the first proviso in
the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 so that the same now reads:
Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign
period.
Thus, Congress even strengthened its mandatory directive that election offenses can be committed by a candidate "only" upon the
start of the campaign period. Accusing the ponente of giving a specious reasoning in explaining the above proviso, the majority
points out to the basic principle of law that any act is lawful, unless expressly declared as unlawful. Therefore, the majority claims
that there was no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, that partisan political activities
before the start of the campaign period are lawful. The logical conclusion is that partisan political acts, if done before the start of
the campaign period, are lawful. According to the majority, any election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any
election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period.
The ponente takes exception to the above sweeping and unwarranted reasoning. Not all election offenses are required to be
committed by a candidate and, like the prohibited act of premature campaigning, not all election offenses are required to be
committed after the start of the campaign period. To reiterate, Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which defines the
prohibited act of premature campaigning is still good law despite the passage of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended.
Precisely, the conduct of election campaign or partisan political activity before the campaign period is the very evil that Section 80
seeks to prevent.
The majority opinion maintains its objection to the allegedly strained construction and/or interpretation of the ponente of the
particular provisions involved in this case. With equal vehemence, however, the ponente adamantly rejects the majority’s absurd
and unwarranted theory of repeal of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code put forth in both the Dissenting Opinion to the
Decision dated 11 September 2009 and the Resolution of the majority.
As the majority repeatedly pointed out, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, was enacted
merely to give the COMELEC ample time for the printing of ballots. Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other hand, is a
substantive law which defines the prohibited act of premature campaigning, an election offense punishable with the gravest of
penalties that can be imposed on a candidate, i.e., disqualification or, if elected, removal from office. If the majority opinion
indignantly rejects the attempts of the ponente to reconcile the provisions of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section
15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, then why should they insist on repealing the former provision and not the latter?
The ponente emphasizes that whether the election would be held under the manual or the automated system, the need for
prohibiting premature campaigning – to level the playing field between the popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and the lesser-
known or poorer candidates, on the other, by allowing them to campaign only within the same limited period – remains. Again, the
choice as to who among the candidates will the voting public bestow the privilege of holding public office should not be swayed by
the shrewd conduct, verging on bad faith, of some individuals who are able to spend resources to promote their candidacies in
advance of the period slated for campaign activities.
However, by virtue of the Resolution of the majority, premature campaigning will now be officially decriminalized and, as a
consequence, the value and significance of having a campaign period will now be utterly negated. Thus, one year, five years or even
ten years prior to the day of the elections, a person aspiring for public office may now engage in election campaign or partisan
political activities to promote his candidacy, with impunity. All he needs to have is a very deep campaign war chest to be able to
carry out this shrewd activity.
Indeed, while fair elections has been dealt a fatal blow by the Resolution of the majority, it is fervently hoped that the writing of
the Decision dated 11 September 2009 and this Dissenting Opinion will not be viewed as an effort made in vain if in the future the
said Resolution can be revisited and somehow rectified.
Premises considered, there is no reason to reverse and set aside the earlier ruling of the Court rendered in this case.
I, therefore, vote to DENY WITH FINALITY the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Rosalinda A. Penera on the Decision dated 11
September 2009.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
DISSENTING OPINION
ABAD, J.:
The Facts and the Case
Petitioner Rosalinda Penera and respondent Edgar Andanar ran for mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao Del Norte, during the May 14, 2007
elections.
On March 29, 2007 a motorcade by petitioner Penera’s political party preceded the filing of her certificate of candidacy before the
Municipal Election Officer of Sta. Monica. Because of this, on April 2, 2007 Andanar filed with the Regional Election Director for
Region 13 in SPA 07-224 a petition to disqualify1 Penera, among others,2 for engaging in election campaign before the start of the
campaign period.
Andanar claimed that Penera and her partymates went around Sta. Monica on March 29, announcing their candidacies and asking the
people to vote for them in the coming elections. Answering the petition, Penera claimed that although a motorcade preceded the
filing of her certificate of candidacy, she merely observed the usual practice of holding a motorcade on such momentous occasion,
but which celebration ended soon after she filed her certificate. Penera claimed that no one made a speech during the event. All
they had were lively background music and "a grand standing for the purpose of raising the hands of the candidates in the
motorcade."
The parties presented their position papers and other evidence in the case. 3 Afterwards, the regional office forwarded its record to
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Manila where the case was raffled to the Second Division for resolution. But the elections
of May 14, 2007 overtook it, with petitioner Penera winning the election for Mayor of Sta. Monica. She assumed office on July 2,
2007.
On July 24, 2007 the COMELEC’s Second Division issued a resolution, disqualifying petitioner Penera from continuing as a mayoralty
candidate in Sta. Monica on the ground that she engaged in premature campaigning in violation of Sections 80 and 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code. The Second Division found that she, her partymates, and a bevy of supporters held a motorcade of two trucks and
numerous motorcycles laden with balloons, banners, and posters that showed the names of their candidates and the positions they
sought. One of the trucks had a public speaker that announced Penera’s candidacy for mayor.
Petitioner Penera filed before the COMELEC en banc a motion for reconsideration4 of the Second Division’s July 24, 2007 resolution.
The En Banc denied her motion on January 30, 2008.5 Still undeterred, Penera came up to this Court. On September 11, 2009 an
almost evenly divided Court affirmed the ruling of the COMELEC. On motion for reconsideration, however, the number of votes
shifted in favor of granting the petition and reversing the ruling of the COMELEC.
The Issue
The core issue that divided the Court is whether or not petitioner Penera’s act of campaigning for votes immediately preceding the
filing of her certificate of candidacy on March 29, 2007 violates the prohibition in Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against
premature campaigning, with the result that she is disqualified from holding office in accordance with Section 68 of the Code.
Discussion
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits any person, whether a candidate or not, from engaging in election campaign or
partisan political activity except during the campaign period fixed by law.
Apart from its penal consequence, the law disqualifies any candidate who engages in premature campaigning from holding the office
to which he was elected. Section 68 of the Code reads:
SECTION. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision
of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having x x x (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,
paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected,
from holding the office; x x x. (Underscoring supplied.)
Since the COMELEC found petitioner Penera guilty of having led on March 29, 2007 a colorful and noisy motorcade that openly
publicized her candidacy for mayor of Sta. Monica, this Court held in its original decision that the COMELEC correctly disqualified
her from holding the office to which she was elected.
The current majority of the Court claims, however, that with the passage of Republic Act (R.A.) 9369, a candidate who campaigns
before the official campaign period may no longer be regarded as having committed an unlawful act that constitutes ground for
disqualification. The majority’s reasoning is as follows:
a. Section 79 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code states that a candidate is "any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public
office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of
parties."
b. It is a person’s filing of a certificate of candidacy, therefore, that marks the beginning of his being a candidate. It is also such
filing that marks his assumption of the responsibilities that goes with being a candidate. Before Penera filed her certificate of
candidacy on March 29, 2007, she could not be regarded as having assumed the responsibilities of a "candidate."
c. One of these responsibilities is the duty not to commit acts that are forbidden a candidate such as campaigning for votes before
the start of the prescribed period for election campaigns. Premature campaigning is a crime and constitutes a ground for
disqualification from the office that the candidate seeks.
d. But, with the amendment of Section 15 of R.A. 8436 by Section 13 of R.A. 9369, a person’s filing of a certificate of candidacy
does not now automatically mark him as a "candidate." He shall be regarded a "candidate," says Section 15, only at the start of the
campaign period. Further, the "unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
aforesaid campaign period."
It is significant that before the passage of R.A. 9369 a candidate for a local office had up to the day before the start of the campaign
period (which in the case of a local election consists of 45 days before the eve of election day) within which to file his certificate of
candidacy and, thus, be regarded as a "candidate." But the need for time to print the ballots with the names of the candidates on
them under the automated election system prompted Congress to authorize the COMELEC to set a deadline for the filing of the
certificates of candidacy long before the start of the campaign period. Thus, the pertinent portion of Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as
amended, provides:
SECTION 15. Official ballot. –
xxxx
For this purpose [the printing of ballots], the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/ petition for
registration/ manifestation to participate in the election. x x x
xxxx
Evidently, while Congress was willing to provide for advance filing of certificates of candidacy, it did not want to impose on those
who file early certificates the responsibilities of being already regarded as "candidates" even before the start of the campaign
period. Thus, the same Section 15 provides further on:
Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy; x x x.
In Penera’s case, she filed her certificate of candidacy on March 29, 2007. Section 15 does not yet treat her as "candidate" then.
Only at the start of the official campaign period on March 30, 2007 was she to be considered as such "candidate." To emphasize this,
Congress provided further on in Section 15 that an early filer’s responsibility as a candidate begins only when the campaign period
begins. Thus –
Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign
period; x x x.
The current majority concludes from the above that from the time R.A. 9369 took effect on February 10, 2007 a person like
petitioner Penera cannot be held liable as a "candidate" for engaging in premature election campaign before she filed her certificate
of candidacy or even after she filed one since she may be regarded as a "candidate" only at the start of the campaign period on
March 30, 2007. Consequently, since she was not yet a "candidate" on March 29, 2007 when she went around Sta. Monica
campaigning for votes on her way to appearing before the election registrar to file her certificate of candidacy, she cannot be held
liable for premature campaigning.
But the fact that Penera was not yet a candidate before she actually handed in her certificate of candidacy to the designated
COMELEC official does not exempt her from the prohibition against engaging in premature election campaign. Section 80 which
imposes the ban ensnares "any person," even a non-candidate. Thus:
SECTION 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. — It shall be unlawful for any person, whether
or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political
activity except during the campaign period: x x x (Emphasis ours.)
Essentially, the law makes the prohibition against premature campaigning apply to "any person" and "any party, or association of
persons." This means that no one is exempt from the ban. The mention of the word "candidate" in the first grouping, i.e., "any
person, whether or not a voter or candidate," merely stresses the point that even those with direct interest in a political campaign
are not exempt from the ban. Consequently, even if Penera had not yet filed her certificate of candidacy, Section 80 covered her
because she fell in the category of "any person."
The provision of Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as amended, that regards Penera as a "candidate" only at the start of the campaign period
on March 30, 2007 did not, therefore, exempt her from liability as a non-candidate engaging in premature election campaign.
Here, candidate Penera has been found by the COMELEC to have violated Section 80 when, even before she was a candidate, she
prematurely campaigned for votes for herself. The ground for her consequent disqualification—premature campaigning—already
accrued by the time she filed her certificate of candidacy or when the official campaign period began. Consequently, she is
disqualified under Section 68 from continuing as a candidate or, since she has been elected, from holding on to that office. Thus:
SECTION 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision
of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having x x x (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,
paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected,
from holding the office; x x x (Underscoring supplied.)
Does this position contravene Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as amended, that regards Penera as a "candidate" only at the start of the
campaign period on March 30, 2007? It does not because Section 80, which the Court seeks to enforce, is essentially intended as a
ground for sanctioning "any person," not necessarily a candidate, who engages in premature election campaign.
The real challenge to the current minority position, however, is the meaning that the Omnibus Election Code places on the term
"election campaign." "The term ‘election campaign’ or ‘partisan political activity,’ says Section 79, "refers to an act designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office." The object of the election campaign
activity must be the "election or defeat of a particular candidate."
When petitioner Penera practically said "vote for me" during the March 29 motorcade that she led around Sta. Monica, did she solicit
votes for a "particular candidate?" The current majority holds that since, according to Section 79, a "candidate refers to any person
aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy" and since Penera held her vote-solicitation
motorcade before she filed her certificate of candidacy, she did not engage during the town motorcade in a campaign for the
election of any "particular candidate."
But this is being too literal. It is like saying that a woman cannot be held liable for parricide since the penal code uses the male
pronoun in ascribing to the offender the acts that constitute the crime. Thus, the penal code says:
Art. 246. Parricide. — Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.
Yet, parricide, as everyone knows, can also be committed by a woman who shall kill her father, mother, or child, or her spouse. The
spirit of the law intends to punish any person, male or female, who kills his or her ascendants, descendants, or spouse. Literalness
must yield to evident legislative intent.
Here, did Congress in enacting R.A. 9369 intend to abolish or repeal Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code that prohibits election
campaigns before the start of the campaign period? It did not. Section 80 remains in the statute books and R.A. 9369 did not,
directly or indirectly, touch it.
The current majority of course claims, citing Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as amended, that "the effective date when partisan political
acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. The pertinent portion of Section 15 says:
Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign
period; x x x.
If we were to abide by the view of the current majority, Congress ordained when it passed the above provision that it is only for
unlawful acts or omissions committed during the campaign period that candidates could be punished. Consequently, if candidates
take campaign funds from a foreign government 6 or conspire with others to bribe voters7 just one day before the start of the
campaign period, they cannot be prosecuted. A candidate under the theory of the current majority can freely commit a litany of
other crimes relating to the election so long as he commits them before the start of the campaign period. Surely, R.A. 9369 did not
intend to grant him immunity from prosecution for these crimes.
The more reasonable reading of the provision—that unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon
the start of the campaign period—is that Congress referred only to unlawful acts or omissions that could essentially be committed
only during the campaign period. For how could a candidate commit unlawful "pre-campaign" acts during the campaign period?
The unlawful act of engaging in premature election campaign under Section 80, in relation to Section 79 which defines the terms
"candidate" and "election campaign," may be regarded as consisting of three elements:
1. A person acts to promote the election or defeat of another to a public office;
2. He commits the act before the start of the campaign period; and
3. The person whose election or defeat the offender seeks has filed a certificate of candidacy for the office.
The first two elements could take place when the offender engages in premature election campaign for the person whose election
or defeat he seeks to promote but who has not as yet filed his certificate of candidacy. Whereas, the third element—consisting in
the latter person’s filing his certificate of candidacy—could take place later, close to the campaign period.
The elements of a crime need not be present on a single occasion. In B.P. 22 cases, the issuer of the check may have knowingly
issued a perfectly worthless check to apply on account. But, until the check is dishonoured by the drawee bank, the crime of issuing
a bouncing check is not deemed committed. The analogy is far from perfect but the point is that the offender under Section 80
knew fully when she shouted on the top of her voice, "vote for me as your mayor!" before she filed her certificate of candidacy that
she was running for mayor. If she says she is not liable because she is technically not yet a candidate, the people should say, "Let us
not kid each other!"
Congress could not be presumed to have written a ridiculous rule. It is safe to assume that, in enacting R.A. 9369, Congress did not
intend to decriminalize illegal acts that candidates and non-candidates alike could commit prior to the campaign period.
Further, current majority’s view may doom the next generations. Congress enacted Section 80 because, historically, premature
election campaigns begun even years before the election saps the resources of the candidates and their financial backers, ensuring
considerable pay-back activities when the candidates are elected. Such lengthy campaigns also precipitate violence, corrupt the
electorate, and divert public attention from the more vital needs of the country.8
Actually, practically all the principal stakeholders in the election, namely, the voters, the candidates, and the COMELEC, have since
1969 assumed that premature election campaign is not allowed. People generally wait for the campaign period to start before
engaging in election campaign. Even today, after the passage of R.A. 9369, those aspiring to national offices have resorted to the so-
called "infomercials" that attempt to enhance their popularities by showing their philosophies in life, what they have accomplished,
and the affection with which ordinary people hold them. No one has really come out with ads soliciting votes for any particular
candidate or person aspiring for a particular public office. They are all aware of Section 80.
Parenthetically, the Supreme Court declared the law banning premature election campaign constitutional in Gonzales v. Commission
on Elections9 only because the majority in the Court were unable to muster two-thirds votes to declare it unconstitutional. The
freedom of expression has always loomed large in the mind of the Court. It would not be likely, therefore, for the Court to hastily
declare every expression tending to promote a person’s chances in the elections as prohibited election campaigning.
I vote to deny the motion for reconsideration.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
SEPARATE OPINION
DAVIDE, JR. C.J.:
The procedural and factual antecedents of these consolidated cases are as follows:
On 9 January 2004, petitioner Victorino X. Fornier filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to
disqualify private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) and to deny due course to or cancel his certificate of candidacy for the
position of President in the forthcoming 10 May 2004 presidential elections. As a ground therefore, he averred that FPJ committed
falsity in a material representation in his certificate of candidacy in declaring that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth
and in fact he is not, since he is the illegitimate son of Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, and Allan Poe, a Spanish national. The
case was docketed as COMELEC Case SPA No. 04-003 and assigned to the COMELEC’s First Division.
At the hearing before the First Division of the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier offered FPJ’s record of birth to prove that FPJ was born
on 20 August 1939 to Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, and Allan Poe, who was then married to Paulita Gomez. Upon the other
hand, FPJ tried to establish that his father was a Filipino citizen whose parents, although Spanish nationals, were Filipino citizens.
He adduced in evidence a copy of the marriage contract of Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley, showing that they were married on 16
September 1940 in Manila.
In its Resolution of 23 January 2004, the First Division of the COMELEC dismissed COMELEC Case SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. It
declared that COMELEC’s jurisdiction is limited to all matters relating to election, returns and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial and city officials, but not those of national officials like the President. It has, however, jurisdiction to pass upon the issue
of citizenship of national officials under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code on petitions to deny due course or cancel
certificates of candidacy on the ground that any material representation contained therein is false. It found that the evidence
adduced by petitioner Fornier is not substantial, and that FPJ did not commit any falsehood in material representation when he
stated in his certificate of candidacy that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
His motion for reconsideration filed before the COMELEC en banc having been denied, petitioner Fornier filed a petition with this
Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 161824.
Meanwhile, petitioners Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. came to this Court via a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 161434, to challenge the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the issue of the
citizenship of FPJ. They assert that only this Court has jurisdiction over the issue in light of the last paragraph of Section 4 of Article
VII of the Constitution, which provides:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
On 29 January 2004 petitioner Velez filed a similar petition, which was docketed as G.R. No. 161634.
The core issues in these consolidated cases, as defined by the Court during the oral argument, are as follows:
(1) Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy of Presidential
candidates;
(2) Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petitions of (a) Tecson, et al., (b) Velez, and (c) Fornier; and
(3) Whether respondent FPJ is a Filipino citizen, and if so, whether he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
These consolidated petitions must be dismissed.
Both the petitions of Tecson and Velez invoke the jurisdiction of this Court as provided for in the last paragraph of Section 4 of
Article VII of the Constitution, and raise the issue of the ineligibility of a candidate for President on the ground that he is not a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. The actions contemplated in the said provision of the Constitution are post-election
remedies, namely, regular election contests and quo warranto. The petitioner should have, instead, resorted to pre-election
remedies, such as those prescribed in Section 68 (Disqualifications), in relation to Section 72; Section 69 (Nuisance candidates); and
Section 78 (Petition to deny course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy), in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code,
which are implemented in Rules 23, 24 and 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. These pre-election remedies or actions do not,
however, fall within the original jurisdiction of this Court.
Under the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the COMELEC has the original jurisdiction to determine in an
appropriate proceeding whether a candidate for an elective office is eligible for the office for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy or is disqualified to be a candidate or to continue such candidacy because of any of the recognized grounds for
disqualification. Its jurisdiction over COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 is, therefore, beyond question.
Upon the other hand, this Court has jurisdiction over Fornier’s petition (G.R. No. 161824) under Section 7 of Article IX-A of the
Constitution, which provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days
from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This Court can also take cognizance of the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the challenged resolution in COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 by virtue of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, which reads as follows:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of nay branch or instrumentality of the Government.
On the issue of whether private respondent FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen, the following facts have been established by a
weighty preponderance of evidence either in the pleadings and the documents attached thereto or from the admissions of the
parties, through their counsels, during the oral arguments:
1. FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 in Manila, Philippines.
2. FPJ was born to Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley.
3. Bessie Kelley and Allan Poe were married on 16 September 1940.
4. Allan Poe was a Filipino because his father, Lorenzo Poe, albeit a Spanish subject, was not shown to have declared his allegiance
to Spain by virtue of the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902.
From the foregoing it is clear that respondent FPJ was born before the marriage of his parents. Thus, pursuant to the Civil Code then
in force, he could either be (a) a natural child if both his parents had no legal impediments to marry each other; or (b) an
illegitimate child if, indeed, Allan Poe was married to another woman who was still alive at the time FPJ was born.
Petitioner Fornier never alleged that Allan Poe was not the father of FPJ. By revolving his case around the illegitimacy of FPJ,
Fornier effectively conceded paternity or filiation as a non-issue. For purposes of the citizenship of an illegitimate child whose
father is a Filipino and whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the child to follow the citizenship of his
putative father, as advanced by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, one of the amici curiae. Since paternity or filiation is in fact admitted by
petitioner Fornier, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that FPJ is a Filipino citizen, pursuant to
paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, which reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
…
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
I agree with the amici curiae that this provision makes no distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children of Filipino
fathers. It is enough that filiation is established or that the child is acknowledged or recognized by the father.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I dissent from the majority opinion.
The Antecedent Proceedings
Petitioner Fornier filed before the Commission on Elections ("Comelec") a "Petition for Disqualification of Presidential Candidate
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." on the ground that Fernando Poe, Jr. ("FPJ") is not a natural-born Philippine
citizen. The Comelec First Division dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioner failed to present substantial evidence that FPJ
committed "any material misrepresentation when he stated in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is a natural-born citizen." On
motion for reconsideration, the Comelec En Banc affirmed the ruling of the First Division. Petitioner Fornier now assails the Comelec
En Banc resolution under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Undisputed Facts
The undisputed facts are based on two documents and the admission of FPJ. The first document is the Birth Certificate of FPJ,
showing he was born on 20 August 1939. The Birth Certificate is an evidence of FPJ.[1] The second document is the Marriage
Certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, showing that their marriage took place on 16 September 1940. The Marriage Certificate
is also an evidence of FPJ.[2] Moreover, FPJ admits that his mother Bessie Kelley was an American citizen.[3]
Based on these two documents and admission, the undisputed facts are: (1) FPJ was born out of wedlock and therefore
illegitimate,[4] and (2) the mother of FPJ was an American citizen.
The Issues
The issues raised in Fornier’s petition are:
(a) Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the petition to disqualify FPJ as a candidate for President on the ground that FPJ is not a
natural-born Philippine citizen;
(b) Whether FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Jurisdiction
The Comelec has jurisdiction to determine initially the qualifications of all candidates. Under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the
Constitution, the Comelec has the power and function to "[E]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election." The initial determination of who are qualified to file certificates of candidacies with the Comelec clearly falls within
this all-encompassing constitutional mandate of the Comelec. The conduct of an election necessarily includes the initial
determination of who are qualified under existing laws to run for public office in an election. Otherwise, the Comelec’s certified list
of candidates will be cluttered with unqualified candidates making the conduct of elections unmanageable. For this reason, the
Comelec weeds out every presidential election dozens of candidates for president who are deemed nuisance candidates by the
Comelec.[5]
Section 2(3), Article IX-C of the Constitution also empowers the Comelec to "[D]ecide, except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections x x x." The power to decide "all questions affecting elections" necessarily includes the power to decide
whether a candidate possesses the qualifications required by law for election to public office. This broad constitutional power and
function vested in the Comelec is designed precisely to avoid any situation where a dispute affecting elections is left without any
legal remedy. If one who is obviously not a natural-born Philippine citizen, like Arnold Schwarzenneger, runs for President, the
Comelec is certainly not powerless to cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is no need to wait until after the
elections before such candidate may be disqualified.
Under Rule 25 on "Disqualification of Candidates" of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a voter may question before the Comelec the
qualifications of any candidate for public office. Thus, Rule 25 provides:
Section 1. Grounds for Disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by
the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified
from continuing as a candidate.
Section 2. Who May File Petition for Disqualification. — Any citizen of voting age, or duly registered political party, organization or
coalition of political parties may file with the Law Department of the Commission a petition to disqualify a candidate on grounds
provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The Comelec adopted its Rules of Procedure pursuant to its constitutional power to promulgate its own rules of procedure[6] to
expedite the disposition of cases or controversies falling within its jurisdiction.
The Comelec has ruled upon the qualifications of candidates, even if the Constitution provides that some other body shall be the
"sole judge" of the qualifications of the holders of the public offices involved. The Court has upheld the jurisdiction of Comelec to
issue such rulings,[7] even when the issue is the citizenship of a candidate.[8] Thus, the Comelec has jurisdiction to determine
initially if FPJ meets the citizenship qualification to run for President.
However, the Comelec En Banc, in its scanty resolution, failed to state the factual bases of its ruling. The Comelec En Banc also
failed to rule conclusively on the issue presented – whether FPJ is a natural-born Philippine citizen. The Comelec En Banc affirmed
the First Division ruling that "[W]e feel we are not at liberty to finally declare whether or not the respondent is a natural-born
citizen." In short, the Comelec En Banc allowed a candidate for President to run in the coming elections without being convinced
that the candidate is a natural-born Philippine citizen. Clearly, the Comelec En Banc acted with grave abuse of discretion. Under
Section 1, Article VIII, as well as Section 5, Article VIII, of the Constitution, the Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the issue in
a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65.
To hold that the Court acquires jurisdiction to determine the qualification of a candidate for President only after the elections
would lead to an absurd situation. The Court would have to wait for an alien to be elected on election day before he could be
disqualified to run for President. If the case is not decided immediately after the election, an alien who wins the election may even
assume office as President before he is finally disqualified. Certainly, this is not what the Constitution says when it provides that
"[N]o person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."[9] The clear and specific language of
the Constitution prohibits the election of one who is not a natural-born citizen. Thus, the issue of whether a candidate for President
is a natural-born Philippine citizen must be decided before the election.
Governing Laws
Since FPJ was born on 20 August 1939, his citizenship at the time of his birth depends on the Constitution and statutes in force at
the time of his birth.[10] FPJ’s citizenship at the time of his birth in 1939, applying the laws in force in 1939, determines whether
he is a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Natural-born Philippine citizens are "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."[11] If a person has to perform an act, such as proving in an administrative or judicial
proceeding, that an event subsequent to his birth transpired thus entitling him to Philippine citizenship, such person is not a natural
born citizen.[12]
The 1935 Constitution and the Spanish Civil Code, the laws in force in 1939, are the governing laws that determine whether a person
born in 1939 is a Philippine citizen at the time of his birth in 1939. Any subsequent legislation cannot change the citizenship at birth
of a person born in 1939 because such legislation would violate the constitutional definition of a natural-born citizen as one who is a
Philippine citizen from birth. In short, one who is not a Philippine citizen at birth in 1939 cannot be declared by subsequent
legislation a natural-born citizen.
General Principles
A legitimate child of a Filipino father follows the citizenship of the father. A child born within wedlock is presumed to be the son of
the father[13] and thus carries the blood of the father. Under the doctrine of jus sanguinis, as provided for in Section 1(3), Article III
of the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, by the fact of legitimacy, automatically follows the citizenship of the Filipino father.
An illegitimate child, however, enjoys no presumption at birth of blood relation to any father unless the father acknowledges the
child at birth.[14] The law has always required that "in all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved."[15] The
only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the child who conclusively carries the
blood of the mother. Thus, unless the father acknowledges the illegitimate child at birth, the illegitimate child can only acquire the
citizenship of the only legally known parent - the mother.
However, if the Filipino father is legally known because the filiation (blood relation of illegitimate child to the father) of the child to
the Filipino father is established in accordance with law, the child follows the citizenship of the Filipino father. This gives effect,
without discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children, to the provision of the 1935 Constitution that "[T]hose whose
fathers are citizens of the Philippines"[16] are Philippine citizens.
Nature of Citizenship
If the Filipino father acknowledges the illegitimate child at birth, the child is a natural-born Philippine citizen because no other act
after his birth is required to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. The child possesses all the qualifications to be a Philippine
citizen at birth.
If the Filipino father acknowledges the child after birth, the child is a Philippine citizen as of the time of the acknowledgment. In
this case, the child does not possess all the qualifications to be a Philippine citizen at birth because an act - the acknowledgement
of the Filipino father - is required for the child to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. Statutory provisions on retroactivity
of acknowledgment cannot be given effect because they would be contrary to the constitutional definition of natural- born citizens
as those who are Philippine citizens at birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
If the illegitimacy of a child is established, there is no presumption that the child has the blood of any man who is supposed to be
the father. There is only a conclusive presumption that the child has the blood of the mother. If an illegitimate child claims to have
the blood of a man who is supposed to be the child’s father, such blood relation must be established in accordance with proof of
filiation as required by law.
Where the illegitimate child of an alien mother claims to follow the citizenship of the putative father, the burden is on the
illegitimate child to establish a blood relation to the putative Filipino father since there is no presumption that an illegitimate child
has the blood of the putative father. Even if the putative father admits paternity after the birth of the illegitimate child, there must
be an administrative or judicial approval that such blood relation exists upon proof of paternity as required by law.
Citizenship, being a matter of public and State interest, cannot be conferred on an illegitimate child of an alien mother on the mere
say so of the putative Filipino father. The State has a right to examine the veracity of the claim of paternity. Otherwise, the grant
of Philippine citizenship to an illegitimate child of an alien mother is left to the sole discretion of the putative Filipino father. For
example, a Philippine citizen of Chinese descent can simply claim that he has several illegitimate children in China. The State
cannot be required to grant Philippine passports to these supposed illegitimate children born in China of Chinese mothers just
because the putative Filipino father acknowledges paternity of these illegitimate children. There must be either an administrative
or judicial determination that the claim of the putative Filipino father is true.
The case of the illegitimate Vietnamese children, born in Vietnam of Vietnamese mothers and allegedly of Filipino fathers, is
illustrative. These children grew up in Vietnam, many of them studying there until high school. These children grew up knowing they
were Vietnamese citizens. In 1975, a Philippine Navy vessel brought them, together with their Vietnamese mothers, to the
Philippines as Saigon fell to the communists. The mothers of these children became stateless when the Republic of (South) Vietnam
ceased to exist in 1975. The Department of Justice rendered Opinion No. 49 dated 3 May 1995 that being children of Filipino fathers,
these Vietnamese children, even if illegitimate, are Philippine citizens under Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution and
Section 1(2), Article III of the 1973 Constitution. This Opinion is cited by FPJ as basis for his claim of being a natural-born Philippine
citizen.[17] However, this Opinion categorically stated that before the illegitimate Vietnamese children may be considered Filipino
citizens "it is necessary in every case referred to that such paternity be established by sufficient and convincing documentary
evidence."[18]
In short, the illegitimate child must prove to the proper administrative or judicial authority the paternity of the alleged Filipino
father by "sufficient and convincing documentary evidence." Clearly, an administrative or judicial act is necessary to confer on the
illegitimate Vietnamese children Philippine citizenship. The mere claim of the illegitimate child of filiation to a Filipino father, or
the mere acknowledgment of the alleged Filipino father, does not automatically confer Philippine citizenship on the child. The State
must be convinced of the veracity of such claim and approve the same. Since the illegitimate Vietnamese children need to perform
an act to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship, they are not natural-born Philippine citizens. They become Philippine citizens
only from the moment the proper administrative or judicial authority approve and recognize their filiation to their alleged Filipino
fathers.
The rationale behind requiring that only natural-born citizens may hold certain high public offices[19] is to insure that the holders of
these high public offices grew up knowing they were at birth citizens of the Philippines. In their formative years they knew they
owed from birth their allegiance to the Philippines. In case any other country claims their allegiance, they would be faithful and
loyal to the Philippines of which they were citizens from birth. This is particularly true to the President who is the commander-in-
chief of the armed forces.[20] The President of the Philippines must owe, from birth, allegiance to the Philippines and must have
grown up knowing that he was a citizen of the Philippines at birth. The constitutional definition of a natural-born Philippine citizen
would lose its meaning and efficacy if one who was at birth recognized by law as an alien were declared forty years later[21] a
natural-born Philippine citizen just because his alleged Filipino father subsequently admitted his paternity.
Proof of Filiation
Article 131[22] of the Spanish Civil Code, the law in force in 1939, recognized only the following as proof of filiation of a natural
child:
a. acknowledgment in a record of birth;
b. acknowledgment in a will;
c. acknowledgment in some other public document.
To establish his Philippine citizenship at birth, FPJ must present either an acknowledgement in a record of birth, or an
acknowledgment in some other public document executed at the time of his birth. An acknowledgment executed after birth does
not make one a citizen at birth but a citizen from the time of such acknowledgment since the acknowledgment is an act done after
birth to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship.
After the birth of one who is not a natural-born Philippine citizen, a subsequent legislation liberalizing proof of filiation cannot apply
to such person to make him a natural-born citizen. A natural-born Philippine citizen is expressly defined in the Constitution as one
who is a citizen at birth. If a person is not a citizen at birth, no subsequent legislation can retroactively declare him a citizen at
birth since it would violate the constitutional definition of a natural-born citizen.
Burden of Proof
Any person who claims to be a citizen of the Philippines has the burden of proving his Philippine citizenship. Any person who claims
to be qualified to run for President because he is, among others, a natural-born Philippine citizen, has the burden of proving he is a
natural-born citizen. Any doubt whether or not he is natural-born citizen is resolved against him. The constitutional requirement of
a natural-born citizen, being an express qualification for election as President, must be complied with strictly as defined in the
Constitution. As the Court ruled in Paa v. Chan: [23]
It is incumbent upon a person who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that he is really a Filipino.
No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be
resolved in favor of the State.
Since the undisputed facts show that FPJ is an illegitimate child, having been born out of wedlock, the burden is on FPJ to prove his
blood relation to his alleged Filipino father. An illegitimate child enjoys no presumption of blood relation to any father. Such blood
relationship must be established in the appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.
Private party litigants cannot stipulate on the Philippine citizenship of a person because citizenship is not a private right or
property, but a matter of public and State interest. Even if petitioner Fornier admits that FPJ, although illegitimate, is the son of
Allan F. Poe, such admission cannot bind the State for the purpose of conferring on FPJ the status of a natural-born Philippine
citizen or even of a naturalized citizen. Certainly, the Court will not recognize a person as a natural-born Philippine citizen just
because the private party litigants have admitted or stipulated on such a status. In the present case, the Solicitor General, as
representative of the Government, is strongly disputing the status of FPJ as a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Legitimation
Under Article 123[24] of the Spanish Civil Code, legitimation took effect as of the date of marriage. There was no retroactivity of
the effects of legitimation on the rights of the legitimated child. Thus, a legitimated child acquired the rights of a legitimate child
only as of the date of marriage of the natural parents. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married on 16 September 1940 while FPJ
was born more than one year earlier on 20 August 1939. Assuming that Allan F. Poe was FPJ’s natural father, the effects of
legitimation did not retroact to the birth of FPJ on 20 August 1939.
Besides, legitimation vests only civil, not political rights, to the legitimated child. As the Court held in Ching Leng:[25]
The framers of the Civil Code had no intention whatsoever to regulate therein political questions. Hence, apart from reproducing
the provisions of the Constitution on citizenship, the Code contains no precept thereon except that which refers all matters of
"naturalization", as well as those related to the "loss and reacquisition of citizenship" to "special laws." Consistently with this policy,
our Civil Code does not include therein any rule analogous to Articles 18 to 28 of the Civil Code of Spain, regulating citizenship.
(Underscoring in the original)
Clearly, even assuming that the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley legitimated FPJ, such legitimation did not vest
retroactively any civil or political rights to FPJ.
Treaty of Paris of 1898 and Philippine Bill of 1902
FPJ admits that his grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was a Spanish citizen who came to the Philippines from Spain.[26] To benefit from the
mass naturalization under the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902, FPJ must prove that Lorenzo Pou was an
inhabitant and resident of the Philippines on 11 April 1899. Once it is established that Lorenzo Pou was an inhabitant and resident of
the Philippines on 11 April 1899, then he is presumed to have acquired Philippine citizenship under the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and
the Philippine Bill of 1902.[27] Being an inhabitant and resident of the Philippines on 11 April 1899 is the determinative fact to fall
under the coverage of the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902.[28]
There is, however, no evidence on record that Lorenzo Pou was a Philippine inhabitant and resident on 11 April 1899. The date of
arrival of Lorenzo Pou in the Philippines is not known. If he arrived in the Philippines after 11 April 1899, then he could not benefit
from the mass naturalization under the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902. There is also no evidence that Lorenzo
Pou was naturalized as a Philippine citizen after 11 April 1899. Thus, there can be no presumption that Lorenzo Pou was a Philippine
citizen.
There is also no evidence on record that Allan F. Poe, the son of Lorenzo Pou and the alleged father of FPJ, was naturalized as a
Philippine citizen. Thus, based on the evidence adduced there is no legal basis for claiming that Allan F. Poe is a Philippine citizen.
Nevertheless, there is no need to delve further into this issue since the Court can decide this case without determining the
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou and Allan F. Poe. Whether or not Lorenzo Pou and Allan F. Poe were Philippine citizens is not material in
resolving whether FPJ is a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Convention on the Rights of the Child
The Philippines signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 26 January 1990 and ratified the same on 21 August 1990. The
Convention defines a child to mean "every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the
child, majority is attained earlier." Obviously, FPJ cannot invoke the Convention since he is not a child as defined in the Convention,
and he was born half a century before the Convention came into existence. FPJ’s citizenship at birth in 1939 could not in any way be
affected by the Convention which entered into force only on 2 September 1990.
The Convention has the status of a municipal law[29] and its ratification by the Philippines could not have amended the express
requirement in the Constitution that only natural-born citizens of Philippines are qualified to be President. While the Constitution
apparently favors natural-born citizens over those who are not, that is the explicit requirement of the Constitution which neither
the Executive Department nor the Legislature, in ratifying a treaty, could amend. In short, the Convention cannot amend the
definition in the Constitution that natural-born citizens are "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
In any event, the Convention guarantees a child "the right to acquire a nationality,"[30] and requires States Parties to "ensure the
implementation" of this right, "in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless."[31] Thus, as far as nationality or
citizenship is concerned, the Convention guarantees the right of the child to acquire a nationality so that he may not be stateless.
The Convention does not guarantee a child a citizenship at birth, but merely "the right to acquire a nationality" in accordance with
municipal law. When FPJ was born in 1939, he was apparently under United States law an American citizen at birth.[32] After his
birth FPJ also had the right to acquire Philippine citizenship by proving his filiation to his alleged Filipino father in accordance with
Philippine law. At no point in time was FPJ in danger of being stateless. Clearly, FPJ cannot invoke the Convention to claim he is a
natural-born Philippine citizen.
The Doctrine in Ching Leng v. Galang
The prevailing doctrine today is that an illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an alien mother follows the citizenship of the alien
mother as the only legally known parent. The illegitimate child, even if acknowledged and legally adopted by the Filipino father,
cannot acquire the citizenship of the father. The Court made this definitive doctrinal ruling in Ching Leng v. Galang,[33] which
involved the illegitimate minor children of a naturalized Filipino of Chinese descent with a Chinese woman, Sy An. The illegitimate
children were later on jointly adopted by the naturalized Filipino and his legal wife, So Buan Ty.
The facts in Ching Leng as quoted by the Court from the trial court’s decision are as follows:
After the petitioner Ching Leng Alias Ching Ban Lee obtained judgment in this Court dated May 2, 1950 granting his petition for
naturalization, he together with his wife So Buan Ty filed another petition also in this Court in Special Proc. No. 1216 for the
adoption of Ching Tiong Seng, Ching Liong Ding, Victoria Ching Liong Yam, Sydney Ching and Ching Tiong An, all minors and
admittedly the illegitimate children of petitioner Ching Leng with one Sy An, a Chinese citizen. Finding the petition for adoption
proper, this Court granted the same in a decision dated September 12, 1950, declaring the said minors free from all legal obligations
of obedience and maintenance with respect to their mother Sy An and to all legal intents and purposes the children of the adopter
Ching Leng alias Ching Ban Lee and So Buan Ty with all the legal rights and obligations provided by law.
On September 29, 1955, Ching Leng took his oath of allegiance and became therefore a full pledge (sic) Filipino citizen. Believing
now that his adopted illegitimate children became Filipino citizens by virtue of his naturalization, petitioner Ching Leng addressed a
communication to the respondent Commissioner of Immigration requesting that the alien certificate of registration of the said
minors be cancelled. (Bold underscoring supplied)
In Ching Leng, the Court made a definitive ruling on the meaning of "minor child or children" in Section 15 of the Naturalization
Law,[34] as well as the meaning of children "whose parents are citizens of the Philippines" under the Constitution. The Court
categorically ruled that these children refer to legitimate children only, and not to illegitimate children. Thus, the Court held:
It is claimed that the phrases "minor children" and "minor child", used in these provisions, include adopted children. The argument is
predicated upon the theory that an adopted child is, for all intents and purposes, a legitimate child. Whenever, the word "children"
or "child" is used in statutes, it is generally understood, however, to refer to legitimate children, unless the context of the law and
its spirit indicate clearly the contrary. Thus, for instance, when the Constitution provides that "those whose parents are citizens of
the Philippines, "and "those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines," who shall elect Philippine citizenship "upon reaching the
age of majority", are citizens of the Philippines (Article IV, Section 1, subdivisions 3 and 4), our fundamental law clearly refers to
legitimate children (Chiong Bian vs. De Leon, 46 Off. Gaz., 3652-3654; Serra v. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952).
Similarly, the children alluded to in said section 15 are those begotten in lawful wedlock, when the adopter, at least is the father. In
fact, illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality, not that of the illegitimate
father (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332, 335-336; Santos Co vs. Gov’t of the Philippines, 52 Phil. 543, 544; Serra v. Republic, supra;
Gallofin v. Ordoñez, 70 Phil. 287; Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953). Although, adoption gives "to the adopted person
the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter", pursuant to said Article 341 of our Civil Code, we have
already seen that the rights therein alluded to are merely those enumerated in Article 264, and do not include the acquisition of the
nationality of the adopter.
Moreover, as used in said section 15 of the Naturalization Law, the term "children" could not possibly refer to those whose relation
to the naturalized person is one created by legal fiction, as, for instance, by adoption, for, otherwise, the place and time of birth of
the child would be immaterial. The fact that the adopted persons involved in the case at bar are illegitimate children of appellant
Ching Leng does not affect substantially the legal situation before us, for, by legal fiction, they are now being sought to be given the
status of legitimate children of said appellant, despite the circumstance that the Civil Code of the Philippine does not permit their
legitimation. (Bold underscoring supplied)
Ching Leng, penned by Justice Roberto Concepcion in October 1958, was a unanimous decision of the Court En Banc. Subsequent
Court decisions, including Paa v. Chan[35] and Morano et al. v. Vivo,[36] have cited the doctrine laid down in Ching Leng that the
provision in the 1935 Constitution stating "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines" refers only to legitimate children.
When the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions were drafted, the framers did not attempt to change the intent of this provision, even as they
were presumably aware of the Ching Leng doctrine.
Nevertheless, I believe that it is now time to abandon the Ching Leng doctrine. The inexorable direction of the law, both
international and domestic in the last 100 years, is to eliminate all forms of discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate
children. Where the Constitution does not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children, we should not also distinguish,
especially when private rights are not involved as in questions of citizenship. Abandoning the Ching Leng doctrine upholds the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Abandoning the Ching Leng doctrine is also in compliance with our treaty obligation under the
Covenant on the Rights of Children mandating States Parties to eliminate all forms of discrimination based on the status of children,
save of course those distinctions prescribed in the Constitution itself like the reservation of certain high public offices to natural-
born citizens.
Abandoning the Ching Leng doctrine does not mean, however, that an illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an alien mother
automatically becomes a Philippine citizen at birth. We have repeatedly ruled that an illegitimate child does not enjoy any
presumption of blood relation to the alleged father until filiation or blood relation is proved as provided by law.[37] Article 887 of
the Civil Code expressly provides that "[I]n all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved." The illegitimate
child becomes a Philippine citizen only from the time he establishes his blood relation to the Filipino father. If the blood relation is
established after the birth of the illegitimate child, then the child is not a natural-born Philippine citizen since an act is required
after birth to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Conclusion
In conclusion, private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is not a natural-born Philippine citizen since there is no showing that his alleged
Filipino father Allan F. Poe acknowledged him at birth. The Constitution defines a natural-born citizen as a Philippine citizen "from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect" his Philippine citizenship. Private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. does
not meet this citizenship qualification.
Therefore, I vote to grant the petition of Victorino X. Fornier. However, I vote to dismiss the petitions of Maria Jeanette C. Tecson,
Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. and Zoilo Antonio Velez on the ground that their direct petitions invoking the jurisdiction of the Court under
Section 4, paragraph 7, Article VII of the Constitution are premature, there being no election contest in this case.
DISSENTING OPINION
CORONA, J.:
Stripped of the complicated and contentious issues of morality and religion, I believe the basic issue here is simple: does petitioner
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualify, under the terms of the Constitution and RA 7941, as a marginalized and underrepresented sector in
the party-list system?
The relevant facts are likewise relatively uncomplicated. Petitioner seeks accreditation by the respondent Commission on Elections
as a political organization of a marginalized and underrepresented sector under the party-list system. Finding that petitioner is not a
marginalized sector under RA 7941, the Commission on Elections denied its petition.
A System For Marginalized
And Underrepresented Sectors
The party-list system is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. It is essentially a tool for the advancement of social justice with the
fundamental purpose of affording opportunity to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to participate in the shaping of public
policy and the crafting of national laws. It is premised on the proposition that the advancement of the interests of the marginalized
sectors contributes to the advancement of the common good and of our nation’s democratic ideals.
But who are the marginalized and underrepresented sectors for whom the party-list system was designed?
The Texts of the Constitution
And of RA1 7941
The resolution of a constitutional issue primarily requires that the text of the fundamental law be consulted. Section 5(2), Article VI
of the Constitution directs the course of our present inquiry. It provides:
SEC. 5. x x x
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of Representatives including those under
the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. (emphasis
supplied)
The Constitution left the matter of determining the groups or sectors that may qualify as "marginalized" to the hands of Congress.
Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act was enacted in 1995. The law provides:
Section 2. Declaration of policy. — The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this
end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or
secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a
coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for
decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. (emphasis supplied)
The Court’s Previous Pronouncements
As the oracle of the Constitution, this Court divined the intent of the party-list system and defined its meaning in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections:2
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party -- or any
organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with
the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. x x x
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves
[Section 2 of RA 7941] mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list
system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack [of] well-defined
constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is
national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the
representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely,
"labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because
representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized
and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-
organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a
congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the
"marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and underrepresented" become
members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in
life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the
implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it
must be applied according to its express terms.
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA
7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-
list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or
secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a
coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law
that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words
employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the
phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized
by those in immediate association.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion
owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG’s position to treat them similarly
defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan admitted during the Oral
Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of their
respective sectors.
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized nor
underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical
limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of one’s constituency; indeed, it is likely to
arise more directly from the number and amount of one’s bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution
and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to
give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a
direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses
and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past – the farm hands,
the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement – to come out and participate, as indeed many of them
came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and
desecrating this social justice vehicle.
xxx xxx xxx
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system would not only
dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it.
The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the
prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor
underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the
qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, the Court stressed that the party-list system is reserved only for those sectors
marginalized and underrepresented in the past (e.g., labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, professionals and even those in the underground movement who
wish to come out and participate). They are those sectors traditionally and historically marginalized and deprived of an opportunity
to participate in the formulation of national policy although their sectoral interests are also traditionally and historically regarded as
vital to the national interest. That is why Section 2 of RA 7941 speaks of "marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole."
How should the matter of whether a particular sectoral interest is vital to national interest (and therefore beneficial to the nation
as a whole) be determined? Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s opinion3 in Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections4 offers valuable insight:
… Similarly, limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the major political parties from participating in the
election of their representatives is aligned with the constitutional mandate to "reduce social, economic, and political inequalities,
and remove cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good"; the right of the people and
their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making; the
right of women to opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the
nation; the right of labor to participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits in keeping with its
role as a primary social economic force; the right of teachers to professional advancement; the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to the consideration of their cultures, traditions and institutions in the formulation of national plans and policies, and
the indispensable role of the private sector in the national economy.
As such, the interests of marginalized sectors are by tradition and history vital to national interest and therefore beneficial to the
nation as a whole because the Constitution declares a national policy recognizing the role of these sectors in the nation’s life. In
other words, the concept of marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list scheme has been carefully refined by
concrete examples involving sectors deemed to be significant in our legal tradition. They are essentially sectors with a constitutional
bond, that is, specific sectors subject of specific provisions in the Constitution, namely, labor, 5 peasant,6 urban poor,7 indigenous
cultural communities,8 women,9 youth,10 veterans,11 fisherfolk,12 elderly,13 handicapped,14 overseas workers15 and professionals.16
The premise is that the advancement of the interests of these important yet traditionally and historically marginalized sectors
promotes the national interest. The Filipino people as a whole are benefited by the empowerment of these sectors.
The long-muffled voices of marginalized sectors must be heard because their respective interests are intimately and indispensably
woven into the fabric of the national democratic agenda. The social, economic and political aspects of discrimination and
marginalization should not be divorced from the role of a particular sector or group in the advancement of the collective goals of
Philippine society as a whole. In other words, marginalized sectors should be given a say in governance through the party-list
system, not simply because they desire to say something constructive but because they deserve to be heard on account of their
traditionally and historically decisive role in Philippine society.
A Unifying Thread
Fidelity to the Constitution requires commitment to its text. Thus, in the exercise of its function as official interpreter of the
Constitution, the Court should always bear in mind that judicial prudence means that it is safer to construe the Constitution from
what appears upon its face.17
With regard to the matter of what qualifies as marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list system, Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution mentions "the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." On the other hand, the law speaks of "labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."18
Surely, the enumeration of sectors considered as marginalized and underrepresented in the fundamental law and in the
implementing law (RA 7941) cannot be without significance. To ignore them is to disregard the texts of the Constitution and of RA
7941. For, indeed, the very first of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party’s eight guidelines for screening party-list participants is this:
the parties, sectors or organizations "must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA
7941."19
For this reason, I submit the majority’s decision is cryptic and wanting when it makes short shrift of the issue of whether petitioner
is a marginalized and underrepresented sector in the following manner:
The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
The resolution of petitions for accreditation in the party-list system on a case-to-case basis not tethered to the enumeration of the
Constitution and of RA 7941 invites the exercise of unbridled discretion. Unless firmly anchored on the fundamental law and the
implementing statute, the party-list system will be a ship floating aimlessly in the ocean of uncertainty, easily tossed by sudden
waves of flux and tipped by shifting winds of change in societal attitudes towards certain groups. Surely, the Constitution and RA
7941 did not envision such kind of a system.
Indeed, the significance of the enumeration in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 5 of RA 7941 is clearly
explained in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party:
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is
national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the
representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely,
"labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because
representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized
and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-
organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
xxx xxx xxx
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA
7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-
list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or
secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a
coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law
that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words
employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the
phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized
by those in immediate association.20 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
More importantly, in defining the concept of a "sectoral party," Section 3(d) of RA 7941 limits "marginalized and underrepresented
sectors" and expressly refers to the list in Section 5 thereof:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. — x x x
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector, x x x. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner does not question the constitutionality of Sections 2, 3(d) and 5 of RA 7941. (Its charges of violation of non-establishment
of religion, equal protection, free speech and free association are all leveled at the assailed resolutions of the Commission on
Elections.) Thus, petitioner admits and accepts that its case must rise or fall based on the aforementioned provisions of RA 7941.
Following the texts of the Constitution and of RA 7941, and in accordance with established rules of statutory construction and the
Court’s pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, the meaning of "marginalized sectors" under the party list system is
limited and qualified. Hence, other sectors that may qualify as marginalized and underrepresented should have a close connection
to the sectors mentioned in the Constitution and in the law. In other words, the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
qualified to participate in the party-list system refer only to the labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, professionals and other related or similar sectors.
This interpretation is faithful to and deeply rooted in the language of the fundamental law and of its implementing statute. It is
coherent with the mandate of the Constitution that marginalized sectors qualified to participate in the party-list system but not
mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI are "such other sectors as may be provided by law" duly enacted by Congress. It is also
consistent with the basic canon of statutory construction, ejusdem generis, which requires that a general word or phrase that
follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase should be construed to
include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases, akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned.21 Moreover, it reins in the subjective elements of passion and prejudice that accompany discussions of issues with moral
or religious implications as it avoids the need for complex balancing and undue policy-making.
What is the unifying thread that runs through the marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list system? What are
the family resemblances that would characterize them?22
Based on the language of the Constitution and of RA 7941 and considering the pronouncements of this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party and BANAT, the following factors are significant:
(a) they must be among, or closely connected with or similar to, the sectors mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941;
(b) they must be sectors whose interests are traditionally and historically regarded as vital to the national interest but they have
long been relegated to the fringes of society and deprived of an opportunity to participate in the formulation of national policy;
(c) the vinculum that will establish the close connection with or similarity of sectors to those expressly mentioned in Section 5 of RA
7941 is a constitutional provision specifically recognizing the special significance of the said sectors (other than people’s
organizations, unless such people’s organizations represent sectors mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941)23 to the advancement of the
national interest and
(d) while lacking in well-defined political constituencies, they must have regional or national presence to ensure that their interests
and agenda will be beneficial not only to their respective sectors but, more importantly, to the nation as a whole.
For Purposes of the Party-List System,
Petitioner is Not a Marginalized Sector
In this case, petitioner asserts that it is entitled to accreditation as a marginalized and underrepresented sector under the party-list
system. However, the Commission on Elections disagrees.
The majority reverses the Commission on Elections. While it focuses on the contentious issues of morality, religion, equal
protection, and freedom of expression and association, by granting the petition, the majority effectively rules that petitioner is a
qualified marginalized and underrepresented sector, thereby allowing its accreditation and participation in the party-list system.
I disagree.
Even assuming that petitioner was able to show that the community of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBT) is
underrepresented, it cannot be properly considered as marginalized under the party-list system. First, petitioner is not included in
the sectors mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 5 of RA 7941. Unless an overly strained
interpretation is resorted to, the LGBT sector cannot establish a close connection to any of the said sectors. Indeed, petitioner does
not even try to show its link to any of the said sectors. Rather, it represents itself as an altogether distinct sector with its own
peculiar interests and agenda.
Second, petitioner’s interest as a sector, which is basically the legal recognition of its members’ sexual orientation as a right,
cannot be reasonably considered as an interest that is traditionally and historically considered as vital to national interest. At best,
petitioner may cite an emergent awareness of the implications of sexual orientation on the national human rights agenda. However,
an emergent awareness is but a confirmation of lack of traditional and historical recognition. 24 Moreover, even the majority admits
that there is no "clear cut consensus favorable to gay rights claims."25
Third, petitioner is cut off from the common constitutional thread that runs through the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
under the party-list system. It lacks the vinculum, a constitutional bond, a provision in the fundamental law that specifically
recognizes the LGBT sector as specially significant to the national interest. This standard, implied in BANAT, is required to create
the necessary link of a particular sector to those sectors expressly mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
Section 5 of RA 7941.
Finally, considering our history and tradition as a people, to consider the promotion of the LGBT agenda and "gay rights" as a
national policy as beneficial to the nation as a whole is debatable at best. Even the majority (aside from extensively invoking foreign
practice and international conventions rather than Philippine laws) states:
We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights
claims….26
This is so unlike the significance of the interests of the sectors in Section 5 of RA 7941 which are, without doubt, indisputable.
Regardless of the personal beliefs and biases of its individual members, this Court can only apply and interpret the Constitution and
the laws. Its power is not to create policy but to recognize, review or reverse the policy crafted by the political departments if and
when a proper case is brought before it. Otherwise, it will tread on the dangerous grounds of judicial legislation.
In this instance, Congress, in the exercise of its authority under Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, enacted RA 7941.
Sections 2, 3(d) and (5) of the said law instituted a policy when it enumerated certain sectors as qualified marginalized and
underrepresented sectors under the party-list system. Respect for that policy and fidelity to the Court’s duty in our scheme of
government require us to declare that only sectors expressly mentioned or closely related to those sectors mentioned in Section 5 of
RA 7941 are qualified to participate in the party-list system. That is the tenor of the Court’s rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party and BANAT. As there is no strong reason for the Court to rule otherwise, stare decisis compels a similar conclusion in this case.
The Court is called upon to exercise judicial restraint in this case by strictly adhering to, rather than expanding, legislative policy on
the matter of marginalized sectors as expressed in the enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941. The Court has no power to amend and
expand Sections 2, 3(d) and 5 of RA 7941 in the guise of interpretation. The Constitution expressly and exclusively vests the
authority to determine "such other [marginalized] sectors" qualified to participate in the party-list system to Congress. Thus, until
and unless Congress amends the law to include the LGBT and other sectors in the party-list system, deference to Congress’
determination on the matter is proper.
A Final Word
To be succinctly clear about it, I do not say that there is no truth to petitioner’s claim of discriminatory and oppressive acts against
its members. I am in no position to make that claim. Nor do I claim that petitioner has no right to speak, to assemble or to access
our political departments, particularly the legislature, to promote the interests of its constituency. Social perceptions of sexual and
other moral issues may change over time, and every group has the right to persuade its fellow citizens that its view of such matters
is the best.27 But persuading one’s fellow citizens is one thing and insisting on a right to participate in the party-list system is
something else. Considering the facts, the law and jurisprudence, petitioner cannot properly insist on its entitlement to use the
party-list system as a vehicle for advancing its social and political agenda.
While bigotry, social stereotyping and other forms of discrimination must be given no place in a truly just, democratic and
libertarian society, the party-list system has a well-defined purpose. The party-list system was not designed as a tool to advocate
tolerance and acceptance of any and all socially misunderstood sectors. Rather, it is a platform for the realization of the aspirations
of marginalized sectors whose interests are, by nature and history, also the nation’s but which interests have not been sufficiently
brought to public attention because of these sectors’ underrepresentation.
Congress was given by the Constitution full discretion to determine what sectors may qualify as marginalized and underrepresented.
The Court’s task is to respect that legislative determination by strictly adhering to it. If we effectively and unduly expand such
congressional determination, we will be dabbling in policy-making, an act of political will and not of judicial judgment.
Accordingly, I respectfully vote to dismiss the petition.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
SEPARATE OPINION
ABAD, J.:
I have to concur only in the result set forth in the well-written ponencia of Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo because I arrived at the
same conclusion following a different path.
I also felt that the Court needs, in resolving the issues in this case, to say more about what the Constitution and Republic Act (R.A.)
7941 intends in the case of the party-list system to abate the aggravations and confusion caused by the alarming overnight
proliferation of sectoral parties.
The underlying policy of R.A. 7941 or The Party-List System Act is to give the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society
an opportunity to take a direct part in enacting the laws of the land. In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections (COMELEC),1 the Court laid down guidelines for accreditation, but these seem to leave the COMELEC like everyone else
even more perplexed and dumbfounded about what organizations, clubs, or associations can pass for sectoral parties with a right to
claim a seat in the House of Representatives. The Court can, in adjudicating this case, unravel some of the difficulties.
Here, I fully agree that the COMELEC erred when it denied Ang Ladlad’s petition for sectoral party accreditation on religious and
moral grounds. The COMELEC has never applied these tests on regular candidates for Congress. There is no reason for it to apply
them on Ang Ladlad. But the ponencia already amply and lucidly discussed this point.
What I am more concerned about is COMELEC’s claim in its comment on the petition that the Ang Ladlad sectoral party was not
marginalized and underrepresented since it is not among, or even associated with, the sectors specified in the Constitution and in
R.A. 7941.2 Ang Ladlad, it claims, did not qualify as a marginalized and underrepresented group of people like those representing
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals. This is effectively the COMELEC’s frame of mind in adjudicating applications for accreditation.
But, the COMELEC’s proposition imposes an unwarranted restriction which is inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the
Constitution and the law. A reading of Ang Bagong Bayani will show that, based on the Court’s reading, neither the Constitution nor
R.A. 7941 intends the excessively limited coverage that the COMELEC now suggests. In fact, the Court said in that case that the list
in R.A. 7941 is not exclusive. Thus, while the party-list system is not meant for all sectors of society, it was envisioned as a social
justice tool for the marginalized and underrepresented in general.
As it happened, the only clue that the Constitution provides respecting the identity of the sectors that will make up the party-list
system is found in the examples it gives, namely, the labor, the peasant, the urban poor, the indigenous cultural minorities, the
women, and the youth segments of society. Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
(2) The party-list representative shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector." (Underscoring supplied.)
Getting its bearing from the examples given above, the Congress provided in Section 2 of R.A. 7941 a broad standard for screening
and identifying those who may qualify for the party-list system. Thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system or group interests in the House of Representatives by
enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
(Underscoring supplied.)
The above speaks of "marginalized and underrepresented sectoral parties or organizations x x x lack well defined political
constituencies x x x who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation." But, as the Court said in Ang
Bagong Bayani, the whole thing boils down to ascertaining whether the party seeking accreditation belongs to the "marginalized and
underrepresented."3
Unfortunately, Congress did not provide a definition of the term "marginalized and underrepresented." Nor did the Court dare
provide one in its decision in Ang Bagong Bayani. It is possible, however, to get a sense of what Congress intended in adopting such
term. No doubt, Congress crafted that term—marginalized and underrepresented—from its reading of the concrete examples that
the Constitution itself gives of groupings that are entitled to accreditation. These examples are the labor, the peasant, the urban
poor, the indigenous cultural minorities, the women, and the youth sectors. Fortunately, quite often ideas are best described by
examples of what they are, which was what those who drafted the 1987 Constitution did, rather than by an abstract description of
them.
For Congress it was much like looking at a gathering of "a dog, a cat, a horse, an elephant, and a tiger" and concluding that it is a
gathering of "animals." Here, it looked at the samples of qualified groups (labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural minorities,
women, and youth) and found a common thread that passes through them all. Congress concluded that these groups belonged to the
"marginalized and underrepresented."
So what is the meaning of the term "marginalized and underrepresented?" The examples given (labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural minorities, women, and youth) should be the starting point in any search for definition. Congress has added six
others to this list: the fisherfolk, the elderly, the handicapped, the veterans, the overseas workers, and the professionals. 4 Thus, the
pertinent portion of Section 5 of R.A. 7941 provides:
Sec. 5. Registration. – x x x Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
If one were to analyze these Constitutional and statutory examples of qualified parties, it should be evident that they represent the
working class (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, overseas workers), the service class (professionals), the economically deprived (urban
poor), the social outcasts (indigenous cultural minorities), the vulnerable (women, youth) and the work impaired (elderly,
handicapped, veterans). This analysis provides some understanding of who, in the eyes of Congress, are marginalized and
underrepresented.
The parties of the marginalized and underrepresented should be more than just lobby or interest groups. They must have an
authentic identity that goes beyond mere similarities in background or circumstances. It is not enough that their members belong to
the same industry, speak the same dialect, have a common hobby or sport, or wish to promote public support for their mutual
interests. The group should be characterized by a shared advocacy for genuine issues affecting basic human rights as these apply to
their groups. This is in keeping with the statutory objective of sharing with them seats in the House of Representatives so they can
take part in enacting beneficial legislation.
It should be borne in mind, however, that both the Constitution and R.A. 7941 merely provide by examples a sense of what the
qualified organizations should look like. As the Court acknowledged in Ang Bagong Bayani, these examples are not exclusive. For
instance, there are groups which are pushed to the margin because they advocate an extremist political ideology, such as the
extreme right and the extreme left of the political divide. They may be regarded, if the evidence warrants, as qualified sectors.
Further, to qualify, a party applying for accreditation must represent a narrow rather than a specific definition of the class of
people they seek to represent. For example, the Constitution uses the term "labor," a narrower definition than the broad and more
abstract term, "working class," without slipping down to the more specific and concrete definition like "carpenters," "security
guards," "microchips factory workers," "barbers," "tricycle drivers," and similar sub-groupings in the "labor" group. See the other
illustrations below.
*The definition that the Constitution and R.A. 7941 use by their examples.
Obviously, the level of representation desired by both the Constitution and R.A. 7941 for the party-list system is the second, the
narrow definition of the sector that the law regards as "marginalized and underrepresented." The implication of this is that, if any of
the sub-groupings (the carpenters, the security guards, the microchips factory workers, the barbers, the tricycle drivers in the
example) within the sector desires to apply for accreditation as a party-list group, it must compete with other sub-groups for the
seat allotted to the "labor sector" in the House of Representatives. This is the apparent intent of the Constitution and the law.
An interpretation that will allow concretely or specifically defined groups to seek election as a separate party-list sector by itself
will result in riot and redundancy in the mix of sectoral parties grabbing seats in the House of Representatives. It will defeat
altogether the objectives of the party-list system. If they can muster enough votes, the country may have a party-list of pedicab
drivers and another of tricycle drivers. There will be an irrational apportionment of party-list seats in the legislature.
In addition, Section 5 of R.A. 7941 provides that parties interested in taking part in the party-list system must state if they are to be
considered as national, regional, or sectoral parties. Thus:
Sec. 5. Registration. – Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its
president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, x x x.
This provision, taken alongside with the territorial character of the sample sectors provided by the Constitution and R.A. 7941,
indicates that every sectoral party-list applicant must have an inherently regional presence (indigenous cultural minorities) or a
national presence (all the rest).
The people they represent are not bound up by the territorial borders of provinces, cities, or municipalities. A sectoral group
representing the sugar plantation workers of Negros Occidental, for example, will not qualify because it does not represent the
inherently national character of the labor sector.
Finally, as the Court held in Ang Bagong Bayani, it is not enough for a party to claim that it represents the marginalized and
underrepresented. That is easy to do. The party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented. It must
present to the COMELEC clear and convincing evidence of its history, authenticity, advocacy, and magnitude of presence. The
COMELEC must reject those who put up building props overnight as in the movies to create an illusion of sectoral presence so they
can get through the door of Congress without running for a seat in a regular legislative district.
In sum, to qualify for accreditation:
One, the applying party must show that it represents the "marginalized and underrepresented," exemplified by the working class,
the service class, the economically deprived, the social outcasts, the vulnerable, the work impaired, or some such similar class of
persons.
Two, the applying party should be characterized by a shared advocacy for genuine issues affecting basic human rights as these apply
to the sector it represents.
Three, the applying party must share the cause of their sector, narrowly defined as shown above. If such party is a sub-group within
that sector, it must compete with other sub-groups for the seat allocated to their sector.
Four, the members of the party seeking accreditation must have an inherent regional or national presence.
And five, except for matters the COMELEC can take judicial notice of, the party applying for accreditation must prove its claims by
clear and convincing evidence.
In this case, Ang Ladlad represents men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered persons
(LGBTs). Applying the universally accepted estimate that one out of every 10 persons is an LGBT of a certain kind, 5 the Filipino
LGBTs should now stand at about 8.7 million. Despite this, however, they are by and large, subtly if not brutally, excluded from the
mainstream, discriminated against, and persecuted. That the COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s petition on religious and moral grounds
is proof of this discrimination.
Ang Ladlad claims that many cases of intolerance and violence against LGBTs have been documented. At home, effeminate or gay
youths are subjected to physical abuse by parents or guardians to make them conform to standard gender norms of behavior, while
lesbian youths are raped to cure them of their perceived affliction. LGBTs are refused admission from certain schools, or are
suspended and put on probation. Meanwhile, in the workplace, they are denied promotions or benefits which are otherwise available
to heterosexuals holding the same positions. There is bigotry for their group.
Ang Ladlad has amply proved that it meets the requirements for sectoral party accreditation. Their members are in the vulnerable
class like the women and the youth. Ang Ladlad represents a narrow definition of its class (LGBTs) rather than a concrete and
specific definition of a sub-group within the class (group of gay beauticians, for example). The people that Ang Ladlad seeks to
represent have a national presence.
The lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-gendered persons in our communities are our brothers, sisters, friends, or colleagues who
have suffered in silence all these years. True, the party-list system is not necessarily a tool for advocating tolerance or acceptance
of their practices or beliefs. But it does promise them, as a marginalized and underrepresented group, the chance to have a direct
involvement in crafting legislations that impact on their lives and existence. It is an opportunity for true and effective
representation which is the very essence of our party-list system.
For the above reasons, I vote to GRANT the petition.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
I maintain my dissent and vote to reconsider the Court’s April 16, 2013 Decision. I so vote for the reasons stated in my main Dissent,
some of which I restate below for emphasis. Most importantly, I believe that the majority’s ruling runs counter to the policy behind
Republic Act No. (RA) 92251, is legally illogical and unsound, and should thus be reversed.
a) The assailed Decision rules on a situation of doubt and in the relatively uncharted area of application where RA 9225 overlaps
with our election laws. It reverses the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruling that respondent Rommel C. Arnado’s use of his
United States (U.S.) passport was isolated and did not affect his renunciation of his previous U.S. citizenship and his re-acquisition of
Filipino citizenship. These, to my mind, should have been the starting points in the Court’s consideration of the present case and the
motion for reconsideration.
b) After complying with the twin requirements of RA 9225, Arnado not only became a "pure" Filipino citizen but also became eligible
to run for public office. To be sure, the majority in fact concedes that Arnado’s use of his U.S. passport is not a ground for loss of
Filipino citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 as the law requires express renunciation and not by implication or inference
from conduct. Why the norm will be any different with respect to the loss of citizenship rights is, to my mind, a question that the
majority ruling left hanging and unanswered as it disregards a directly related jurisprudential landmark – Aznar v. Commission on
Elections2 - where the Court ruled that the mere fact that therein respondent Emilio Mario Renner Osmeña was a holder of a
certificate that he is an American did not mean that he was no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of
registration did not amount to a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. Through the Court’s ruling in the present case (that by
Arnado’s isolated use of his U.S. passport, he is reverted to the status of a dual citizen), the Court effectively reversed Aznar and,
under murky facts and the flimsiest of reasons, created a new ground for the loss of the political rights of a Filipino citizen.
c) In a situation of doubt, doubts should be resolved in favor of full Filipino citizenship since the thrust of RA 9225 is to encourage
the return to Filipino citizenship of natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship through their acquisition of another
citizenship.3 Note in this regard that Arnado consciously and voluntarily gave up a very much sought after citizenship status in favor
of returning to full Filipino citizenship and participating in Philippine governance.
From the perspective of our election laws, doubts should also be resolved in favor of Arnado since his election to the office of Mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte was never in doubt. The present voters of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte have eloquently spoken and
approved Arnado’s offer of service not only once but twice – in 2010 and now in 2013. Note that the present case was very much
alive in the minds of the Kauswagan voters in the immediately past May 13, 2013 elections, yet they again voted Arnado into office.
d) To reiterate what I have stated before, under RA 9225, natural-born citizens who were deemed to have lost their Philippine
citizenship because of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country and who subsequently complied with the requirements of
RA 9225 are deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship. RA 9225 cured and negated the presumption made under CA 63.
Hence, as in Japzon v. Commission on Elections,4 Arnado assumed "pure" Philippine citizenship again after taking the Oath of
Allegiance and executing an Oath of Renunciation of his American citizenship under RA 9225.
In this light, the proper framing of the main issue in this case should be whether Arnado’s use of his U.S. passport affected his status
as a "pure" Philippine citizen. In question form – did Arnado’s use of a U.S. passport amount to a ground under the law for the loss of
his Filipino citizenship under CA 63 or his rights thereunder or, alternatively, the retention of his dual citizenship status?
That Arnado’s use of his U.S. passport amounts to an express renunciation of his Filipino citizenship or some of his rights as a citizen
– when its use was an isolated act that he sufficiently explained and fully justified – is not a conclusion that is easy to accept under
the available facts of the case and the prevailing law. I emphasize that the law requires express renunciation in order to lose
Philippine citizenship. The term means a renunciation that is made distinctly and explicitly and is not left to inference or
implication; it is a renunciation manifested by direct and appropriate language, as distinguished from that which is inferred from
conduct.5 The appreciation of Arnado’s use of his U.S. passport should not depart from this norm, particularly in a situation of
doubt.
Aznar, already cited above, presents a clear and vivid example, taken from jurisprudence, of what "express renunction" is not. The
Court ruled that the mere fact that Osmeña was a holder of a certificate that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a
Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration did not amount to a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
In the present case, other than the use of his U.S. passport in two trips to and from the U.S., the record does not bear out any
indication, supported by evidence, of Arnado’s intention to re-acquire U.S. citizenship. In the absence of clear and affirmative acts
of re-acquisition of U.S. citizenship either by naturalization or by express acts (such as the re-establishment of permanent residency
in the U.S.), Arnado’s use of his U.S. passport cannot but be considered an isolated act that did not undo his renunciation of his U.S.
citizenship. What he might in fact have done was to violate American law on the use of passports, but this is a matter irrelevant to
the present case. Thus, Arnado remains to be a "pure" Filipino citizen and the loss of his Philippine citizenship or of citizenship rights
cannot be presumed or inferred from his isolated act of using his U.S. passport for travel purposes.
I do not dispute that an Oath of Renunciation is not an empty or formal ceremony that can be perfunctorily professed at any given
day, only to be disregarded on the next. As a mandatory requirement under Section 5(2) of RA 9225, it allows former natural-born
Filipino citizens who were deemed to have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country to enjoy full civil and political rights, foremost among them, the privilege to run for public office.
It is another matter, however, to say that Arnado effectively negated his Oath of Renunciation when he used his U.S. passport for
travel to the U.S. To reiterate, if only for emphasis, Arnado sufficiently justified the use of his U.S. passport despite his renunciation
of his U.S. citizenship: when he travelled on April 14, 2009, June 25, 2009 and July 29, 2009, he had no Philippine passport that he
could have used to travel to the U.S. to attend to the business and other affairs that he was leaving. If at all, he could be faulted for
using his U.S. passport by the time he returned to the Philippines on November 24, 2009 because at that time, he had presumably
received his Philippine passport. However, given the circumstances of Arnado's use and that he consistently used his Philippine
passport for travel after November 24, 2009, the true character of his use of his U.S. passport stands out and cannot but be an
isolated and convenient act that did not negate his Oath of Renunciation.
In these lights, I maintain the conclusion that no basis exists to overturn the ruling of the COMELEC for grave abuse of discretion; its
ruling was neither capricious nor arbitrary as it had basis in law and in fact.
e) With the Court’s assailed pronouncement and its underlying negative policy implication, the Court has effectively left Arnado "[A]
MAN WITHOUT A COUNTRY"6 - neither a U.S. citizen by U.S. law, nor a Filipino citizen with full political rights despite his compliance
with all the requirements of RA 9225. The only justification given for the treatment was the isolated use of Arnado’s old U.S.
passport in traveling between the U.S. and the Philippines before the duly applied for Philippine passport could be issued. Under this
situation, read in the context of the election environment under which Japzon v. Commission on Elections 7 was made, the following
ruling was apparently lost on the majority:
Finally, when the evidence of x x x lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak or inconclusive and
it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victor’s right to the office, the will of the
electorate should be respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. x x
x In this case, Japzon failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines.8
For all these reasons, I urge the Court to reconsider its position in the assailed April 16, 2013 Decision and grant Rommel C. Arnado’s
motion for reconsideration.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the Tribunal's Resolution dismissing the present protest and, as a consequence, the counter-protest. My concurrence is
anchored not on the merits of the protest and counter-protest since they have not reached the period of appreciation or evaluation
of the ballots nor on the failure of protestant to comply with procedural requirements, but simply upon the protestant's assumption
and discharge of office as a Senator of the Republic after the 8 May 1995 elections.
Protestant's candidacy for Senator in the 8 May 1995 elections, her election to said office and her actual assumption and discharge
of the office, combined to constitute, in my view, a supervening fact that rendered moot and academic her present protest
because, if she were to pursue her present protest (without such supervening fact) and, if she were to win the protest, her term of
office as President of the Philippines would in any case expire on 30 June 1998. When she, however, chose to run for Senator in the
8 May 1995 elections, which was after her filing of the present protest, she knew that, if elected, her term of office as Senator
would expire only on 30 June 2001. Therefore, as a successful protestant in this case, she could be President only up to 30 June
1998. What happens then to the last three (3) years of her term as Senator, i.e., 30 June 1998 to 30 June 2001? There would be a
void, a hiatus or vacuum because after serving as President up to 30 June 1998, she can no longer assume the office of Senator from
30 June 1998 to 30 June 2001. There would likewise be a void, a hiatus or vacuum in her term of office as Senator from the time she
assumes the presidency to 30 June 1998 (assuming she were to win the present protest). Thus, by continuing this protest, there
could result an ensuing vacuum in the office of Senator, to which position protestant has been duly elected subsequent to the filing
of her present protest. And yet, natura vacuum abhorret. (Nature abhors a vacuum).
Public policy-wise, it is also not fair to the people to elect a Senator for six (6) years and yet, he or she will serve for less than that
period. In other words; by voluntarily opting to become a Senator of the land with a term of office expiring on 30 June 2001,
protestant must be deemed to have abandoned this protest which, if successfully pursued, would at most bring her only up to 30
June 1998 in the office of the President, with the last three (3) years of her term as Senator going to waste, in terms of loss of
people's representation in the Senate.
I repeat that in this protest, protestant seeks to be declared as the truly elected President up to 30 June 1998. In the 8 May 1995
elections, however, she was elected Senator for a term ending on 30 June 2001. As Senator, she has become a member of the
legislative department of government impressed with the duty, among others, to fiscalize the executive. She cannot, in my view,
opt to fiscalize the executive until she herself becomes the executive, at which point, she will abandon the fiscalizing duty
entrusted to her by the people. She must choose only one of the two (2) positions involved; she cannot have both within overlapping
periods of time. And she, in fact, made the choice becoming and qualifying as a Senator of the Republic from 30 June 1995 to 30
June 2001.
It appears clear that the people (electorate) expect her to perform dutifully, creditably and successfully in the position of her last
and most recent choice.
She should, in my considered view, be deemed to have abandoned or waived her claim to the Presidency of the Republic, at least
until 30 June 1998, when she can run for the said office without relinquishing or forfeiting her seat as Senator (See Sec. 67, Art. IX,
BP 881).
Bellosillo, J., concurs.
Dissenting Opinions
PUNO, J., dissenting:
The presidential election of May 11, 1992 was a watershed in our political history. The first presidential election after the EDSA
revolution, it was a test to determine whether our people were ready to reexercise their sovereignty vitiated during the
authoritarian years. It was also a test to ascertain the capability of government to hold clean, honest, and credible elections. It
attracted the keen interest of many and no less than seven (7) candidates vied for the presidency.1 After the smoke of election
battle cleared, candidate Fidel V. Ramos was proclaimed winner. He garnered 5,342,571 votes while candidate M. Defensor-Santiago
took the second place as she obtained 4,465,173 votes. 2 Soon, murmurs and whispers of fraud filled the air with all the candidates,
including the winner, alleging that they were victims of election irregularities. The losers were urged to seek judicial relief but only
M. Defensor-Santiago dared to file an election protest; a remedy derisively dismissed by some as a chase of a chimera. The others
left their grievance to the tribunal of the people's conscience.
Mrs. Santiago formally filed her election protest on July 20, 1992. Paragraph 3 of her Protest capsulizes her cause of action, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
3. In violation of the Constitution and specific statutory provisions, the protestee in conspiracy with top officials of the then reigning
administration used government funds like the rebel returnee funds, the BALGU AND NALGU funds, among others, and government
facilities like radio and television networks as well as transportation facilities to campaign for the protestee and buy out whole
slates of candidates, voters, watchers and members of the board of election inspectors/tellers, election registrars and other
Comelec officials, other strategic officials in government as well as other individuals to manipulate, tamper, change, replace, alter,
switch ballots and election returns and other election documents including certificates of canvass and statement of votes by
precinct and municipality, print ballots and stuff them in ballot boxes, the results of the election in favor of the protestee.
On September 22, 1992, after the filing of the Answer of the protestee containing a counter protest, this Tribunal ordered the
protestant to pinpoint the three (3) areas that "best exemplify the frauds and irregularities committed in the 1992 presidential
election." The protestant specified the pilot areas as Metro Manila, Pampanga, and Zamboanga involving a total of seventeen
thousand five hundred twenty-seven (17,527) precincts. Revision of ballots in these pilot areas proceeded though it suffered some
delay primarily because the same ballots were also used as evidence in the election protest filed by Cielo Macapagal-Salgado against
Bren Giuao involving the governorship of Pampanga and the election protest filed by Augusto Syjuco against Joker Arroyo involving
the then lone congressional seat in Makati.
On August 16, 1995, protestant filed a Motion alleging that the ballots and other election documents in thirteen thousand five
hundred ten (13,510) precincts out of the seventeen thousand five hundred twenty-seven (17,527) precincts in the pilot areas had
already been revised. She prayed ". . . that the revision of ballots and other election documents in the remaining precincts of the
pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process of the pilot areas be deemed completed." We deferred our ruling on the
prayer of the protestant.
It is of public notice that the protestant filed her certificate of candidacy in the election of May 8, 1995 for senator. She won and
was proclaimed and now discharges the duties of the office.
The majority would dismiss protestant's election protest as moot and academic on two (2) grounds: first, that the findings of
irregularities made by the revisors of the protestant in the course of the revision of ballots in 13,510 contested precincts are entirely
irrelevant; and second, she abandoned her protest when she filed her certificate of candidacy in the May 8, 1995 senatorial
elections.
With due respect, I dissent.
The majority holds that "it is entirely irrelevant at this stage of the proceedings that the protestant's revisors discovered in the
course of the revisions alleged irregularities in 13,510 out of the 17,525 contested precincts in the pilot areas." The majority noted
the protestant's decision to waive the revision of the remaining unrevised ballots from 4,017 precincts. It also noted the failure of
the protestant to inform the Tribunal whether she still intends to present additional evidence after the completion of the revision of
the ballots from the pilot areas.
I will not count against the protestant her decision to waive revision of the ballots from 4,017 precincts. Without engaging in
speculation, it seems to me obvious that the protestant made the waiver because of her belief, rightly or wrongly, that the
contested ballots in 13,500 precincts when properly appreciated will sufficiently establish her electoral victory. It is also apparent
that the protestant is wary of the slow pace of the protest and she felt that the waiver will at least shorten the lengthening odds of
time against her. Indubitably too, the waiver will enable her to cut the cost of her protest.
Nor will I make any adverse inference from the alleged failure of the protestant to inform this Tribunal whether she would still be
presenting evidence to support the allegations of fraud and irregularities made by her revisors. The records show that in a motion
dated August 16, 1995, she prayed that the revision of ballots in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be deemed completed.
The Tribunal has not acted on this motion, hence, the process of revision of ballots is not formally finished. Since the Tribunal has
not formally declared the termination of the process of revision, it is not timely for protestant to manifest whether or not she would
adduce further evidence to prove her claim of fraud and irregularities. In any event, if the Tribunal entertains any doubt on the
matter it should issue an Order requiring the protestant to make clear whether or not she intends to exercise her right to present
further evidence. Valuable rights need not be lost on the basis of equivocal acts and omissions.
Prescinding from these premises, I will not dismiss as entirely irrelevant the allegations of the revisors of the protestant that they
discovered in the course of the revision irregularities in 13,510 precincts in the pilot areas. The protestant still has the opportunity
to adduce further evidence to prove her case. She can still undertake to make a technical examination of the ballots through
handwriting experts. She can still present the testimonies of witnesses like voters, watchers, inspectors and others who have
knowledge of the alleged fraud and irregularities. She can still submit a memorandum of facts and law to clinch her case. It is only
after the protestant has been afforded the opportunity to exercise these rights that the Tribunal can proceed to examine the
contested ballots. Then and only then can the Tribunal rule whether or not the protestant failed to make a case.
It can be assumed arguendo that the protestant has lost her right to present additional evidence by her failure to invoke it within a
reasonable time. Even then, I submit that the non-presentation of further evidence is not necessarily fatal. Certain types of fraud
and irregularities can be proved without the testimonies of handwriting experts or the testimonies of voters, watchers, inspectors
and others who witnessed the same. There are fraud and irregularities which are patent on the face of the ballots and other
election documents and paraphernalia. Ballots that are marked, ballots that are spurious, ballots written by the same hand, a ballot
written by different hands, tampered tally sheets, false list of voters, falsified election returns, and other election documents can
be appreciated without need of evidence aliunde. For this reason, the Tribunal cannot evade the duty to examine the protested
ballots for the ballots are the best evidence to enable the court to determine the votes obtained by the protestant and the
protestee.3 Needless to state, until the Tribunal examines and appreciates the protested ballots it cannot dismiss the protest.
I do not also subscribe to the ruling of the majority that the protestant abandoned her protest when she ran for Senator and
discharged her duties. Abandonment in law means "voluntary relinquishment of all right, title, claim . . . with the intention of not
reclaiming it,"4 In ascertaining abandonment, whether in election, property, or criminal litigations, ". . . intention is the first and
paramount object of inquiry for there can be no abandonment without the intent to abandon."5 Intention is subjective and can be
inferred from the acts and conduct of a person. It is a question of fact. 6
In the case at bar, the Tribunal cannot resolve this question of fact for lack of competent evidence. The protestee has not adduced
evidence to prove acts and omissions of the protestant which can be the basis for a finding that she intentionally abandoned her
protest. Indeed, the protestee does not want the protest to be dismissed on a technicality but prays that it be decided on the
merits. The lack of competent evidence on record notwithstanding, the majority ruled, to wit:
. . . She knew that the term of office of the Senators who would then be elected would be six (6) years, to commence at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election and to end at noon of 30 June 2001. Knowing her high sense of integrity and
candor, it is most unlikely that during her campaign she promised to serve the electorate as Senator, subject to the outcome of this
protest. In short, she filed her certificate of candidacy for the Senate without any qualification, condition or reservation. (Emphasis
supplied).
Clearly, the majority merely relied on a deduction to support its conclusion that the protestant did not make any promise to serve
the electorate as a Senator subject to the outcome of this protest. It deduced this conclusion from its knowledge of protestant's
"high sense of integrity and candor." The argument is a non sequitur. If the protestant has candor, the conclusion ought to be that
she should have bared to the electorate the pendency of her protest.
A more fundamental reason prevents me from joining the majority. With due respect, I submit that the majority ruling on
abandonment is inconsistent with the doctrine that an election contest is concerned less with the private interest of the candidates
but more with public interest. Under a republican regime of government, the overarching object of an election contest is to seek
and enforce the judgment of the people on who should govern them. It is not a happenstance that the first declaration of policy of
our Constitution underlines in bright that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."7
The first duty of a citizen as a particle of sovereignty in a democracy is to exercise his sovereignty just as the first duty of any
reigning government is to uphold the sovereignty of the people at all cost. Thus, in Moraleja vs. Relova,8 we emphatically held that
". . . once the court has acquired jurisdiction over an election contest, the public interest involved demands that the true winner be
known without regard to the wishes or acts of the parties so much so that there can be no default, compromise nor stipulation of
facts in this kind of cases." Wisely, this Tribunal has consistently demurred from dismissing election contests even on the ground of
death of the protestee or the protestant.9
The majority appears to stray away from this lodestar of our Constitution. It will dismiss the case at bar even while the protestee
and the protestant are yet alive, even while the term of the 1992 president-elect has yet to expire, and even while the protestee
and the protestant together plead that the Tribunal should determine the true will of the people by deciding their dispute on the
merit and not on technicalities that trifle with the truth. I submit that it is the better stance for the Tribunal to decide this election
contest on the merit and vindicate the political judment of the people which far surpasses in significance all other considerations.
Our duty to tell the people who have the right to govern them cannot depend on the uncertain oscillations of politics of the litigants
as often times they are directed by the wind of convenience, and not by the weal of the public.
I proffer this postulate only because of the dominant public interest involved in the case at bar. This case does not involve an
obscure office but the presidency. It concerns the first presidential election after the EDSA revolution. Only 877,398 votes separate
the protestee and the protestant. Ballots in 13,500 precincts are contested by the revisors of the protestant which if found correct
can materially affect the results of the election. The protestant has charged that nationwide irregularities were committed in the
elections. The protestee, on the other hand, dismisses the protest as merely intended to keep the protestant in the limelight in
preparation for her senatorial campaign. Even the protestee has pleaded that the protest be tried on its merit as it involves a
matter of paramount and grave public interest. Considering these distinct facts, the Tribunal should not dismiss the protest on the
ground of mootness.
To be sure, the majority cultures the thesis that the dismissal of the case at bar will ". . . serve public interest, as it would dissipate
the aura of uncertainty on the results of the 1992 presidential election." Dismissing the case on the tenuous technicality that it has
become moot and academic will not tell the people who really won the last presidential election. Only the light of truth can pierce
the uncertainty that has enveloped its results. It is with reason that the protestant has been joined by the protestee in the plea that
this Tribunal decide their case on its merit so that once and for all, its result will be free from the badgerings of doubt. I join their
plea for the people deserve the whole truth and in an election context a half-truth is a lie. I vote to continue hearing the election
protest at bar and decide it on the merit without unnecessary delay.
Francisco, J., concurs.