CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ATTEMPT TO COMMIT

SUICIDE

MANIPAL UNIVERSITY JAIPUR

SCHOOL OF LAW

Submitted To: Submitted By:

T. BHATTACHARYYA Shubham Agarwal
(PROFESSOR) 161401099
School of Law BA. LL.B. (Hons.)
Manipal University Jaipur Semester - III
Section - B

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the project entitled, “Constitutionality of Attempt to Commit Suicide”
submitted by “Shubham Agarwal” in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of
“BA.LLB (Hons.) at the “MANIPAL UNIVERSITY JAIPUR” is an authentic work carried
out by her under my supervision and guidance.

To the best of my knowledge, the matter embodied in the project has not been submitted to
any other University / Institute for the award of any Degree or Diploma in the year 2017-
2018.

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

In performing our assignment, I had to take the help and guidance of some respected persons
who deserve our greatest gratitude. The completion of this assignment gives me much
pleasure. I would like to show our gratitude to Prof. T. BHATTACHARYYA, Course
Instructor, and Manipal University Jaipur for giving us good guideline for assignment
throughout numerous consultations. I would also like to expand our deepest gratitude to all
those who have directly and indirectly guided us in writing this assignment.

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In addition, a thank you to the Professor who introduced us to the Methodology of work and
whose passion for the “underlying structures” had lasting effect. I also thank the Manipal
University Jaipur for the consent to include the copyrighted pictures as a part of our paper.

Many people, especially our classmates and team members itself have made valuable
comment suggestions on this proposal which gave us inspiration to improve our assignment. I
thank all the people for their help directly and indirectly to complete our assignment.

Shubham Agarwal

Table of Contents

CERTIFICATE ..................................................................................................................................... 1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .................................................................................................................... 2
INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................. 4
Culpable homicide and murder distinguished ................................................................................... 6
Cases under clause (1) ........................................................................................................................ 10
Where death is caused not by the first but by the subsequent act .................................................. 17
WEBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................................. 20

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 INTRODUCTION

This section which defines the offence of murder and also states the five exceptions when
culpable homicide is not murder, is undoubtedly the most important section in the Indian
Penal Code. It says that except in the five cases which have been described as exceptions
under this very section, the offence of culpable homicide, as defined in the preceding section,
is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death,
or secondly, if it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury about which the
offender has knowledge that it is likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is
caused, or thirdly, if it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and
the bodily injury which had been intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death, or fourthly, if there is knowledge on the part of the person
committing the act that it is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability, cause

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death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any
excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as mentioned above.
As it is clear from the language used in this section, murder has been defined through
culpable homicide. The five cases described by way of exceptions in the latter part of this
section have been accepted from the purview of the definition of murder in this section.
Except these five exceptional cases, culpable homicide is murder if circumstances described
under any of the four clauses are present.
In other words only these four classes of culpable homicide are murder and any other kind of
culpable homicide continues to be culpable homicide and does not become murder. This,
therefore, means that all murders are culpable homicides but all culpable homicides are not
murder. To put it differently, murder has been defined through culpable homicide and not
vice versa. Murder is an aggravated form of culpable homicide. Culpable homicide is the
genus and murder is its specie.
In fact the Indian Penal Code divides culpable homicide into two categories, one amounting
to murder described under the four clauses of section 300 and made punishable under section
302, and the other not amounting to murder described under the three clauses of section 299
and under the five exceptions of section 300 and made punishable under section 304 of the
Code. As will be seen later, it is sometimes quite difficult to differentiate between the two,
and that is why Sir Fitz James Stephen was of the view that culpable homicide and murder
are the weakest parts of the Indian Penal Code.
Death
In all cases of murder the victim must die. ‘Death’ as defined under section 46 of the Code
denotes the death of a human being, unless the contrary appears from the context.

Act
‘Act’ according to section 33 of the Code denotes as well a series of acts as a single act, while
section 32 specifically states that in every part of the Indian Penal Code, except where a
contrary intention appears from the context, words which refer to acts done extend also to
illegal omissions. In other words, death caused by a positive act or by a negative act, that is,
by an illegal omission, may amount to murder if requirements as laid down in section 300 are
met. Besides, as discussed under the preceding section, death caused by effect of words may
also amount to murder if conditions stated under section 300 are fulfilled.

Motive
As shown under the preceding section, even though motive is not a requirement under any of
the sections of the Indian Penal Code, it does find mention in many judicial pronouncements
with respect to criminal law in general and especially under culpable homicide not amounting
to murder and murder. The word is frequently used in the courts by the lawyers as well. The
reason for the same is that it helps to find out the intention of the offender, and to that extent,
therefore, it becomes relevant to consider it. Additionally, Section 8 of the Indian Evidence

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Act, 1872 says that any fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for
any fact in issue or relevant facts.

Culpable homicide and murder distinguished

One of the most complex matters under the Code is to distinguish between culpable homicide
and murder. The first real attempt in this regard was made in the case Reg v. Govinda Two
other cases where earnest efforts were made in this direction were Indar Singh v. King Emp.,
and State v. Punnayya) In Reg v. Govinda, the accused, about 18 years old, kicked his wife,
about 15 years old, and gave her a few blows on the body as a result of which she fell down
on the ground. Then he put one knee on her chest and struck her a few more blows by fist on
her face causing extravasations of blood in the brain resulting in her death.

The lower court convicted him of murder. There was a difference of opinion amongst the two
judges of the High Court and consequently, the matter was referred to a third judge, Justice
Melvill, who held the accused guilty under clause (2) of section 299 for culpable homicide
and sentenced him under section 304 Part I on the ground that the death was caused with the
intention on the part of the accused to cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death.

The learned Justice ruled out the applicability of clauses (1) and (3) of section 300 by stating
that the facts and circumstances of the case did neither show intention to cause death nor the
bodily injury intended to be inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death. Melvill J. discussed the two sections clause by clause and attempted to bring out the
differences between the two offences clearly. For the sake of convenience he set out the
provisions in the following manner:

SECTION 299
A person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the death is caused is done

(a) With the intention of causing death;

(b) With the intention of causing such- bodily injury as is likely to cause death;

(c) With the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death.

SECTION 300
Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is
caused is done.—

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(1) With the intention of causing death;

(2) With the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to
cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused;

(3) With the intention of causing bodily injury to any person, and the bodily injury intended
to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death;

(4) With the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability,
cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without
any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.

The learned Justice very meticulously marked the words printed in italics above and through
them tried to distinguish the two offences.

The first clause of section 299(1), indicated as (a) above, and the first clause of section 300,
indicated as (1) above, have exactly the same language. This, therefore, means that whenever
death is caused with the intention of causing death, the liability is always of murder. The
authors of the Code first indicated that intentional causing of death is always culpable
homicide under the first clause of section 299.

But by repeating the same language in clause (1) of section 300 they have made this kind of
culpable homicide a murder. Therefore, the conclusion is simple that intentional causing of
death is always a murder. This in effect means that in practice there can be no conviction on
the basis of the first clause of section 299 as such conviction has got to be always under the
first clause of section 300.

The question that arises then is why were the authors of the Code repeating the language of
first clause of section 299 in the first clause of section 300. The answer is that they had no
other option because they had defined murder through culpable homicide and in their wisdom
they thought that such culpable homicide deserved to be made murder. The only way to do it
was to repeat the same language in the first clause of section 300.

It is important to note here, as has already been pointed out in the discussions under the first
clause of section 299, that intention to cause death on the part of the accused is not easily
deducible. There has to be very strong conclusive evidence in this regard. For instance, in a
case of death having been caused by one or two violent blows the courts will generally be not
inclined to presume intention on the part of the accused to cause death because there is
always a reasonable doubt that such might not have been his intention.

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Additional evidence such as previous unsuccessful attempts on the life of the deceased by the
same accused may, however, force the court to conclude that he did have intention to cause
death. Intention to cause death can be concluded where, for instance, the accused gives a
sharp-edged weapon blow on the deceased who falls down and is not in a position to do
anything against the accused but the accused continues to inflict more blows on him
ultimately causing his death. In such a case there is no confusion and the evidence quite
clearly suggests intention to cause death on the part of the accused.

Clause (2) of section 300 is a special clause in the sense that both intention and knowledge
are relevant under it. Since no other clause of this nature has been provided either under
section 299 or under section 300, this clause needs to be understood only but cannot be
compared with any other clause.

This clause is applicable where the act by which death is caused is done with the intention of
causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person
to whom the harm is caused. The offence is murder if death results while the offender has the
intention of causing bodily injury, and he also knows that the particular person injured is
likely from either peculiarity of constitution, or immature age, or other special circumstances
to be killed by an injury which would not ordinarily cause death. The illustration (b) given in
section 300 refers to this clause.

It says that A, knowing that Z is laboring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause
his death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the
blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health.

But if A, not knowing that Z is laboring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would
not in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in a sound state of health, here A although
he may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, if he did not intend to cause
death or such bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause death.

According to the second clause of section 299, indicated as (b) above, if the act by which the
death is caused is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, the offence is culpable homicide. But under the third clause of section 300, indicated
as (3) above, if such an act is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person,
and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, the offence is murder.

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In both these clauses the offender must have intention to cause bodily injury. Absence of the
same would make these clauses not applicable to the particular situation. The court shall infer
such an intention only when there is enough evidence leading to such a conclusion.

The second clause of section 299 would apply when the bodily injury caused is such as is
likely to cause death, while under the third clause of section 300, the bodily injury must be
such as is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
The difference lies in the degree of probability of death. If the probability of death is
comparatively less the second clause of section 299 will be applicable whereas if it is much
more than the third clause of section 300 must apply. What are the criteria of judging such
probability? Basically there are three things which are important and the court would always
keep them in mind, all at the same time.

The three things are the nature of the injury, the nature of the weapon used and the part of the
body where the injury has been caused. An injury may be superficial or deep, simple or
grievous, covering less area or more and the like. A cumulative view of the injuries caused is
to be taken while judging the nature. A weapon may be non-lethal or lethal, blunt or sharp,
and the like.

There has to be a difference between lathi, stick, bamboo, etc. on the one hand, and pistol,
revolver, gun, sword, spear, gandasa, gupti, dagger and knife etc. on the other. The part of
body where injury has been caused may be non-vital or vital. Hands, legs, hips, thighs etc. are
non-vital parts where an injury is comparatively less probable to result in death.

On the other hand, heart, brain and abdomen etc. are vital parts where an injury may result
into very serious consequences most of the times. As noted above earlier, it must always be
borne in mind that the court must keep nature of the injury, nature of the weapon and part of
the body, all at the same time, in mind to arrive at a correct conclusion with regard to the
guilt or otherwise of the accused.

Under the third clause of section 299, indicated as (c) above, death must be caused by doing
an act with the knowledge that the accused is likely by such act to cause death. Under the
fourth clause of section 300, on the other hand, indicated as (4) above, death must be caused
by doing an act with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all
probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and the act is
committed without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as
aforesaid.

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These knowledge clauses, that is, the third clause of section 299 and the fourth clause of
section 300, are perhaps intended to apply to such cases where neither intention to cause
death nor intention to cause bodily injury can be inferred, that is to say, where the second
clause of section 299 or the first, second and third clauses of section 300 are not applicable.
Examples of application of the knowledge clause may be cases of furious driving, firing at a
mark near a public road, sudden attack without premeditation, and the like. Whether the
offence is culpable homicide or murder depends upon the degree of risk to human life.

If death is a likely result, it is culpable homicide while if it is most probable result, it is

murder. For instance, driving furiously through a very crowded area and causing accident
resulting in death may attract the fourth clause of section 300, whereas same kind of driving
through a less crowded area may entail the application of the third clause of section 299.

Here also, many a time, nature of the injury, nature of the weapon used and part of the body
where the injury is inflicted, all considered together at the same time, may be the guiding
factors while determining as to which of the knowledge clauses is applicable.

Cases under clause (1)

Where the accused persons caught the deceased, a young boy, who had allegedly stolen their
utensils, tied his hands and tried to extort a confession, and one of the accused poured
kerosene on the boy after which the appellant lighted the match setting him on fire causing
his death, there is no doubt that it is a case of intentional causing of death and, therefore,
section 300(1) was held to be applicable.

Where the first appellant believed that his wife had been practicing witchcraft and beat her in
presence of and at the instigation of the second appellant, his sister, and the beating continued
till his wife died, and she was hastily cremated, it was held that the first appellant had
intentionally murdered her.

The deceased and his friend were going somewhere when they met with another person on
the way who owed some money to that friend who demanded the same from him. The
accused who also happened to pass by intervened from the debtor’s side which provoked the
deceased so much that he pushed him away. The accused went away and returned with a
‘dharia’ and accompanied with certain other armed men.

The accused struck the deceased by the ‘dharia’ and others also attacked him resulting in his
death. It was held that facts and circumstances clearly showed intention on the part of the
accused to cause death. The accused abused and attacked the victim. The victim, however,
overpowered him and managed to sit on the chest of the accused. Thereafter the accused
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delivered a knife blow on the victim’s thigh and managed to release himself from the victim’s
grip and inflicted another strong knife blow on the victim’s stomach causing his death.

It was held that the accused had intentionally caused the death of the deceased. Where the
appellants, armed with deadly weapons, entered in the room of an old woman, bolted the
room from inside and strangulated her, it was held that they had caused her death
intentionally.

In Sreedharan Satheesan v. State of Kerala, there was a dispute between the accused and
the deceased regarding payment of money. The accused, who was a driver, caused serious
injuries by his mini bus and hit the deceased with great speed in the middle portion of the
body. Tyre marks were also found on the thighs of the deceased. Damage was also caused to
the scrotum and pelvic region.

It was held that it was intentional killing and section 300 (1) was applicable. In Bhagubhai
Manilal v. Stale of Gujarat, the deceased was forcibly taken from the field to the panchayat
office where he was confined and set ablaze after pouring kerosene over him. He sustained
seventy-five per cent burn injuries and died.

The Supreme Court held that this was an intentional murder. In State of U.P. v. Ramesh
Prasad Misra, there was a horrendous bedroom murder of a young married girl. The plea of
alibi and the defense theory of stranger committing murder were not established. There were
strong evidence of the sister and father of the deceased regarding demand for dowry.

The Supreme Court held that such evidence could not be excluded by applying sections 32
and 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and presumptions under section 113-B of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 arises in such a case. This evidence can also be treated to be relevant for
deciding whether the accused was guilty under section 498-A of the Code. The acquittal of
the accused was set aside and he was sentenced to imprisonment for life only in view of a
long lapse of time from the date of commission of the crime.

In a bride burning case there existed enough circumstantial evidence. Dowry demands had
continuously been made and the bride was being cruelly treated. The bride died of 100% burn
injuries. There was total absence of shouts or cries. The medical evidence showed that
asphyxia was not due to burns. Internal injuries which occur in case of strangulation were
found.

There was a total burning of neck to destroy evidence of attempted strangulation. A half-
burnt post card was planted near the dead body to indicate that it was a case of suicidal death.
The accused persons had been watching the whole incident through a window without any

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hue and cry or without any serious attempt to save the deceased. It was held to be an
intentional murder.

Locking the cottage from outside in which the deceased was sleeping and then setting it on
fire and thus burning him alive, thrusting a deadly weapon ‘sela’ into the chest of the
deceased causing instantaneous death, and sprinkling the shop and the body of the deceased
with kerosene and then setting them to fire causing death have all been held to be murder
with the intention of causing death.

The prosecution successfully established that the husband and the mother-in-law of the
deceased had strong compelling reasons to commit her murder because the parents of the
deceased did not agree to register a piece of land in the name of the deceased’s husband but
insisted to get it registered in the name of their daughter instead.

The brother of the deceased was wholly truthful and reliable witness and the evidence of
neighbors was trustworthy. Both the dying declarations, one to the neighbors and the other to
her brother, were consistent and made voluntarily and in natural course of events disclosing
how she had been put on fire before her death, had been established by the prosecution.

The medical evidence corroborated the prosecution’s case and the conduct of the accused
persons also pointed out towards their guilt. It was held that they had intentionally killed the
deceased. The mother-in-law and the husband of the deceased had been accused of murdering
the deceased in her matrimonial home where the mother-in-law was definitely present and
possibly the husband was also present and thereafter his reaching another place nearby could
not be ruled out.

The deceased was done to death by asphyxia and thereafter her dead body was burnt soaking
it with kerosene. Without the husband’s participation it was impossible for the mother-in- law
to commit all these acts alone. The link of chain of circumstantial evidence was duly
established by the prosecution. The conduct of the husband was inculpatory.

The normal conduct on his part after hearing the news of his wife’s death would have been
that he would be expected to reach home immediately, make inquiries and take further action
in the matter were all absent in the present case. Both the mother-in-law and the husband
were convicted of intentional murder as he was also particepis criminals in committing the
crime.

Where the accused throttled to death the deceased who was a field worker in the family
planning department, after an initial attempt to rape her when they were going to another
village through a jungle where eighteen injuries in all were inflicted on the deceased,

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including the one which fractured the parietal bone, by the appellant and others who had
attacked the deceased by various weapons where five injuries on the region of the head of the
deceased were inflicted over a very trivial matter; and where nine accused persons armed
with ‘bankas’ and ‘lathis’ attacked the deceased and severed his head from his body and
threw it into a river, intention to cause death is clear from the facts and circumstances of the
cases and the Supreme Court applied clause (1) of section 300.

There were circumstantial evidence indicating strong motive of the accused to eliminate the
victim. The accused admitted the victim in the hospital. The victim was in a coma and under
strong influence of alcohol. It was detected that poison had been mixed in the alcohol. There
was no evidence to indicate that the accused had administered the poison. The accused could
not be convicted merely on the basis of the grave suspicion against him.

The deceased had been living with the accused in a one-room family house for eight to ten
days before the incident. She died of gunshot injuries. There was no evidence of sexual
advances by the accused towards her. No case of attempt to molest the deceased was made
before the gun shot.

The accused did not run away from the place of occurrence even though he had opportunity
to do so. There was also no evidence that the accused could handle a gun. The mere fact that
the accused and the deceased were occupants of the house is not sufficient.

The accused was a child. The case was based on circumstantial evidence. Presumption of
juvenile innocence could be displaced only if circumstances unmistakably prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. Even if the defenses of alibi and suicide raised by the accused failed, the
same could not be taken as circumstances against the accused and no adverse inference
against him could be drawn.

The deceased woman was married to the main accused about seven months back and they
had lived together for about three months only. On the day of the incident when the milkman
reached their home and the door was opened on his call, he found the woman burning in the
kitchen. The main accused husband and his sister were charged with murder.

It was proved that they did not enter the kitchen nor did they make any attempt to put out the
fire. Only an unused stove, but no matchbox, was found in the kitchen. Three injuries had
been caused on her body before she had been set on fire. The deceased was a very courageous
and confident woman was clear from the facts that even though she had been set on fire she
had not moved away from that spot, and that in her life time she had written some letters to

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her parents stating that she would face life with confidence even if she had to take a job and
live alone.

In view of all these facts it was held that the death was not suicide but an intentional murder.
The deceased woman died about one and a half years after her marriage due to strangulation,
and about 95% burn injuries were caused after her death. The evidence of the doctor was
reliable and consistent with medical jurisprudence.

The death took place in the husband’s bed room, and he was convicted of intentional murder
and also under section 201 of the Indian Penal Code. The Supreme Court observed that
absence of motive did not break the link in the chain of circumstances connecting the accused
with the crime nor did it militate against the prosecution case.

The investigating officer’s helplessness in collecting evidence from neighbors could not be an
insurance that the accused was innocent. In such a case of death of a young lady by
strangulation and post mortem burns suspicion that someone amongst the father, mother and
brother of the accused husband might have facilitated the accused to screen the evidence of
murder could not be a substitute for proof against them.

In bride-burning cases dying declarations positively accusing the husband or mother-in-law

must be accepted if the same is reliable, trustworthy and proved to be without tutoring, and
the theory of suicide should be ruled out. There are cases of bride burning where intention to
cause death is inferred from many reliable circumstances of the case including the body and
the burnt hair giving smell of the presence of kerosene or petrol or any such inflammable
material. The accused murdered his wife.

He pleaded that the gunshot injury was caused by accident due to grappling. The medical
evidence did not suggest that the injury was due to accident. The eye-witness, mother of the
accused, also stated that the accused had shot at the deceased deliberately. Evidence of
witnesses on behalf of the accused was not reliable. The theory of accident was rejected and
he was held guilty of intentional murder.

Where the husband committed murder of his wife was proved by circumstantial evidence,
and the medical evidence disclosed that she died of strangulation and her body was set on fire
thereafter while the circumstances indicated that none other except the accused had access to
the room where she died, the husband was convicted of intentional murder.

In Jawahar Lai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the accused husband and in-laws were alleged
to have doused the wife in kerosene and set her ablaze. The post mortem and inquest reports

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along with the evidence of the doctor who had performed the post mortem clearly ruled out
the possibility of suicide by the deceased.

The conduct of the accused husband during the relevant time was totally suspicious. The
evidence of brother and sister of the deceased showed that after marriage the deceased was
severely harassed by her husband and his parents for not having brought sufficient dowry,
thus clearly establishing motive for the murder.

Thrusting cloth in the mouth of the deceased rendered her completely helpless and so the
court opined that murder could be committed by a single person. It was held by the Supreme
Court that the husband was, therefore, guilty as the case against the other accused persons
could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

In Gurpreet Singh v. State of Haryana, relation between the accused husband and the
deceased wife were estranged. Their joint petition for divorce was pending in the court and
the husband was to pay Rs. three lacks to his wife. Suddenly, in a fire in the house the wife
was burnt to death.

The photographs brought on record showed that the body of the deceased was totally burnt in
a sitting posture on the sofa. The investigating officer found no sign of struggle or movement
of the deceased at the place of occurrence. At the time of the incident the accused was present
in the house. Photographs produced showed the devastation of fire, obviously a definite
attempt to see that one does not survive in any event.

The accused offered neither reason nor explanation except the plea of alibi which was found
to be false. The evidence on record was sufficient to connect the accused with the brutal
killing of the wife, the motive of which was apparent. The accused was convicted both by the
trial court and the High Court. The Supreme Court refused to interfere.

Where the accused murdered in a hotel room the woman with whom he was having an illicit
relationship because she threatened his marital life, and where a rape accused murdered the
victim after he was released on bail, the intention to cause death is obvious.

In another case, the cause of death by poisoning was not established by the post mortem
report. The doctor noted that the death was due to cardio respiratory failure either due to
taking excess wine or due to poisoning. Alcoholic smell in the mouth of the deceased was
found. The relatives of the deceased stated before the doctor and the investigating officer that
the deceased did not name the accused to have poisoned him.

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The alleged dying declaration thus was not reliable and his conviction was set aside as the
cause of death was not established beyond doubt. Where the accused poured kerosene on the
deceased and set her on fire resulting in 30% burns, and then a supervening illness developed
which is a natural consequence of the burning, it is clear that the accused had killed the
deceased with the intention of causing her death.

In a bride-burning case there were two dying declarations giving two different versions. In
the dying declaration recorded by a doctor in presence of two other doctors, the deceased
stated that she was burnt by her mother-in-law and husband. The motive, failure to bring
enough dowry, was duly established.

The second dying declaration was recorded by a person and attested by the Sarpanch
established that the deceased had committed suicide. This was introduced by the police
inspector in his cross-examination and was not proved by the competent witness. It could not
be relied on. The conviction of the accused persons for the intentional murder under sections
302, 34 based on the dying declaration recorded by the doctor was sustained.

Where the statements of eye-witnesses that kerosene was poured over deceased persons
during communal riots and they were burnt alive but the ‘panch witnesses’ or the medical
evidence did not state that the dead bodies smelt of kerosene, even though the medical
evidence did say that deaths were by burns, it was held that there was no infirmity in the
evidence and the deaths caused were intentional murders.

In Vasant v. State of Maharashtra, there was enmity between the deceased and the accused.
The accused was seen grappling with the deceased. On being separated by the witnesses the
accused was alleged to have gone running to his jeep, drove it on the wrong side and towards
the deceased in high speed, knocked him down and ran over him. The road at the scene of
occurrence was wide and there was no reason for the accused to drive his jeep to the wrong
side. The Supreme Court held that this was an intentional murder.

In Rohtas v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the two accused persons came fully prepared with
spears to attack. Blow was inflicted on the chest of one of the deceased piercing his lungs and
heart resulting into profuse bleeding and death while the brother of the deceased also
sustained two incised wounds. The Supreme Court held that it was a case of intentional
murder and that there was no cause for interfering with the High Court’s verdict.

In Razak Ali Kureshi Sandhi v. State of Gujarat, the accused truck driver intentionally
dashed against customs officers crushing them to death. The Supreme Court held that
conviction for intentional murder did not suffer from any infirmity.

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Similarly, in Munna v. State of Rajasthan, the eye-witness stated that the deceased was first
chased and thereafter run over by a station wagon driven by the accused. The evidence fully
corroborated on material particulars. The Rajasthan High Court held the accused guilty of
deliberate murder.

In Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, the accused attacked the deceased on his head with an
axe. The doctor mentioned that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death. The Supreme Court applied clause (1) of section 300 observing that intention to
cause death is clear.

In Maniben v. State of Gujarat, There was a property dispute between the accused and the
deceased because of which death of the deceased was caused by burning after pouring
kerosene. The Supreme Court held that accused was-guilty of murder.

In Satvir v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the accused persons, armed with knives, laid down the
deceased on the ground and caused injuries on his vital parts resulting in his death. The
Supreme Court stated that intention to cause death was proved.

There may be cases where the accused does an act with the intention of causing death but that
act in fact does not cause death even though the accused may believe that the deceased has
died, and then to save himself and with a view to confuse or destroy evidence of the crime he
does another act which in fact causes the death of the deceased.

In such cases, the courts have delivered different judgments, some of acquittals and others of
convictions. The difference in opinion is because of the fact as to whether the court accepts or
rejects the technical plea of the accused or not.

Where death is caused not by the first but by the subsequent act

In Khandu v. Emp., the accused inflicted a blow by a lathi on the head of the deceased. The
deceased did not die because of this injury but the accused, believing the deceased to be dead,
set the hut on fire with a view to remove all evidence of the crime. The medical evidence
stated that even though the deceased suffered head injury he did not die of the same, but in
fact died of burns.

The accused’s plea in the court was that his crime had been committed in two stages. In the
first stage even if intention to cause death could be inferred from his conduct when he hit the
deceased on the head, the fact is that death did not result from this as the medical evidence

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said, and so even though he might have had the mens rea the actus reus was absent in the first
stage.

In the second stage, he believed that the deceased was already dead when he set the hut on
hire, which meant that his mens rea by that time was already over because he believed that he
was burning a dead body, even though actus reus was present because the medical evidence
said that death had resulted because of bums. Since under the common law principle of
criminal liability one would be liable only when both mens rea and actus reus are
simultaneously present, he could not be held guilty of murder as at neither stage both these
requirements were present.

The court agreed with this view and did not hold the accused guilty of murder even though he
was held liable for attempt to commit murder. The minority judge, however, did not agree
with this opinion of the majority. He believed that the whole crime was one complete
transaction and, therefore, the technical argument that the crime had been committed in two
stages could not be accepted.

The difference between the two points of view lies in the perception of the judge. A judge
who believes that since the responsibility to prove a case beyond reasonable doubt rests with
the prosecution the accused should be entitled, as of right, to the faintest of benefit like
technical arguments would have a liberal attitude in favor of an accused till the case of the
prosecution is water tight.

On the other hand, another judge may have equal respect for the principle that the prosecution
must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, but for that he may not like to give technical
benefits to an accused, and consequently, his argument would be that if intention to cause
death is proved beyond a shadow of doubt on the part of an accused, it would make no
difference whether the ultimate result which he wishes to achieve is achieved by his first act
or by the subsequent one, and, therefore, in any case he should be held liable for the crime
committed by him. In the Khandu’s case the majority judges belonged perhaps to the former
class.

In Ningraj Das v. Emp. on the other hand, where the accused persons, with the intention of
causing the death of a lady, decoyed her to a certain place and attempted first to strangle her
and then in her unconscious or semi-conscious state dragged her and placed her on the
railway tracks, and she was run over, it was held that they were guilty of murder. The court
opined that the two acts were intimately connected with each other and were, therefore, one
single transaction. Here the judge must have belonged to the latter category.

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There are many such cases which have been decided on the basis of following either of the
above discussed reasoning’s. In Kaliappa Goundan v. Emp. the accused attacked the
deceased inflicting three punctured wounds on her head. He then threw her into a well.
According to the medical evidence the three wounds were not sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause her death but she died by the latter act when she was thrown into the
well.

The accused was held guilty of murder as the intention to cause death on his part was
apparent from the very beginning and both stages of the act were closely connected in time
and space. Similarly, in Nehal Mahto v. Emp. the accused attacked the deceased with the
intention of causing her death and then believing that she had died placed her on the railway
tracks and she was run over. The accused was held guilty of murder as both his acts were
intimately connected with each other.

It is clear that in all the above mentioned cases intention to cause death on the part of the
accused was proved beyond doubt. If the same, however, is not inferable in similar cases,
what kind of a decision can be expected is an important question. In Palani Goundan v.
Emp the accused struck a blow by a ploughshare on the head of his wife as a result of which
she fell down unconscious. Believing her dead, he changed her on a beam by a rope to give it
a suicide look. She died of hanging.

The accused was held guilty of grievous hurt only and not of murder as intention to cause
death on his part could not be inferred. Liability for culpable homicide not amounting to
murder was also rejected by the court. Similarly, in Dalu Sardar v. Emp., the accused
kicked his wife around her abdomen and also slapped her and gave her other blows as a result
of which she fell down unconscious. Believing her dead, to give the crime an appearance of a
suicide, he hung her by rope causing her death. The court convicted him of grievous hurt as
he did not have intention to cause death.

Some judicial pronouncements on similar facts are available where knowledge clauses, that
is, clause (4) of section 300 or clause (3) of section 299, have been held to be applicable. In
Nannhu v. State, the accused gave two blows to his wife by a lathi, both falling on non-vital
parts of her body.

As a result she fell down unconscious. Believing her dead the accused cut her body into three
pieces and buried them. It was held that there was no reason for the accused to believe that
his wife had died by the two blows he inflicted on her because these blows had not fallen on
her vital parts. Consequently, he must be deemed to have knowledge, while cutting her body

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into three pieces, that his act was so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability,
cause her death.

He was, therefore, held guilty of murder. On the other hand, in Sreenarayan v. Emp, the
main accused inflicted a single blow by a firewood on the head of the deceased as a result of
which she fell down unconscious bleeding from her nose. Believing her dead, the main
accused and his wife placed her on a pyre and set in on fire causing her death by burns.

In the absence of intention to cause death on the part of the accused the court did not convict
them of murder, but convicted them of culpable homicide not amounting to murder instead,
holding that they must be deemed to have known that their act was likely to cause death.

WEBLIOGRAPHY

1. https://www.lawnotes.in/Section_300_of_Indian_Penal_Code,_1860
2. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/626019/
3. http://lawnn.com/murder-section-300-definition-meaning-exceptions-
punishment-section-302/
4. http://www.shareyouressays.com/knowledge/section-300-of-indian-
penal-code-1860-explained/118750
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