Application for Permission to Upper Tribunal

Office stamp (date received)

Appeal and Notice of Appeal Administrative Appeals Chamber

from an Information Rights decision of For any other kind of case
the First-tier Tribunal decided by the General
(General Regulatory Chamber) Regulatory Chamber of the
First-tier Tribunal use
Form UT11

You must apply to the First-tier Tribunal for permission to appeal before you fill in this form.
Use this form either (1) to apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal if the First-tier Tribunal refused you
permission to appeal or your application was not admitted because you were late
or (2) to appeal to the Upper Tribunal if the First-tier Tribunal has granted you permission to appeal.

Please use black ink and complete the form in CAPITALS or in typewriting. Use another sheet of paper if there is not
enough space for you to say everything. Please put your name at the top of any additional sheets.

A About the Appellant

Title
✔ Mr Mrs Miss Ms Other

Surname, or name [Appellant Surname]

of company, firm or
organisation

Other names [Appellant Other name]

Address [Appellant Address]

Postcode

Telephone number [Appellant Telephone]

Email address [Appellant email]

Do you have a ✔ No
Yes
solicitor or other
representative?

If yes, please give your representative’s details below:

Name of representative

Status (solicitor, agent,

friend etc.)

UT13 Application for Permission to Appeal and Notice of Appeal - General Regulatory Chamber, Information Rights (09.15) © Crown copyright 2015

1
 Organisation (if any)

Address

Postcode

Telephone number

Email address

Reference number (if any)

B About the respondent(s)

Please give details of the respondent(s) below (these will be the person or persons and/or organisations who were the
other party (or parties) in the First-tier Tribunal).

1st respondent

Name of first or only

Information Commissioner
respondent

Address Wycliffe House

Water Lane
Wilmslow, Cheshire

Postcode S K 9 5 A F

Telephone number 0303 123 1113

Email address casework@ico.org.uk

2nd respondent (if any)

Name of second
respondent

Address

Postcode

Telephone number

Email address

2
 C About the First-tier Tribunal which decided your case

Where did the Tribunal hear your case? At an oral hearing

(please tick one) ✔ At a paper hearing
There was no hearing

(Situations where there may not have been a hearing, include if you are appealing against a case management
decision, or if your case was struck out.)

If there was a hearing, what was the date of / /

the hearing?

What was the date of the Tribunal's decision? 0 9 / 0 6 / 2 0 1 7

What was the Tribunal's reference number? EA/2017/0019

Did the First-tier Tribunal suspend the effect ✔ No

Yes
of its decision?

Do you now wish to apply for the effect ✔ No

Yes
of the First-tier Tribunal decision to be
suspended?

If you wish to apply to the Upper Tribunal for suspension of the effect of the First-tier Tribunal decision,
please give your reasons why:

D Reasons for any delay

Note: You must apply to the First-tier Tribunal for permission to appeal before you fill in this form.

Did the First-tier Tribunal refuse to admit ✔ No

Yes
your application for permission to appeal
because you were late?

Has more than one month passed since the ✔ No

Yes
First-tier Tribunal sent you notice of the grant
or refusal of permission to appeal or notice
that your application has not been admitted?

If the answer to either of the above questions (or both) is 'Yes', please apply for an extension of time by giving your
reasons for the delay here:

3
 E Reasons for appealing
Note: You can only appeal if the First-tier Tribunal decision was wrong on one or more points of law and you must say
why the First-tier Tribunal was wrong in law.

If the First-tier Tribunal granted you permission to appeal on limited grounds and you are now appealing, please
state whether you also wish to apply for permission on additional grounds and complete Part G as appropriate.

Alleged errors of law

– Lack of objectivity

(failure to take account of relevant factors)

Note 1:

The First-tier Tribunal's decision of 17 January 2018 to refuse permission makes the following Ruling (paragraph
7):

"....I have concluded 'that the ground is not arguable because it relies on an unsubstantiated allegation of bias
against the Tribunal. The Applicant’s argument is essentially circular: the Tribunal dismissed his appeal, therefore it
must be biased. That argument is my view insufficient to form the basis for an appeal for error of law."

The Tribunal has assumed that the Appellant alleges bias simply on the grounds that he is aggrieved by the
outcome and overlooks the realistic prospect that a fair minded and informed observer, having considered the
substantial evidence, might be satisfied that Appellant’s and the Commissioner’s submissions were not considered
in equal measure and conclude that the tribunal was biased (the test laid down by the decision in Porter v McGiII
[2002] 2 AC 357).

In among the representations was extensive evidence proving undeniably that North East Lincolnshire Council
routinely dealt with matters improperly. Consequently it was the council that was solely responsible for the volume
of correspondence which the Commissioner determined it was imposing an unreasonable burden on the authority.

Submissions also included evidence proving beyond all doubt that matters which the Commissioner determined
had been comprehensively addressed by the Council, Local Government Ombudsman, police and the courts was
complete and utter fantasy. The Appellant therefore contends that his allegation of bias is substantiated.

There must be a point at which the finding of fact is so unreasonable as to be irrational and so on that basis the
decision should also be considered challengeable on a point of law.

Note 2: The grounds of appeal of 6 July 2017 are attached to this form.

If you want to say more, please use another sheet of paper

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F Request for an oral hearing of an Application

Has the First-tier Yes
Tribunal given you
permission to appeal?
✔ No
If 'Yes', your case is an appeal. Go straight to Part G on the next page
If 'No', you are applying to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal.
Please continue to complete this Part

Do you or your Yes Please give your reasons why in the box below
representative wish to
have an oral hearing
before the Upper ✔ No
Tribunal at this stage?

Would you like the Yes Please give your reasons why in the box below
hearing to be in
private?
✔ No

      
  
   

5
 Application for permission to Appeal or Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

I apply for permission to appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal
and/or

I appeal againft:'lhe decisiGfi OfUle FIf§fitFef'1 rlbun&1\"'c

(delete as applicable)

~•.,1-8t1tho.[§~~~~Paft:A.~'Ff1Y1rEffialfm~oc-eW~~~==~-
the Upper Tribunal.*
(*delete if you have no representative or you are a solicitor filling in this form on behalf of a client)

Signed

Applicant! Appellant or solicitor

Date [Q]JJJ[QTI]J~

After you have filled in the form please send it to the appropriate office below:

If the First-tier Tribunal hearing was in England:

The Upper Tribunal Office (Administrative Appeals Chamber),
5th floor, 7 Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL

If the First-tierTribunal hearing was in Wales, or you live in Wales you may send the form to the London address
(above) or to:
The Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber),
Cardiff Civil Justice Centre, 2 Park Street, Cardiff, Wales, CF10 1ET

Ifthe First-tierTribunal hearing was in Scotland:

The Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber),
George House, 126 George Street, Edinburgh, EH2 4HH

Ifthe First-tierTribunal hearing was in Northern Ireland:

Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber),
Tribunal Hearing Centre, 2nd Floor, Royal Courts of Justice, Chichester Street, Belfast, BT1 3JF

You should enclose a copy of the following documents with this form (please tick the appropriate boxes)
but do not delay sending in your form if you do not have all of them

1. The decision notice issued by the First-tierTribunal, and [{]

2. if separate, the written reasons for the Tribunal's decision [{]

3. The letter from the First-tier Tribunal telling you that you have been granted or
refused permission to appeal or that your application has not been admitted [{]

The Office will let you know when they have received this form. Contact the office if you are not told within
two weeks that the form has been received.

6
IN THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL APPEAL: EA/2017/0019
GENERAL REGULATORY CHAMBER
(INFORMATION RIGHTS)

BETWEEN:

Appellant
and

THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER

Respondent

APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL TO UPPER TRIBUNAL

(GROUNDS OF APPEAL)

Introduction

1. These grounds of appeal are in accordance with paragraph (5)(b) and (5)(c) of rule
42 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules
2009.

Alleged error of law

2. In the circumstances (i.e. where the public body cites vexatiousness to facilitate a
cover-up in which the police and governing bodies etc. are complicit) it is
considered an oppressive use of the Tribunal to assist them in obstructing the
disclosure of information requested by the Appellant by dismissing the Appeal. It
is therefore in the public interest that the matter is put before the Upper Tribunal
for consideration.
Grounds of Appeal

3. It is contended that the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) provides no

exemptions which would preclude someone requesting information relating to any
specific subject. The majority of the requests in the present case which are deemed
vexatious were made as a consequence of the Council’s (proven) criminal actions
against the Appellant. The subsequent dishonesty of the Council’s fraud
investigation into allegations as well as Humberside police’s claim to have
investigated were other significant factors (both refused to provide any proof that
investigations even took place).

4. The requests were considered vexatious by the council because they related to a
cover-up in which the police, etc., etc., subsequently became complicit. This has
reinforced the Appellant’s already held view that the statutory system of
governing complaints and associated procedures has been devised primarily to
facilitate cover-ups but at the same time presenting a false image to the public that
those suffering injustice at the hands of public bodies are treated fairly with an
avenue where their grievances can be independently adjudicated.

Lack of objectivity

5. It is considered that a biased Tribunal can be raised as a point of law in an

application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The Tribunal’s
decision notice clearly demonstrates that the Appellant’s and the Council’s
submissions were not considered in equal measure.

6. The Tribunal’s decision notice at paragraph 12 focuses on the fact that the
Appellant has been making requests to the Council over a number of years.
Presumably this is to reinforce the argument that the Appellant’s requests are
vexatious, implying he randomly decided in 2011 to embark on a quest to burden
the Council.

7. Representations submitted in the Appellant’s Grounds of Appeal justified why he

had taking to FOI, i.e., the provocation by the Council in its routine denial of any
wrongdoing when the trouble was taken to raise matters through its formal
 complaint procedure. The Tribunal addresses this in paragraph 13, after stating
that the Appellant has remained dissatisfied with a number of steps he has taken to
challenge various issues involving the police, Local Government Ombudsman and
the courts, re:

“This Tribunal is not, as the Appellant concedes, the appropriate venue to

explore whether the Council is processing liability for Council Tax
effectively.”

8. The Tribunal has not been asked to explore this or adjudicate on whether the
Council has been dishonest. However, it has been provided evidence, which the
Judge and Tribunal members have read with care (Exhibit A-1) proving beyond all
doubt that false evidence was submitted to the court which has been covered up
ultimately by the Council applying Section 14 FOIA exemptions.

9. The Tribunal is not required to make formal judgment in respect of the allegations
but it would be judicially unsound (an oppressive use of the judicial system), in
the face of such an obvious cover-up for the Tribunal to obstruct the Appellant in
favour of assisting the Council keep a lid on the unfair and dishonest manner in
which it conducts its business.

10. It is the Appellant’s view that the gross injustice caused him, which may continue
indefinitely because the Council has exploited Section 14, is of significant
importance to outweigh the factors relevant to assessing the burden put upon the
authority. The Tribunal however is not persuaded that this is the case and must
presumably have considered that the Appellant would have had no reasonable
foundation for thinking that the information sought would be of value to him.
Paragraphs 11-15 disagree.

The value or serious purpose of requests / motive of the requester

11. The Appellant is in the unfortunate position to be fighting the injustice of three
cover-ups involving holders of public/judicial office, police etc., who are liable to
imprisonment for misconduct related offences. He therefore has only FOI
legislation available for carrying out investigations which the negligent/criminal
 public bodies should have investigated on his behalf in return for the taxes he
pays.

12. It will be no revelation to the Tribunal that each public body, in response to every
request concerning these matters has exploited Section 14 to avoid disclosing the
information requested. However, despite having all the section 14 complaints
upheld by the Commissioner concerning Humberside police, NELC and the MoJ
on the grounds that they had no serious purpose it is worth noting a Decision
Notice dated 28 June 2017 (FS50622653) regarding Humberside police.

13. Ironically the outcome was useful, despite the Commissioner upholding the
section 14 exemption. It revealed (FS50622653, para 24) that a police officer who
the Appellant had alleged to have inaccurately set out his Witness Statement
relating to his wrongful conviction to include the phrase "you can't make me" was
the same constable involved in a separate incident where it was reported that the
exact phrase was said by another defendant who was subsequently convicted.

14. The possibility therefore is that the use of standard (not necessarily true) phrases
are incorporated into Witness Statements to the detriment of the defendant. The
Appellant has recently succeeded in having the Independent Police Complaints
Commission (IPCC) take over a complaint into this matter which Humberside
police wrongly dealt with by Local Resolution and had delayed its outcome by
taking 510 days to complete. This information is now usefully available for the
IPCC and Criminal Cases Review Commission in support of the Appellant’s
allegations against the police for wrongful arrest, false statements and miscarriage
of justice.

15. Additionally, it is clearly not appropriate that a decision of vexatiousness is made

on the grounds that the intention is to open up issues that have already been dealt
with by the (presumed) correct channels. Neither the Commissioner nor the
Tribunal should be at liberty to restrict an aggrieved person escalating concerns on
this basis.
Misrepresentation in the Tribunal’s Decision

16. Paragraph 14 of the Tribunal’s Decision needs to be clarified because in the re-
wording from the Appellant’s Response it has taken on a whole different meaning.
The relevant content in the Tribunal’s Decision states as follows:

“The Appellant maintains that his requests for information have serious
purpose, and that the consequence of the original error in respect of his
liability for Council Tax is material “in compounding the injustice further
and possibly preventing years of criminal wrongdoing by the Council being
uncovered.”

The corresponding content is from the Appellant’s Response (paragraph 14). Note
the ‘official error’ referred to is a reference to the Commissioner’s erroneous
assessment (in the Appellant’s view) of the requests being vexatious as opposed to
the Council’s error:

“If a request is erroneously labelled vexatious the Commissioner is

responsible for preventing someone from obtaining information that the law
entitles them to access. The consequence of the official error in the present
case is material in compounding the injustice further and possibly preventing
years of criminal wrongdoing by the Council being uncovered. The standard
expected of the Commissioner can not be considered to have been met if a
determination of vexatiousness relies upon on the alleged dismissal by the so
called responsible institutions. If the Commissioner is not prepared to look
into the alleged findings, or has no jurisdiction to question them, then it is
unreasonable that they are exploited in these proceedings to help persuade
the Tribunal that the requests were vexatious.”

6 July 2017