Professional Documents
Culture Documents
LEONIDAS,
Branch 38, Court of First Instance of Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II and
LINDA GRIMM, respondents.
The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved
in an intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its
Branch 38 (after a probate in the Utah district court).
Antecedents. — Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati Medical
Center on November 27, 1977. He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two
children, named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel
Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce (Sub-Annexes A
and B. pp. 36-47, Rollo).
He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his
Philippine estate which he described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second
win disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children of the first marriage
were given their legitimes in the will disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the will dealing
with his property outside this country, the testator said: têñ.£îhqwâ£
I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter, Juanita Grimm Morris, or my daughter,
Elsa Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have provided for each of them in a separate
will disposing of my Philippine property. (First clause, pp. 43-47, Rollo).
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm and E. LaVar Tate on
March 7, 1978 in Probate No. 3720 of the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah. Juanita
Grimm Morris of Cupertino, California and Mrs. Roberts of 15 C. Benitez Street, Horseshoe Village,
Quezon City were notified of the probate proceeding (Sub-Annex C, pp. 48-55, Rollo).
Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January,
1978 (p. 53, Rollo). In its order dated April 10, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to probate
the two wills and the codicil It was issued upon consideration of the stipulation dated April 4, 1978 "by
and between the attorneys for Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm, Edward Miller Grimm II, E. LaVar Tate,
Juanita Kegley Grimm (first wife), Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts" (Annex C, pp. 48-51,
Rollo).
Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete, as the first parties,
and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with
knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah
regarding the estate. It was signed by David E. Salisbury and Donald B. Holbrook, as lawyers of the
parties, by Pete and Linda and the attorney-in-fact of Maxine and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel,
Juanita Grimm Morris and Juanita Kegley Grimm.
In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal
representatives (administrators) of Grimm's Philippine estate (par. 2). It was also stipulated that
Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the estate should be reserved for her and that would not be less
than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila (par. 4). The agreement indicated the
computation of the "net distributable estate". It recognized that the estate was liable to pay the fees of
the Angara law firm (par. 5).
It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall share equally in the Net
Distributable Estate" and that Ethel and Juanita Morris should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total
of the net distributable estate and marital share. A supplemental memorandum also dated April 25,
1978 was executed by the parties (Sub-Annex F, pp. 49-61, Annex, F-1, pp. 75-76, Testate case).
Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it should be stated that forty- three days after
Grimm's death, or January 9, 1978, his daughter of the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers
Deogracias T. Reyes and. Gerardo B. Macaraeg, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance
intestate proceeding No. 113024 for the settlement of his estate. She was named special administratrix.
On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara law office, filed an opposition and motion to
dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate
of Grimm's will. She also moved that she be appointed special administratrix, She submitted to the court
a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine estate. It is found in pages 58 to 64 of the record.
The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine, through a new lawyer, William
C. Limqueco (partner of Gerardo B. Macaraeg, p. 78, testate case withdrew that opposition and motion
to dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint administrators.
Apparently, this was done pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromise agreement. The court
ignored the will already found in the record.
The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and approval of the court, they
sold for P75,000 on March 21, 1979 the so-called Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned by the
deceased. Linda and Juanita allegedly conformed with the sale (pp. 120-129, Record). It turned out that
the buyer, Makiling Management Co., Inc., was incorporated by Ethel and her husband, Rex Roberts,
and by lawyer Limqueco (Annex L, p. 90, testate case).
Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and Juanita, they sold for P1,546,136 to Joseph
Server and others 193,267 shares of RFM Corporation (p. 135, Record).
Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by lawyers Limqueco and
Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in his order of July 27,
1979 adjudicated to Maxine onehalf (4/8) of the decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth (1/8) each
to his four children or 12-1/2% (pp. 140-142, Record). No mention at all was made of the will in that
order.
Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as
their lawyer who on August 9, moved to defer approval of the project of partition. The court considered
the motion moot considering that it had already approved the declaration of heirs and project of
partition (p. 149, Record).
Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979 alleged that he was no longer connected
with Makiling Management Co., Inc. when the Palawan Pearl Project was sold: that it was Maxine's son
Pete who negotiated the sale with Rex Roberts and that he (Limqueco) was going to sue Maxine for the
lies she imputed to him (Annex H, p. 78, testate case).
Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue dated
October 2, 1979. It was stated therein that Maxine paid P1,992,233.69 as estate tax and penalties and
that he interposed no objection to the transfer of the estate to Grimm's heirs (p. 153, Record). The court
noted the certification as in conformity with its order of July 27, 1979.
After November, 1979 or for a period of more than five months, there was no movement or activity in
the intestate case. On April 18, 1980 Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion for
accounting "so that the Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the present intestate
estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer was notified of that motion.
Before that motion could be heard, or on June 10, 1980, the Angara law firm filed again its appearance
in collaboration with Del Callar as counsel for Maxine and her two children, Linda and Pete. It should be
recalled that the firm had previously appeared in the case as Maxine's counsel on March 11, 1978, when
it filed a motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding and furnished the court with a copy of Grimm's will.
As already noted, the firm was then superseded by lawyer Limqueco.
Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. — On September 8, 1980, Rogelio A.
Vinluan of the Angara law firm in behalf of Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court
a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979
partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that
Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the
properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine (pp. 25-35, Rollo).
Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to the machinations of the
Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is
void because Grimm died testate and that the partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit in his order of
October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the
testate proceeding be dismissed, or. alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard in
Branch 20 and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to
the petition for probate (pp. 22-23, Rollo).
Ruling. — We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass
either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75,
Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs.
Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate
should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with
the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the
two cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and answer
to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose.
Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices
and other papers in the testate case.
WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is dissolved. No costs.
DIZON, J.:
On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition for certiorari — docketed as G.R.
L-21938 — against the respondents Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts of First
Instance of Negros Occidental and of Manila, Branch IV, who will be referred to hereinafter as the
Negros Court and the Manila Court, respectively — praying:
... that after due proceedings judgment be rendered annulling the orders of 19 April 1963 (Annex 'H')
and 11 July 1963 (Annex 'I') of respondent Negros court dismissing the first instituted Special Proceeding
No. 6344, supra, and the order of 1 July 1963 (Annex 'K') of respondent Manila court denying
petitioner's omnibus motion to intervene and to dismiss the later-instituted Special Proceeding No.
51396, supra, both special proceedings pertaining to the settlement of the same estate of the same
deceased, and consequently annulling all proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396; supra, of the
respondent Manila court as all taken without jurisdiction.
For the preservation of the rights of the parties pending these proceedings, petitioner prays for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents Manila court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona
and Higinio Uriarte from proceeding with Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, until further orders of
this Court.
Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as follows:
6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and failing to
declare itself 'the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of' the deceased Don Juan
Uriarte y Goite as prescribed in Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Manila court erred
in failing to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, notwithstanding proof of prior filing of
Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, in the Negros court.
The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was granted and issued by this Court on October 24, 1963.
On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same respondents a pleading entitled SUPPLEMENTAL
PETITION FOR MANDAMUS — docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-21939 — praying, for the reasons
therein stated, that judgment be rendered annulling the orders issued by the Negros Court on
December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first disapproving his record on appeal and the second
denying his motion for reconsideration, and further commanding said court to approve his record on
appeal and to give due course to his appeal. On July 15, 1964 We issued a resolution deferring action on
this Supplemental Petition until the original action for certiorari (G.R. L-21938) is taken up on the merits.
On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938 filed their answer traversing petitioner's
contention that the respondent courts had committed grave abuse of discretion in relation to the
matters alleged in the petition for certiorari.
It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for the settlement
of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein, inter
alia, that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said
decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for his compulsory
acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon petitioner's motion the Negros Court appointed the
Philippine National Bank as special administrator on November 13, 1961 and two days later it set the
date for the hearing of the petition and ordered that the requisite notices be published in accordance
with law. The record discloses, however, that, for one reason or another, the Philippine, National Bank
never actually qualified as special administrator.
On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents herein, filed an opposition
to the above-mentioned petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite
who had "executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy whereof has been
requested and which shall be submitted to this Honorable Court upon receipt thereof," and further
questioning petitioner's capacity and interest to commence the intestate proceeding.
On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced Special
Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of
the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the
Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan
Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings,
and (2) that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate
proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. A copy of the Petition for
Probate and of the alleged Will were attached to the Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court was first to
take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed
the Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. His motion for reconsideration of said order having
been denied on July 27, 1963, petitioner proceeded to file his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record
on appeal for the purpose of appealing from said orders to this court on questions of law. The
administrator with the will annexed appointed by the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396
objected to the approval of the record on appeal, and under date of December 7, 1963 the Negros Court
issued the following order:
Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by the petitioner on July 27, 1963, be dismissed for
having been filed out of time and for being incomplete. In the meantime, before the said record on
appeal was approved by this Court, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme
Court entitled Vicente Uriarte, Petitioner, vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, et al., G.R. No.
L-21938, bringing this case squarely before the Supreme Court on questions of law which is tantamount
to petitioner's abandoning his appeal from this Court.
WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the certiorari, the record on appeal filed by the petitioner is hereby
disapproved.
In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the supplemental petition for mandamus mentioned
heretofore.
On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396 pending in
the Manila Court, asking for leave to intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the
annulment of the proceedings had in said special proceeding. This motion was denied by said court in its
order of July 1 of the same year.
It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros
Court, Vicente Uriarte filed in the same court, during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite, Civil Case No.
6142 to obtain judgment for his compulsory acknowledgment as his natural child. Clearly inferrable from
this is that at the time he filed the action, as well as when he commenced the aforesaid special
proceeding, he had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte y Goite. Up to this time,
no final judgment to that effect appears to have been rendered.
The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros Court has not gone farther
than the appointment of a special administrator in the person of the Philippine National Bank who, as
stated heretofore, failed to qualify.
On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings were had in Special Proceeding No.
51396, the Manila Court admitted to probate the document submitted to, it as the last will of Juan
Uriarte y Goite, the petition for probate appearing not to have been contested. It appears further that,
as stated heretofore, the order issued by the Manila Court on July 1, 1963 denied petitioner. Vicente
Uriarte's Omnibus Motion for Intervention, Dismissal of Petition and Annulment of said proceedings.
Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special proceeding pending before the Negros
Court filed by Higinio Uriarte were attached a copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite and of
the petition filed with the Manila Court for its probate. It is clear, therefore, that almost from the start
of Special Proceeding No. 6344, the Negros Court and petitioner Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence
of the aforesaid last will and of the proceedings for its probate.
The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are (a) whether or not the Negros Court
erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6644, on the one hand, and on the other, (b) whether the
Manila Court similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding proof of
the prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance have original
exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of deceased persons — whether they died testate or intestate. While their jurisdiction over
such subject matter is beyond question, the matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance
where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a
decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in
the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate.
Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a non-resident alien — like the deceased Juan
Uriarte y Goite — the Courts of First Instance in provinces where the deceased left any property have
concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for the settlement of his
estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of First Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts —
province and city where the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable properties. From this
premise petitioner argues that, as the Negros Court had first taken cognizance of the special proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of said decedent (Special Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no
longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Special Proceeding No. 51396 intended to settle the estate
of the same decedent in accordance with his alleged will, and that consequently, the first court erred in
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, while the second court similarly erred in not dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 51396.
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a
deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his
will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however,
that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement
of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of
first instance it is found it hat the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter
should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been
appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to
the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should
the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As
already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority
over intestate proceedings.
Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have filed the
petition for the probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court — particularly in
Special Proceeding No. 6344 — or was entitled to commence the corresponding separate proceedings,
as he did, in the Manila Court.
The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to support the view that he should
have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an
appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344. In the
first place, it is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice
to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be involved. This, in effect, was the
result of the submission of the will aforesaid to the Manila Court. In the second place, when respondent
Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente Uriarte's petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, he had already informed the Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had
left a will in Spain, of which a copy had been requested for submission to said court; and when the other
respondent, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had
submitted to the Negros Court a copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may be
inferred that, like Higinio Uriarte, he knew before filing the petition for probate with the Manila Court
that there was already a special proceeding pending in the Negros Court for the settlement of the estate
of the same deceased person. As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it seems quite clear that in his
opposition to petitioner's petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had expressly promised to submit
said will for probate to the Negros Court.
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan
Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept
petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition,
albeit we say that it was not the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the
light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that
petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is
enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan
Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition
filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence
(presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with
the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of
Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with
the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and
for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the
Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said will to
probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to
assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all
the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence.
Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a
lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the
same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present
where the objection against said proceedings is raised too late.
In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, Judge Fernandez of the Negros
Court said that he was "not inclined to sustain the contention of the petitioner that inasmuch as the
herein petitioner has instituted Civil Case No. 6142 for compulsory acknowledgment by the decedent
such action justifies the institution by him of this proceedings. If the petitioner is to be consistent with
the authorities cited by him in support of his contention, the proper thing for him to do would be to
intervene in the testate estate proceedings entitled Special Proceedings No. 51396 in the Court of First
Instance of Manila instead of maintaining an independent action, for indeed his supposed interest in the
estate of the decedent is of his doubtful character pending the final decision of the action for
compulsory acknowledgment."
We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No.
6142 until it is finally determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it
is still open, or to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to submit for
determination the question of his acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased testator, said court
having, in its capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased
testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged natural child (II
Moran on Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., p. 476; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil.
343; Lopez vs. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on vs. Belmonte, 47 O. G. 1119).
Coming now to the supplemental petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L-21939), We are of the opinion, and
so hold, that in view of the conclusions heretofore stated, the same has become moot and academic. If
the said supplemental petition is successful, it will only result in compelling the Negros Court to give due
course to the appeal that petitioner was taking from the orders of said court dated December 7, 1963
and February 26, 1964, the first being the order of said court dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344,
and the second being an order denying petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of said order of
dismissal. Said orders being, as a result of what has been said heretofore beyond petitioner's power to
contest, the conclusion can not be other than that the intended appeal would serve no useful purpose,
or, worse still, would enable petitioner to circumvent our ruling that he can no longer question the
validity of said orders.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered denying the writs prayed
for and, as a result, the petition for certiorari filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the supplemental
petition for mandamus docketed as G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby dismissed. The writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued is set aside. With costs against petitioner.